Add russh::server::run_on_socket
to facilitate dropping privileges immediately after socket binding
#231
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Securing SSH servers is not straightforward. Most state-of-the-art systems utilize privilege dropping after they bind to a socket in order to minimize their attack surface, including OpenSSH. Currently russh does not support this pattern since socket binding and the main server event loop are tied to a single function,
russh::server::run
.This PR introduces a function
russh::server::run_on_socket
which is identical torussh::server::run
except that it accepts atokio::net::TcpListener
in place of a socket address, allowing end-users to bind to a socket and perform other intermediate actions before handing over control to the main server event loop.russh::server::run
's behavior is left untouched, so the change is fully backwards compatible.