

# The Polygon Zero zkEVM

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November 22, 2023

## **Abstract**

We describe the design of Polygon Zero's zkEVM, ...

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# 1 Introduction

TODO

## 2 STARK framework

### 2.1 Cost model

Our zkEVM is designed for efficient verification by STARKs [1], particularly by an AIR with degree 3 constraints. In this model, the prover bottleneck is typically constructing Merkle trees, particularly constructing the tree containing low-degree extensions of witness polynomials.

### 2.2 Field selection

Our zkEVM is designed to have its execution traces encoded in a particular prime field  $\mathbb{F}_p$ , with  $p = 2^{64} - 2^{32} + 1$ . A nice property of this field is that it can represent the results of many common u32 operations. For example, (widening) u32 multiplication has a maximum value of  $(2^{32} - 1)^2$ , which is less than  $p$ . In fact a u32 multiply-add has a maximum value of  $p - 1$ , so the result can be represented with a single field element, although if we were to add a carry in bit, this no longer holds.

This field also enables a very efficient reduction method. Observe that

$$2^{64} \equiv 2^{32} - 1 \pmod{p}$$

and consequently

$$\begin{aligned} 2^{96} &\equiv 2^{32}(2^{32} - 1) \pmod{p} \\ &\equiv 2^{64} - 2^{32} \pmod{p} \\ &\equiv -1 \pmod{p}. \end{aligned}$$

To reduce a 128-bit number  $n$ , we first rewrite  $n$  as  $n_0 + 2^{64}n_1 + 2^{96}n_2$ , where  $n_0$  is 64 bits and  $n_1, n_2$  are 32 bits each. Then

$$\begin{aligned} n &\equiv n_0 + 2^{64}n_1 + 2^{96}n_2 \pmod{p} \\ &\equiv n_0 + (2^{32} - 1)n_1 - n_2 \pmod{p} \end{aligned}$$

After computing  $(2^{32} - 1)n_1$ , which can be done with a shift and subtraction, we add the first two terms, subtracting  $p$  if overflow occurs. We then subtract  $n_2$ , adding  $p$  if underflow occurs.

At this point we have reduced  $n$  to a `u64`. This partial reduction is adequate for most purposes, but if we needed the result in canonical form, we would perform a final conditional subtraction.

## 2.3 Cross-table lookups

TODO

# 3 Tables

## 3.1 CPU

TODO

## 3.2 Arithmetic

Each row of the arithmetic table corresponds to a binary or ternary arithmetic operation. Each of these operations has an associated flag  $f_{op}$  in the table, such that  $f_{op} = 1$  whenever the operation is `op` and 0 otherwise. The full list of operations carried out by the table is as follows:

### Binary operations:

- basic operations: “add”, “mul”, “sub” and “div”,
- comparisons: “lt” and “gt”,
- shifts: “shr” and “shl”,
- “byte”: given  $x_1, x_2$ , returns the  $x_1$ -th “byte” in  $x_2$ ,
- modular operations: “mod”, “AddFp254”, “MulFp254” and “SubFp254”,
- range-check: no operation is performed, as this is only used to range-check the input and output limbs in the range  $[0, 2^{16} - 1]$ .

For ‘mod’, the second input is the modulus. “AddFp254”, “MulFp254” and “SubFp254” are modular operations modulo “Fp254” – the prime for the BN curve’s base field.

**Ternary operations:** There are three ternary operations: modular addition “AddMod”, modular multiplication “MulMod” and modular subtraction “SubMod”.

Besides the flags, the arithmetic table needs to store the inputs, output and some auxiliary values necessary to constraints. The input and output values are range-checked to ensure their canonical representation. Inputs are 256-bits words. To avoid having too large a range-check, inputs are therefore split into sixteen 16-bits limbs, and range-checked in the range  $[0, 2^{16} - 1]$ .

Overall, the table comprises the following columns:

- 17 columns for the operation flags  $f_{op}$ ,
- 1 column  $op$  containing the opcode,
- 16 columns for the 16-bit limbs  $x_{0,i}$  of the first input  $x_0$ ,
- 16 columns for the 16-bit limbs  $x_{1,i}$  of the second input  $x_1$ ,
- 16 columns for the 16-bit limbs  $x_{2,i}$  of the third input  $x_2$ ,
- 16 columns for the 16-bit limbs  $r_i$  of the output  $r$ ,
- 32 columns for auxiliary values  $aux_i$ ,
- 1 column **range\_counter** containing values in the range  $[0, 2^{16} - 1]$ , for the range-check,
- 1 column storing the frequency of appearance of each value in the range  $[0, 2^{16} - 1]$ .

**Note on  $op$ :** The opcode column is only used for range-checks. For optimization purposes, we check all arithmetic operations against the cpu table together. To ensure correctness, we also check that the operation’s opcode corresponds to its behavior. But range-check is not associated to a unique operation: any operation in the cpu table might require its values to be checked. Thus, the arithmetic table cannot know its opcode in advance: it needs to store the value provided by the cpu table.

### 3.2.1 Auxiliary columns

The way auxiliary values are leveraged to efficiently check correctness is not trivial, but it is explained in detail in each dedicated file. Overall, five files explain the implementations of the various checks. Refer to:

1. “mul.rs” for details on multiplications.
2. “addcy.rs” for details on addition, subtraction, “lt” and “gt”.
3. “modular.rs” for details on how modular operations are checked. Note that even though “div” and “mod” are generated and checked in a separate file, they leverage the logic for modular operations described in “modular.rs”.
4. “byte” for details on how “byte” is checked.
5. “shift.rs” for details on how shifts are checked.

**Note on “lt” and “gt”:** For “lt” and “gt”, auxiliary columns hold the difference  $d$  between the two inputs  $x_1, x_2$ . We can then treat them similarly to subtractions by ensuring that  $x_1 - x_2 = d$  for “lt” and  $x_2 - x_1 = d$  for “gt”. An auxiliary column  $cy$  is used for the carry in additions and subtractions. In the comparisons case, it holds the overflow flag. Contrary to subtractions, the output of “lt” and “gt” operations is not  $d$  but  $cy$ .

**Note on “div”:** It might be unclear why “div” and “mod” are dealt with in the same file.

Given numerator and denominator  $n, d$ , we compute, like for other modular operations, the quotient  $q$  and remainder **rem**:

$$div(x_1, x_2) = q * x_2 + \mathbf{rem}$$

. We then set the associated auxiliary columns to **rem** and the output to  $q$ .

This is why “div” is essentially a modulo operation, and can be addressed in almost the same way as “mod”. The only difference is that in the “mod” case, the output is **rem** and the auxiliary value is  $q$ .

**Note on shifts:** “shr” and “shl” are internally constrained as “div” and “mul” respectively with shifted operands. Indeed, given inputs  $s, x$ , the output should be  $x \gg s$  for “shr” (resp.  $x \ll s$  for “shl”). Since shifts are binary operations, we can use the third input columns to store  $s_{\text{shifted}} = 1 \ll s$ . Then, we can use the “div” logic (resp. “mul” logic) to ensure that the output is  $\frac{x}{s_{\text{shifted}}}$  (resp.  $x * s_{\text{shifted}}$ ).

### 3.3 Byte Packing

The BytePacking STARK module is used for reading and writing non-empty byte sequences of length at most 32 to memory. The "packing" term highlights that reading a sequence in memory will pack the bytes into an EVM word (i.e. U256), while the "unpacking" operation consists in breaking down an EVM word into its byte sequence and writing it to memory.

This allows faster memory copies between two memory locations, as well as faster memory reset (see [memcpy.asm](#) and [memset.asm](#) modules).

The 'BytePackingStark' table will have  $\ell$  rows per packing/unpacking operation, where  $0 < \ell \leq 32$  is the length of the sequence being processed.

Each row contains the following columns:

1. 5 columns containing information on the initial memory address from which the sequence starts (namely a flag differentiating read and write operations, address context, segment and offset values, as well as timestamp),
2.  $f_{\text{end}}$ , a flag indicating the end of a sequence,
3. 32 columns  $b_i$  indicating the index of the byte being read/written at a given row,
4. 32 columns  $v_i$  indicating the values of the bytes that have been read or written during a sequence,
5. 2 columns  $r_i$  needed for range-checking the the byte values.

**Notes on columns generation:** Whenever a byte unpacking operation is called, the value `val` is read from the stack, but because the EVM and the STARKs use different endianness, we need to convert `val` to a little-endian byte sequence. Only then do we resize it to the appropriate length, and prune extra zeros and higher bytes in the process. Finally, we reverse the byte order and write this new sequence into the  $v_i$  columns of the table.

Whenever the operation is a byte packing, the bytes are read one by one from memory and stored in the  $v_i$  columns of the BytePackingStark table.

Note that because of the different endianness on the memory and EVM sides, we generate rows starting with the final virtual address value (and the associated byte). We decrement the address at each row.

The  $b_i$  columns hold a boolean value.  $b_i = 1$  whenever we are currently reading or writing the  $i$ -th element in the byte sequence.  $b_i = 0$  otherwise.

**Cross-table lookups:** The read or written bytes need to be checked against both the cpu and the memory tables. Whenever we call `MSTORE_32BYTES`, `MLOAD_32BYTES` or `PUSH` on the cpu side, we make use of ‘BytePackingStark’ to make sure we are carrying out the correct operation on the correct values. For this, we check that the following values correspond:

1. the address (comprising the context, the segment, and the virtual address),
2. the length of the byte sequence,
3. the timestamp,
4. the value (either written to or read from the stack)

On the other hand, we need to make sure that the read and write operations correspond to the values read or stored on the memory side. We therefore need a CTL for each byte, checking that the following values are identical in ‘MemoryStark’ and ‘BytePackingStark’:

1. a flag indicating whether the operation is a read or a write,
2. the address (context, segment and virtual address),
3. the byte (followed by 0s to make sure the memory address contains a byte and not a U256 word),
4. the timestamp

**Note on range-check:** Range-checking is necessary whenever we do a memory unpacking operation that will write values to memory. These values are constrained by the range-check to be 8-bit values, i.e. fitting between 0 and 255 included. While range-checking values read from memory is not necessary, because we use the same `byte_values` columns for both read and write operations, this extra condition is enforced throughout the whole trace regardless of the operation type.

### 3.4 Logic

Each row of the logic table corresponds to one bitwise logic operation: either AND, OR or XOR. Each input for these operations is represented as 256 bits, while the output is stored as eight 32-bit limbs.

Each row therefore contains the following columns:



1.  $f_{\text{and}}$ , an “is and” flag, which should be 1 for an OR operation and 0 otherwise,
2.  $f_{\text{or}}$ , an “is or” flag, which should be 1 for an OR operation and 0 otherwise,
3.  $f_{\text{xor}}$ , an “is xor” flag, which should be 1 for a XOR operation and 0 otherwise,
4. 256 columns  $x_{1,i}$  for the bits of the first input  $x_1$ ,
5. 256 columns  $x_{2,i}$  for the bits of the second input  $x_2$ ,
6. 8 columns  $r_i$  for the 32-bit limbs of the output  $r$ .

Note that we need all three flags because we need to be able to distinguish between an operation row and a padding row – where all flags are set to 0.

The subdivision into bits is required for the two inputs as the table carries out bitwise operations. The result, on the other hand, is represented in 32-bit limbs since we do not need individual bits and can therefore save the remaining 248 columns. Moreover, the output is checked against the cpu, which stores values in the same way.

### 3.5 Memory

For simplicity, let’s treat addresses and values as individual field elements. The generalization to multi-element addresses and values is straightforward.

Each row of the memory table corresponds to a single memory operation (a read or a write), and contains the following columns:

1.  $a$ , the target address
2.  $r$ , an “is read” flag, which should be 1 for a read or 0 for a write
3.  $v$ , the value being read or written
4.  $\tau$ , the timestamp of the operation

The memory table should be ordered by  $(a, \tau)$ . Note that the correctness of the memory could be checked as follows:

1. Verify the ordering by checking that  $(a_i, \tau_i) \leq (a_{i+1}, \tau_{i+1})$  for each consecutive pair.

2. Enumerate the purportedly-ordered log while tracking the “current” value of  $v$ , which is initially zero.<sup>1</sup>
  - (a) Upon observing an address which doesn’t match that of the previous row, if the operation is a read, check that  $v = 0$ .
  - (b) Upon observing a write, don’t constrain  $v$ .
  - (c) Upon observing a read at timestamp  $\tau_i$  which isn’t the first operation at this address, check that  $v_i = v_{i-1}$ .

The ordering check is slightly involved since we are comparing multiple columns. To facilitate this, we add an additional column  $e$ , where the prover can indicate whether two consecutive addresses changed. An honest prover will set

$$e_i \leftarrow \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } a_i \neq a_{i+1}, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

We also introduce a range-check column  $c$ , which should hold:

$$c_i \leftarrow \begin{cases} a_{i+1} - a_i - 1 & \text{if } e_i = 1, \\ \tau_{i+1} - \tau_i & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

The extra  $-1$  ensures that the address actually changed if  $e_i = 1$ . We then impose the following transition constraints:

1.  $e_i(e_i - 1) = 0$ ,
2.  $(1 - e_i)(a_{i+1} - a_i) = 0$ ,
3.  $c_i < 2^{32}$ .

The last constraint emulates a comparison between two addresses or timestamps by bounding their difference; this assumes that all addresses and timestamps fit in 32 bits and that the field is larger than that.

### 3.5.1 Virtual memory

In the EVM, each contract call has its own address space. Within that address space, there are separate segments for code, main memory, stack memory, calldata, and returndata. Thus each address actually has three components:

1. an execution context, representing a contract call,

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<sup>1</sup>EVM memory is zero-initialized.

2. a segment ID, used to separate code, main memory, and so forth, and so on
3. a virtual address.

The comparisons now involve several columns, which requires some minor adaptations to the technique described above; we will leave these as an exercise to the reader.

### 3.5.2 Timestamps

Memory operations are sorted by address  $a$  and timestamp  $\tau$ . For a memory operation in the CPU, we have:

$$\tau = \text{NUM\_CHANNELS} \times \text{cycle} + \text{channel}.$$

Since a memory channel can only hold at most one memory operation, every CPU memory operation's timestamp is unique.

Note that it doesn't mean that all memory operations have unique timestamps. There are two exceptions:

- Before bootstrapping, we write some global metadata in memory. These extra operations are done at timestamp  $\tau = 0$ .
- Some tables other than CPU can generate memory operations, like KeccakSponge. When this happens, these operations all have the timestamp of the CPU row of the instruction which invoked the table (for KeccakSponge, KECCAK\_GENERAL).

## 3.6 Keccak-f

This table computes the Keccak-f[1600] permutation.

### 3.6.1 Keccak-f Permutation

To explain how this table is structured, we first need to detail how the permutation is computed. [This page](#) gives a pseudo-code for the permutation. Our implementation differs slightly – but remains equivalent – for optimization and constraint degree reasons.

Let:

- $S$  be the sponge width ( $S = 25$  in our case)

- `NUM_ROUNDS` be the number of Keccak rounds (`NUM_ROUNDS` = 24)
- `RC` a vector of round constants of size `NUM_ROUNDS`
- `I` be the input of the permutation, comprised of  $S$  64-bit elements

The first step is to reshape  $I$  into a  $5 \times 5$  matrix. We initialize the state  $A$  of the sponge with  $I$ :

$$A[x, y] := I[x, y] \quad \forall x, y \in \{0..4\}$$

We store  $A$  in the table, and subdivide each 64-bit element into two 32-bit limbs. Then, for each round  $i$ , we proceed as follows:

1. First, we define  $C[x] := \mathbf{xor}_{i=0}^4 A[x, i]$ . We store  $C$  as bits in the table. This is because we need to apply a rotation on its elements' bits and carry out `xor` operations in the next step.
2. Then, we store a second vector  $C'$  in bits, such that:

$$C'[x, z] = C[x, z] \mathbf{xor} C[x - 1, z] \mathbf{xor} C[x + 1, z - 1]$$

3. We then need to store the updated value of  $A$ :

$$A'[x, y] = A[x, y] \mathbf{xor} C[x, y] \mathbf{xor} C'[x, y]$$

Note that this is equivalent to the equation in the official Keccak-f description:

$$A'[x, y] = A[x, y] \mathbf{xor} C[x - 1, z] \mathbf{xor} C[x + 1, z - 1]$$

4. The previous three points correspond to the  $\theta$  step in Keccak-f. We can now move on to the  $\rho$  and  $\pi$  steps. These steps are written as:

$$B[y, 2 \times x + 3 \times y] := \mathbf{rot}(A'[x, y], r[x, y])$$

where  $\mathbf{rot}(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{s})$  is the bitwise cyclic shift operation, and  $r$  is the matrix of rotation offsets. We do not need to store  $B$ :  $B$ 's bits are only a permutation of  $A$ 's bits.

5. The  $\chi$  step updates the state once again, and we store the new values:

$$A''[x, y] := B[x, y] \text{ xor } (\text{not } B[x + 1, y] \text{ and } B[x + 2, y])$$

Because of the way we carry out constraints (as explained below), we do not need to store the individual bits for  $A''$ : we only need the 32-bit limbs.

6. The final step,  $\iota$ , consists in updating the first element of the state as follows:

$$A'''[0, 0] = A''[0, 0] \text{ xor } RC[i]$$

where

$$A'''[x, y] = A''[x, y] \forall (x, y) \neq (0, 0)$$

Since only the first element is updated, we only need to store  $A'''[0, 0]$  of this updated state. The remaining elements are fetched from  $A''$ . However, because of the bitwise **xor** operation, we do need columns for the bits of  $A''[0, 0]$ .

Note that all permutation elements are 64-bit long. But they are stored as 32-bit limbs so that we do not overflow the field.

It is also important to note that all bitwise logic operations ( **xor** , **not** and **and**) are checked in this table. This is why we need to store the bits of most elements. The logic table can only carry out eight 32-bit logic operations per row. Thus, leveraging it here would drastically increase the number of logic rows, and incur too much overhead in proving time.

### 3.6.2 Columns

Using the notations from the previous section, we can now list the columns in the table:

1. `NUM_ROUNDS` = 24 columns  $c_i$  to determine which round is currently being computed.  $c_i = 1$  when we are in the  $i$ -th round, and 0 otherwise. These columns' purpose is to ensure that the correct round constants are used at each round.
2. 1 column  $t$  which stores the timestamp at which the Keccak operation was called in the cpu. This column enables us to ensure that inputs and outputs are consistent between the cpu, keccak-sponge and keccak-f tables.

3.  $5 \times 5 \times 2 = 50$  columns to store the elements of  $A$ . As a reminder, each 64-bit element is divided into two 32-bit limbs, and  $A$  comprises  $S = 25$  elements.
4.  $5 \times 64 = 320$  columns to store the bits of the vector  $C$ .
5.  $5 \times 64 = 320$  columns to store the bits of the vector  $C'$ .
6.  $5 \times 5 \times 64 = 1600$  columns to store the bits of  $A'$ .
7.  $5 \times 5 \times 2 = 50$  columns to store the 32-bit limbs of  $A''$ .
8. 64 columns to store the bits of  $A''[0, 0]$ .
9. 2 columns to store the two limbs of  $A'''[0, 0]$ .

In total, this table comprises 2,431 columns.

### 3.6.3 Constraints

Some constraints checking that the elements are computed correctly are not straightforward. Let us detail them here.

First, it is important to highlight the fact that a **xor** between two elements is of degree 2. Indeed, for  $x \text{ xor } y$ , the constraint is  $x + y - 2 \times x \times y$ , which is of degree 2. This implies that a **xor** between 3 elements is of degree 3, which is the maximal constraint degree for our STARKs.

We can check that  $C'[x, z] = C[x, z] \text{ xor } C[x - 1, z] \text{ xor } C[x + 1, z - 1]$ . However, we cannot directly check that  $C[x] = \text{xor}_{i=0}^4 A[x, i]$ , as it would be a degree 5 constraint. Instead, we use  $C'$  for this constraint. We see that:

$$\text{xor}_{i=0}^4 A'[x, i, z] = C'[x, z]$$

This implies that the difference  $d = \sum_{i=0}^4 A'[x, i, z] - C'[x, z]$  is either 0, 2 or 4. We can therefore enforce the following degree 3 constraint instead:

$$d \times (d - 2) \times (d - 4) = 0$$

Additionally, we have to check that  $A'$  is well constructed. We know that  $A'$  should be such that  $A'[x, y, z] = A[x, y, z] \text{ xor } C[x, z] \text{ xor } C'[x, z]$ . Since we do not have the bits of  $A$  elements but the bits of  $A'$  elements, we check the equivalent degree 3 constraint:

$$A[x, y, z] = A'[x, y, z] \text{ xor } C[x, z] \text{ xor } C'[x, z]$$

Finally, the constraints for the remaining elements,  $A''$  and  $A'''$  are straightforward:  $A''$  is a three-element bitwise `xor` where all bits involved are already stored and  $A'''[0, 0]$  is the output of a simple bitwise `xor` with a round constant.

### 3.7 KeccakSponge

This table computes the Keccak256 hash, a sponge-based hash built on top of the Keccak-f[1600] permutation. An instance of KeccakSponge takes as input a Memory address  $a$ , a length  $l$ , and computes the Keccak256 digest of the memory segment starting at  $a$  and of size  $l$ . An instance can span many rows, each individual row being a single call to the Keccak table. Note that all the read elements must be bytes; the proof will be unverifiable if this is not the case. Following the Keccak specifications, the input string is padded to the next multiple of 136 bytes. Each row contains the following columns:

- Read bytes:
  - 3 address columns: `context`, `segment` and the offset `virt` of  $a$ .
  - `timestamp`: the timestamp which will be used for all memory reads of this instance.
  - `already_absorbed_bytes`: keeps track of how many bytes have been hashed in the current instance. At the end of an instance, we should have absorbed  $l$  bytes in total.
  - `KECCAK_RATE_BYTES` `block_bytes` columns: the bytes being absorbed at this row. They are read from memory and will be XORed to the rate part of the current state.
- Input columns:
  - `KECCAK_RATE_U32S` `original_rate_u32s` columns: hold the rate part of the state before XORing it with `block_bytes`. At the beginning of an instance, they are initialized with 0.
  - `KECCAK_RATE_U32S` `xored_rate_u32s` columns: hold the original rate XORed with `block_bytes`.
  - `KECCAK_CAPACITY_U32S` `original_capacity_u32s` columns: hold the capacity part of the state before applying the Keccak permutation.
- Output columns:

- KECCAK\_DIGEST\_BYTES `updated_digest_state_bytes` columns: the beginning of the output state after applying the Keccak permutation. At the last row of an instance, they hold the computed hash. They are decomposed in bytes for endianness reasons.
- KECCAK\_WIDTH\_MINUS\_DIGEST\_U32S `partial_updated_state_u32s` columns: the rest of the output state. They are discarded for the final digest, but are used between instance rows.
- Helper columns:
  - `is_full_input_block`: indicates if the current row has a full input block, i.e. `block_bytes` contains only bytes read from memory and no padding bytes.
  - KECCAK\_RATE\_BYTES `is_final_input_len` columns: in the final row of an instance, indicate where the final read byte is. If the  $i$ -th column is set to 1, it means that all bytes after the  $i$ -th are padding bytes. In a full input block, all columns are set to 0.

For each instance, constraints ensure that:

- at each row:
  - `is_full_input_block` and `is_final_input_len` columns are all binary.
  - Only one column in `is_full_input_block` and `is_final_input_len` is set to 1.
  - `xored_rate_u32s` is `original_rate_u32s` XOR `block_bytes`.
  - The CTL with Keccak ensures that (`updated_digest_state_bytes` columns, `partial_updated_state_u32s`) is the Keccak permutation output of (`xored_rate_u32s`, `original_capacity_u32s`).
- at the first row:
  - `original_rate_u32s` is all 0.
  - `already_absorbed_bytes` is 0.
- at each full input row (i.e. `is_full_input_block` is 1, all `is_final_input_len` columns are 0):
  - `context`, `segment`, `virt` and `timestamp` are unchanged in the next row.



- Next `already_absorbed_bytes` is current `already_absorbed_bytes` + `KECCAK_RATE_BYTES`.
- Next (`original_rate_u32s`, `original_capacity_u32s`) is current (`updated_digest_state_bytes` columns, `partial_updated_state_u32s`).
- The CTL with Memory ensures that `block_bytes` is filled with contiguous memory elements [`a + already_absorbed_bytes`, `a + already_absorbed_bytes + KECCAK_RATE_BYTES - 1`]
- at the final row (i.e. `is_full_input_block` is 0, `is_final_input_len`'s  $i$ -th column is 1 for a certain  $i$ , the rest are 0):
  - The CTL with Memory ensures that `block_bytes` is filled with contiguous memory elements [`a + already_absorbed_bytes`, `a + already_absorbed_bytes + i - 1`]. The rest are padding bytes.
  - The CTL with CPU ensures that `context`, `segment`, `virt` and `timestamp` match the `KECCAK_GENERAL` call.
  - The CTL with CPU ensures that  $l = \text{already\_absorbed\_bytes} + i$ .
  - The CTL with CPU ensures that `updated_digest_state_bytes` is the output of the `KECCAK_GENERAL` call.

The trace is padded to the next power of two with dummy rows, whose `is_full_input_block` and `is_final_input_len` columns are all 0.

## 4 Merkle Patricia tries

### 4.1 Internal memory format

Without our zkEVM's kernel memory,

1. An empty node is encoded as (`MPT_NODE_EMPTY`).
2. A branch node is encoded as (`MPT_NODE_BRANCH`,  $c_1, \dots, c_{16}, v$ ), where each  $c_i$  is a pointer to a child node, and  $v$  is a pointer to a value. If a branch node has no associated value, then  $v = 0$ , i.e. the null pointer.
3. An extension node is encoded as (`MPT_NODE_EXTENSION`,  $k, c$ ),  $k$  represents the part of the key associated with this extension, and is encoded as a 2-tuple (`packed_nibbles`, `num_nibbles`).  $c$  is a pointer to a child node.

4. A leaf node is encoded as  $(\text{MPT\_NODE\_LEAF}, k, v)$ , where  $k$  is a 2-tuple as above, and  $v$  is a pointer to a value.
5. A digest node is encoded as  $(\text{MPT\_NODE\_HASH}, d)$ , where  $d$  is a Keccak256 digest.

## 4.2 Prover input format

The initial state of each trie is given by the prover as a nondeterministic input tape. This tape has a slightly different format:

1. An empty node is encoded as  $(\text{MPT\_NODE\_EMPTY})$ .
2. A branch node is encoded as  $(\text{MPT\_NODE\_BRANCH}, v?, c_1, \dots, c_{16})$ . Here  $v?$  consists of a flag indicating whether a value is present, followed by the actual value payload if one is present. Each  $c_i$  is the encoding of a child node.
3. An extension node is encoded as  $(\text{MPT\_NODE\_EXTENSION}, k, c)$ ,  $k$  represents the part of the key associated with this extension, and is encoded as a 2-tuple  $(\text{packed\_nibbles}, \text{num\_nibbles})$ .  $c$  is a pointer to a child node.
4. A leaf node is encoded as  $(\text{MPT\_NODE\_LEAF}, k, v)$ , where  $k$  is a 2-tuple as above, and  $v$  is a value payload.
5. A digest node is encoded as  $(\text{MPT\_NODE\_HASH}, d)$ , where  $d$  is a Keccak256 digest.

In the current implementation, we use a length prefix rather than a is-present prefix, but we plan to change that.

Nodes are thus given in depth-first order, enabling natural recursive methods for encoding and decoding this format.

## 5 Privileged instructions

To ease and speed-up proving time, the zkEVM supports custom, privileged instructions that can only be executed by the kernel. Any appearance of those privileged instructions in a contract bytecode for instance would result in an unprovable state.

In what follows, we denote by  $p_{BN}$  the characteristic of the BN254 curve base field, curve for which Ethereum supports the ecAdd, ecMul and ecPairing precompiles.

- 0x0C. **ADDFP254**. Pops 2 elements from the stack interpreted as BN254 base field elements, and pushes their addition modulo  $p_{BN}$  onto the stack.
- 0x0D. **MULFP254**. Pops 2 elements from the stack interpreted as BN254 base field elements, and pushes their product modulo  $p_{BN}$  onto the stack.
- 0x0E. **SUBFP254**. Pops 2 elements from the stack interpreted as BN254 base field elements, and pushes their difference modulo  $p_{BN}$  onto the stack. This instruction behaves similarly to the SUB (0x03) opcode, in that we subtract the second element of the stack from the initial (top) one.
- 0x0F. **SUBMOD**. Pops 3 elements from the stack, and pushes the modular difference of the first two elements of the stack by the third one. It is similar to the SUB instruction, with an extra pop for the custom modulus.
- 0x21. **KECCAK\_GENERAL**. Pops 4 elements (successively the context, segment, and offset portions of a Memory address, followed by a length  $\ell$ ) and pushes the hash of the memory portion starting at the constructed address and of length  $\ell$ . It is similar to KECCAK256 (0x20) instruction, but can be applied to any memory section (i.e. even privileged ones).
- 0x49. **PROVER\_INPUT**. Pushes a single prover input onto the stack.
- 0xC0-0xDF. **MSTORE\_32BYTES**. Pops 4 elements from the stack (successively the context, segment, and offset portions of a Memory address, and then a value), and pushes a new offset' onto the stack. The value is being decomposed into bytes and written to memory, starting from the reconstructed address. The new offset being pushed is computed as the initial address offset + the length of the byte sequence being written to memory. Note that similarly to PUSH (0x60-0x7F) instructions there are 31 MSTORE\_32BYTES instructions, each corresponding to a target byte length (length 0 is ignored, for the same reasons as MLOAD\_32BYTES, see below). Writing to memory an integer fitting in  $n$  bytes with a length  $\ell < n$  will result in the integer being truncated. On the other hand, specifying a length  $\ell$  greater than the byte size of the value being written will result in padding with zeroes. This process is heavily used when resetting memory sections (by calling MSTORE\_32BYTES\_32 with the value 0).
- 0xF6. **GET\_CONTEXT**. Pushes the current context onto the stack. The kernel always has context 0.

- 0xF7. **SET\_CONTEXT**. Pops the top element of the stack and updates the current context to this value. It is usually used when calling another contract or precompile, to distinguish the caller from the callee.
- 0xF8. **MLOAD\_32BYTES**. Pops 4 elements from the stack (successively the context, segment, and offset portions of a Memory address, and then a length  $\ell$ ), and pushes a value onto the stack. The pushed value corresponds to the U256 integer read from the big-endian sequence of length  $\ell$  from the memory address being reconstructed. Note that an empty length is not valid, nor is a length greater than 32 (as a U256 consists in at most 32 bytes). Missing these conditions will result in an unverifiable proof.
- 0xF9. **EXIT\_KERNEL**. Pops 1 element from the stack. This instruction is used at the end of a syscall, before proceeding to the rest of the execution logic. The popped element, *keccak\_info*, contains several informations like the current program counter, current gas used, and if we are in kernel (i.e. privileged) mode.
- 0xFB. **MLOAD\_GENERAL**. Pops 3 elements (successively the context, segment, and offset portions of a Memory address), and pushes the value stored at this memory address onto the stack. It can read any memory location, general (similarly to MLOAD (0x51) instruction) or privileged.
- 0xFC. **MSTORE\_GENERAL**. Pops 4 elements (successively a value, then the context, segment, and offset portions of a Memory address), and writes the popped value from the stack at the reconstructed address. It can write to any memory location, general (similarly to MSTORE (0x52) / MSTORE8 (0x53) instructions) or privileged.

## References

- [1] E. Ben-Sasson, I. Bentov, Y. Horesh, and M. Riabzev, “Scalable, transparent, and post-quantum secure computational integrity.” Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2018/046, 2018. <https://ia.cr/2018/046>.