



**DEAR DELEGATES:**

My name is Ellie Plachinski, and I am a sophomore majoring in chemistry and mathematics. I was an active member of Model UN during high school, but I am excited to chair for the first time at MIT MUNC 2017. Outside of MUN, I work in the Center for Environmental Health Sciences doing organic chemistry research, I am a member of MIT Symphony Orchestra, and I volunteer at the MIT Science Olympiad tournament. Please ask me if you have any questions throughout the conference!

My name is Claire Hsu, and I am a sophomore majoring in computer science and engineering. This is my first time being involved in Model UN (maybe similar to some of you), so I am very excited to chair this committee at MIT MUNC 2017. Outside of MUN, I work in the Laboratory for Atomistic and Molecular Mechanics doing protein structure research. I am also a member of the MIT IEEE Undergraduate Research and Technology Conference committee and the MIT Quidditch Team. Please let me know if you have any questions during the conference!

We are eager to observe the result of your preparation for this event, and for the lively debates on two of the world's current and pressing nuclear projects. Throughout the duration of the conference, we encourage you not to shy away from the challenges of debate with your fellow delegates, and to construct resolutions that tackle some of the most complex problems in the world with grace. The United Nations Security Council poses an additional challenge to passing a resolution: the five permanent members of the council (China, Russia, The United States, The United Kingdom, and France) have the power to veto resolutions.

Please keep in mind that you are expected to prepare opening remarks (no more than one minute in duration), as well as position papers of one page in length. Hopefully, the following guide will assist your endeavors. We wish you luck with your research and preparation!

Claire Hsu and Ellie Plachinski  
Chairs — Security Council  
MITMUNC IX 2017

## **Topic A: The Nuclear Threat on the Korean Peninsula**

### Introduction

Highlighted by recent publicity of constant threats between the United States and North Korea (Democratic People's Republic of Korea), the nuclear threat on the Korean peninsula has long been an issue on the international scale. Recent sanctions on North Korea, concerning oil imports and coal and metal exports, have been implemented by the United Nations Security Council as an attempt to slow or discourage the growth of their nuclear program, which has been steadily growing since the first notable long range missile test in 2006. Although claims are usually unconfirmed, North Korea has been an increasing threat due to their self-proclaimed successful intercontinental ballistic missile this past summer and their claimed hydrogen bomb, which created a 6.3 magnitude seismic event in September. The most recent example of the nuclear threat occurred just in November, when a ballistic missile made headlines, as estimates from scientists suggested that the test showed "more than enough range to reach Washington D.C., and in fact any part of the continental United States." (David Wright, Union of Concerned Scientists) Tensions have increased on the peninsula to the point that the country has accused the United States, one of its main adversaries, of "trying to drive the situation of the Korean peninsula to the brink of nuclear war."<sup>1</sup>

Outside of just its nuclear arsenal, the issue of nuclear proliferation in North Korea connects with the state of its people and politics, which is why it is important to understand the state of the country when considering actions to control the nuclear threat. Generally, living conditions are poor - according to the KUNI report, about half of the population lives in extreme poverty, which is only exacerbated by the recent food outage. Human rights are also an ongoing crisis in North

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/06/asia/north-korea-asean/index.html>

Korea - deserting the country is considered a capital crime and there is extremely limited freedom of speech and expression. Because the country is a dictatorship, speaking out against the leaders or country results in capital punishment. As North Korea increases its nuclear arsenal and falters in providing for its people, the United States Department of State has recently renamed North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism, and the 2014 UN Commission of Inquiry recently “found that abuses in North Korea were without parallel in the contemporary world.”<sup>2</sup>

### Background of Nuclear Weapons in North Korea

The topic of nuclear weapons and non-proliferation has long been an issue on the Korean peninsula. In 1985, North Korea officially signed the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty), an international treaty designed for countries to pledge to not acquire nuclear weapons and to pursue full elimination of existing arsenals. While seemingly peaceful, in 2003, allegations from the United States arose that claimed North Korea had been running an underground uranium weapons program, and the DPRK quickly withdrew from the treaty. Months following the withdrawal, the nation also announced the reactivation of one of its nuclear reactors (Yongbyon) and declared its possession of nuclear weapons.

Recognizing the imminent threat of the situation, five other countries - South Korea, the United States, China, Japan, and Russia (four of which are on the UNSC today) initiated discussions with North Korea to address disarmament, relations, use of nuclear energy, and sanctions. These talks were called the Six-party talks, started in 2003. At first, progress was stagnant - in 2006, North Korea tested long range missiles, and the UNSC passed the first sanction on North Korea (see Resolution 1718). The UN Security Council Sanctions Committee on North Korea was also

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<sup>2</sup> <https://www.hrw.org/asia/north-korea>


created following this launch - this committee includes all members of the UNSC, and aims to execute the sanctions declared by the overarching council. As a result of these talks, however, in 2007, North Korea agreed to shut down the Yongbyon reactor restarted following the treaty withdrawal, discuss nuclear programs to be abandoned, and resolve relations with the US and Japan in return for economic, energy and humanitarian assistance.<sup>3</sup> (North Korea currently is in a food shortage due to poor rainfall totals this past year, which makes sanctions on North Korean imports even more of a hit on the people in the country, who face famine.)

Despite the talks, North Korea continued nuclear tests, which prompted them to discontinue the talks in 2009. As a response, the UNSC passed its second resolution concerning the nuclear threat from North Korea - Resolution 1718, which gave all member states the ability to search North Korean cargo and destroy any items possibly related to nuclear weapons.

Despite this, as illustrated in the figure to the right, nuclear tests following the conclusion of the talks have been consistently increasing. With a slight pause following Kim Jong Il's death, the nuclear program has skyrocketed under the new regime, with more intermediate and intercontinental tests than before.

#### North Korea's nuclear and missile tests

Since 1984, North Korea has carried out **more than 150** missile and nuclear tests. **Over half have been since 2011**, when Kim **Jong-Un** came into power.



In 2013, more sanctions from the UN passed after the third nuclear test by North Korea. Resolutions 2087 and 2094 passed to enforce cargo seizures and more sanctions on money

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/13/AR2007021300508.html>

transfers. The most recent four sanctions have involved affecting metals exports from North Korea and oil imports. Though these sanctions are powerful, some call for more serious measures - in response to the most recent test, U.S. ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley called for a total oil embargo<sup>4</sup> instead of only cutting off 55% of oil imported in North Korea. As an idea of the economic impact surrounding these sanctions, in the recent sanctions on metal and seafood exports, the UN estimated that an approximate \$1 billion would be lost from the DPRK revenue.<sup>5</sup>

As of today, the current status of North Korea's nuclear program is debated, as experts can only assess what kinds of tests have been performed and whether they have been successful or not. Concerning the test in September that generated a magnitude 6.3 seismic event, experts (from sources including NORSAR, Seoul National University, CTBTO) suggest that North Korea has successfully developed a hydrogen bomb or was extremely close to doing so.<sup>6</sup> A report in August stated that the Japanese Ministry of Defense and US intelligence officials believed that North Korea had achieved miniaturization (making bombs smaller and easier to transport), which suggests that the country now has the ability to weaponize nuclear bombs inside their missiles.<sup>7</sup>

While the sanctions continue to press on the DPRK regime to reconsider talks and denuclearization, sanctions also push on the country's economy and on its relations with China and Russia. While China remains as one of North Korea's top economic partners, recent nuclear events have caused China to take a stronger stance on its economic partner, seeing as how China is one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. For instance, in 2013, following a

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/09/11/550301634/u-n-security-council-approves-new-north-korea-sanctions>

<sup>5</sup> <https://www.un.org/press/en/2017/sc12945.doc.htm>

<sup>6</sup> <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-thermonuclear-ana/possible-two-stage-hydrogen-bomb-seen-game-changer-for-north-korea-idUSKCN1BE0PT>

<sup>7</sup> [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/north-korea-now-making-missile-ready-nuclear-weapons-us-analysts-say/2017/08/08/e14b882a-7b6b-11e7-9d08-b79f191668ed\\_story.html?utm\\_term=.f51dc3e17206](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/north-korea-now-making-missile-ready-nuclear-weapons-us-analysts-say/2017/08/08/e14b882a-7b6b-11e7-9d08-b79f191668ed_story.html?utm_term=.f51dc3e17206)

large nuclear test, the foreign minister of China Yang Jiechi responded saying “China ‘resolutely’ opposes the latest nuclear test conducted by the DPRK”.<sup>8</sup> China could also face a possible refugee crisis if the food outage were to further spiral. Russia also has taken a similar stance, condemning recent launches. However, rather than implementing policies regarding sanctions or economic pressures, Putin recently released a piece arguing for more direct dialogue, detailing a Russian-Chinese roadmap that would find a solution to the nuclear threat on the Korean peninsula without force or threat. The proposal calls for more diplomacy and discussion, much to the opposition of United States representatives, who argue for more tangible action and sanctions.

Another point to consider is the relationship between North Korea and the United States, which well-summarizes the increasing tensions between North Korea and the rest of the world. Made notable by the numerous spats between President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, the relations between the two countries is aggressive. Following the threat on the Pacific island of Guam this past summer, US experts have aimed to conclude whether intercontinental missiles could reach the mainland. While not proven, US intelligence officials now say that North Korea has produced a missile capable of travelling to the United States mainland (as stated before), which has prompted tests of emergency sirens in US territory islands in the Pacific and military drills in South Korea. Of course, if the US takes military action on North Korea, the country could easily respond with an attack on South Korea, where 28,000+ US troops are stationed.

Questions to Consider:

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<sup>8</sup> [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2013-02/12/content\\_16221030.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2013-02/12/content_16221030.htm)

- How would further economic sanctions on North Korea affect its relations (economic or otherwise) with China, an economic partner?
- Will the Russian-Chinese proposal succeed in slowing the threat of nuclear war, or will the current policy of force and economic pressure be enough?
- Observing the consistent progress of the program and increased tensions between North Korea and the United States, how should the Security Council prevent a breaking point?

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## Topic B: The Status of Iran's Nuclear Program

### Introduction:

Since the early 2000's, the status of Iran's Nuclear Program has been in the corner of the world's vision. Despite Iran's insistence that its nuclear enrichment program is not for the purpose of developing weapons, the lack of transparency, even in allowing impartial, international inspections, resulted in a tense thirty years of negotiation. In 2015, after decades of sanctions and years of trade isolation, the UNSC adopted a resolution made by the five permanent powers of the UNSC, Iran, and Germany: the JCPOA, or Joint Cooperative Plan of Action. The JCPOA lifted all UNSC, multilateral, and national nuclear-related sanctions against Iran. However, Middle Eastern countries like Saudi Arabia and Israel have voiced their disapproval of this act, and one of the secondary negotiators, the United States, under new leadership begins to attach the JCPOA. In 2017, both allegations by Iran that the United States is in noncompliance with the JCPOA and suspected nuclear weapons tests by Iran threaten to shake the tentative agreement.

### Timeline of Iran's Nuclear Program:

- 1945**     *5 Aug.* The **United States** drops a uranium bomb on Hiroshima.
- 9 Aug.* The **United States** drops a plutonium bomb on Nagasaki.
- 1950's**    *1952.* **United Kingdom** detonates its first successful plutonium bomb. **U.S.** detonates its first thermonuclear hydrogen bomb.
- 1953.* The **Soviet Union** detonates its first thermonuclear hydrogen bomb. The **United States** covertly overthrows Prime Minister Mossadegh in Iran, and installs Shah Reza Mohammad Pahlavi. US-Iranian relations warm, Eisenhower begins "Atoms for Peace" program with Iran.
- 1960's**    *1961.* **The USSR** detonates the hydrogen bomb "Tsar Bomba", the most destructive weapon in human history.
- 1968.* The **NPT** (Non-Proliferation Treaty) is created. Original signatories include **US, USSR, Iran, China, South Korea, UK, Iraq, Egypt**. Notable non-signatories: **Israel, Pakistan, India**. The NPT prohibits the attainment of nuclear weapons.

- 1970's**    *1973.* The Shah of **Iran** establishes the **Atomic Energy Organization of Iran**. Its goals include training its engineers abroad, constructing 20 nuclear reactors (also uranium enrichment facilities, reprocessing plants). This receives financial and technical support from the **U.S.**
- 1979.* The **Iranian** revolution overthrows the Shah. The **Ayatollah Khomeini** seizes power. He denounces Iran's nuclear program as imperialist and anti-Islam.
- 22 Sept.* **Iran** is suspected to have conducted a nuclear weapon test (its suspected third) with **South Africa**.
- 4 Nov.* Iranian Hostage Crisis begins. This damages already fraying relations between **Iran** and the **U.S.**
- 1980's**    *1980.* **Iran-Iraq War** begins. **Soviet Union** initially helps arm **Iraq**, **U.S.** provides weapons in *1982*, along with **France, Britain, and China**. **Kuwait, UAE, Saudi Arabia** provide financial support to **Iraq**.
- 1985-1987.* **U.S.** secretly sells **Iran** arms in exchange for the release of US hostages (**Iran Contra Affair**).
- Late 1980's.* **Iran** secretly restarts a nuclear program, with support from **Pakistan, China, USSR**.
- 1988.* **Iran-Iraq War** ends in a stalemate.
- 1989.* Ayatollah Khomeini dies. President Khamenei becomes the new Supreme Leader.
- 1990's**    *1991-1992.* The Cold War ends, along with the **Soviet Union**. **Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan**, new nations resulting from the dissolving of the **USSR**, denounce their existing nuclear programs.
- 1995.* **U.S.** imposes sanctions on **Iran** for sponsoring terrorism in the Middle East and Africa, suspects they are constructing nuclear weapons. **Iran** denies involvement.
- 1997.* **Khatami**, a reformist candidate, wins the presidential election in **Iran**. His powers are severely hindered by the Supreme Leader's influence.
- 1999.* **Khatami** visits **Saudi Arabia** (the first Iranian leader to visit the Arab world since *1979*). The two leaders issue a statement pledging to foster a nuclear-free Middle East.

- 2002** *Jan.* Pres. Bush of the **U.S.** labels **Iraq, Iran, North Korea** “axis of evil” due to covert terrorist efforts (specifically, 9/11).
- Aug.* The United Nations learns of several clandestine nuclear programs whose existence was previously unknown to the world, and publicly criticizes **Iran**. Iran agrees to inspections by the **IAEA** (International Atomic Energy Agency).
- Sept.* **Iran** utilizes help from **Russian** technicians to speed up construction on a nuclear reactor in Bushehr, claiming the facility will become a nuclear power plant.
- 2003** *Sept.* **IAEA** Board of Governors adapts a resolution asking **Iran** to stop all enrichment (and reprocessing) activities, declare all material relevant to its uranium enrichment program, and allow **IAEA** to conduct environmental sampling at any location.
- Oct.* **Iran**, partially in result to the **Iraq War**, publically temporarily suspends its nuclear program, but continues to enrich uranium.
- 2004** *Nov.* **Iran**, under pressure from the **UN** and **IAEA** for not fully dismantling its uranium enrichment program, agrees to suspend its enrichment activities following conversations with **France, UK, and Germany**. Due to **Iran’s** verified compliance by the **IAEA**, The **UN** does not refer **Iran** to the Security Council.
- 2005** *Feb.* **Russia** and **Iran** reach a nuclear fuel agreement: **Russia** will provide fuel for the Bushehr reactor if **Iran** returns spent fuel back to **Russia**, so that it cannot extract plutonium from the used fuel.
- Jun.* Secular conservative **Mahmoud Ahmadinejad** wins the **Iranian** presidency, despite **UNSC** objections that he supports the expansion of **Iran’s** nuclear program.
- Aug.* **Iran** begins producing uranium hexafluoride. **France, UK, Germany** halt negotiations with Tehran.
- Sept.* The **IAEA** adopts a resolution finding Iran in noncompliance with its safeguards, stating that its lack of assurance in the peaceful nature of the program fall under the jurisdiction of the **UNSC**.
- 2006** *4 Feb.* **IAEA** refers **Iran** to the **UNSC**.
- 6 Feb.* **Iran** tells **IAEA** it will stop complying with non-legally binding inspection procedures, will not implement additional protocols.

*Jun.* UNSC permanent members, with **Germany**, (P5 + 1) provide a proposal to **Iran** to have its uranium enriched abroad before going back to **Iran** to be used in power plants. This theoretically incentivizes **Iran** stopping its uranium enrichment for an indefinite period.

*31 Jul.* The **UNSC** adopts Resolution 1696, legally forcing **Iran** to stop its enrichment and reprocessing activities.

*22 Aug.* **Iran** rejects the P5 + 1 proposal requirement to suspend enrichment.

*23 Dec.* **UNSC** unanimously adopts Resolution 1737, imposing sanctions on **Iran** for its failure to suspend enrichment and reprocessing of uranium. The sanctions prohibit other countries from transferring sensitive technology (missile, nuclear) to **Iran**.

**2007**     *24 Mar.* **Iran** continues to fail to suspend uranium enrichment. As a result, **UNSC** unanimously adopts Resolution 1747.

*3 Dec.* **U.S.** releases summary of new **National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)** report on **Iran's** nuclear program. The report states that **Iran** halted (and has not since restarted) its nuclear weapons program in 2003.

**2008**     *3 Mar.* **UNSC** passes Resolution 1803. This broadens sanctions on **Iran**, requiring increased efforts from member states to prevent **Iran** from acquiring “sensitive” technology.

*14 Jun.* P5+1 present new proposal to **Iran**, with relatively the same framework as the one in 2006. However, this proposal includes a “freeze-for-freeze”, or that if **Iran** halts expansion of enrichment activities, the **UNSC** would halt the expansion of sanctions against **Iran**.

**2009**     *8 Apr.* The **U.S.**, under the new **Obama** administration, agrees to fully participate in P5+1 and **Iran** discussions, instead of the previous policy requiring **Iran** to meet **UNSC** demands first.

*25 Sept.* **U.S.**, **British**, **French** intelligence discover a secret uranium-enrichment facility in the mountains near Qom, **Iran**.

*1 Oct.* P5 + 1 and **Iran** agree to a proposal: **Iran** will export 3.5% enriched uranium, and receive 20% enriched uranium in return (for its nuclear reactor).

**2010**     *9 Feb.* **Iran** begins producing 20% enriched uranium, supposedly for its nuclear reactor.

*9 Jun.* **UNSC** adopts Resolution 1929. Sanctions against **Iran** are considerably expanded, including an arms embargo against **Iran**.

*24 Jun.* **U.S. Congress** tightens **U.S.** sanctions against **Iran's** energy sector until 2016.

*11 Nov.* UN publishes a report showing that **Iran** planned (or is planning) to develop a nuclear warhead.

**2011** Major western powers strategically isolate **Iran** from international finance and trade.

**2012** *Jan.* The **EU** places an embargo on Iranian oil.

*Jan.* **IAEA** will travel to Tehran to discuss **IAEA** investigations (following 2011 report).

*Spring and Summer.* **Iran** and P5+1 meet for negotiations.

*Nov.* **IAEA** reports that **Iran** has installed 2,800 new centrifuges (totalling 75% necessary to complete nuclear site at Qom facility). **Iran** continues to enrich uranium to 20% in excess of the needs of the nuclear reactor.

**2013** **Iran** continues to negotiate with P5+1, and the **US** imposes new round of sanctions on **Iran**.

*Jun.* **Hassan Rouhani** is elected president of **Iran**. He states **Iran** will maintain its nuclear program, but states it will be more transparent.

Negotiations continue. In *Sept.*, **Obama** calls **Rouhani**, marking a turning point in negotiations.

*Dec.* P5+1 and **Iran** launch **Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)**, freezing **Iran's** nuclear program while negotiations continue.

**2014** **Iran** agrees to send its stockpile of enriched uranium to **Russia** to be transformed into fuel rods only usable in the reactor.

P5+1 and **Iran** continue to negotiate and discuss the **JCPOA**.

**2015** Relations between the **West** and **Iran** begin to thaw as an agreement begins to appear

on the horizon, regarding **Iran's** nuclear project and future.

*20 Jul.* **UNSC** adopts a resolution endorsing the **JCPOA**, adding the lifting of **UNSC** sanctions to the deal. This is “**finalization day**”.

**2016**     **UNSC** Resolutions (including 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1929) imposing sanctions on **Iran** are abolished, **Iran** implements multiple means to modify existing nuclear facilities, resumes trade with its former well-established partners, including the **U.S.**

**2017**     *2 Jun.* **IAEA** releases second quarterly report, and it is revealed **Iran** is meeting its obligations.

*Fall.* **U.S. Congress** attempts to implement sanctions (despite violation of **JCPOA**). Newly elected president **Donald Trump** declares that he will not certify that the **JCPOA** prohibits nuclear sanctions against **Iran**, encouraging Congress to use the window of 60 days to re-introduce sanctions.

#### Questions to Consider:

- Are missile tests by Iran in violation of the spirit of Resolution 2231?
- How might recent political changes, in the US and around the world, impact the JCPOA?
- When implementing sanctions, is the kind of sanction (particularly if you are considering implementing economic sanctions) constructive and effective? Who will the sanctions impact the most?

#### The Current Status:

The Obama Administration claimed in 2015 that “the only alternative to the Iran nuclear deal is war.” In reality, the alternative to the JCPOA was, and still is, a better deal, at least is the view of the current U.S. Administration. Part of the JCPOA relies on the United States certify every ninety days that Iran is in compliance with the deal, which the president reluctantly did, until October of this year. By stating that Iran was no longer in compliance with the JCPOA (even though it was/is), and advocating for a renegotiation, a move opposed both by U.S. allies and enemies, President Trump reopens two barely-scarred over wounds back into the forefront: the trustworthiness of the United States, and the potential forfeiting of the intense scrutiny of Iran. By the United States removing itself from the process of recertification of the JCPOA, it will be

unknown if/when Iran stops complying, or if they decided to cheat on some aspects (a primary reason for frequent inspections by the IAEA). Additionally, radicalized factions within Iran have used this opportunity to once again declare to their country, and the world at large, that the United States cannot be trusted. The United States has not withdrawn from the deal, as since the declaration the problem shifted to Congress, which had sixty days to reimpose sanctions against Iran. As of two days ago, Congress missed that deadline. Where does that leave the JCPOA at large?

Twenty-eight days remain until the issue returns to President Trump for the next recertification. With a gridlocked Congress, it is unlikely that, should the president choose to claim Iran is not in compliance with the JCPOA again, the U.S. will reimpose the 2015 sanctions against Iran.

Where does that leave the UNSC?

The United States is clearly calling for a renegotiation of the JCPOA. Does the UNSC pursue this option? Will the U.S. remain involved in the status of Iran's nuclear program? President Trump specifically cites the sunset period (2025, when all restrictions are removed) as a reason to negotiate the deal, along with the allowing for Iran to possess enriched uranium. With an increasingly destabilized Middle East, the status of the Trump Administration, and current lack of strict supervision of Iran, any action on this matter must be considered carefully and extensively.

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