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windows_service_create_with_tscon.yml
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windows_service_create_with_tscon.yml
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name: Windows Service Create with Tscon
id: c13b3d74-6b63-4db5-a841-4206f0370077
version: 1
date: '2023-03-29'
author: Michael Haag, Splunk
type: TTP
status: production
data_source:
- Sysmon EventID 1
description: The following analytic detects potential RDP Hijacking attempts by monitoring
a series of actions taken by an attacker to gain unauthorized access to a remote
system. The attacker first runs the quser command to query the remote host for disconnected
user sessions. Upon identifying a disconnected session, they use the sc.exe command
to create a new Windows service with a binary path that launches tscon.exe. By specifying
the disconnected session ID and a destination ID, the attacker can transfer the
disconnected session to a new RDP session, effectively hijacking the user's session.
This analytic allows security teams to detect and respond to RDP Hijacking attempts,
mitigating potential risks and impacts on targeted systems.
search: '| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time)
as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=sc.exe
Processes.process="*/dest:rdp-tcp*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name
Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_service_create_with_tscon_filter`'
how_to_implement: The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection
and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related
telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search,
you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process.
Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must
be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to
the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the `Processes` node of the `Endpoint`
data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field
names and speed up the data modeling process.
known_false_positives: False positives may arise in the RDP Hijacking analytic when
legitimate administrators access remote sessions for maintenance or troubleshooting
purposes. These activities might resemble an attacker''s attempt to hijack a disconnected
session, leading to false alarms. To mitigate the risk of false positives and improve
the overall security posture, organizations can implement Group Policy to automatically
disconnect RDP sessions when they are complete. By enforcing this policy, administrators
ensure that disconnected sessions are promptly terminated, reducing the window of
opportunity for an attacker to hijack a session. Additionally, organizations can
also implement access control mechanisms and monitor the behavior of privileged
accounts to further enhance security and reduce the chances of false positives in
RDP Hijacking detection.
references:
- https://doublepulsar.com/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1563.002/T1563.002.md
tags:
analytic_story:
- Active Directory Lateral Movement
asset_type: Endpoint
confidence: 80
impact: 80
message: An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified
on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to hijack a RDP session.
mitre_attack_id:
- T1563.002
- T1563
- T1543.003
observable:
- name: user
type: User
role:
- Victim
- name: dest
type: Hostname
role:
- Victim
- name: parent_process_name
type: Process
role:
- Parent Process
- name: process_name
type: Process
role:
- Child Process
product:
- Splunk Enterprise
- Splunk Enterprise Security
- Splunk Cloud
required_fields:
- _time
- Processes.dest
- Processes.user
- Processes.parent_process_name
- Processes.parent_process
- Processes.original_file_name
- Processes.process_name
- Processes.process
- Processes.process_id
- Processes.parent_process_path
- Processes.process_path
- Processes.parent_process_id
risk_score: 64
security_domain: endpoint
tests:
- name: True Positive Test
attack_data:
- data: https://media.githubusercontent.com/media/splunk/attack_data/master/datasets/attack_techniques/T1563.002/rdphijack/tscon_windows-sysmon.log
source: XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational
sourcetype: xmlwineventlog