It is basically a clone of Augur.
If there is a team of voters who can steal from you, you need to pay them enough fees so that the long-term expected profit from these fees exceeds the short-term expected profit of stealing from you.
They claim that there is a dispute mechanism to prevent the voters from stealing from you. But the dispute mechanism is another insecure voting mechanism, which is broken for the same reason.
In Augur they get some amount of security from this kind of mechanism by requiring that the voters have a security bond which is much larger than the amount of money that they could possibly steal. The problem with this design is that you need to pay the voters to have that much money locked up. This is expensive by the interest rate on that money. So this kind of mechanism requires oracle fees to pay the voters. These oracle fees make the system too expensive, and worse, they create a vulnerability to parasite attacks. A parasite attack is when someone copies your oracle outcome to enforce their contracts, but they do not pay the fees to your oracle voters. So your oracle voters aren't incentivized to lock up value in the bonds that secure the network, and it breaks.
But really, it is much worse than that. Because voting mechanisms are vulnerable to tragedy of the commons. The amount of money you would need to pay to bribe the voters to break the network, it is only a small fraction of the size of the security bond.
Tragedy of the commons happens whenever the benefits of participating in an attack are centralized to the person making the decision, and the costs of that person participating in the attack are distributed to a larger group.
Additionally, proof of stake does not work. I wrote about it here: https://github.com/zack-bitcoin/amoveo-docs/blob/master//other_blockchains/proof_of_stake.md