windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline.yml

name: Windows Process With NamedPipe CommandLine
id: e64399d4-94a8-11ec-a9da-acde48001122
version: 1
date: '2022-02-23'
author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
status: production
type: Anomaly
description: This analytic is to look for process commandline that contains named
  pipe. This technique was seen in some adversaries, threat actor and malware like
  olympic destroyer to communicate to its other child processes after process injection
  that serve as defense evasion and privilege escalation. On the other hand this analytic
  may catch some normal process that using this technique for example browser application.
  In that scenario we include common process path we've seen during testing that cause
  false positive which is the program files. False positive may still be arise if
  the normal application is in other folder path.
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
  as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process = "*\\\\.\\pipe\\*"
  NOT (Processes.process_path IN ("*\\program files*")) by Processes.parent_process_name
  Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name
  Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_path Processes.process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
  Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
  | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_process_with_namedpipe_commandline_filter`'
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
  and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
  telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
  you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
  Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must
  be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to
  the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint`
  data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
  names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: Normal browser application may use this technique. Please update
  the filter macros to remove false positives.
references:
- https://blog.talosintelligence.com/2018/02/olympic-destroyer.html
tags:
  analytic_story:
  - Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
  asset_type: Endpoint
  confidence: 70
  impact: 70
  message: Process with named pipe in $process$ on $dest$
  mitre_attack_id:
  - T1055
  observable:
  - name: dest
    type: Endpoint
    role:
    - Victim
  product:
  - Splunk Enterprise
  - Splunk Enterprise Security
  - Splunk Cloud
  required_fields:
  - _time
  - Processes.dest
  - Processes.user
  - Processes.parent_process_name
  - Processes.parent_process
  - Processes.original_file_name
  - Processes.process_name
  - Processes.process
  - Processes.process_id
  - Processes.parent_process_path
  - Processes.process_path
  - Processes.parent_process_id
  - Processes.process_guid
  risk_score: 49
  security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
  attack_data:
  - data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/malware/olympic_destroyer/sysmon.log
    source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
    sourcetype: xmlwineventlog