



VICTORIA PER INTELLECTUM

OPAR 2 VIS –Targeting Presentation – Pre D5





### D5 Weather Report


- D6.1: Dawn, clear skies, winds from the Northeast
- D6.2: Dusk, clear skies, winds from the North
- D7.1: Day, broken clouds, winds from the North-East
- D7.2: Night, clear skies, winds from the North-East
- D8.1: Day, clear skies, winds from North-East
- D8.2: Dusk, clear skies, winds from North-East
- (i.e. weather not a major factor for the next few days)





# D4 Enemy Situation/BDA - Ground

- Strikes on army HQ Buildings in Aleppo mean deployment of 5 Corps is VERY LIKELY to be delayed, along with mobilisation of 6 Corps
- Recent destruction of 1 Corps HQ, 11 Div HQ and damage to 12 DIV HQ mean further attacks by 1 Corps units are UNLIKELY over the next few days, and coordination of brigades is VERY LIKELY to be severely hampered.
- Significant attrition of 11 Mechanised Division at Gaziantep has now begun:
  - 81% of BMP-2s remain
  - 63% of tube artillery remains
  - EVEN CHANCE remaining rocket artillery is a single GRAD, or a single GRAD and 2 x SMERCH (neither observed firing D5.2)
  - SA-15s and SA-8s all destroyed. Significant numbers of SA-13 and GUNDISH remain.
- Significant attrition of 10 Armoured Division at Minakh
  - 85% of T-72s remain
  - 53% of tube artillery remains
  - Remaining rocket arty consisting of 2 x GRAD, 2 x URAGAN and 2 x SMERCH remain a significant threat and their destruction should be prioritised.
  - 2 x SA-15 and 2 x SA-8 remain in the area along with numerous SA-19 and GUNDISH.
  - Numerous recent observations of armoured formations moving north along road just west of Gaziantep.
     Assessed LIKELY this is a brigade preparing for a counterattack against our forces IVO Gaziantep.
- 12<sup>th</sup> Mot DIV reduced to 2 effective Bdes
  - · One continues to hold Birecik Dam
  - One remains IVO Attaturk Dam, supported by 2 x GRAD, and now reinforced by detatched Bde from 10<sup>th</sup> Armour DIV
  - 2 x SA-15 remain near the damaged HQ IVO Birecik Dam



DISCLAIMER:

- Little attrition and little recent contact with 2<sup>nd</sup> DIV near Hatay:

  This is for multiplayer online gaming using the Digital Combat Systems simulation software published by Eagle Dynamics. The information is not in any way suitable for real world use or operations.
  - 21st Mech DIV assessed still holding defensive positions east of Hatay (in the absence of any observations)





### D4 Enemy Situation/BDA - Ground


- 5<sup>th</sup> Corps is a big deal!
  - 2 x Armour DIV (includes a total of 8 x SA-15)
  - 1 x Mech DIV (includes 4 x SA-15)
  - 1 x Mot DIV (includes 4 x SA-15)
  - Heavy Rocket Arty Regt
  - Air Defence DIV (1 x SA-6 + 2 x SA-11)
- Arrival of this Corps provides many options to the Syrians, and the new air defenses can severely impede our ability to provide air support to LCC.
- Deployment timescale expected between 4-7 days. Could consider sending SOF team to monitor activity at the base in Palmyra to give warning of movement.





### D4 Enemy Situation/BDA - IADS

- No change in IADS situation.
- In Sector West:
  - Friendly air units continue to enjoy freedom to manoeuvre in the north of the sector and attrit any enemy SAM units that deploy here.
  - Further units remain in the south of the sector around Tartus and Homs. Indications of new units near Homs – likely at Air Defence Academy.
  - Assessed LIKELY that no backup SCC exists in this sector based on pilot observations of SAM behaviour.
- In Sector East
  - 3 x SA-3 sites degraded (loss of SR) or disabled (loss of SR and TR), plus one SA-11 disabled.
  - 2 x SA-2, 1 x SA-3, 2 x SA-6 and 1 x SA-11 remain fully operational. Only 1 x SA-2 location known for certain. SA-6 and -11 observed on D3.1 not seen since
  - Moving SA-2 may move to protect Palmyra in southeast of sector due to arrival of new MiG-29s.
- In Sector South, no changes. IADS still fully operational.







### D4 Enemy Situation/BDA - IADS

VIS still recommends on-call SEAD as a minimum (or SEAD organic to package) for strike missions into Syrian territory due to the mobility of SA-6 and SA-11 systems (approx. 30 mins to pack up, a few hours drive within sector, 30 mins to set up — able to reposition within sector between our events).

Several IADs units assessed to be at or soon to be at the Air Defence Academy (TGT062) (SA-15s, SA-2, possible SA-6). Recommend targeting this in the next 1-2 days to slow the replacement of long range and medium range SAM units and maintain our advantage.






### D4 Situation/BDA - Sea

- Nothing new to report wrt naval operations
- Remaining Syrian units are:
  - 2 x Molniya patrol boat at sea
  - 2 x Rezny frigate in Tartus

Syrian navy still presents a threat to JCTF logistics.

- Significant and growing Russian presence. Currently not known how actively they will enforce the embargo. Chinese SAG en-route but LIKELY will not arrive for some time.
- VIS recommendations remain as for D4:
  - JCTF shipping is routed to stay at least 55 nautical miles from the Lebanese coast
  - If logistics security becomes a priority, target the Molniyas and Reznys directly







### D4 Enemy Situation/BDA - WMDs

- 622<sup>nd</sup> Scud Regiment (Aleppo) has moved to Alert Status 1. TELs have moved out of base and into hiding. To launch, they would need to rendezvous with a fuel truck from the storage sights at either the 622<sup>nd</sup> Base or the Rocket Fuel Factory (both in Aleppo, both under watch by SoF).
- No sign of fuel being moved from either location, therefore it is LIKELY that the fuel storage remains a critical vulnerability of the WMD system.
- Remaining Scud Regiments (both near Damascus) have moved to Alert Status 2. Able to leave base at 30 mins notice.
- SCUD test carried out during D5. It is not currently known where the fuel for this launch came from, as no activity was detected by SOF teams observing Aleppo SCUD base and the Rocket Fuel Factory.
- Recommend holding back 8 x GBU 31(V)3/B for short-notice strike on WMD oxidiser storage if needed)





## D4 Enemy Situation/BDA - Air

- Air picture is largely unchanged since D4. Little contact during D5.
- Tabga appears not operational. Assessed LIKELY due to destruction of all fuel storage and without significant Syrian logistics effort will persist until D11 (low confidence!)
- Hama AB runway was also hit. VERY LIKELY Non-operational until D9.
- Attrition of another MiG-23 at Shayrat. 19 remain.
- 8 x MiG-29 observed landing at Palmyra D4.2. LIKELY these have been acquired from Russia and a new Squadron is now based at Palmyra. Another 4 aircraft likely on the way or have already arrived unobserved.
- Syria's primary airfields to obstruct JCTF air operations over the next few days are Shayrat (20 x MiG-23), Tiyas (22 x MiG-29) and Palmyra (est. 12 x MiG-29). QRA observed from both Shayrat and Tiyas when encroaching within 80NM.
- Unknown if new Palmyra sqn is night capable. Both other airfields have night-capable units, multiblaver or infine gaming using the Digital Combat Systems simulation software published by Eagle Dynamics. The information is not in any way suitable for real world use or operations.







## D5 Enemy MLCOA

#### ML COA – 24 to 72 hrs:

 Following severe attrition of army C2, and particularly 1 Corps C2, it is assessed that 1 Corps units will not commence new offensives, and brigades will be poorly coordinated.

#### Gaziantep

 11 DIV attempts to defend airfield, focussing remaining tube arty on pinch-points to slow the advance and inflict losses. The primary aim is likely to be to delay JCTF forces to buy time for the 5 Corps to deploy.

#### Minakh


- 10 DIV Continues to hold Minakh with one brigade
- Second brigade moving north preparing to counterattack Gaziantep (assessed LIKELY that such plans will already have been made, and brigade C2 will continue to execute those orders. However, with the loss of the Corps HQ coordination with 10 DIV forces will be hampered).

#### Birecik/Attaturk/Sanliurfa

 12 DIV and detached armour brigade take up defensive positions and continue to stage for attack on Sanliurfa once C2 is restored.

#### Hatay

• 2 Corps units continue to hold defensive positions, protecting 1 Corps flank and harassing friendly forces at Hatay with GRADs.







### D5 Enemy MLCOA


- ML COA 24 to 72 hrs:
  - Signs of pending invasion of Syrian territory (e.g. close to Hatay) likely to result in threats to use WMDs on CJTF forces and/or Turkish civilian targets.
  - Reconfiguration of IADS to maximise cover on key WMD infrastructure (esp. Aleppo)
  - SA-2 from Jirah redeployed to Palmyra to cover airbase and army base.
  - Airforce Assault Sqns deployed chiefly in A2A role to replace losses. CAP out of Tiyas AB, Shayrat AB and Palmyra AB.
  - Navy aims to enforce embargo, with Molniyas and Reznys aiming to stay within IADS coverage except when intelligence received about JTCF logistics shipping.
  - Syria have motivation for Russia to become more involved in the conflict and will likely look for
    opportunities to exploit ambiguity and potential for confusion. Russia can provide indirect support to
    their ally by creating ambiguous situations that make use of JCTF reluctance for conflict with Russia to
    escalate. VIS assess it is LIKELY that Russia will increase activity in the region even if not providing direct
    support in the form of attacks on JCTF forces or shipping: more flights from Syria, Egypt and Iraq, and
    increased naval activity.





### D5 Enemy MDCOA

- MD COA 24 to 72 hrs:
  - 11<sup>th</sup> DIV defends Gaziantep Intl
  - 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps launch attack on Hatay with the aim of ultimately driving far enough north to endanger Incirlik AB
  - 10<sup>th</sup> DIV holds the third brigade in reserve ready for a counterattack on the 56<sup>th</sup> DIV.
  - 12<sup>th</sup> DIV holds ground IVO Birecik and Attaturk Dam to allow force to be concentrated on repelling JCTF forces. Detached armoured brigade counterattacks Gaziantep forces from the east.







### D5 Enemy MDCOA

- MD COA 24 to 72 hrs:
  - IADS units redeployed north to provide greater defence in depth and prevent easy CJTF access to strategic targets, as well as improving their air-force's prospects providing effective CAP.
  - Airforce redeploys fighter/interceptor squadrons further north to alternative airfields within IADS coverage, and spreads night-capable squadrons more evenly to avoid reliance on particular airfields.
  - Southern SCUD regiments moved to alert state 1 and deploy to hiding places. 922<sup>nd</sup>
     SCUD Regiment used to attack Incirlik and other targets with conventional warheads, disrupting ability of CJTF to project air power
  - Syrian navy exploits Russian support for embargo and absence of CJTF SAG to attack CSG with Molinyas, with Reznys providing support.
  - Syria conducts cyber-attacks on CJTF assets, causing further disruption to logistics





## D6/7 Targeting Recommendations

- AR IVO Minakh in priority order:
  - Remaining SA-15s, to make permissive for A2G specialists
  - Remaining rocket arty (2 x SMERCH, 2 x URAGAN, 2 x GRAD (and accompanying SA-8s)) to limit Syrian ability to strike behind our lines
  - C2 if observed (DIV or Bde HQs NOT hospitals!), to further degrade ability to carry out coordinated or offensive actions
  - MBTs, especially if they look like they might be heading north
- Support LCC with CAS in accordance with his priorities. Main threats assessed to be:
  - Tube arty within 15km of pinch points
  - Armoured units approaching from Minakh or Birecik
- Continue to degrade IADS to allow strategic targets to be hit more easily and provide more permissive environment for CAP to operate. Specifically:
  - TGT062 (Air defence academy IVO Homs, a critical node in deploying new air defense units to replace losses)
  - SA-2 and other SAMs IVO Tabqa (to keep it vulnerable to later strikes so it stays out of the game), or any SAMs relocating to the north of their sectors
  - Units in the south of Sector West to improve access to Damascus area and the airbases that are currently operational
- If resources permit:
  - Destroy 2 Corps HQ, 21 and 22 DIV HQs and their GRADs, along with any SA-15s in that area to prevent 2 Corps from harassing or attacking our forces at Hatay
  - Further strikes on JADS elements for Shayrat/Tiyas airbases ftware published by Eagle Dynamics. The information is not in any way suitable for real world use or operations.





### D5 Current TST List

• VIS recommend that SCUDs and their fuel trucks stay on the TST list at this point. No other target would be worth deviating from the planned mission to engage.





## D5 Intelligence Requirements

- Full list provided in separate Excel sheet.
- New ones for D6 focus on:
  - COA for 10 DIV brigades at Minakh

IR35		Where are the 5th Corps Divisions deploying?	D5.1
	IR35.1	Are there SA-6 or SA-11 within 50km of the FLOT? If so, where?	D5.1
	IR35.2	Are there MBTs or SA-19s located near Hatay to the south or east (apart from IVO Minakh)?	D5.1
	IR35.3	Are there BMP-2 or SA-13 located with 12th DIV near Birecik or Attaturk dam?	D5.1
	IR35.4	Are there SA-8 located IVO Birecik or Attaturk dam?	D5.1
	IR35.5	How many SA-15s/SA-8s are located at Gaziantep? D5 to D8	D5.1
	IR35.6	How many SA-15s/SA-8s are located at Minakh? D5 to D8	D5.1
	IR35.7	How many SA-15s are located at Birecik dam? D5 to D8	D5.1
	IR35.8	How many SA-15s/SA-8s are located south of Hatay? D5 to D8	D5.1
	IR35.9	How many SA-15s/SA-8s are located IVO Taftanaz? D5 to D8	D5.1
	IR35.10	Are any SA-15s/SA-8s located within 50km of the FLOT but not IVO south of Hatay, Taftanaz, Minakh, Gaziantep or Birecik Dam? D5 to D8	D5.1
	IR35.11	Are there enemy SAMs located IVO Kharab Ishk?	D5.1
	IR35.12	Are there enemy SAMs located IVO Tal Siman?	D5.1
	IR35.13	Are there enemy SAMs located IVO Aleppo Intl?	D5.1
	IR35.14	Is any enemy rotary wing activity observed within 200km of FLOT? D5 to D8	D5.1
	IR35.15	Is any fixed wing activity observed into or out of front-line airfields (Kharab Ishk, Aleppo Int, Kuweires, Tal Siman? These may be possible staging points for Corps or Divisions.	D5.1
	IR35.16	What military traffic is observed travelling close to SoF positions in Aleppo - esp. BRDM-2 or ARV MTLB-U BOMAN on D5, larger formations D5.2 onwards. Report strength, type and direction of travel.	D5.1
IR36		Are the MiG-29s now located at Palmyra night-capable?	D5.1
IR37		Are the MiG-29s now located at Palmyra engaging in CAP or QRA?	D5.1





### D5 Vulnerable SYTGT

- Syrian operational targets that are currently not well protected by Syrian counter-air assets:
  - -SYTGT001 Syrian Army HQ Building 1 destruction would prevent deployment or movement of Corps-sized units for 4 to 7 days, and ability to conduct an offensive using more than one Corps will be removed.
  - -SYTGT002 Syrian Army HQ Building 2 destruction would delay mobilisation by 4-7 days, and cause chaos in the mobilisation and deployment of forces.
  - SYTGT003 622nd Scud Regt. Base destruction now has reduced impact as TELs are in the field, but fuel and oxidiser storage is one of only two such sites known.
  - SYTGT137 Rocket Fuel Factory destruction would prevent manufacture of more Scud fuel/oxidiser, and storage on-site is one of only two such sites known.
  - SYTGT100 Syrian Naval HQ destruction would severely impact coordination of maritime operations and reduce flow of supplies by sea, including loading oil for export, by 50%
  - SYTGT005 Syrian Navy Storage destruction would increase duration of navy repairs
  - SYTGT081 Al Safira Military Research Centre destruction would significantly hamper military research including biological weapons
  - SYTGT088 Syrian Intelligence Office Jirah destruction reduces Syrian ability to coordinate air strikes on friendly ground forces
  - SYTGT119 Al Assad Ammo Storage impact unknown one of three known ammo storage sites
  - SYTGT075 1st Corps Army Base destruction would reduce morale of 1st Corps units
  - Ammo factories totalling 67% of Syrian MLRS production capacity (2 locations), 50% of unguided bomb and 100% of PGM production capacity (1 location and 100% of AAA/small-arms ammo production capacity (1 location)
  - Vehicle factories totalling 100% of current truck production capacity (1 location), 40% of current BMP/BTR/Scud TEL production capacity (1 location), and final assembly of MiG-21 or MiG-23 (1 location)
  - This is for multiplayer online gaming using the Digital Combat Systems simulation software published by Eagle Dynamics. The information is not in any way suitable for real world use or operations. Chemical weapons production facility