

Apr 10, 2013

sohr



# **Executive Summary**

## **Issues Overview**

On Apr 10, 2013, a source code review was performed over the src code base. 2 files, 21 LOC (Executable) were scanned and reviewed for defects that could lead to potential security vulnerabilities. A total of 2 reviewed findings were uncovered during the analysis.

Issues by Fortify Priority Order	
High	2

## **Recommendations and Conclusions**

The Issues Category section provides Fortify recommendations for addressing issues at a generic level. The recommendations for specific fixes can be extrapolated from those generic recommendations by the development group.



# **Project Summary**

## **Code Base Summary**

Code location: C:/ThinkpadR60/Projekte/MobileApps/AndroidApps/src/LocationLeak/LocationLeak/src

Number of Files: 2 Lines of Code: 21

Build Label: <No Build Label>

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Scan time: 00:31

SCA Engine version: 5.14.0.0034 Machine Name: TZI-SOHR-T510 Username running scan: sohr

#### **Results Certification**

Results Certification Valid

Details:

Results Signature:

SCA Analysis Results has Valid signature

Rules Signature:

There were no custom rules used in this scan

#### **Attack Surface**

Attack Surface:

Private Information:

de. ecspride. and roid testapps. location leak. Location Leak \$ My Location Listener. on Location Changed the location leak. Location Leak \$ My Location Listener. On Location Changed the location leak. Location lea

## Filter Set Summary

Current Enabled Filter Set:

Security Auditor View

Filter Set Details:

Folder Filters:

If [fortify priority order] contains critical Then set folder to Critical

If [fortify priority order] contains high Then set folder to High

If [fortify priority order] contains medium Then set folder to Medium

If [fortify priority order] contains low Then set folder to Low

Visibility Filters:

## **Audit Guide Summary**





File System Inputs

Hide issues involving file system inputs.

Depending on your system, inputs from files may or may not come from trusted users. AuditGuide can hide issues that are based on data coming from the file system if it is trusted.

Enable if you trust file system inputs.

Filters:

If taint contains file system Then hide issue

If taint contains constantfile Then hide issue

If taint contains stream Then hide issue

If category is file access race condition Then hide issueTaint from Command-Line Arguments

Hide issues involving taint from command-line arguments.

Depending on your system, inputs from command-line arguments may or may not come from trusted users. AuditGuide can hide issues that are based on data coming from command-line arguments if they are trusted.

Enable if you trust command-line arguments.

#### Filters:

If taint contains args Then hide issueProperty File Inputs

Hide inputs from properties files.

Depending on your system, inputs from properties files may or may not come from trusted users. AuditGuide can hide issues that are based on data coming from properties files if they are trusted.

Enable if you trust inputs from properties files.

#### Filters:

If taint contains property Then hide issueEnvironment Variable Inputs

Hide issues involving environment variable inputs.

Depending on your system, inputs from environment variables may or may not come from trusted users. AuditGuide can hide issues that are based on data coming from environment variables if they are trusted.

Enable if you trust environment variable inputs.

#### Filters:

If taint contains environment Then hide issueJ2EE Bad Practices

Hide warnings about J2EE bad practices.

Depending on whether your application is a J2EE application, J2EE bad practice warnings may or may not apply. AuditGuide can hide J2EE bad practice warnings.

Enable if J2EE bad practice warnings do not apply to your application because it is not a J2EE application.

#### Filters:

If category contains j2ee Then hide issue


If category is race condition: static database connection Then hide issue



## Results Outline

#### Overall number of results

The scan found 2 issues



#### Abstract:

The program requests permission to access the device's GPS location.

#### **Explanation:**

Access to GPS location information can compromise a user's privacy and personal safety. Programs that require access to GPS location information must be careful to manage it with the utmost caution.

Example 1: The following code requests permission to ACCESS\_FINE\_LOCATION.

<permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS\_FINE\_LOCATION"</pre>

android:permissionGroup="android.permission-group.LOCATION"

and roid: protection Level = "dangerous"

 $and roid: label = "@string/permlab\_accessFineLocation"$ 

android:description="@string/permdesc\_accessFineLocation"/>

#### Recommendations:

Validate that the program requires GPS location information. Rather than granting blanket access to location, determine the appropriate level for the required use. The following examples demonstrate different levels of granularity that can be used when referring to GPS location.

Example 2: For testing purposes, the following code creates mock location providers and does not access any real GPS information.

<permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS\_MOCK\_LOCATION"</pre>

android:permissionGroup="android.permission-group.LOCATION"

android:protectionLevel="dangerous"

android:label="@string/permlab\_accessMockLocation"

android:description="@string/permdesc\_accessMockLocation" />

Example 3: The following code uses coarse location information for WiFi or Cell-ID functionality, reserving fine location for GPS and other such uses that demand it.

<permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS\_COARSE\_LOCATION"</pre>

android:permissionGroup="android.permission-group.LOCATION"

android:protectionLevel="dangerous"

android:label="@string/permlab\_accessCoarseLocation"

android:description="@string/permdesc\_accessCoarseLocation"/>

#### AndroidManifest.xml, line 27 (Privilege Management: Android Location)

Fortify Priority: High Folder High



Security Features
The program requests permission to to access the device's GPS location on line 27 of AndroidManifest.xml.
AndroidManifest.xml:27 null()
<pre><uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION"></uses-permission></pre>

28				
LocationLeak.java, line 42 (Privilege Management: Android Location)				
Fortify Priority:	High Folder High			
Kingdom:	Security Features			
Abstract:	The program accesses the device's GPS location on line 42 of LocationLeak.java.			
Sink:	LocationLeak.java:42 requestLocationUpdates()			
40				
41	LocationListener locationListener = new MyLocationListener();			
42	locationManager.requestLocationUpdates(LocationManager.GPS_PROVIDER, 5000, 10, locationListener);			
43	}			
44				



Issue Count by Category				
Issues by Category	2			
Privilege Management: Android Location				



