



VIRTUAL INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE

VICTORIA PER INTELLECTUM

OPAR D+9 IADS

INTSUM VIS-IADS-001

DISCLAIMER:

This is for multiplayer online gaming using the Digital Combat Systems simulation software published by Eagle Dynamics. The information is not in any way suitable for real world use or operations.

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MAJOR EVENTS D+9 IADS

Intel

Attempted strike on Jirah Airbase was met by multiple QRA MIG21s (x18) from Abu Al Duhur.

Assessment:

Abu Al Duhur has become operational again from D+4 runway strikes. 613 Sqn based at Al Duhur has LIKELY received reinforcements, their numbers were previously assessed at 9.

Intel


Chinese (PLAAF) drone UAV VID'd operating 25nm south of Al Assad.

Assessment: China may provide Syria with armaments and/or equipment. Drones are LIKELY based out of Al Assad. It is POSSIBLE that Al Assad is being used as a point of delivery/purchase to demonstrate capabilities.

Intel

Increased Air Defense observed IVO Abu Al Duhur and Taftanaz.

Assessment: Air defense umbrella likely protecting High Value Assets and western approach via previously used Transit Corridors.





IADS BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT D+9

Syrian Sector West D+9 IADS elements

Intel

Planned strike to further damage Jirah AB was unsuccessful resulting in several shootdowns of friendly assets due to Air Defense and QRA aircraft from Abu Al Duhur. 18 MIG21s launched from 2000z to 2133z. Four unknown aircraft sortied North from Marj Ruhal AB at 2001z.


Previous un-accounted BDA reports from D+5 indicating that Jirah AB should be out of commission until D+12.

Assessment:

Previous strength of 613th Squadron at Abu Al Duhur assessed at 9. It is LIKELY that the airbase has been reinforced from 611 or 612 Squadrons based at Marj Ruhal AB.

Jirah AB is LIKELY still defended by SA11 and/or SA-15.

Recommendation: Discontinue use of TC which has LIKELY been compromised and is now **predictable**. Explore low level attack options from the Northern border. Intel suggests such routes will be masked and afford minimal reaction time by early warning assets. Take advantage of MIG21 daytime restriction to conduct strikes against Abu Al Duhur at night. Tabqa air defenses are unknown. Sortie ELINT capable aircraft to gather electronic order of battle information for the area.



IADS FORCE STATUS D+9 831st SA-2 Reg

Syrian Sector West D+9 IADS elements

SECTOR WEST

831st SA-2 Regiment

8310 EWR BN - Unknown

8311 SA-2 BN - 92% Strength - No Fan Song

8312 SA-3 BN - 89% Strength - No change


8313 SA-3 BN - 100% Strength - No change

8314A Air Defense Bty - 100% Strength - No change

Assessment - The regiment is likely responsible for the area defense of Minakh AB and the NW border.

Several DOG EARs have been detected, indicating ADF BN HQ presence. The presence of two such vehicles is an indicator for two separate battalions. It is therefore LIKELY that the regiment has been reinforced, possibly by the 841st SA-2 Regiment from the south.

Recommendation - Prioritize the destruction of DOG EAR (Sborka) vehicles to degrade command and control / combat effectiveness further.



IADS FORCE STATUS D+9 - 841st SA-2 Reg

Syrian Sector West and East D+9 IADS elements

SECTOR WEST

841nd SA-2 Regiment

8410 EWR BN - 100% Strength


8411 SA-2 BN - 42% Strength - Combat Ineffective

8412 SA-3 BN - 100% Strength - No change

8413 SA-3 BN - 100% Strength - No change

8414A Air Defense Bty - 100% Strength - No change

Assessment - The regiment is likely responsible for the area defense Abu Al Duhur AB. The 8411 SA-2 BN is combat ineffective but other units remain operational. The Northern approach to Abu Al Duhur IVO Taftanaz has seen heavy reinforcements by point defense units such as SA-15s.





IADS FORCE STATUS D+9 - 851st SA-6 Reg

Syrian Sector West and East D+9 IADS elements

SECTOR WEST

851st SA-6 Regiment


8510 EWR BN - 100% Strength - No change

8511 SA-6 BN - 88% Strength - No change - No search radar.

8512 SA-6 BN - 100% Strength - No change

8513A Air Defense Bty - 100% Strength - No change

Assessment - The regiment is likely responsible for the area defense Abu Al Duhur AB. Additional information as to the disposition of battalions is desired.





IADS FORCE STATUS D+9 - 861st SA-2 Reg

Syrian Sector West and East D+9 IADS elements

SECTOR EAST

861st SA-2 Regiment

8611 SA-2 BN - 92% Strength - No change - No Tracking Radar
(Fan Song).

8612 SA-3 BN - 100% Strength - No change

8613 SA-3 BN - 100% Strength - No change

8614A Air Defense Bty - 100% Strength - No change

Assessment - Whereabouts unknown.



IADS FORCE STATUS D+9 - 871st SA-2 Reg

Syrian Sector West and East D+9 IADS elements

SECTOR EAST

871st SA-2 Regiment

8710 EWR BN - 100% Strength - No change


8711 SA-2 BN - 83% Strength - No change.

8712 SA-3 BN - 89% Strength - No change. No search radar.

8713 SA-3 BN - 89% Strength - No change. No search radar.

8714A Air Defense Bty - 100% Strength - No change

Assessment - The regiment is likely responsible for the area defense Kuweires AB.





IADS FORCE STATUS D+9 - 881st SA-6 Reg

Syrian Sector West and East D+9 IADS elements

SECTOR EAST

881st SA-6 Regiment


8810 EWR BN - 100% Strength - No change

8811 SA-6 BN - 88% Strength - No change. No search radar.

8812 SA-6 BN - 88% Strength - No change.

8813A Air Defense Bty - 100% Strength - No change.

Assessment - Believed to be operating IVO Kuweires and tasked with its protection. BDA reports correlated to this regiments are somewhat unclear but it is assessed that the SA6 sites are inoperable as at least one was hit on D+5 and no other reports of SA6 activity in the vicinity have been noted.





IADS FORCE STATUS D+9 - 8820nd SA-11 BN

Syrian Sector West and East D+9 IADS elements


SECTOR EAST

8820nd SA-11 Battalion

8820A SA-11 Battery - 80% strength. No search radar.

8821A SA-11 Battery - 80% strength. No search radar.

Assessment - Operating SW of Jirah, the batterie's SNOW DRIFT search radars were hit on D+5 and D+7 rendering them ineffective. No change.






OVERALL IADS FORCE STATUS D+9 NORTH

The Syrian IADS in the North Sector has been partially degraded by the loss of the SDACC center in Abu Al Duhur and the backup center IVO Jirah AB. Several key EWR sites remain operational despite CJTF efforts to destroy them. Jirah AB remains inoperable and is estimated to remain out of operation until D+12.

SA11s remain a significant threat in the southern part of the North sector.


With the restoration of Abu Al Duhur and continued operations out of Tabqa AB, the Syrian Air Force has been able to impede CJTF operations and negate air superiority despite loosing several search radars attached to key air defense sites.





SA-11 SITES D+9 NORTH SECTOR

D9_24 SA11	N 36 16.485 E 036 58.562
D9_30 SA11	N 36 10.701 E 037 24.183
D8_25 SAM Launch (Unknown - assessed SA11)	N 36 01.135 E 037 45.998
D4_52 SA-11	N 35 33.195 E 036 50.000
D6_3 SA-11	N 35 32.194 E 037 06.964
D4 H45 H26 SA-11	N 35 12.621 E 036 51.799
D6_1 SA-11	N 35 07.053 E 036 43.565






SA-6 SITES D+9 NORTH SECTOR

D6_4 SA-6


N 35 45.204 E 036 53.266





SA-3 SITES D+9 NORTH SECTOR


D5_6 SA-3	N 36 40.543 E 036 56.213
D8_37 SA-3 Launcher + Logistic	N 36 11.480 E 037 36.180
D2_F51 SA-3 EST	N 35 43.373 E 035 50.119
D7_27 SA-3	N 35 47.439 E 037 30.073





SA-19 SITES D+9 NORTH SECTOR


D9_10 3x SA-19 MX	N 36 40.200 E 036 51.163
D9_46 SA-19	N 36 07.330 E 037 03.515





SA-8 SITES D+9 NORTH SECTOR

D9_29 SA-8	N 36 00.144 E 036 43.060
D9_28 SA-8	N 36 03.603 E 036 50.783
D9_22 SA-8	N 35 57.376 E 036 53.386






EWR SITES D+9 NORTH SECTOR (IR7)

D3_19 EWR55G6	N 35 24.000 E 035 57.000
D8_28 EWR 55G6	N 35 56.900 E 037 17.500
D3_H22 EWR 55G6	N 35 44.500 E 038 33.500

Shown with 500ft AGL terrain shading - green indicates coverage.

Sector WEST IADS believed to be degraded. Presence of Backup SDCC unknown.

Sector EAST IADS intact due to SDACC center at Tabqa.





SYRIAN AF STRENGTH ASSESSMENT D+9

IR-3

It is **estimated** that the enemy air order of battle has been severely attritted based on assessments from reports. 4th Generation (MIG-29) airframe numbers are estimated down to **49%** of their original strength and all but 6 MIG-25 have been destroyed leaving them down to **25%** strength.

Overall estimated **69%** remain of Fighters/Interceptors and Bomber aircraft, limiting the ability to **sustain** offensive and defensive air operations.


Based on sortie generation s It is **LIKELY** that Abu Al Duhur has been reinforced with an additional squadron of MIG21s.

Intelligence suggests that the QRA reaction is **10 minutes** from Abu Al Duhu (MIG21), Tabqa (MIG29), Marj Ryhall AB (MIG23s) and Mezze AB (MIG29s).

IR-5

SyAF is able to conduct A-G sorties based on the aircraft inventory, although their operations are severely impeded by presence of CJTF fighters. SU-24s have observed operating in the AO as well as along the Syrian Coastline (low level). It is **CONFIRMED** that MIG29s based at Tabqa are being sortied for A-A role, but are otherwise a part of an A-G division, to meet CJTF strikes.

Detection range of the Syrian Early Warning system appears to be just off the coast of Syria. The only known EW site that has the detection range necessary to activate QRA based on observed timings is based at Al Assad.





SYRIAN IADS D+9 IR-8 + MISC

IR 8 - Presence of Russian forces confirmed in the AO - both operating over the ocean as well at Al Assad.

A PLAAF Unarmed Drone has also been observed operating IVO Al Assad. Intentions unknown.

A civilian airliner (Aeroflot markings) was observed landing at Al Assad.

Intentions of Russian and/or Chinese forces is unclear currently. Possible scenarios include the supply of arms to Syria to field test units, or by means of war by proxy to undermine CJTF efforts in the region.

Recommendations

VIS has noted that several flights have been conducting operations within known SA11 threat areas without effective SEAD support in an ALR Medium settings. It has also been noted that pilots may be taking tactical decisions on escalating the ALR. VIS recommends that the conduct of flight within different ALR settings be emphasized so as to minimize risk to CJTF assets.

VIS recommends that any SA11 and SA15 MEZ be regarded as a ALR HIGH without effective SEAD support.

VIS recommends that a minimum altitude be established for FW in SPINS for North Sector to avoid the MEZ of low-medium altitude Air Defense unless mission needs and ALR dictate otherwise.

VIS recommends the discontinuation of previously used Transit Corridors as they have been LIKELY been compromised and are now predictable.

VIS recommends that maximum effort be placed in denying the use of Tabqa, Al Duhur and continued denial of Jirah AB and that operational advantage at night is utilized (MIG21s are not night capable).