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0002-UBUNTU-SAUCE-no-up-apparmor-Sync-to-apparmor3-RC1-sn.patch
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0002-UBUNTU-SAUCE-no-up-apparmor-Sync-to-apparmor3-RC1-sn.patch
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From ba9ec6a8686c99f38285e19f356c7667a10f40c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Jun 2015 03:43:23 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 02/10] UBUNTU: SAUCE: (no-up) apparmor: Sync to apparmor3 -
RC1 snapshot
This is a sync and squash to the apparmor 3 RC 1 development snapshot.
The set of patches in this squash are available at the apparmor-3.RC1
tag in git://kernel.ubuntu.com/jj/ubuntu-utopic.git.
This cleans up several functions over the alpha6 sync, and includes
multiple bug fixes. In addition it picks up
- new network mediation
- fine grained mediation of all unix socket types
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1362199
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: BirdZhang <0312birdzhang@gmail.com>
---
security/apparmor/Kconfig | 35 +
security/apparmor/Makefile | 43 +-
security/apparmor/af_unix.c | 632 ++++++++
security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | 319 +++-
security/apparmor/audit.c | 75 +-
security/apparmor/capability.c | 52 +-
security/apparmor/context.c | 88 +-
security/apparmor/domain.c | 165 ++-
security/apparmor/file.c | 555 +++++--
security/apparmor/include/af_unix.h | 121 ++
security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h | 60 +-
security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h | 2 +
security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 72 +-
security/apparmor/include/capability.h | 6 +-
security/apparmor/include/context.h | 178 ++-
security/apparmor/include/domain.h | 2 +
security/apparmor/include/file.h | 92 +-
security/apparmor/include/ipc.h | 22 +-
security/apparmor/include/label.h | 419 ++++++
security/apparmor/include/match.h | 15 +
security/apparmor/include/mount.h | 54 +
security/apparmor/include/net.h | 110 ++
security/apparmor/include/path.h | 63 +-
security/apparmor/include/perms.h | 174 +++
security/apparmor/include/policy.h | 173 +--
security/apparmor/include/procattr.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/include/resource.h | 4 +-
security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h | 95 ++
security/apparmor/ipc.c | 235 ++-
security/apparmor/label.c | 1844 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/apparmor/lib.c | 434 +++++-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 815 +++++++++--
security/apparmor/mount.c | 703 +++++++++
security/apparmor/net.c | 397 +++++
security/apparmor/path.c | 175 +--
security/apparmor/policy.c | 409 ++++--
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c | 125 +-
security/apparmor/procattr.c | 60 +-
security/apparmor/resource.c | 112 +-
39 files changed, 7823 insertions(+), 1114 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/apparmor/af_unix.c
create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/af_unix.h
create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/label.h
create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/mount.h
create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/net.h
create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/perms.h
create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h
create mode 100644 security/apparmor/label.c
create mode 100644 security/apparmor/mount.c
create mode 100644 security/apparmor/net.c
diff --git a/security/apparmor/Kconfig b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
index d49c5396..a738fee2 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/Kconfig
+++ b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
@@ -30,6 +30,41 @@ config SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 1.
+config SECURITY_APPARMOR_STATS
+ bool "enable debug statistics"
+ depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR
+ select APPARMOR_LABEL_STATS
+ default n
+ help
+ This enables keeping statistics on various internal structures
+ and functions in apparmor.
+
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_APPARMOR_UNCONFINED_INIT
+ bool "Set init to unconfined on boot"
+ depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR
+ default y
+ help
+ This option determines policy behavior during early boot by
+ placing the init process in the unconfined state, or the
+ 'default' profile.
+
+ This option determines policy behavior during early boot by
+ placing the init process in the unconfined state, or the
+ 'default' profile.
+
+ 'Y' means init and its children are not confined, unless the
+ init process is re-execed after a policy load; loaded policy
+ will only apply to processes started after the load.
+
+ 'N' means init and its children are confined in a profile
+ named 'default', which can be replaced later and thus
+ provide for confinement for processes started early at boot,
+ though not confined during early boot.
+
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer Y.
+
config SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
bool "SHA1 hash of loaded profiles"
depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR
diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
index d693df87..69ce26e2 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
+++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
@@ -4,11 +4,44 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
- resource.o sid.o file.o
+ resource.o sid.o file.o label.o mount.o net.o af_unix.o
apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH) += crypto.o
-clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h
+clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h
+# Build a lower case string table of address family names
+# Transform lines from
+# define AF_LOCAL 1 /* POSIX name for AF_UNIX */
+# #define AF_INET 2 /* Internet IP Protocol */
+# to
+# [1] = "local",
+# [2] = "inet",
+#
+# and build the securityfs entries for the mapping.
+# Transforms lines from
+# #define AF_INET 2 /* Internet IP Protocol */
+# to
+# #define AA_FS_AF_MASK "local inet"
+quiet_cmd_make-af = GEN $@
+cmd_make-af = echo "static const char *address_family_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
+ sed $< >>$@ -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e "/AF_ROUTE/d" -e \
+ 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
+ echo "};" >> $@ ;\
+ echo -n '\#define AA_FS_AF_MASK "' >> $@ ;\
+ sed -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e "/AF_ROUTE/d" -e \
+ 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/\L\1/p'\
+ $< | tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
+
+# Build a lower case string table of sock type names
+# Transform lines from
+# SOCK_STREAM = 1,
+# to
+# [1] = "stream",
+quiet_cmd_make-sock = GEN $@
+cmd_make-sock = echo "static const char *sock_type_names[] = {" >> $@ ;\
+ sed $^ >>$@ -r -n \
+ -e 's/^\tSOCK_([A-Z0-9_]+)[\t]+=[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
+ echo "};" >> $@
# Build a lower case string table of capability names
# Transforms lines from
@@ -61,6 +94,7 @@ cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *const rlim_names[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {" \
tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
$(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h
+$(obj)/net.o : $(obj)/net_names.h
$(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h
$(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \
$(src)/Makefile
@@ -68,3 +102,8 @@ $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/linux/capability.h \
$(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/uapi/asm-generic/resource.h \
$(src)/Makefile
$(call cmd,make-rlim)
+$(obj)/net_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h \
+ $(srctree)/include/linux/net.h \
+ $(src)/Makefile
+ $(call cmd,make-af)
+ $(call cmd,make-sock)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/af_unix.c b/security/apparmor/af_unix.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..73bd94d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/af_unix.c
@@ -0,0 +1,632 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor af_unix fine grained mediation
+ *
+ * Copyright 2014 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include <net/tcp_states.h>
+
+#include "include/af_unix.h"
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/file.h"
+#include "include/label.h"
+#include "include/path.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+
+static inline int unix_fs_perm(int op, u32 mask, struct aa_label *label,
+ struct unix_sock *u, int flags)
+{
+ AA_BUG(!label);
+ AA_BUG(!u);
+ AA_BUG(!UNIX_FS(u));
+
+ if (unconfined(label) || !LABEL_MEDIATES(label, AA_CLASS_FILE))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!u->path.dentry) {
+ struct path_cond cond = { };
+ struct file_perms perms = { };
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+
+ /* socket path has been cleared because it is being shutdown */
+ /* TODO: fix flags */
+ if (!(flags & PATH_MEDIATE_DELETED))
+ return -EACCES;
+ /* Mediate at original socket location */
+ /* TODO: ns disconnected paths */
+ /* TODO: after switch to newer audit provide deleted/shutdown
+ * message as part of audit info
+ */
+ return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+ __aa_path_perm(op, profile,
+ u->addr->name->sun_path,
+ mask, &cond, flags, &perms));
+ } else {
+ /* the sunpath may not be valid for this ns so use the path */
+ struct path_cond cond = { u->path.dentry->d_inode->i_uid,
+ u->path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode
+ };
+
+ return aa_path_perm(op, label, &u->path, flags, mask & NET_FS_PERMS,
+ &cond);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* passing in state returned by PROFILE_MEDIATES_AF */
+static unsigned int match_to_prot(struct aa_profile *profile,
+ unsigned int state, int type, int protocol,
+ const char **info)
+{
+ u16 buffer[2];
+ buffer[0] = cpu_to_be16(type);
+ buffer[1] = cpu_to_be16(protocol);
+ state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, state, (char *) &buffer,
+ 4);
+ if (!state)
+ *info = "failed type and protocol match";
+ return state;
+}
+
+static unsigned int match_addr(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int state,
+ struct sockaddr_un *addr, int addrlen)
+{
+ if (addr)
+ /* include leading \0 */
+ state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, state,
+ addr->sun_path,
+ unix_addr_len(addrlen));
+ else
+ /* anonymous end point */
+ state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, state, "\x01",
+ 1);
+ /* todo change to out of band */
+ state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->policy.dfa, state);
+ return state;
+}
+
+static unsigned int match_to_local(struct aa_profile *profile,
+ unsigned int state, int type, int protocol,
+ struct sockaddr_un *addr, int addrlen,
+ const char **info)
+{
+ state = match_to_prot(profile, state, type, protocol, info);
+ if (state) {
+ state = match_addr(profile, state, addr, addrlen);
+ if (state) {
+ /* todo: local label matching */
+ state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->policy.dfa,
+ state);
+ if (!state)
+ *info = "failed local label match";
+ } else
+ *info = "failed local address match";
+ }
+
+ return state;
+}
+
+static unsigned int match_to_sk(struct aa_profile *profile,
+ unsigned int state, struct unix_sock *u,
+ const char **info)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_un *addr = NULL;
+ int addrlen = 0;
+
+ if (u->addr) {
+ addr = u->addr->name;
+ addrlen = u->addr->len;
+ }
+
+ return match_to_local(profile, state, u->sk.sk_type, u->sk.sk_protocol,
+ addr, addrlen, info);
+}
+
+#define CMD_ADDR 1
+#define CMD_LISTEN 2
+#define CMD_OPT 4
+
+static inline unsigned int match_to_cmd(struct aa_profile *profile,
+ unsigned int state, struct unix_sock *u,
+ char cmd, const char **info)
+{
+ state = match_to_sk(profile, state, u, info);
+ if (state) {
+ state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, state, &cmd, 1);
+ if (!state)
+ *info = "failed cmd selection match";
+ }
+
+ return state;
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int match_to_peer(struct aa_profile *profile,
+ unsigned int state,
+ struct unix_sock *u,
+ struct sockaddr_un *peer_addr,
+ int peer_addrlen,
+ const char **info)
+{
+ state = match_to_cmd(profile, state, u, CMD_ADDR, info);
+ if (state) {
+ state = match_addr(profile, state, peer_addr, peer_addrlen);
+ if (!state)
+ *info = "failed peer address match";
+ }
+ return state;
+}
+
+static int do_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, unsigned int state, u32 request,
+ struct common_audit_data *sa)
+{
+ struct aa_perms perms;
+
+ AA_BUG(!profile);
+
+ aa_compute_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state, &perms);
+ aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+ return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa,
+ audit_net_cb);
+}
+
+static int match_label(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_profile *peer,
+ unsigned int state, u32 request,
+ struct common_audit_data *sa)
+{
+ AA_BUG(!profile);
+ AA_BUG(!peer);
+
+ aad(sa)->target = aa_peer_name(peer);
+
+ if (state) {
+ state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, state, aa_peer_name(peer));
+ if (!state)
+ aad(sa)->info = "failed peer label match";
+ }
+ return do_perms(profile, state, request, sa);
+}
+
+
+/* unix sock creation comes before we know if the socket will be an fs
+ * socket
+ * v6 - semantics are handled by mapping in profile load
+ * v7 - semantics require sock create for tasks creating an fs socket.
+ */
+static int profile_create_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, int family,
+ int type, int protocol)
+{
+ unsigned int state;
+
+ AA_BUG(!profile);
+ AA_BUG(profile_unconfined(profile));
+
+ if ((state = PROFILE_MEDIATES_AF(profile, AF_UNIX))) {
+ DEFINE_AUDIT_UNIX(sa, OP_CREATE, NULL, type, protocol);
+
+ state = match_to_prot(profile, state, type, protocol,
+ &aad(&sa)->info);
+ return do_perms(profile, state, AA_MAY_CREATE, &sa);
+ }
+
+ return aa_profile_af_perm(profile, OP_CREATE, family, type, protocol,
+ NULL);
+}
+
+int aa_unix_create_perm(struct aa_label *label, int family, int type,
+ int protocol)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+
+ if (unconfined(label))
+ return 0;
+
+ return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+ profile_create_perm(profile, family, type, protocol));
+}
+
+
+static inline int profile_sk_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, int op,
+ u32 request, struct sock *sk)
+{
+ unsigned int state;
+
+ AA_BUG(!profile);
+ AA_BUG(!sk);
+ AA_BUG(UNIX_FS(sk));
+ AA_BUG(profile_unconfined(profile));
+
+ state = PROFILE_MEDIATES_AF(profile, AF_UNIX);
+ if (state) {
+ DEFINE_AUDIT_UNIX(sa, op, sk, sk->sk_type, sk->sk_protocol);
+
+ state = match_to_sk(profile, state, unix_sk(sk),
+ &aad(&sa)->info);
+ return do_perms(profile, state, request, &sa);
+ }
+
+ return aa_profile_af_perm(profile, op, sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
+ sk->sk_protocol, sk);
+}
+
+int aa_unix_label_sk_perm(struct aa_label *label, int op, u32 request,
+ struct sock *sk)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+
+ return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+ profile_sk_perm(profile, op, request, sk));
+}
+
+static int unix_label_sock_perm(struct aa_label *label, int op, u32 request,
+ struct socket *sock)
+{
+ if (unconfined(label))
+ return 0;
+ if (UNIX_FS(sock->sk))
+ return unix_fs_perm(op, request, label, unix_sk(sock->sk), 0);
+
+ return aa_unix_label_sk_perm(label, op, request, sock->sk);
+}
+
+/* revaliation, get/set attr */
+int aa_unix_sock_perm(int op, u32 request, struct socket *sock)
+{
+ return unix_label_sock_perm(aa_current_label(), op, request, sock);
+}
+
+static int profile_bind_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct sock *sk,
+ struct sockaddr *addr, int addrlen)
+{
+ unsigned int state;
+
+ AA_BUG(!profile);
+ AA_BUG(!sk);
+ AA_BUG(addr->sa_family != AF_UNIX);
+ AA_BUG(profile_unconfined(profile));
+ AA_BUG(unix_addr_fs(addr, addrlen));
+
+ state = PROFILE_MEDIATES_AF(profile, AF_UNIX);
+ if (state) {
+ /* bind for abstract socket */
+ DEFINE_AUDIT_UNIX(sa, OP_BIND, sk, sk->sk_type,
+ sk->sk_protocol);
+ aad(&sa)->net.addr = unix_addr(addr);
+ aad(&sa)->net.addrlen = addrlen;
+
+ state = match_to_local(profile, state,
+ sk->sk_type, sk->sk_protocol,
+ unix_addr(addr), addrlen,
+ &aad(&sa)->info);
+ return do_perms(profile, state, AA_MAY_BIND, &sa);
+ }
+
+ return aa_profile_af_perm(profile, OP_BIND, sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
+ sk->sk_protocol, sk);
+}
+
+int aa_unix_bind_perm(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
+ int addrlen)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ struct aa_label *label = aa_current_label();
+
+ /* fs bind is handled by mknod */
+ if (unconfined(label) || unix_addr_fs(address, addrlen))
+ return 0;
+
+ return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+ profile_bind_perm(profile, sock->sk, address, addrlen));
+}
+
+int aa_unix_connect_perm(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
+ int addrlen)
+{
+ /* unix connections are covered by the
+ * - unix_stream_connect (stream) and unix_may_send hooks (dgram)
+ * - fs connect is handled by open
+ */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int profile_listen_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, struct sock *sk,
+ int backlog)
+{
+ unsigned int state;
+
+ AA_BUG(!profile);
+ AA_BUG(!sk);
+ AA_BUG(UNIX_FS(sk));
+ AA_BUG(profile_unconfined(profile));
+
+ state = PROFILE_MEDIATES_AF(profile, AF_UNIX);
+ if (state) {
+ u16 b = cpu_to_be16(backlog);
+ DEFINE_AUDIT_UNIX(sa, OP_LISTEN, sk, sk->sk_type,
+ sk->sk_protocol);
+
+ state = match_to_cmd(profile, state, unix_sk(sk), CMD_LISTEN,
+ &aad(&sa)->info);
+ if (state) {
+ state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, state,
+ (char *) &b, 2);
+ if (!state)
+ aad(&sa)->info = "failed listen backlog match";
+ }
+ return do_perms(profile, state, AA_MAY_LISTEN, &sa);
+ }
+
+ return aa_profile_af_perm(profile, OP_LISTEN, sk->sk_family,
+ sk->sk_type, sk->sk_protocol, sk);
+}
+
+int aa_unix_listen_perm(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ struct aa_label *label = aa_current_label();
+
+ if (unconfined(label) || UNIX_FS(sock->sk))
+ return 0;
+
+ return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+ profile_listen_perm(profile, sock->sk, backlog));
+}
+
+
+static inline int profile_accept_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
+ struct sock *sk,
+ struct sock *newsk)
+{
+ unsigned int state;
+
+ AA_BUG(!profile);
+ AA_BUG(!sk);
+ AA_BUG(UNIX_FS(sk));
+ AA_BUG(profile_unconfined(profile));
+
+ state = PROFILE_MEDIATES_AF(profile, AF_UNIX);
+ if (state) {
+ DEFINE_AUDIT_UNIX(sa, OP_ACCEPT, sk, sk->sk_type,
+ sk->sk_protocol);
+
+ state = match_to_sk(profile, state, unix_sk(sk),
+ &aad(&sa)->info);
+ return do_perms(profile, state, AA_MAY_ACCEPT, &sa);
+ }
+
+ return aa_profile_af_perm(profile, OP_ACCEPT, sk->sk_family,
+ sk->sk_type, sk->sk_protocol, sk);
+}
+
+/* ability of sock to connect, not peer address binding */
+int aa_unix_accept_perm(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ struct aa_label *label = aa_current_label();
+
+ if (unconfined(label) || UNIX_FS(sock->sk))
+ return 0;
+
+ return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+ profile_accept_perm(profile, sock->sk, newsock->sk));
+}
+
+
+/* dgram handled by unix_may_sendmsg, right to send on stream done at connect
+ * could do per msg unix_stream here
+ */
+/* sendmsg, recvmsg */
+int aa_unix_msg_perm(int op, u32 request, struct socket *sock,
+ struct msghdr *msg, int size)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int profile_opt_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, int op, u32 request,
+ struct sock *sk, int level, int optname)
+{
+ unsigned int state;
+
+ AA_BUG(!profile);
+ AA_BUG(!sk);
+ AA_BUG(UNIX_FS(sk));
+ AA_BUG(profile_unconfined(profile));
+
+ state = PROFILE_MEDIATES_AF(profile, AF_UNIX);
+ if (state) {
+ u16 b = cpu_to_be16(optname);
+ DEFINE_AUDIT_UNIX(sa, op, sk, sk->sk_type, sk->sk_protocol);
+
+ state = match_to_cmd(profile, state, unix_sk(sk), CMD_OPT,
+ &aad(&sa)->info);
+ if (state) {
+ state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->policy.dfa, state,
+ (char *) &b, 2);
+ if (!state)
+ aad(&sa)->info = "failed sockopt match";
+ }
+ return do_perms(profile, state, request, &sa);
+ }
+
+ return aa_profile_af_perm(profile, op, sk->sk_family,
+ sk->sk_type, sk->sk_protocol, sk);
+}
+
+int aa_unix_opt_perm(int op, u32 request, struct socket *sock, int level,
+ int optname)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ struct aa_label *label = aa_current_label();
+
+ if (unconfined(label) || UNIX_FS(sock->sk))
+ return 0;
+
+ return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+ profile_opt_perm(profile, op, request, sock->sk,
+ level, optname));
+}
+
+/* null peer_label is allowed, in which case the peer_sk label is used */
+static int profile_peer_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, int op, u32 request,
+ struct sock *sk, struct sock *peer_sk,
+ struct aa_label *peer_label,
+ struct common_audit_data *sa)
+{
+ unsigned int state;
+
+ AA_BUG(!profile);
+ AA_BUG(profile_unconfined(profile));
+ AA_BUG(!sk);
+ AA_BUG(!peer_sk);
+ AA_BUG(UNIX_FS(peer_sk));
+
+ state = PROFILE_MEDIATES_AF(profile, AF_UNIX);
+ if (state) {
+ struct aa_sk_cxt *peer_cxt = SK_CXT(peer_sk);
+ struct aa_profile *peerp;
+ struct sockaddr_un *addr = NULL;
+ int len = 0;
+ if (unix_sk(peer_sk)->addr) {
+ addr = unix_sk(peer_sk)->addr->name;
+ len = unix_sk(peer_sk)->addr->len;
+ }
+ state = match_to_peer(profile, state, unix_sk(sk),
+ addr, len, &aad(sa)->info);
+ if (!peer_label)
+ peer_label = peer_cxt->label;
+ return fn_for_each(peer_label, peerp,
+ match_label(profile, peerp, state, request,
+ sa));
+ }
+
+ return aa_profile_af_perm(profile, op, sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
+ sk->sk_protocol, sk);
+}
+
+/**
+ *
+ * Requires: lock held on both @sk and @peer_sk
+ */
+int aa_unix_peer_perm(struct aa_label *label, int op, u32 request,
+ struct sock *sk, struct sock *peer_sk,
+ struct aa_label *peer_label)
+{
+ struct unix_sock *peeru = unix_sk(peer_sk);
+ struct unix_sock *u = unix_sk(sk);
+
+ AA_BUG(!label);
+ AA_BUG(!sk);
+ AA_BUG(!peer_sk);
+
+ if (UNIX_FS(peeru))
+ return unix_fs_perm(op, request, label, peeru, 0);
+ else if (UNIX_FS(u))
+ return unix_fs_perm(op, request, label, u, 0);
+ else {
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ DEFINE_AUDIT_UNIX(sa, op, sk, sk->sk_type, sk->sk_protocol);
+ aad(&sa)->net.peer_sk = peer_sk;
+
+ /* TODO: ns!!! */
+ if (!net_eq(sock_net(sk), sock_net(peer_sk))) {
+ ;
+ }
+
+ if (unconfined(label))
+ return 0;
+
+ return fn_for_each_confined(label, profile,
+ profile_peer_perm(profile, op, request, sk,
+ peer_sk, peer_label, &sa));
+ }
+}
+
+
+/* from net/unix/af_unix.c */
+static void unix_state_double_lock(struct sock *sk1, struct sock *sk2)
+{
+ if (unlikely(sk1 == sk2) || !sk2) {
+ unix_state_lock(sk1);
+ return;
+ }
+ if (sk1 < sk2) {
+ unix_state_lock(sk1);
+ unix_state_lock_nested(sk2);
+ } else {
+ unix_state_lock(sk2);
+ unix_state_lock_nested(sk1);
+ }
+}
+
+static void unix_state_double_unlock(struct sock *sk1, struct sock *sk2)
+{
+ if (unlikely(sk1 == sk2) || !sk2) {
+ unix_state_unlock(sk1);
+ return;
+ }
+ unix_state_unlock(sk1);
+ unix_state_unlock(sk2);
+}
+
+int aa_unix_file_perm(struct aa_label *label, int op, u32 request,
+ struct socket *sock)
+{
+ struct sock *peer_sk = NULL;
+ u32 sk_req = request & ~NET_PEER_MASK;
+ int error = 0;
+
+ AA_BUG(!label);
+ AA_BUG(!sock);
+ AA_BUG(!sock->sk);
+ AA_BUG(sock->sk->sk_family != AF_UNIX);
+
+ /* TODO: update sock label with new task label */
+ unix_state_lock(sock->sk);
+ peer_sk = unix_peer(sock->sk);
+ if (peer_sk)
+ sock_hold(peer_sk);
+ if (!unix_connected(sock) && sk_req) {
+ error = unix_label_sock_perm(label, op, sk_req, sock);
+ if (!error) {
+ // update label
+ }
+ }
+ unix_state_unlock(sock->sk);
+ if (!peer_sk)
+ return error;
+
+ unix_state_double_lock(sock->sk, peer_sk);
+ if (UNIX_FS(sock->sk)) {
+ error = unix_fs_perm(op, request, label, unix_sk(sock->sk),
+ PATH_SOCK_COND);
+ } else if (UNIX_FS(peer_sk)) {
+ error = unix_fs_perm(op, request, label, unix_sk(peer_sk),
+ PATH_SOCK_COND);
+ } else {
+ struct aa_sk_cxt *pcxt = SK_CXT(peer_sk);
+ if (sk_req)
+ error = aa_unix_label_sk_perm(label, op, sk_req,
+ sock->sk);
+ last_error(error,
+ xcheck(aa_unix_peer_perm(label, op,
+ MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE,
+ sock->sk, peer_sk, NULL),
+ aa_unix_peer_perm(pcxt->label, op,
+ MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE,
+ peer_sk, sock->sk, label)));
+ }
+
+ unix_state_double_unlock(sock->sk, peer_sk);
+ sock_put(peer_sk);
+
+ return error;
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index 7db9954f..f86f56e8 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -18,15 +18,18 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/major.h>
#include "include/apparmor.h"
#include "include/apparmorfs.h"
#include "include/audit.h"
#include "include/context.h"
#include "include/crypto.h"
+#include "include/ipc.h"
#include "include/policy.h"
#include "include/resource.h"
@@ -37,7 +40,7 @@
*
* Returns: length of mangled name
*/
-static int mangle_name(char *name, char *target)
+static int mangle_name(const char *name, char *target)
{
char *t = target;
@@ -186,6 +189,147 @@ static const struct file_operations aa_fs_profile_remove = {
.llseek = default_llseek,
};
+/**
+ * query_label - queries a label and writes permissions to buf
+ * @buf: the resulting permissions string is stored here (NOT NULL)
+ * @buf_len: size of buf
+ * @query: binary query string to match against the dfa
+ * @query_len: size of query
+ *
+ * The buffers pointed to by buf and query may overlap. The query buffer is
+ * parsed before buf is written to.
+ *
+ * The query should look like "LABEL_NAME\0DFA_STRING" where LABEL_NAME is
+ * the name of the label, in the current namespace, that is to be queried and
+ * DFA_STRING is a binary string to match against the label(s)'s DFA.
+ *
+ * LABEL_NAME must be NUL terminated. DFA_STRING may contain NUL characters
+ * but must *not* be NUL terminated.
+ *
+ * Returns: number of characters written to buf or -errno on failure
+ */
+static ssize_t query_label(char *buf, size_t buf_len,
+ char *query, size_t query_len)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ struct aa_label *label;
+ char *label_name, *match_str;
+ size_t label_name_len, match_len;
+ struct aa_perms perms;
+ unsigned int state = 0;
+ struct label_it i;
+
+ if (!query_len)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ label_name = query;
+ label_name_len = strnlen(query, query_len);
+ if (!label_name_len || label_name_len == query_len)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /**
+ * The extra byte is to account for the null byte between the
+ * profile name and dfa string. profile_name_len is greater
+ * than zero and less than query_len, so a byte can be safely
+ * added or subtracted.
+ */
+ match_str = label_name + label_name_len + 1;
+ match_len = query_len - label_name_len - 1;
+
+ label = aa_label_parse(aa_current_label(), label_name, GFP_KERNEL,
+ false);
+ if (IS_ERR(label))
+ return PTR_ERR(label);
+
+ aa_perms_all(&perms);
+ label_for_each_confined(i, label, profile) {
+ struct aa_perms tmp;
+ struct aa_dfa *dfa;
+ if (profile->file.dfa && *match_str == AA_CLASS_FILE) {
+ dfa = profile->file.dfa;
+ state = aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, profile->file.start,
+ match_str + 1, match_len - 1);
+ } else if (profile->policy.dfa) {
+ if (!PROFILE_MEDIATES_SAFE(profile, *match_str))
+ continue; /* no change to current perms */
+ dfa = profile->policy.dfa;
+ state = aa_dfa_match_len(dfa, profile->policy.start[0],
+ match_str, match_len);
+ }
+ if (state)
+ aa_compute_perms(dfa, state, &tmp);
+ else
+ aa_perms_clear(&tmp);
+ aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &tmp);
+ aa_perms_accum_raw(&perms, &tmp);
+ }
+ aa_put_label(label);
+
+ return scnprintf(buf, buf_len,
+ "allow 0x%08x\ndeny 0x%08x\naudit 0x%08x\nquiet 0x%08x\n",
+ perms.allow, perms.deny, perms.audit, perms.quiet);
+}
+
+#define QUERY_CMD_LABEL "label\0"
+#define QUERY_CMD_LABEL_LEN 6
+#define QUERY_CMD_PROFILE "profile\0"
+#define QUERY_CMD_PROFILE_LEN 8
+
+/**
+ * aa_write_access - generic permissions query
+ * @file: pointer to open apparmorfs/access file
+ * @ubuf: user buffer containing the complete query string (NOT NULL)
+ * @count: size of ubuf
+ * @ppos: position in the file (MUST BE ZERO)
+ *
+ * Allows for one permission query per open(), write(), and read() sequence.
+ * The only query currently supported is a label-based query. For this query
+ * ubuf must begin with "label\0", followed by the profile query specific
+ * format described in the query_label() function documentation.
+ *
+ * Returns: number of bytes written or -errno on failure
+ */
+static ssize_t aa_write_access(struct file *file, const char __user *ubuf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char *buf;
+ ssize_t len;
+
+ if (*ppos)
+ return -ESPIPE;
+
+ buf = simple_transaction_get(file, ubuf, count);
+ if (IS_ERR(buf))
+ return PTR_ERR(buf);
+
+ if (count > QUERY_CMD_PROFILE_LEN &&
+ !memcmp(buf, QUERY_CMD_PROFILE, QUERY_CMD_PROFILE_LEN)) {
+ len = query_label(buf, SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT,
+ buf + QUERY_CMD_PROFILE_LEN,
+ count - QUERY_CMD_PROFILE_LEN);
+ } else if (count > QUERY_CMD_LABEL_LEN &&
+ !memcmp(buf, QUERY_CMD_LABEL, QUERY_CMD_LABEL_LEN)) {
+ len = query_label(buf, SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT,
+ buf + QUERY_CMD_LABEL_LEN,
+ count - QUERY_CMD_LABEL_LEN);
+ } else
+ len = -EINVAL;
+
+ if (len < 0)
+ return len;
+
+ simple_transaction_set(file, len);
+
+ return count;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations aa_fs_access = {
+ .write = aa_write_access,
+ .read = simple_transaction_read,
+ .release = simple_transaction_release,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};