The Polygon Zero zkEVM

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Abstract

We describe the design of Polygon Zero's zkEVM, ...

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2.1 Cost model

Our zkEVM is designed for efficient verification by STARKs [1], particularly by an AIR with degree 3 constraints. In this model, the prover bottleneck is typically constructing Merkle trees, particularly constructing the tree containing low-degree extensions of witness polynomials.

2.2 Field selection

Our zkEVM is designed to have its execution traces encoded in a particular prime field $\mathbb{F}_p$, with $p = 2^{64} - 2^{32} + 1$. A nice property of this field is that it can represent the results of many common u32 operations. For example, (widening) u32 multiplication has a maximum value of $(2^{32} - 1)^2$, which is less than p. In fact a u32 multiply-add has a maximum value of $p - 1$, so the result can be represented with a single field element, although if we were to add a carry in bit, this no longer holds.

This field also enables a very efficient reduction method. Observe that

$$2^{64} \equiv 2^{32} - 1 \pmod{p}$$

and consequently

$$\begin{aligned} 2^{96} &\equiv 2^{32}(2^{32} - 1) \pmod{p} \\ &\equiv 2^{64} - 2^{32} \pmod{p} \\ &\equiv -1 \pmod{p}. \end{aligned}$$

To reduce a 128-bit number n, we first rewrite n as $n_0 + 2^{64}n_1 + 2^{96}n_2$, where n_0 is 64 bits and n_1, n_2 are 32 bits each. Then

$$\begin{aligned} n &\equiv n_0 + 2^{64}n_1 + 2^{96}n_2 \pmod{p} \\ &\equiv n_0 + (2^{32} - 1)n_1 - n_2 \pmod{p} \end{aligned}$$

After computing $(2^{32} - 1)n_1$, which can be done with a shift and subtraction, we add the first two terms, subtracting p if overflow occurs. We then subtract n_2, adding p if underflow occurs.

At this point we have reduced n to a `u64`. This partial reduction is adequate for most purposes, but if we needed the result in canonical form, we would perform a final conditional subtraction.

2.3 Cross-table lookups

The various STARK tables carry out independent operations, but on shared values. We need to check that the shared values are identical in all the STARKs that require them. This is where cross-table lookups (CTLs) come in handy.

Suppose STARK S_1 requires an operation – say Op – that is carried out by another STARK S_2. Then S_1 writes the input and output of Op in its own table, and provides the inputs to S_2. S_2 also writes the inputs and outputs in its rows, and the table's constraints check that Op is carried out correctly. We then need to ensure that the inputs and outputs are the same in S_1 and S_2.

In other words, we need to ensure that the rows – reduced to the input and output columns – of S_1 calling Op are permutations of the rows of S_2 that carry out Op.

To prove this, the first step is to only select the rows of interest in S_1 and S_2, and filter out the rest. Let f^1 be the filter for S_1 and f^2 the filter for S_2. f^1 and f^2 are constrained to be in $\{0, 1\}$. $f^1 = 1$ (resp. $f^2 = 1$) whenever the row at hand carries out Op in S_1 (resp. in S_2), and 0 otherwise. Let also (α, β) be two random challenges.

The idea is to create subtables S_1' and S_2' of S_1 and S_2 respectively, such that $f^1 = 1$ and $f^2 = 1$ for all their rows. The columns in the subtables are limited to the ones whose values must be identical (the inputs and outputs of Op in our example).

Let $\{c^{1,i}\}_{i=1}^m$ be the columns in S_1' an $\{c^{2,i}\}_{i=1}^m$ be the columns in S_2'. The prover defines a "running product" Z for S_1' such that:

$$Z_{n-1}^{S_1} = 1$$

$$Z_{i+1}^{S_1} = Z_i^{S_1} \cdot [f_i^1 \cdot \Big(\sum_{j=0}^{m-1} \alpha^j \cdot c_i^{1,j} + \beta \Big) + (1 - f_i^1)]$$

The second equation "selects" the terms of interest thanks to f^1 and filters out the rest.

Similarly, the prover constructs a running product Z^{S_2} for S_2. Note that Z is computed "upside down": we start with $Z_{n-1} = 1$ and the final product is in Z_0.

On top of the constraints to check that the running products were correctly constructed, the verifier checks that $Z_0^{S_1} = Z_0^{S_2}$. This ensures that the columns in S_1' and the columns in S_2' are permutations of each other.

To sum up, for each STARK S, the prover:

1. constructs a running product P_i^l for each table looking into S (called looking products here),

2. constructs a running product P^S for S (called looked product here),

3. sends the final value for each running product $P_{i,0}^l$ and P_0^S to the verifier,

4. sends a commitment to P_i^l and P^S to the verifier.

Then, for each STARK S, the verifier:

1. computes the product $P = \prod_i P_{i,0}^l$,

2. checks that $P = P_0^S$,

3. checks that each P_i^l and P^S was correctly constructed.

2.4   Range-checks

In most cases, tables deal with U256 words, split into 32-bit limbs (to avoid overflowing the field). To prevent a malicious prover from cheating, it is crucial to range-check those limbs.

2.4.1   What to range-check?

One can note that every element that ever appears on the stack has been pushed. Therefore, enforcing a range-check on pushed elements is enough to range-check all elements on the stack. Similarly, all elements in memory must have been written prior, and therefore it is enough to range-check memory writes. However, range-checking the PUSH and MSTORE opcodes is not sufficient.

1. Pushes and memory writes for "MSTORE_32BYTES" are range-checked in "BytePackingStark".

2. Syscalls, exceptions and prover inputs are range-checked in "Arithmetic-Stark".

3. The inputs and outputs of binary and ternary arithmetic operations are range-checked in "ArithmeticStark".

4. The inputs' bits of logic operations are checked to be either 1 or 0 in "LogicStark". Since "LogicStark" only deals with bitwise operations, this is enough to have range-checked outputs as well.

5. The inputs of Keccak operations are range-checked in "KeccakStark". The output digest is written as bytes in "KeccakStark". Those bytes are used to reconstruct the associated 32-bit limbs checked against the limbs in "CpuStark". This implictly ensures that the output is range-checked.

Note that some operations do not require a range-check:

1. "MSTORE_GENERAL" read the value to write from the stack. Thus, the written value was already range-checked by a previous push.

2. "EQ" reads two – already range-checked – elements on the stack, and checks they are equal. The output is either 0 or 1, and does therefore not need to be checked.

3. "NOT" reads one – already range-checked – element. The result is constrained to be equal to $\texttt{0xFFFFFFFF} - \texttt{input}$, which implicitly enforces the range check.

4. "PC": the program counter cannot be greater than 2^{32} in user mode. Indeed, the user code cannot be longer than 2^{32}, and jumps are constrainted to be JUMPDESTs. Moreover, in kernel mode, every jump is towards a location within the kernel, and the kernel code is smaller than 2^{32}. These two points implicitly enforce PC's range check.

5. "GET_CONTEXT", "DUP" and "SWAP" all read and push values that were already written in memory. The pushed values were therefore already range-checked.

Range-checks are performed on the range $[0, 2^{16} - 1]$, to limit the trace length.

2.4.2 Lookup Argument

To enforce the range-checks, we leverage logUp, a lookup argument by Ulrich Häbock. Given a looking table $s = (s_1, ..., s_n)$ and a looked table $t = (t_1, ..., t_m)$, the goal is to prove that

$$\forall 1 \leq i \leq n, \exists 1 \leq j \leq r \ \texttt{such that} \ s_i = t_j$$

In our case, $t = (0, .., 2^{16} - 1)$ and s is composed of all the columns in each STARK that must be range-checked.

The logUp paper explains that proving the previous assertion is actually equivalent to proving that there exists a sequence l such that:

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{1}{X - s_i} = \sum_{j=1}^{r} \frac{l_j}{X - t_j}$$

The values of s can be stored in c different columns of length n each. In that case, the equality becomes:

$$\sum_{k=1}^{c} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{1}{X - s_i^k} = \sum_{j=1}^{r} \frac{l_j}{X - t_j}$$

The 'multiplicity' m_i of value t_i is defined as the number of times t_i appears in s. In other words:

$$m_i = |s_j \in s; s_j = t_i|$$

Multiplicities provide a valid sequence of values in the previously stated equation. Thus, if we store the multiplicities, and are provided with a challenge α, we can prove the lookup argument by ensuring:

$$\sum_{k=1}^{c} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{1}{\alpha - s_i^k} = \sum_{j=1}^{r} \frac{m_j}{\alpha - t_j}$$

However, the equation is too high degree. To circumvent this issue, Häbock suggests providing helper columns h_i and d such that at a given row i:

$$h_i^k = \frac{1}{\alpha + s_i^k} \forall 1 \le k \le c$$

$$d_i = \frac{1}{\alpha + t_i}$$

The h helper columns can be batched together to save columns. We can batch at most contraint_degree $- 1$ helper functions together. In our case, we batch them 2 by 2. At row i, we now have:

$$h_i^k = \frac{1}{\alpha + s_i^{2k}} + \frac{1}{\alpha + s_i^{2k+1}} \forall 1 \le k \le c/2$$

If c is odd, then we have one extra helper column:

$$h_i^{c/2+1} = \frac{1}{\alpha + s_i^c}$$

For clarity, we will assume that c is even in what follows.

Let g be a generator of a subgroup of order n. We extrapolate h, m and d to get polynomials such that, for $f \in \{h^k, m, g\}$: $f(g^i) = f_i$. We can define the following polynomial:

$$Z(x) := \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left[\sum_{k=1}^{c/2} h^k(x) - m(x) * d(x) \right]$$

2.4.3 Constraints

With these definitions and a challenge α, we can finally check that the assertion holds with the following constraints:

$$Z(1) = 0$$

$$Z(g\alpha) = Z(\alpha) + \sum_{k=1}^{c/2} h^k(\alpha) - m(\alpha)d(\alpha)$$

These ensure that We also need to ensure that h^k is well constructed for all $1 \le k \le c/2$:

$$h(\alpha)^k \cdot (\alpha + s_{2k}) \cdot (\alpha + s_{2k+1}) = (\alpha + s_{2k}) + (\alpha + s_{2k+1})$$

Note: if c is odd, we have one unbatched helper column $h^{c/2+1}$ for which we need a last constraint:

$$h(\alpha)^{c/2+1} \cdot (\alpha + s_c) = 1$$

Finally, the verifier needs to ensure that the table t was also correctly computed. In each STARK, t is computed starting from 0 and adding at most 1 at each row. This construction is constrained as follows:

1. $t(1) = 0$

2. $(t(g^{i+1}) - t(g^i)) \cdot ((t(g^{i+1}) - t(g^i)) - 1) = 0$

3. $t(g^{n-1}) = 2^{16} - 1$

3 Tables

3.1 CPU

TODO

3.2 Arithmetic

Each row of the arithmetic table corresponds to a binary or ternary arithmetic operation. Each of these operations has an associated flag f_{op} in the table, such that $f_{\mathsf{op}} = 1$ whenever the operation is op and 0 otherwise. The full list of operations carried out by the table is as follows:

Binary operations:

- basic operations: "add", "mul", "sub" and "div",

- comparisons: "lt" and "gt",

- shifts: "shr" and "shl",

- "byte": given x_1, x_2, returns the x_1-th "byte" in x_2,

- modular operations: "mod", "AddFp254", "MulFp254" and "SubFp254",

- range-check: no operation is performed, as this is only used to range-check the input and output limbs in the range $[0, 2^{16} - 1]$.

For 'mod', the second input is the modulus. "AddFp254", "MulFp254" and "SubFp254" are modular operations modulo "Fp254' – the prime for the BN curve's base field.

Ternary operations: There are three ternary operations: modular addition "AddMod", modular multiplication "MulMod" and modular subtraction "SubMod".

Besides the flags, the arithmetic table needs to store the inputs, output and some auxiliary values necessary to constraints. The input and output values are range-checked to ensure their canonical representation. Inputs are 256-bits words. To avoid having too large a range-check, inputs are therefore split into sixteen 16-bits limbs, and range-checked in the range $[0, 2^{16} - 1]$.

Overall, the table comprises the following columns:

- 17 columns for the operation flags f_{op},

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- 1 column *op* containing the opcode,

- 16 columns for the 16-bit limbs $x_{0,i}$ of the first input x_0,

- 16 columns for the 16-bit limbs $x_{1,i}$ of the second input x_1,

- 16 columns for the 16-bit limbs $x_{2,i}$ of the third input x_2,

- 16 columns for the 16-bit limbs r_i of the output r,

- 32 columns for auxiliary values $\texttt{aux}_i$,

- 1 column `range_counter` containing values in the range $[0, 2^{16} - 1]$, for the range-check,

- 1 column storing the frequency of appearance of each value in the range $[0, 2^{16} - 1]$.

Note on *op***:** The opcode column is only used for range-checks. For optimization purposes, we check all arithmetic operations against the cpu table together. To ensure correctness, we also check that the operation's opcode corresponds to its behavior. But range-check is not associated to a unique operation: any operation in the cpu table might require its values to be checked. Thus, the arithmetic table cannot know its opcode in advance: it needs to store the value provided by the cpu table.

3.2.1 Auxiliary columns

The way auxiliary values are leveraged to efficiently check correctness is not trivial, but it is explained in detail in each dedicated file. Overall, five files explain the implementations of the various checks. Refer to:

1. "mul.rs" for details on multiplications.

2. "addcy.rs" for details on addition, subtraction, "lt" and "gt".

3. "modular.rs" for details on how modular operations are checked. Note that even though "div" and "mod" are generated and checked in a separate file, they leverage the logic for modular operations described in "modular.rs".

4. "byte" for details on how "byte" is checked.

5. "shift.rs" for details on how shifts are checked.

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Note on "lt" and "gt": For "lt" and "gt", auxiliary columns hold the difference d between the two inputs x_1, x_2. We can then treat them similarly to subtractions by ensuring that $x_1 - x_2 = d$ for "lt" and $x_2 - x_1 = d$ for "gt". An auxiliary column cy is used for the carry in additions and subtractions. In the comparisons case, it holds the overflow flag. Contrary to subtractions, the output of "lt" and "gt" operations is not d but cy.

Note on "div": It might be unclear why "div" and "mod" are dealt with in the same file.

Given numerator and denominator n, d, we compute, like for other modular operations, the quotient q and remainder `rem`:

$$div(x_1, x_2) = q * x_2 + \texttt{rem}$$

. We then set the associated auxiliary columns to `rem` and the output to q.

This is why "div" is essentially a modulo operation, and can be addressed in almost the same way as "mod". The only difference is that in the "mod" case, the output is `rem` and the auxiliary value is q.

Note on shifts: "shr" and "shl" are internally constrained as "div" and "mul" respectively with shifted operands. Indeed, given inputs s, x, the output should be $x >> s$ for "shr" (resp. $x << s$ for "shl"). Since shifts are binary operations, we can use the third input columns to store $s_{\texttt{shifted}} = 1 << s$. Then, we can use the "div" logic (resp. "mul" logic) to ensure that the output is $\frac{x}{s_{\texttt{shifted}}}$ (resp. $x * s_{\texttt{shifted}}$).

3.3 Byte Packing

TODO

3.4 Logic

Each row of the logic table corresponds to one bitwise logic operation: either AND, OR or XOR. Each input for these operations is represented as 256 bits, while the output is stored as eight 32-bit limbs.

Each row therefore contains the following columns:

1. $f_{\texttt{and}}$, an "is and" flag, which should be 1 for an OR operation and 0 otherwise,

2. f_{or}, an "is or" flag, which should be 1 for an OR operation and 0 otherwise,

3. f_{xor}, an "is xor" flag, which should be 1 for a XOR operation and 0 otherwise,

4. 256 columns $x_{1,i}$ for the bits of the first input x_1,

5. 256 columns $x_{2,i}$ for the bits of the second input x_2,

6. 8 columns r_i for the 32-bit limbs of the output r.

Note that we need all three flags because we need to be able to distinguish between an operation row and a padding row – where all flags are set to 0.

The subdivision into bits is required for the two inputs as the table carries out bitwise operations. The result, on the other hand, is represented in 32-bit limbs since we do not need individual bits and can therefore save the remaining 248 columns. Moreover, the output is checked against the cpu, which stores values in the same way.

3.5 Memory

For simplicity, let's treat addresses and values as individual field elements. The generalization to multi-element addresses and values is straightforward.

Each row of the memory table corresponds to a single memory operation (a read or a write), and contains the following columns:

1. a, the target address

2. r, an "is read" flag, which should be 1 for a read or 0 for a write

3. v, the value being read or written

4. τ, the timestamp of the operation

The memory table should be ordered by (a, τ). Note that the correctness of the memory could be checked as follows:

1. Verify the ordering by checking that $(a_i, \tau_i) \leq (a_{i+1}, \tau_{i+1})$ for each consecutive pair.

2. Enumerate the purportedly-ordered log while tracking the "current" value of v, which is initially zero.[1]

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[1]EVM memory is zero-initialized.

(a) Upon observing an address which doesn't match that of the previous row, if the operation is a read, check that $v = 0$.

(b) Upon observing a write, don't constrain v.

(c) Upon observing a read at timestamp τ_i which isn't the first operation at this address, check that $v_i = v_{i-1}$.

The ordering check is slightly involved since we are comparing multiple columns. To facilitate this, we add an additional column e, where the prover can indicate whether two consecutive addresses changed. An honest prover will set

$$e_i \leftarrow \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } a_i \neq a_{i+1}, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

We also introduce a range-check column c, which should hold:

$$c_i \leftarrow \begin{cases} a_{i+1} - a_i - 1 & \text{if } e_i = 1, \\ \tau_{i+1} - \tau_i & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

The extra -1 ensures that the address actually changed if $e_i = 1$. We then impose the following transition constraints:

1. $e_i(e_i - 1) = 0$,

2. $(1 - e_i)(a_{i+1} - a_i) = 0$,

3. $c_i < 2^{32}$.

The last constraint emulates a comparison between two addresses or timestamps by bounding their difference; this assumes that all addresses and timestamps fit in 32 bits and that the field is larger than that.

3.5.1 Virtual memory

In the EVM, each contract call has its own address space. Within that address space, there are separate segments for code, main memory, stack memory, calldata, and returndata. Thus each address actually has three compoments:

1. an execution context, representing a contract call,

2. a segment ID, used to separate code, main memory, and so forth, and so on

3. a virtual address.

The comparisons now involve several columns, which requires some minor adaptations to the technique described above; we will leave these as an exercise to the reader.

3.5.2 Timestamps

Memory operations are sorted by address a and timestamp τ. For a memory operation in the CPU, we have:

$$\tau = \texttt{NUM\_CHANNELS} \times \texttt{cycle} + \texttt{channel}.$$

Since a memory channel can only hold at most one memory operation, every CPU memory operation's timestamp is unique.

Note that it doesn't mean that all memory operations have unique timestamps. There are two exceptions:

- Before bootstrapping, we write some global metadata in memory. These extra operations are done at timestamp $\tau = 0$.

- Some tables other than CPU can generate memory operations, like KeccakSponge. When this happens, these operations all have the timestamp of the CPU row of the instruction which invoked the table (for KeccakSponge, KECCAK_GENERAL).

3.6 Keccak-f

This table computes the Keccak-f[1600] permutation.

3.6.1 Keccak-f Permutation

To explain how this table is structured, we first need to detail how the permutation is computed. This page gives a pseudo-code for the permutation. Our implementation differs slightly – but remains equivalent – for optimization and constraint degree reasons.

Let:

- S be the sponge width ($S = 25$ in our case)

- $\texttt{NUM\_ROUNDS}$ be the number of Keccak rounds ($\texttt{NUM\_ROUNDS} = 24$)

- RC a vector of round constants of size $\texttt{NUM\_ROUNDS}$

- I be the input of the permutation, comprised of S 64-bit elements

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The first step is to reshape I into a 5×5 matrix. We initialize the state A of the sponge with I:

$$A[x, y] := I[x, y] \ \forall x, y \in \{0..4\}$$

We store A in the table, and subdivide each 64-bit element into two 32-bit limbs. Then, for each round i, we proceed as follows:

1. First, we define $C[x] := \text{xor}_{i=0}^{4} A[x, i]$. We store C as bits in the table. This is because we need to apply a rotation on its elements' bits and carry out `xor` operations in the next step.

2. Then, we store a second vector C' in bits, such that:

$$C'[x, z] = C[x, z] \ \text{xor} \ C[x - 1, z] \ \text{xor} \ C[x + 1, z - 1]$$

.

3. We then need to store the updated value of A:

$$A'[x, y] = A[x, y] \ \text{xor} \ C[x, y] \ \text{xor} \ C'[x, y]$$

Note that this is equivalent to the equation in the official Keccak-f description:

$$A'[x, y] = A[x, y] \ \text{xor} \ C[x - 1, z] \ \text{xor} \ C[x + 1, z - 1]$$

.

4. The previous three points correspond to the θ step in Keccak-f. We can now move on to the ρ and π steps. These steps are written as:

$$B[y, 2 \times x + 3 \times y] := \text{rot}(A'[x, y], r[x, y])$$

where `rot(a, s)` is the bitwise cyclic shift operation, and r is the matrix of rotation offsets. We do not need to store B: B's bits are only a permutation of A''s bits.

5. The χ step updates the state once again, and we store the new values:

$$A''[x, y] := B[x, y] \ \text{xor} \ (\text{not} \ B[x + 1, y] \ \text{and} \ B[x + 2, y])$$

Because of the way we carry out constraints (as explained below), we do not need to store the individual bits for A'': we only need the 32-bit limbs.

6. The final step, ι, consists in updating the first element of the state as follows:

$$A'''[0,0] = A''[0,0] \ \texttt{xor} \ RC[i]$$

where

$$A'''[x,y] = A''[x,y] \forall (x,y) \neq (0,0)$$

Since only the first element is updated, we only need to store $A'''[0,0]$ of this updated state. The remaining elements are fetched from A''. However, because of the bitwise $\texttt{xor}$ operation, we do need columns for the bits of $A''[0,0]$.

Note that all permutation elements are 64-bit long. But they are stored as 32-bit limbs so that we do not overflow the field.

It is also important to note that all bitwise logic operations ($\texttt{xor}$, $\texttt{not}$ and $\texttt{and}$) are checked in this table. This is why we need to store the bits of most elements. The logic table can only carry out eight 32-bit logic operations per row. Thus, leveraging it here would drastically increase the number of logic rows, and incur too much overhead in proving time.

3.6.2 Columns

Using the notations from the previous section, we can now list the columns in the table:

1. $\texttt{NUM\_ROUNDS} = 24$ columns c_i to determine which round is currently being computed. $c_i = 1$ when we are in the i-th round, and 0 otherwise. These columns' purpose is to ensure that the correct round constants are used at each round.

2. 1 column t which stores the timestamp at which the Keccak operation was called in the cpu. This column enables us to ensure that inputs and outputs are consistent between the cpu, keccak-sponge and keccak-f tables.

3. $5 \times 5 \times 2 = 50$ columns to store the elements of A. As a reminder, each 64-bit element is divided into two 32-bit limbs, and A comprises $S = 25$ elements.

4. $5 \times 64 = 320$ columns to store the bits of the vector C.

5. $5 \times 64 = 320$ columns to store the bits of the vector C'.

6. $5 \times 5 \times 64 = 1600$ columns to store the bits of A'.

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7. $5 \times 5 \times 2 = 50$ columns to store the 32-bit limbs of A''.

8. 64 columns to store the bits of $A''[0,0]$.

9. 2 columns to store the two limbs of $A'''[0,0]$.

In total, this table comprises 2,431 columns.

3.6.3 Constraints

Some constraints checking that the elements are computed correctly are not straightforward. Let us detail them here.

First, it is important to highlight the fact that a `xor` between two elements is of degree 2. Indeed, for x `xor` y, the constraint is $x + y - 2 \times x \times y$, which is of degree 2. This implies that a `xor` between 3 elements is of degree 3, which is the maximal constraint degree for our STARKs.

We can check that $C'[x, z] = C[x, z]$ `xor` $C[x - 1, z]$ `xor` $C[x + 1, z - 1]$. However, we cannot directly check that $C[x] = $ `xor`$_{i=0}^{4} A[x, i]$, as it would be a degree 5 constraint. Instead, we use C' for this constraint. We see that:

$$\texttt{xor}_{i=0}^{4} A'[x, i, z] = C'[x, z]$$

This implies that the difference $d = \sum_{i=0}^{4} A'[x, i, z] - C'[x, z]$ is either 0, 2 or 4. We can therefore enforce the following degree 3 constraint instead:

$$d \times (d - 2) \times (d - 4) = 0$$

Additionally, we have to check that A' is well constructed. We know that A' should be such that $A'[x, y, z] = A[x, y, z]$ `xor` $C[x, z]$ `xor` $C'[x, z]$. Since we do not have the bits of A elements but the bits of A' elements, we check the equivalent degree 3 constraint:

$$A[x, y, z] = A'[x, y, z] \texttt{ xor } C[x, z] \texttt{ xor } C'[x, z]$$

Finally, the constraints for the remaining elements, A'' and A''' are straightforward: A'' is a three-element bitwise `xor` where all bits involved are already storedn and $A'''[0,0]$ is the output of a simple bitwise `xor` with a round constant.

3.7 KeccakSponge

This table computes the Keccak256 hash, a sponge-based hash built on top of the Keccak-f[1600] permutation. An instance of KeccakSponge takes as input a Memory address a, a length l, and computes the Keccak256 digest of the memory segment starting at a and of size l. An instance can span many rows, each individual row being a single call to the Keccak table. Note that all the read elements must be bytes; the proof will be unverifiable if this is not the case. Following the Keccak specifications, the input string is padded to the next multiple of 136 bytes. Each row contains the following columns:

- Read bytes:

    - 3 address columns: `context`, `segment` and the offset `virt` of a.

    - `timestamp`: the timestamp which will be used for all memory reads of this instance.

    - `already_absorbed_bytes`: keeps track of how many bytes have been hashed in the current instance. At the end of an instance, we should have absorbed l bytes in total.

    - KECCAK_RATE_BYTES `block_bytes` columns: the bytes being absorbed at this row. They are read from memory and will be XORed to the rate part of the current state.

- Input columns:

    - KECCAK_RATE_U32S `original_rate_u32s` columns: hold the rate part of the state before XORing it with `block_bytes`. At the beginning of an instance, they are initialized with 0.

    - KECCAK_RATE_U32s `xored_rate_u32s` columns: hold the original rate XORed with `block_bytes`.

    - KECCAK_CAPACITY_U32S `original_capacity_u32s` columns: hold the capacity part of the state before applying the Keccak permutation.

- Output columns:

    - KECCAK_DIGEST_BYTES `updated_digest_state_bytes columns`: the beginning of the output state after applying the Keccak permutation. At the last row of an instance, they hold the computed hash. They are decomposed in bytes for endianness reasons.

- KECCAK_WIDTH_MINUS_DIGEST_U32S partial_updated_state_u32s columns: the rest of the output state. They are discarded for the final digest, but are used between instance rows.

- Helper columns:

  - is_full_input_block: indicates if the current row has a full input block, i.e. block_bytes contains only bytes read from memory and no padding bytes.
  - KECCAK_RATE_BYTES is_final_input_len columns: in the final row of an instance, indicate where the final read byte is. If the i-th column is set to 1, it means that all bytes after the i-th are padding bytes. In a full input block, all columns are set to 0.

For each instance, constraints ensure that:

- at each row:

  - is_full_input_block and is_final_input_len columns are all binary.
  - Only one column in is_full_input_block and is_final_input_len is set to 1.
  - xored_rate_u32s is original_rate_u32s XOR block_bytes.
  - The CTL with Keccak ensures that (updated_digest_state_bytes columns, partial_updated_state_u32s) is the Keccak permutation output of (xored_rate_u32s, original_capacity_u32s).

- at the first row:

  - original_rate_u32s is all 0.
  - already_absorbed_bytes is 0.

- at each full input row (i.e. is_full_input_block is 1, all is_final_input_len columns are 0):

  - context, segment, virt and timestamp are unchanged in the next row.
  - Next already_absorbed_bytes is current already_absorbed_bytes + KECCAK_RATE_BYTES.
  - Next (original_rate_u32s, original_capacity_u32s) is current (updated_digest_state_bytes columns, partial_updated_state_u32s).

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- The CTL with Memory ensures that `block_bytes` is filled with contiguous memory elements $[a + \text{already\_absorbed\_bytes}, a + \text{already\_absorbed\_bytes} + \text{KECCAK\_RATE\_BYTES - 1}]$

- at the final row (i.e. `is_full_input_block` is 0, `is_final_input_len`'s i-th column is 1 for a certain i, the rest are 0):

  - The CTL with Memory ensures that `block_bytes` is filled with contiguous memory elements $[a + \text{already\_absorbed\_bytes}, a + \text{already\_absorbed\_bytes} + i - 1]$. The rest are padding bytes.
  - The CTL with CPU ensures that `context`, `segment`, `virt` and `timestamp` match the `KECCAK_GENERAL` call.
  - The CTL with CPU ensures that $l = \text{already\_absorbed\_bytes} + i$.
  - The CTL with CPU ensures that `updated_digest_state_bytes` is the output of the `KECCAK_GENERAL` call.

The trace is padded to the next power of two with dummy rows, whose `is_full_input_block` and `is_final_input_len` columns are all 0.

4 Merkle Patricia tries

4.1 Internal memory format

Withour our zkEVM's kernel memory,

1. An empty node is encoded as (`MPT_NODE_EMPTY`).

2. A branch node is encoded as (`MPT_NODE_BRANCH`, $c_1, \ldots, c_{16}, v$), where each c_i is a pointer to a child node, and v is a pointer to a value. If a branch node has no associated value, then $v = 0$, i.e. the null pointer.

3. An extension node is encoded as (`MPT_NODE_EXTENSION`, k, c), k represents the part of the key associated with this extension, and is encoded as a 2-tuple (`packed_nibbles`, `num_nibbles`). c is a pointer to a child node.

4. A leaf node is encoded as (`MPT_NODE_LEAF`, k, v), where k is a 2-tuple as above, and v is a pointer to a value.

5. A digest node is encoded as (`MPT_NODE_HASH`, d), where d is a Keccak256 digest.

4.2 Prover input format

The initial state of each trie is given by the prover as a nondeterministic input tape. This tape has a slightly different format:

1. An empty node is encoded as (MPT_NODE_EMPTY).

2. A branch node is encoded as (MPT_NODE_BRANCH, $v_?, c_1, \ldots, c_{16}$). Here $v_?$ consists of a flag indicating whether a value is present, followed by the actual value payload if one is present. Each c_i is the encoding of a child node.

3. An extension node is encoded as (MPT_NODE_EXTENSION, k, c), k represents the part of the key associated with this extension, and is encoded as a 2-tuple (packed_nibbles, num_nibbles). c is a pointer to a child node.

4. A leaf node is encoded as (MPT_NODE_LEAF, k, v), where k is a 2-tuple as above, and v is a value payload.

5. A digest node is encoded as (MPT_NODE_HASH, d), where d is a Keccak256 digest.

> In the current implementation, we use a length prefix rather than a is-present prefix, but we plan to change that.

Nodes are thus given in depth-first order, enabling natural recursive methods for encoding and decoding this format.

5 CPU logic

The CPU is in charge of coordinating the different STARKs, proving the correct execution of the instructions it reads and guaranteeing that the final state of the EVM corresponds to the starting state after executing the input transaction. All design choices were made to make sure these properties can be adequately translated into constraints of degree at most 3 while minimizing the size of the different table traces (number of columns and number of rows).

In this section, we will detail some of these choices.

5.1 Kernel

The kernel is in charge of the proving logic. This section aims at providing a high level overview of this logic. For details about any specific part of the logic, one can consult the various "asm" files in the "kernel" folder.

We prove one transaction at a time. These proofs can later be aggregated recursively to prove a block. Proof aggregation is however not in the scope of this section. Here, we assume that we have an initial state of the EVM, and we wish to prove that a single transaction was correctly executed, leading to a correct update of the state.

Since we process one transaction at a time, a few intermediary values need to be provided by the prover. Indeed, to prove that the registers in the EVM state are correctly updated, we need to have access to their initial values. When aggregating proofs, we can also constrain those values to match from one transaction to the next. Let us consider the example of the transaction number. Let n be the number of transactions executed so far in the current block. If the current proof is not a dummy one (we are indeed executing a transaction), then the transaction number should be updated: $n := n + 1$. Otherwise, the number remains unchanged. We can easily constrain this update. When aggregating the previous transaction proof (lhs) with the current one (rhs), we also need to check that the output transaction number of lhs is the same as the input transaction number of rhs.

Those prover provided values are stored in memory prior to entering the kernel, and are used in the kernel to assert correct updates. The list of prover provided values necessary to the kernel is the following:

1. the previous transaction number: t_n,

2. the gas used before executing the current transaction: g_u_0,

3. the gas used after executing the current transaction: g_u_1,

4. the block bloom filter before executing the current transaction: b_f_0

5. the block bloom filter after executing the current transaction: b_f_1,

6. the state, transaction and receipts MPTs before executing the current transaction: $\texttt{tries}_0$,

7. the hash of all MPTs before executing the current transaction: $\texttt{digests}_0$,

8. the hash of all MPTs after executing the current transaction: $\texttt{digests}_1$,

9. the RLP encoding of the transaction.

Initialization: The first step consists in initializing:

- The shift table: it maps the number of bit shifts s with its shifted value $1 << s$. Note that $0 \leq s \leq 255$.

- The block bloom filter: the current block bloom filter is initialized with b_f_0.

- The initial MPTs: the initial state, transaction and receipt tries $\texttt{tries}_0$ are loaded from memory and hashed. The hashes are then compared to $\texttt{digests}\_0$.

- We load the transaction number t_n and the current gas used g_u_0 from memory.

If no transaction is provided, we can halt after this initialization. Otherwise, we start processing the transaction. The transaction is provided as its RLP encoding. We can deduce the various transaction fields (such as its type or the transfer value) from its encoding. Based on this, the kernel updates the state trie by executing the transaction. Processing the transaction also includes updating the transactions MPT with the transaction at hand.

The processing of the transaction returns a boolean "success" that indicates whether the transaction was executed successfully, along with the leftover gas.

The following step is then to update the receipts MPT. Here, we update the transaction's bloom filter and the block bloom filter. We store "success", the leftover gas, the transaction bloom filter and the logs in memory. We also store some additional information that facilitates the RLP encoding of the receipts later.

If there are any withdrawals, they are performed at this stage.

Finally, once the three MPTs have been updated, we need to carry out final checks:

- the gas used after the execution is equal to g_u_1,

- the new transaction number is $n + 1$ if there was a transaction,

- the updated block bloom filter is equal to b_f_1,

- the three MPTs are hashed and checked against $\texttt{digests}_1$.

Once those final checks are performed, the program halts.

MPT hashing: MPTs are a complex structure in the kernel, and we will not delve into all of its aspects. Here, we only explain how the hashing works, since it is part of the initialization and final checks. The data required for the MPTs are stored in the "TrieData" segment in memory. Whenever we need to hash an MPT, we recover the information from the "TrieData" segment and write it in the correct format in the "RlpRaw" segment. We start by getting the node type. If the node is a hash node, we simply return its value. Otherwise, we RLP encode the node recursively:

- If it is an empty node, the encoding is 0x80.

- If it is a branch node, we encode the node's value and append it to the RLP tape. Then, we encode each of the children and append the encodings to the RLP tape.

- If it is an extension node, we RLP encode its child and hex prefix it.

- If it is a leaf, we RLP encode it depending on the type of trie, and hex prefix the encoding. Note that for a receipt leaf, the encoding is RLP(type||RLP(receipt)). In the case of a transaction, their RLP encoding is already provided by the input, so we simply load it from memory.

Finally, we hash the output of the RLP encoding, stored in "RlpRaw" – unless it is already a hash.

5.2 Privileged instructions

To ease and speed-up proving time, the zkEVM supports custom, privileged instructions that can only be executed by the kernel. Any appearance of those privileged instructions in a contract bytecode for instance would result in an unprovable state.

In what follows, we denote by p_{BN} the characteristic of the BN254 curve base field, curve for which Ethereum supports the ecAdd, ecMul and ecPairing precompiles.

0x0C. ADDFP254. Pops 2 elements from the stack interpreted as BN254 base field elements, and pushes their addition modulo p_{BN} onto the stack.

0x0D. MULFP254. Pops 2 elements from the stack interpreted as BN254 base field elements, and pushes their product modulo p_{BN} onto the stack.

0x0E. `SUBFP254`. Pops 2 elements from the stack interpreted as BN254 base field elements, and pushes their difference modulo p_{BN} onto the stack. This instruction behaves similarly to the SUB (0x03) opcode, in that we subtract the second element of the stack from the initial (top) one.

0x0F. `SUBMOD`. Pops 3 elements from the stack, and pushes the modular difference of the first two elements of the stack by the third one. It is similar to the SUB instruction, with an extra pop for the custom modulus.

0x21. `KECCAK_GENERAL`. Pops 4 elements (successively the context, segment, and offset portions of a Memory address, followed by a length ℓ) and pushes the hash of the memory portion starting at the constructed address and of length ℓ. It is similar to KECCAK256 (0x20) instruction, but can be applied to any memory section (i.e. even privileged ones).

0x49. `PROVER_INPUT`. Pushes a single prover input onto the stack.

0xC0-0xDF. `MSTORE_32BYTES`. Pops 4 elements from the stack (successively the context, segment, and offset portions of a Memory address, and then a value), and pushes a new offset' onto the stack. The value is being decomposed into bytes and written to memory, starting from the reconstructed address. The new offset being pushed is computed as the initial address offset + the length of the byte sequence being written to memory. Note that similarly to PUSH (0x60-0x7F) instructions there are 31 MSTORE_32BYTES instructions, each corresponding to a target byte length (length 0 is ignored, for the same reasons as MLOAD_32BYTES, see below). Writing to memory an integer fitting in n bytes with a length $\ell < n$ will result in the integer being truncated. On the other hand, specifying a length ℓ greater than the byte size of the value being written will result in padding with zeroes. This process is heavily used when resetting memory sections (by calling MSTORE_32BYTES_32 with the value 0).

0xF6. `GET_CONTEXT`. Pushes the current context onto the stack. The kernel always has context 0.

0xF7. `SET_CONTEXT`. Pops the top element of the stack and updates the current context to this value. It is usually used when calling another contract or precompile, to distinguish the caller from the callee.

0xF8. `MLOAD_32BYTES`. Pops 4 elements from the stack (successively the context, segment, and offset portions of a Memory address, and then a length

ℓ), and pushes a value onto the stack. The pushed value corresponds to the U256 integer read from the big-endian sequence of length ℓ from the memory address being reconstructed. Note that an empty length is not valid, nor is a length greater than 32 (as a U256 consists in at most 32 bytes). Missing these conditions will result in an unverifiable proof.

0xF9. **EXIT_KERNEL**. Pops 1 element from the stack. This instruction is used at the end of a syscall, before proceeding to the rest of the execution logic. The popped element, *kexit_info*, contains several informations like the current program counter, current gas used, and if we are in kernel (i.e. privileged) mode.

0xFB. **MLOAD_GENERAL**. Pops 3 elements (successively the context, segment, and offset portions of a Memory address), and pushes the value stored at this memory address onto the stack. It can read any memory location, general (similarly to MLOAD (0x51) instruction) or privileged.

0xFC. **MSTORE_GENERAL**. Pops 4 elements (successively a value, then the context, segment, and offset portions of a Memory address), and writes the popped value from the stack at the reconstructed address. It can write to any memory location, general (similarly to MSTORE (0x52) / MSTORE8 (0x53) instructions) or privileged.

5.3 Stack handling

TODO

5.4 Gas handling

5.4.1 Out of gas errors

The CPU table has a "gas" register that keeps track of the gas used by the transaction so far.

The crucial invariant in our out-of-gas checking method is that at any point in the program's execution, we have not used more gas than we have available; that is "gas" is at most the gas allocation for the transaction (which is stored separately by the kernel). We assume that the gas allocation will never be 2^{32} or more, so if "gas" does not fit in one limb, then we've run out of gas.

When a native instruction (one that is not a syscall) is executed, a constraint ensures that the "gas" register is increased by the correct amount.

This is not automatic for syscalls; the syscall handler itself must calculate and charge the appropriate amount.

If everything goes smoothly and we have not run out of gas, "gas" should be no more than the gas allowance at the point that we STOP, REVERT, stack overflow, or whatever. Indeed, because we assume that the gas overflow handler is invoked *as soon as* we've run out of gas, all these termination methods verify that $gas \leq allowance$, and jump to `exc_out_of_gas` if this is not the case. This is also true for the out-of-gas handler, which checks that:

1. we have not yet run out of gas

2. we are about to run out of gas

and "PANIC" if either of those statements does not hold.

When we do run out of gas, however, this event must be handled. Syscalls are responsible for checking that their execution would not cause the transaction to run out of gas. If the syscall detects that it would need to charge more gas than available, it aborts the transaction by jumping to `exc_out_of_gas`, which in turn verifies that the out-of-gas hasn't *already* occurred.

Native instructions do this differently. If the prover notices that execution of the instruction would cause an out-of-gas error, it must jump to the appropriate handler instead of executing the instruction. (The handler contains special code that PANICs if the prover invoked it incorrectly.)

5.4.2   Overflow

We must be careful to ensure that "gas" does not overflow to prevent denial of service attacks.

Note that a syscall cannot be the instruction that causes an overflow. This is because every syscall is required to verify that its execution does not cause us to exceed the gas limit. Upon entry into a syscall, a constraint verifies that $gas < 2^{32}$. Some syscalls may have to be careful to ensure that the gas check is performed correctly (for example, that overflow modulo 2^{256} does not occur). So we can assume that upon entry and exit out of a syscall, $gas < 2^{32}$.

Similarly, native instructions alone cannot cause wraparound. The most expensive instruction, JUMPI, costs 10 gas. Even if we were to execute 2^{32} consecutive JUMPI instructions, the maximum length of a trace, we are nowhere close to consuming $2^{64} - 2^{32} + 1$ (= Golilocks prime) gas.

The final scenario we must tackle is an expensive syscall followed by many expensive native instructions. Upon exit from a syscall, $gas < 2^{32}$. Again, even if that syscall is followed by 2^{32} native instructions of cost 10, we do not see wraparound modulo Goldilocks.

5.5 Exceptions

Sometimes, when executing user code (i.e. contract or transaction code), the EVM halts exceptionally (i.e. outside of a STOP, a RETURN or a REVERT). When this happens, the CPU table invokes a special instruction with a dedicated operation flag `exception`. Exceptions can only happen in user mode; triggering an exception in kernel mode would make the proof unverifiable. No matter the exception, the handling is the same:

   – The opcode which would trigger the exception is not executed. The operation flag set is `exception` instead of the opcode's flag.

   – We push a value to the stack which contains: the current program counter (to retrieve the faulty opcode), and the current value of `gas_used`. The program counter is then set to the corresponding exception handler in the kernel (e.g. `exc_out_of_gas`).

   – The exception handler verifies that the given exception would indeed be triggered by the faulty opcode. If this is not the case (if the exception has already happened or if it doesn't happen after executing the faulty opcode), then the kernel panics: there was an issue during witness generation.

   – The kernel consumes the remaining gas and returns from the current context with `success` set to 0 to indicate an execution failure.

   Here is the list of the possible exceptions:

Out of gas: Raised when a native instruction (i.e. not a syscall) in user mode pushes the amount of gas used over the current gas limit. When this happens, the EVM jumps to `exc_out_of_gas`. The kernel then checks that the consumed gas is currently below the gas limit, and that adding the gas cost of the faulty instruction pushes it over it. If the exception is not raised, the prover will panic when returning from the execution: the remaining gas is checked to be positive after STOP, RETURN or REVERT.

Invalid opcode: Raised when the read opcode is invalid. It means either that it doesn't exist, or that it's a privileged instruction and thus not available in user mode. When this happens, the EVM jumps to `exc_invalid_opcode`. The kernel then checks that the given opcode is indeed invalid. If the exception is not raised, decoding constraints ensure no operation flag is set to 1, which would make it a padding row. Halting constraints would then make the proof unverifiable.

Stack underflow: Raised when an instruction which pops from the stack is called when the stack doesn't have enough elements. When this happens,

the EVM jumps to `exc_stack_overflow`. The kernel then checks that the current stack length is smaller than the minimum stack length required by the faulty opcode. If the exception is not raised, the popping memory operation's address offset would underflow, and the Memory range check would require the Memory trace to be too large to be provable ($> 2^{60}$).

Invalid JUMP destination: Raised when the program counter jumps to an invalid location (i.e. not a JUMPDEST). When this happens, the EVM jumps to `exc_invalid_jump_destination`. The kernel then checks that the opcode is a JUMP, and that the destination is not a JUMPDEST by checking the JUMPDEST segment. If the exception is not raised, jumping constraints will fail the proof.

Invalid JUMPI destination: Same as the above, for JUMPI.

Stack overflow: Raised when a pushing instruction in user mode pushes the stack over 1024. When this happens, the EVM jumps to `exc_stack_overflow`. The kernel then checks that the current stack length is exactly equal to 1024 (since an instruction can only push once at most), and that the faulty instruction is pushing. If the exception is not raised, stack constraints ensure that a stack length of 1025 in user mode will fail the proof.

References

[1] E. Ben-Sasson, I. Bentov, Y. Horesh, and M. Riabzev, "Scalable, transparent, and post-quantum secure computational integrity." Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2018/046, 2018. https://ia.cr/2018/046.