



# **Modern Advanced Cyber-Attacks in 2026 and the impact at the Threat Intel level**

@ Vinterkonferansen 2026  
by André Lima



Red Team Leader @ Telenor Cyberdefence

# André Lima

- ❑ 15 years of experience: Portugal, Australia, Norway
- ❑ Researcher & Speaker in multiple conferences around Europe
  - ❑ Vinterkonferansen (2026)
  - ❑ Sikkerhetsfestivalen (2023,2024,2025)
  - ❑ Bsides Kristiansand (2025)
  - ❑ TIBER-EU Provider Conference (2024)
  - ❑ Bsides Oslo (2022,2023)
  - ❑ Bsides Lisbon (2022)
- ❑ Experienced in TIBER-EU/NO standard
- ❑ Malware developer and Defense/EDR Evasion specialist
- ❑ Certifications: OSED, OSCP, OSWP, eCRE, SLAE64, eWPTX



# Agenda

Intro / Context – What are MCP servers? How is that relevant?


A demo... to prove this is not just theoretical.

Impact for Cyber Threat Intel



Conclusions



# Intro / Context



# Intro / Context



# Intro / Context – New attack surface / vectors



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- AI adoption and automation



Prompt  
Injection



0 Click



# Intro / Context – New attack surface / vectors


- Vibe-coding





# Intro / Context – New attack surface / vectors

- AI deception will improve




# Intro / Context – Bigger problem...

- APTs (the focus of this presentation)



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research.checkpoint.com/2026/voidlink-early-ai-generated-malware-framework/

## VOIDLINK: EVIDENCE THAT THE ERA OF ADVANCED AI-GENERATED MALWARE HAS BEGUN

...

January 20, 2026

### Key Points

Check Point Research (CPR) believes a new era of AI-generated malware has begun. [VoidLink](#) stands as the first evidently documented case of this era, as a truly advanced malware framework **authored almost entirely by artificial intelligence**, likely under the direction of a single individual.

Until now, solid evidence of AI-generated malware has primarily been linked to inexperienced threat actors, as in the case of [FunkSec](#), or to malware that largely mirrored the functionality of existing open-source malware tools. VoidLink is the first evidence based case that shows how **dangerous AI can become in the hands of more capable malware developers**.

# Intro / Context – Bigger problem...

- APTs (the focus of this presentation)





# Intro /

# AI-Guided Malware

- APTs (the 1

Home » Artificial Intelligence (AI)

Leah Siskind  
Director of Impact and AI Research Fellow

Maria Riofrio  
Research Assistant

Mariam Lomtadze  
Intern

Listen to analysis  
6 min


Hackers are now using AI to guide attacks in real time. In a statement that initially attracted little attention among Western analysts, Ukraine's national cybersecurity agency **warned** on July 17 that a Russian cyber threat group, known as **APT28**, is using AI in a novel way as part of its cyberattacks. Once the hackers gain access to their target, the AI instructs the malware how to move through the network and disrupt, destroy, or steal information. This more adaptive methodology makes it harder for defenders to detect and thwart attacks.

**AI Is Reshaping the Cyber Threat Landscape**



# Intro / Context – new APTs




- MCP servers concepts



<https://modelcontextprotocol.io/docs/learn/architecture>



# Intro / Context – new APTs

- MCP servers 
  - **Transport layer:** Defines the communication mechanisms and channels that enable data exchange between clients and servers, including transport-specific connection establishment, message framing, and authorization.
    - Stdio transport 
    - Streamable HTTP transport (Server-Sent Events - SSE) 






# Intro / Context – new APTs

- MCP defines three core **primitives** that servers can expose:
  - **Tools:** Executable functions that AI applications can invoke to perform actions (e.g., file operations, API calls, database queries)
  - **Resources:** Data sources that provide contextual information to AI applications (e.g., file contents, database records, API responses)
  - **Prompts:** Reusable templates that help structure interactions with language models (e.g., system prompts, few-shot examples)




# Intro / Context – new APTs



# Intro / Context – new APTs

- My custom MCP server...



```
Windows PowerShell
PS C:\Users\andre\Documents\Claude_Projects\Vinterkonferansen2026> claude mcp list
Checking MCP server health...

MCP_DOCKER: docker mcp gateway run - ✓ Connected
kali: docker run --rm -i --network host --cap-add NET_RAW --cap-add NET_ADMIN kali-pentest-kali-pentest-mcp - ✓ Connected
PS C:\Users\andre\Documents\Claude_Projects\Vinterkonferansen2026> |
```



Demo 





# Impact for Threat intel





Attribution  
gets foggier



### Static IOCs

They already age like  
yogurt, MCP makes them  
spoil instantly



Threat modelling  
changes



Detection Engineering  
must adapt

 So... what should I be looking for? 



# Some things to track in 2026...

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Track #1



Track #2



Track #3





# Some things to track in 2026...

## Track #1

### Network shape.

Timing symmetry,  
consistent TLS  
configurations,  
predictable domain-  
registration churn, subtly  
similar HTTP header  
stacks, or the same C2  
URI grammar.

## Track #2

## Track #3



# Some things to track in 2026...

## Track #2

### Behavioural signatures.

MCP engines chain TTPs based on internal logic: discovery → escalation → pivot → collection → exfil.

The exact commands change, but the high-level sequence doesn't.

## Track #1

## Track #3



# Some things to track in 2026...



Track #1

Track #2

Track #3

**Orchestration  
footprints.**


MCP systems call out to themselves, their orchestration APIs, or their own provisioning modules.




# Thank you for coming... 😊



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 0x4ndr3

 <https://0x4ndr3.github.io/>