

OPERATION ACTIVE RESOLVE INTELLIGENCE REPORT D+2

1 General Information

This intelligence report covers the last 24 hours (D+2).

2 Intelligence

2.1 Air

2.1.1 Cyberattack against Syrian Airforce

Cyberattack against Syrian Airforce was likely a factor in prevent QRA reactions and air operations from Syrian Airforce on D+2. A CJTF Cyber unit was tasked to coordinate a cyber attack with JFACC's attack on the Syrian Sector Command Center (SCC) for Air Defense sector West. Intention behind this cyber attack was to aid and set conditions for the strike for it to be successful

ASSESSMENT: It is LIKELY that the cyber attack was major contributing factor of low air activity on the western and eastern sector the last 24 hours. It is also assessed as LIKELY that the Syrian Airforce have already been able to recover from the cyber attack, or will be able to recover within the next 24 hours.

2.1.2 SCC WEST likely moved to backup location

Last 24 hours CJTF attacked SCC WEST in a successful strike. It have been reported that SCC's have backup command centers that will take their place if the primary SCC is destroyed. These backup command centers are not operational 24/7, and is not ready to assume the command and control of the sector on very short notice.

ASSESSMENT: After the successful strike at SCC WEST last 24 hours, it is HIGHLY LIKELY that command and control of sector west will be moved to a backup facility at

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a unknown location. It is LIKELY that backup SCC WEST is operational within 12-48 hours.

2.2 Sea

NSTR (Nothing Significant To Report)

2.3 Ground

2.3.1 Hezbollah trying to get Silkworm missiles.

Recently VID have picked up reports that Hezbollah have been approaching Iran to get a supply of Silkworm missiles. Hezbollah are reported to have a stockpile of Silkworm missiles¹. The current state of these missiles is unknown.

ASSESSMENT: It is LIKELY that the current stockpile of missiles is not operational. It is HIGHLY LIKELY that Hezbollah have operators that are trained to use these missiles. It is LIKELY that Iran is positive to providing Hezbollah with additional Silkworm missiles, as Iran then can influence the target selection, and have leverage against CJTF, USA and Israel. It is an EVEN CHANCE that preparations are being taken to prepare a shipment of missiles to Hezbollah trough Syrian into Lebanon.

2.3.2 Activation of Syrian Reserve Corps

The last 24 hours there have been discussions in certain circles in the Syrian Regime about the possibility to active the Syrian 6th Corps, a reserve unit not in active duty. VID do currently not possess any more information about the 6th Corps

ASSESSMENT: Based in knowledge of the Syrian Army it is assessed as LIKELY that it will take at least 7 days to active a Corps, and an additional 7 days to move it into locations and be operational for combat operations.

2.4 Political

2.4.1 Syria and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

The last 24 hours, in certain circles of the Syrian regime there have been talk about weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Discussions have been centered around what ifs, in case of any situation would escalate and threaten the Syrian regimes survival.

ASSESSMENT: It is HIGHLY UNLIKLY that the Syrian regime will use WMD in offensive operations. It is currently assessed as EVEN CHANCE that the Syrian regime will use WMD if the survival of the Syrian Regime is at stake.

2.4.2 Russian complain about unsafe interception in international airspace

Russian officials have complained about unsafe maneuvering by CJTF forces in international airspace. A F-14 were reported to maneuver close to a TU-22 on a reported routine mission in the Mediterranean in international airspace. The maneuver from the F-14 forces the TU-22 to conduct a evasive maneuver to avoid being hit by the F-14.

¹ INTREP VIS OPAR-004 - HEZBOLLAH ground combat tactics DISCLAIMER:

ASSESSMENT: It is HIGHLY LIKELY that Russia will use all possible means for propaganda and diplomatic effort to undermine the credibility of CJTF. It is LIKELY that Russian will continue provocations to undermine CJTF.

2.4.3 Incursion into Jordan and Lebanon.

At D+2 1702Z 4 aircraft from CJTF violated Lebanese airspace for about 6 minutes. At D+2 1718Z 2 aircraft from CJTF violated Jordanian airspace for about 4 minutes. Both the Jordanian and Lebanese government filed official complaints to CJTF.

ASSESSMENT: It is LIKELY that incursions into neutral airspace have a negative impact on the view and legitimacy of CJTF operations in the region. It is HIGHLY LIKLEY that these incursions will not lead to any actions, but it is an EVEN CHANCE that further incursions will lead to reactions from either Lebanon or Jordan.

2.4.4 Russian discontent with CJTF operations in Syria

Russia have the last 24 hours conducted a series of meetings where the agenda have been to end CJTF operations into Syria, and urge all parties to resume to the negotiating table. Russian media have also been showing interviews with Russian diplomats and officials stating this view publicly.

ASSESSMENT: It is a EVEN CHANCE that Russia is conducting this to set conditions for a further increased activity in the region, and EVEN CHANCE for Russia to take a more active role in the defense of Syria.

3 VID Information gaps

- What is the status of Syrian SCUD units?
- What is the status of Syrian Air Force
 - o DCA missions? (Does the Syrian Air Force fly CAPs?
 - o QRA (reaction times, from what bases type of aircrafts)
- What is the status of 4th Corps and 5th Corps (Are they leaving bases, if yes, that can indicate a major Syrian offensive. Which direction?)
- What is the status of Syrian Air Force A-G missions?
- Is there presence of Russian forces in either Tartus or Bassel Al-Assad airfield?
- What is the status of Syrian IADS?
 - o Positions of EWR
 - Position of SAM sites
 - Is the entire IADS operational