test_endless_data_attack.py

#!/usr/bin/env python

# Copyright 2012 - 2017, New York University and the TUF contributors
# SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT OR Apache-2.0

"""
<Program Name>
  test_endless_data_attack.py

<Author>
  Konstantin Andrianov.

<Started>
  March 13, 2012.

  April 3, 2014.
    Refactored to use the 'unittest' module (test conditions in code, rather
    than verifying text output), use pre-generated repository files, and
    discontinue use of the old repository tools. Minor edits to the test cases.
    -vladimir.v.diaz

<Copyright>
  See LICENSE-MIT OR LICENSE for licensing information.

<Purpose>
  Simulate an endless data attack, where an updater client tries to download a
  target file modified by an attacker to contain a large amount of data (a TUF
  client should only download up to the file's expected length).  TUF and
  non-TUF client scenarios are tested.

  There is no difference between 'updates' and 'target' files.
"""

# Help with Python 3 compatibility, where the print statement is a function, an
# implicit relative import is invalid, and the '/' operator performs true
# division.  Example:  print 'hello world' raises a 'SyntaxError' exception.
from __future__ import print_function
from __future__ import absolute_import
from __future__ import division
from __future__ import unicode_literals

import os
import tempfile
import shutil
import json
import logging
import unittest
import sys

import tuf
import tuf.formats
import tuf.log
import tuf.client.updater as updater
import tuf.unittest_toolbox as unittest_toolbox
import tuf.roledb

from tests import utils

import securesystemslib
import six

logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)


class TestEndlessDataAttack(unittest_toolbox.Modified_TestCase):

  @classmethod
  def setUpClass(cls):
    # Create a temporary directory to store the repository, metadata, and target
    # files.  'temporary_directory' must be deleted in TearDownModule() so that
    # temporary files are always removed, even when exceptions occur.
    cls.temporary_directory = tempfile.mkdtemp(dir=os.getcwd())

    # Launch a SimpleHTTPServer (serves files in the current directory).
    # Test cases will request metadata and target files that have been
    # pre-generated in 'tuf/tests/repository_data', which will be served by the
    # SimpleHTTPServer launched here.  The test cases of this unit test assume
    # the pre-generated metadata files have a specific structure, such
    # as a delegated role 'targets/role1', three target files, five key files,
    # etc.
    cls.server_process_handler = utils.TestServerProcess(log=logger)



  @classmethod
  def tearDownClass(cls):
    # Cleans the resources and flush the logged lines (if any).
    cls.server_process_handler.clean()

    # Remove the temporary repository directory, which should contain all the
    # metadata, targets, and key files generated of all the test cases.
    shutil.rmtree(cls.temporary_directory)




  def setUp(self):
    # We are inheriting from custom class.
    unittest_toolbox.Modified_TestCase.setUp(self)

    self.repository_name = 'test_repository1'

    # Copy the original repository files provided in the test folder so that
    # any modifications made to repository files are restricted to the copies.
    # The 'repository_data' directory is expected to exist in 'tuf/tests/'.
    original_repository_files = os.path.join(os.getcwd(), 'repository_data')
    temporary_repository_root = \
      self.make_temp_directory(directory=self.temporary_directory)

    # The original repository, keystore, and client directories will be copied
    # for each test case.
    original_repository = os.path.join(original_repository_files, 'repository')
    original_client = os.path.join(original_repository_files, 'client')

    # Save references to the often-needed client repository directories.
    # Test cases need these references to access metadata and target files.
    self.repository_directory = \
      os.path.join(temporary_repository_root, 'repository')
    self.client_directory = os.path.join(temporary_repository_root, 'client')

    # Copy the original 'repository', 'client', and 'keystore' directories
    # to the temporary repository the test cases can use.
    shutil.copytree(original_repository, self.repository_directory)
    shutil.copytree(original_client, self.client_directory)

    # Set the url prefix required by the 'tuf/client/updater.py' updater.
    # 'path/to/tmp/repository' -> 'localhost:8001/tmp/repository'.
    repository_basepath = self.repository_directory[len(os.getcwd()):]
    url_prefix = 'http://localhost:' \
        + str(self.server_process_handler.port) + repository_basepath

    # Setting 'tuf.settings.repository_directory' with the temporary client
    # directory copied from the original repository files.
    tuf.settings.repositories_directory = self.client_directory
    self.repository_mirrors = {'mirror1': {'url_prefix': url_prefix,
                                           'metadata_path': 'metadata',
                                           'targets_path': 'targets'}}

    # Create the repository instance.  The test cases will use this client
    # updater to refresh metadata, fetch target files, etc.
    self.repository_updater = updater.Updater(self.repository_name,
                                              self.repository_mirrors)


  def tearDown(self):
    # Modified_TestCase.tearDown() automatically deletes temporary files and
    # directories that may have been created during each test case.
    unittest_toolbox.Modified_TestCase.tearDown(self)
    tuf.roledb.clear_roledb(clear_all=True)
    tuf.keydb.clear_keydb(clear_all=True)

    # Logs stdout and stderr from the sever subprocess.
    self.server_process_handler.flush_log()



  def test_without_tuf(self):
    # Verify that a target file replaced with a larger malicious version (to
    # simulate an endless data attack) is downloaded by a non-TUF client (i.e.,
    # a non-TUF client that does not verify hashes, detect mix-and-mix attacks,
    # etc.)  A tuf client, on the other hand, should only download target files
    # up to their expected lengths, as explicitly specified in metadata, or
    # 'tuf.settings.py' (when retrieving 'timestamp.json' and 'root.json unsafely'.)

    # Test: Download a valid target file from the repository.
    # Ensure the target file to be downloaded has not already been downloaded,
    # and generate its file size and digest.  The file size and digest is needed
    # to verify that the malicious file was indeed downloaded.
    target_path = os.path.join(self.repository_directory, 'targets', 'file1.txt')
    client_target_path = os.path.join(self.client_directory, 'file1.txt')
    self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(client_target_path))
    length, hashes = securesystemslib.util.get_file_details(target_path)
    fileinfo = tuf.formats.make_targets_fileinfo(length, hashes)

    url_prefix = self.repository_mirrors['mirror1']['url_prefix']
    url_file = os.path.join(url_prefix, 'targets', 'file1.txt')

    # On Windows, the URL portion should not contain backslashes.
    six.moves.urllib.request.urlretrieve(url_file.replace('\\', '/'), client_target_path)

    self.assertTrue(os.path.exists(client_target_path))
    length, hashes = securesystemslib.util.get_file_details(client_target_path)
    download_fileinfo = tuf.formats.make_targets_fileinfo(length, hashes)
    self.assertEqual(fileinfo, download_fileinfo)

    # Test: Download a target file that has been modified by an attacker with
    # extra data.
    with open(target_path, 'a') as file_object:
      file_object.write('append large amount of data' * 100000)
    large_length, hashes = securesystemslib.util.get_file_details(target_path)
    malicious_fileinfo = tuf.formats.make_targets_fileinfo(large_length, hashes)

    # Is the modified file actually larger?
    self.assertTrue(large_length > length)

    # On Windows, the URL portion should not contain backslashes.
    six.moves.urllib.request.urlretrieve(url_file.replace('\\', '/'), client_target_path)

    length, hashes = securesystemslib.util.get_file_details(client_target_path)
    download_fileinfo = tuf.formats.make_targets_fileinfo(length, hashes)

    # Verify 'download_fileinfo' is unequal to the original trusted version.
    self.assertNotEqual(download_fileinfo, fileinfo)

    # Verify 'download_fileinfo' is equal to the malicious version.
    self.assertEqual(download_fileinfo, malicious_fileinfo)



  def test_with_tuf(self):
    # Verify that a target file (on the remote repository) modified by an
    # attacker, to contain a large amount of extra data, is not downloaded by
    # the TUF client.  First test that the valid target file is successfully
    # downloaded.
    file1_fileinfo = self.repository_updater.get_one_valid_targetinfo('file1.txt')
    destination = os.path.join(self.client_directory)
    self.repository_updater.download_target(file1_fileinfo, destination)
    client_target_path = os.path.join(destination, 'file1.txt')
    self.assertTrue(os.path.exists(client_target_path))

    # Verify the client's downloaded file matches the repository's.
    target_path = os.path.join(self.repository_directory, 'targets', 'file1.txt')
    length, hashes = securesystemslib.util.get_file_details(client_target_path)
    fileinfo = tuf.formats.make_targets_fileinfo(length, hashes)

    length, hashes = securesystemslib.util.get_file_details(client_target_path)
    download_fileinfo = tuf.formats.make_targets_fileinfo(length, hashes)
    self.assertEqual(fileinfo, download_fileinfo)

    # Modify 'file1.txt' and confirm that the TUF client only downloads up to
    # the expected file length.
    with open(target_path, 'a') as file_object:
      file_object.write('append large amount of data' * 10000)

    # Is the modified file actually larger?
    large_length, hashes = securesystemslib.util.get_file_details(target_path)
    self.assertTrue(large_length > length)

    os.remove(client_target_path)
    self.repository_updater.download_target(file1_fileinfo, destination)

    # A large amount of data has been appended to the original content.  The
    # extra data appended should be discarded by the client, so the downloaded
    # file size and hash should not have changed.
    length, hashes = securesystemslib.util.get_file_details(client_target_path)
    download_fileinfo = tuf.formats.make_targets_fileinfo(length, hashes)
    self.assertEqual(fileinfo, download_fileinfo)

    # Test that the TUF client does not download large metadata files, as well.
    timestamp_path = os.path.join(self.repository_directory, 'metadata',
                                  'timestamp.json')

    original_length, hashes = securesystemslib.util.get_file_details(timestamp_path)

    with open(timestamp_path, 'r+') as file_object:
      timestamp_content = securesystemslib.util.load_json_file(timestamp_path)
      large_data = 'LargeTimestamp' * 10000
      timestamp_content['signed']['_type'] = large_data
      json.dump(timestamp_content, file_object, indent=1, sort_keys=True)


    modified_length, hashes = securesystemslib.util.get_file_details(timestamp_path)
    self.assertTrue(modified_length > original_length)

    # Does the TUF client download the upper limit of an unsafely fetched
    # 'timestamp.json'?  'timestamp.json' must not be greater than
    # 'tuf.settings.DEFAULT_TIMESTAMP_REQUIRED_LENGTH'.
    try:
      self.repository_updater.refresh()

    except tuf.exceptions.NoWorkingMirrorError as exception:
      for mirror_url, mirror_error in six.iteritems(exception.mirror_errors):
        self.assertTrue(isinstance(mirror_error, securesystemslib.exceptions.Error))

    else:
      self.fail('TUF did not prevent an endless data attack.')


if __name__ == '__main__':
  utils.configure_test_logging(sys.argv)
  unittest.main()