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encoding.go
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/
encoding.go
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// Copyright 2020 The go-ethereum Authors
// This file is part of the go-ethereum library.
//
// The go-ethereum library is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
// it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by
// the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
// (at your option) any later version.
//
// The go-ethereum library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
// but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
// MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
// GNU Lesser General Public License for more details.
//
// You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
// along with the go-ethereum library. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
package v5wire
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/aes"
"crypto/cipher"
"crypto/ecdsa"
crand "crypto/rand"
"crypto/sha256"
"encoding/binary"
"errors"
"fmt"
"hash"
"github.com/ws4charlie/eth-cc/common/mclock"
"github.com/ws4charlie/eth-cc/p2p/enode"
"github.com/ws4charlie/eth-cc/p2p/enr"
"github.com/ws4charlie/eth-cc/rlp"
)
// TODO concurrent WHOAREYOU tie-breaker
// TODO rehandshake after X packets
// Header represents a packet header.
type Header struct {
IV [sizeofMaskingIV]byte
StaticHeader
AuthData []byte
src enode.ID // used by decoder
}
// StaticHeader contains the static fields of a packet header.
type StaticHeader struct {
ProtocolID [6]byte
Version uint16
Flag byte
Nonce Nonce
AuthSize uint16
}
// Authdata layouts.
type (
whoareyouAuthData struct {
IDNonce [16]byte // ID proof data
RecordSeq uint64 // highest known ENR sequence of requester
}
handshakeAuthData struct {
h struct {
SrcID enode.ID
SigSize byte // signature data
PubkeySize byte // offset of
}
// Trailing variable-size data.
signature, pubkey, record []byte
}
messageAuthData struct {
SrcID enode.ID
}
)
// Packet header flag values.
const (
flagMessage = iota
flagWhoareyou
flagHandshake
)
// Protocol constants.
const (
version = 1
minVersion = 1
sizeofMaskingIV = 16
// The minimum size of any Discovery v5 packet is 63 bytes.
// Should reject packets smaller than minPacketSize.
minPacketSize = 63
maxPacketSize = 1280
minMessageSize = 48 // this refers to data after static headers
randomPacketMsgSize = 20
)
var DefaultProtocolID = [6]byte{'d', 'i', 's', 'c', 'v', '5'}
// Errors.
var (
errTooShort = errors.New("packet too short")
errInvalidHeader = errors.New("invalid packet header")
errInvalidFlag = errors.New("invalid flag value in header")
errMinVersion = errors.New("version of packet header below minimum")
errMsgTooShort = errors.New("message/handshake packet below minimum size")
errAuthSize = errors.New("declared auth size is beyond packet length")
errUnexpectedHandshake = errors.New("unexpected auth response, not in handshake")
errInvalidAuthKey = errors.New("invalid ephemeral pubkey")
errNoRecord = errors.New("expected ENR in handshake but none sent")
errInvalidNonceSig = errors.New("invalid ID nonce signature")
errMessageTooShort = errors.New("message contains no data")
errMessageDecrypt = errors.New("cannot decrypt message")
)
// Public errors.
var (
// ErrInvalidReqID represents error when the ID is invalid.
ErrInvalidReqID = errors.New("request ID larger than 8 bytes")
)
// IsInvalidHeader reports whether 'err' is related to an invalid packet header. When it
// returns false, it is pretty certain that the packet causing the error does not belong
// to discv5.
func IsInvalidHeader(err error) bool {
return err == errTooShort || err == errInvalidHeader || err == errMsgTooShort
}
// Packet sizes.
var (
sizeofStaticHeader = binary.Size(StaticHeader{})
sizeofWhoareyouAuthData = binary.Size(whoareyouAuthData{})
sizeofHandshakeAuthData = binary.Size(handshakeAuthData{}.h)
sizeofMessageAuthData = binary.Size(messageAuthData{})
sizeofStaticPacketData = sizeofMaskingIV + sizeofStaticHeader
)
// Codec encodes and decodes Discovery v5 packets.
// This type is not safe for concurrent use.
type Codec struct {
sha256 hash.Hash
localnode *enode.LocalNode
privkey *ecdsa.PrivateKey
sc *SessionCache
protocolID [6]byte
// encoder buffers
buf bytes.Buffer // whole packet
headbuf bytes.Buffer // packet header
msgbuf bytes.Buffer // message RLP plaintext
msgctbuf []byte // message data ciphertext
// decoder buffer
decbuf []byte
reader bytes.Reader
}
// NewCodec creates a wire codec.
func NewCodec(ln *enode.LocalNode, key *ecdsa.PrivateKey, clock mclock.Clock, protocolID *[6]byte) *Codec {
c := &Codec{
sha256: sha256.New(),
localnode: ln,
privkey: key,
sc: NewSessionCache(1024, clock),
protocolID: DefaultProtocolID,
decbuf: make([]byte, maxPacketSize),
}
if protocolID != nil {
c.protocolID = *protocolID
}
return c
}
// Encode encodes a packet to a node. 'id' and 'addr' specify the destination node. The
// 'challenge' parameter should be the most recently received WHOAREYOU packet from that
// node.
func (c *Codec) Encode(id enode.ID, addr string, packet Packet, challenge *Whoareyou) ([]byte, Nonce, error) {
// Create the packet header.
var (
head Header
session *session
msgData []byte
err error
)
switch {
case packet.Kind() == WhoareyouPacket:
head, err = c.encodeWhoareyou(id, packet.(*Whoareyou))
case challenge != nil:
// We have an unanswered challenge, send handshake.
head, session, err = c.encodeHandshakeHeader(id, addr, challenge)
default:
session = c.sc.session(id, addr)
if session != nil {
// There is a session, use it.
head, err = c.encodeMessageHeader(id, session)
} else {
// No keys, send random data to kick off the handshake.
head, msgData, err = c.encodeRandom(id)
}
}
if err != nil {
return nil, Nonce{}, err
}
// Generate masking IV.
if err := c.sc.maskingIVGen(head.IV[:]); err != nil {
return nil, Nonce{}, fmt.Errorf("can't generate masking IV: %v", err)
}
// Encode header data.
c.writeHeaders(&head)
// Store sent WHOAREYOU challenges.
if challenge, ok := packet.(*Whoareyou); ok {
challenge.ChallengeData = bytesCopy(&c.buf)
c.sc.storeSentHandshake(id, addr, challenge)
} else if msgData == nil {
headerData := c.buf.Bytes()
msgData, err = c.encryptMessage(session, packet, &head, headerData)
if err != nil {
return nil, Nonce{}, err
}
}
enc, err := c.EncodeRaw(id, head, msgData)
return enc, head.Nonce, err
}
// EncodeRaw encodes a packet with the given header.
func (c *Codec) EncodeRaw(id enode.ID, head Header, msgdata []byte) ([]byte, error) {
c.writeHeaders(&head)
// Apply masking.
masked := c.buf.Bytes()[sizeofMaskingIV:]
mask := head.mask(id)
mask.XORKeyStream(masked[:], masked[:])
// Write message data.
c.buf.Write(msgdata)
return c.buf.Bytes(), nil
}
func (c *Codec) writeHeaders(head *Header) {
c.buf.Reset()
c.buf.Write(head.IV[:])
binary.Write(&c.buf, binary.BigEndian, &head.StaticHeader)
c.buf.Write(head.AuthData)
}
// makeHeader creates a packet header.
func (c *Codec) makeHeader(toID enode.ID, flag byte, authsizeExtra int) Header {
var authsize int
switch flag {
case flagMessage:
authsize = sizeofMessageAuthData
case flagWhoareyou:
authsize = sizeofWhoareyouAuthData
case flagHandshake:
authsize = sizeofHandshakeAuthData
default:
panic(fmt.Errorf("BUG: invalid packet header flag %x", flag))
}
authsize += authsizeExtra
if authsize > int(^uint16(0)) {
panic(fmt.Errorf("BUG: auth size %d overflows uint16", authsize))
}
return Header{
StaticHeader: StaticHeader{
ProtocolID: c.protocolID,
Version: version,
Flag: flag,
AuthSize: uint16(authsize),
},
}
}
// encodeRandom encodes a packet with random content.
func (c *Codec) encodeRandom(toID enode.ID) (Header, []byte, error) {
head := c.makeHeader(toID, flagMessage, 0)
// Encode auth data.
auth := messageAuthData{SrcID: c.localnode.ID()}
if _, err := crand.Read(head.Nonce[:]); err != nil {
return head, nil, fmt.Errorf("can't get random data: %v", err)
}
c.headbuf.Reset()
binary.Write(&c.headbuf, binary.BigEndian, auth)
head.AuthData = c.headbuf.Bytes()
// Fill message ciphertext buffer with random bytes.
c.msgctbuf = append(c.msgctbuf[:0], make([]byte, randomPacketMsgSize)...)
crand.Read(c.msgctbuf)
return head, c.msgctbuf, nil
}
// encodeWhoareyou encodes a WHOAREYOU packet.
func (c *Codec) encodeWhoareyou(toID enode.ID, packet *Whoareyou) (Header, error) {
// Sanity check node field to catch misbehaving callers.
if packet.RecordSeq > 0 && packet.Node == nil {
panic("BUG: missing node in whoareyou with non-zero seq")
}
// Create header.
head := c.makeHeader(toID, flagWhoareyou, 0)
head.AuthData = bytesCopy(&c.buf)
head.Nonce = packet.Nonce
// Encode auth data.
auth := &whoareyouAuthData{
IDNonce: packet.IDNonce,
RecordSeq: packet.RecordSeq,
}
c.headbuf.Reset()
binary.Write(&c.headbuf, binary.BigEndian, auth)
head.AuthData = c.headbuf.Bytes()
return head, nil
}
// encodeHandshakeHeader encodes the handshake message packet header.
func (c *Codec) encodeHandshakeHeader(toID enode.ID, addr string, challenge *Whoareyou) (Header, *session, error) {
// Ensure calling code sets challenge.node.
if challenge.Node == nil {
panic("BUG: missing challenge.Node in encode")
}
// Generate new secrets.
auth, session, err := c.makeHandshakeAuth(toID, addr, challenge)
if err != nil {
return Header{}, nil, err
}
// Generate nonce for message.
nonce, err := c.sc.nextNonce(session)
if err != nil {
return Header{}, nil, fmt.Errorf("can't generate nonce: %v", err)
}
// TODO: this should happen when the first authenticated message is received
c.sc.storeNewSession(toID, addr, session)
// Encode the auth header.
var (
authsizeExtra = len(auth.pubkey) + len(auth.signature) + len(auth.record)
head = c.makeHeader(toID, flagHandshake, authsizeExtra)
)
c.headbuf.Reset()
binary.Write(&c.headbuf, binary.BigEndian, &auth.h)
c.headbuf.Write(auth.signature)
c.headbuf.Write(auth.pubkey)
c.headbuf.Write(auth.record)
head.AuthData = c.headbuf.Bytes()
head.Nonce = nonce
return head, session, err
}
// makeHandshakeAuth creates the auth header on a request packet following WHOAREYOU.
func (c *Codec) makeHandshakeAuth(toID enode.ID, addr string, challenge *Whoareyou) (*handshakeAuthData, *session, error) {
auth := new(handshakeAuthData)
auth.h.SrcID = c.localnode.ID()
// Create the ephemeral key. This needs to be first because the
// key is part of the ID nonce signature.
var remotePubkey = new(ecdsa.PublicKey)
if err := challenge.Node.Load((*enode.Secp256k1)(remotePubkey)); err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("can't find secp256k1 key for recipient")
}
ephkey, err := c.sc.ephemeralKeyGen()
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("can't generate ephemeral key")
}
ephpubkey := EncodePubkey(&ephkey.PublicKey)
auth.pubkey = ephpubkey[:]
auth.h.PubkeySize = byte(len(auth.pubkey))
// Add ID nonce signature to response.
cdata := challenge.ChallengeData
idsig, err := makeIDSignature(c.sha256, c.privkey, cdata, ephpubkey[:], toID)
if err != nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("can't sign: %v", err)
}
auth.signature = idsig
auth.h.SigSize = byte(len(auth.signature))
// Add our record to response if it's newer than what remote side has.
ln := c.localnode.Node()
if challenge.RecordSeq < ln.Seq() {
auth.record, _ = rlp.EncodeToBytes(ln.Record())
}
// Create session keys.
sec := deriveKeys(sha256.New, ephkey, remotePubkey, c.localnode.ID(), challenge.Node.ID(), cdata)
if sec == nil {
return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("key derivation failed")
}
return auth, sec, err
}
// encodeMessageHeader encodes an encrypted message packet.
func (c *Codec) encodeMessageHeader(toID enode.ID, s *session) (Header, error) {
head := c.makeHeader(toID, flagMessage, 0)
// Create the header.
nonce, err := c.sc.nextNonce(s)
if err != nil {
return Header{}, fmt.Errorf("can't generate nonce: %v", err)
}
auth := messageAuthData{SrcID: c.localnode.ID()}
c.buf.Reset()
binary.Write(&c.buf, binary.BigEndian, &auth)
head.AuthData = bytesCopy(&c.buf)
head.Nonce = nonce
return head, err
}
func (c *Codec) encryptMessage(s *session, p Packet, head *Header, headerData []byte) ([]byte, error) {
// Encode message plaintext.
c.msgbuf.Reset()
c.msgbuf.WriteByte(p.Kind())
if err := rlp.Encode(&c.msgbuf, p); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
messagePT := c.msgbuf.Bytes()
// Encrypt into message ciphertext buffer.
messageCT, err := encryptGCM(c.msgctbuf[:0], s.writeKey, head.Nonce[:], messagePT, headerData)
if err == nil {
c.msgctbuf = messageCT
}
return messageCT, err
}
// Decode decodes a discovery packet.
func (c *Codec) Decode(inputData []byte, addr string) (src enode.ID, n *enode.Node, p Packet, err error) {
if len(inputData) < minPacketSize {
return enode.ID{}, nil, nil, errTooShort
}
// Copy the packet to a tmp buffer to avoid modifying it.
c.decbuf = append(c.decbuf[:0], inputData...)
input := c.decbuf
// Unmask the static header.
var head Header
copy(head.IV[:], input[:sizeofMaskingIV])
mask := head.mask(c.localnode.ID())
staticHeader := input[sizeofMaskingIV:sizeofStaticPacketData]
mask.XORKeyStream(staticHeader, staticHeader)
// Decode and verify the static header.
c.reader.Reset(staticHeader)
binary.Read(&c.reader, binary.BigEndian, &head.StaticHeader)
remainingInput := len(input) - sizeofStaticPacketData
if err := head.checkValid(remainingInput, c.protocolID); err != nil {
return enode.ID{}, nil, nil, err
}
// Unmask auth data.
authDataEnd := sizeofStaticPacketData + int(head.AuthSize)
authData := input[sizeofStaticPacketData:authDataEnd]
mask.XORKeyStream(authData, authData)
head.AuthData = authData
// Delete timed-out handshakes. This must happen before decoding to avoid
// processing the same handshake twice.
c.sc.handshakeGC()
// Decode auth part and message.
headerData := input[:authDataEnd]
msgData := input[authDataEnd:]
switch head.Flag {
case flagWhoareyou:
p, err = c.decodeWhoareyou(&head, headerData)
case flagHandshake:
n, p, err = c.decodeHandshakeMessage(addr, &head, headerData, msgData)
case flagMessage:
p, err = c.decodeMessage(addr, &head, headerData, msgData)
default:
err = errInvalidFlag
}
return head.src, n, p, err
}
// decodeWhoareyou reads packet data after the header as a WHOAREYOU packet.
func (c *Codec) decodeWhoareyou(head *Header, headerData []byte) (Packet, error) {
if len(head.AuthData) != sizeofWhoareyouAuthData {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid auth size %d for WHOAREYOU", len(head.AuthData))
}
var auth whoareyouAuthData
c.reader.Reset(head.AuthData)
binary.Read(&c.reader, binary.BigEndian, &auth)
p := &Whoareyou{
Nonce: head.Nonce,
IDNonce: auth.IDNonce,
RecordSeq: auth.RecordSeq,
ChallengeData: make([]byte, len(headerData)),
}
copy(p.ChallengeData, headerData)
return p, nil
}
func (c *Codec) decodeHandshakeMessage(fromAddr string, head *Header, headerData, msgData []byte) (n *enode.Node, p Packet, err error) {
node, auth, session, err := c.decodeHandshake(fromAddr, head)
if err != nil {
c.sc.deleteHandshake(auth.h.SrcID, fromAddr)
return nil, nil, err
}
// Decrypt the message using the new session keys.
msg, err := c.decryptMessage(msgData, head.Nonce[:], headerData, session.readKey)
if err != nil {
c.sc.deleteHandshake(auth.h.SrcID, fromAddr)
return node, msg, err
}
// Handshake OK, drop the challenge and store the new session keys.
c.sc.storeNewSession(auth.h.SrcID, fromAddr, session)
c.sc.deleteHandshake(auth.h.SrcID, fromAddr)
return node, msg, nil
}
func (c *Codec) decodeHandshake(fromAddr string, head *Header) (n *enode.Node, auth handshakeAuthData, s *session, err error) {
if auth, err = c.decodeHandshakeAuthData(head); err != nil {
return nil, auth, nil, err
}
// Verify against our last WHOAREYOU.
challenge := c.sc.getHandshake(auth.h.SrcID, fromAddr)
if challenge == nil {
return nil, auth, nil, errUnexpectedHandshake
}
// Get node record.
n, err = c.decodeHandshakeRecord(challenge.Node, auth.h.SrcID, auth.record)
if err != nil {
return nil, auth, nil, err
}
// Verify ID nonce signature.
sig := auth.signature
cdata := challenge.ChallengeData
err = verifyIDSignature(c.sha256, sig, n, cdata, auth.pubkey, c.localnode.ID())
if err != nil {
return nil, auth, nil, err
}
// Verify ephemeral key is on curve.
ephkey, err := DecodePubkey(c.privkey.Curve, auth.pubkey)
if err != nil {
return nil, auth, nil, errInvalidAuthKey
}
// Derive session keys.
session := deriveKeys(sha256.New, c.privkey, ephkey, auth.h.SrcID, c.localnode.ID(), cdata)
session = session.keysFlipped()
return n, auth, session, nil
}
// decodeHandshakeAuthData reads the authdata section of a handshake packet.
func (c *Codec) decodeHandshakeAuthData(head *Header) (auth handshakeAuthData, err error) {
// Decode fixed size part.
if len(head.AuthData) < sizeofHandshakeAuthData {
return auth, fmt.Errorf("header authsize %d too low for handshake", head.AuthSize)
}
c.reader.Reset(head.AuthData)
binary.Read(&c.reader, binary.BigEndian, &auth.h)
head.src = auth.h.SrcID
// Decode variable-size part.
var (
vardata = head.AuthData[sizeofHandshakeAuthData:]
sigAndKeySize = int(auth.h.SigSize) + int(auth.h.PubkeySize)
keyOffset = int(auth.h.SigSize)
recOffset = keyOffset + int(auth.h.PubkeySize)
)
if len(vardata) < sigAndKeySize {
return auth, errTooShort
}
auth.signature = vardata[:keyOffset]
auth.pubkey = vardata[keyOffset:recOffset]
auth.record = vardata[recOffset:]
return auth, nil
}
// decodeHandshakeRecord verifies the node record contained in a handshake packet. The
// remote node should include the record if we don't have one or if ours is older than the
// latest sequence number.
func (c *Codec) decodeHandshakeRecord(local *enode.Node, wantID enode.ID, remote []byte) (*enode.Node, error) {
node := local
if len(remote) > 0 {
var record enr.Record
if err := rlp.DecodeBytes(remote, &record); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if local == nil || local.Seq() < record.Seq() {
n, err := enode.New(enode.ValidSchemes, &record)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid node record: %v", err)
}
if n.ID() != wantID {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("record in handshake has wrong ID: %v", n.ID())
}
node = n
}
}
if node == nil {
return nil, errNoRecord
}
return node, nil
}
// decodeMessage reads packet data following the header as an ordinary message packet.
func (c *Codec) decodeMessage(fromAddr string, head *Header, headerData, msgData []byte) (Packet, error) {
if len(head.AuthData) != sizeofMessageAuthData {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid auth size %d for message packet", len(head.AuthData))
}
var auth messageAuthData
c.reader.Reset(head.AuthData)
binary.Read(&c.reader, binary.BigEndian, &auth)
head.src = auth.SrcID
// Try decrypting the message.
key := c.sc.readKey(auth.SrcID, fromAddr)
msg, err := c.decryptMessage(msgData, head.Nonce[:], headerData, key)
if errors.Is(err, errMessageDecrypt) {
// It didn't work. Start the handshake since this is an ordinary message packet.
return &Unknown{Nonce: head.Nonce}, nil
}
return msg, err
}
func (c *Codec) decryptMessage(input, nonce, headerData, readKey []byte) (Packet, error) {
msgdata, err := decryptGCM(readKey, nonce, input, headerData)
if err != nil {
return nil, errMessageDecrypt
}
if len(msgdata) == 0 {
return nil, errMessageTooShort
}
return DecodeMessage(msgdata[0], msgdata[1:])
}
// checkValid performs some basic validity checks on the header.
// The packetLen here is the length remaining after the static header.
func (h *StaticHeader) checkValid(packetLen int, protocolID [6]byte) error {
if h.ProtocolID != protocolID {
return errInvalidHeader
}
if h.Version < minVersion {
return errMinVersion
}
if h.Flag != flagWhoareyou && packetLen < minMessageSize {
return errMsgTooShort
}
if int(h.AuthSize) > packetLen {
return errAuthSize
}
return nil
}
// mask returns a cipher for 'masking' / 'unmasking' packet headers.
func (h *Header) mask(destID enode.ID) cipher.Stream {
block, err := aes.NewCipher(destID[:16])
if err != nil {
panic("can't create cipher")
}
return cipher.NewCTR(block, h.IV[:])
}
func bytesCopy(r *bytes.Buffer) []byte {
b := make([]byte, r.Len())
copy(b, r.Bytes())
return b
}