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what's the difference between the qemu here and the community one?? #10
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Hello moypray, There are quite a few differences between the Xilinx QEMU and the mainline QEMU. Xilinx recommends that you use the Xilinx QEMU as it has better support for our products. Some of the key features that the Xilinx QEMU repo has compared to the mainline repo are:
Thanks, Alistair |
@alistair23 , Got it, thanks for your information~~ |
edgarigl
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It fixes heap-use-after-free which was found by clang's ASAN. Control flow of this use-after-free: main_thread: * Got SIGTERM and completes main loop * Calls migration_shutdown - migrate_fd_cancel (so, migration_thread begins to complete) - object_unref(OBJECT(current_migration)); migration_thread: * migration_iteration_finish -> schedule cleanup bh * object_unref(OBJECT(s)); (Now, current_migration is freed) * exits main_thread: * Calls vm_shutdown -> drain bdrvs -> main loop -> cleanup_bh -> use after free If you want to reproduce, these couple of sleeps will help: vl.c:4613: migration_shutdown(); + sleep(2); migration.c:3269: + sleep(1); trace_migration_thread_after_loop(); migration_iteration_finish(s); Original output: qemu-system-x86_64: terminating on signal 15 from pid 31980 (<unknown process>) ================================================================= ==31958==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x61900001d210 at pc 0x555558a535ca bp 0x7fffffffb190 sp 0x7fffffffb188 READ of size 8 at 0x61900001d210 thread T0 (qemu-vm-0) #0 0x555558a535c9 in migrate_fd_cleanup migration/migration.c:1502:23 #1 0x5555594fde0a in aio_bh_call util/async.c:90:5 #2 0x5555594fe522 in aio_bh_poll util/async.c:118:13 #3 0x555559524783 in aio_poll util/aio-posix.c:725:17 #4 0x555559504fb3 in aio_wait_bh_oneshot util/aio-wait.c:71:5 #5 0x5555573bddf6 in virtio_blk_data_plane_stop hw/block/dataplane/virtio-blk.c:282:5 #6 0x5555589d5c09 in virtio_bus_stop_ioeventfd hw/virtio/virtio-bus.c:246:9 #7 0x5555589e9917 in virtio_pci_stop_ioeventfd hw/virtio/virtio-pci.c:287:5 #8 0x5555589e22bf in virtio_pci_vmstate_change hw/virtio/virtio-pci.c:1072:9 #9 0x555557628931 in virtio_vmstate_change hw/virtio/virtio.c:2257:9 #10 0x555557c36713 in vm_state_notify vl.c:1605:9 #11 0x55555716ef53 in do_vm_stop cpus.c:1074:9 #12 0x55555716eeff in vm_shutdown cpus.c:1092:12 #13 0x555557c4283e in main vl.c:4617:5 #14 0x7fffdfdb482f in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2082f) #15 0x555556ecb118 in _start (x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x1977118) 0x61900001d210 is located 144 bytes inside of 952-byte region [0x61900001d180,0x61900001d538) freed by thread T6 (live_migration) here: #0 0x555556f76782 in __interceptor_free /tmp/final/llvm.src/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:124:3 #1 0x555558d5fa94 in object_finalize qom/object.c:618:9 #2 0x555558d57651 in object_unref qom/object.c:1068:9 #3 0x555558a55588 in migration_thread migration/migration.c:3272:5 #4 0x5555595393f2 in qemu_thread_start util/qemu-thread-posix.c:502:9 #5 0x7fffe057f6b9 in start_thread (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpthread.so.0+0x76b9) previously allocated by thread T0 (qemu-vm-0) here: #0 0x555556f76b03 in __interceptor_malloc /tmp/final/llvm.src/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cc:146:3 #1 0x7ffff6ee37b8 in g_malloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x4f7b8) #2 0x555558d58031 in object_new qom/object.c:640:12 #3 0x555558a31f21 in migration_object_init migration/migration.c:139:25 #4 0x555557c41398 in main vl.c:4320:5 #5 0x7fffdfdb482f in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2082f) Thread T6 (live_migration) created by T0 (qemu-vm-0) here: #0 0x555556f5f0dd in pthread_create /tmp/final/llvm.src/projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_interceptors.cc:210:3 #1 0x555559538cf9 in qemu_thread_create util/qemu-thread-posix.c:539:11 #2 0x555558a53304 in migrate_fd_connect migration/migration.c:3332:5 #3 0x555558a72bd8 in migration_channel_connect migration/channel.c:92:5 #4 0x555558a6ef87 in exec_start_outgoing_migration migration/exec.c:42:5 #5 0x555558a4f3c2 in qmp_migrate migration/migration.c:1922:9 #6 0x555558bb4f6a in qmp_marshal_migrate qapi/qapi-commands-migration.c:607:5 #7 0x555559363738 in do_qmp_dispatch qapi/qmp-dispatch.c:131:5 #8 0x555559362a15 in qmp_dispatch qapi/qmp-dispatch.c:174:11 #9 0x5555571bac15 in monitor_qmp_dispatch monitor.c:4124:11 #10 0x55555719a22d in monitor_qmp_bh_dispatcher monitor.c:4207:9 #11 0x5555594fde0a in aio_bh_call util/async.c:90:5 #12 0x5555594fe522 in aio_bh_poll util/async.c:118:13 #13 0x5555595201e0 in aio_dispatch util/aio-posix.c:460:5 #14 0x555559503553 in aio_ctx_dispatch util/async.c:261:5 #15 0x7ffff6ede196 in g_main_context_dispatch (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x4a196) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free migration/migration.c:1502:23 in migrate_fd_cleanup Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c327fffb9f0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c327fffba00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c327fffba10: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c327fffba20: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c327fffba30: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd =>0x0c327fffba40: fd fd[fd]fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c327fffba50: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c327fffba60: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c327fffba70: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c327fffba80: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c327fffba90: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: cc ==31958==ABORTING Signed-off-by: Yury Kotov <yury-kotov@yandex-team.ru> Message-Id: <20190408113343.2370-1-yury-kotov@yandex-team.ru> Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com> Fixed up comment formatting
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When emulating irqchip in qemu, such as following command: x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64 -m 1024 -smp 4 -hda /home/test/test.img -machine kernel-irqchip=off --enable-kvm -vnc :0 -device edu -monitor stdio We will get a crash with following asan output: (qemu) /home/test/qemu5/qemu/hw/intc/ioapic.c:266:27: runtime error: index 35 out of bounds for type 'int [24]' ================================================================= ==113504==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x61b000003114 at pc 0x5579e3c7a80f bp 0x7fd004bf8c10 sp 0x7fd004bf8c00 WRITE of size 4 at 0x61b000003114 thread T4 #0 0x5579e3c7a80e in ioapic_eoi_broadcast /home/test/qemu5/qemu/hw/intc/ioapic.c:266 #1 0x5579e3c6f480 in apic_eoi /home/test/qemu5/qemu/hw/intc/apic.c:428 #2 0x5579e3c720a7 in apic_mem_write /home/test/qemu5/qemu/hw/intc/apic.c:802 #3 0x5579e3b1e31a in memory_region_write_accessor /home/test/qemu5/qemu/memory.c:503 #4 0x5579e3b1e6a2 in access_with_adjusted_size /home/test/qemu5/qemu/memory.c:569 #5 0x5579e3b28d77 in memory_region_dispatch_write /home/test/qemu5/qemu/memory.c:1497 #6 0x5579e3a1b36b in flatview_write_continue /home/test/qemu5/qemu/exec.c:3323 #7 0x5579e3a1b633 in flatview_write /home/test/qemu5/qemu/exec.c:3362 #8 0x5579e3a1bcb1 in address_space_write /home/test/qemu5/qemu/exec.c:3452 #9 0x5579e3a1bd03 in address_space_rw /home/test/qemu5/qemu/exec.c:3463 #10 0x5579e3b8b979 in kvm_cpu_exec /home/test/qemu5/qemu/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c:2045 #11 0x5579e3ae4499 in qemu_kvm_cpu_thread_fn /home/test/qemu5/qemu/cpus.c:1287 #12 0x5579e4cbdb9f in qemu_thread_start util/qemu-thread-posix.c:502 #13 0x7fd0146376da in start_thread (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpthread.so.0+0x76da) #14 0x7fd01436088e in __clone (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x12188e This is because in ioapic_eoi_broadcast function, we uses 'vector' to index the 's->irq_eoi'. To fix this, we should uses the irq number. Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@163.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20190622002119.126834-1-liq3ea@163.com>
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The test aarch64 kernel is in an array defined with unsigned char aarch64_kernel[] = { [...] } which means it could be any size; currently it's quite small. However we write it to a file using init_bootfile(), which writes exactly 512 bytes to the file. This will break if we ever end up with a kernel larger than that, and will read garbage off the end of the array in the current setup where the kernel is smaller. Make init_bootfile() take an argument giving the length of the data to write. This allows us to use it for all architectures (previously s390 had a special-purpose init_bootfile_s390x which hardcoded the file to write so it could write the correct length). We assert that the x86 bootfile really is exactly 512 bytes as it should be (and as we were previously just assuming it was). This was detected by the clang-7 asan: ==15607==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow on address 0x55a796f51d20 at pc 0x55a796b89c2f bp 0x7ffc58e89160 sp 0x7ffc58e88908 READ of size 512 at 0x55a796f51d20 thread T0 #0 0x55a796b89c2e in fwrite (/home/petmay01/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/sanitizers/tests/migration-test+0xb0c2e) #1 0x55a796c46492 in init_bootfile /home/petmay01/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/tests/migration-test.c:99:5 #2 0x55a796c46492 in test_migrate_start /home/petmay01/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/tests/migration-test.c:593 #3 0x55a796c44101 in test_baddest /home/petmay01/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/tests/migration-test.c:854:9 #4 0x7f906ffd3cc9 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x72cc9) #5 0x7f906ffd3bfa (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x72bfa) #6 0x7f906ffd3bfa (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x72bfa) #7 0x7f906ffd3ea1 in g_test_run_suite (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x72ea1) #8 0x7f906ffd3ec0 in g_test_run (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x72ec0) #9 0x55a796c43707 in main /home/petmay01/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/tests/migration-test.c:1187:11 #10 0x7f906e9abb96 in __libc_start_main /build/glibc-OTsEL5/glibc-2.27/csu/../csu/libc-start.c:310 #11 0x55a796b6c2d9 in _start (/home/petmay01/linaro/qemu-from-laptop/qemu/build/sanitizers/tests/migration-test+0x932d9) Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Laurent Vivier <lvivier@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com> Message-id: 20190702150311.20467-1-peter.maydell@linaro.org
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Reading the RX_DATA register when the RX_FIFO is empty triggers an abort. This can be easily reproduced: $ qemu-system-arm -M emcraft-sf2 -monitor stdio -S QEMU 4.0.50 monitor - type 'help' for more information (qemu) x 0x40001010 Aborted (core dumped) (gdb) bt #1 0x00007f035874f895 in abort () at /lib64/libc.so.6 #2 0x00005628686591ff in fifo8_pop (fifo=0x56286a9a4c68) at util/fifo8.c:66 #3 0x00005628683e0b8e in fifo32_pop (fifo=0x56286a9a4c68) at include/qemu/fifo32.h:137 #4 0x00005628683e0efb in spi_read (opaque=0x56286a9a4850, addr=4, size=4) at hw/ssi/mss-spi.c:168 #5 0x0000562867f96801 in memory_region_read_accessor (mr=0x56286a9a4b60, addr=16, value=0x7ffeecb0c5c8, size=4, shift=0, mask=4294967295, attrs=...) at memory.c:439 #6 0x0000562867f96cdb in access_with_adjusted_size (addr=16, value=0x7ffeecb0c5c8, size=4, access_size_min=1, access_size_max=4, access_fn=0x562867f967c3 <memory_region_read_accessor>, mr=0x56286a9a4b60, attrs=...) at memory.c:569 #7 0x0000562867f99940 in memory_region_dispatch_read1 (mr=0x56286a9a4b60, addr=16, pval=0x7ffeecb0c5c8, size=4, attrs=...) at memory.c:1420 #8 0x0000562867f99a08 in memory_region_dispatch_read (mr=0x56286a9a4b60, addr=16, pval=0x7ffeecb0c5c8, size=4, attrs=...) at memory.c:1447 #9 0x0000562867f38721 in flatview_read_continue (fv=0x56286aec6360, addr=1073745936, attrs=..., buf=0x7ffeecb0c7c0 "\340ǰ\354\376\177", len=4, addr1=16, l=4, mr=0x56286a9a4b60) at exec.c:3385 #10 0x0000562867f38874 in flatview_read (fv=0x56286aec6360, addr=1073745936, attrs=..., buf=0x7ffeecb0c7c0 "\340ǰ\354\376\177", len=4) at exec.c:3423 #11 0x0000562867f388ea in address_space_read_full (as=0x56286aa3e890, addr=1073745936, attrs=..., buf=0x7ffeecb0c7c0 "\340ǰ\354\376\177", len=4) at exec.c:3436 #12 0x0000562867f389c5 in address_space_rw (as=0x56286aa3e890, addr=1073745936, attrs=..., buf=0x7ffeecb0c7c0 "\340ǰ\354\376\177", len=4, is_write=false) at exec.c:3466 #13 0x0000562867f3bdd7 in cpu_memory_rw_debug (cpu=0x56286aa19d00, addr=1073745936, buf=0x7ffeecb0c7c0 "\340ǰ\354\376\177", len=4, is_write=0) at exec.c:3976 #14 0x000056286811ed51 in memory_dump (mon=0x56286a8c32d0, count=1, format=120, wsize=4, addr=1073745936, is_physical=0) at monitor/misc.c:730 #15 0x000056286811eff1 in hmp_memory_dump (mon=0x56286a8c32d0, qdict=0x56286b15c400) at monitor/misc.c:785 #16 0x00005628684740ee in handle_hmp_command (mon=0x56286a8c32d0, cmdline=0x56286a8caeb2 "0x40001010") at monitor/hmp.c:1082 From the datasheet "Actel SmartFusion Microcontroller Subsystem User's Guide" Rev.1, Table 13-3 "SPI Register Summary", this register has a reset value of 0. Check the FIFO is not empty before accessing it, else log an error message. Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com> Message-id: 20190709113715.7761-3-philmd@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
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In the previous commit we fixed a crash when the guest read a register that pop from an empty FIFO. By auditing the repository, we found another similar use with an easy way to reproduce: $ qemu-system-aarch64 -M xlnx-zcu102 -monitor stdio -S QEMU 4.0.50 monitor - type 'help' for more information (qemu) xp/b 0xfd4a0134 Aborted (core dumped) (gdb) bt #0 0x00007f6936dea57f in raise () at /lib64/libc.so.6 #1 0x00007f6936dd4895 in abort () at /lib64/libc.so.6 #2 0x0000561ad32975ec in xlnx_dp_aux_pop_rx_fifo (s=0x7f692babee70) at hw/display/xlnx_dp.c:431 #3 0x0000561ad3297dc0 in xlnx_dp_read (opaque=0x7f692babee70, offset=77, size=4) at hw/display/xlnx_dp.c:667 #4 0x0000561ad321b896 in memory_region_read_accessor (mr=0x7f692babf620, addr=308, value=0x7ffe05c1db88, size=4, shift=0, mask=4294967295, attrs=...) at memory.c:439 #5 0x0000561ad321bd70 in access_with_adjusted_size (addr=308, value=0x7ffe05c1db88, size=1, access_size_min=4, access_size_max=4, access_fn=0x561ad321b858 <memory_region_read_accessor>, mr=0x7f692babf620, attrs=...) at memory.c:569 #6 0x0000561ad321e9d5 in memory_region_dispatch_read1 (mr=0x7f692babf620, addr=308, pval=0x7ffe05c1db88, size=1, attrs=...) at memory.c:1420 #7 0x0000561ad321ea9d in memory_region_dispatch_read (mr=0x7f692babf620, addr=308, pval=0x7ffe05c1db88, size=1, attrs=...) at memory.c:1447 #8 0x0000561ad31bd742 in flatview_read_continue (fv=0x561ad69c04f0, addr=4249485620, attrs=..., buf=0x7ffe05c1dcf0 "\020\335\301\005\376\177", len=1, addr1=308, l=1, mr=0x7f692babf620) at exec.c:3385 #9 0x0000561ad31bd895 in flatview_read (fv=0x561ad69c04f0, addr=4249485620, attrs=..., buf=0x7ffe05c1dcf0 "\020\335\301\005\376\177", len=1) at exec.c:3423 #10 0x0000561ad31bd90b in address_space_read_full (as=0x561ad5bb3020, addr=4249485620, attrs=..., buf=0x7ffe05c1dcf0 "\020\335\301\005\376\177", len=1) at exec.c:3436 #11 0x0000561ad33b1c42 in address_space_read (len=1, buf=0x7ffe05c1dcf0 "\020\335\301\005\376\177", attrs=..., addr=4249485620, as=0x561ad5bb3020) at include/exec/memory.h:2131 #12 0x0000561ad33b1c42 in memory_dump (mon=0x561ad59c4530, count=1, format=120, wsize=1, addr=4249485620, is_physical=1) at monitor/misc.c:723 #13 0x0000561ad33b1fc1 in hmp_physical_memory_dump (mon=0x561ad59c4530, qdict=0x561ad6c6fd00) at monitor/misc.c:795 #14 0x0000561ad37b4a9f in handle_hmp_command (mon=0x561ad59c4530, cmdline=0x561ad59d0f22 "/b 0x00000000fd4a0134") at monitor/hmp.c:1082 Fix by checking the FIFO is not empty before popping from it. The datasheet is not clear about the reset value of this register, we choose to return '0'. Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com> Message-id: 20190709113715.7761-4-philmd@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
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When creating the admin queue in nvme_init() the variable that holds the number of queues created is modified before actual queue creation. This is a problem because if creating the queue fails then the variable is left in inconsistent state. This was actually observed when I tried to hotplug a nvme disk. The control got to nvme_file_open() which called nvme_init() which failed and thus nvme_close() was called which in turn called nvme_free_queue_pair() with queue being NULL. This lead to an instant crash: #0 0x000055d9507ec211 in nvme_free_queue_pair (bs=0x55d952ddb880, q=0x0) at block/nvme.c:164 #1 0x000055d9507ee180 in nvme_close (bs=0x55d952ddb880) at block/nvme.c:729 #2 0x000055d9507ee3d5 in nvme_file_open (bs=0x55d952ddb880, options=0x55d952bb1410, flags=147456, errp=0x7ffd8e19e200) at block/nvme.c:781 #3 0x000055d9507629f3 in bdrv_open_driver (bs=0x55d952ddb880, drv=0x55d95109c1e0 <bdrv_nvme>, node_name=0x0, options=0x55d952bb1410, open_flags=147456, errp=0x7ffd8e19e310) at block.c:1291 #4 0x000055d9507633d6 in bdrv_open_common (bs=0x55d952ddb880, file=0x0, options=0x55d952bb1410, errp=0x7ffd8e19e310) at block.c:1551 #5 0x000055d950766881 in bdrv_open_inherit (filename=0x0, reference=0x0, options=0x55d952bb1410, flags=32768, parent=0x55d9538ce420, child_role=0x55d950eaade0 <child_file>, errp=0x7ffd8e19e510) at block.c:3063 #6 0x000055d950765ae4 in bdrv_open_child_bs (filename=0x0, options=0x55d9541cdff0, bdref_key=0x55d950af33aa "file", parent=0x55d9538ce420, child_role=0x55d950eaade0 <child_file>, allow_none=true, errp=0x7ffd8e19e510) at block.c:2712 #7 0x000055d950766633 in bdrv_open_inherit (filename=0x0, reference=0x0, options=0x55d9541cdff0, flags=0, parent=0x0, child_role=0x0, errp=0x7ffd8e19e908) at block.c:3011 #8 0x000055d950766dba in bdrv_open (filename=0x0, reference=0x0, options=0x55d953d00390, flags=0, errp=0x7ffd8e19e908) at block.c:3156 #9 0x000055d9507cb635 in blk_new_open (filename=0x0, reference=0x0, options=0x55d953d00390, flags=0, errp=0x7ffd8e19e908) at block/block-backend.c:389 #10 0x000055d950465ec5 in blockdev_init (file=0x0, bs_opts=0x55d953d00390, errp=0x7ffd8e19e908) at blockdev.c:602 Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com> Message-id: 927aae40b617ba7d4b6c7ffe74e6d7a2595f8e86.1562770546.git.mprivozn@redhat.com Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com> Tested-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
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Aug 8, 2019
commit a6f230c move blockbackend back to main AioContext on unplug. It set the AioContext of SCSIDevice to the main AioContex, but s->ctx is still the iothread AioContex(if the scsi controller is configure with iothread). So if there are having in-flight requests during unplug, a failing assertion happend. The bt is below: (gdb) bt #0 0x0000ffff86aacbd0 in raise () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #1 0x0000ffff86aadf7c in abort () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #2 0x0000ffff86aa6124 in __assert_fail_base () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #3 0x0000ffff86aa61a4 in __assert_fail () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #4 0x0000000000529118 in virtio_scsi_ctx_check (d=<optimized out>, s=<optimized out>, s=<optimized out>) at /home/qemu-4.0.0/hw/scsi/virtio-scsi.c:246 #5 0x0000000000529ec4 in virtio_scsi_handle_cmd_req_prepare (s=0x2779ec00, req=0xffff740397d0) at /home/qemu-4.0.0/hw/scsi/virtio-scsi.c:559 #6 0x000000000052a228 in virtio_scsi_handle_cmd_vq (s=0x2779ec00, vq=0xffff7c6d7110) at /home/qemu-4.0.0/hw/scsi/virtio-scsi.c:603 #7 0x000000000052afa8 in virtio_scsi_data_plane_handle_cmd (vdev=<optimized out>, vq=0xffff7c6d7110) at /home/qemu-4.0.0/hw/scsi/virtio-scsi-dataplane.c:59 #8 0x000000000054d94c in virtio_queue_host_notifier_aio_poll (opaque=<optimized out>) at /home/qemu-4.0.0/hw/virtio/virtio.c:2452 assert(blk_get_aio_context(d->conf.blk) == s->ctx) failed. To avoid assertion failed, moving the "if" after qdev_simple_device_unplug_cb. In addition, to avoid another qemu crash below, add aio_disable_external before qdev_simple_device_unplug_cb, which disable the further processing of external clients when doing qdev_simple_device_unplug_cb. (gdb) bt #0 scsi_req_unref (req=0xffff6802c6f0) at hw/scsi/scsi-bus.c:1283 #1 0x00000000005294a4 in virtio_scsi_handle_cmd_req_submit (req=<optimized out>, s=<optimized out>) at /home/qemu-4.0.0/hw/scsi/virtio-scsi.c:589 #2 0x000000000052a2a8 in virtio_scsi_handle_cmd_vq (s=s@entry=0x9c90e90, vq=vq@entry=0xffff7c05f110) at /home/qemu-4.0.0/hw/scsi/virtio-scsi.c:625 #3 0x000000000052afd8 in virtio_scsi_data_plane_handle_cmd (vdev=<optimized out>, vq=0xffff7c05f110) at /home/qemu-4.0.0/hw/scsi/virtio-scsi-dataplane.c:60 #4 0x000000000054d97c in virtio_queue_host_notifier_aio_poll (opaque=<optimized out>) at /home/qemu-4.0.0/hw/virtio/virtio.c:2447 #5 0x00000000009b204c in run_poll_handlers_once (ctx=ctx@entry=0x6efea40, timeout=timeout@entry=0xffff7d7f7308) at util/aio-posix.c:521 #6 0x00000000009b2b64 in run_poll_handlers (ctx=ctx@entry=0x6efea40, max_ns=max_ns@entry=4000, timeout=timeout@entry=0xffff7d7f7308) at util/aio-posix.c:559 #7 0x00000000009b2ca0 in try_poll_mode (ctx=ctx@entry=0x6efea40, timeout=0xffff7d7f7308, timeout@entry=0xffff7d7f7348) at util/aio-posix.c:594 #8 0x00000000009b31b8 in aio_poll (ctx=0x6efea40, blocking=blocking@entry=true) at util/aio-posix.c:636 #9 0x00000000006973cc in iothread_run (opaque=0x6ebd800) at iothread.c:75 #10 0x00000000009b592c in qemu_thread_start (args=0x6efef60) at util/qemu-thread-posix.c:502 #11 0x0000ffff8057f8bc in start_thread () from /lib64/libpthread.so.0 #12 0x0000ffff804e5f8c in thread_start () from /lib64/libc.so.6 (gdb) p bus $1 = (SCSIBus *) 0x0 Signed-off-by: Zhengui li <lizhengui@huawei.com> Message-Id: <1563696502-7972-1-git-send-email-lizhengui@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Message-Id: <1563829520-17525-1-git-send-email-pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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Currently offloads disabled by guest via the VIRTIO_NET_CTRL_GUEST_OFFLOADS_SET command are not preserved on VM migration. Instead all offloads reported by guest features (via VIRTIO_PCI_GUEST_FEATURES) get enabled. What happens is: first the VirtIONet::curr_guest_offloads gets restored and offloads are getting set correctly: #0 qemu_set_offload (nc=0x555556a11400, csum=1, tso4=0, tso6=0, ecn=0, ufo=0) at net/net.c:474 #1 virtio_net_apply_guest_offloads (n=0x555557701ca0) at hw/net/virtio-net.c:720 #2 virtio_net_post_load_device (opaque=0x555557701ca0, version_id=11) at hw/net/virtio-net.c:2334 #3 vmstate_load_state (f=0x5555569dc010, vmsd=0x555556577c80 <vmstate_virtio_net_device>, opaque=0x555557701ca0, version_id=11) at migration/vmstate.c:168 #4 virtio_load (vdev=0x555557701ca0, f=0x5555569dc010, version_id=11) at hw/virtio/virtio.c:2197 #5 virtio_device_get (f=0x5555569dc010, opaque=0x555557701ca0, size=0, field=0x55555668cd00 <__compound_literal.5>) at hw/virtio/virtio.c:2036 #6 vmstate_load_state (f=0x5555569dc010, vmsd=0x555556577ce0 <vmstate_virtio_net>, opaque=0x555557701ca0, version_id=11) at migration/vmstate.c:143 #7 vmstate_load (f=0x5555569dc010, se=0x5555578189e0) at migration/savevm.c:829 #8 qemu_loadvm_section_start_full (f=0x5555569dc010, mis=0x5555569eee20) at migration/savevm.c:2211 #9 qemu_loadvm_state_main (f=0x5555569dc010, mis=0x5555569eee20) at migration/savevm.c:2395 #10 qemu_loadvm_state (f=0x5555569dc010) at migration/savevm.c:2467 #11 process_incoming_migration_co (opaque=0x0) at migration/migration.c:449 However later on the features are getting restored, and offloads get reset to everything supported by features: #0 qemu_set_offload (nc=0x555556a11400, csum=1, tso4=1, tso6=1, ecn=0, ufo=0) at net/net.c:474 #1 virtio_net_apply_guest_offloads (n=0x555557701ca0) at hw/net/virtio-net.c:720 #2 virtio_net_set_features (vdev=0x555557701ca0, features=5104441767) at hw/net/virtio-net.c:773 #3 virtio_set_features_nocheck (vdev=0x555557701ca0, val=5104441767) at hw/virtio/virtio.c:2052 #4 virtio_load (vdev=0x555557701ca0, f=0x5555569dc010, version_id=11) at hw/virtio/virtio.c:2220 #5 virtio_device_get (f=0x5555569dc010, opaque=0x555557701ca0, size=0, field=0x55555668cd00 <__compound_literal.5>) at hw/virtio/virtio.c:2036 #6 vmstate_load_state (f=0x5555569dc010, vmsd=0x555556577ce0 <vmstate_virtio_net>, opaque=0x555557701ca0, version_id=11) at migration/vmstate.c:143 #7 vmstate_load (f=0x5555569dc010, se=0x5555578189e0) at migration/savevm.c:829 #8 qemu_loadvm_section_start_full (f=0x5555569dc010, mis=0x5555569eee20) at migration/savevm.c:2211 #9 qemu_loadvm_state_main (f=0x5555569dc010, mis=0x5555569eee20) at migration/savevm.c:2395 #10 qemu_loadvm_state (f=0x5555569dc010) at migration/savevm.c:2467 #11 process_incoming_migration_co (opaque=0x0) at migration/migration.c:449 Fix this by preserving the state in saved_guest_offloads field and pushing out offload initialization to the new post load hook. Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org Signed-off-by: Mikhail Sennikovsky <mikhail.sennikovskii@cloud.ionos.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
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May 12, 2020
There is a use-after-free possible: bdrv_unref_child() leaves bs->backing freed but not NULL. bdrv_attach_child may produce nested polling loop due to drain, than access of freed pointer is possible. I've produced the following crash on 30 iotest with modified code. It does not reproduce on master, but still seems possible: #0 __strcmp_avx2 () at /lib64/libc.so.6 #1 bdrv_backing_overridden (bs=0x55c9d3cc2060) at block.c:6350 #2 bdrv_refresh_filename (bs=0x55c9d3cc2060) at block.c:6404 #3 bdrv_backing_attach (c=0x55c9d48e5520) at block.c:1063 #4 bdrv_replace_child_noperm (child=child@entry=0x55c9d48e5520, new_bs=new_bs@entry=0x55c9d3cc2060) at block.c:2290 #5 bdrv_replace_child (child=child@entry=0x55c9d48e5520, new_bs=new_bs@entry=0x55c9d3cc2060) at block.c:2320 #6 bdrv_root_attach_child (child_bs=child_bs@entry=0x55c9d3cc2060, child_name=child_name@entry=0x55c9d241d478 "backing", child_role=child_role@entry=0x55c9d26ecee0 <child_backing>, ctx=<optimized out>, perm=<optimized out>, shared_perm=21, opaque=0x55c9d3c5a3d0, errp=0x7ffd117108e0) at block.c:2424 #7 bdrv_attach_child (parent_bs=parent_bs@entry=0x55c9d3c5a3d0, child_bs=child_bs@entry=0x55c9d3cc2060, child_name=child_name@entry=0x55c9d241d478 "backing", child_role=child_role@entry=0x55c9d26ecee0 <child_backing>, errp=errp@entry=0x7ffd117108e0) at block.c:5876 #8 in bdrv_set_backing_hd (bs=bs@entry=0x55c9d3c5a3d0, backing_hd=backing_hd@entry=0x55c9d3cc2060, errp=errp@entry=0x7ffd117108e0) at block.c:2576 #9 stream_prepare (job=0x55c9d49d84a0) at block/stream.c:150 #10 job_prepare (job=0x55c9d49d84a0) at job.c:761 #11 job_txn_apply (txn=<optimized out>, fn=<optimized out>) at job.c:145 #12 job_do_finalize (job=0x55c9d49d84a0) at job.c:778 #13 job_completed_txn_success (job=0x55c9d49d84a0) at job.c:832 #14 job_completed (job=0x55c9d49d84a0) at job.c:845 #15 job_completed (job=0x55c9d49d84a0) at job.c:836 #16 job_exit (opaque=0x55c9d49d84a0) at job.c:864 #17 aio_bh_call (bh=0x55c9d471a160) at util/async.c:117 #18 aio_bh_poll (ctx=ctx@entry=0x55c9d3c46720) at util/async.c:117 #19 aio_poll (ctx=ctx@entry=0x55c9d3c46720, blocking=blocking@entry=true) at util/aio-posix.c:728 #20 bdrv_parent_drained_begin_single (poll=true, c=0x55c9d3d558f0) at block/io.c:121 #21 bdrv_parent_drained_begin_single (c=c@entry=0x55c9d3d558f0, poll=poll@entry=true) at block/io.c:114 #22 bdrv_replace_child_noperm (child=child@entry=0x55c9d3d558f0, new_bs=new_bs@entry=0x55c9d3d27300) at block.c:2258 #23 bdrv_replace_child (child=child@entry=0x55c9d3d558f0, new_bs=new_bs@entry=0x55c9d3d27300) at block.c:2320 #24 bdrv_root_attach_child (child_bs=child_bs@entry=0x55c9d3d27300, child_name=child_name@entry=0x55c9d241d478 "backing", child_role=child_role@entry=0x55c9d26ecee0 <child_backing>, ctx=<optimized out>, perm=<optimized out>, shared_perm=21, opaque=0x55c9d3cc2060, errp=0x7ffd11710c60) at block.c:2424 #25 bdrv_attach_child (parent_bs=parent_bs@entry=0x55c9d3cc2060, child_bs=child_bs@entry=0x55c9d3d27300, child_name=child_name@entry=0x55c9d241d478 "backing", child_role=child_role@entry=0x55c9d26ecee0 <child_backing>, errp=errp@entry=0x7ffd11710c60) at block.c:5876 #26 bdrv_set_backing_hd (bs=bs@entry=0x55c9d3cc2060, backing_hd=backing_hd@entry=0x55c9d3d27300, errp=errp@entry=0x7ffd11710c60) at block.c:2576 #27 stream_prepare (job=0x55c9d495ead0) at block/stream.c:150 ... Signed-off-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com> Message-Id: <20200316060631.30052-2-vsementsov@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: John Snow <jsnow@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
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We neglect to free port->bh on the error paths. Fix that. Reproducer: {'execute': 'device_add', 'arguments': {'id': 'virtio_serial_pci0', 'driver': 'virtio-serial-pci', 'bus': 'pci.0', 'addr': '0x5'}, 'id': 'yVkZcGgV'} {'execute': 'device_add', 'arguments': {'id': 'port1', 'driver': 'virtserialport', 'name': 'port1', 'chardev': 'channel1', 'bus': 'virtio_serial_pci0.0', 'nr': 1}, 'id': '3dXdUgJA'} {'execute': 'device_add', 'arguments': {'id': 'port2', 'driver': 'virtserialport', 'name': 'port2', 'chardev': 'channel2', 'bus': 'virtio_serial_pci0.0', 'nr': 1}, 'id': 'qLzcCkob'} {'execute': 'device_add', 'arguments': {'id': 'port2', 'driver': 'virtserialport', 'name': 'port2', 'chardev': 'channel2', 'bus': 'virtio_serial_pci0.0', 'nr': 2}, 'id': 'qLzcCkob'} The leak stack: Direct leak of 40 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f04a8008ae8 in __interceptor_malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xefae8) #1 0x7f04a73cf1d5 in g_malloc (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x531d5) #2 0x56273eaee484 in aio_bh_new /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/async.c:125 #3 0x56273eafe9a8 in qemu_bh_new /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/main-loop.c:532 #4 0x56273d52e62e in virtser_port_device_realize /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/hw/char/virtio-serial-bus.c:946 #5 0x56273dcc5040 in device_set_realized /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/hw/core/qdev.c:891 #6 0x56273e5ebbce in property_set_bool /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/qom/object.c:2238 #7 0x56273e5e5a9c in object_property_set /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/qom/object.c:1324 #8 0x56273e5ef5f8 in object_property_set_qobject /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/qom/qom-qobject.c:26 #9 0x56273e5e5e6a in object_property_set_bool /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/qom/object.c:1390 #10 0x56273daa40de in qdev_device_add /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/qdev-monitor.c:680 #11 0x56273daa53e9 in qmp_device_add /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/qdev-monitor.c:805 Fixes: 199646d Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Amit Shah <amit@kernel.org> Message-Id: <20200309021738.30072-1-pannengyuan@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Laurent Vivier <lvivier@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
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The tulip networking card emulation has an OOB issue in 'tulip_copy_tx_buffers' when the guest provide malformed descriptor. This test will trigger a ASAN heap overflow crash. To trigger this issue we can construct the data as following: 1. construct a 'tulip_descriptor'. Its control is set to '0x7ff | 0x7ff << 11', this will make the 'tulip_copy_tx_buffers's 'len1' and 'len2' to 0x7ff(2047). So 'len1+len2' will overflow 'TULIPState's 'tx_frame' field. This descriptor's 'buf_addr1' and 'buf_addr2' should set to a guest address. 2. write this descriptor to tulip device's CSR4 register. This will set the 'TULIPState's 'current_tx_desc' field. 3. write 'CSR6_ST' to tulip device's CSR6 register. This will trigger 'tulip_xmit_list_update' and finally calls 'tulip_copy_tx_buffers'. Following shows the backtrack of crash: ==31781==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x628000007cd0 at pc 0x7fe03c5a077a bp 0x7fff05b46770 sp 0x7fff05b45f18 WRITE of size 2047 at 0x628000007cd0 thread T0 #0 0x7fe03c5a0779 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0x79779) #1 0x5575fb6daa6a in flatview_read_continue /home/test/qemu/exec.c:3194 #2 0x5575fb6daccb in flatview_read /home/test/qemu/exec.c:3227 #3 0x5575fb6dae66 in address_space_read_full /home/test/qemu/exec.c:3240 #4 0x5575fb6db0cb in address_space_rw /home/test/qemu/exec.c:3268 #5 0x5575fbdfd460 in dma_memory_rw_relaxed /home/test/qemu/include/sysemu/dma.h:87 #6 0x5575fbdfd4b5 in dma_memory_rw /home/test/qemu/include/sysemu/dma.h:110 #7 0x5575fbdfd866 in pci_dma_rw /home/test/qemu/include/hw/pci/pci.h:787 #8 0x5575fbdfd8a3 in pci_dma_read /home/test/qemu/include/hw/pci/pci.h:794 #9 0x5575fbe02761 in tulip_copy_tx_buffers hw/net/tulip.c:585 #10 0x5575fbe0366b in tulip_xmit_list_update hw/net/tulip.c:678 #11 0x5575fbe04073 in tulip_write hw/net/tulip.c:783 Signed-off-by: Li Qiang <liq3ea@163.com> Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
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Direct leak of 4120 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fa114931887 in __interceptor_calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.6+0xb0887) #1 0x7fa1144ad8f0 in g_malloc0 (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x588f0) #2 0x561e3c9c8897 in qmp_object_add /home/elmarco/src/qemu/qom/qom-qmp-cmds.c:291 #3 0x561e3cf48736 in qmp_dispatch /home/elmarco/src/qemu/qapi/qmp-dispatch.c:155 #4 0x561e3c8efb36 in monitor_qmp_dispatch /home/elmarco/src/qemu/monitor/qmp.c:145 #5 0x561e3c8f09ed in monitor_qmp_bh_dispatcher /home/elmarco/src/qemu/monitor/qmp.c:234 #6 0x561e3d08c993 in aio_bh_call /home/elmarco/src/qemu/util/async.c:136 #7 0x561e3d08d0a5 in aio_bh_poll /home/elmarco/src/qemu/util/async.c:164 #8 0x561e3d0a535a in aio_dispatch /home/elmarco/src/qemu/util/aio-posix.c:380 #9 0x561e3d08e3ca in aio_ctx_dispatch /home/elmarco/src/qemu/util/async.c:298 #10 0x7fa1144a776e in g_main_context_dispatch (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5276e) Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20200325184723.2029630-3-marcandre.lureau@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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May 12, 2020
There is an overflow, the source 'datain.data[2]' is 100 bytes, but the 'ss' is 252 bytes.This may cause a security issue because we can access a lot of unrelated memory data. The len for sbp copy data should take the minimum of mx_sb_len and sb_len_wr, not the maximum. If we use iscsi device for VM backend storage, ASAN show stack: READ of size 252 at 0xfffd149dcfc4 thread T0 #0 0xaaad433d0d34 in __asan_memcpy (aarch64-softmmu/qemu-system-aarch64+0x2cb0d34) #1 0xaaad45f9d6d0 in iscsi_aio_ioctl_cb /qemu/block/iscsi.c:996:9 #2 0xfffd1af0e2dc (/usr/lib64/iscsi/libiscsi.so.8+0xe2dc) #3 0xfffd1af0d174 (/usr/lib64/iscsi/libiscsi.so.8+0xd174) #4 0xfffd1af19fac (/usr/lib64/iscsi/libiscsi.so.8+0x19fac) #5 0xaaad45f9acc8 in iscsi_process_read /qemu/block/iscsi.c:403:5 #6 0xaaad4623733c in aio_dispatch_handler /qemu/util/aio-posix.c:467:9 #7 0xaaad4622f350 in aio_dispatch_handlers /qemu/util/aio-posix.c:510:20 #8 0xaaad4622f350 in aio_dispatch /qemu/util/aio-posix.c:520 #9 0xaaad46215944 in aio_ctx_dispatch /qemu/util/async.c:298:5 #10 0xfffd1bed12f4 in g_main_context_dispatch (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x512f4) #11 0xaaad46227de0 in glib_pollfds_poll /qemu/util/main-loop.c:219:9 #12 0xaaad46227de0 in os_host_main_loop_wait /qemu/util/main-loop.c:242 #13 0xaaad46227de0 in main_loop_wait /qemu/util/main-loop.c:518 #14 0xaaad43d9d60c in qemu_main_loop /qemu/softmmu/vl.c:1662:9 #15 0xaaad4607a5b0 in main /qemu/softmmu/main.c:49:5 #16 0xfffd1a460b9c in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x20b9c) #17 0xaaad43320740 in _start (aarch64-softmmu/qemu-system-aarch64+0x2c00740) 0xfffd149dcfc4 is located 0 bytes to the right of 100-byte region [0xfffd149dcf60,0xfffd149dcfc4) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0xaaad433d1e70 in __interceptor_malloc (aarch64-softmmu/qemu-system-aarch64+0x2cb1e70) #1 0xfffd1af0e254 (/usr/lib64/iscsi/libiscsi.so.8+0xe254) #2 0xfffd1af0d174 (/usr/lib64/iscsi/libiscsi.so.8+0xd174) #3 0xfffd1af19fac (/usr/lib64/iscsi/libiscsi.so.8+0x19fac) #4 0xaaad45f9acc8 in iscsi_process_read /qemu/block/iscsi.c:403:5 #5 0xaaad4623733c in aio_dispatch_handler /qemu/util/aio-posix.c:467:9 #6 0xaaad4622f350 in aio_dispatch_handlers /qemu/util/aio-posix.c:510:20 #7 0xaaad4622f350 in aio_dispatch /qemu/util/aio-posix.c:520 #8 0xaaad46215944 in aio_ctx_dispatch /qemu/util/async.c:298:5 #9 0xfffd1bed12f4 in g_main_context_dispatch (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x512f4) #10 0xaaad46227de0 in glib_pollfds_poll /qemu/util/main-loop.c:219:9 #11 0xaaad46227de0 in os_host_main_loop_wait /qemu/util/main-loop.c:242 #12 0xaaad46227de0 in main_loop_wait /qemu/util/main-loop.c:518 #13 0xaaad43d9d60c in qemu_main_loop /qemu/softmmu/vl.c:1662:9 #14 0xaaad4607a5b0 in main /qemu/softmmu/main.c:49:5 #15 0xfffd1a460b9c in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x20b9c) #16 0xaaad43320740 in _start (aarch64-softmmu/qemu-system-aarch64+0x2c00740) Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Chen Qun <kuhn.chenqun@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Message-id: 20200418062602.10776-1-kuhn.chenqun@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
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when s->inflight is freed, vhost_dev_free_inflight may try to access s->inflight->addr, it will retrigger the following issue. ==7309==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x604001020d18 at pc 0x555555ce948a bp 0x7fffffffb170 sp 0x7fffffffb160 READ of size 8 at 0x604001020d18 thread T0 #0 0x555555ce9489 in vhost_dev_free_inflight /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/hw/virtio/vhost.c:1473 #1 0x555555cd86eb in virtio_reset /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/hw/virtio/virtio.c:1214 #2 0x5555560d3eff in virtio_pci_reset hw/virtio/virtio-pci.c:1859 #3 0x555555f2ac53 in device_set_realized hw/core/qdev.c:893 #4 0x5555561d572c in property_set_bool qom/object.c:1925 #5 0x5555561de8de in object_property_set_qobject qom/qom-qobject.c:27 #6 0x5555561d99f4 in object_property_set_bool qom/object.c:1188 #7 0x555555e50ae7 in qdev_device_add /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/qdev-monitor.c:626 #8 0x555555e51213 in qmp_device_add /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/qdev-monitor.c:806 #9 0x555555e8ff40 in hmp_device_add /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/hmp.c:1951 #10 0x555555be889a in handle_hmp_command /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/monitor.c:3404 #11 0x555555beac8b in monitor_command_cb /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/monitor.c:4296 #12 0x555556433eb7 in readline_handle_byte util/readline.c:393 #13 0x555555be89ec in monitor_read /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/monitor.c:4279 #14 0x5555563285cc in tcp_chr_read chardev/char-socket.c:470 #15 0x7ffff670b968 in g_main_context_dispatch (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x4a968) #16 0x55555640727c in glib_pollfds_poll util/main-loop.c:215 #17 0x55555640727c in os_host_main_loop_wait util/main-loop.c:238 #18 0x55555640727c in main_loop_wait util/main-loop.c:497 #19 0x555555b2d0bf in main_loop /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/vl.c:2013 #20 0x555555b2d0bf in main /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/vl.c:4776 #21 0x7fffdd2eb444 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x22444) #22 0x555555b3767a (/root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/x86_64-softmmu/qemu-system-x86_64+0x5e367a) 0x604001020d18 is located 8 bytes inside of 40-byte region [0x604001020d10,0x604001020d38) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0x7ffff6f00508 in __interceptor_free (/lib64/libasan.so.4+0xde508) #1 0x7ffff671107d in g_free (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5007d) previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7ffff6f00a88 in __interceptor_calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.4+0xdea88) #1 0x7ffff6710fc5 in g_malloc0 (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x4ffc5) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free /root/smartx/qemu-el7/qemu-test/hw/virtio/vhost.c:1473 in vhost_dev_free_inflight Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c08801fc150: fa fa 00 00 00 00 04 fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa 0x0c08801fc160: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa 00 00 00 00 04 fa 0x0c08801fc170: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 01 fa fa 00 00 00 00 04 fa 0x0c08801fc180: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 01 fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 01 0x0c08801fc190: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 04 fa =>0x0c08801fc1a0: fa fa fd[fd]fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa 0x0c08801fc1b0: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa 0x0c08801fc1c0: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c08801fc1d0: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 01 fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa 0x0c08801fc1e0: fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd 0x0c08801fc1f0: fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 01 fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==7309==ABORTING Signed-off-by: Li Feng <fengli@smartx.com> Message-Id: <20200417101707.14467-1-fengli@smartx.com> Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Raphael Norwitz <raphael.norwitz@nutanix.com>
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When error happen in multifd_new_send_channel_async, 'sioc' will not be used to create the multifd_send_thread. Let's free it to avoid a memleak. And also do error_free after migrate_set_error() to avoid another leak in the same place. The leak stack: Direct leak of 2880 byte(s) in 8 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f20b5118ae8 in __interceptor_malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xefae8) #1 0x7f20b44df1d5 in g_malloc (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x531d5) #2 0x564133bce18b in object_new_with_type /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/qom/object.c:683 #3 0x564133eea950 in qio_channel_socket_new /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel-socket.c:56 #4 0x5641339cfe4f in socket_send_channel_create /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/migration/socket.c:37 #5 0x564133a10328 in multifd_save_setup /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/migration/multifd.c:772 #6 0x5641339cebed in migrate_fd_connect /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/migration/migration.c:3530 #7 0x5641339d15e4 in migration_channel_connect /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/migration/channel.c:92 #8 0x5641339cf5b7 in socket_outgoing_migration /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/migration/socket.c:108 Direct leak of 384 byte(s) in 8 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f20b5118cf0 in calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xefcf0) #1 0x7f20b44df22d in g_malloc0 (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5322d) #2 0x56413406fc17 in error_setv /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/error.c:61 #3 0x564134070464 in error_setg_errno_internal /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/error.c:109 #4 0x5641340851be in inet_connect_addr /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/qemu-sockets.c:379 #5 0x5641340851be in inet_connect_saddr /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/qemu-sockets.c:458 #6 0x5641340870ab in socket_connect /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/qemu-sockets.c:1105 #7 0x564133eeaabf in qio_channel_socket_connect_sync /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel-socket.c:145 #8 0x564133eeabf5 in qio_channel_socket_connect_worker /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel-socket.c:168 Indirect leak of 360 byte(s) in 8 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f20b5118ae8 in __interceptor_malloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xefae8) #1 0x7f20af901817 in __GI___vasprintf_chk (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x10d817) #2 0x7f20b451fa6c in g_vasprintf (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x93a6c) #3 0x7f20b44f8cd0 in g_strdup_vprintf (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x6ccd0) #4 0x7f20b44f8d8c in g_strdup_printf (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x6cd8c) #5 0x56413406fc86 in error_setv /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/error.c:65 #6 0x564134070464 in error_setg_errno_internal /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/error.c:109 #7 0x5641340851be in inet_connect_addr /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/qemu-sockets.c:379 #8 0x5641340851be in inet_connect_saddr /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/qemu-sockets.c:458 #9 0x5641340870ab in socket_connect /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/qemu-sockets.c:1105 #10 0x564133eeaabf in qio_channel_socket_connect_sync /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel-socket.c:145 #11 0x564133eeabf5 in qio_channel_socket_connect_worker /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel-socket.c:168 Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com> Message-Id: <20200506095416.26099-2-pannengyuan@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
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…leaks When error happen in multifd_send_thread, it use error_copy to set migrate error in multifd_send_terminate_threads(). We should call error_free after it. Similarly, fix another two places in multifd_recv_thread/multifd_save_cleanup. The leak stack: Direct leak of 48 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f781af07cf0 in calloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xefcf0) #1 0x7f781a2ce22d in g_malloc0 (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x5322d) #2 0x55ee1d075c17 in error_setv /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/error.c:61 #3 0x55ee1d076464 in error_setg_errno_internal /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/error.c:109 #4 0x55ee1cef066e in qio_channel_socket_writev /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel-socket.c:569 #5 0x55ee1cee806b in qio_channel_writev /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel.c:207 #6 0x55ee1cee806b in qio_channel_writev_all /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel.c:171 #7 0x55ee1cee8248 in qio_channel_write_all /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel.c:257 #8 0x55ee1ca12c9a in multifd_send_thread /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/migration/multifd.c:657 #9 0x55ee1d0607fc in qemu_thread_start /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/qemu-thread-posix.c:519 #10 0x7f78159ae2dd in start_thread (/lib64/libpthread.so.0+0x82dd) #11 0x7f78156df4b2 in __GI___clone (/lib64/libc.so.6+0xfc4b2) Indirect leak of 52 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f781af07f28 in __interceptor_realloc (/lib64/libasan.so.5+0xeff28) #1 0x7f78156f07d9 in __GI___vasprintf_chk (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x10d7d9) #2 0x7f781a30ea6c in g_vasprintf (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x93a6c) #3 0x7f781a2e7cd0 in g_strdup_vprintf (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x6ccd0) #4 0x7f781a2e7d8c in g_strdup_printf (/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x6cd8c) #5 0x55ee1d075c86 in error_setv /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/error.c:65 #6 0x55ee1d076464 in error_setg_errno_internal /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/error.c:109 #7 0x55ee1cef066e in qio_channel_socket_writev /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel-socket.c:569 #8 0x55ee1cee806b in qio_channel_writev /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel.c:207 #9 0x55ee1cee806b in qio_channel_writev_all /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel.c:171 #10 0x55ee1cee8248 in qio_channel_write_all /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/io/channel.c:257 #11 0x55ee1ca12c9a in multifd_send_thread /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/migration/multifd.c:657 #12 0x55ee1d0607fc in qemu_thread_start /mnt/sdb/backup/qemu/util/qemu-thread-posix.c:519 #13 0x7f78159ae2dd in start_thread (/lib64/libpthread.so.0+0x82dd) #14 0x7f78156df4b2 in __GI___clone (/lib64/libc.so.6+0xfc4b2) Reported-by: Euler Robot <euler.robot@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Pan Nengyuan <pannengyuan@huawei.com> Message-Id: <20200506095416.26099-3-pannengyuan@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
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tries to fix a leak detected when building with --enable-sanitizers: ./i386-softmmu/qemu-system-i386 Upon exit: ==13576==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 1216 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f9d2ed5c628 in malloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5) #1 0x7f9d2e963500 in g_malloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.) #2 0x55fa646d25cc in object_new_with_type /tmp/qemu/qom/object.c:686 #3 0x55fa63dbaa88 in qdev_new /tmp/qemu/hw/core/qdev.c:140 #4 0x55fa638a533f in pc_pflash_create /tmp/qemu/hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c:88 #5 0x55fa638a54c4 in pc_system_flash_create /tmp/qemu/hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c:106 #6 0x55fa646caa1d in object_init_with_type /tmp/qemu/qom/object.c:369 #7 0x55fa646d20b5 in object_initialize_with_type /tmp/qemu/qom/object.c:511 #8 0x55fa646d2606 in object_new_with_type /tmp/qemu/qom/object.c:687 #9 0x55fa639431e9 in qemu_init /tmp/qemu/softmmu/vl.c:3878 #10 0x55fa6335c1b8 in main /tmp/qemu/softmmu/main.c:48 #11 0x7f9d2cf06e0a in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 #12 0x55fa6335f8e9 in _start (/tmp/qemu/build/i386-softmmu/qemu-system-i386) Signed-off-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu> Message-Id: <20200701145231.19531-1-alxndr@bu.edu> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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…tart When the disconnect event is triggered in the connecting stage, the tcp_chr_disconnect_locked may be called twice. The first call: #0 qemu_chr_socket_restart_timer (chr=0x55555582ee90) at chardev/char-socket.c:120 #1 0x000055555558e38c in tcp_chr_disconnect_locked (chr=<optimized out>) at chardev/char-socket.c:490 #2 0x000055555558e3cd in tcp_chr_disconnect (chr=0x55555582ee90) at chardev/char-socket.c:497 #3 0x000055555558ea32 in tcp_chr_new_client (chr=chr@entry=0x55555582ee90, sioc=sioc@entry=0x55555582f0b0) at chardev/char-socket.c:892 #4 0x000055555558eeb8 in qemu_chr_socket_connected (task=0x55555582f300, opaque=<optimized out>) at chardev/char-socket.c:1090 #5 0x0000555555574352 in qio_task_complete (task=task@entry=0x55555582f300) at io/task.c:196 #6 0x00005555555745f4 in qio_task_thread_result (opaque=0x55555582f300) at io/task.c:111 #7 qio_task_wait_thread (task=0x55555582f300) at io/task.c:190 #8 0x000055555558f17e in tcp_chr_wait_connected (chr=0x55555582ee90, errp=0x555555802a08 <error_abort>) at chardev/char-socket.c:1013 #9 0x0000555555567cbd in char_socket_client_reconnect_test (opaque=0x5555557fe020 <client8unix>) at tests/test-char.c:1152 The second call: #0 0x00007ffff5ac3277 in raise () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #1 0x00007ffff5ac4968 in abort () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #2 0x00007ffff5abc096 in __assert_fail_base () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #3 0x00007ffff5abc142 in __assert_fail () from /lib64/libc.so.6 #4 0x000055555558d10a in qemu_chr_socket_restart_timer (chr=0x55555582ee90) at chardev/char-socket.c:125 #5 0x000055555558df0c in tcp_chr_disconnect_locked (chr=<optimized out>) at chardev/char-socket.c:490 #6 0x000055555558df4d in tcp_chr_disconnect (chr=0x55555582ee90) at chardev/char-socket.c:497 #7 0x000055555558e5b2 in tcp_chr_new_client (chr=chr@entry=0x55555582ee90, sioc=sioc@entry=0x55555582f0b0) at chardev/char-socket.c:892 #8 0x000055555558e93a in tcp_chr_connect_client_sync (chr=chr@entry=0x55555582ee90, errp=errp@entry=0x7fffffffd178) at chardev/char-socket.c:944 #9 0x000055555558ec78 in tcp_chr_wait_connected (chr=0x55555582ee90, errp=0x555555802a08 <error_abort>) at chardev/char-socket.c:1035 #10 0x000055555556804b in char_socket_client_test (opaque=0x5555557fe020 <client8unix>) at tests/test-char.c:1023 Run test/test-char to reproduce this issue. test-char: chardev/char-socket.c:125: qemu_chr_socket_restart_timer: Assertion `!s->reconnect_timer' failed. Signed-off-by: Li Feng <fengli@smartx.com> Acked-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20200522025554.41063-1-fengli@smartx.com>
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"tmp.tls_hostname" and "tmp.tls_creds" allocated by migrate_params_test_apply() is forgot to free at the end of qmp_migrate_set_parameters(). Fix that. The leak stack: Direct leak of 2 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from: #0 0xffffb597c20b in __interceptor_malloc (/usr/lib64/libasan.so.4+0xd320b) #1 0xffffb52dcb1b in g_malloc (/usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x58b1b) #2 0xffffb52f8143 in g_strdup (/usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x74143) #3 0xaaaac52447fb in migrate_params_test_apply (/usr/src/debug/qemu-4.1.0/migration/migration.c:1377) #4 0xaaaac52fdca7 in qmp_migrate_set_parameters (/usr/src/debug/qemu-4.1.0/qapi/qapi-commands-migration.c:192) #5 0xaaaac551d543 in qmp_dispatch (/usr/src/debug/qemu-4.1.0/qapi/qmp-dispatch.c:165) #6 0xaaaac52a0a8f in qmp_dispatch (/usr/src/debug/qemu-4.1.0/monitor/qmp.c:125) #7 0xaaaac52a1c7f in monitor_qmp_dispatch (/usr/src/debug/qemu-4.1.0/monitor/qmp.c:214) #8 0xaaaac55cb0cf in aio_bh_call (/usr/src/debug/qemu-4.1.0/util/async.c:117) #9 0xaaaac55d4543 in aio_bh_poll (/usr/src/debug/qemu-4.1.0/util/aio-posix.c:459) #10 0xaaaac55cae0f in aio_dispatch (/usr/src/debug/qemu-4.1.0/util/async.c:268) #11 0xffffb52d6a7b in g_main_context_dispatch (/usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x52a7b) #12 0xaaaac55d1e3b(/usr/bin/qemu-kvm-4.1.0+0x1622e3b) #13 0xaaaac4e314bb(/usr/bin/qemu-kvm-4.1.0+0xe824bb) #14 0xaaaac47f45ef(/usr/bin/qemu-kvm-4.1.0+0x8455ef) #15 0xffffb4bfef3f in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib64/libc.so.6+0x23f3f) #16 0xaaaac47ffacb(/usr/bin/qemu-kvm-4.1.0+0x850acb) Direct leak of 2 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from: #0 0xffffb597c20b in __interceptor_malloc (/usr/lib64/libasan.so.4+0xd320b) #1 0xffffb52dcb1b in g_malloc (/usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x58b1b) #2 0xffffb52f8143 in g_strdup (/usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x74143) #3 0xaaaac5244893 in migrate_params_test_apply (/usr/src/debug/qemu-4.1.0/migration/migration.c:1382) #4 0xaaaac52fdca7 in qmp_migrate_set_parameters (/usr/src/debug/qemu-4.1.0/qapi/qapi-commands-migration.c:192) #5 0xaaaac551d543 in qmp_dispatch (/usr/src/debug/qemu-4.1.0/qapi/qmp-dispatch.c) #6 0xaaaac52a0a8f in qmp_dispatch (/usr/src/debug/qemu-4.1.0/monitor/qmp.c:125) #7 0xaaaac52a1c7f in monitor_qmp_dispatch (/usr/src/debug/qemu-4.1.0/monitor/qmp.c:214) #8 0xaaaac55cb0cf in aio_bh_call (/usr/src/debug/qemu-4.1.0/util/async.c:117) #9 0xaaaac55d4543 in aio_bh_poll (/usr/src/debug/qemu-4.1.0/util/aio-posix.c:459) #10 0xaaaac55cae0f in in aio_dispatch (/usr/src/debug/qemu-4.1.0/util/async.c:268) #11 0xffffb52d6a7b in g_main_context_dispatch (/usr/lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x52a7b) #12 0xaaaac55d1e3b(/usr/bin/qemu-kvm-4.1.0+0x1622e3b) #13 0xaaaac4e314bb(/usr/bin/qemu-kvm-4.1.0+0xe824bb) #14 0xaaaac47f45ef (/usr/bin/qemu-kvm-4.1.0+0x8455ef) #15 0xffffb4bfef3f in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib64/libc.so.6+0x23f3f) #16 0xaaaac47ffacb(/usr/bin/qemu-kvm-4.1.0+0x850acb) Signed-off-by: Chuan Zheng <zhengchuan@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: KeQian Zhu <zhukeqian1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: HaiLiang <zhang.zhanghailiang@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
edgarigl
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It should be safe to reenter qio_channel_yield() on io/channel read/write path, so it's safe to reduce in_flight and allow attaching new aio context. And no problem to allow drain itself: connection attempt is not a guest request. Moreover, if remote server is down, we can hang in negotiation, blocking drain section and provoking a dead lock. How to reproduce the dead lock: 1. Create nbd-fault-injector.conf with the following contents: [inject-error "mega1"] event=data io=readwrite when=before 2. In one terminal run nbd-fault-injector in a loop, like this: n=1; while true; do echo $n; ((n++)); ./nbd-fault-injector.py 127.0.0.1:10000 nbd-fault-injector.conf; done 3. In another terminal run qemu-io in a loop, like this: n=1; while true; do echo $n; ((n++)); ./qemu-io -c 'read 0 512' nbd://127.0.0.1:10000; done After some time, qemu-io will hang trying to drain, for example, like this: #3 aio_poll (ctx=0x55f006bdd890, blocking=true) at util/aio-posix.c:600 #4 bdrv_do_drained_begin (bs=0x55f006bea710, recursive=false, parent=0x0, ignore_bds_parents=false, poll=true) at block/io.c:427 #5 bdrv_drained_begin (bs=0x55f006bea710) at block/io.c:433 #6 blk_drain (blk=0x55f006befc80) at block/block-backend.c:1710 #7 blk_unref (blk=0x55f006befc80) at block/block-backend.c:498 #8 bdrv_open_inherit (filename=0x7fffba1563bc "nbd+tcp://127.0.0.1:10000", reference=0x0, options=0x55f006be86d0, flags=24578, parent=0x0, child_class=0x0, child_role=0, errp=0x7fffba154620) at block.c:3491 #9 bdrv_open (filename=0x7fffba1563bc "nbd+tcp://127.0.0.1:10000", reference=0x0, options=0x0, flags=16386, errp=0x7fffba154620) at block.c:3513 #10 blk_new_open (filename=0x7fffba1563bc "nbd+tcp://127.0.0.1:10000", reference=0x0, options=0x0, flags=16386, errp=0x7fffba154620) at block/block-backend.c:421 And connection_co stack like this: #0 qemu_coroutine_switch (from_=0x55f006bf2650, to_=0x7fe96e07d918, action=COROUTINE_YIELD) at util/coroutine-ucontext.c:302 #1 qemu_coroutine_yield () at util/qemu-coroutine.c:193 #2 qio_channel_yield (ioc=0x55f006bb3c20, condition=G_IO_IN) at io/channel.c:472 #3 qio_channel_readv_all_eof (ioc=0x55f006bb3c20, iov=0x7fe96d729bf0, niov=1, errp=0x7fe96d729eb0) at io/channel.c:110 #4 qio_channel_readv_all (ioc=0x55f006bb3c20, iov=0x7fe96d729bf0, niov=1, errp=0x7fe96d729eb0) at io/channel.c:143 #5 qio_channel_read_all (ioc=0x55f006bb3c20, buf=0x7fe96d729d28 "\300.\366\004\360U", buflen=8, errp=0x7fe96d729eb0) at io/channel.c:247 #6 nbd_read (ioc=0x55f006bb3c20, buffer=0x7fe96d729d28, size=8, desc=0x55f004f69644 "initial magic", errp=0x7fe96d729eb0) at /work/src/qemu/master/include/block/nbd.h:365 #7 nbd_read64 (ioc=0x55f006bb3c20, val=0x7fe96d729d28, desc=0x55f004f69644 "initial magic", errp=0x7fe96d729eb0) at /work/src/qemu/master/include/block/nbd.h:391 #8 nbd_start_negotiate (aio_context=0x55f006bdd890, ioc=0x55f006bb3c20, tlscreds=0x0, hostname=0x0, outioc=0x55f006bf19f8, structured_reply=true, zeroes=0x7fe96d729dca, errp=0x7fe96d729eb0) at nbd/client.c:904 #9 nbd_receive_negotiate (aio_context=0x55f006bdd890, ioc=0x55f006bb3c20, tlscreds=0x0, hostname=0x0, outioc=0x55f006bf19f8, info=0x55f006bf1a00, errp=0x7fe96d729eb0) at nbd/client.c:1032 #10 nbd_client_connect (bs=0x55f006bea710, errp=0x7fe96d729eb0) at block/nbd.c:1460 #11 nbd_reconnect_attempt (s=0x55f006bf19f0) at block/nbd.c:287 #12 nbd_co_reconnect_loop (s=0x55f006bf19f0) at block/nbd.c:309 #13 nbd_connection_entry (opaque=0x55f006bf19f0) at block/nbd.c:360 #14 coroutine_trampoline (i0=113190480, i1=22000) at util/coroutine-ucontext.c:173 Note, that the hang may be triggered by another bug, so the whole case is fixed only together with commit "block/nbd: on shutdown terminate connection attempt". Signed-off-by: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <vsementsov@virtuozzo.com> Message-Id: <20200727184751.15704-3-vsementsov@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
edgarigl
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OSS-Fuzz found sending illegal addresses when querying the write protection bits triggers an assertion: qemu-fuzz-i386: hw/sd/sd.c:824: uint32_t sd_wpbits(SDState *, uint64_t): Assertion `wpnum < sd->wpgrps_size' failed. ==11578== ERROR: libFuzzer: deadly signal #8 0x7ffff628e091 in __assert_fail #9 0x5555588f1a3c in sd_wpbits hw/sd/sd.c:824:9 #10 0x5555588dd271 in sd_normal_command hw/sd/sd.c:1383:38 #11 0x5555588d777c in sd_do_command hw/sd/sd.c #12 0x555558cb25a0 in sdbus_do_command hw/sd/core.c:100:16 #13 0x555558e02a9a in sdhci_send_command hw/sd/sdhci.c:337:12 #14 0x555558dffa46 in sdhci_write hw/sd/sdhci.c:1187:9 #15 0x5555598b9d76 in memory_region_write_accessor softmmu/memory.c:489:5 Similarly to commit 8573378 ("hw/sd: fix out-of-bounds check for multi block reads"), check the address range before sending the status of the write protection bits. Include the qtest reproducer provided by Alexander Bulekov: $ make check-qtest-i386 ... Running test qtest-i386/fuzz-sdcard-test qemu-system-i386: ../hw/sd/sd.c:824: sd_wpbits: Assertion `wpnum < sd->wpgrps_size' failed. Reported-by: OSS-Fuzz (Issue 29225) Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/450 Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org> Reviewed-by: Bin Meng <bmeng.cn@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu> Message-Id: <20210702155900.148665-4-f4bug@amsat.org>
edgarigl
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When building the 'microvm' machine stand-alone we get: $ qemu-system-x86_64 -M microvm ** ERROR:qom/object.c:714:object_new_with_type: assertion failed: (type != NULL) Bail out! ERROR:qom/object.c:714:object_new_with_type: assertion failed: (type != NULL) Aborted (core dumped) Looking at the backtrace: (gdb) bt #3 0x00007ff2330492ff in g_assertion_message_expr () at /lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0 #4 0x000055a878c18341 in object_new_with_type (type=<optimized out>) at qom/object.c:714 #5 0x000055a878c18399 in object_new (typename=typename@entry=0x55a878dec36a "isa-pit") at qom/object.c:747 #6 0x000055a878cc8146 in qdev_new (name=name@entry=0x55a878dec36a "isa-pit") at hw/core/qdev.c:153 #7 0x000055a878a8b439 in isa_new (name=name@entry=0x55a878dec36a "isa-pit") at hw/isa/isa-bus.c:160 #8 0x000055a878adb782 in i8254_pit_init (base=64, isa_irq=0, alt_irq=0x0, bus=0x55a87ab38760) at include/hw/timer/i8254.h:54 #9 microvm_devices_init (mms=0x55a87ac36800) at hw/i386/microvm.c:263 #10 microvm_machine_state_init (machine=<optimized out>) at hw/i386/microvm.c:471 #11 0x000055a878a944ab in machine_run_board_init (machine=machine@entry=0x55a87ac36800) at hw/core/machine.c:1239 The "isa-pit" type (TYPE_I8254) is missing. Add it. Fixes: 0ebf007 ("hw/i386: Introduce the microvm machine type") Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20210616204328.2611406-24-philmd@redhat.com>
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When building the Pegasos2 machine stand-alone we get: $ qemu-system-ppc -M pegasos2 -bios pegasos2.rom ERROR:qom/object.c:714:object_new_with_type: assertion failed: (type != NULL) Bail out! ERROR:qom/object.c:714:object_new_with_type: assertion failed: (type != NULL) Looking at the backtraces: Thread 1 "qemu-system-ppc" received signal SIGABRT, Aborted. (gdb) bt #0 0x00007ffff53877d5 in raise () at /lib64/libc.so.6 #1 0x00007ffff5370895 in abort () at /lib64/libc.so.6 #2 0x00007ffff6dc4b6c in g_assertion_message_expr.cold () at /lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0 #3 0x00007ffff6e229ff in g_assertion_message_expr () at /lib64/libglib-2.0.so.0 #4 0x0000555555a0c8f4 in object_new_with_type (type=0x0) at qom/object.c:714 #5 0x0000555555a0c9d5 in object_new (typename=0x555555c7afe4 "isa-pit") at qom/object.c:747 #6 0x0000555555a053b8 in qdev_new (name=0x555555c7afe4 "isa-pit") at hw/core/qdev.c:153 #7 0x00005555557cdd05 in isa_new (name=0x555555c7afe4 "isa-pit") at hw/isa/isa-bus.c:160 #8 0x00005555557cf518 in i8254_pit_init (bus=0x55555603d140, base=64, isa_irq=0, alt_irq=0x0) at include/hw/timer/i8254.h:54 #9 0x00005555557d12f9 in vt8231_realize (d=0x5555563d9770, errp=0x7fffffffcc28) at hw/isa/vt82c686.c:704 (gdb) bt #0 0x00007ffff54bd7d5 in raise () at /lib64/libc.so.6 #1 0x00007ffff54a6895 in abort () at /lib64/libc.so.6 #2 0x00005555558f7796 in object_new (typename=0x555555ad4889 "isa-parallel") at qom/object.c:749 #3 object_new (typename=type0x555555ad4889 "isa-parallel") at qom/object.c:743 #4 0x00005555558f0d46 in qdev_new (name=0x555555ad4889 "isa-parallel") at hw/core/qdev.c:153 #5 0x000055555576b669 in isa_new (name=0x555555ad4889 "isa-parallel") at hw/isa/isa-bus.c:160 #6 0x000055555576bbe8 in isa_superio_realize (dev=0x555555f15910, errp=<optimized out>) at hw/isa/isa-superio.c:54 #7 0x000055555576d5ed in via_superio_realize (d=0x555555f15910, errp=0x7fffffffcb30) at hw/isa/vt82c686.c:292 #8 0x00005555558f12c1 in device_set_realized (obj=<optimized out>, ...) at hw/core/qdev.c:761 #9 0x00005555558f5066 in property_set_bool (obj=0x555555f15910, ..., errp=0x7fffffffcbb0) at qom/object.c:2262 #10 0x00005555558f7f38 in object_property_set (obj=0x555555f15910, name=0x555555b1b1e3 "realized", ...) at qom/object.c:1407 #11 0x00005555558fb2d0 in object_property_set_qobject (obj=0x555555f15910, name=0x555555b1b1e3 "realized", ...) at qom/qom-qobject.c:28 #12 0x00005555558f8525 in object_property_set_bool (obj=0x555555f15910, name=0x555555b1b1e3 "realized", ...) at qom/object.c:1477 #13 0x00005555558f18ee in qdev_realize (dev=0x555555f15910, bus=0x55555602a610, errp=<optimized out>) at hw/core/qdev.c:389 #14 0x00005555558f197f in qdev_realize_and_unref (dev=0x555555f15910, bus=0x55555602a610, errp=<optimized out>) at hw/core/qdev.c:396 #15 0x000055555576b709 in isa_realize_and_unref (errp=<optimized out>, bus=0x55555602a610, dev=0x555555f15910) at hw/isa/isa-bus.c:179 #16 isa_create_simple (bus=0x55555602a610, name=0x555555adc33b "vt8231-superio") at hw/isa/isa-bus.c:173 #17 0x000055555576d9b7 in vt8231_realize (d=0x555556186a50, errp=<optimized out>) at hw/isa/vt82c686.c:706 The "isa-pit" type (TYPE_I8254) and "isa-parallel" are missing. Add them. Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org> Reviewed-by: BALATON Zoltan <balaton@eik.bme.hu> Reviewed-by: Bin Meng <bmeng.cn@gmail.com> Message-Id: <20210515173716.358295-12-philmd@redhat.com> [PMD: Added "isa-parallel" later]
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OSS-Fuzz found sending illegal addresses when querying the write protection bits triggers the assertion added in commit 84816fb ("hw/sd/sdcard: Assert if accessing an illegal group"): qemu-fuzz-i386-target-generic-fuzz-sdhci-v3: ../hw/sd/sd.c:824: uint32_t sd_wpbits(SDState *, uint64_t): Assertion `wpnum < sd->wpgrps_size' failed. #3 0x7f62a8b22c91 in __assert_fail #4 0x5569adcec405 in sd_wpbits hw/sd/sd.c:824:9 #5 0x5569adce5f6d in sd_normal_command hw/sd/sd.c:1389:38 #6 0x5569adce3870 in sd_do_command hw/sd/sd.c:1737:17 #7 0x5569adcf1566 in sdbus_do_command hw/sd/core.c:100:16 #8 0x5569adcfc192 in sdhci_send_command hw/sd/sdhci.c:337:12 #9 0x5569adcfa3a3 in sdhci_write hw/sd/sdhci.c:1186:9 #10 0x5569adfb3447 in memory_region_write_accessor softmmu/memory.c:492:5 It is legal for the CMD30 to query for out-of-range addresses. Such invalid addresses are simply ignored in the response (write protection bits set to 0). In commit 84816fb ("hw/sd/sdcard: Assert if accessing an illegal group") we misplaced the assertion *before* we test the address is in range. Move it *after*. Include the qtest reproducer provided by Alexander Bulekov: $ make check-qtest-i386 ... Running test qtest-i386/fuzz-sdcard-test qemu-system-i386: ../hw/sd/sd.c:824: sd_wpbits: Assertion `wpnum < sd->wpgrps_size' failed. Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org Reported-by: OSS-Fuzz (Issue 29225) Suggested-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Fixes: 84816fb ("hw/sd/sdcard: Assert if accessing an illegal group") Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/495 Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org> Message-Id: <20210802235524.3417739-3-f4bug@amsat.org> Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Tested-by: Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>
franciscoIglesias
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Jan 30, 2023
As soon as virtio_scsi_data_plane_start() attaches host notifiers the IOThread may start virtqueue processing. There is a race between IOThread virtqueue processing and virtio_scsi_data_plane_start() because it only assigns s->dataplane_started after attaching host notifiers. When a virtqueue handler function in the IOThread calls virtio_scsi_defer_to_dataplane() it may see !s->dataplane_started and attempt to start dataplane even though we're already in the IOThread: #0 0x00007f67b360857c __pthread_kill_implementation (libc.so.6 + 0xa257c) #1 0x00007f67b35bbd56 raise (libc.so.6 + 0x55d56) #2 0x00007f67b358e833 abort (libc.so.6 + 0x28833) #3 0x00007f67b358e75b __assert_fail_base.cold (libc.so.6 + 0x2875b) #4 0x00007f67b35b4cd6 __assert_fail (libc.so.6 + 0x4ecd6) #5 0x000055ca87fd411b memory_region_transaction_commit (qemu-kvm + 0x67511b) #6 0x000055ca87e17811 virtio_pci_ioeventfd_assign (qemu-kvm + 0x4b8811) #7 0x000055ca87e14836 virtio_bus_set_host_notifier (qemu-kvm + 0x4b5836) #8 0x000055ca87f8e14e virtio_scsi_set_host_notifier (qemu-kvm + 0x62f14e) #9 0x000055ca87f8dd62 virtio_scsi_dataplane_start (qemu-kvm + 0x62ed62) #10 0x000055ca87e14610 virtio_bus_start_ioeventfd (qemu-kvm + 0x4b5610) #11 0x000055ca87f8c29a virtio_scsi_handle_ctrl (qemu-kvm + 0x62d29a) #12 0x000055ca87fa5902 virtio_queue_host_notifier_read (qemu-kvm + 0x646902) #13 0x000055ca882c099e aio_dispatch_handler (qemu-kvm + 0x96199e) #14 0x000055ca882c1761 aio_poll (qemu-kvm + 0x962761) #15 0x000055ca880e1052 iothread_run (qemu-kvm + 0x782052) #16 0x000055ca882c562a qemu_thread_start (qemu-kvm + 0x96662a) This patch assigns s->dataplane_started before attaching host notifiers so that virtqueue handler functions that run in the IOThread before virtio_scsi_data_plane_start() returns correctly identify that dataplane does not need to be started. This fix is taken from the virtio-blk dataplane code and it's worth adding a comment in virtio-blk as well to explain why it works. Note that s->dataplane_started does not need the AioContext lock because it is set before attaching host notifiers and cleared after detaching host notifiers. In other words, the IOThread always sees the value true and the main loop thread does not modify it while the IOThread is active. Buglink: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2099541 Reported-by: Qing Wang <qinwang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20220808162134.240405-1-stefanha@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Emanuele Giuseppe Esposito <eesposit@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
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