



# VIRTUAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

*VICTORIA PER INTELLECTUM*  
**INTSUM VIS IADS**

## **OPAR D+7**

### **DISCLAIMER:**

This is for multiplayer online gaming using the Digital Combat Systems simulation software published by Eagle Dynamics. The information is not in any way suitable for real world use or operations.

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


# MAJOR EVENTS LAST PERIOD

Syrian Air Defense Sector Command Center BDA confirmed destroyed ( ref BDA D7\_63 ) / JPTL OPARTGT069.

Backup SDACC center located in sector East at Jirah AB.

Heavy losses have been sustained by friendly forces since D+1 due to SAMs, on the order of 30+ aircraft.



## BDA LAST PERIOD

## Syrian Sector West and East D+7

Syrian Air Defense Sector Command Center BDA confirmed destroyed.

( ref BDA D7\_63 ) / JPTL OPARTGT069. SA-2 site along with 5 vehicles also destroyed – ref BDA D7\_56.

Two Northbound HFF MIG-25s were shot down between Hama and Homs. Ref BDA D7 22.

An SA-2 site was destroyed in **KB-Z3** ref BDA D7\_39. As well as an SA-11 site with a SD radar.ref BDA D7 64, 57 and 58.

8411 SA-2BN remains at 42% strength and is combat ineffective.


8312 SA-3BN remains at 89% strength, is degraded but combat effective.

## EAST

8711 SA-2BN is at 83% strength, and is combat effective.

8712 SA-3BN is at 89% strength. Combat effective.

8820A and 8821A SA-11 Batteries are down to 80% and partially combat effective (no Search Radars).







# VIS IADS RECOMMENDATIONS


## Syrian IADS Sector West

### VIS recommendations:

The surface to air threats posed in sector west are prohibitive to ALR medium air operations. A critical blow to Sector West's IADS coordination ability has been denied, but several EWR sites remain active that enable QRA forces to react as soon as aircraft enter the sector. Neutralizing the following sites should negate QRA effectiveness.

QRA has been observed to have 10-15min reaction times. This is approximately the time it takes to transit the corridor towards FAOR 1 at tactical speeds.

Additionally, a previously unreported ADSCC located at N36 05° '74 E 37 57 49 by Jirah AB. This should be a priority target to negate Syrian IADS capabilities.




## IADS THREAT SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The current threats posed by surface to air sites pose a significant hinderance to sustained air operations under ALR medium settings. VIS suggests a concentrated focus on SEAD/DEAD to enable a more permissive environment.

Prioritizing ADSCC and Airbases priority class A Airbases capable of supporting 4<sup>th</sup> gen fighters such as Jirah AB ,SAM sites and mentioned EWR sites would greatly enhance our ability to gain and maintain air supremacy. The SA10 site at Al Assad remains a potent threat to air operations and should be avoided at all costs.

VIS advises that the Transit Corridor established on D+7 may be contested for ALR-M. Denying enemy air operations in IADS sector west whilst enabling our own is a suggested priority to HHQ. The suppression of enemy air defenses is a crucial steppingstone in obtaining air supremacy in line with HHQ directives.





# ASSESSMENT OF ENEMY IADS DISPOSITION

VIS assesses that the disposition of SA regiments and battalions in sectors West and East is as follows.

**A. 831<sup>st</sup> SA-2 Regiment – Static.**

Likely tasked with the area defense of Minakh AB.

**B. 851<sup>st</sup> SA-6 Regiment – Movement unknown.**

Likely tasking undetermined.

**C. 8520nd SA-11 Battalion – Movement unknown.**

83% strength – Combat Effective.

Likely tasked with the area defense of Hama AB.


**D. 8820nd SA-11 Battalion – movement unknown.**

Likely tasked with the defense of approach to Tabqa AB.

**E. 841<sup>st</sup> SA-2 Regiment. - Static**

Likely tasked with the area defence of Abu Al Duhur

AB.





# INTELLIGENCE GAPS FILLED

1. Russian forces confirmed present in Bassel Al-Assad - SA-10 , Hinds, Drones and SU-27s.

2. QRA - reaction times assessed 10-15min (D2\_F30 - Mezzeh AB).

3. Identified EWR sites:

D3\_19 EWR 55G6 N 35 24.000 E 035 57.000

D3\_H22 EWR 55G6 N 35 44.500 E 038 33.500

4. Status of the Syrian AF has not been reassessed since last intelligence reports although several MIG25 and MIG 29 shootdowns have been reported.



# INTELLIGENCE GAPS

1. What is the scope of movement (SOM) of mobile SA regiments?
2. What is the supply state of AD units.
3. What is the force strength of 4<sup>th</sup> generation aircraft, QRA in particular.
4. Does the Syrian AF fly CAPS?
5. Does the Syrian AF have AWACS support, if so where are the tracks located?
6. What are the minimum risk zones available to fly at medium-high blocks?

