#Exogenous Empirical-evidence Equilibria in Perfect-monitoring Repeated Games Yield Correlated Equilibria Nicolas Dudebout and Jeff S. Shamma

##Abstract This paper proves that exogenous empirical-evidence equilibria (xEEEs) in perfect-monitoring repeated games induce correlated equilibria of the associated one-shot game. An empirical-evidence equilibrium (EEE) is a solution concept for stochastic games. At equilibrium, agents’ strategies are optimal with respect to models of their opponents. These models satisfy a consistency condition with respect to the actual behavior of the opponents. As such, EEEs replace the full-rationality requirement of Nash equilibria by a consistency-based bounded-rationality one. In this paper, the framework of empirical evidence is summarized, with an emphasis on perfect-monitoring repeated games. A less constraining notion of consistency is introduced. The fact that an xEEE in a perfect-monitoring repeated game induces a correlated equilibrium on the underlying one-shot game is proven. This result and the new notion of consistency are illustrated on the hawk-dove game. Finally, a method to build specific correlated equilibria from xEEEs is derived.

##BibTeX @InProceedings{dudebout_shamma:2014, author = "Dudebout, Nicolas and Shamma, Jeff S.", title = "Exogenous Empirical-evidence Equilibria in Perfect-monitoring Repeated Games Yield Correlated Equilibria", booktitle = "53rd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control", year = 2014, month = dec }

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