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socks-extensions.txt
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socks-extensions.txt
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Tor's extensions to the SOCKS protocol
Table of Contents
1. Overview
1.1. Extent of support
2. Name lookup
3. Other command extensions.
4. HTTP-resistance
5. Optimistic data
1. Overview
The SOCKS protocol provides a generic interface for TCP proxies. Client
software connects to a SOCKS server via TCP, and requests a TCP connection
to another address and port. The SOCKS server establishes the connection,
and reports success or failure to the client. After the connection has
been established, the client application uses the TCP stream as usual.
Tor supports SOCKS4 as defined in [1], SOCKS4A as defined in [2], and
SOCKS5 as defined in [3] and [4].
The stickiest issue for Tor in supporting clients, in practice, is forcing
DNS lookups to occur at the OR side: if clients do their own DNS lookup,
the DNS server can learn which addresses the client wants to reach.
SOCKS4 supports addressing by IPv4 address; SOCKS4A is a kludge on top of
SOCKS4 to allow addressing by hostname; SOCKS5 supports IPv4, IPv6, and
hostnames.
1.1. Extent of support
Tor supports the SOCKS4, SOCKS4A, and SOCKS5 standards, except as follows:
BOTH:
- The BIND command is not supported.
SOCKS4,4A:
- SOCKS4 usernames are used to implement stream isolation.
SOCKS5:
- The (SOCKS5) "UDP ASSOCIATE" command is not supported.
- SOCKS5 BIND command is not supported.
- IPv6 is not supported in CONNECT commands.
- SOCKS5 GSSAPI subnegotiation is not supported.
- The "NO AUTHENTICATION REQUIRED" (SOCKS5) authentication method [00] is
supported; and as of Tor 0.2.3.2-alpha, the "USERNAME/PASSWORD" (SOCKS5)
authentication method [02] is supported too, and used as a method to
implement stream isolation. As an extension to support some broken clients,
we allow clients to pass "USERNAME/PASSWORD" authentication message to us
even if no authentication was selected. Furthermore, we allow
username/password fields of this message to be empty. This technically
violates RFC1929 [4], but ensures interoperability with somewhat broken
SOCKS5 client implementations.
- Custom reply error code. The "REP" fields, as per the RFC[3], has
unassigned values which are used to describe Tor internal errors. See
ExtendedErrors in the tor.1 man page for more details. It is only sent
back if this SocksPort flag is set.
(For more information on stream isolation, see IsolateSOCKSAuth on the Tor
manpage.)
2. Name lookup
As an extension to SOCKS4A and SOCKS5, Tor implements a new command value,
"RESOLVE" [F0]. When Tor receives a "RESOLVE" SOCKS command, it initiates
a remote lookup of the hostname provided as the target address in the SOCKS
request. The reply is either an error (if the address couldn't be
resolved) or a success response. In the case of success, the address is
stored in the portion of the SOCKS response reserved for remote IP address.
(We support RESOLVE in SOCKS4 too, even though it is unnecessary.)
For SOCKS5 only, we support reverse resolution with a new command value,
"RESOLVE_PTR" [F1]. In response to a "RESOLVE_PTR" SOCKS5 command with
an IPv4 address as its target, Tor attempts to find the canonical
hostname for that IPv4 record, and returns it in the "server bound
address" portion of the reply.
(This command was not supported before Tor 0.1.2.2-alpha.)
3. Other command extensions.
Tor 0.1.2.4-alpha added a new command value: "CONNECT_DIR" [F2].
In this case, Tor will open an encrypted direct TCP connection to the
directory port of the Tor server specified by address:port (the port
specified should be the ORPort of the server). It uses a one-hop tunnel
and a "BEGIN_DIR" relay cell to accomplish this secure connection.
The F2 command value was removed in Tor 0.2.0.10-alpha in favor of a
new use_begindir flag in edge_connection_t.
4. HTTP-resistance
Tor checks the first byte of each SOCKS request to see whether it looks
more like an HTTP request (that is, it starts with a "G", "H", or "P"). If
so, Tor returns a small webpage, telling the user that his/her browser is
misconfigured. This is helpful for the many users who mistakenly try to
use Tor as an HTTP proxy instead of a SOCKS proxy.
5. Optimistic data
Tor allows SOCKS clients to send connection data before Tor has sent a
SOCKS response. When using an exit node that supports "optimistic data",
Tor will send such data to the server without waiting to see whether the
connection attempt succeeds. This behavior can save a single round-trip
time when starting connections with a protocol where the client speaks
first (like HTTP). Clients that do this must be ready to hear that
their connection has succeeded or failed _after_ they have sent the
data.
References:
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SOCKS#SOCKS4
[2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SOCKS#SOCKS4a
[3] SOCKS5: RFC 1928 https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1928.txt
[4] RFC 1929: https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1929.txt