



JFACC AIR OPERATIONS DIRECTIVE OPERATION ACTIVE RESOLVE D+11 [DRAFT]

1. SITUATION

a. JFC guidance (verbatim).

(1) Priority of effort is on establishing Air Superiority in support of LCC in the northern sector.

Start shaping for phase 2 in the operation

For support to LCC, support shaping effort for LCC by removing enemy long range artillery, C2, logistics and artillery.

(2) Prepare plan for phase 2.

Revise priority on Joint Target List (JTL).

Plan need to take into account support to LCC (CAS, AR and CAP) and Air Interdiction campaign for targets at JTL.

Submit CONOP (Concept of Operations) to CJTF HQ for approval.

CONOP can contain options to fly through neutral territory.

CONOP can contain options for attacking adversary's posing a threat to the phase.

CONOP can contain request for MCC to move CSG-72 operations box

CONOP can contain request to SOCC for observation posts for target acquisition in enemy territory-

Prepare contingency plans for striking Syrian WMD at short notice (regardless of phase).

ALR: EXTREME approved for such a plan.

(3) JFACC is the supported commander.

See [CJTF Operations Order](#)

DISCLAIMER:

This is for multiplayer online gaming using the Digital Combat Systems simulation software published by Eagle Dynamics. The information is not in any way suitable for real world use or operations.

b. Enemy situation.

The last 24 hours have seen a continued high activity in the vicinity of PALMYRA airfield. It is still unclear to VIS what the activity is related to. Russian SAG arrived in the Area of Operations (AO). Late last night the reported Russian SAG1 was observed entering the AO. The SAG was observed was 350nm SOUTHWEST of INCIRLIK.

The last 24 hours VID sources have seen an increased activity in the 922ndSCUD regiment base (OPARTGT003) coupled with an increased activity at the Sharqiyah Research Center (OPARTGT059). The increased activity has been related to testing and production facilities. In addition, rebuilding efforts are taking place at the storage facility. A higher number than normal of fuel trucks are present at the facility. VID also assesses that an EVEN CHANCE that Syrian forces are preparing to use the SCUDs or preparing for a move of SCUDs due to a risk of CJTF-82 invasion of Syria.

For further details see: [VID INTREP D10](#)

Allied A/C continued effort to degrade enemy forces in the Northern front, shaping conditions to allied ground force maneuver into the area.

1st Corps have withdrawn from Turkey.

All 1st Corps units have dug in hard near the front line to Turkey, and are showing no intention to give up easily. Enemy units of 1st Corps is anticipated to dig in hard to protect their home country.

Lead elements of 2nd Corps have been found in the vicinity of Minakh AB.

A substantial enemy artillery (both SPHs and rockets) is still present at AL MINAKH and threatens LCC's planned ground maneuver into that area. The Western portion of the KBs [NW of Taftanaz] is estimated to contain only remnant enemy forces. In the Southern area of the KB, the area stretching from the IDLIB / MAARRAT-MISRIN and Eastwards is still known to be housing enemy high-value asset such as Logistical BNs and two suspected field HQ and is still regarded as heavily defended.

3rd Corps is holding strong in GOLAN Heights region and currently VIS does not hold any new intelligence of this area.

4th Corps is still believed to protecting Damaskus.

5th Corps is still believed stationary however is expected to be able to move within days if needed.

See [VIS INTSUM GROUND D10](#)

The Syrian IADS in the North Sector (IADS West Sector) is partially degraded by the loss of the SCC center in Abu Al Duhur and the backup center IVO Jirah AB. The backup center IVO Jirah AB has been re-assessed as the SDACC Backup Center, and thus the entire IADS network may be running on reduced redundancy (RR).

Several key EWR sites remain operational. A "New" EWR has been noted west of Abu Al Duhur. Jirah AB remains inoperable and is estimated to remain out of operation until D+12.

Intentions of Russian and/or Chinese forces activity in the area is unclear. It is VERY LIKELY that Syrians recognize that legacy SAM systems is a serious defensive liability. To address

DISCLAIMER:

This is for multiplayer online gaming using the Digital Combat Systems simulation software published by Eagle Dynamics. The information is not in any way suitable for real world use or operations.

these liabilities the best course of action would be to modernize their air defense systems to effect the defense of its airspace and critical infrastructure. VID has obtained intelligence on systems that Syrians might be attempting to procure.

These include S300PS (SA-10B Grumble B), S300-PMU1 and 2 (SA-20A/B Gargoyle A/B) and S300V or S300VM (SA-12 Gladiator/Giant or SA-23 Antey 2500)

See [VID INTREP RUSSIAN S-300 variants](#)

Overall estimated 67% remain of Fighters/Interceptors and Bomber aircraft - a 2% decrease from D+9. Syrian ability to sustain offensive and defensive air operations is assessed as limited. The Syrian Airforce is assessed as having a Basic DCA and elementary strategic strike competencies, although this may improve with future acquisitions of modern airframes, equipment and training.

See [VIS INTSUM D+11 IADS](#) for details.

c. Friendly situation (by joint force component).

55th Division is static at the FLOT to prepare for assault into Syria in PHASE 2

56th Division is static at the FLOT to prepare for assault into Syria in PHASE 2.

III Corps (southern sector)

III Corps was planned to start its offensive at D+4. However, due to low attrition of the Syrian 3rd Corps the offensive is delayed. III Corps will start its offensive when conditions are set for starting the offensive.

Conditions set for offensive start is 35% attrition on the following enemy units:


- 30th Armored Division (Syrian 3rd Corps)
- 31st Mechanized Division (Syrian 3rd Corps)
- 32nd Motorized Division (Syrian 3rd Corps)

Several SOF teams have started insertion into Syria to prepare for CJTF-82 Operations order phase 2. SOF teams are also on standby to conduct counter terrorism missions and counter insurgency operations.

CSG-72 continues to support the mission from CSG-72 operations box. The operations box has been moved closer to Incirlik to be able to generate more sorties. SAG-1 continues to support the mission by creating a screen for potential Russian interference from the WEST.

DISCLAIMER:

This is for multiplayer online gaming using the Digital Combat Systems simulation software published by Eagle Dynamics. The information is not in any way suitable for real world use or operations.



See also [CJTF Directions & Guidance D+11](#)

2. MISSION The JFACC's mission statement (verbatim).

JFACC will establish air superiority in the area of operations and defeat Syrian offensive capability in support of CJTF-82 offensive operations to neutralize Syrian offensive capability to conduct offensives in the region.

DISCLAIMER:

This is for multiplayer online gaming using the Digital Combat Systems simulation software published by Eagle Dynamics. The information is not in any way suitable for real world use or operations.

3. EXECUTION–AIR OPERATIONS

a. JFACC's intent.

Air superiority in the northern sector will be gained by:

- 7 day denial of the use of air bases hosting enemy aircraft capable of seriously interfering in CTJF air operations.¹
- Destroying enemy air defense assets capable of serious interference with CJTF air operations.
- Sortie the destruction of enemy long range artillery, C2, logistics and artillery in support of LCC.

(1) Purpose.

Establish and maintain air superiority in the North sector and deny the enemy the ability to impede CTJF air operations. Provide direct support to friendly ground forces to set conditions for Phase 2.

(2) End state.

Desired D+11 end state:

- Enemy air bases supporting enemy aircraft that hinder air superiority are denied use until at least D+18 in the Syria North sector.
- Enemy air defense assets capable of serious interference with CJTF air operations in the northern sector are neutralized. These include SA-2s, SA-3s, SA-6s, SA-11s, SA-15s. Priority shall be made on such sites protecting strategic assets and high value targets.
- 50% Early warning sites in the North Sector are destroyed. Priority shall be made on sites IVO Abu Al Dahur.
- Syrian long range artillery (MLRS) in northern sector degraded to 25% strength.
- Syrian artillery in the northern sector degraded to 50% strength.
- Syrian 1st and 2nd Corps HQ elements destroyed.
- Syrian attack helicopters attached to 1st and 2nd Corps degraded to 50% strength.

b. Execution: Strikes against assigned JPTL DPs and

c. Focus of effort by objective.

Priority effort shall be focused on supported AI strikes against designated JTPL targets for D+11 by target priority and orders listed in JTPL.

d. Allocation of sorties

Priorities are as follows:

1. Airbase denial in the North Sector.
2. Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses and EWRs in the North Sector, priority on IADS West.
3. Destruction of Syrian long range artillery, artillery and attack helicopters in the northern sector.
- 4.

e. Acceptable level of risk.

As per JPTL D+11. Otherwise as per SPINS.

f. Collateral damage and civilian casualty guidance

IAW [Law of Armed Conflict](#). Suspected civilian casualties should be reported through the C2 network as soon as is practicable.

¹ Serious interference is defined as requiring the withdrawal of aircraft due for force survival reasons.

DISCLAIMER:

This is for multiplayer online gaming using the Digital Combat Systems simulation software published by Eagle Dynamics. The information is not in any way suitable for real world use or operations.

g. TST guidance.

Prioritization will be IAW SPINS/JPTL/TST.

h. Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (ISR) –

- Within an ALR low setting - JFACC seeks Intelligence gaps on Palmyra filled.
 - ISR on Palmyra AB gathered, particularly in respect to 4th gen aircraft.
 - ELINT on IADS IVO Palmyra gathered.
 - IR 7 - Position of SAM sites.
 - IR 7 - Position of EWR sites.
 - ISR on 5th Corps base at Palmyra gathered.
 - Ground force composition and or movement IVO Palmyra base.

Sensor taskings should be conducted where resources permit to identify the location and movements of enemy air defence assets and SCUD launchers/WMD. These locations should be reported as soon as is practicable.

Presence of enemy air defence assets – ground- and air-based – shall be reported as soon as practicable. Reports should, where possible, include the observing aircraft's current position, a relative bearing or cardinal direction to the threat. the type of threat and an estimated distance (RWR circles, near / medium / far).

i. Other issues

Increased air activity in Palmyra is a possible indication of air force activity. It stands to reason based on [VID INTREP D9](#) that modern equipment supplied by France and/or Pakistan may already be in theater and could threaten air superiority in the northern sector.

j. Direction and Guidance

Aircrews **must** remain clear of Jordanian and Lebanese airspace at all times. Munitions must not be expended which may encroach on either airspace.

All flights follow: [Guide for filling BDA and INTEL for OPAR](#)

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

NSTR.

5. COMMAND AND CONTROL

IAW JAOP.

DISCLAIMER:

This is for multiplayer online gaming using the Digital Combat Systems simulation software published by Eagle Dynamics. The information is not in any way suitable for real world use or operations.