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National Democratic Institute
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for International Affairs

"A PATH TO DEMOCRATIC RENEWAL"

**A REPORT ON THE FEBRUARY 7, 1986
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN THE PHILIPPINES**

**By the
INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER DELEGATION**

**Based on a January 26 to February 19, 1986
observer mission to the Philippines
by forty-four delegates from nineteen countries**

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Each member of the group understood in advance that the task of observing this vital election would not be an easy one. Indeed they knew that the members of the International Observer Delegation chose to accept those risks because they understood that the community of democracies had an important role to play in helping to preserve democracy in the Philippines.

We at the sponsoring Institutes are particularly grateful for the advice received from two individuals who have long experience in observing elections: Mr. Howard Penniman of the American Enterprise Institute and Mr. Larry Garber of the International Human Rights Law Group. NDI wishes to express its special thanks to Mr. Garber, its chief consultant, whose guidance, knowledge of Philippine law and drafting skill contributed greatly to the success of our efforts.

The sponsoring Institutes also want to thank staff members who participated in the mission and the production of this report. These include: Robert Henderson, Kathi Walther and Steven Wagner of NRIIA; and Patricia Keefer, Curt Wiley, Karen Clark and Leticia Martinez of NDI.

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FOREWORD

This report was prepared by the sponsoring organizations, the National Democratic and Republican Institutes for International Affairs, after consultations with members of the delegation and, in particular, with President Pastrana and Mr. Hume, the delegation leaders. The report analyzes information received from each of the 10 teams sent to 15 provinces in the Philippines. It is an effort to present a national perspective of the February 7 snap presidential election, including an analysis of the campaign, balloting and counting phases.

Consultations with members of the delegation indicate a strong consensus for the conclusions reached herein. However, the sponsoring organizations accept full responsibility for the accuracy of this report and for its conclusions.

Events in the Philippines have moved at a rapid and dramatic pace since February 7, 1986. This report must necessarily limit its scope to events associated directly with the elections; thus, analysis of the more dramatic events which occurred after the last member of our delegation departed on February 19, is beyond our immediate purview.

We believe that an analysis of the failure of this presidential election is a useful tool against which to measure the progress of Filipino democracy, and is applicable to similar transitions which will take place in the future. The story of an attempt to corrupt the electoral process, the ultimate expression of a democratic people, is one of great importance to those who seek democratic futures for their own nations.

It is hoped that this report will add to the growing body of literature which seeks to both explain and protect the essential elements of democratic self-rule. In the process, we also wish to offer our gratitude and respect for the courageous Filipinos who have brought about a peaceful reconciliation in the aftermath of the February 7 election. The willingness of the Filipino people to participate in the election, and to see their will ultimately expressed, must serve as an inspiration and a continuing call to vigilance. Just as a loss of democratic freedoms is a blow to all democratic peoples, the victory of democracy is a triumph of free peoples everywhere.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The International Delegation which observed the February 7 presidential election in the Philippines was sponsored by the National Democratic and Republican Institutes for International Affairs and included forty-four individuals from nineteen countries. The co-leaders of the delegation were the former President of Colombia, the Honorable Misael Pastrana, and the Honorable John Hume, a member of the British and European Parliaments from Northern Ireland.

1. The delegation concludes that the election of February 7 was not conducted in a free and fair manner. It is our belief that the Government of Ferdinand Marcos and the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) bear the responsibility for this failure.

2. The delegation finds that the National Assembly, the Batasang Pambansa, ignored explicit provisions of the Philippine Electoral Code requiring that tampered or altered Election Returns be set aside during the final counting process -- despite protests by representatives of the opposition party. For this reason, and because of numerous other violations of the Code, the delegation concludes that the February 15 Batasang proclamation naming Ferdinand Marcos and Arturo Tolentino the winners of the February 7 election was invalid.

3. At the same time, we observed millions of Filipinos who were committed to making the electoral process work. Principally because of their commitment, the election succeeded in providing a vehicle through which the national will of the Philippines was ultimately expressed.

4. There is no single piece of "smoking-gun" evidence which leads to our determination that the election failed to meet a "free-and-fair" standard; there are instead many "smoking-guns." They include the following:

-- The campaign period was marked by numerous violations of the provisions designed to curb improper campaign practices and to limit the Government's use of its power to influence the election;

-- The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) did not carry out its responsibility under the election code to provide equal access to the television media during the campaign period. As a result, Marcos benefitted greatly from the partisan-owned and influenced television and radio media, though the opposition had reasonable access to alternative (radio and print) media.

-- COMELEC officials were unable or unwilling to deal with the problem of fraudulent registration. Safeguards designed to guard against double voting,

including indelible ink applied to voters' fingers, were in many areas either ignored or unenforced. The combination of these two factors contributed to an undetermined amount of double voting.

-- An estimated 3.5 million voters were disenfranchised on election day when they could not find their names on the voting register. This resulted in a voter turnout of only 76% in this important presidential election, as compared to 89% in the 1984 Batasang election. This is a major dropoff, especially considering the absence of a well-organized boycott for this election.

Disenfranchise~~m~~ment appears to have occurred in opposition-oriented provinces or cities. For example, in the ten cities and provinces which had the highest voter turnout, the winner was the ruling party, while in the ten cities and provinces which had the lowest turnout, the opposition won in eight out of ten. Even more striking is that in the cities or provinces where the ruling party won by a margin of 150,000 votes or more, the turnout ranged between 82% and 96% of the vote. On the other hand, in areas where the opposition's margin of victory was greater than 50,000, the turnout ranged between 71 and 81 percent.

-- Virtually all members of the delegation observed or were told by credible sources that voters were being paid on election day to vote for the Marcos-Tolentino ticket. In many areas, carbonized sample ballots were used as proof of an individual's vote and as a receipt for payments ranging between 25 to 500 pesos.

-- Numerous instances of intimidation of voters were recorded by the delegation; members of the military, the Civil Home Defense Forces, and Barangay officials were commonly implicated.

-- Pollwatchers from the designated opposition UNIDO party and the accredited citizen's arm, NAMFREL, were not permitted access to polling places in many provinces.

-- Problems relating to the counting of votes occurred during all phases of the process. Major discrepancies between the count kept by NAMFREL -- based on hard copies of precinct tally forms signed by all members of the Board of Election Inspectors -- and COMELEC recurred throughout the week following the election, evidencing attempts to manipulate the vote count.

-- Delegation members reported numerous instances wherein precincts recorded zero votes for Aquino

despite the claim of the UNIDO pollwatchers present at the precinct that they voted for Aquino.

-- Hard evidence was uncovered of "ghost" precincts, or fictional polling places, wherein the vote was completely fabricated. In one municipality of Southern Leyte, three such precincts were discovered over and above the 55 authorized. In the 55 legitimate precincts, the vote was 6,371 for Marcos and 5,876 for Aquino. In the three ghost precincts, the vote was 900 for Marcos and 9 for Aquino.

-- While we have no direct evidence, we believe that the interference with the counting process which occurred after election day was not simply a dispute between COMELEC and NAMFREL over their "quick count" agreement; rather we believe this was part of an effort by the Government and its supporters to buy time so that the above mentioned fraud could be undertaken.

5. The above-listed violations were perpetrated by national and local officials who supported the Marcos-Tolentino ticket. While we cannot exclude the possibility, our delegation did not observe a single election code violation by supporters of the opposition party despite efforts undertaken to monitor their activities.

I. Introduction

The February 7, 1986 "snap" presidential election was recognized by virtually all Filipinos as an election of historic importance. Both major presidential candidates

Ferdinand Marcos and Corazon Aquino -- welcomed the presence of international observers. The international observer mission organized by the National Democratic Institute and National Republican Institute for International Affairs was one of two major delegations which responded to the invitation of the candidates and other Filipino institutions. The delegation included members of national parliaments, party leaders, election experts, and Philippines specialists (See Annex I).

The objectives of the delegation were fourfold:

- 1) to evidence support for those committed to the democratic process in the Philippines;
- 2) to deter fraud on election day and during the counting phase by being present in key provinces;
- 3) to detect and report incidents of fraud and other violations of the electoral code; and
- 4) to disseminate broadly an independent evaluation of the electoral process.

A. The Delegation's Activities in the Philippines

The delegation's work was aided by the report of a six person advance delegation which visited the Philippines in early January. The advance delegation met with the major institutional actors responsible for the conduct of elections and carefully reviewed the laws governing the February 7 snap election. Its report assessed the feasibility of organizing an international delegation and served to brief the full delegation about the nature of the process and the potential problem areas (See Annex II).

On January 26, 1986, several members of the delegation arrived in the Philippines to make logistical arrangements and decisions relevant to the deployment of the mission. They visited ten different provinces to gain insights into the conduct of the campaign and the administrative preparations underway for the election and to assess the security conditions. The remainder of the delegation arrived in the Philippines on or before February 4, 1986.

On February 5, 1986, the delegation announced its presence and objectives at a press conference (See Annex III). The delegation also met with representatives of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), the National Citizens' Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), the ruling KBL party and the dominant opposition UNIDO party (See Annex IV). As another part of the day-long briefing, the delegation

reviewed the Terms of Reference established for the mission (See Annex V), and the plan devised for coverage of the election in various critical provinces.

Because of its geography and demography, observing an election in the Philippines is difficult. The nation is comprised of over 7,000 islands and over 55 million people live in the country. Voting occurs at local precincts, of which there were over 85,000 for this election.

The delegation divided into ten teams and sought to observe the electoral process in as many different types of provinces as was practicable (See Annex VI). Thus, some of the provinces selected for observation were KBL strongholds, others were opposition strongholds and still others were areas where insurgents were strong. The ten teams began deploying to their assigned regions on February 6. The teams were instructed to report on the entire electoral process in their particular regions (See Annex VII).

During the day preceding the election, each team met with local officials to review the conduct of the campaign. On election day, each team visited several polling sites. A total of over 1,500 precincts were visited by members of the delegation. Despite a resolution adopted by the COMELEC regarding the presence of observers within fifty meters of a polling site (See Annex VIII), the

advance mission concluded, in view of anticipated problems, that access to the polling sites was not a threshold issue. In any event, members of the delegation were in many cases able to observe what was happening inside the polling sites (See section V infra).

In accordance with the recommendations of the advance delegation, considerable attention was directed at the transfer of ballot boxes and election returns to canvassing centers and to the actual canvassing of votes. Thus, the teams remained in their assigned provinces until February 9 to monitor as much of the canvassing process as was possible.

The delegation regrouped in Manila on February 9, and each team presented a report of its observations. Based on these reports, a statement was presented at a press conference that evening (See Annex IX).

The delegation reported "occurrences of vote-buying, intimidation and lack of respect for electoral procedures" during the polling and counting phases committed by the ruling party. Other abuses reported by the delegation were the exclusion of NAMFREL from polling stations and the failure of COMELEC officials to respond to complaints. Because the official vote count was incomplete, and due to conflicts between the official count and the NAMFREL count,

(see section VI.B.5 infra), the delegation declined to offer a final assessment of the electoral process. Such an assessment required consideration of whether the irregularities affected the margin of victory.

Most of the delegation departed Manila on February 10. A technical team was assigned the task of monitoring the vote count and investigating allegations of fraud. The last member of the delegation left the Philippines on February 19, 1986. In sum, therefore, coverage of the election process by the international team spanned the periods January 6 to 12 for the advance mission, and January 26 to February 19 for the observer mission itself.

B. Fact-Finding Methodology

Because of the conflicting results reported by COMELEC and NAMFREL -- and the conflicting allegations of fraud -- it is important to set forth the methodology the delegation used to prepare this report. Given the size of the Philippines, the size of our delegation and the relatively short period many members of the delegation spent in the country, the delegation relied on information from the following sources: 1) first-hand observations by members of the delegation; 2) the records and reports collected by the major institutional actors, including the COMELEC, NAMFREL, the Batasang Pambansa (Parliament), the KBL and UNIDO; and 3) on some occasions, the observations of those

individuals whom members of the delegation considered credible witnesses, including Filipino monitoring groups, other foreign observers and members of the local and foreign media.

The delegation recognizes that observers, particularly in a country like the Philippines, cannot offer a precise calculation of the probable result of an election absent any form of fraud. At the same time, observers need not limit themselves to answering only whether the election, including the reporting of the results, was conducted in a credible fashion as was promised by President Marcos in announcing the election. While the delegation's findings make clear that the answer to the question of credibility is a resounding "no," the report also goes further.

For the purpose of evaluating the February 7 election, this observer delegation has adopted the following method of analysis: 1) did the law in place contain adequate safeguards to ensure a fair campaign and to prevent fraud or to permit its detection; 2) was the law implemented in a fair and impartial manner; 3) in areas where the law was not implemented fairly and impartially, were these failings likely to affect the reported results; and 4) assuming the failings are significant, does the election provide any basis for determining the candidate supported by the majority of the population.

In summary, the delegation finds that: 1) the law contained the necessary safeguards; 2) in many instances, the law was ignored or was implemented in a manner favoring the KBL party; 3) in many areas, the failure to enforce the law impartially significantly affected the results reported both at the precinct and provincial level; and 4) these failings were significant, but were almost exclusively the result of wrongdoing by KBL supporters and the inability or unwillingness of COMELEC officials to take the necessary steps to prevent the wrongdoings. Under these circumstances, it is appropriate not to count the vote totals from areas where the fraud was most blatant. We therefore conclude that the proclamation by the Batasang of a Marcos victory was improper.

At the delegation's initial press conference on February 5, we stated that we expected that our evaluation of the election would not differ significantly from that of the Filipino people. Having witnessed the events of the past three weeks and having reviewed the statement issued by the Catholic Bishops Conference on February 14, 1986 (See Annex X), and the statement of NAMFREL's chairman (See Annex XI), the delegation believes it is clear that this expectation has been met.

II. Institutional Setting

The first part of this section summarizes the background of the February 7 snap election. The second part presents a general evaluation of the law calling for the election. The third part assesses the roles of the major institutional actors in this election.

A. Background to Snap Election

After martial law was lifted in 1981, a presidential election was held pursuant to the Philippines Constitution adopted in 1973. Without the participation of the leading opposition parties, Ferdinand Marcos won that election by an overwhelming margin. Under the Constitution, the next presidential election was scheduled for May 1987.

In 1983, Benigno Aquino was assassinated as he returned from exile. An independent commission established by the Government concluded that high-level army officials, including chief-of-staff Fabian Ver, were legally responsible for the Aquino murder. After the murder, Filipinos began expressing their discontent with the Marcos government more publicly through rallies and the establishment of alternative media.

Elections for the Batasang were held in 1984. While segments of the opposition chose to boycott the election on the grounds that conditions for a fair election were absent, the UNIDO party led by Salvador Laurel mounted a serious campaign. The results gave Marcos' KBL Party two-thirds of the seats in the Batasang.

The 1984 elections were viewed as "fairer" than previous Filipino elections, in part as a result of the work of the newly formed NAMFREL. However, NAMFREL's analysis of the elections indicated that contests for only 65% of the seats "were sufficiently free from anomalies to be considered valid" (See Annex XII). A more comprehensive report prepared by two political scientists at the University of Philippines and based on material gathered by NAMFREL was released in January 1986. Their report concluded that the "1984 parliamentary elections was [sic] not meant to be free, fair, orderly and honest. There seemed to be a grand design deliberately planned and executed to ensure the continued dominance of the ruling party in the national assembly" (See Annex XIII).

The situation in the Philippines continued to deteriorate following the 1984 elections, with the economy in serious trouble and the insurgency led by the New People's Army (NPA) growing. The Philippines is the only non-communist country in Asia to suffer four years of negative economic growth. In 1984, real GNP in the

Philippines recorded a negative 5.3% growth rate, and this trend continued in 1985.

As reported in the U.S. Department of State Human Rights Report for 1985, serious human rights violations continued throughout the country (See Annex XIV). According to the report, frequent incidents of human rights abuses by the NPA and security forces persisted, particularly in the countryside. The NPA reportedly stepped up its use of terror tactics to further its objectives, and security forces responded in kind.

It is against this backdrop that Marcos announced on November 3, 1985 his intention to hold a "snap" election. On November 11, 1985, Marcos submitted a letter to the Batasang requesting that it enact legislation calling for a snap election and indicating that he would resign the presidency after the election if another candidate was proclaimed the winner (See Annex XV). On December 2, 1985, the Batasang enacted the legislation necessary to set the process in motion for a "snap" election (See Annex XVI).

The legislation was challenged by several groups as being unconstitutional in view of the fact that there was no presidential vacancy at the time the election was scheduled. On December 19, 1985, the Philippine Supreme Court rejected the petition by a vote of seven to five. The majority's position rested primarily on the fact that

the Filipino people sincerely wanted the opportunity to participate in the "snap" election, and that the Supreme Court should not thwart the popular will.

The Supreme Court decision removed the major legal obstacle which could have prevented the snap election, and both major parties began mobilizing their efforts soon afterwards. Although there were rumors throughout the campaign that Marcos would cancel the election through a reimposition of martial law, no steps were taken in that direction.

B. Assessment of the Election Law

The laws governing the "snap" election included Batasang Pambansa BLG. 883 (BPB 883 - referred to also as Cabinet Bill 7), and the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (BPB 881, hereinafter "Code"); both bills were approved on December 2, 1985. In addition, COMELEC had authority to adopt rules and regulations "as may be necessary to ensure the holding of a free, honest, orderly and credible election" (BPB 883, sec. 13). Prior to the election day, COMELEC had promulgated over fifty regulations governing the special presidential election (See Annex XVII).

The advance delegation which visited the Philippines in early January carefully reviewed the election law and concluded that:

The Code and COMELEC regulations provide a comprehensive framework for the administration of a procedurally correct election. There are numerous provisions designed to protect against fraud and, if fraud occurs, to permit its detection. If problems arise in this area, it will be in the implementation of these procedures by election officials. Further, there are several provisions designed to encourage a fair campaign. However, some of the campaign-related provisions may be unrealistic in the context of this election campaign and, hence, are likely to be ignored.

The delegation endorses the above assessment of the election law.

The advance delegation identified many of the potential problems that, in fact, developed during the campaign and on election day. These are discussed in later sections of this report.

C. Assessment of Institutional Actors

Evaluation of the major institutional actors is critical to understanding the conduct of the election and why fraud proved to be so pervasive. The assessment focuses on the background and performance of these institutions prior to election day. The election day activities are discussed in Sections IV and V.

1. Commission on Elections - "COMELEC"

COMELEC was charged with the responsibility of administering the election apparatus. Under the code, it

was authorized to exercise a wide range of authority including: control over the media, regulation of campaign activities and finance, registration of voters, ballot preparation, election day activities and tabulation of the vote.

COMELEC is chartered to have nine commissioners who are appointed by the President. Until January 31, 1986, there were only seven members serving on the COMELEC. However, with only 7 days remaining before the election, Marcos filled the two vacancies with the appointments of Jaime Layosa and Ruben Agpalo. The former was recommended by NAMFREL, while the latter was recommended by the Jaycees and other civic groups.

As all of the commissioners were appointed by President Marcos, many questioned COMELEC's independence, particularly in view of its handling of several complaints relating to the 1984 election. While the advance delegation believed that the COMELEC was committed to ensuring a fair election, events in the weeks leading up to the election raised serious doubts. One controversial issue concerned the conduct of a "quick count."

In December, COMELEC announced plans to conduct an "Operation Super Quick Count" fashioned after NAMFREL's successful "Operation Quick Count," which in the 1984 election produced results from the provinces more quickly

than did COMELEC's official count. The short period before the election and the high costs of the plan led COMELEC to abandon "Operation Super Quick Count." Throughout the pre-election period, however, COMELEC maintained its responsibility for the official count.

During the week before the election, COMELEC appeared to threaten the revocation of NAMFREL's accreditation unless NAMFREL agreed to a simultaneous quick count with COMELEC. Two days before the election, an agreement was reached; though in principle it appeared to uphold the essential independence and integrity of NAMFREL's count, in practice the requirements of the new "PARTNERS" agreement served to compromise both the speed and independence of the NAMFREL count (See section VI.A.1 infra)

Other COMELEC actions before the election that raised doubts about its independence included its failure to resolve the "flying voter" issue, its failure to resolve the complaints filed by the parties concerning the campaign, its deputization of the army, its ruling regarding partisan activities by heads of religious orders and its ruling on military voting (See sections III & IV infra). COMELEC claimed it was unable to purge the voting lists of "flying voters" and was unable to investigate other registration irregularities due to the short period it had to prepare for the election. However, in this matter as in others, the delegation believes COMELEC

suffered a failure of will.

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2. NAMFREL

Historically, the Philippines Election Code had permitted the accreditation by the COMELEC of "citizen's arms" to help ensure fair elections. The National Citizens' Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) was formed for this purpose by Filipino businesspersons prior to the 1984 elections and had close ties to the Philippines Catholic church and many civic organizations. The national chairman of NAMFREL was Jose Concepcion, Jr., a prominent Manila businessman, and its co-chair was Bishop Antonio Y. Fortich, who is based in the province of Negros Occidental.

NAMFREL's stated purpose is to "harness citizen power in working toward free, orderly, and honest elections by organizing and training volunteers nationwide to monitor the electoral process." To this end, NAMFREL is believed to have mobilized over 100,000 volunteers for the 1984 elections and effectively covered 40-60% of the approximately 90,000 precincts. NAMFREL received a great deal of praise for its work in monitoring the 1984 congressional elections.

On December 24, 1985, COMELEC named NAMFREL as its nationally accredited citizens arm for the 1986 election. The accreditation gave NAMFREL the authority to place its

volunteers in the polling places on election day and in the canvass centers during the counting of the ballots. Prior to the election, NAMFREL conducted training programs for its poll-watchers throughout the country. For the election, the organization mobilized over 500,000 volunteers throughout the Philippines to work on election day.

During the pre-election period, NAMFREL was accused on a steady basis of being partisan in its orientation and its activities. On January 30, 1986, the KBL filed a complaint seeking the revocation of NAMFREL's accreditation on the grounds of partisanship. Although COMELEC did not act on the matter, the KBL complaint again raised the spectre of disaccreditation and gave COMELEC additional leverage by which to obtain NAMFREL's agreement to a simultaneous quick count.

In evaluating charges of NAMFREL's partisanship, the delegation recognized that any organization which sought to prevent fraud in the election must inevitably find itself arrayed against the government, as the government was responsible for such fraud in the past. By definition, then, NAMFREL would be "anti-government," and the issue then would become NAMFREL's conduct during the election. The delegation observed a number of instances in which NAMFREL volunteers exceeded the limits of what might be termed "non-partisan" activity. On occasion, NAMFREL

volunteers were observed offering the "Laban sign" -- a hand signal in the form of a "L" -- which was a widely accepted opposition symbol. In other areas, NAMFREL volunteers were singing the "Laban Anthem," another undisputedly partisan act. Finally, we noted that in some areas, NAMFREL volunteers were overcrowding some polling stations in violation of agreements reached regarding the number of volunteers permitted in each polling station.

On the whole, however, we must conclude that allegations of massive partisan activity were unfounded. NAMFREL volunteers risked a great deal in the exercise of their constitutional rights, and nearly all did so in a non-partisan fashion. We noted no grounds for the wholesale dismissal of NAMFREL teams in certain provinces and only isolated incidents where NAMFREL volunteers exceeded the bounds of non-partisanship.

3. The Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) (New Society Movement)

The KBL was established in 1978, with Marcos as its titular leader. The party competed in the 1978 elections for an Interim National Assembly, the 1980 local elections, the 1981 presidential election and the 1984 Batasang elections. As a result, it had established a well-organized political organization with party workers in all areas of the country.

The party's ideology, as expressed in its national platform, emphasized the need for "stability based on the momentum of national rebirth and achievement." The party platform called for the continued development of the Philippines and also stressed the achievements of the Marcos government over the past eighteen years.

4. The United National Democratic Party (UNIDO)

For the 1986 election, the leading opposition politicians united behind the candidacies of Corazon Aquino for President and Salvador Laurel for Vice-President. Mrs. Aquino represented the PDP-Laban (Pilipino Democratic Party - Lakas Ng Bayan) group which had boycotted the 1984 election; Mr. Laurel was the President of the UNIDO party, which participated in that election.

The agreement to run an Aquino-Laurel ticket was finalized on December 11, 1985, a day before the filing deadline. The ticket was made possible when Mr. Laurel agreed to run as Vice-President and Mrs. Aquino agreed to run under the UNIDO banner. COMELEC quickly recognized the ticket as the Dominant Opposition Party, thus entitling UNIDO to name a poll-watcher in each precinct.

Although UNIDO participated in the 1984 elections, it was not well-organized throughout the country. Further,

during the campaign, infighting between the PDP-Laban faction and the UNIDO party in several provinces hindered its ability to organize effectively. The joint ticket also had to define its election reform as the campaign developed; three major addresses by Mrs. Aquino during the campaign set forth the policy goals of the DOP (See Annex XVIII).

5. The Catholic Church

With a population that at least nominally is 80% Catholic, the Catholic Church plays a significant political role in the Philippines. Prior to the election, the Church issued several pastoral letters concerning the February 7 election (See Annex XIX). The letters stressed the duty of the devout to exercise vigilance in ensuring a free and fair election and criticized attempts at pre-election intimidation and vote-buying. For example, the pastoral letter read in all the churches on January 25, 1986 stated: "Do not allow yourselves to be corrupted by money or other immoral considerations into voting or not voting, or cheating for a candidate. Always vote according to your conscience" (emphasis in original).

Although the Church had no direct monitoring role, many priests and nuns were active in NAMFREL and some openly supported the political parties, particularly UNIDO. Many churches organized collections from parishioners for

NAMFREL and helped NAMFREL recruit volunteers. In response to a KBL-inspired complaint, COMELEC issued a resolution warning members of religious organizations against engaging in partisan politics (Res. 1766).

6. The Armed Forces

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) includes the regular military and the Philippines Constabulary (PC). The primary task of the former is external security, while the latter was established to provide for internal security. In addition, during the past ten years, para-military units have been established, primarily the Civil Home Defense Forces (CHDF). During the past several years, all sectors of the AFP have been criticized for their failure to implement military reform, for their continued human rights abuses and for their increased involvement in political matters.

Concern about the AFP's neutrality during the election led a group of officers who are part of the Reform AFP Movement (RAM), to organize a special program, "Kamalyan 86," for the election. The program was designed to "impart to AFP personnel the significance of an honest, clean, fair and free election" and "to call for public vigilance against fraud and coercion at all stages of the electoral process" (See Annex XX). Although the RAM program was announced with considerable fanfare on January 8, 1986,

many army commanders denied the RAM officers access to the soldiers on their bases and generally hindered the development of the program.

7. The New Peoples' Army

The New Peoples' Army is a communist revolutionary movement in the Philippines. Estimates regarding its size vary from 10,000 to 20,000, although all agree that the NPA has grown considerably during the past few years. The NPA's position on the election was to urge boycott, though there appeared to be no organized attempt to disrupt the election through violence and terrorism as had occurred during the 1984 elections.

III. Evaluation of the Electoral Process

As is evident from the content of the Terms of Reference (See Annex V), the sponsors of the mission recognize that an election process includes more than what happens on election day. The ability of political parties and candidates to communicate with voters in a non-intimidating climate is crucial to the conduct of a fair election. The first part of this section reviews the campaign leading up to the election, while the second part addresses the role the media played during the campaign.

A. Political Campaign

In any election, a ruling party has inherent institutional advantages. This is particularly true in a presidential election where one of the candidates is the incumbent president, as was the case in the Philippines. At the same time, election laws often include precise provisions for the conduct of a campaign which seek to balance these inherent advantages.

The Philippines Omnibus Election Code contains several examples of such provisions. The code provides for equal access to the media (Code, Sec. 86), the procurement of time and space in the media (Code, Sec. 92), an accounting of all campaign expenditures (Code, Sec. 105-06) and

limitations on how funds may be expended by candidates and parties (Code, Sec. 100-02). In addition, COMELEC adopted several resolutions designed to promote a fair campaign, including those which prohibited the Government, during the campaign, from appointing or transferring public employees (Res. 1735), from appointing or using for political purposes police personnel (Res. 1743), and from distributing public works projects (Res. 1744).

Our evaluation of the campaign is formed, to a large extent, by the provisions of the Election Code, the COMELEC resolutions, and the degree to which they were complied with or ignored by the major institutional actors during the campaign. While we did not expect technical compliance with the very detailed provisions of the Code and the resolutions, the delegation found that in many cases the spirit of the law was ignored completely. Primary responsibility for this failure belongs to the COMELEC (See sections III.A.3-4 infra).

1. Adequacy of the Campaign Period

As noted earlier, a constitutional challenge to the election filed by several individuals identified with the opposition was rejected by the Supreme Court on December 19, 1985. It was after this decision that political campaigning began in earnest. Under Filipino law, the campaign ended at midnight on February 5, 1986 (BPB 883); thus, the effective campaign period was forty-five days.

For the ruling KBL party, the short campaign period was one for which it was unprepared. However, the party had an established and effective political organization which gave it a significant advantage. Further, because Marcos was the dominant figure in the party, there were no divisions within the party over policy. Finally, given the control over the mass media exerted by the Government (see section III.B. infra), Marcos had little trouble communicating his message to voters through television, radio and the major daily newspapers.

For the dominant opposition party (DOP), the short campaign period posed serious problems. Because the DOP had limited access to the electronic mass media, it relied primarily on political rallies for visibility in the different provinces of the Philippines. The short campaign period limited the number of rallies that could be organized; nonetheless, during the course of the campaign, Mrs. Aquino and Mr. Laurel managed to hold rallies in sixty-eight of the Philippines' seventy-four provinces.

2. Political Rallies; Restrictions on Political Campaigning

For the most part, both parties were able to organize political rallies at which the party standard-bearer or other party stalwarts would speak. Rallies generally were festive affairs. Both parties recruited cultural

celebrities to participate in their rallies in the hope of attracting additional supporters.

The few problems regarding rallies involved those organized by the DOP. On January 9, for example, local officials cancelled an Aquino rally in Quirino, a Marcos stronghold. Other restrictions on political campaigning involved the harassment and intimidation of individuals, primarily those who supported the DOP in certain regions of the Philippines (See section III.A.3 infra). For example, some individuals feared for their safety if they were seen at an opposition campaign rally.

Notwithstanding the various pressures, the campaign period saw the defection of many local KBL leaders, who had developed strong organizations, to the opposition. On January 10, 1986, for example, Governor Enrique Zaldivar of Antique province resigned from the KBL and announced his support for the Aquino-Laurel ticket. These defections were countered by the defections of some local opposition leaders to the KBL.

3. Political Killings, Arrests and Intimidation

Political violence in the Philippines is endemic, although the exact number of politically motivated killings is hard to pinpoint. According to the recently released U.S. Department of State Human Rights Report, political

killings; disappearances and torture by the military, para-military groups (particularly the Civil Home Defense Forces - CHDF) and the New People's Army continued throughout 1985 (See Annex XIV).

In some areas visited by the delegation, the NPA was viewed in benign terms: while the NPA required payment of "taxes," the population did not believe that the NPA resorted to terror tactics except against military police personnel and local political officials who were believed to be mistreating civilians. The U.S. Department of State, however, reported that "increasingly throughout 1985 there were verified reports of NPA intimidation and even killing of civilians who refused to pay revolutionary taxes." Given the NPA's decentralized organization, it is conceivable that in some areas the NPA conducts itself as "Robin Hoods," while in other areas it is using terror tactics.

According to the U.S. Department of State, the military and para-military forces meanwhile continued to summarily execute those individuals believed to be cooperating with the NPA; in addition, the military and CHDF are poorly disciplined, which often led to their random harassment and mistreatment of civilians. For this reason, as conceded by one Brigadier General, the military had been losing the psychological war with the NPA for the "hearts and minds"

of the rural population. It is in this context that election-related violence should be understood.

The NPA's official position was to encourage a boycott of the "snap" election, while continuing to organize its forces and to conduct raids on military and police personnel. It was apparently responsible for the killing of some local KBL leaders, although it claimed that these killings were incidental to the election.

Several complaints were filed with the COMELEC by UNIDO regarding military involvement in the campaign. One such complaint involved the province of Antique, where the military allegedly provided vehicles and personnel to accompany a KBL Member of Parliament as he campaigned in the province (See Annex XXI). Other complaints involved intimidation of voters by military forces in certain provinces.

The local CHDF were viewed as being responsible for the more serious attempts at intimidation. While nominally under the control of the Philippine Constabulary, the CHDF are often responsible to the local "strongman" in a particular area, organized officially as bodyguards and known unofficially as "goons." The delegation received reports that the CHDF visited the houses of potential voters prior to the elections in several areas. The

message delivered was that a vote for President Marcos would be in the best interest for all involved.

The CHDF were also responsible for one of the more widely reported incidents during the campaign when they attacked the car carrying Mrs. Aquino's sister-in-law as it was driving through Tarlac, the home province of the Aquino family. The car windows were smashed as television cameras recorded the altercation.

More serious than these incidents of intimidation and harassment were the slayings of several local party organizers during the campaign. For example, on January 15, 1986, Jeremias de Jesus, a UNIDO organizer in St. Lucia, Tarlac was killed, apparently by four members of the CHDF. De Jesus had visited the U. S. Embassy the previous day to recount how local leaders and CHDF were telling people in Tarlac to vote for Marcos or not to vote at all.

The army reported a total of forty-seven election-related killings during the campaign. According to the army, the breakdown by the victim's affiliation was as follows: twenty KBL supporters; ten UNIDO supporters, and 17 unidentified. Other monitoring groups reported higher numbers of opposition supporters killed.

While the level of violence from whatever source may have served to intimidate supporters of both parties, it

must be stated that intimidation by forces under Government control could have been prevented by issuing the necessary orders and by aggressively prosecuting those guilty of wrongdoing. These actions were not taken.

The overall effect of the intimidation cannot be underestimated; at the same time, its precise effect on the population is difficult to gauge. The delegation encountered many very brave people who, although they had been subjected to some form of intimidation, decided to participate actively in the electoral process in whatever capacity. The willingness of these people to place, in some instances, their lives on the line in support of the democratic process created lasting impressions on all members of the delegation.

4. Improper Campaign Practices

The delegation observed and heard many instances where the provisions designed to curb improper campaign practices and to limit the Government's use of its power to influence the election were violated. The Government distributed massive amounts of money and announced several new programs designed to benefit the citizenry of particular provinces during the campaign.

Further, the delegation heard from credible sources

that the KBL pressured Government employees to attend KBL rallies and to otherwise display support for the KBL. The delegation observed firsthand such efforts in the case of employees of the government-owned Manila Hotel. Public transportation was often diverted for the purpose of bringing people to the KBL rallies, despite a COMELEC resolution explicitly prohibiting this practice (Res. 1759). At the KBL's closing rally in Manila on February 5, 1986, for example, rows of public buses could be seen in the street around the park waiting for the rally's conclusion. People attending the UNIDO rally the previous night at the same park in Manila had to arrange their own transportation.

The COMELEC's response to complaints filed regarding improper campaign practices gave credence to the allegations that COMELEC was a less-than-independent institution. With one exception, COMELEC simply referred the matters to local election officials for investigation. It did not appear that the local officials were inclined to pursue the investigations aggressively. Thus, by election day, not one of the complaints filed by UNIDO had been resolved by COMELEC (See Annex XXII).

The one complaint which COMELEC resolved was filed by the KBL concerning the activities of "the heads, supervisors and administrators of religious

organizations." COMELEC resolved to remind, enjoin and warn the religious leaders of the Election Code's provision prescribing the coercion of subordinates. (Res. 1766, citing Code, sec. 261(d)). Despite complaints filed concerning and equally clear provisions of the Code regarding: wagers on the election results (Code, 261(c)) improper coercion by public officers or government officials (Code, sec. 261(d)); and the use of armoured vehicles (Code, sec. 261(r)), the COMELEC declined to take any action with respect to these complaints (See Annex XXII).

At the same time, it should be noted that COMELEC did not harass the DOP by investigating bogus complaints against it or by forcing compliance with onerous resolutions. COMELEC's attitude was one of "laissez-faire" toward both parties. Ultimately, however, it must be concluded that a "laissez-faire" policy worked to the benefit of the ruling KBL party, which had far greater assets to use in the campaign.

B. Role of the Media

A major means of communicating with potential voters during any election campaign is through the mass media. This includes free advertising time or space, the purchase of advertising time or space, and the news coverage of the

mass media. Also relevant are attempts to restrict the flow of information through a censorship process or through the intimidation of journalists.

The media in the Philippines reflects in several respects the nature of political life in the Philippines, for there is diversity in the print and broadcast media. Further, there were no reports of attempts to censor news coverage or editorials by resort to the legal process.

Notwithstanding this considerable freedom, the KBL had tremendous advantages in its ability to use and benefit from the media. The several television and radio stations owned by the Government were partisan in the extreme towards the KBL. Further, the KBL had considerable funds available for the purchase of television and newspaper advertisements. UNIDO lacked such funds.

Recognizing the importance of the media, the Election Code gave the COMELEC considerable authority to regulate "election propaganda through mass media" and required access to the media on equal terms for parties and candidates (Code, sec. 86). The Code further provided that radio and television "shall not unduly allow the scheduling of any program ... to manifestly favor ... any candidate or political party by unduly or repeatedly referring to ... said candidate and/or party respecting, however,... the

right of said station to broadcast accounts of significant or newsworthy events and views on matters of public interest" (Id.).

The mass media in the Philippines includes television, radio and newspapers. Because each type of news medium exhibits significantly different characteristics, they are treated separately below.

1. Television

There are an estimated 3 million televisions in the Philippines for a population of 55 million. Most television owners live in urban areas, with Metro Manila comprising by far the largest aggregation of television owners.

Five stations, with their main studios in Manila, operate in the Philippines. Owned and operated by the Government, Channel 4 is the only station available in many parts of the country. The remaining stations, while nominally independent, were owned by friends of Marcos.

Television news coverage of the campaign heavily favored Marcos. KBL campaign rallies were covered extensively -- often Marcos' entire speech was telecast under the guise of news coverage -- while UNIDO rallies and Aquino's speeches were covered in a minimal or non-existent

fashion. COMELEC's unofficial response to the extreme partisanship of the news coverage was to refer to a Supreme Court decision, UNIDO vs. COMELEC, which recognized that, owing to his peculiar position, "the President's activities and pronouncements are given wider coverage than these [sic] of the other candidates." (See Annex XXIII, point 5).

UNIDO filed a complaint with the COMELEC regarding partisan news coverage against Channel 4 and a second station on January 9, 1986. The complaint focused on the coverage of the respective KBL and UNIDO nominating conventions. Despite several hearings on the matter, COMELEC declined to rule on the complaint prior to the election.

While the stations made available one minute spots for purchased advertisements by each of the major parties, the stations declined to sell "bloc" time (i.e., a half-hour to an hour of time) to either party. The stations responded to the UNIDO requests for bloc time by noting that "existing policy...prohibits the sale of airtime for political programs. This policy has been adopted to avoid disruption of our regular programs which are already doing well in the ratings" (See Annex XXIV). UNIDO complained that this allegedly neutral policy served to benefit the KBL, which did not need to purchase "bloc" time since

President Marcos' speeches and pronouncements were repeated verbatim in the context of news broadcasts. With respect to the one-minute advertisements, UNIDO was forced to petition the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board before its paid commercials could be shown on television.

Although COMELEC did not respond to UNIDO's equal access complaint, it implemented a schedule for "COMELEC time" pursuant to section 92 of the Election Code. "COMELEC time" is time procured by the COMELEC for use by the major political parties to discuss their respective campaigns. COMELEC time began on January 13 and continued until the end of the campaign. Between 4:00 and 6:30 p.m. a half-hour was made available each night on one television station either to the KBL or UNIDO. The COMELEC time was distributed equally throughout the campaign; however, given the time slot and the limited amount of time made available, it did not balance the KBL's tremendous advantage resulting from the television news coverage.

2. Radio

Radios are available throughout the Philippines and provide the most accessible source of information for many parts of the country. Over 130 radio stations operate in the Philippines. Although most radio stations were owned

by the Government or friends of Marcos, there also were several radio stations, including the Church supported Radio Veritas, which were antagonistic to Marcos. During the campaign, the news coverage of the various stations reflected their partisan inclinations.

As a result of the partisan nature of radio stations and the fact that a listener had choices available, there were few complaints regarding radio coverage of the campaign or access to radio. Despite it being authorized by the Election Code, no COMELEC time was made available on radio stations.

3. Newspapers

The Philippines has an extremely literate population: it is estimated that close to 90% of the adult population can read. Thus, newspapers and magazines are an important source of information.

There were six daily newspapers being distributed nationwide prior to the election. They included the pro-government Bulletin Today, Times-Journal and Daily Express and the opposition-oriented Malaya, Phillipine Daily Inquirer and The Manila Times. In addition, there were two widely circulated pro-opposition weekly magazines, Mr. and Ms. and Veritas. The opposition newspapers and

magazines began publishing only after the assassination of Benigno Aquino in 1983 (The Manila Times reappeared two days before the election), although each reported growing circulations.

Without making a comparative substantive evaluation of each newspaper's coverage of the news, it was evident that the coverage in each paper reflected its partisan inclinations. Thus, the same story might appear on page one in the pro-government newspapers and be buried in the back pages of pro-opposition newspapers. Similarly, the headline accompanying a story reflected the partisan inclinations of each newspaper. As was true with radio, given the availability of newspapers reflecting different views there were no formal complaints regarding the news coverage of the newspapers. Nor did either party request that "COMELEC space" be procured for use by the major parties.

UNIDO, however, complained about the advertising policies of the three pro-government dailies. The papers required UNIDO to submit the copy of its advertisements to a censorship board established to review the contents of movies. Although the Board ultimately approved the advertisements, UNIDO alleged that the censorship process was unwarranted and caused unnecessary delays.

The fear of libel suits among pro-opposition newspapers

was a real one. Two suits were filed during the campaign against newspapers which reprinted news articles from the foreign press regarding Marcos' hidden wealth and war record. Lawyers believed these suits represented a not so subtle attempt to shut down the newspapers. The cases were put on hold during the campaign.

4. Foreign Press

The foreign press played a considerable role in the electoral process. Foreign journalists were well-represented at official press conferences and were responsible for much of the investigative reporting during the campaign. Articles printed in foreign newspapers or magazines were often reprinted in the local newspapers, either as news or as advertisements. The foreign press also led an unsuccessful attempt to rescind the rule restricting the media to remaining at least fifty meters from the polling sites (Res. 1747, See Annex VIII).

The U.S. television networks, in particular, were a significant factor during the period leading up to the election. Marcos' decision to schedule a "snap" election was announced on U.S. television. The incident in Tarlac involving Mrs. Aquino's sister-in-law was filmed by a photographer from a U.S. network. One U.S. network brought its election specialists to the Philippines for the purpose of projecting the outcome on election night. Finally, an attempt to arrange a debate between Marcos and Aquino on

U.S. television the night before the election was scratched only after the COMELEC ruled such a debate would be contrary to the provisions of the Election Code (Res. 1769).

C. Summary

Ferdinand Marcos and the KBL had significant institutional advantages during the campaign. While some advantages were attributable to his incumbency and the disorganization of the opposition, others were the result of the Government acting in a manner contrary to the Election Code and the unwillingness of the COMELEC to ensure compliance with the Code's requirements. Finally, Marcos benefited from the partisan government-owned and influenced television and radio media, though the opposition did have reasonable access to alternative media (radio and print) with the exception of television.

IV. Administration of the Election -- Pre-Election Phase

The advance delegation reported on preparations for the election up to January 10, 1986. Upon arrival in the Philippines, the delegation reviewed those matters which the advance delegation had advised warranted particular consideration.

A. Voter Registration

All Filipinos over the age of 18 are both qualified and required to register and to vote (Code, sec. 54). In 1984, there were 24 million voters, 88.7% of whom voted. Those who registered in 1984 were not required to register again for the February 7 election (Code, sec. 113). Registration for new voters, which was initially scheduled for December 21 and 28, 1985 (BPB 883, sec. 6), was held on December 28 and 29, 1985.

Two problems evolved from the registration process. First, the requirement that four photographs be produced by a registrant (Code, sec. 126) was viewed as onerous. The UNIDO challenged the requirement before the COMELEC and the Supreme Court. The latter upheld the requirement on January 27, 1986, eleven days before the election; the Court ruled, however, that those who registered without submitting the four photographs could be included in the voters lists if they submitted photographs before February 5.

The effect of the photograph requirement is reflected in figures from Tarlac province, where 5,000 applications for registration were submitted on the registration days but only 400 were accompanied by photographs. Even after the Supreme Court decision, only 200 additional individuals submitted the requisite photographs before election day.

COMELEC reported a total of slightly more than 26 million registered voters as of February 7, or an increase of approximately two million voters from 1984. COMELEC officials acknowledged that the number of registered voters was significantly less than they had anticipated.

The second problem concerned fraudulent registration, particularly voters who were registered under different names in different constituencies (i.e., flying voters). During the advance delegation's visit, COMELEC officials acknowledged that this was a genuine and serious problem and appeared committed to tackling the problem -- at least in showcase areas such as Makati, a city in the Metro Manila area.

In the end, COMELEC conceded that it had been unable to deal with the problem in a meaningful manner. A COMELEC official indicated that resolution of the problem would have required initiating an entirely new voter registration process in some areas. Given the time available before the snap election such a process, he claimed, was impractical.

Attempts by the political parties to purge the voter lists through the courts also proved difficult. In Makati, UNIDO organized groups of attorneys to file exclusion cases against hundreds of "flying voters". However, with a few exceptions, the courts refused to rule on the petitions in a timely fashion.

B. Preparation of Election Materials

COMELEC began preparing materials for the election, including ballot boxes, ballots and the election return sheets, soon after the election was scheduled. However, because of the serious mistrust felt toward the COMELEC, the parties and NAMFREL exercised considerable vigilance over the preparations process.

During the week before the election, there were rumors of blank ballots and election returns being prepared. While it would have required considerable effort to evade the audit process established, it certainly was not impossible. However, the delegation was not presented with first-hand evidence supporting the rumors.

A second problem concerned the indelible ink. A truly indelible ink was a crucial safeguard to prevent multiple voting by flying voters. In 1984, the ink obtained was easily removed.

NAMFREL officials initially alleged that COMELEC delayed in obtaining a formula for a truly indelible ink. However, prior to the election, NAMFREL officials appeared satisfied that the ink being produced would be indelible. Unfortunately, in some areas, this turned out not to be the case (See section V.B.2 infra).

A final problem concerned preparation of voter lists, which would include both the 1984 and the subsequent registrants. Although scheduled to be ready by January 15, 1986, in many areas they were not ready until immediately before the election. As a result, they could not be reviewed by parties and voters; also COMELEC did not announce the exact number of precincts established for the election until less than a week before election day, when it announced there would be 85,938 precincts operating. The delay contributed to a major problem which developed on election day (See section V.B.1 infra).

C. Distribution of Election Materials

Given the geographic diversity of the Philippines, perhaps the most impressive aspect of the process was COMELEC's ability to distribute the election materials with sufficient lead time to provinces throughout the country. Local election officials told members of the delegation that the materials were in their possession a week prior to

the election. As a result, there were fewer delays in opening the polling sites than would be expected on election day.

V. Election Day Observations

The conduct of the election varied considerably in the different provinces of the Philippines, and within individual areas in these provinces. We must note that the large majority of cases, the balloting was routine with no or minor irregularities evident during our observations. However, each team reported a steady pattern of abuse and irregularity in a minority of sites which suggested that the incidence of fraud and malpractice was widespread. Further, the compilation of these team reports leads to the conclusion that there was a nationwide attempt to affect the outcome of the vote by manipulation and abuse of the electoral procedures.

Pursuant to a COMELEC resolution, international observers were prohibited from entering within fifty meters of a polling site (Res. 1747). However, a COMELEC official told the delegation that local COMELEC officials were authorized to invite observers inside the polling site.

Several members of the delegation accepted such invitations and thus were able to observe the balloting process inside the building where voting was taking place. In other instances, members of the delegation remained outside the building but within fifty meters and were able

to observe the process in an unobstructed manner. Finally, in a few instances, members of the delegation were asked to leave an area near the polling site.

The first part of this section briefly describes the balloting process as it was designed to be carried out by law. The second part describes several of the major problems that developed on election day.

A. The Balloting Process

Voting began at 7:00 a.m. in most of the over 85,000 precincts established for the election. Approximately 300 voters were assigned to each precinct. The precincts were located in public buildings, most often schools.

Each precinct was administered by a Board of Election Inspectors (BEI), which included two teachers and two individuals designated by the KBL and UNIDO, respectively. In addition to the members of the BEI, those permitted access to the polling place during voting hours included the poll-watchers designated by the parties, the NAMFREL poll-watchers and one other poll-watcher designated by other citizen groups. As is discussed below, access to the polling site was denied in some areas to UNIDO and NAMFREL poll-watchers.

The actual voting process took longer than anticipated. In theory, each voter was required: 1) to show that they had not previously voted; 2) to sign four voting lists and place thumbmarks on each of the voting lists; 3) to mark the ballot behind an enclosed booth (the voter was required to write the name of the selected candidates on the ballot); 4) to return the ballot to the chair of the BEI; 5) to place a thumbmark on the ballot; and 6) to have his or her forefinger marked with the indelible ink. The ballot, meanwhile, was placed in the ballot box, while the counterfoil was placed in a separate compartment of the ballot box.

In practice, the BEI did not always follow the prescribed procedures. This reflected the fact that some procedures were used for the first time in this election and the fact that members of the BEI sought to expedite the procedures. These technical adjustments by the BEI did not necessarily encourage or permit the commission of fraud.

One election day problem involved voting by military personnel. In previous elections, military personnel voted on their bases. However, the new election code proscribed voting on military bases (Code, sec. 155) and the COMELEC sought to enforce the proscription. To prevent disenfranchisement of the military, the COMELEC -- two days before the election -- authorized the military to vote in the polling place nearest their assignment (Res. 1768)

Commissioner Felipe dissented, noting that there was no provision in the Election Code authorizing the procedure adopted and that the procedure could open the door to floodgates of "flying voters."

UNIDO filed an emergency petition with the Supreme Court, which issued an interim order on the morning of the election. The Court deferred ruling on the substance of the petition, but authorized voting by military personnel so long as they went to a polling site in civilian attire and presented an order as evidence of their assignment to the region. The BEI was instructed to count votes cast by the military separate from the regular votes. As can be imagined, this last-minute ruling caused considerable confusion at the precinct level.

Polling sites were scheduled to close at 3:00 p.m. However, as was authorized by the Election Code, members of the delegation observed several polling sites which remained open past 3:00 p.m. to give those waiting in line an opportunity to vote.

Following the closing of the polls, the ballots were counted and recorded on an Election Return. The original Election Return was sent to the municipal or city Election Registrar, while copies were placed in the ballot box, sent to COMELEC in Manila, and distributed to the

representatives of the KBL and UNIDO. In addition, pursuant to an agreement with COMELEC, each member of the BEI was required to sign NAMFREL's Precinct Tally Form, which included results from a particular precinct and served as the basis for the NAMFREL "Quick Count." In most areas observed, counting at the precinct level was completed by 6:00 p.m.

B. Problem Areas

Prior to the election, a member of the Reform AFP movement told members of the delegation that the ruling party was concerned that the race was closer than expected. Having expected to face a divided opposition, the KBL found itself facing an Aquino-Laurel ticket which had gained momentum throughout the campaign. Thus, on the eve of the election, KBL leaders may have panicked and ordered the local leaders to get as many votes for Marcos as was possible. For some local leaders, this meant sending out the goons and reporting statistically improbable vote totals favoring the Marcos ticket. Whatever the rationale, election day problems were pervasive, as described below.

1. Disenfranchisement

In virtually all areas, members of the delegation heard complaints from voters who were not included on voter

lists. In some instances, voters had been reassigned to a new polling site without being informed, while in other instances they were left off the voting lists entirely. Although at first glance, the problem appeared to be administrative, careful review of the voting figures raised the suspicion that the voting lists were manipulated to benefit the ruling party.

According to NAMFREL's analysis, close to 3.5 million voters were disenfranchised (See Annex XXV) NAMFREL based its estimate on the fact that in 1984, despite a well-organized boycott, 89% of those registered to vote cast ballots. Assuming a similar turnout in 1986, it would be expected that 23.4 of the 26 million registered voters would cast ballots. However, according to both the results reported by the Batasang and the results projected by NAMFREL, only 20 million ballots were cast. In other words, turnout for this election was only 76%, significantly less than 1984.

For the most part, disenfranchisement appears to have occurred in opposition-oriented areas. According to NAMFREL, in the ten cities which had the highest voter turnout, the winner was the ruling party, while in the ten cities and provinces which had the lowest turnout, the opposition was the winner in eight of the ten (See Annex XXVI).

Even more striking is that in the seven cities or provinces where turnout is above 90%, the ruling party won between 85 and 99.4 per cent of the votes with an overall winning percentage in these areas of 94% (See Annex XXVII). Similarly, in the eight cities and provinces where the ruling party won by a margin of 150,000 votes or more, the turnout ranged between 82 and 96 percent (Id.). On the other hand, in areas where the opposition's margin of victory was greater than 50,000, the turnout ranged between 71 and 81 percent (Id.).

The delegation was unable to investigate how such massive and targeted disenfranchisement was accomplished. The UNIDO provincial coordinator in Eastern Samar, however, reported that the KBL conducted a census prior to the election throughout the province. "Those known to be sympathetic with the opposition candidates were deleted from the voter's lists and included, if at all, in far away voting centers" (See Annex XXVIII). The result, according to the UNIDO coordinator, was that only 97,444 votes out of 149,00 votes were cast in the province; Aquino won the province by 10,000 votes.

2. Indelible Ink

As discussed earlier, COMELEC was unable to purge the registration lists of flying voters prior to the election

day. Thus, the only safeguard against multiple voting by individuals registered under more than one name was the use of indelible ink.

Several members of the delegation observed that the ink was easily wiped off by voters following its application. Also at some polling sites, the election administrators did not appear to be checking voters' fingers prior to handing them ballots. Thus, it was possible for an undetermined number of voters to cast more than one ballot on election day, particularly in areas where UNIDO and NAMFREL were not well-organized.

3. Vote-buying

Virtually all members of the delegation observed or were told by credible sources that voters were being paid money on election day for the purpose of encouraging a vote for the Marcos-Tolentino ticket. The amount of such payments varied from 25 to 500 pesos. In many instances, voters were given the money as part of the traditional election day practices. Some voters acknowledged receipt of such money, but claimed to have voted the Aquino-Laurel ticket anyway. In this respect, the voters were following the pastoral letter of the Catholic church, which advised Filipinos "to vote their conscience" (See Annex XIX).

While the secrecy of the ballot served to allow some voters to take the money and vote for Aquino, the UNIDO coordinator in Eastern Samar reported that at some polling sites, the ballots were opened by the chair of the BEI before being deposited in the ballot box (See Annex XXVIII). If the voter had written Marcos on the ballot, the BEI chair would signal the Barangay captain, who would then pay the voter as he or she left the polling site.

In some areas, mechanisms were designed to ensure that those receiving payments actually voted for Marcos. Members of the delegation were given a copy of a sample ballot which had Marcos-Tolentino written on it. Beneath the sample ballot was a sheet of carbonized paper. The voter was instructed to take the sample ballot into the voting booth, to place the real ballot between the sample ballot and the carbon paper, and to trace the sample ballot onto the real ballot. The real ballot would be deposited in the ballot box and the carbon paper would serve as a receipt for payment of money.

4. Intimidation

According to the Army, a total of 80 individuals were killed on election day and on the day after in election-related incidents. This includes two NAMFREL workers, one who was killed in the province of Capiz and a

second who was killed by "unidentified killers" after challenging the anomalous counting of ballots in the province of Agusan del Sur. This type of violence, given the fact that it occurred on election day, could well have intimidated voters and election officials.

With regard to other forms of intimidation, several members of the delegation saw individuals in military uniform, or otherwise armed, well within the fifty meters proscribed by the Election Code. Members of the delegation also received credible reports regarding NPA attempts to "encourage" a boycott of the election by warning teachers not to appear at their usual precincts on election day.

The most serious form of intimidation observed by members of the delegation was that practiced by the CHDF in provinces and cities with a local strongman, including Negros del Norte, Tarlac, and Makati. In these areas, the CHDF were responsible for threatening voters and opposition poll-watchers with guns, poles or by their mere presence. They also were responsible for snatching and stuffing ballot boxes (See Annex XXIX). The delegation also heard reports of activities by CHDF in other provinces, which involved less blatant, but also improper, attempts to coerce and threaten voters into supporting the ruling party candidates.

5. Exclusion of NAMFREL from Polling Sites

The presence of NAMFREL was viewed as an important safeguard for the conduct of a credible election. To ensure that NAMFREL accreditation would not be arbitrarily revoked by local officials, COMELEC and NAMFREL agreed before the election that NAMFREL's accreditation could not be withdrawn unless prior notice was provided to the COMELEC and NAMFREL, and the latter was given an opportunity to designate substitute officials.

On election day, NAMFREL poll-watchers were excluded completely from four provinces: Antique; Isabela; Negros del Norte; and Quirino. The basis for the exclusion was the alleged partisanship of the NAMFREL workers (See Annex XXX). NAMFREL's complaints to the COMELEC on election day regarding the alleged violation of the agreement went unheeded.

In addition to the province-wide exclusion of NAMFREL, NAMFREL watchers were subjected to various forms of physical intimidation. In Makati, for example, NAMFREL pulled out its volunteers because of the extensive harassment (See Appendix I). Whatever the merits of this decision as a tactical matter, it reflected the difficult circumstances under which NAMFREL operated. In addition to the two deaths mentioned above, NAMFREL reported over a

hundred incidents in which its volunteers were injured by "goons", local KBL officials or the CHDF (See Annex XXXI).

In part, as a result of these activities, NAMFREL was unable to cover as many precincts as it had anticipated. This affected NAMFREL's ability to obtain vote totals from close to 30% of the established precincts.

VI. Counting Phase

Despite the irregularities observed during the balloting process, the delegation was hopeful that the counting process might provide some means of redress for irregularities which occurred during the balloting. Unfortunately, this proved not to be the case. Once again, serious problems developed concerning all aspects of the count, leaving the delegation with no choice but to conclude that the "official" results announced by the Batasang on February 15th were wholly unreliable. The first part of this section provides a chronology of developments relating to the vote count, the second documents the specific problems which developed during the count, and the third covers other election-related developments which occurred during the week following the election.

A. Chronology

Following the counting of the ballots at the precinct level, two procedures were followed. The first involved the joint COMELEC-NAMFREL "Quick Count", while the second led to the "official" proclamation by the Batasang. Both procedures are described below.

1. Operation Quick Count

After considerable discussion, COMELEC and NAMFREL reached an agreement on February 5, 1986 regarding the conduct of parallel and coordinated operation quick counts (See Annex XXXII). The agreement called for a NAMFREL volunteer to carry the fourth copy of the Election Return, and the NAMFREL Precinct Tally Form (PTF) (See Annex XXXIII), to the municipal election registrar; the registrar would verify the data on the Election Return with the data on the PTF and then sign all the forms. The NAMFREL representative then would transmit the information included on the PTF by telex or telegraph to the COMELEC tabulation center (PICC) and to the NAMFREL tabulation center at LaSalle Greenhills. The agreement specified that only hard copy, which included the actual PTF, telexes or telegraphs, could be tabulated.

The purpose of this elaborate procedure was "the speedy and accurate tabulation and dissemination to the public of the election results" (See Annex XXXII). However, according to the NAMFREL Executive Council, the procedures served to slow down considerably NAMFREL's attempt to conduct a Quick Count (See Annex XXXIV). First, the late date at which the agreement was reached (36 hours prior to the election) meant that many local election officials and NAMFREL volunteers were unaware of the new procedures

established. Second, NAMFREL alleged that some members of the Board of Election Inspectors refused to sign the PTF and that many Election Registrars were unavailable to review and to verify the documents. Third, at the last minute, COMELEC ordered that telegrams be transmitted through only one company, thus creating considerable backlog.

Notwithstanding the delays and mutual recriminations, COMELEC and NAMFREL proceeded with their parallel, but no longer coordinated, quick counts. By Sunday evening, forty-eight hours after the polls closed, COMELEC had tabulated results from 28.2 per cent of the precincts while NAMFREL had tabulated results from 46.2 per cent of the precincts. The results reported by COMELEC and NAMFREL, however, differed significantly. According to the COMELEC count, Marcos was leading by 150,000 votes, while NAMFREL reported Aquino leading by 750,000 votes (See Annex XXXV).

On Sunday evening, over fifteen computer technicians walked out from the PICC tabulation center. Several members of the delegation attended a press conference in a Manila church, which began at 1:30 a.m. Monday morning. The group's spokesperson said that the technicians left the Center because their professional integrity was being compromised. They claimed to have brought with them

computer data which indicated that COMELEC was skewing its results by not reporting returns from areas in which the opposition was winning (See section V.B.5 infra).

The COMELEC and NAMFREL "Quick" counts proceeded throughout the week following the election. Annex XXXVI provides a comparison of the two counts on a daily basis. The considerable variance reported on a daily basis further convinced the delegation that some form of manipulation was occurring.

The delegation reviewed and observed NAMFREL's tabulation procedures. In addition to its initial quick count, which was based on vote totals sent to NAMFREL headquarters by telex and telegraph, NAMFREL reentered all the precinct totals into its computers once it received the original precinct tally form from its provincial supervisors. In this way, it managed to identify those totals which had been misreported through the telex or telegraph reporting process.

NAMFREL completed virtually all of its count on Monday, February 17, 1986; with a total of 69.03 percent of the precincts tabulated, NAMFREL reported Mrs. Aquino with 7,502,601 votes and Mr. Marcos with 6,787,556 votes, a difference of 715,045. The delegation is convinced that the NAMFREL results accurately reflect the count at the

precinct level. NAMFREL's inability to tabulate more than 70% of the precincts was a result of the following factors: 1) the lack of an organization in some areas, either due to lack of interest or intimidation by ruling party supporters; 2) the exclusion of NAMFREL from certain provinces and precincts on election day; and 3) the unwillingness of local officials to provide NAMFREL volunteers with signed copies of the PTF.

2. The "Official" Count

Under the Election Code, the official proclamation by the Batasang is based on "certificates of canvass" from 74 provinces, 47 chartered cities and 19 districts in Metro Manila. The certificates were prepared in the following manner. In the case of chartered cities and districts in Metro Manila, following the count at the precinct level, the original Election Return were taken to a city "canvassing" center. The returns were canvassed by a Board of Canvassers, which included a COMELEC official, two school administrators, and representatives of the KBL and UNIDO. In general, the city Boards of Canvassers were able to complete their task in an expeditious manner, although serious problems developed in some city centers.

In cases of municipalities, the Election Returns were gathered by the Municipal Election Registrar, who would

then transport the Returns in a locked ballot box to the provincial "canvassing" center in the provincial capital. The process of collecting Election Returns from outlying precincts in a given municipality often delayed matters considerably. Thus, while the counting at the precinct level generally was finished by 6:00 p.m., the local BEI often did not bring the Election Return to the Municipal Election Registrar until sometime on Saturday. In many instances, the Municipal Election Registrar waited until Sunday before traveling to the provincial capital. As a result, many of the Provincial Canvassing Boards did not complete their work until late Sunday or Monday.

To ensure against wholesale fraud (that is, manipulation of the vote totals after the balloting), the Philippines Election Code contained safeguards designed to ensure the integrity of the Certificates of Canvass prepared at the provincial and city canvassing centers. These safeguards included: 1) the presence of party observers, NAMFREL, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and others during all phases of the canvassing process; 2) the ability of the party observers to challenge particular election returns that appeared to have been tampered with; 3) the requirement that each member of the Board of Canvassers sign the Certificate; and 4) that the Certificate be placed in an envelope and sealed in a prescribed manner before it is transmitted to the Batasang.

The delegation was unable to observe the canvassing process to completion in most of the provinces. However, members of the delegation observed that in numerous instances Certificates of Canvass presented to the Batasang were challenged either because a complaint pending before COMELEC alleged a "failure of election" (See section VI.B.1 infra), or because the Certificates on their face were not in compliance with prescribed procedures.

The Batasang met to begin receiving the Certificates of Canvass on Tuesday, February 11, 1986. The UNIDO party sought to delay the Batasang's count until all challenges were resolved. However, the KBL-dominated Batasang proceeded with the count, allowing each side to register their objections. UNIDO filed objections to the certificates from virtually all provinces and cities (See Annex XXXVII). Among the grounds for objection were the following: no seal or improperly sealed (79); no signature by the representative designated by UNIDO (22); erasures and alterations (42); and statistical improbability (6). (Id.)

The Election Code provides that:

When it appears that any Certificate of Canvass or supporting statement of votes by polling places bears erasures or alterations which may cast doubt as to the veracity of the number of votes stated therein, the Batasang Pambansa upon request by the Presidential or Vice Presidential candidate

concerned or his [sic] party shall for the sole purpose of verifying the exact number of votes cast for the President or Vice President, count the votes as they appear in the copies of the Election Return provided to the Commission. For this purpose, the Speaker shall require the Commission to deliver its copies of the election returns to the Batasang Pambansa (Code, sec. 19).

As the delegation understands this provision, once a candidate challenges a Certificate of Canvass, the Batasang should attempt to verify the results reported by comparing the certificates with the Election Returns.

Notwithstanding this explicit provision and despite UNIDO objections, the Committee appointed by the Speaker added the totals for each candidate upon receipt of all 140 Certificates, and prepared a report for the Batasang (See Annex XXXVIII). The opposition members of the committee refused to sign the report, but it was accepted by the Batasang, and at 11:27 p.m. on Saturday, February 15, Ferdinand Marcos and Arturo Tolentino were proclaimed the winners of the election (See Annex XXXIX).

B. Problem Areas

Problems relating to the counting of votes occurred during all phases of the process. Some of the more egregious examples of the fraud that occurred are described below.

1. Misreporting of Results

The initial count was conducted by the Board of Election Inspectors at the precinct level. However, in some instances, votes cast for Mrs. Aquino were not counted. For example, two members of the delegation were present at the provincial canvassing center in Ilocos Sur. In one precinct, the result announced was 147 for Marcos and zero for Aquino, despite the fact that an Aquino supporter present at the canvassing center claimed that he and two brothers voted for Aquino. All told, eight precincts observed by members of the delegation in Ilocos Sur reported 100 % turnout and 100 % for Marcos, which meant that in each case the designated UNIDO representative on the BEI voted for Marcos.

2. Statistical Improbability

In addition to the above incident, the members of the delegation observed or heard reports of several other areas where the results reported from a particular municipality or city appeared statistically improbable, given the overwhelming margin for Marcos. For example, in two municipalities in the province of Lanoa del Sur, Marcos vote totals ranged from five to seven thousand while Aquino received zero. Further, in several provinces where Marcos scored overwhelming margins of victory (i.e., in the 90% or

more range), voter turnout was extraordinarily high (See Annex XXVII).

3. Ghost Precincts

The advance delegation reported the possibility that precincts not designated by COMELEC would be established on election day and report fictitious vote counts. Following the election, members of the delegation were presented with strong evidence that such "ghost precincts" were in fact established.

In the Southern Leyte municipality of Sogod, for example, COMELEC authorized the establishment of 55 precincts. However, Election Returns for 58 precincts were presented to the provincial Board of Canvassers. According to the KBL representative to the Board, the three additional precincts were the result of "splitting of precincts" prior to the election day. However, while the vote in the 55 designated precincts was 6,371 for Marcos and 5,876 for Aquino, in the three ghost precincts the vote total was 900 for Marcos and nine for Aquino (See Annex XL). All told in Southern Leyte, UNIDO alleged that 33 ghost precincts were established and that these precincts reported an over 90% margin for Marcos; in the province's other 638 precincts Marcos' margin was 52.7% to 47.3% (See Annex Id.).

4. Exclusion of UNIDO from Canvassing Process

In several regions, the UNIDO representative or watcher was improperly excluded from the canvassing process. For example, in the province of Maguindanao, after the UNIDO representative on the Board of Canvassers left for a doctor's appointment, the Board appointed a relative of a government minister to replace her. By the time she returned, the canvassing process was complete. UNIDO representatives also complained that the individuals assigned to guard the election returns were threatened by armed men and forced to leave the provincial capital during the count (See Annex XLI) The results reported in the Batasang from Maguindanao were 180,000 for Marcos and 57,864 for Aguino. In Negros Del Norte and other provinces, UNIDO representatives and others were intimidated by goons, and when they left, KBL supporters were appointed to the Board of Canvassers (See Annex XLII).

5. Discrepancy Between COMELEC/Batasang and NAMFREL Results

As noted earlier, the delegation is convinced that the results reported by NAMFREL are reliable, particularly when compared to the results reported by COMELEC. The walkout at the COMELEC Tabulation Center by the computer technicians lends support to this conclusion, but no

statistical evidence. (An analysis of Batsang and NAMFREL figures follows.) During the week following the walkout, the group's spokesperson, Linda Kapunan, provided the details of events which sparked the walkout (See Annex XLIII).

According to Ms. Kapunan, the workers began noticing that the numbers on the keyboard printouts were not consistent with the numbers appearing on the public tabulation board. In addition, Ms. Kapunan saw the head of the tabulation center, Pedro Baraoidan, conferring with several individuals and computing figures on a hand calculator, adding to her suspicions. She claimed that the decision to walk out was made over a period of time and after several consultations, and that the group's primary concern was their professional reputations.

In response, Mr. Baraoidan stated that there had been no attempts at manipulation (See Annex LXIV). He acknowledged that a new system was implemented Saturday evening to speed up the counting and that the system's people were not informed of the change; he claimed that the implementation of the new system explained the "inconsistencies." Baraoidan further charged that the walkout was pre-planned, as evidenced by the presence of hecklers and a large media contingent. He also claimed that the group may have attempted to paralyze the system from

the start but that he was unable to prove that charge. Nonetheless, the walkout did stop the COMELEC tabulation for a period of hours as the group which left took the program and data disks and security codes on their computers before leaving.

COMELEC appointed a three-person committee to investigate the matter. Members of the walkout group were in hiding and were unwilling to meet with the Commission members, although Ms. Kapunan gave several interviews to pro-opposition newspapers. Relying on Dr. Baraoidan's affidavit, the Committee concluded "that the walkout appears to have no solid basis because [the group's] premise was based merely on assumption, to quote that [we] sensed something 'fishy,' which to our mind is more a product of imagination than real" (See Annex XLV). The Catholic Bishops, on the other hand, praised the "COMELEC computer technicians who refused to degrade themselves by participating in election fraud" (See Annex X)

The results reported by the Batasang for several provinces are inherently inconsistent with those reported by NAMFREL. For example, in Ilocos Norte, the Batasang reported Aquino to have received 718 votes with 99% of the precincts tallied; NAMFREL's figures with 29% of the precinct tallied indicate that Aquino received 1,937 votes. According to an analysis of NAMFREL data prepared

by the Center for Democracy, 13 provinces evidence discrepancies of this sort with Marcos losing 75,739 votes and Aquino losing 171,183 (See Annex XLVI).

The discrepancies were the result of several factors. First, in some cases the vote totals from a particular precinct recorded on the Certificate of Canvass were inconsistent with the Precinct Tally Forms collected by NAMFREL, suggesting some tampering of the Election Return before it was submitted to the Board of Canvassers. Annex XLVII shows numerous such discrepancies in the Province of Lanao Del Sur.

Second, vote totals for some precincts may not have been included in the Canvass due to challenges, and in other instances ghost precincts were included in the Canvass. The Center for Democracy reports 1103 precincts authorized but not tabulated by the Batasang, and 161 precincts tabulated by the Batasang, although not authorized (See Annex XLVIII). Finally, given the fact that the Certificates were tabulated in instances where the procedural safeguards were not complied with, it is possible that substitute Certificates were presented to the Batasang (See Annex XXXVII).

As noted earlier, the NAMFREL count, although limited to 70% of the Precincts, is more reliable. In part, the failure to tabulate the remaining 30% is a result of the

harassment and intimidation directed at NAMFREL in certain areas. In many of these areas a failure of election should have been declared (See section VI.C.1 infra) In any event, the NAMFREL figures for the 70% counted appear the most reliable indicator of the popular will of the Filipino people as based on the February 7 election.

C. Developments During the Week Following the Election

Simultaneous with the vote count, there were several developments relating to the election which bear on the delegation's evaluation of the process. This section describes these developments

1. COMELEC's Handling of Post-Election Complaints

In the aftermath of the election, both parties filed complaints with COMELEC regarding the conduct of the election. The UNIDO complaints focused on those areas where intimidation had been particularly bad and requested the COMELEC to declare a "failure of election" for those areas. Annexes XLI, XLII, IL contain the petitions or supporting affidavits filed by UNIDO in Maguindanao, Negros del Norte, and Cadiz city, respectively.

The KBL complaints appeared to be filed in response to the UNIDO complaints so as to ensure that an even-handed resolution of all the complaints would not harm the KBL cause. The KBL alleged, inter alia, intimidation, massive vote buying, and a conspiracy between "the communist NPA, the Opposition Party and NAMFREL" to prevent KBL supporters from voting (Res. 1775, included as Annex L).

Initially, COMELEC declined to act on the complaints concluding that once the Batasang met, the Batasang was responsible for handling all such complaints (Res. 1774) Since the Batasang only tabulated the Certificates and refused to consider the complaints, the UNIDO's remaining alternative was to appeal to the Presidential Election Tribunal (PET), which was also partisan in favor of Marcos.

On February 13, two days after issuing its resolution declining to consider party complaints, COMELEC issued a further resolution which: (1) listed all the KBL complaints; (2) indicated that if a complaint were substantiated, COMELEC would recommend to the Batasang that the Certificate of Canvass be excluded; and (3) requested that the political parties refrain from "airing their complaints to the media before" the COMELEC had an opportunity to act (Res. 1775, see Annex Id.). COMELEC further reported that its field officials urged that NAMFREL's accreditation be revoked in view of their partisan activity during the election. By the time the

Batasang issued its official proclamation, COMELEC had not resolved any of the complaints and the UNIDO attorneys appeared disinclined to challenge the Batasang's proclamation before the PET.

2. Reprisals

Annex LI contains a breakdown of election-related casualties reported by the army as of February 18, 1986. Following the election, there were increased reports of reprisals against UNIDO workers. Those targeted included individuals who joined the UNIDO party during the campaign and those who campaigned actively for the UNIDO ticket despite the presence of a KBL strongman.

The most publicized incident involved the assassination of Enrique Javier, a former Governor of Antique. He was killed outside the provincial capital, which he had just left after observing the canvassing of votes. During the campaign, Javier complained several times to COMELEC regarding the intimidation and the use of the military by KBL strongman Arturo Pacificador (See Annex XXI). An army officer and a former soldier were among those arrested; they were seen driving to the scene in a car used by Pacificador, who had been implicated in the killing of eight UNIDO workers on the eve of the 1984 election.

The most serious incidents took place in Quirino, a Marcos stronghold where a KBL strongman, Orlando Dulay, reigned. During the campaign, Dulay allegedly threatened UNIDO and NAMFREL workers constantly. Three UNIDO workers were abducted before the election and their dead bodies were found after the election. In addition three young girls, who worked for UNIDO were clubbed to death soon after the election. As a result of these incidents, many of those who supported the opposition fled the province after the election; the church established "safe" houses where those fleeing could stay.

3. Response of the Filipino People

On February 14, 1986, the Catholic Bishops's Conference issued a strong statement condemning the conduct of the election (See Annex X). According to the statement, a government which lacks legitimacy need not command the respect of the population. The statement implicitly called for non-violent civil disobedience as a means to ensure that the will of the people was respected.

The boycotting left issued statements indicating that its perspective on the election had been vindicated. It called for a radical response to the latest outrage, a call which found sympathy among many UNIDO supporters. Mrs. Aquino, however, declined to enter an alliance with the far

left or to allow it to take the lead in organizing protests against the Marcos regime.

On Sunday, February 16, the opposition held a massive rally at which Mrs. Aquino called for a boycott of businesses, banks and media owned by Marcos and his cronies. She also announced a schedule of rallies during the following week in other provinces as part of an attempt to build popular support. Although some of her advisors sought a more aggressive approach, Mrs. Aquino stressed that she did not want to provoke violence.

By the time the last member of the delegation left the Philippines, it appeared that the boycott was having some effect. The value of the peso and stock prices were declining rapidly, and the country appeared destined for months of internal strife -- with the NPA as the most likely beneficiary.

VII. Foreign Observers and the Election

Despite the invitation of the two major presidential candidates and the warm welcome most Filipinos extended to foreign observers, the presence of observers aroused controversy among some segments of the population. The wording of COMELEC's resolution regarding observers "rules and regulations regarding foreign intervention" reflected COMELEC's ambivalence toward observers. The pro-government press was even more vehement in denouncing the presence of observers as "intervenors" and "meddlers" (See Annex LII) The radical left also criticized the presence of observers on the grounds that it implied an endorsement of the election.

Despite the controversy, the delegation believes that observers contributed positively to the Filipino electoral process. For example, following a December visit to the Philippines by a delegation sponsored by the Center for Democracy, COMELEC adopted several resolutions addressing concerns raised by the Center delegation (See Annex XXIII). COMELEC's actions, such as designating UNIDO as the DOP and accrediting NAMFREL, ensured that the election would proceed with all major actors participating. Our advance delegation reported on several of the vulnerable areas of the electoral process, thus ensuring that members of the delegation, other foreign observers and the media

focused their attention on these areas in monitoring the election.

Despite our inability to deter the pervasive character of the fraud, this delegation's presence did offer support to those who were struggling to preserve the integrity of the process; it also served to form international opinion about the legitimacy of the "official" proclamation. The Filipino experience should serve as a warning to other governments who seek to thwart the popular will through electoral fraud.

Members of the delegation also found it beneficial to work with international standards and apply them to a particular situation. Delegates made the inevitable comparisons between what they were observing and their own electoral systems. This can only serve to enhance international understanding of democratic electoral principles.

VIII. Concluding Observations

As the delegation looks back at the election and the widespread violations of the electoral code which characterized it, we have sought to understand why it occurred the way it did. It seemed obvious to our advance group that overt efforts by the governing party to subvert the electoral process could well result in an inability to govern. It seemed equally obvious, given the soundness of the electoral code and the safeguards adopted, that fraud would be detected. What, then, were the circumstances which led to the perpetration of massive violations in full view of the media, international observers and the Filipino people?

Though it may be technically beyond our purview, we will try to answer this question. This election has historic consequences for the Philippines, and analysts will long speculate over the cause of the illegal activities which occurred on February 7 and immediately thereafter. To some extent, our own consensus assessment is based on speculation, but few outside observers had the opportunity to gather and weigh the evidence as carefully as did our delegation.

During our advance visit to the Philippines, we concluded that violations of the campaign practices of the

electoral code would be most difficult to detect and substantiate. In the pre-election period, the governing party could use its power of incumbency to influence the electorate legally and illegally. Indeed, we subsequently uncovered a good deal of evidence to this effect. Under normal circumstances, this should have sufficed to give the KBL confidence that it would win with a minimum of illegal activity on election day when detection was more likely.

A military officer -- a member of the reformist group and a person who appeared credible -- told the leaders of our delegation the day before the election that an order had just been sent out to key military officers and KBL leaders to "win at all costs." He speculated that this order followed a last-minute reading of polling information which indicated that a legal victory would be highly improbable.

To support his claim, the officer provided us with a copy of a document marked "CONFIDENTIAL" which listed vote counts for the various regions and provinces and provided a projected overall margin of victory for President Marcos at 53 percent to 47 percent (See Annex LIII). Upon examination, this document appeared to be a series of targets for local KBL coordinators.

Examining the target margins by province after the

election, several discrepancies appear. Nevertheless, the projected overall margin of victory in this document is virtually the same as the margin by which Marcos was proclaimed the winner.

Two days after the election, the counting process ground to a halt. Many focused attention on the breakdown of the NAMFREL-COMELEC "quick count" agreement, but it also was apparent that the count itself was creating concern at the KBL leadership level. It seemed to us and other observers that the Government was slowing down the count to get a better idea of the number of votes it needed. In retrospect, it is most likely that the alarm was caused by the provincial vote counts. The targets set in the confidential document we obtained were not being achieved. While we can only speculate, it would appear that considerable adjustments must have taken place to achieve the final 53 - 47 margin of victory.

Clearly, Ferdinand Marcos must accept ultimate responsibility for what occurred during the balloting and counting phases. It was he who promised a "free and fair" election. Much of what happened was obviously being directed by the Malacanang Palace, but it would be incorrect to assume that Marcos exercised absolute control. If he did, in fact, issue the order to "win at all costs," he released forces which were beyond his

capacity to control. Local "warloads" and Barangay officials felt considerable pressure to deliver their jurisdictions, and they went about this task using methods that had succeeded in the past.

What was different this time was that NAMFREL, two international observer delegations (See Annex LIV), foreign embassies and a very large media contingent were watching. In the end, Marcos was able to achieve a "win," but the costs were more than he had anticipated.

At the same time, it should be noted that certain aspects of the election day irregularities cannot be separated from the larger social, cultural, and historical character of the Philippines. The archipelago includes over 7,000 islands; internal communications and transportation are uneven at best, outside of a few of the larger metropolitan areas. Some parts of the Philippines are cut off -- literally for days at a time from the larger population centers which make up the majority of the Philippine population.

In these areas, and in some less remote, there exist near-feudal political systems in which the ultimate political, economic and legal power rests in the hands of one or two individuals. The exercise of influence is largely unchecked due to a lack of "balancing" powers, an

absence of central control, and inadequate means of redress. Though our delegation sought to avoid use of the phrase "by Philippines standards" in expressing our judgements, we add in closing the caution that there are important social, cultural and historical factors at play which can mitigate against the conduct of free and fair elections in the Philippines.

There can be no doubt that these factors were used, and indeed exacerbated, by the ruling KBL in the course of the February snap elections and well before. It is important to note, however, that many of these factors pre-date the presidency of Ferdinand Marcos. Although there is no question of the democratic will and courage of the Filipino people, the new generation of Philippine leaders must address the historical factors which created the opportunity for this prolonged dictatorship.

The new leadership would do well recognize that fundamental precepts of democracy include law, order and the balance of power among the institutions of governance. The Philippine people are now celebrating a hard won fight for democratic justice and freedom, but critical and difficult decisions lie ahead which will test their commitment to these noblest of ideals.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A bipartisan delegation sponsored by the National Republican and Democratic Institutes for International Affairs visited the Philippines January 5-11. The purpose of the visit was to assess the feasibility of sending an international group to observe the February 7 election and to review steps being taken to safeguard the integrity of that election. Meetings were held with the key official and non-official organizations that will administer and monitor the election.

Of particular importance to the delegation were: (1) preparations being made by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC); (2) the administration of the electoral code in the pre-election period; (3) the registration of voters; and (4) the willingness of the government, the military, the contesting parties and various citizens' groups to cooperate with an international observer team.

Our summary conclusions about these matters are as follows:

The electoral processes established by laws and regulations for the conduct of balloting and for the tabulation of votes provide a comprehensive framework for the administration of a procedurally correct election. The laws and regulations also contain provisions encouraging a fair electoral campaign. Taken as a whole, these laws and

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regulations compare favorably with those of other democratic countries. The actual implementation of the electoral procedures by local, provincial and national election officials on election day and during the counting phase is a key factor in the conduct of a "free and fair" election. Wholesale vote buying, intimidation, and fraud in the balloting and counting phases can be detected by accredited monitoring groups. It, therefore, should be possible for an international group working with Filipino authorities and accredited citizens groups to evaluate the fairness of this phase of the electoral process.

-- The registration of voters which occurred on December 28 and 29, 1985, produced a number of "statistical improbabilities" according to COMELEC, and these were being investigated. All voter lists were to have been purged of illegal registrants by January 15, "Revision Day." Because we departed Manila on January 11, we were not able to evaluate fully COMELEC's actions to ensure the integrity of the registration process. We note, however, that other election procedures are in place which could be used to detect double voting, "ghost" precincts, "flying voters" and other irregularities stemming from fraudulent registration practices.

-- Only a few complaints of specific campaign-related incidents were related to the delegation prior to its departure. We have noted reports of what appear to be an

increase of such incidents in the week since we left. An international observer delegation should interview individuals affected by alleged pre-election intimidation and vote-buying, seek to determine whether complaints are being presented to the responsible authorities and whether these complaints are being investigated and adjudicated promptly and effectively. If an obvious and discernable pattern emerges, this could greatly influence an evaluation of the conduct of the electoral process, even if the balloting and counting phases are conducted in accordance with the law.

-- According to many accounts and our own less than scientific observation, access to radio and television is not being equally divided between the two major parties. This is a controversial issue in the campaign and could impact on the outcome. An unequal distribution of television coverage appears attributable to stations refusing to sell time "to either party," but then providing extensive coverage of President Marcos' campaign during news segments. However, at the time of our departure, the opposition had filed only one complaint with COMELEC involving two specific cases of one-sided television coverage. A more aggressive posture by the opposition in seeking redress through COMELEC and by COMELEC in administering the "equal time" provisions in the electoral code during the last weeks of the campaign could ameliorate

some of the unfair allocation of overall media time in favor of President Marcos' KBL Party.

-- Free election time -- "COMELEC Time" -- began on television January 8, and a published listing of the schedule for the week of January 13, indicated that this "free" time would be allocated equally to the two major parties. The limited amount of time thus far acquired by COMELEC for partisan activity by the two major candidates is unlikely to overcome imbalances which may exist in media coverage.

Typically the power of incumbency can influence the amount of space print journalists give to one party or the other. It should be noted that the Philippine press is strongly partisan in nature and that coverage is often reflective of editorial policy rather than considerations of newsworthiness. Some concern exists in the Philippines about the influence used to prejudice print media coverage of the campaign. It was beyond the competence of this delegation to determine the pervasiveness of that influence or its impact on the campaign.

-- The delegation was encouraged to organize an international observer effort by the two major parties and leading Filipino citizens' groups. Despite some expressions of concern regarding the "intervention" of foreigners in the

Filipino electoral process, the delegation received adequate assurances from all sides that an international observer group would receive the cooperation it would need to monitor and evaluate the February 7 election.

Given the above considerations, our Institutes have decided to assemble a forty-member joint delegation of international observers for the February 7 election. This delegation would be comprised of high-level party leaders from many of the world's democratic nations. It is our belief that such a delegation can contribute to the conduct of a free and fair election, will be instrumental in determining international opinion about such an election, and will serve to underscore the vital role a credible electoral process can play in bringing about political stability in the Philippines.

TEXT OF INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER DELEGATION'S
PRESS CONFERENCE, MANILA, FEBRUARY 5, 1986

Following is the transcript of a February 5, 1986 press conference of the international observer delegation to the Philippine presidential election which was organized by the National Democratic and National Republican Institutes for International Affairs.

(Begin transcript)

Keith Schuette: I'm the Executive Director of the National Republican Institute for International Affairs. One of the co-chairman of our delegation: to my right, the former President of Colombia, Dr. Misael Pastrana. Dr. Pastrana was President of Colombia from 1970-1974. He is the former minister of State in Colombia, former ambassador to the United States and many other posts. He is party leader of the ruling or governing conservative party of Colombia, and he is also a representative and vice-chairman of the International Democrat Union.

Brian Atwood: I'm Brian Atwood with the National Democratic Institute. It's my pleasure to introduce Mr. John Hume, who's a member of the British Parliament and the European Parliament and the leader of the Social Democratic and Labor Party of Northern Ireland. He initiated a few years ago something called a New Ireland Forum, which was the beginning of negotiations, eventually, between Great Britain and Ireland, the Irish Republic. And he's said by many to have been the architect of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Mr. Hume will read the opening statement on behalf of the two leaders of the delegation.

Mr. Hume: Our delegation has come to the Philippines at the general invitation of the two major presidential candidates to participate as international observers in the electoral process here. We accept this role with a great sense of purpose.

As a multi-national representation of the community of democracies, we have a deep faith in the electoral process as a vital means for expressing the popular will. We are stating by our presence that we believe that this election can be a valid expression of the will of the people of the Philippines. At the same time, we recognize that every democratic society contains within it those elements who would attempt to distort the popular will through electoral malpractice, and it is our hope that our presence will encourage the democratic forces on all sides to seek a fair and free election.

The people on our delegation who have committed themselves to this important mission have done so in the clear understanding that they're leaving all personal and political biases behind them. We will monitor and evaluate this election without prejudice, and we accept, unless proven otherwise, the publicly expressed desires of all candidates to conduct this election fairly.

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As co-leaders of the delegation, we want to offer special thanks to the two sponsoring organizations, the National Democratic and Republican Institutes for International Affairs of the United States, and for the careful preparations that they have undertaken.

As a result of a preliminary visit and a thorough report on the electoral system here, we begin our task with a substantial amount of information and insight. We will meet today with representatives of both political parties and with COMELEC and NAMFREL.

Our group will be briefed thoroughly by technical experts, and we'll receive detailed information on the provinces we intend to cover.

Nine teams of 4 or 5 individuals will be sent to various parts of the country to observe the process. We have chosen these areas after careful consultation with a wide variety of experts on Filipino elections. A list of the provinces and the observer teams will be provided to you.

We have concluded that the laws and procedures are such that malpractice can be detected, especially that which is attempted or perpetuated on a wholesale basis. We hope that this will not occur but we will not hesitate to expose it if it does. We plan to meet with the press after the election to issue a preliminary report of what we have observed. This will not include a final evaluation of the election's validity. This final report, which will be based on a careful analysis of the complete national picture, is too important for instant analysis. We will want to consult with many credible sources before finalizing our opinion.

Finally, we are conscious of the vital importance of this election to the future of the Philippines and its people. We share the hope of the vast majority of the Filipino people that this election will provide a clear mandate to the government that is asked to lead this great nation after the 7th of February. We hope that our delegation will be able to say that we have borne witness to a fair and free election which reflects the will of the Filipino people. Thank you very much.

Q: I'd like to ask Mr. Atwood and Mr. Schuette to give us a brief account of who is paying for this mission, how much is being paid, and if there is any United States Government money in this project, particularly any C.I.A. money? Exactly what is your budget?

A: (Atwood): Our Institutes were both created as private corporations affiliated with the Republican and Democratic parties of the United States. Most of the money that we use to operate comes from the National Endowment for Democracy, which is also a non-governmental institution in the United States that does receive money, a grant from the U.S.I.A., the U.S. Information Agency. For this particular project, about 20 percent of the resources that we are using come from private sources. contributions to our institutes. Both of our institutes are non-profit, non-partisan

organizations, despite our affiliations with the two parties. About 40 percent of the money comes from [a section of] the Agency for International Development that is concerned with Human Rights and electoral processes. The other 40 percent comes from the National Endowment for Democracy for our normal operating expenses.

Q: How much money are you talking about.

A: We pay for the travel of the individuals and the room and board here on a per diem basis. Perhaps it's going to cost somewhere around about \$60,000, something like that.

Q: For the whole time for both groups -- for 44 people?

A: (Atwood) That's right. Maybe that's a low estimate. Sixty thousand for each delegation, \$120,000 total.

Q: And no C.I.A. money?

A: (Atwood): Absolutely not. Indeed, there's a prohibition in the law that created the grant for the National Endowment for Democracy against that kind of association.

Q: I wonder if you would give us your criteria for judging whether this election is going to be fair or not?

A: (Hume): Well, we will be looking at the areas that have been identified as vital areas for electoral malpractice; [these are] well known, and they are not any different no matter what country you're in or [where you are] dealing with the electoral process. I have been involved in a part of the world which has had 12 elections in the last 12 years and where there has been a lot of allegations of, to put it mildly, "over enthusiasm" in electoral practice. and where special legislation has had to be brought to tighten it all up. So, as co-leader of the delegation. I know exactly what I'm looking for, and as I say, it's the same in every area.

We will be looking at the areas that have already been identified as areas [where fraud is likely. and to observe whether] anyone is trying to conduct electoral malpractaice registration, alleged bribery, and buying votes; the actual voting itself, and the counting procedures.

We're under no illusions. There's a huge number of polling stations in this country. We can't cover them all. But we have a 44-member team. We had an advance team right here that reported on the situation. And we will do an effective job, we believe, with the resources at our disposal. We will discuss with the different political parties. We will discuss with COMELEC and with NAMFREL, and with any other sources that we will regard as credible in the country before coming to a final conclusion. And we're not going to intervene in any way in advance of the election or with the result. We are here to observe, not to intervene.

Q: How do you distinguish between "over-enthusiasm" and fraud?

A: (Hume): Well, I think the distinction is usually pretty clear -- when you see it in practice.

Q: From what you have seen so far, how would you assess prospects for a free and fair election?

A: (Pastrana): The first criterion is to observe the electoral process based on the other countries. Our mandate is none other than our own conscience. We represent different political tendencies from diverse countries. We have no ideological compromise in our observer mission other than fulfilling this mission with objective criteria and with the will of rendering a report that reflects the reality of the process that is taking place.

Q: Mr. Schuette or Mr. Atwood, you've spent some time over here, I'm wondering what your assessment is now of the prospects for a fair and free election?

A: (Schuette): As we noted in our report, [of which you] have copies or there are copies available to you, the procedures: the electoral log, the Omnibus Election Code, and the various resolutions that have been passed, in our opinion, stand the test. We have a number of experts in our delegation who have done election observing in other countries before, and it is their judgment and our judgment that the law compares favorably with that, for example, that we might find in the United States. It is important to note, however, that laws are only as good as those who must enforce them and ultimately it will be a decision of those institutions in the Philippines who are charged with enforcing electoral laws, monitoring those laws, as to whether this will be a free and fair election. We would not be here if we did not think that there was a reasonable prospect for a representative and honest election.

Q: Do you think that with 40 observers, you are in a position to make a scientific judgment on the entire country on the fairness of the election?

A: (Schuette): Statistically, I believe 40 out of 91,000 would cause pain for a lot of statisticians. We feel that we will be able to take a representative sample of the atmosphere, of the counting process, of the transport of electoral returns, of the management of the election. Does that mean that when we issue our final report that we will have touched every base, recorded every incident, and made a judgment about all that activity? I think the answer is no. There are no institutions in the Philippines that are prepared to offer that broad a coverage. We are confident that our plans will allow us to make a judgment that we would consider to be responsible and representative.

Q: When you say 90,000 and 40 observers, then you'll only be looking at 40 precincts.

A: There will be many more than 40. We will have 8 teams in the field visiting a number of precincts from the hub areas where they are deployed. We won't know until after the election as to exactly how many precincts we can visit. It will be many more than 40, I can assure you of that.

A: (Schuette): We have been working very closely with COMELEC. They have been very cooperative with us. I believe we have a list that we have provided today as to where our teams will be going. They've been cooperative, although we have not sought nor have they offered their permission. This is a mission that's very independent, and they've [COMELEC] been very cooperative with us.

Q: Mr. Schuette, have you been allowed or told that you will be allowed to go into the polls. and, if not, do you think that this is going to harm the mission.

A: (Schuette): As we noted when we were here for our earlier visit. our mission must first and foremost respect the laws of the Philippines. According to the law, there are only certain individuals that are allowed into the polling place. We respect that law. We do not feel that this measurably limits our ability to discharge our responsibilities effectively. As we noted back in Washington, there are only so many things that can happen inside a polling place. We are looking at the larger picture. We are able to interview people coming in and out of the polls. There are adequate safeguards in place, it would appear, to protect the integrity of the polling stations.

Q: When are you planning to issue your preliminary report -- Sunday, Saturday?

A: (Hume): Sunday evening is the projected time, all being well here.

Q: If everybody knows where you're going in advance, how can you hope to get a representative picture of what's going on?

A: (Hume): Well, you know, some of us have been fighting elections for a very long time, and we know what we're doing when we're fighting elections and we're looking at elections being fought. And experienced electioneering is something that is limited to practicing politicians and the people who work within their parties. And from my own personal experience of elections, I would be quite confident that I could go into any electoral area, start talking to people, start looking at what's happening, and come to a very good conclusion of what is actually happening. I mean, people aren't any different no matter what part of the world they're in and I don't think elections are either. It's a question of the experience of the people who are doing it, and we have a highly experienced team.

Q: My question is, why was no attempt made to not set a previous schedule of where you are going? Wouldn't it have been possible to select randomly the day of the election?

A: (Atwood): Let me just answer that. The fact of the matter is that we did keep the information until very late in the day yesterday. But there is a time when you have to have the cooperation of individuals within the area. Our people are going to nine

different areas, including Metro Manila, and we will also have a chartered plane which will drop our leading delegation into various areas at very little notice. The areas that they'll be covering will be regions which have been identified by a lot of people as being critical. They will not know where our team is going within the region. Teams of four and five will be making their own strategy as to where they go at any given time of the day. They've been assured that with their COMELEC credentials that they'll have access to various places and that no one is going to be trying to disrupt their travels, so we don't think that given those circumstances and given the late time of the day that anyone really would have had opportunities to make showcases out of these particular provinces.

Q: Mr. Schuette, you have said that the laws looked okay. There's a history in this country of there being a disparity in election practice from the laws. How do you decide how much irregularity is an acceptable amount of irregularity for the elections to still be credible?

A: (Hume): I think you would understand yourself that the very question you ask me needs to await the answer to your question. You have to see what has happened before you can make a judgement. We can't say, oh, that we're going to judge on a [basis of] one percent or ten percent or fifty percent. You have to actually see what's happening. It's a practical sense of elaboration we're engaged in.

Q: You mean you're not going out in your separate directions with the pre-established criteria of what to look for, what to mark down in your tally sheets?

A: (Hume): Oh yes, we're very, very clear -- I've already outlined the areas that we have been looking at and that we will be looking at. But we will not be making any comments on any of our findings until next Sunday, and then our final reports will come in much later than that.

Q: Mr Hume, can I ask you to address the question of access to the media and how much weight you're going to attach to that in your final report?

A: (Hume): Well, that is one of the areas in which we will be drawing up our report, because obviously, the access to media is a key element in a fair and free election. We have been studying that in practice, and we will be commenting on that in due course.

Q: Have you reached any conclusion today on what you've studied and what you've covered from your preliminary exposure?

A: (Hume): I think we've already made clear that we won't be announcing any conclusions until after the election, first of all next Sunday, and our final conclusions much later. It's much too serious a matter for instant judgements.

Q: Do you have any advice for the American team that is coming in tonight, Mr. Hume?

A: (Hume): No.

Q: Mr. Hume, could you give us examples of electoral fraud and malpractice with which you, as a Northern Ireland Roman Catholic politician, have direct personal experience?

A: Yeah, plenty of them. I mean the best-known election slogan in Northern Ireland is "vote early and vote often." We have been fighting that practice for years. We think that as a result of recent legislation, we have got it under control because there's now strict identity checks at polling stations.

It has not been unusual in Northern Ireland for people who have passed away to have registered their opinion in the ballot box on a very many occasions. Also, registration has been a problem. We now have a very strict watch on registration; parties police the registration process so that everybody who's entitled to be on the register is on it, but nobody is on it more than once. So those are the areas that we've had to deal with in Northern Ireland: registration and malpractice in the act of voting. People voting for the dead; these are the sort of things that are always, I think, an issue where elections are very toughly and tightly fought.

Q: I've got a question for Mr. Atwood, if I may. I believe it was you who in recent Congressional testimony noted that the ballot-printing machine or machinery was missing recently for a week or so. I hope I'm not misquoting you. The implication there is that somebody could have taken it and printed a lot of phoney ballots, and what I'm wondering is, can you add anything to that and what procedures might uncover those ballots if at some point they're introduced into the count?

A: Yes, we were informed by the Commission on Elections that after the snap election was announced, that for a period of about eight days, the watermark machine was not under control. Now, that does not necessarily imply that it was being used during that period, but it was not under control. There are many ways that this kind of thing can be detected.

We will be looking in the field for indications that the copy of the election return that was signed by both parties and by the board of election inspectors at the precinct level reflects a different vote count than that which is received at the provincial counting center. Quite obviously, if a pattern emerges of that kind of activity, then there will be certain implications in that and we will take note of that. Beyond that, I don't think I should say any more about it.

Q: I have a question for Mr. Schuette. Since this is a primarily American government-financed operation, I wonder what you can say to Filipinos who would say that this is an intrusion in their affairs. something that a sovereign government shouldn't tolerate?

A: We haven't been asked that question, so I normally don't answer questions that haven't been asked.

A: (Atwood): We are here as a neutral, impartial mission that has no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of the

OBSERVER MISSION BRIEFING SCHEDULE
February 5, 1986

9:00 National Democratic and Republican Institutes for International Affairs
J. Brian Atwood, Executive Director, NDI
Keith Schuette, Executive Director, NRIIA

10:30 Commission on Elections - "COMELEC"
Froilan Bacungan, COMELEC Commissioner

11:30 National Citizens' Movement for Free Elections - "NAMFREL"
Jose Concepcion, Chairman

1:00 KBL
Blas Ople, Minister of Labor and Marcos' Campaign Manager

2:30 UNIDO
Francis Garchitorena, Counsel to Mrs. Aquino

3:15 Team Meetings

National Democratic Institute
for International Affairs

National Republican Institute
for International Affairs

MEMORANDUM

TO : NDI and NRIIA International Observer Team

FROM: J. Brian Atwood, NDI
Keith Schuette, NRIIA

RE : Terms of Reference

DATE: January 31, 1986

The observations of this mission and those of other credible sources will form the basis for our conclusions about the February 7 presidential election in the Philippines. Our mission, therefore, requires that all observers attempt to document observations and in all cases distinguish factual information from subjective judgements.

Delegation members will be provided with evaluation forms. The sponsoring organizations will attempt to assess the election from a national perspective in the final evaluation, and we would like you to review the issues we feel are important to accomplishing this objective. These terms of reference have been prepared for that purpose.

I. The Political Campaign

A. Adequacy of the Campaign Period: Was the time provided for campaigning adequate to permit all parties to communicate their respective messages to voters? Was the time provided adequate to permit the establishment of tamper-proof electoral procedures?

B. Restrictions on Campaigning: Did the participating parties have access to all regions of the country to conduct their respective campaigns? Were there any de jure or de facto restrictions on political campaigning by participating parties or others?

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for International Affairs
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Washington, D.C. 20004
(202) 783-2280 Telex 5106000161NRIIA

C. Political Arrests: Have there been any arrests, detentions, or killings of party leaders or other individuals during the campaign which appear politically motivated?

D. Intimidation: During the campaign, were candidates or voters intimidated, in the form of explicit or implicit threats to vote for a specific candidate or to vote at all, by security forces, political parties, or by insurgent groups? What was the government's response to such actions?

E. Improper Campaign Practices: Was there evidence of vote-buying or other illegal campaign tactics by either party? How did COMELEC respond to complaints about improper campaign practices?

II. Role of the Media

A. COMELEC Time: Did COMELEC provide the major parties adequate and relatively equal access to the media through allocations of COMELEC time?

B. Media Access: Were parties permitted to purchase time and space in the Filipino media?

C. Coverage of the Campaign: Did the Filipino media give adequate and balanced coverage of the political campaign?

D. Censorship: Was there any censorship of the print or broadcast media? Were any journalists intimidated through arrest, detention, or death during the campaign period?

III. Administration of the Election

A. COMELEC: Did the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and local elections officials act in a non-partisan manner?

B. Voter Registration: Were the statistical improbabilities and other problems with the voter registration lists recognized by COMELEC corrected prior to the election? If not, did other safeguards in the law act to prevent the phenomena of "flying" and "ghost" voters?

C. Fraud Prevention: Were the safeguards established to prevent such fraudulent practices as the stuffing of ballot boxes utilized at all precincts?

D. Counting of Ballots: Were the safeguards to ensure against fraud in the counting and canvassing processes utilized at all precincts and canvassing centers? Was there evidence that disputes in the counting or canvassing process

were resolved in a partisan manner? Were there suspicious delays in the preparation of the election returns or the certificates of canvassing?

E. Role of Observers: Were the two leading parties, NAMFREL, and other accredited watchers permitted access to all precincts and canvassing centers? Were complaints witnessed by party poll-watchers, NAMFREL representatives or other observers handled in a non-partisan manner?

F. Environment at the Polling Site: According to information provided from those permitted access to polling sites, were voters able to cast a secret ballot? Was there any intimidation of voters by security forces, private armies, local leaders, political parties, or insurgent groups on election day?

IV. The Results

A. Announcement of Official Results: Are the official results being reported in accordance with the provisions of the Philippines Election Code? Do the official results coincide with those reported by NAMFREL's Quick Count? Are there unreasonable delays in the canvassing process being caused by frivolous objections?

B. Ability of the winner to assume power: Is the winner of the election likely to assume power in accordance with the provisions setting the terms of the election?

NRIIA/NDI TEAM ASSIGNMENTS TO PROVINCES

Team I: Region 1
Province: Ilocos Sur

Jerry Austin - Coordinator
Tabib Bensoda
Steve McCarthy
Marilyn Zak

Team II: Region 3
Province: Tarlac

Patricia Keefer - Coordinator
Dorothy Lightborne
George Mackie
Judy Norcross
Howard Penniman

Team III: Region 4
Province: Batangas

Steve Wagner - Coordinator
Elizabeth Bagley
Smith Bagley
Robert Hill
William Tucker

Team IV: Region 5
Province: Negros Occidental and Negros del Norte

Glenn Cowan - Coordinator
Manual Ayau
Raymond Gastil
Peter Schramm
David Steinberg

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Team V: Region 8
Province: Leyete

Kathi Walther - Coordinator
Jose Rodriguez
Juan Carlos Pastrana
Bill Sweeney

Team VI: Region 5
Province: Albay and Camarines

Larry Garber - Coordinator
Martin Lasater
Ronald Sebago
Dennis Teti

Team VII: Region 10
Province: Misamis Occidental and Lanao del Norte

Elaine Shocas - Coordinator
Mark Braden
Al Graham
John Loulis

Team VIII: Region 11
Province: Davao City, Davao del Sur, and Davao del Norte

Rick Fisher - Coordinator
Curt Cutter
Antonio Gomes de Pinho
Patrick O'Malley
Edward Weidenfeld

Team IX: National Capitol Region
Province: Metro Manila and Pangasinan

Rob Henderson Coordinators
Curt Wiley

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EVALUATION FORM

International Observer Delegation

I. NAME _____

Official Position _____

II. Province(s) visited _____

Date of arrival in province _____

Date of departure in province _____

III. Election Day

A. I(we) visited the following cities, municipalities and rural areas on election day:

B. For each polling site visited:

a. b. c. d.

1. Were there large numbers of people outside the polling site waiting to vote, _____

2. Were there any armed individuals outside the polling site? _____

3. Were there any complaints related by credible sources regarding what was occurring within the polling site (describe below) _____

The group heard the following complaints regarding the conduct of the election (be specific as to the nature of the complaint, the source and its duration).

1.

2.

3.

..../2

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- 2 -

C. I(we) was at the following polling site at 3:00 p.m. _____.

For each precinct for which a vote count was received, indicate the following:

	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1. Precinct No.	_____	_____	_____	_____
2. Time count received	_____	_____	_____	_____
3. Source	_____	_____	_____	_____
4. Presidential race:				
Pres. F. Marcos	_____	_____	_____	_____
Mrs. C. Aquino	_____	_____	_____	_____
Others	_____	_____	_____	_____
5. Vice-presidential race:				
Arturo Tolentino	_____	_____	_____	_____
Salvador Laurel	_____	_____	_____	_____
Eva Kalaw	_____	_____	_____	_____
Other	_____	_____	_____	_____
6. Describe any problems reported at the counting phase:				

a.

b.

c.

IV. Canvassing Phase

A. I(we) watched the canvassing at the following center _____.

B. The canvassing began at " _____".

C. Present at the canvassing center were representatives or the following organization:

1. KBL	_____
2. UNIDO	_____
3. NAMFREL	_____
4. IBP	_____
5. Other	_____

..../3

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D. The canvassing proceeded without interruption until: _____.
Canvassing was halted due to _____.

E. Describe the nature of any objections filed, by whom they were filed, and how they were

1.

2.

3.

4.

F. At the time of my departure from the canvassing center:

1. Out of a total of _____ precincts, _____ had been canvassed.

2. Presidential count : Pres. F. Marcos _____
Mrs. C. Aquino _____
Other _____

3. Vice-Presidential count: Arturo Tolentino _____
Salvador Laurel _____
Eva Kalaw _____
Other _____

V. Election Campaign

A. I/we spoke with representatives of the following organizations regarding the campaign in the province visited:

1. COMELEC	_____	6. Local elected officials	_____
2. KBL	_____	7. Security Forces	_____
3. LNIDO	_____	8. Media	_____
4. Church	_____	9. Other	_____
5. NAMFREL	_____		

B. The group heard the following complaints regarding the campaign period (be specific in describing the nature of the complaints, the credibility of the source; and your view of its likely effect on the campaign).

1.

2.

3.

- 4 -

VI. Overall Comments: Based on what you have observed and on the reports you received from credible sources, provide your evaluation of the election.

I would like the above statement included in the report under my name and an appendix to the report. Yes No

Republic of the Philippines
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Manila
--00a--

RE: Rules and regulations
against foreign intervention.

P R E S E N T :

SAVELLANDO, Victorino A., Chairman
OPINICH, Jaime, Commissioner
BALUNGAN, Froilan M., Commissioner
FELIPE, Ramon M., Jr., Commissioner
MAQUINEZ, Quirino A., Commissioner
ORTIZ, Mario U., Commissioner
GURO, Mangontawar B., Commissioner

Promulgated:

January 10, 1985

RESOLUTION NO. 1747

WHEREAS, Section 81 of the Omnibus Election Code provides as follows:

"SEC. 81. Intervention of foreigners. - It shall be unlawful for any foreigner, whether judicial or natural person to aid any candidate or political party, directly or indirectly, or take part in or influence in any manner any election, or to contribute or make any expenditure in connection with any election campaign or partisan political activity. (Sec. 36, 1978 EC)"

WHEREAS, foreign groups or individuals and members of
media will be coming to observe the February 7, 1986 election:

WHEREAS, it is the duty of this Commission to issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code and to guide the said foreign groups or individuals coming to this country for said purpose;

NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, and Batas Pambansa Blg. 883, the Commission on Elections RESOLVES as follows:

SECTION 1. Registration required.- Any panel, committee, sub-committee, organization, group, association or individuals, whether private, government or member of media, who may want to observe elections in the Philippines, shall, first register with the Commission on Elections;

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Any individual or group of the category defined in the preceding paragraph already in the country upon the promulgation of this resolution shall have forty-eight hours to register from notice or publication of this resolution.

SEC. 2. Identification cards. - The Commission on Elections shall register any applicant and issue individual identification cards to such applicants.'

SEC. 3. Privileges. - Those who are duly registered shall have the following privileges:

A. Before election day:

1. Request any official or agency of the government for interview or briefing on the electoral process;
2. Confer with representatives of registered political parties, candidates or their representatives on any matter they may wish to be informed about, but thereafter refrain while in the Philippines from making any remarks or statements which constitute partisan political activity as defined by the Omnibus Election Code;
3. Confer with representatives of media, and private firms or organizations that are under contract by the government or any political party or candidates on any matter they may wish to be informed about;
4. Such similar activities they may wish to undertake provided these shall not constitute partisan political activity.

B. On election day:

1. To observe the election in any locality subject to the following limitations applicable to the Comelec's citizen arms and other person as provided in the Omnibus election Code:

"52 (K), 8 2. - Members or units of any citizen group or organization so designated by the Commission shall not be allowed to enter any polling place except to vote, and shall, if they so desire, stay in an area at least fifty meters away from the polling place."

x x x x x x x x x x x x

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- 3 -

"Sec. 192. Persons allowed in and around the polling place. - During the voting, no person shall be allowed inside the polling place, except the members of the board of election inspectors, the watchers, representatives of the Commission, the voters casting their votes, voters waiting for their turn to get inside the booths whose number shall not exceed twice the number of booths and the voters waiting for their turn to cast their votes whose number shall not exceed twenty at any one time. The watchers shall stay only in the space reserved for them, it being illegal for them to enter places reserved for the voters or for the board of election inspectors or to mingle and talk with the voters within the polling place."

2. Interview voters, political leaders and other individuals and make audio, visual or audio-visual recordings in any place, subject to the limitations provided in the preceding paragraph;
3. Undertake any such other activities anywhere in the Philippines provided these shall not constitute partisan political activity.

C. After the election:

1. Observe the canvass of votes by the various provincial and city Boards of Canvassers;
2. Observe the proceedings of the Batasang Pambansa as the National Board of Canvassers.

All those registered may travel to any part of the country to perform the acts above-mentioned, but shall not engage in any partisan political activity.

SEC. 4. Penalty for violation. - Any violation of above-quoted Sec. 81 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be punishable under Sec. 264 of the same Code with one to six years' imprisonment and deportation.

SEC. 5. Effectivity. - This resolution shall take effect immediately upon promulgation.

SEC. 6. Dissemination. - The Law Department shall implement this resolution and the Education and Information Department shall cause the publication of the same in two (2) daily

- 4 -

newspaper of general circulation immediately after promulgation thereof, and shall furnish copies to all registered political parties, all candidates, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which shall disseminate them to its foreign service establishments and to representatives of foreign countries in the Philippines, and assist in the implementation of this resolution.

SO ORDERED.

Victorino A. Savellano
VICTORINO A. SAVELLANO
Chairman

Jayme Opinion
JAYME OPINION
Commissioner

Ramon H. Felipe
RAMON H. FELIPE, J.P.
Commissioner

Mario D. Cruz
MARIO D. CRUZ
Commissioner

Froilan M. Bacungan
FROILAN M. BACUNGAN
Commissioner

Quirino A. Marquinez
QUIRINO A. MARQUINEZ
Commissioner

Magandawar B. Guro
MAGANDAWAR B. GURO
Commissioner

TRANSCRIPT OF FEBRUARY 9, 1986 PRESS CONFERENCE
AT THE MANILA HOTEL GIVEN BY
THE INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER GROUP TO THE
PHILIPPINE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

ANNEX IX
Page 117

OPENING STATEMENT BY BRIAN ATWOOD: I'm Brian Atwood with the National Democratic Institute and I'd like to introduce my counterpart from the National Republican Institute, Mr. Keith Schuette, and the co-leaders of our delegation, Mr. John Hume, the leader of the Social Democratic and Labor Party of Northern Ireland and a member of the British and European Parliaments, and President Misael Pastrana of Colombia, who was president of Colombia from 1970 to 1974. The other delegates of our group represent 19 nations and various political parties. The four of us will be available for your questions and President Pastrana has a statement to read.

PASTRANA: Ladies and gentlemen. We have had the opportunity to observe an historic election in a country which each of our delegates holds in the highest esteem. We have come here as friends of democracy and of the Filipino people, and have been reaffirmed in our purpose. We share the belief that the electoral process is sacred in a democracy and the vote of the individual must be protected from those who would seek to either deny, or alter it.

We are grateful for the invitation to observe this election which was extended by both major parties. We have been moved by our experience and by the deep dedication of the vast majority of the Filipino people to the principles of democracy, and the sanctity of the electoral process. Wherever we went in the Philippines, people came up to our delegation members to thank us for coming. Some expressed surprise that we would travel so far to offer our moral support to their efforts to keep the electoral process free and honest. All of us were deeply heartened by these expressions of gratitude.

Over the past week our delegates from 19 nations and a wide range of political and ideological viewpoints have observed the electoral process in 15 provinces of the Philippines. These areas were selected on the basis of past history of election irregularities and with an eye toward maintaining political balance. We have been careful to remain impartial, and to distinguish personal observation from hearsay and fact from rumor. We have also been able to reach a consensus among each of our teams in evaluating the election in these provincial areas. We have come here today, as we said we would, to offer our observations, not our final assessment.

We have begun with the premise that an election is the mechanism by which citizens individually and collectively express the will of a nation. We recognize that irregularities occur to some extent in all democratic nations. The question that must be addressed by all who cherish democracy is whether malpractice occurs to such an extent as to invalidate an election result. This judgment can only be made after careful analysis of the election returns against documented reports of malpractice. We are obviously not prepared now to make

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that critical judgment.

Our teams have reported on areas of the country where the balloting and counting have gone smoothly and without incident. Members of the delegation have compared these areas favorably with elections held in other parts of the world.

However, in other areas, we have observed practices which compare far less favorably. Occurrences of vote buying, intimidation and lack of respect for electoral procedures were present, and were observed by members of our delegation. Attempting to ascertain the impact of these activities which are illegal under Filipino law must await the final result of the election.

A critical aspect of any election is the dissemination of the results, and the credibility attached to those results. Forty-eight hours after the vote we note that there are a number of competing counts which are damaging to the credibility of the process. One of the problems in this regard has been the failure of the COMELEC-NAMFREL "PARTNERS" agreement which was originally crafted to provide reliable and credible results. Our observations suggest that the resolution of the information problem is critical in ensuring national confidence in the results of this election. Regarding the official count and canvas, certain delays are occurring. Some of these have been caused by legal challenges to election returns wherein discrepancies have been found. Other delays are taking place which seem to have no basis in law. We will continue to study this problem, and to look for patterns to see whether these delays result in a shift of votes.

The activities of NAMFREL have been the focus of much attention and commentary by the government and the media. Our observations have been that the vast majority of NAMFREL volunteers in the regions we have covered have acted in a non-partisan, professional manner. Many have risked a great deal to preserve the integrity of the electoral process.

The electoral anomalies which we have witnessed are serious and could well have an impact upon the final result. These anomalies fall under two categories: those which can be termed "irregularities" and those abuses which are clearly intended to affect the outcome of the election.

Under the category of irregularities, we begin by taking note of the fact that this was a snap election and there was not much time to prepare guidelines and training programs for teachers and others who served as members of the Board of Canvass. Our teams reported instances of improperly locked and sealed -- or unlocked and unsealed ballot boxes and election returns. Instances of ineffective application of indelible ink and other weaknesses in the enforcement of safeguards designed to prevent double-voting were observed and reported by our teams. Of great concern are reports that thousands of voters -- particularly in the Manila area -- were not able to vote because their names were not on the registration list.

In the category of abuses designed to affect the outcome, we saw many instances of vote-buying, attempts at intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes, and tampered election returns. In some areas NAMFREL, the accredited arm of COMELEC, was excluded from polling stations in violation of a range of previous agreements reached regarding access of the citizens' arm. There were also some limited areas in which the system of safeguards seemed to break down completely, and those who held responsibility for adjudicating complaints were either unavailable, or unresponsive.

We cannot determine at this point whether the extent of this activity will affect the overall results of the election, but the potential exists, and we would be remiss if we did not publicly acknowledge this fact. We will keep a team of technical experts in Manila to continue to collect information, analyze results, and observe the activities of those institutions which are designed to provide redress under the law.

We close today by underscoring our support for the democratic aspirations of the people of this great nation. The ultimate judgment as to the validity of this election -- and hence its ability to facilitate reconciliation and stability -- rests with the Filipino people. We stand with them in their fervent hope that the final result will reflect their will. Many thanks.

Q1: Could you summarize for us in your own words what you think your basic findings are in terms of -- what probability do you give that this election was a fair and accurate reading of the people's will?

John Hume: What we're essentially saying in this statement is that it is not a question of whether there were electoral abuses. It is a question of the extent of them, and whether they were extensive enough to affect the final outcome of the election, and to distort the popular will of the people of the Philippines. We are saying that in all the areas that we were invited to observe -- registration of voting, vote-buying and bribery of voters, switching of ballot boxes, and changing the ballots within them, and counting procedures -- that we have found evidence of serious malpractice. We cannot make a final judgment as to what effect those malpractices will have on the final outcome until we actually see what that final outcome is.

Q2: You have identified here a lot of doings, wrongdoings Can you identify the wrongdoer's please?

Hume: Well, we think it not unfair to say that the wrongdoings that we identified were largely carried out in local areas by local officials who were supporters of the government.

Q3: Sir, you gave a fairly strong endorsement of NAMFREL in your statement --

Hume: Yes.

Q continues: but NAMFREL accuses COMELEC of favoring the president: COMELEC accuses NAMFREL of favoring Mrs. Aquino. Do you think either one or perhaps both of those accusations are accurate to some extent?

Hume: Well, we think that the difference of opinion that has risen between COMELEC and NAMFREL is a fairly crucial difference of opinion; because as we say in our statement, one of the most important and crucial aspects of this election was the counting process and the information process of delivering the results to the Filipino people. And any delay in that is something that is bound to cause concern. We were guaranteed that at midnight on the night of the election, 40 percent of the votes would be counted. We were guaranteed that by both NAMFREL and COMELEC. Two percent were counted at that time, and there clearly has been a slowness in the providing of information to the public in the Philippines, who are the people who most want to hear that information, because they are the people who are most affected by it. The breakdown between those two bodies, the partnership agreement which we regarded as something crucial and important to the provision of information to the Filipino people, has meant that the media is the major source of information, and the television in particular, and I hope you're not going to ask me to comment on the impartiality of television in this country.

Q4: Looking at the infractions that you mentioned, and the deaths you didn't mention, and the controversies surrounding the tabulation process, many people have concluded this is just about the dirtiest campaign and election that they've ever seen --

Hume: Yes. Well, I'm afraid I have to admit that I have never participated in a Philippine election before, in order to be able to make a comparison between this and previous elections. We are most anxious that as an international observer team what we say would have credibility. And therefore what we have come to do is observe this election, not compare it to other ones which we didn't observe.

Q5: Do you feel that you have to step lightly -- that you have to be careful what you say?

Hume: No, we feel that we have to tell the truth as we see it. And we feel that it would not be credible if we as an international and objective team were to say tonight that the malpractices that we have found were sufficient as to distort the election result. When we haven't yet seen the election result. There are other reasons, for the moment, for our prudence which, no doubt, you may be all aware of as well, in that there are -- depending on the outcome of this election, there's a lot of political options facing the political leaders in this country. We don't wish in any way to interfere in that process, or indeed to give justification to the choosing of political options, and I'm not going to be any more specific than that.

Q6: Would you assess the role that the domestic news media has played in this campaign both before the election and after?

Hume: Well, I think that we will be giving a full assessment of that. It's one of the areas in our final report that we will be giving an assessment to. I've spent most of the time in Manila, and I spent most of my time getting my information from television in Manila, which accounts for the personal observation that I have made, which I don't think too many of you disagree with.

Q7: Why do you have to wait for the results to judge? Can you tell me why?

Hume: We have said, clearly and unequivocally, that serious malpractices have taken place in a number of areas, including widespread purchase of votes. What we have also said is that we do not know whether the extent of that malpractice was such as to distort the popular will of the Filipino people. That is a statement of fact and common sense. We are not in a position to make that judgment; we haven't seen the final result. We are watching three counts proceeding at the moment, or what we are told are three counts.

Q8: Could we ask you if any of you, any members of the panel saw anomalies performed by the Opposition?

Hume: All our delegates are here, and we chose the areas to which we sent people carefully, and in a balanced way, and we don't have any evidence, any such evidence.

Q9: Sir, could you assess the seriousness of the problem in which voters were not on the list and could not vote? Were these problems only taking place in provinces that favored the Opposition?

Hume: We have complaints from different parts of the country of two aspects of voter registration. One, people who weren't on registers that they should have been on, absent voters if you like, and others, voters -- ghost voters, as they call them in this country -- and there's both of those. Now, we have no means of assessing at the moment which side was responsible for this. We simply know that there is a serious problem in that area, and that we have to assess that whenever we see it. For example, I'll give you an example of the practical problem I'm talking -- I myself visited a polling site at a school in Manila. There were 78 precincts in that school, and I was rather surprised at the fact that that means 25,000 voters. If you look at the hours of election, that's eight hours to cast 25,000 votes at 3,000 votes an hour. That's an awful lot of votes in the hour. But we saw clear evidence in that school that the poll watchers for both NAMFREL and the Opposition were removed. In order to draw a conclusion from that, that that was done in order to determine fraud, we would need to see the results from that school.

Q10: I'd like to follow that up. Would you say that there has been a significant amount of disenfranchisement? Could you provide some adjectives, has the fraud been widespread, has there been serious amounts of intimidation? I mean this report reads like the result of some committee where you're trying to please everyone there. Was there a difference of opinion in the committee about what the

conclusion should be?

Hume: No, there was a remarkable consensus and this body of delegates includes 44 people from 19 countries from a wide spread of political opinion, and there was a remarkable consensus on our statement this evening. You're asking me for adjectives. I think it's a serious matter in any country when there is this sort of widespread electoral malpractice. By the way, could I add that I think these things are only a symptom, because it is very self-evident to anybody who has been in this country recently, and it must have been self-evident to yourselves, that there exists among the Filipino people, a large section of the Filipino people, a serious distrust of the electoral process as it is practiced. I think that is self-evident to anyone. It's self-evident from the very existence of a national citizens organization for fair elections. And for anybody watching those volunteers in action, and watching Filipino women protecting ballot boxes, and the determination and the commitment to the sacredness of the fundamental democratic act, the casting of a vote, is an expression of a deep -- first of all -- a deep sense of what democracy should be, and an expression that they fear that they can't trust the process. And that is what they are saying themselves. That's not what we are saying. And that is a serious matter which must be addressed by the leaders of this country. And it doesn't require electoral malpractice to show that in fact that feeling exists, and if that existed in any society, any democratic society, it would be a very serious matter indeed.

Because democracy is not about majority rule. It's not about holding all power in the hands of one section of a population. It's about majority rule with the consent of the community as a whole, and when that consent is withdrawn or in doubt, then a society is in danger, and that is what I think is the major concern of the people of this country. and it has to be addressed by their leaders and by the Filipino people themselves. and as our statement says clearly, the final and only judgment that really matters in this election is the judgment of the people of this country.

Q11: Sir, it seems to me that there is a strong possibility that we will have two totally different electoral results --

Hume: Yes.

Q continues: so what is your comment? Who is the one who is cheating?

Hume: He said the strong possibility is that we'll have two conflicting results to this election, leading to the conclusion that somebody has been cheating. I would suggest that if there were two conflicting results, it would be very obvious that somebody was cheating. And he wants to know who we think it will have been. That is, as President Pastrana is pointing out, we underlined in our statement, that's where the importance, and the crucial importance for this election, for its results and for the transmission of the information to the Filipino people was so crucial that the

maintenance of that partnership between COMELEC and NAMFREL and the breakdown of it, and whatever the reasons for the breakdown of it, are also crucial. We can only wait and see what the real reason behind all that was. We're not in a position to comment.

Q12: What are your thoughts about why the COMELEC-NAMFREL agreement broke down and why it broke down completely?

Hume: I think I've just answered that question in my last couple of remarks, really.

Q13: Why do you have to wait until a president has been determined by the election to decide whether this election is credible or not? Are you saying that we have to wait and see if President Marcos wins and therefore decide on whether it was credible or not?

Hume: No, no, I'm not saying any such thing. I'm just telling you the reality, which is, there is no democratic country in the world where there are not electoral abuses. It happens everywhere. But the real question is, how extensive are they, and are they so extensive that they actually distort the result of the election, and the popular will of the people? We're not dodging anything by stating that. That is a factual position. If we were to say anything else, our position would not be credible, and we would not be behaving as objective international observers.

Q14: Can't you at least say that there's deliberate acts by the government? You say you can't say the extent of the fraud or the irregularities --

Hume: Look, look, you write your own headlines, right? You write your own headlines.

Q15: The past few hours, President Marcos has moved ahead in the COMELEC tallies, and in fact, Commissioner Opinion says that as of 24 hours ago, he had almost a half-a-million-vote lead on an unofficial COMELEC count --

Hume: Yes.

Q continues: does that say something to you, that 48 hours after the election, suddenly a surge is happening?

Hume: Well, the fact that the COMELEC total is different from the NAMFREL total tells me that there's something wrong, yes.

Q16: That it surged say something to you also?

Hume: I'd have to be very honest with you. I haven't been watching Channel 4 all day today.

Q17: Mr. Hume, can you please comment on alleged abuses by the military during this election?

Hume: Abuses by the military in this election?

APPEL

Q continues: Yes, and the role of the military in this election? Page

Hume continues: We had one report in one military center about irregularities but we would -- and in a southern part in Mindanao of irregularities involving the military.

Q18: Mr. Hume, when you said that your final decision -- the decision of the group would depend on results. does that mean that you have already figured out the number of votes that have been stolen and therefore the spread between the result that perhaps Mr. Marcos would get legitimately and the number of votes he comes up with, and what if that spread gives him the election, then you will decide that the will of the people has not been heard? Do you have a figure that you can tell us, of numbers of votes that you think have been stolen?

Hume: No, I'm not going to give you such a figure. Look, we're dealing in a common-sense situation and we've got a lot of common sense, most of us, and -- over 200 polling stations encompassing fifteen hundred precincts -- that's what we monitored, right? Now, there are 90,000 precincts in this country, and there's 7,000 islands in this country. We are only sampling, right? So we've got to make intelligent judgments based on the facts at our disposal and based on the final results. I've already given you one example; for example, the polling station I mentioned where the Opposition is put out of a station. Quite clearly, the significance of that will only be determined when we see the results from that station.

It's also significant when you see, as we have seen, in some areas, all the votes from a particular ballot box going to one candidate, and none to the other. Apart from the fact that that's statistically impossible, the poll-watching clerk for the candidate who got none asked the question, where is my vote, which is a very intelligent question. Now, if we are going to judge how widespread that is over the whole country, then it's useful to see the returns from every precinct, to see how many places that happened over the whole country, not just in a number of places where we happened to be present when it happened. That's going to tell us a lot about and enable us to make an intelligent estimate of the number of fraudulent votes. And that measured against the final result, is how you make up your mind.

Now, it would be very easy for us, given our different political opinions -- and we do have political opinions, some of us -- to come here and express them, in particular in relation to the internal politics of the Philippines. That's not part of our job. Neither is it part of our job to use the facts that we have to do that. What our job is is to independently observe this election and report on what we see and that is what we're doing. And what we're saying, and we're saying it very clearly and unequivocally, that we have found evidence of malpractice in all the areas we have mentioned, and that it depends on the final results as to whether that, in fact, will affect the popular will of the people of the Philippines. And I'm not going to increase or subtract from that statement, because that's the central point that we are making in our statement.

Q19: Mr. Hume, did you or any of the delegation run into any interference, or abuse, or any unpleasantness from any group or individual, in trying to make your rounds?

Hume: Well, I think that our general experience was very interesting and our general experience, which I would suggest might have been the experience of yourselves as well, was that people walked up to us, shook hands with us in very large numbers, and thanked us for being here.

Q20: Nothing specifically untoward, though?

Hume: There was nothing very much. In some areas where there would be a bit of tension, that might be reflected in attitudes to us, but there was nothing organized. We would say that we were well-received by all sides, because it was quite clear from the accreditation that we wore that we were international observers.

Q21: Mr. Hume, are you and your co-president planning to stay here in Manila till the final results are in. or are you going to leave before?

Hume: Well, if we knew when they were going to be in, we could plan... We are leaving behind a team of technical experts to continue the assessment for us, and when we are satisfied that we have all the data that we need to draft our final report, we will come together to do so.

Q22: Mr. Hume, what effect do you hope your conclusions will have or who do you hope they will affect? Are you going to be presenting your findings to anyone formally, and --

Hume: No.

Q continues: could you answer the big "so what?" about -- your conclusions sound correct to me but what will you do with them?

Hume: Well, you could well be right, so what? We were invited here and we came, and we have observed, and we will report. But as I said, and as the statement says, the real judges of this election are the people who have to live with its results, are the people of the Philippines. They are the real judges. The rest of us can and we will, as we have been invited to do, we will give your report, and we hope, and it is our hope, that that report will assist the people of the Phillipines in developing and preserving the democratic process in their country.

Q23: You will not present this report formally to any -- ?

Hume: We don't present it to anyone. no. We will make it available to the public via your good selves. Thank you very much, everybody.

Q24: One more question, Mr. Hume. Could you please identify the Manila voting center you visited where NAMFREL representatives were pulled out of the center?

Hume: A place called Tejeros. (End transcript)

CATHOLIC BISHOPS' CONFERENCE OF THE PHILIPPINES
POST ELECTION STATEMENT

INTRODUCTION. The people have spoken. Or have tried to. Despite the obstacles thrown in the way of their speaking freely, we, the bishops, believe that on the basis of our assessment as pastors of the recently concluded polls, what they attempted to say is clear enough.

THE CONDUCT OF THE POLLS. In our considered judgment, the polls were unparalleled in the fraudulence of their conduct. And we condemn especially the following modes of fraudulence and irregularities.

1. The systematic disenfranchisement of voters. The sheer scrambling of the voters' lists made it impossible for vast number of our people to express their proper preference of candidates.

2. The widespread and massive vote-buying. The vote-buyers in their cynical exploiting of the people's poverty and deep, if misguided, sense of utang na loob deprived ^a great many of any real freedom of choice.

3. The deliberate tampering with the election returns. The votes of the people, even when already duly expressed and counted, were altered to register choices other than their own.

4. Intimidation, harassment, terrorism and murder. These made naked fear the decisive factor in people not participating in the polls or making their final choice. These and many other irregularities point to a criminal use of power to thwart the sovereign will of the people. Yet, despite these evil acts, we are morally certain the people's real will for change has been truly manifested.

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GOVERNMENT BASED ON THE POLLS. According to moral principles, a government that assumes or retains power through fraudulent means has no moral basis. For such an access to power is tantamount to a forcible seizure and cannot command the allegiance of the citizenry. The most we can say then, about such a government, is that it is a government in possession of power. But admitting that, we hasten to add: Because of that very fact, that same government itself has the obligation to right the wrong it is founded on. It must respect the mandate of the people. This is precondition for any reconciliation.

RESPONSE IN FAITH. If such a government does not of itself freely correct the evil it has inflicted on the people then it is our serious moral obligation as a people to make it do so.

We are not going to effect the change we seek by doing nothing, by sheer apathy. If we did nothing we would be part to our own destruction as a people. We would be jointly guilty with the perpetrators of the wrong we want righted.

Neither do we advocate a bloody, violent means of righting this wrong. If we did, we would be sanctioning the enormous sin of fratricidal strife. Killing to achieve justice is not within the purview of our Christian vision in our present context.

The way indicated to us now is the way of non-violent struggle for justice.

This means active resistance of evil by peaceful means -- in the manner of Christ. And its one end for now is that the will of the people be done through ways and means proper to the Gospel.

We therefore ask every loyal member of the Church, every community of the faithful, to form their judgment about the February 7 polls. And if in faith they see things as we the bishops do, we must come together and discern what appropriate actions to take that will be according to the mind of Christ. In a creative,

imaginative way, under the guidance of Christ's Spirit, let us pray together, reason together, decide together, act together, always to the end that the truth prevail, that the will of the people be fully respected.

CONCLUSION. These last few days have given us shining examples of the non-violent struggle for justice we advocate here:

-- The thousands of NAMFREL workers and volunteers who risked their very lives to ensure clean and honest elections;

-- The COMELEC computer technicians who refused to degrade themselves by participating in election frauds.

-- The poll officials -- registrars, teachers, government workers -- who did their duty without fear or favor;

-- The millions of ordinary voters who kept the sanctity of their ballot untarnished, their dignity intact.

-- Radio Veritas and fearless press people who spoke and reported the truth at all times.

Men and women of conscience, all. We cannot commend them highly enough.

There are thousands of their kind among government officials in the Batasan, the military, the COMELEC, among millions of our people who in the face of overwhelming odds voted and acted as their conscience dictated. Are there other men and women of conscience who will stand up like them and courageously confess their Christianity?

Now is the time to speak up. Now is the time to repair the wrong. The wrong was systematically organized. So must its correction be. But as in the election itself, that depends fully on the people; on what they are willing and ready to do. We, the bishops, stand in solidarity with them in the common discernment for the good of the nation. But we insist: Our acting must always be according to the Gospel of Christ, that is, in a peaceful,

non-violent way.

May He, the Lord of justice, the Lord of peace, be with us in our striving for that good. And may the Blessed Virgin Mary, the Queen of Peace, and patroness of our country, assist us in this time of need.

For the Catholic Bishops' Conference
of the Philippines

+RICARDO CARDINAL VIDAL
Archbishop of Cebu
President
Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines

February 13, 1986
Manila

Doc. #2

• JOSE CONCEPCION, JR.
NAMFREL NATIONAL CHAIRMAN

(SUMMARY POINTS OF TAIK DELIVERED BEFORE THE MANILA JAYCÉES
ON FEB. 18, 1986 AT THE CENTURY PARK SHERATON, MANILA.)

1. AS WE LOOK BACK ON OUR EXPERIENCE OF THE FEB. 7 ELECTION, AND ON THE BASIS OF OUR DEBRIEFINGS WITH THE REGIONAL AD PROVINCIAL CHAIRMEN OF NAMFREL FROM DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE COUNTRY, ONE THING IS CLEAR: NEVER HAS A MORE VIGILANT POPULACE WITNESSED A MORE PERVERSIVE TRAVESTY UPON THE SANCTITY OF THE BALLOT IN OUR HISTORY.
2. THERE HAVE BEEN MANY TRAGIC EVENTS IN THIS ELECTION, ALL OF WHICH COMBINED HAVE HAD A STAGGERING AND TELLING EFFECT ON THE EMERGENCE OF THE TRUE WILL OF THE PEOPLE. TO WHAT EXTENT THIS EFFECT HAS BEEN WE PROBABLY WILL NEVER BE ABLE TO FIN OUT FULLY. BUT ONE TRAGEDY OF THE ELECTION THAT IS OFTEN OVERLOOKED IS THE LARGE-SCALE DISENFRANCHISEMENT THAT HAS TAKEN PLACE, WHICH CAN GIVE US AN IDEA OF THE IMPACT UPON THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE.
3. THE TOTAL NUMBER OF VOTERS REGISTERED FOR THE FEB. 7, 1986 ELECTION IS 26,181,829 BASED ON COMELEC. HOWEVER, THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF VOTES FINALLY CANVASSED BY THE BATASAN IS 20,150,160, REPRESENTING ONLY 76.96% OF TOTAL REGISTERED VOTERS. IF THIS IS TO BE BELIEVED, THE ELECTION JUST HELD

MUST HAVE HAD ONE OF THE LOWEST, IF NOT THE LOWEST,

NUMBER OF ACTUAL VOTES COUNTED FOR THE PRESIDENCY AND

VICE PRESIDENCY.

4. IN THE 1984 BATASAN ELECTION, IN SPITE OF A STRONG AND WELL-ORGANIZED BOYCOTT CAMPAIGN, THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF VOTERS WAS 89.46% OF THE TOTAL REGISTERED VOTERS. IF WE ARE TO ASSUME CONSERVATIVELY THAT THE SAME PERCENTAGE WOULD HAVE VOTED IN THIS ELECTION, IT WOULD MEAN AN ACTUAL NUMBER OF VOTES OF AT LEAST 23,422,264. COMPARING THIS WITH THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF VOTES CANVASSED BY THE BATASAN, WE CAN ESTIMATE THE EXTENT OF DISENFRANCHISED VOTERS AT 3,272,104. IN OTHER WORDS, ABOUT 3.3 MILLION VOTERS WERE NOT ABLE TO VOTE IN THIS ELECTION.

5. THE DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF VOTERS WAS EFFECTED BY SEVERAL MEANS, OF WHICH THE MAJOR ONES WERE THE FOLLOWING:

- REVISED LISTING OF THE VOTERS LISTS (SCRAMBLING) - TO THE EFFECT THAT MANY VOTERS COULD NOT FIND THEIR NAMES IN THE LIST OF THE PRECINCT WHERE THEY HAVE BEEN VOTING IN ALL THE TIME, OR IN ANY OTHER LIST.
- SLOWDOWN IN VOTING PROCEDURES - WHERE ADDITIONAL STEPS (SUCH AS SIGNING OF 4 VOTING RECORDS INSTEAD OF ONE) WERE REQUIRED ALL OF A SUDDEN, SUCH THAT LONG QUEUES FORMED AND MANY NEVER MADE IT TO THE 3 P.M. DEADLINE.
- LATE OPENING AND/OR EARLY CLOSING OF THE POLLING PLACE - IN VIOLATION OF THE 7 A.M. - 3P.M. VOTING HOURS.

6. BUT PERHAPS THE MOST SINISTER ASPECT OF THE DISENFRANCHISEMENT IS THE EMERGING PATTERN THAT IT SEEMS TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE LARGELY IN OPPOSITION-ORIENTED AREAS.

- IN THE 10 CITIES AND PROVINCES WHICH HAD THE HIGHEST PERCENTAGE OF ACTUAL VOTES CANVASSED AS AGAINST REGISTERED VOTERS, THE WINNER WAS THE RULING PARTY. (SEE CHART).
 - IN THE 10 CITIES AND PROVINCES WHICH HAD THE LOWEST PERCENTAGE OF ACTUAL VOTES CANVASSED AS AGAINST REGISTERED VOTERS, THE WINNER WAS THE OPPOSITION (SEE CHART), EXCEPT IN 2 INSTANCES (IN CARLOTA CITY AND MAKATI).
7. FROM ALL OF THESE FIGURES, WHAT WE WANT TO POINT OUT IS THAT THE MASSIVE DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF VOTERS, TOGETHER WITH ALL THE OTHER MEANS USED TO TIWART THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE, HAVE A COMBINED IMPACT THAT WOULD HAVE AFFECTED THE MARGIN, IF NOT THE OUTCOME, OF THE ELECTION.
8. AND IT IS PRECISELY TO GUARD AGAINST THESE HOSTILE FORCES THAT SO MANY OF OUR NAMFREL VOLUNTEERS BRAVELY MOVED OUT TO THE BATTLEFIELD ON ELECTION DAY. IT IS PRECISELY TO ASSURE THAT THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTION REFLECTS NO MORE AND NO LESS THAN THE TRUE WILL OF THE PEOPLE THAT SO MANY OF THEM WERE BEATEN UP, SLAPPED, PUNCHED, STONED, SHOT AT, BODILY THROWN OUT OF POLLING PLACES, SURROUNDED AND TERRORIZED BY ARMED MEN. THREE OF THEM WERE KILLED IN THE LINE OF DUTY.
9. WE IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE ELECTION CAN DO NO LESS THAN TO PLEDGE OURSELVES TO THE IDEALS THAT THEY DIED FOR. WE CANNOT TRAMPLE UPON THEIR MEMORY BY ACCEPTING THE OUTCOME OF AN ELECTION THAT HAS NOT BEEN CLEAN AND HONEST. WE CANNOT ALLOW THEIR SUPREME SACRIFICE TO HAVE BEEN IN VAIN. WITH FAITH IN GOD AND CONFIDENCE IN EACH OTHER, WE SHALL CONTINUE THE FIGHT IN THE MOST PERILOUS DAYS STILL AHEAD.
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The National Citizens' Movement for Free Elections or NAMFREL, a non-partisan, volunteer organization whose primary objective is the holding of clean elections, was given a first crack at its objective on May 14, 1984 — election day for the 183 members of the First Regular Session of the Batasan Pambansa (Philippine Parliament). Confronted by skeptics and doubting Thomases from both the opposition and government ranks, the boycott movement and other groups who were out to discredit the whole democratic process, the NAMFREL stood its ground and found strength in its motto: "It is better to light a candle than to curse the darkness".

With a group of leaders whose credibility and dignity were unquestionable, the NAMFREL found its allies in the civic, professional, educational, and church organizations whose memberships supported NAMFREL's crusade to restore the Filipino people's faith in the ballot's power as the most appropriate vehicle to express (not just protest) their aspirations.

In this debut article, Christian Monsod, NAMFREL Chairman of Metro Manila and a businessman, talks about the vigilance of NAMFREL's 200,000 volunteers throughout the country, the effectiveness of NAMFREL as he compares its performance vis-a-vis its objectives, and finally, NAMFREL in the future.

NAMFREL-Testing Democracy at the Grassroots

by CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD

May 14, 1984 was a significant day for the Philippines. It was election day for 183 members of the Batasan Pambansa (parliament), the first regular legislative body since 1972. It was also a day of foreboding.

In the face of a highly visible boycott movement and the obvious use by the KBL of all the resources at its disposal, including those of the government, many political and media analysts were prepared to predict that the elections would confirm the optimism of the President and the First Lady for a KBL landslide. President Marcos said the opposition would be lucky if 30 of its assemblymen would be elected and the First Lady went on record that Metro Manila, under her campaign generalship, would elect all 21 KBL candidates.

More important, however, than just the results of elections was the question on whether the electoral process itself would remain a viable option for the expression of the people's will. The sentiment of the people seemed to be oppositional in the face of the Aquino assassination and the economic crisis. Yet, there were equally clear signs that the KBL political machinery was still intact and the government was not prepared to allow a dilution of its power through a decisive opposition performance at the polls. If the elections were patently manipulated, would the people accept it as docilely as in previous years? In the ultimate analysis, democracy was going to be tested in the country and the question was, would it survive?

What happened on election day was unprecedented and, in many ways, unexpected. There was overwhelming participation, perhaps as a form of protest but a clear choice for peaceful electoral processes nonetheless. While the opposition may have won a majority of the seats contested, or perhaps even of the Batasan, if results of doubtful validity turn out to have been won by the opposition, the elections for about 65% of the seats were sufficiently free from anomalies to be considered valid. And even in those districts with questionable results, there were numerous instances where the people refused to be cowed and, in fact, are still pursuing their protests with vigor i.e., Antique, Nueva Vizcaya, Pampanga, Northern Samar, to name a few.

Democracy did survive, however tenuously. The people did give it a chance and seem to be willing to continue doing so. One of the institutions responsible for making the 1984 elections a hopeful experience for the country was the National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL).

NAMFREL is a non-partisan, volunteer organization whose primary objective is clean elections. It had its antecedent in an organization of the same name in the early 1950s which went out of existence in the later years of the decade. Various other movements were subsequently organized for the same purpose among them CNFA and CINACORP. Shortly after the Aquino assassination, a new citizens group was organized by Joe Concepcion Jr., a businessman, who had made clean elections a personal crusade for 17 years and who was also one of the founders of the Citizens League for Good Government in the sixties. After undergoing several changes, the name NAMFREL was adopted in November 1983 with the permission of its original chairman. In the context of the country's electoral history of the past 12 years, it was a most unlikely candidate to succeed in what seemed like a quixotic mission.

NAMFREL was criticized by both the government (as favoring the opposition) and the boycott movement and the leftist elements (as being naive tools of the government and the U.S.). A Jesuit priest who headed a city chapter in Mindanao answered the critics. "We are partisan only for truth, justice and elections." But NAMFREL survived both attacks mainly by ignoring them. It adopted the motto, "It is better to light a candle than to curse the darkness", moved on and found vindication in its own performance.

From a longer perspective, the obvious questions are: How effective really was NAMFREL? Did it achieve its stated objectives? What was the NAMFREL phenomenon and what is its future?

NAMFREL effectiveness

There is ample evidence that NAMFREL's pollwatching activities did make a difference in the elections. One only has to listen to the comments of candidates such as former Justice Cecilio Munoz-Palma ("NAMFREL is the miracle of the

1984 elections") and many others who considered their victory a triumph as well of NAMFREL's vigilance. But, there were also detractors, such as one provincial candidate who called it "Tamtirel" and a Metro Manila mayor, whose KBL candidate lost by a wide margin, who

publicly stated, "We would have won had it not been for NAMFREL."

How does one measure effectiveness?

NAMFREL classified the electoral districts according to a rating of 1 to 5 in which those rated 1, 2, and 3 were districts in which the elections may be considered valid either because there were no anomalies or they were insufficient to materially affect the results. Category 4 was composed of those districts where disorderliness and suspected fraud were of such a magnitude that they could have materially affected the results and Category 5 were those in which elections may be considered a failure.

In addition to these five categories there were 9 electoral districts with ten seats in which NAMFREL had no meaningful presence for various reasons, including physical prevention by local officials or lack of volunteers because of the peace and order situation or overwhelming control by government forces.

NAMFREL's assessment is that the elections for about 125 seats, classified under categories 1, 2 or 3 may be considered valid. The elections for 48 seats were classified under categories 4 and 5 and were, therefore, of doubtful validity. A correlation of the election results according to party affiliation and the ratings of 1 to 5 resulted in the following.

- In the districts where elections may be considered valid, categories 1, 2 and 3, the KBL won 49% and the non-KBL won 51% of the seats (62 vs. 63 seats respectively).
- In districts rated as 4, the KBL won 70% and the non-KBL won 30% of the seats (15 vs. 6) in the districts rated as 5, the KBL won 89% and the non-KBL 11% of the seats (24 vs. 3).
- For the 10 seats in which NAMFREL had no canvassing for one reason or another, all 10 seats were won by the KBL.
- In Metro Manila, the region where NAMFREL was probably most organized with about 30,000 volunteers, the opposition took 15 of

the 21 seats with another seat won by government and c) after twelve years the KBL being considered highly questionable for failure of election.

Performance vs. Objectives

NAMFREL was accredited by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) as its citizen arm in November 1983. It had six months to organize and train volunteers to man about 85,000 voting centers all over the country not only on election day but also during four days of registration.

A new list of voters was authorized by the interim Batasan Pambansa which would be valid for 12 years. It was obvious that if elections were to represent the true will of the electorate, that old list had to be purged of flying voters roughly estimated at about 4 million.

The new registration of voters was only one of several institution-building legislation advocated by NAMFREL. It also helped bring about, among others:

- a) an amendment to the Constitution that members of the Batasan are to be elected by province or district rather than by region;

- b) changes in legislation that enabled the opposition to qualify for accreditation and thereby be entitled to inspectors in the citizens' election committee;

- c) discontinuance of the system of block voting;

- d) the enactment of a 1984 election code that contained at least 15 critical procedural amendments to protect the integrity of the ballot;

- e) the withdrawal of the proposal to increase the number of Batasan members from 200 to 230, with the additional thirty to be appointed by the President rather than elected;

- f) the withdrawal of a proposal that would give undue advantage to incumbent assemblymen over new candidates by giving the former the right to run anywhere in the region as an exception to the residency rule;

- g) the introduction of a provision that gave immunity to persons from questioning, arrest or detention during and after the campaign period for alleged violations of law and decree pertaining to the security of the state;

- h) appointment of two commissioners to the COMELEC, bringing up their number to seven out of the nine positions.

While not all proposals of NAMFREL were given due course, particularly the repeal of Amendment 6 (which gives the President absolute decree-making powers) and the appointment of commissioners to the last two vacancies in the COMELEC from a list submitted by civic, professional and educational groups, it was the judgment of NAMFREL that the reforms were sufficient, from the point of view of legislation, to make clean elections possible. Many other things had to be done. But since elections are processes, procedures themselves constitute the substance of the right to vote.

The other objectives of NAMFREL, in addition to legislative reforms, were a) the creation of an environment and opportunities for new leaders to emerge; b) the themselves had the foresight to politicization and mobilization of ordinary citizens in the task of good but there was also tragedy. Many

volunteers were beaten up. Two were killed in Mindanao, one by the NPA, the other reportedly by a barangay official. This exemplified the risks the volunteers faced from all sides.

The total number of volunteers, coming from all sectors and all walks of life, was about 200,000. Many more appeared on election day, asked for *Bantay ng Bayan* badges and stood vigil, accompanied the transfer of ballot boxes, contributed food and transportation and essentially made themselves useful in many unselfish ways. Many did not even bother to enter their names in the NAMFREL roster and simply worked quietly, effectively and without public recognition.

Stories abound about NAMFREL volunteers, such as the happening in the third district of Quezon City where entire neighborhoods suddenly appeared in a festive community spirit. On the other hand there was an atmosphere of tension and grim determination in such places as Tondo, Nueva Vizcaya, Antique, Tarlac, Muntinlupa and Davao del Norte where a group of citizens who called themselves Villeneuve's Valiants (after the bishop who acted as NAMFREL's chairman for the area) stood their ground against a private army. Nuns manned the most dangerous polls in Pasay, the Ilocos provinces and a dozen other places. Catholic Women's League members, most of them in uniform, watched for hours beside lawyers, doctors and businessmen. The women were the staunchest and most persevering volunteers. And then there were the youth.

In Metro Manila, the youth volunteered in large numbers, particularly in Quezon City, Makati, Taguig and Pasay. On the eve of elections, in a barangay in the fourth district of Quezon City where no volunteers could previously be found, an urgent call came for a turnout at 8:00 p.m. The volunteers turned out to be about thirty young people, some in their teens, who had previously worked for the boycott movement but had decided at the last minute to do "something constructive". In Makati and Taguig, groups of young volunteers from poor neighborhoods, some of them in law school, confronted barangay captains and their goons with detailed knowledge of their rights under the election law and prevailed, even to the extent of taking pictures of erring barangay officials.

Just as impressive were the family volunteers and the sense of community that they inspired - husbands, wives, children and neighbors in common cause. There were couples from the Christian Family Movement (CFM) who went out almost daily from parish to parish talking about how they want to build a better country for their children. The Manila Jaycees managed to harness church groups in Tondo by appealing to parish priests and conservative lay leaders to follow their leadership in a battle they themselves

change. Already its chapters or organizing citizen forums where Members of Parliament (MPs) or asked to answer to their constituents for their performance at the Batasan Action committees are pressuring public officials to place greater priority on community problems, such as the flooding problem in Malabon, a municipal mayor and his barangay captains identified with the KBL have publicly endorsed NAMFREL's proposals, including the repeal of Amendment 6.

And there was endless frustration. The biggest was the unpredictability of the COMELEC. The introduction of a supposedly indelible ink as a safeguard against flying voters was a fiasco since the ink was, for the most part, erasable with plain rubbing alcohol. The question of what really happened has never been answered. There were stories, too, of courageous and dedicated teachers who acted as chairmen of the citizens' election committees. Despite some reports of teacher participation in anomalies, the great majority of the teachers performed admirably in a dangerous and thankless task.

The stories could go on and on.

In the process, new leaders emerged in local communities, more credible than the traditional political "patrons". Ordinary citizens discovered one another and their own power for affirmative action. NAMFREL was mass action at the grassroots that added a new dimension to the concept of institutional-building.

The NAMFREL Experience and the Future

The May elections were only partially successful in terms of ensuring a democratic electoral exercise. Whatever was achieved was due to many factors, of which NAMFREL was only one, albeit a major one in many areas. In this sense, the NAMFREL success was not of its own making. It happened to be there at the right place and at the right time. It helped that its national leadership had credibility and the local chapters attracted just as credible leaders. It helped that civic, professional, educational and church organizations endorsed it fully to their membership. Its greatest attraction was in being perceived by most people as an appropriate vehicle to express, not just protest, their aspirations for peaceful change.

In July 1984, the COMELEC suddenly withdrew the accreditation of NAMFREL as its citizen arm in a meeting to which the lone commissioner recommended by civic and professional groups was not invited. The restoration of such accreditation is unlikely without continued pressure by citizens. Meanwhile, work has to go on for the enactment of a new election code as soon as possible and the filing of exclusion proceedings against multiple registrants. It is estimated that in Metro Manila alone there are at least 400,000 registered flying voters.

NAMFREL hopes to function again as the citizen arm of the COMELEC in the coming elections but will continue to exist with or without accreditation under a *Bantay ng Bayan* theme. At its first public rally on October 19, 1984 in Makati, the movement unfurled its flags that proclaimed its total mission - *Bantay ng Kalayaan*, *Bantay ng Karotongan*, *Bantay ng Karungan* - Guardian of Freedom, Truth and Justice. Its philosophy will remain the same - non-partisanship, volunteerism, community-based membership and the development of a "moderate" option for non-violent

Attached is a copy of the conclusions, some excerpts and various tables from a report prepared under the auspices of the University of the Philippines with assistance from NAMFREL. The 115-page report was released on January 30, 1986, twenty months after the 1984 Batasan elections.

The report provides the most extensive analysis of the 1984 elections. It was prepared by two political scientists at the University of the Philippines and is offered without endorsement by the Institutes for your consideration.

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CONCLUSION

Based on the findings of the study, the May 1984 parliamentary elections was not meant to be free, fair, orderly and honest. There seemed to be a "grand design" deliberately planned and executed to ensure the continued dominance of the ruling party in the regular national assembly. It is even plausible that it is a political strategy designed carefully for the President to continue his strong-man rule without losing the appearance of credible elections.

The significance of the element of credibility in the 1984 political exercise is dictated by the need to fulfill the legitimacy requirement of the present administration as required by the international community. In this context the loopholes and built-in unfairness in the laws, the plan to pad the registration list specially in Metro Manila, the accreditation-inspired opposition party in regions which were considered the bailiwicks of the KEL "operation zero," "buy and scare tactic", the loss of the entire governmental structure as an extension of the KEL political machinery, mobilization of the bureaucracy's programs and other resources for partisan purposes, the partiality of the COMELEC shown in certain electoral districts and decisions handed down, all became intelligible as parts of a coherent whole. By his own admissions, the President instructed his own men to let some opposition candidates win to clothe the process with a facade of credibility. This may mean that some opposition candidates must win at the sufferance of some administration candidates.

In view of the above, the electoral process could be regarded as intolerable, out of the 90 electoral districts in the country, 47 (52.2%) could be considered intolerable, 29 (32.2%) as tolerable and 14 (15%) as abusive. In no case was a desired process observed.

As mentioned, the May 1984 Batasang Pambansa elections was not meant to be free, fair, orderly and honest; however, the results were deemed credible. Of the total 183 seats up for grabs, 91 (49.73%) could be regarded as credible, 61 (33.33%) as questionable and 4 (2.18%) failures. Elections failed in Nueva Vizcaya, Makati, Antique and Northern Samar.

These findings suggest that despite the lack of a conducive atmosphere for the free exercise of one's choice in the electoral process, despite the glaring lopsidedness of the electoral contest between contending parties, despite the disorderliness in the administration of various electoral activities and despite some amount of dishonesty in the conduct of the elections, the results in many parts of the country could be taken as a reflection of the people's collective political will.

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The credible results that emanated from a generally intolerable process can be largely attributed to the electorate themselves. People's vigilance, especially in the urban areas and other rural areas where NAMFREL chapters provided the organizational vehicle for a potential people power to be real. It is noteworthy that in those areas where elections failed, NAMFREL volunteers were effectively shooed away from performing its functions. Intimidation, harassment and terrorism became the lot of many volunteers in places where the results had been regarded as questionable and failure.

Another area of the electoral process where NAMFREL had contributed to the credibility of the results was the operation Quick Count (OQC). The study also indicates a correlation between delays in canvassing and reporting of election returns and discrepancies between NAMFREL and COMELEC tabulations. At the time people were awaiting anxiously for the election results. The COMELEC's performance lagged far behind that of NAMFREL. Three days after May 14, NAMFREL's OQC project had practically covered all the 183 seats. On the basis of partial results, NAMFREL was able to establish voting trends, record reversals and receive reports of anomalies like tampering with election returns, from its chapters all over the country.

The people's responsiveness to NAMFREL's call for volunteers strongly supports the people's desire for change as discerned from the data on distribution of voters by political party. The inability of the opposition to capture proportionate number of seats with the actual votes cast points to the importance of political organization. The extreme fragmentation within the opposition ranks hurt the opposition's common cause. It is implied that political organization is a necessary condition for the opposition to translate pro-opposition sentiments and votes into number of Batasan seats. On the part of the ruling party, political organization proves to be a necessary but not sufficient condition to win the active consent of the people. One of the ironies in this regard is that the most perfected and well-oiled political machinery was defeated by one of the most disorganized and financially handicapped opposition. What seems to work against the ruling party is the lack of sincerity of the national leadership as perceived by the electorate.

For the emerging new breed of leaders and the higher level of politics they espoused, political organization and sincerity are two requirements they have to fulfill if they are to succeed. The beginnings of a populist approach, issue-oriented perspective coupled with political commitment and dedication to public service have been sown. This development when sustained opens new possibilities to make elections as a meaningful mechanism through which the people can express their collective political will, at the same time, to pass popular judgment on the performance of the incumbent government.

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Chart V

Regional Assessment of Electoral Performance By Region
May 1984 Batasang Pambansa Elections

Region/District	Process	Results
Region I Pangasinan	Intolerable Intolerable	Tolerable Credible
Region II Nueva Vizcaya	Intolerable Tolerable	Questionable Failure
Region III Pampanga	Intolerable Intolerable	Tolerable Questionable
Region IV Quezon	Intolerable Intolerable	Credible Credible
Region V Albay	Tolerable Intolerable	Credible Questionable
Region VI Antique	Tolerable Intolerable	Credible Failure
Region VII Cebu Province	Intolerable Abusive	Tolerable Questionable
Region VIII Northern Samar	Intolerable Abusive	Tolerable Failure
Region IX Tawi-Tawi	Tolerable Tolerable	Credible Credible
Region X Cagayan de Oro City	Tolerable Abusive	Tolerable Credible
Region XI Davao City	Intolerable Tolerable	Credible Credible
Region XII Lanao del Norte	Intolerable Tolerable	Tolerable Credible

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The Philippines has a presidential-parliamentary system of government headed by Ferdinand Marcos, President since 1965. Through his personal power, control of the ruling party, and use of emergency decree powers granted by the Constitution, President Marcos has dominated the political arena. The President is elected to a 6-year term and may succeed himself indefinitely. The Government includes a Prime Minister and a unicameral legislature, the National Assembly. National Assembly members are elected to 6-year terms not coinciding with the term of the President. Elections for President and Vice President are set for February 7, 1986.

The Filipino people have a longstanding attachment to democratic principles and institutions, fostered by the legacy of the American colonial period, which began in 1898. From independence in 1946 until 1972 the country was governed under its 1935 Constitution, patterned closely after the United States Constitution. In 1972, President Marcos declared martial law, citing anarchy, lawlessness, urban terrorism, and open rebellion by both Muslim separatists and the New People's Army (NPA), the military wing of the Communist Party (not Moscow-oriented) of the Philippines (CPP). Democratic institutions were suppressed under martial law. The 1935 Constitution was replaced by one ratified in 1973, in a series of controversial "Citizens Assemblies." In 1981, after new constitutional amendments had redefined the presidency, Marcos was reelected to a 6-year term. Although martial law formally ended in 1981, Marcos has continued to exercise broad, discretionary decree-making powers to limit criticism of the regime and opposition activities.

Two insurgent groups are active, the NPA and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), a radical Muslim secessionist group. Both employ terrorist tactics. The NPA is under the direct control of the CPP, a Marxist-Leninist party committed to the establishment of a totalitarian Communist regime in the Philippines. The NPA has grown significantly in recent years and is believed by some observers to have as many as 16,000 full-time armed guerrillas, a similar number of part-time fighters, and a large political and logistic support structure. It operates to some degree in most provinces. In some areas it has gained considerable influence, exacting "taxes" and administering its own arbitrary brand of "law and order," including summary killings. The MNLF, active in the south, since 1972 has waged a secessionist struggle originating in inequities and misunderstandings dating from the Spanish era, including competition with Christians over land, past efforts by the Central Government to control and expand Christian settlements, and the desire of the Muslims to preserve cultural identity. The level of fighting in predominantly Muslim areas has diminished considerably in recent years. The Government has mounted political, military, and economic efforts against both insurgent groups. These efforts have been more successful against the MNLF than against the NPA.

The Philippines is a predominantly agricultural country with a growing industrial sector. It ranks economically in the lower middle range of developing countries. Its private sector is subject to both substantial state intervention and favoritism toward individual entrepreneurs with close ties to the Government and the Marcos family. The economy continued to experience considerable difficulty in 1985.

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In 1985 there continued to be serious human rights violations throughout the country, although there have been some positive developments as well. Among the latter are the Government's toleration of peaceful expressions of political dissent, including large public rallies and demonstrations, and the trend toward greater press freedom. Philippine newspapers now freely print even very harsh criticism of the Government. However, there were frequent reports, many of them well-founded, of human rights abuses, especially in the countryside, by government security forces. These included summary executions or "salvagings" of civilians; instances of torture; arbitrary arrests, detentions, unlawful searches and seizures; and disappearances. In 1985 the Communist-led insurgents stepped up significantly their use of terror, including summary executions, as a tactic in furtherance of their political objectives.

The accuracy of statistics on human rights abuses in the Philippines, which are collected only by the Government and by Task Force Detainees (TFD), is highly questionable. The TFD is a politically active, antigovernment, Catholic church-related group which investigates and compiles statistics only on alleged government violations of human rights. TFD does not document atrocities and murders committed by the NPA, a policy which reinforces reports that TFD has significant links to leftist elements. Also, TFD ascribes responsibility to the Government for some killings for which the motivation is unclear but probably not political.

Although the number of political detainees reportedly declined in 1985, there was an increase in alleged political killings, and in the number of disappearances. In December the verdict acquitting General Ver, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, and his fellow military defendants, after an 8-month trial for the assassination of Benigno Aquino, was not viewed as credible by most Filipinos.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1 Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:

a. Political Killing

As noted above, statistics on human rights violations, including political killings, are not reliable. Accurate assessment of violations committed in areas heavily influenced by the NPA is particularly difficult. Furthermore, because the use of violence for both personal and political purposes has been common historically, distinctions between common criminal activity, personal vendettas, unauthorized reprisals by individual military or constabulary units, and legitimate counterinsurgency operations are sometimes blurred. Government forces and insurgents are responsible for killings, as are common criminals, extremist religious sects, private security forces, and vigilante groups. Clashes between insurgents and government forces occur frequently and often result in fatalities.

Military engagements are but one facet of the use by the Communists of violence to further their political goals. The Communists wage an intense campaign for control of local government mechanisms, utilizing intimidation, kidnaping, and assassination directed against government and military

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officials, businessmen, clergy, teachers, and others who resist. The most obvious sign of Communist influence in any locality of the country is the assassination of local officials. Corrupt or disliked officials are often the first to be murdered. Opponents of the Communist efforts to establish political control, or anyone suspected of being informers for the government, are also in danger of being killed.

Government statistics allege that over 400 civilians were killed by the NPA from the beginning of 1985 to the end of August. Increasingly throughout 1985, there were verified reports of NPA intimidation and even killings of civilians who refused to pay "revolutionary" taxes. For example, in February, a 35-year old housewife was murdered in Davao City, reportedly for refusing to give a contribution to the NPA. In late August, the murder of an elementary school teacher in western Samar received wide coverage. He was stabbed to death by a female member of an insurgent band reportedly because of his outspoken anti-Communism. NPA political assassination teams ("sparrow units") reportedly killed numerous local government officials, policemen, and Philippine military in 1985. Their victims included the Governor of Surigao del Sur province, who was murdered in October. The Australian Government was forced to withdraw its consultants and aid to an integrated development program on Samar in mid-August after a series of NPA incidents and threats.

Numerous reports of summary executions or "salvagings" by government forces occurred throughout the Philippines during 1985. TFD alleged in September 1985 that a total of 238 salvagings had taken place throughout the Philippines by mid-year. (TFD alleged a total of 538 salvagings nationwide for 1984.) According to TFD reports, most of these killings were of farmers in areas of insurgent activity, although some killings did occur in urban settings. As stated above, TFD does not document atrocities and murders committed by NPA insurgents. Additionally, it has a tendency to categorize any murder by persons unknown as a political "salvaging."

Killings of civilians by auxiliary Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF) units and other paramilitary forces were numerous throughout 1985. These forces are heavily deployed in insurgency-affected areas, and sometimes operate independently of direct government or military control. The most notorious among them appear to be armed religious cults which operate mostly in Mindanao and other parts of the southern Philippines. Human rights organizations and the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines have called on the Government to reorganize the CHDF or to dismantle it outright. President Marcos announced in late October that the CHDF program would be overhauled to ensure better screening and training of CHDF personnel.

The Government reported in October that in 1985 it received 91 complaints of salvagings attributed to military personnel, CHDF units, and members of the National Police. It found ten to have no factual basis, 21 to be valid, and 60 were sent under investigation.

In April, an Italian missionary priest, Father Tullio Favali, was murdered in the town of Tulunan, North Cotabato, Mindanao, allegedly by members of a renegade paramilitary group. Public assertions were made in the wake of Father Favali's killing

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that this group, wanted on previous charges dating back to 1979 and suspected of cannibalistic acts, had been protected by the local military establishment. Nevertheless, at the personal order of President Marcos, the two principal suspects in the killing were eventually captured and are standing trial for the murder of Father Favali.

Another case involving the CHDF which attracted wide publicity was an alleged massacre on September 20 of antigovernment demonstrators in Escalante, Negros Occidental, in the Western Visayas region. Over 20 demonstrators were killed and upwards of 50 seriously wounded when CHDF elements reportedly fired indiscriminately into the ranks of the unarmed protestors. In mid-October Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile created a multisectoral factfinding board to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the Escalante killings.

Government officials state that mistakes have been made by security forces fighting in insurgency-affected areas. The Government has carried out investigations and stated that military personnel have been disciplined for abusive behavior. In fact, abusive personnel are seldom seriously punished. Only 5, of a total of 123 military and National Police personnel whom the Government as of October reported as having been charged before courts martial for abusing civilians, were convicted and sentenced.

As of October, according to government reports, a total of 1,153 military personnel had been given administrative disciplinary action, including reprimands, demotions, and discharges for abuse of authority. In late 1984 the Ministry of National Defense formed a social action committee to improve its responsiveness to complaints against military personnel of abuse. In addition, ten retraining centers, or disciplinary barracks, were established throughout the country to rehabilitate soldiers guilty of human rights violations.

For the third year in a row, the Government in May deployed in Metro Manila a controversial "secret marshal" corps of some 350 armed law enforcement officers. The marshals, renamed "special operations teams," or "crimebusters," were assigned to ride as plainclothesmen aboard Metro Manila public transit vehicles in an effort to curb a chronic problem of robberies and assaults on these vehicles. They had summary arrest powers, as well as authority to shoot to kill offenders who refused to submit to arrest. Marshals reportedly killed as many as 25 alleged criminals in May. As in previous years, the program was viewed positively by some Metro Manila residents. In other quarters, however, it drew sharp criticism as a violation of due process. Although the secret marshal program was not officially ended, its activities appeared to have come to a halt in early June.

b. Disappearance

TFD claimed 117 persons as having disappeared from January to June 1985. (TFD claimed a total of 150 disappearances for all of 1984.) The International Labor Organization (ILO) wrote to the Government about the disappearance of three labor leaders. (See also references to ILO communication in Section 2.b. and Section 4.) The Government maintains that its forces were not responsible for these disappearances. However, the Government as a frequent practice has held persons suspected of ~~national security offenses~~ incommunicado in order to

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complete interrogation before revealing their capture. On February 4, Tim Olivarez, a correspondent for a Manila daily and editor of a provincial newsweekly, disappeared shortly after publishing an exposé on a smuggling syndicate which allegedly enjoyed protection by government and military officials. Both the acting Armed Forces Chief of Staff and President Marcos ordered full-scale investigations, resulting in the arrest in mid-November of nine persons, including the alleged head of the syndicate.

On July 11, Father Rudy Romano, a Redemptorist priest and political activist, was abducted in Cebu City. A witness appearing on behalf of the Redemptorist priest at an August Supreme Court habeas corpus hearing identified a military intelligence agent as among his abductors. Although the military has denied having abducted Father Romano, the acting Armed Forces Chief of Staff ordered the "technical arrest" of the agent identified by the eyewitness. As of late 1985, formal charges of kidnaping were reportedly being prepared against the agents and other military men, subsequently identified. Father Romano's fate remains unknown.

The Aquino assassination trial was tainted in many eyes by the disappearance of key eyewitnesses, including some whose testimony before the factfinding board in 1984 helped to establish the finding of a military conspiracy behind the crime. The common-law wife and two female acquaintances of the man whom the military alleges shot Aquino disappeared in early 1984 and were not located in 1985.

Hostage-taking for ransom has been a common practice by Filipino Muslim rebels of the MNLF. For example, an American and a German taken hostage by an MNLF group in November, 1984, on the island of Jolo, south of Mindanao, were held for more than a year and released only in early December. A Japanese citizen is still being held. There is some evidence as well that the NPA has engaged in abductions.

c. Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Although torture is prohibited under the Constitution, a number of persons arrested for alleged national security offenses have reportedly been tortured. TFD alleged that 383 instances of torture took place in the first half of 1985, as compared with 504 for all of 1984. The Ministry of National Defense admits that abuses occur. It also claims that some charges of torture are false and are used as a legal tactic by arrested subversives to gain release. Most complaints of torture or other abuse center on the period immediately after arrest, when suspects are reportedly detained in "safe houses." There are also reports that the NPA engages in torture, particularly against persons suspected of being informers for the government.

In areas of military activity against insurgents, there have been allegations of military abuse ranging from harassment and extortion to rape and murder. These reports have appeared in the press and have also come from numerous human rights organizations which support the widely-held belief that the Government is not doing enough to curb abuses and punish abusive military personnel. Although the Ministry of National Defense has investigated some reported abuses, it states that it frequently fails to find evidence, and few personnel receive serious punishment.

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Although physical punishment is not officially part of the Philippine penal system, prison conditions are often harsh, and reports of abuse frequent. While in confinement, national security detainees are usually allowed visits by family members, lawyers, and others, and are also permitted food supplements from outside sources. The use of prolonged solitary confinement for national security detainees appears to be uncommon and limited for the most part to persons whom the Government regards as key figures in the underground Communist movement. Persons held without bail pending completion of their trials for national security offenses are usually segregated from and have better accommodations than those held without bail for common crimes and those already convicted by the courts.

d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

Arrested persons are generally charged promptly, although this is not always the case, particularly with regard to alleged "national security" offenders. Such persons are sometimes held incommunicado by military intelligence units for days or weeks before the Government presents charges or acknowledges that it is holding them.

The Government asserts that no one is arrested for his political beliefs, but that it arrests "public order violators" who commit specific criminal acts relating to the violent overthrow of the Government. Generally, such persons are charged with subversion and rebellion, possession of firearms and subversive documents, or, occasionally, with crimes such as arson and murder.

Arrests in national security cases are frequently made under "Preventive Detention Actions," (PDA's) which authorize arrests by Presidential Order without court warrant, and which allow persons to be held without bail until the President authorizes their release. The 1983 Presidential Decree which created the Preventive Detention Action system, however, provides for a yearly review of the case of each detainee or accused person held without bail. Despite this provision, President Marcos still retains the power to order anyone's detention for an indefinite period of time. The Supreme Court has ruled that PDA's issued by the President are constitutional.

TFD alleged that a total of 2,371 of what it terms "political arrests" took place in the first half of 1985, compared with 4,158 for all of 1984. This figure includes an unknown number of persons arrested for activities in support of the Communist insurgents. Many of those arrested in 1985 were picked up in mass arrests during rallies and demonstrations and were subsequently released. Two Presidential Decrees promulgated in 1985 eliminated capital punishment for crimes against national security and public order, making defendants accused of such crimes eligible for bail.

A grey area of legal uncertainty exists in cases where a civilian court authorizes the temporary release on bail of defendants held under a PDA. In some instances, as in the case of two Manila student leaders arrested in February, President Marcos has rescinded the PDA, thus allowing the civilian court's release order to prevail. In other instances, however, the military has refused court orders to release defendants where the President has not withdrawn the

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PDA against them. For example, the Supreme Court ordered the temporary release in May of three activist lawyers from Davao City because the PDA's issued against them were of questionable validity. The military refused to heed this order in the absence of a presidential directive to do so. The Supreme Court subsequently reversed itself and ruled that the lawyers' detention was legal after subversion charges were filed against them in Davao.

Habeas corpus is generally available, but remains suspended throughout the country for persons charged with subversion or rebellion and for those charged with any crime in the two regions in Mindanao where the MNLF rebellion is active. Defendants in subversion and rebellion cases or their relatives frequently petition the Supreme Court for habeas corpus. In some instances the Court has granted hearings and compelled the Government to present persons specified in petitions before it. In other cases, however, the Supreme Court has been slow to act on such petitions.

Two prominent opposition leaders, Jovito Salonga and Raul Daza, returned voluntarily from self-exile in the United States in 1985. Both have engaged freely in political activities since their return. Subversion charges against Salonga were dropped three days before his return in January. Daza continues to face a subversion charge dating from 1982 but is now free on bail and has been allowed to return to the United States. In July President Marcos lifted a PDA against Cebu City opposition leader Ribomapil Holganza following a bail release granted by the presiding judge in his subversion trial. In a related case, the Government in January filed rebellion charges against national opposition figure Aquilino Pimentel. Pimentel, who is free on bail, resumed his place in the National Assembly in November, when the Supreme Court overturned a decision by the Commission on Elections invalidating his 1984 election.

There is no evidence of the practice of compulsory or forced labor.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

Persons currently charged with crimes are legally presumed innocent until proven guilty and, if arrested after martial law was lifted in 1981, receive public trials in civilian courts.

The right to counsel is guaranteed by law and is generally honored from the time a person is presented in court for the reading of charges. However, there have been instances in which defendants in subversion and rebellion cases have been held incommunicado without access to counsel for significant periods of time. Once their detention was acknowledged, these defendants were normally permitted visits by lawyers and family members.

If a defendant cannot afford counsel, the court will appoint a lawyer. Private and government legal assistance is available to indigents, and there are lawyers' organizations which provide assistance to alleged national security offenders. Because of case backlog, a shortage of judges, and the practice of hearing cases concurrently, trials in civilian

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part of Philippine jurisprudence. Questions of law and fact, including determinations of guilt or innocence, are all resolved by the presiding judge.

Latest available government figures (September 1985) showed 490 persons accused of national security offenses being held without bail. TFD, which compiles statistics on "political detainees," reported as of June that there were 556 "political prisoners," as compared with 851 at the end of 1984.

The Supreme Court continued to show some signs of assertiveness in sensitive areas. In late December 1984 the Court ruled that a 1982 raid by military authorities on the offices of We Forum, an opposition newspaper, was illegal and unconstitutional because the warrants upon which the raid was based were issued without probable cause. In February, the Supreme Court dismissed all outstanding subversion charges against former Senator Jovito Salonga when a prosecutor threatened to reopen his case after previously dropping the charges. The Court asserted that the original indictment against Salonga was filed with undue haste and was based on hearsay testimony.

There remains, however, widespread Philippine cynicism regarding the fairness and independence of the judiciary, and there is frequent criticism that political influence or bribery of individual judges plays a part in judicial decisions. In August, the Supreme Court ruled that previous testimony by armed forces Chief of Staff General Fabian Ver and seven other defendants could not be used against them at the Aquino assassination trial. General Ver and the other military defendants have since been acquitted and General Ver reinstated as Chief of Staff. The 8-month trial included intimidation, disappearances and recantations of prosecution witnesses, charges of judicial favoritism towards the accused, and a lack of prosecution vigor. At the acquittal in December, the Court reaffirmed the Government's contention that Aquino was murdered by a Communist hit man. That conclusion lacks credibility in the Philippines, inasmuch as it is inconsistent with the 1984 finding of an independent investigative board which implicated elements of the military in the assassination.

Charges in subversion and rebellion cases are often vague. There have been some cases with multiple defendants where conspiracy to overthrow the Government was alleged but little detail was provided in the charges. Members of the opposition have sometimes been linked to alleged conspiracies with subversive elements, and some have left the country to avoid lengthy trials, restriction of movement, or possible imprisonment. The line between national security offenses and common crimes is frequently blurred, and lengthy legal proceedings often result.

In practice there have been few convictions for subversion and rebellion. Trials, including those of better known defendants, tend to continue indefinitely. In many instances defendants held under preventive detention regulations and charged with subversion are given "temporary release" while their trials continue. Others have been released outright after a few weeks or months.

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. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or Correspondence

The state intrudes little into the family life of most Filipinos. Parents are free to raise their children as they see fit. Religious practices are a personal matter, as is the decision to join a political party. The Constitution's Bill of Rights specifies that persons shall be secure in their homes and guarantees the privacy of communications and correspondence. These rights are generally respected by the authorities.

A search warrant may be issued by a judge upon a finding of probable cause. The President may also order a search. There have been allegations that the property of some persons accused of subversion or rebellion has sometimes been searched without a warrant, but in most instances the authorities obtain warrants before acting.

Reports persist that in some rural areas in Mindanao forcible resettlement continued throughout 1985, notwithstanding the 1982 government ban on the practice. According to the Government, higher levels of combat between government forces and Communist insurgents have led some people in scattered rural areas to relocate their homes of their own volition, often for limited periods, to avoid danger. There have been reports of such population movements from different parts of the country.

Section 2 Respect for Civil Rights, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and press are abridged in practice. Media restrictions are usually political and economic in nature, rather than in the form of direct government censorship. Nevertheless, Philippine media now operate with a degree of freedom greater than at any time since the imposition of martial law in 1972. Overall, the Philippine print media are among the most free in the region.

Newspapers in the Philippines are generally divided into two categories: those considered "government-influenced" and those which assume an "oppositionist/independent" editorial line. Three of the country's largest nationally circulated newspapers are owned or controlled by relatives or close associates of the Marcos family. Direct criticism of the Marcos family in these papers is rare, but they do provide coverage, in news reporting, editorials, and in columns, which is occasionally critical of specific government policies and personalities. The progovernment papers have made it a practice since the 1983 Aquino assassination to provide regular coverage of opposition political activities. Outspoken antiestablishment commentary is a common feature of independent newspapers and magazines.

The Philippine public has access to several major international news publications even though these publications sometimes contain articles and editorials sharply critical of the Government. Foreign journalists regularly travel in the Philippines and file stories without hindrance. The Government announced in October a new policy permitting domestic and foreign reporters to cover operations of the Philippine military against the Communist insurgency. The new

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guidelines were intended to expand coverage as a means of informing the public of the actual dimensions of the insurgency problem.

The Government maintains a significant degree of influence over the electronic media, particularly television. Manila has one government-owned television station and four privately-owned stations controlled by persons with close links to the Marcos administration. They produce programs for distribution in Manila and other major cities. All television stations appear to accept government guidance on their editorial policy and often ignore or downplay opposition political activities. A group seeking to obtain a license to operate a Catholic lay television station reported that its application remained stalled throughout 1985.

Radio remains an especially important source of news and information in provincial areas. Ownership is dominated by government loyalists, although there are significant exceptions, such as Radio Veritas, a Catholic church-linked station which provides the only "independent" coverage of local and national issues.

Much attention was focused on the reported killings of 12 journalists in the first 9 months of 1985, bringing the total of newsmen killed to 22 since 1979. Human rights organizations allege government involvement in some of the attacks; the military blames the NPA for some of the deaths; and some of the killings apparently involved purely personal motives. In at least three instances in 1985, the murdered journalists had been actively pursuing stories on alleged corruption in Government or abuses by security forces.

Libel suits are frequently filed in the Philippines, sometimes as a pressure tactic against reporters, with varying degrees of success. A conviction for libel can result in up to 3 years' imprisonment. During the course of the Aquino murder trial, contempt of court charges were filed against two organs of the independent press for casting doubt on the impartiality and integrity of the court hearing the case. In one instance, the charges were quickly dropped; the other case is under court review.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

A broad range of private professional, religious, social, charitable, and political organizations flourishes in the Philippines. The right of peaceful assembly is guaranteed by the Constitution, and this right was generally exercised freely by numerous groups protesting government policies or other issues in 1985. An estimated 100,000 persons joined rallies and marches throughout the Philippines on May 1, Labor Day, with upwards of 50,000 marchers participating in Manila alone. On August 21, 1985, about 70,000 persons were involved in two separate antigovernment demonstrations in Manila to commemorate the second anniversary of Benigno Aquino's death. Thousands of others marched in provincial towns and cities. Opposition rallies are frequently held on a nation-wide basis.

Permits from local authorities are required for outdoor demonstrations in public places. The Government usually complied with requests for rally permits, but some were denied on the grounds of alleged involvement by subversive elements. In some instances, local officials later agreed to issue the

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permits. Rallies and marches are often held without permits. Although the Government advocates a policy of "maximum tolerance" for handling street demonstrations, excessive force was used to disperse otherwise peaceful but permitless demonstrations in some towns and major cities. In addition to the Escalante shootings in September discussed in Section 1.a., police reportedly shot and killed 2 persons and wounded 14 others during a farmers' rally in Manila in October.

A variety of trade unions claim slightly more than 2 million workers out of a total labor force of 20 million. There are also about 2.7 million workers in the National Congress of Farmers Organizations. Union membership in the Philippines tends to be nominal, rather than being composed of active, dues-paying members. However, there are no government restrictions on the right to organize and to affiliate with federations, confederations, or international organizations, or on the right to strike, except for public servants and employees of certain government corporations. National labor organizations are affiliated to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), and to the Communist-dominated World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). The nation has 1,954 registered labor groups; none has been canceled or "deregistered" during the past 2 years. Union certification elections are generally considered to be fairly run.

Unions continue to negotiate collective bargaining agreements and to strike. In October, the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) reported 2,007 collective bargaining agreements covering 266,000 workers as "active."

Compulsory arbitration was exercised in 12 of 937 strike notice instances in 1984, and in 7 of 275 instances through August 1985. The incidence of strikes in the garment industry, in semi-conductor firms, and at export processing zones increased in 1985. Even some public sectors "exempted" from strikes have experienced stoppages. Although a penalty of 6 months' imprisonment for illegal acts by strikers exists, the Labor Ministry asserts that there have been no convictions. However, a Presidential Letter of Instruction was issued in 1985 allowing police to serve injunctions on the picket line in order to halt strikes which the Ministry has not authorized. The use of violence is endemic in the Philippines among management and labor. There have been numerous assassinations of labor leaders and trade union members. The military charges that some leftist labor leaders have engaged in assassination.

The Trade Union Congress of the Philippines (TUCP), established in 1975, claims 1.3 million non-agricultural workers and is the only officially recognized trade union umbrella organization in the country. As a result of this official status, TUCP officials are appointed as representatives of labor on tripartite boards such as the Social Security Commission and the National Council on Wages. Because of these links, the TUCP is often criticized by non-TUCP union leaders as being government controlled. However, the TUCP frequently criticizes the Government about poor wages and bad working conditions as well as on issues affecting trade union autonomy from government controls.

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negotiate collective bargaining agreements. Public service associations, such as public school teachers, cannot legally form recognized unions nor can they legally go on strike. Nonetheless, the Manila Public School Teachers Association struck several times during the past year. The Government is considering a bill to permit public sector employees to organize and bargain but with limitations on their right to strike.

The ILO has communicated with the Government to criticize aspects of the Filipino labor situation, including the requirement of approval by 30 percent of the work force before union recognition is granted; restrictions on the right to establish federations; compulsory arbitration in certain instances; a 1982 law banning strikes in industries that affect the national interest (including export-oriented ones in export processing zones); advance approval of strikes by two-thirds of union members; decrees threatening imprisonment of picketers propagandizing against the Government; and denial of the right to organize unions for teachers, public health personnel, and other public servants. The Government has replied in some detail to ILO criticisms; its reply appeared in the report of the Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations. The ILO has noted that a review of labor legislation is under way and that a draft bill is before the National Assembly incorporating some of the provisions referred to by ILO supervisory bodies.

c. Freedom of Religion

There is no established state religion in the Philippines, and the right to practice one's religion is fully respected. Over 80 percent of the population is Roman Catholic. There are several Protestant and independent Christian groups, and a sizeable Muslim minority. In the Sulu Archipelago in the southwest portion of the country and in parts of Mindanao, Muslims comprise the majority. The Government is assisting efforts to preserve the Filipino Muslim identity and cultural heritage. It has established an institute to train Filipino, Muslim religious and legal leaders for positions in the Sharia court system, which is based on Muslim personal law. The Government also provides assistance to Islamic schools and centers and facilitates the travel of Muslim pilgrims to Mecca. Foreign clergymen and missionaries of various faiths normally perform their duties without difficulty.

Major political parties and groupings in the Philippines have members and leaders from different religions. Government service is open to all on a nondiscriminatory basis, and several senior civil and military officials belong to minority religious groups.

Throughout 1985, the hierarchy of the Philippine Catholic Church, including Jaime Cardinal Sin, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, continued to criticize the Government on various issues, human rights being prominent among them. Pastoral letters critical of the administration were read from pulpits in Catholic churches throughout the Philippines. Many Catholic priests and nuns are actively involved in calling public attention to cases of human rights abuses. Such criticism has at times evoked a negative reaction from high-level authorities, including the President, who claim

THE PHILIPPINES**d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation**

There is freedom to change one's place of residence and employment. Emigration is generally permitted, but former detainees on "temporary release" status need government permission to leave the country, as do persons subject to pending criminal (including national security related) charges. Thousands of Filipinos travel to the United States and elsewhere as temporary visitors each year. Many Filipinos are employed as overseas workers, particularly in the Middle East. Foreign travel for this purpose is encouraged by the Government.

A 1980 Presidential Decree provides that persons convicted of subversion, rebellion, or sedition shall forfeit their rights as citizens, whether such acts are committed inside or outside the country. The decree also provides that judgments may be rendered in absentia. No instance of enforcement of this decree is known.

At the end of October, there were 2,962 Indochinese in a first asylum camp in the Philippines. In addition to providing first asylum to "boat people," the Government, in cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, operates a major refugee processing center in Bataan Province where refugees and displaced persons from camps in the Philippines and other Southeast Asian countries receive English language instruction, cultural orientation, and vocational training before being resettled elsewhere. There were 15,023 refugees and displaced persons in the processing center as of the end of October.

Section 3 Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government

President Ferdinand Marcos, Chief Executive since 1965, wields preeminent power under the country's 1973 Constitution, which provides for a strong president in a presidential-parliamentary system. The President is elected by direct popular vote. President Marcos is currently serving a 6-year term to which he was elected in 1981. In view of questions raised during the year about the Government's mandate, President Marcos, with the concurrence of the opposition, called in November for a presidential election in early 1986, slightly more than 1 year earlier than had been scheduled.

In December, active campaigning began by both President Marcos, the candidate of the ruling KBL Party, and the opposition candidate, Corazon Aquino, widow of the murdered Benigno Aquino. Mrs. Aquino's candidacy was encouraged by broad popular support as indicated, for example, by a petition urging her to run reportedly signed by more than 1.2 million Filipinos. Her "unity ticket" with Vice Presidential candidate Salvador Laurel was created under the banner of his United Nationalist Democratic Organization. Marcos chose as his running mate National Assembly member and former Foreign Minister Arturo Tolentino.

The President possesses extraordinary powers to issue decrees which have the force of law unless overturned by the National Assembly. While described in the Constitution as being subject to exercise only in emergency situations or in

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instances where the National Assembly is unable to act promptly, these powers, in practice, frequently have been used by the President to legislate widely, particularly in the economic sphere. In combination with his constitutional authority, the President uses his control of the ruling KBL Party (New Society Movement) to dominate the political arena. Within the ruling party, issues are often discussed in caucus, and accommodation on key issues is sometimes reflected in the President's final decisions.

As a result of the 1984 elections to the National Assembly, members of various opposition parties and independents now hold about one-third of the seats in that body, as contrasted to the preceding 190-seat assembly, which had fewer than 10 active opposition members when its term ended in June 1984. The ruling KBL party, by force of numbers, still wields preeminent power in the legislature. This fact, together with the President's independent law-making powers, have made it impossible for opposition members to shape a legislative agenda of their own. Nevertheless, the Assembly was a forum for lively political debate and sharp criticism of the Government throughout 1985 and provided a new degree of public accountability and transparency to the system. Among the issues aired prominently in the Assembly was alleged improper foreign investments ("hidden wealth") of Philippine leaders, including President and Mrs. Marcos.

Section 4 Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

The Philippines is a signatory of all principal U.N. human rights and refugee conventions and is currently a member of the U.N. Human Rights Commission. Representatives of various international human rights groups visited the Philippines in 1985 and traveled throughout the country, meeting both Philippine government officials and private citizens involved in human rights matters.

In its communication with the Government noted in Section 2.b., the ILO also expressed concern about trials of labor leaders, the disappearance of three others, the seizure in August and September 1982 of union property, and restrictions on travel of labor leader Bonifacio Tupaz. (However, Mr. Tupaz traveled to New Delhi, Moscow, and Los Angeles in 1985.) The Government informed the ILO in January that the trials noted by the ILO had been postponed. The unionists involved are under a technical "house arrest" but have resumed normal activities.

Several Catholic and Protestant church groups are active in the human rights field. Task Force Detainees (TFD) of the Philippines was established in 1974 by the Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Catholic Church. Headquartered in Manila and with regional field offices, it investigates allegations only of government human rights abuses and publishes reports on its findings. A politically active organization, reportedly with ties to leftist elements, it is an outspoken critic of the Marcos Government and its human rights practices. TFD operates with relative freedom although a few of its members have been arrested on charges of subversion and rebellion.

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The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, a national organization to which all practicing lawyers must belong, has an active human rights committee which has investigated specific alleged abuses and issues reports. The Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG), and the Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI) also assist detainees in preparing defenses against charges brought against them.

The Ministry of National Defense has a special committee for investigating reported human rights violations involving military personnel. The committee's influence has been limited, but its investigations have on occasion led to legal proceedings against servicemen for abusive behavior. The Ministry reported that it cooperates on human rights cases with civilian groups, including the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines and the National Council of Churches of the Philippines, as well as international organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and Amnesty International.

In its 1985 Report, Amnesty International expressed concern about continuing reports of human rights violations by members of the armed forces and paramilitary units under their command and alleges that the Government rarely initiated impartial investigations into such alleged violations. Freedom House rates the Philippines "partly free."

ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL SITUATION

The Philippines, with a population of 56.8 million (mid-1985 estimate) and a population growth rate of 2.4 percent, is predominantly an agricultural country ranking in the lower middle range of developing countries.

The economy was seriously affected by the recent worldwide recession, and by domestic mismanagement, including government-created monopolies. This led to a financial crisis in the last quarter of 1983, precipitated by substantial capital flight and reduced credit availability following the Aquino assassination. In 1984, per capita gross national product (GNP) was estimated at \$603, a decline of 7 percent, and it is expected to decline again in 1985 by an estimated 5 to 7 percent. The poorest 60 percent of the population received 25 percent of total income in 1971 but only 21.4 percent 10 years later. The upper 10 percent moved from 37.1 percent of national income in 1972 to 42 percent in 1981. In May 1985, unemployment was about 14.7 percent nationally and 23.5 percent in Metro Manila. Real wages have fallen by 27 percent in the last 4 years, and an already difficult economic situation for workers is worsening. With much of the population under the age of 15 and a high population growth rate, the Philippines can expect a continued growth of job entrants in coming years.

In recent years the Government has emphasized rural development with programs aimed at increasing production of foodgrains, meat, poultry, and fish. The thrust of these programs has been dulled by excessive intervention in pricing and marketing, resulting in reduced incentives for agricultural producers. The Philippines has for several years been marginally self-sufficient in rice, the staple food, but some rice was imported in 1984 because of drought in 1983. Land reform in rice and corn holdings has contributed to

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population, but significant land tenure problems still exist in several areas of the country. At present, agriculture provides employment for slightly over half the work force, and generates about one-quarter of the GNP. The Government has formulated a plan to promote export-oriented industries and agribusiness to spur economic growth, increase foreign exchange earnings, and provide employment. Traditionally, the Philippines has depended heavily on coconut products and other commodity exports that are subject to international price fluctuations. The Government has also facilitated overseas employment for Filipinos, with the largest number concentrated in the Middle East.

In 1985, life expectancy at birth was 65.4 years and infant mortality was 52.5 per 1,000 live births. It was estimated that about 50 percent of the population had access to safe drinking water, with 35 percent of residents in highly urbanized areas drawing their daily water needs from unsafe sources. In 1980, 41 percent of Filipinos in rural areas lived below a government-defined absolute poverty level, with 32 percent below that level in urban areas. It was estimated in 1980 that the ratio of calorie supply relative to nutritional requirements reached 118.1 percent for all Filipinos. However, there were frequent reports in 1985 of serious malnutrition in areas of the country heavily dependent on the depressed sugar-export sector.

Free education in the primary grades is available to all Filipinos. However recent government data indicate that of the children who begin primary school, only about 70 percent complete it. The adult literacy rate approaches 90 percent.

Children under 15 may not legally be employed except when working directly under the sole responsibility of parents or guardians. However, with parental assent and under the rules laid down by the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), apprentice programs are allowed for children 14 years and over. The Labor Code also places responsibility on the Minister of Labor for conditions of employment of all persons aged 15 to 18 but prohibits employment in hazardous occupations of those younger than 18. There are credible reports of many violations of these provisions of the Labor Code.

The 8-hour day, 48-hour week and a rest day after each 6 working days are mandated by law. With exceptions, women are prohibited from working between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. The Labor Ministry plays a key role in the setting of legislated minimum daily wages rates. The minimum daily rate for nonagricultural workers in Metro Manila was \$57.08 per day as of November 1, 1984. Outside of Metro Manila the rate was \$56.00. In the agricultural sector, and for nonplantation workers, it is \$35.67. (The peso in December was valued at 18.6 to \$1.00.) The Ministry of Labor conducts inspections to ensure compliance with minimum wage standards and working conditions but admits that it faces a difficult task. It cites a study claiming that of the Manila "sweatshops" it surveyed half paid substandard wages. The Ministry concludes that the 8-hour day requirement is more apt to be respected but notes that firms in the Bataan export processing zone usually report considerable overtime. There are reports of compulsory overtime. All workplace laws apply equally to export zones.

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revealed 1,980 violations of wage rules involving cost of living allowances, 13th-month payments, overtime, and related matters.

Philippine occupational health safety standards were codified in 1978. The Labor Ministry has stated that the number of inspections it can perform is still far too low. Of the 5,361 establishments inspected in January-October 1984, 707 (or 13.2 percent) had violations. Violations are most common in small nonunion shops according to a recent survey. The Ministry is trying to upgrade and increase its inspection corps as well as to disseminate more information through academic and other training programs and in the tripartite forums.

Women enjoy full voting privileges and have the right to own and inherit property. They are prominent in Philippine society and represented in large numbers in business and in professions such as law, medicine, education, and journalism. They are also active in politics, being well represented in both national and local governments and within the political opposition. There are 2 women members of the Cabinet and 10 in the current National Assembly, and numerous posts within the judicial and executive branches of the Government are held by women. As mentioned earlier, Corazon Aquino, widow of the murdered Benigno Aquino, is running against President Marcos in the scheduled February 7 presidential election. Imelda Marcos, wife of the President, holds the office of Minister of Human Settlements and exercises considerable influence. Women also occupy posts in local government as governors and mayors.

U.S.OVERSEAS -LOANS AND GRANTS- OBLIGATIONS AND LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS
(U.S.FISCAL YEARS, - MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

COUNTRY: PHILIPPINES

	1983	1984	1985
I.ECON. ASSIST.-TOTAL...	102.8	106.3	234.4
LOANS.....	24.3	23.1	60.8
GRANTS.....	78.5	83.2	173.6
A.AID	86.8	84.3	182.9
LOANS.....	24.3	23.1	20.8
GRANTS.....	62.5	61.2	162.1
(SEC.SUPP.ASSIST.)...	50.0	50.0	140.0
B.FOOD FOR PEACE.....	10.7	17.1	51.5
LOANS.....	0.0	0.0	40.0
GRANTS.....	10.7	17.1	11.5
TITLE I-TOTAL.....	0.0	0.0	40.0
REPAY. IN \$-LOANS.....	0.0	0.0	40.0
PAY. IN FOR. Curr.....	0.0	0.0	0.0
TITLE II-TOTAL.....	10.7	17.1	11.5
E.RELIEF.EC.DEV & WFP.	1.2	0.1	0.0
VOL.RELIEF AGENCY.....	9.5	17.0	11.5
C.OTHER ECON. ASSIST...	5.3	4.9	0.0
LOANS.....	0.0	0.0	0.0
GRANTS.....	5.3	4.9	0.0
PEACE CORPS.....	5.3	4.9	0.0
NARCOTICS.....	0.0	0.0	0.0
OTHER.....	0.0	0.0	0.0
II.MIL. ASSIST.-TOTAL...	51.4	51.5	42.2
LOANS.....	50.0	50.0	15.0
GRANTS.....	1.4	1.5	27.2
A.MAP GRANTS.....	0.0	0.0	25.0
B.CREDIT FINANCING...	50.0	50.0	15.0
C.INTL MIL.ED.TRNG...	1.4	1.5	2.2
D.TRAN-EXCESS STOCK...	0.0	0.0	0.0
E.OTHER GRANTS.....	0.0	0.0	0.0
III.TOTAL ECON. & MIL...	154.2	157.8	276.6
LOANS.....	74.3	73.1	75.8
GRANTS.....	79.9	84.7	200.8
OTHER US LOANS.....	0.0	78.8	0.0
EX-IM BANK LOANS.....	0.0	78.8	0.0
ALL OTHER.....	0.0	0.0	0.0

ASSISTANCE FROM INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES

	1983	1984	1985	1946-85
TOTAL.....	757.3	523.8	448.0	6883.2
IBRD	502.7	183.2	254.0	4308.8
IFC	5.6	0.0	48.1	218.1
IDA	0.0	0.0	0.0	122.2
IBRD	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
ADB	235.2	337.8	145.9	2120.2
AFDB	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
UNDP	3.0	2.8	0.0	68.4
OTHER-UN	10.8	0.0	0.0	45.5
EEC	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

FERDINAND E. MARCOS

PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES

PL-15V

11/11 A.M.

November 11, 1985

The Batasang Pambansa
Thru the Honorable
Speaker Nicanor E. Yñiguez
Quezon City

The Honorable Members
Batasang Pambansa:

In 1981 the Filipino electorate by overwhelming vote renewed my mandate for the leadership of the nation. I have responded to that summons with uncompromising fidelity to duty.

The same fidelity compels me now to face a responsibility thrust upon me by certain developments affecting the presidency. Over the past two years the mandate conferred upon me has been the object of propaganda and dissent that have cast a shadow over the continuing validity of the policies and programs I have instituted under the moral authority of that mandate. Yet the need of the moment is an undivided nation; innumerable tasks await our collective effort. There is no moment to lose. Neither can we prevaricate on the issue laid at our door, the issue of the validity of our present efforts in government, especially our approach to economic recovery and the insurgency problem. Clearly the mandate of 1981 must be placed before the people for reexamination.

I am, therefore, left no choice but to seek a new mandate in an election that will assess, as demanded by the opposition, the policies and programs I am undertaking. Such an election necessarily shortens my tenure. But the necessity arises from no less than the time-honored principle of public accountability, inherent in a democracy and explicit in our Constitution.

I seek public judgment now on policies and programs of a fundamental nature because they involve national growth and honor. For instance, we need to pursue further action in accord with the ideology we are endeavoring to follow. We must carry out the revolution of the poor which we have



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instituted. We must support more forcefully with appropriate measures our rejection of foreign ideologies that do not fit into our traditions and beliefs as a people. We must carry on the program for human resources development, comprising such projects as the livelihood program, self-reliance, cottage industries, and small- and medium-scale industries. --

The basic policies we have laid down concerning land ownership, labor and education must be pursued with vigor and vitality. We must continue with barangay participatory democracy and our rejection of the old social service dole system so as to lift our people from mendicancy to self-reliance through livelihood programs. We must preserve the maintenance of an open society and continue giving the lower and upper classes of our people equal opportunity in order that the former can develop their God-given faculties and rise to positions of leadership. The infrastructure program that emphasizes the development of the countryside must continue. Most of all, the nation must maintain social concord and coherence; free, honest and orderly elections; social justice; freedom of assembly; freedom of speech and other freedoms enshrined in our Constitution, all the frontiers of which have been advanced by the present administration and yet are now questioned by the opposition and their propagandists.

The final settlement of these issues can be achieved only through a presidential election. Once these fundamental issues are settled by mandate of our people, we shall be able to re-establish the unity of our nation. Our government and people will then be able to respond to the challenges of our times free from the threats and vexations which may negate the effectiveness of the government institutions created to implement these policies and programs.

To pave the way for the holding of a special election for President, I hereby irrevocably vacate the position of President effective only when the election is held and after the winner is proclaimed and qualified as President by taking his oath of office ten (10) days after his proclamation. In all presidential elections, it has been the practice and tradition in all democracies that the President continues in office until the President-elect shall have qualified and assumed office. This practice should be continued and not modified. Any alternative will cause an undesirable and dangerous hiatus in the government.

I am obliged, therefore, to inform the Batasang Pambansa that a vacancy will definitely and inevitably occur in the Office of the President upon fulfillment of the conditions I have stated.



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
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In order to submit the fundamental and national issues that urgently need resolution, we should hold an election for President distinct and apart from local elections where parochial and personal issues are involved.

I, therefore, strongly recommend that the Batasang Pambansa exercise its plenary legislative powers to pass a special law establishing the mechanism to hold such an election. A suitable date seems to be January 17, 1986, so that the start of the election campaign period of forty five days shall be December 2, 1985.

Accordingly, I am recommending the enactment of a Cabinet bill calling for presidential elections on January 17, 1986.

Truly yours,


FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President of the Philippines

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BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 883

AN ACT CALLING A SPECIAL ELECTION FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT, PROVIDING FOR THE MANNER OF THE HOLDING THEREOF, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Batasang Pambansa in session assembled:

SECTION 1. Special election for President and Vice-President. - There shall be a special election for President and Vice-President on February 7, 1986.

SEC. 2. Direct vote and term of office. - The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the tenth day following their proclamation and shall end at noon on the thirtieth day of June of the sixth year thereafter.

SEC. 3. Filing of certificate of candidacy. - No person shall be elected President or Vice-President unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy not later than December 11, 1985.

SEC. 4. Nomination of official candidates. - Political parties, coalitions, and other similar groups or organizations shall submit to the Commission on Elections certificate of nomination of their respective official candidates not later than December 21, 1985.

SEC. 5. Election and campaign periods. - The election period shall be fixed by the Commission on Elections in accordance with Section 6, Article XII (C) of the Constitution.

The campaign period shall commence on December 11, 1985 and shall terminate on February 5, 1986.

SEC. 6. Registration of voters. - The board of election inspectors in polling places determined by the Commission on Elections shall meet on December 21 and 28, 1985 to receive and act on applications for registration of qualified voters, from seven o'clock in the morning to four o'clock in the afternoon. The said board shall include the newly registered voters in the list of voters for the particular polling place in which they have registered.

Within seven working days counted from the last day of registration provided herein, the municipal or city election registrar shall transmit direct to the Commission on Elections the exact number of qualified voters newly registered by the respective boards, together with the comparative data showing the increase/decrease in the number and percentage of the voters registered thereat in the May 14, 1984 Batasang Pambansa elections. The

Commission on Elections shall publish in a newspaper of national circulation a summary of the aforementioned information classified on the basis of provinces, cities and municipalities, and shall also furnish a copy thereof to the representatives of the majority party and the dominant opposition party.

Page

SEC. 7. Meeting to close the list of voters before election. - The board of election inspectors shall also meet on January 15, 1986 for the purpose of making such inclusions, exclusions, and corrections as may be or have been ordered by the courts, stating opposite every name so corrected, added, or cancelled the date of the order and the court which issued the same; and for the consecutive numbering of the voters of the polling place.

Should the board fail to include in the list of voters any person ordered by a competent court to be so included, said person shall, upon presentation of a certified copy of the order of inclusion and upon proper identification, be allowed by the board to vote.

Should the board fail to exclude from the list of voters any person ordered by the court to be so excluded, the board shall not permit said person to vote upon presentation to it by any interested party of a certified copy of the order of exclusion.

After the meeting of the board to close the list of voters as provided for in this section, the board shall prepare a list of the inclusions, exclusions and/or corrections, if any, and furnish copies of such list duly signed by all its members to the respective representatives of the majority party and the dominant opposition party in such board.

SEC. 8. Inclusion and exclusion proceedings. - The candidates and their respective political parties shall have up to January 31, 1986 within which to file inclusion and exclusion proceedings.

SEC. 9. Accreditation of dominant opposition party. For purposes of the special election herein provided, the dominant opposition party shall be that registered political party, organization, aggroupment or coalition which nominated a candidate for President and Vice-President.

(1) In case more than one registered political party, organization, aggroupment or coalition presented an official candidate for President and Vice-President, the Commission on Elections shall require them to agree on the nomination of a common representative in the board of election inspectors, board of canvassers, printing committee and other similar bodies.

(2) Should the various opposition political parties, organizations, aggroupments or coalitions fail to come to an agreement, the Commission on Elections shall then determine which among them shall be the dominant opposition party based on but not limited to the following guidelines:

a. Potential of the political party, organization, aggroupment or coalition into becoming a national party as evidenced by the number of its Members in the Batasang Pambansa, as well as by the size and strength of its party organization.

b. Capability of the political party, aggroupment or coalition to wage a bona fide nationwide campaign for its Presidential and Vice-Presidential nominees, as evidenced by its organization, the stature of its candidates and the number and strength of the political parties in the coalition or aggroupment.

c. Bailiwicks or areas of political support.

d. Platform or program of government distinguishing the political party, aggroupment or coalition from the other political entities on ideology and orientation.

e. The record of the political entity concerned in the matter of its adherence to constitutional provisions on elections.

(3) The Commission on Elections shall accredit the dominant opposition party not later than fourteen working days before the first registration day.

SEC. 10. Date of proclamation. - The proclamation of the winners in this special election shall take place within fifteen session days from the day the Batasang Pambansa starts the canvass, unless the delay is occasioned by justifiable cause.

SEC. 11. Prohibited arrests in connection with the election campaign. - The provisions on prohibited arrests and/or detentions in connection with the election campaign, including the penalties for violation thereof, as provided under the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) shall be applicable to the special election provided in this Act.

SEC. 12. Prohibited acts and penalties for election offenses. - The provisions on prohibited acts, the penalties therefor and their prosecution under the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) shall be applicable to the special election provided in this Act.

SEC. 13. Powers and authority of the Commission on Elections. - The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to issue rules and regulations implementing the provisions of this Act and, pursuant to Article XII (C) of the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881), to adopt such measures as may be necessary to ensure the holding of free, honest, orderly and credible election.

Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to deprive the Commission on Elections of its powers or relieve it of its obligation to ensure the equitable protection of the rights and prerogatives of registered political parties for the purpose of holding free, honest, orderly and credible election.

SEC. 14. Applicability of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881). - All other aspects of this special election not covered by any provision of this Act shall be governed by the pertinent provisions of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).

SEC. 15. Appropriations. - The amount of two hundred million pesos or so much thereof as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act is hereby set aside out of the appropriations for special activities fund authorized in the Calendar Year 1985 and Calendar Year 1986 General Appropriations Acts.

The chairman and the poll clerk of the board of election inspectors, the inspectors of the political parties, the education support personnel of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, and the supervisors, principals and other administrators of the said ministry who may be asked by the Commission on Elections and actually report for supervisory assignment during registration and election days, including provincial, city and municipal treasurers shall be entitled to per diems at rates fixed in the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).

The chairmen, poll clerks, and party representatives shall be insured with the Government Service Insurance System in accordance with the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).

SEC. 16. Separability clause. - If for any reason any section or provision of this Act or any portion thereof, or the application of such section, provision or portion to any person, group or circumstance, is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act or the application of such provision to other persons, groups or circumstances shall not be affected by such declaration.

SEC. 17. Effectivity. - This act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved, 2nd day of December, 1985.

(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

AS

Important Dates/Deadlines to Consider

1. December 3, 1985 - Accreditation by Comelec of dominant opposition party;
2. December 11, 1985 - Last day for filing of Certificate of Candidacy with Comelec;
3. December 21, 1985 - Submission of Certificate of Nominations to Commission on Elections by political parties, coalitions, etc;
4. December 11, 1985 to February 5, 1986 - Campaign period;
5. December 21 and 28, 1985 - Registration of voters, 7:00 A.M. to 4:00 P.M.;
6. January 9, 1986 - Registrars of municipal/city to transmit to Comelec exact number of qualified voters newly registered;
7. January 15, 1986 - Meeting of Board of Election Inspectors for making inclusions, exclusions in list of voters;
8. January 31, 1986 - Deadline for filing of inclusion and exclusion proceedings;
9. February 7, 1986 - Special Election for President and Vice-President.
10. Within 15 days from start of canvass by Batasang Pambansa - Proclamation of winners

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TITLES OF MAJOR ADDRESSES
DELIVERED BY MRS. CORAZON AQUINO
DURING CAMPAIGN

1. Building from the Ruins (economy)
January 6, 1986
Intercontinental Hotel, Manila
2. Broken Promise in the Land of Promise (social justice)
January 16, 1986
Atanco de Davon Gymnasium
Davon City
3. Tearing Down the Dictatorship, Rebuilding Democracy
(political reorganization)
January 23, 1986
Manila Hotel, Manila

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"WE MUST OBEY GOD RATHER THAN MEN"
(Joint Pastoral Exhortation of the Catholic Bishops'
Conference of the Philippines on the Snap Election)

Dear Brothers and Sisters in Christ, and Fellow Filipinos.

The eyes of the world are upon us, the only Christian country in Asia, as we conduct the February 7 elections. We are like "a city set on a hill-top" (Mt 5:14). Hence, there is a special urgency that we should let our light shine before men that they may see our good works and give glory to our Father in heaven (cf. Mt 5:16).

The Lord Jesus taught us to pray, "Our Father . . . Your kingdom comes; your will be done on earth as in heaven". These coming elections can, and should be, an event through which God's will is accomplished more fully in our land through our choice of leaders whom he wants, and in the manner that he wants. Indeed, this election will be judged not only in terms of the persons and issues involved, but also by the way it is conducted and the way we respond to its conduct.

These elections can become one great offense to God and a national scandal, or they can be an event of conversion and national renewal.

It has been our sad experience that God's will has been flagrantly transgressed in the past through the violation of our electoral process. Registration anomalies and flying voters, vote-buying and--selling, bribery, unwarranted pressures, serious lies, black propaganda, the fraudulent casting, canvassing and reporting of votes, snatching and switching of ballot boxes, physical violence and killings have often characterized our elections

It is with grave concern and great sadness that we see signs of these happening again now in a concerted manner, and threatening to escalate to a level never experienced before. These practices are sins against the Lord. They violate in a serious manner the dignity of human beings with whom the Lord has united himself. They make their perpetrators unworthy of the Body of the Lord (cf. 1 Cor 11:27).

The presence of this conspiracy of evil should not, however, make us succumb to a paralyzing cynicism. It should rather challenge us all to organize ourselves and our actions so that evil may be conquered by good (cf. Rom 12:21). The children of the light should not be less wise than the children of this world (cf. Lk 16:8)

We should not passively surrender to the forces of evil and allow them to unilaterally determine the conduct and the results of these elections. The popular will is clearly shown by the interest of the vast majority of our people to participate in these elections. Banding together, we can become a massive force that will assure relatively clean and honest elections, expressive of the people's genuine will.

This will must be expressed and respected. For the power to choose our leaders comes from God. From him all authority derives. In a democracy, he chooses to designate the bearers of this authority through the free and honest expression of the people's will. Hence, voting is a sacred right and duty. To exercise this right is to do God's will. To respect this right is to respect God himself.

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- 1) Pray for divine guidance and the grace of free and honest elections.
- 2) Vote. Vote honestly according to your enlightened judgment and conscience after carefully weighing the persons and issues involved.
- 3) Vote into office the persons you believe God wants you to put in office as president and vice-president of this land. Vote for persons who embody the Gospel values of justice, humility, truth, freedom, courage, love, peace, respect for human rights and life. Vote for persons who morally, intellectually and physically show themselves capable of inspiring the whole nation towards a hopeful future.
- 4) In the choice of your candidates, go beyond narrow selfish, family, partisan, and regional considerations. Vote for the persons who can do the most good for the whole country.
- 5) Refuse to cooperate with, and resist singly and in collaboration with others, all efforts at cheating, intimidation, and violence from whatever source, during the campaign period, and at any stage of the electoral process.
- 6) Do not allow yourselves to be corrupted by money or other immoral considerations into voting or not voting, or cheating for a candidate. ALWAYS VOTE ACCORDING TO YOUR CONSCIENCE.
- 7) Exercise unwavering vigilance in organized collaboration with others so that your votes are cast, counted, tallied and reported properly and honestly, and transported untampered. In this connection, we wish to express our wholehearted support for NAMFREL.

We earnestly appeal, in particular, to the official guardians of the polls.

TO THE TEACHERS AND PUBLIC SCHOOL PERSONNEL, we say:

We trust in your integrity. In the eyes of the young you are upholders of truth and honesty. Please do not destroy or let others destroy your name and profession.

Many of you have courageously resisted bribes and pressures in the past. We trust you will do the same in these elections. We note with joy that many of you have exposed attempts by unscrupulous persons to bribe some of you.

TO THE MILITARY, POLICE, AND CHDF (Civilian Home Defense Forces):

You are the guardians of peace and order. You owe your allegiance to the Flag and to our people, not to any particular individual or political group. Above all, we trust you also believe in a just and all-knowing God. We urge you to defend the life, dignity and rights of our citizenry. We ask you never to allow yourselves to be used as instruments of election violence and cheating.

TO THE COMELEC AND OTHER PEOPLE IN THE GOVERNMENT:

You are public servants. No matter who appointed you into office you are the servants of the people. Your utang na loob and loyalty should be directed, above all, to the people you are committed to serve. We urge you to resist all efforts to demean your dignity through pressures and intimidations of all sorts.

To all who serve in the polls, we give this general reminder: "We must obey God rather than men" (Acts 5:29). In a conflict of loyalties and interests, God's will must prevail over unjust commands of earthly leaders.


We address these words to all of you, our countrymen, not only because of our concern to uphold gospel values but also because of our country's critical situation. These elections, if free and honest, will be a big step in restoring that confidence in government and cooperation with it which are essential to national recovery. This confidence can only be lost and our crisis worsen in the event of massive election frauds.

While we raise this call to massive vigilance and propose to you this program of action, we are, nevertheless, conscious that "unless the Lord build the house they labor in vain who build it" (Ps. 127:1). Therefore, once more, we fervently exhort you to pray and fast even as we struggle for clean elections. To those who can we suggest that you celebrate or participate in eucharistic celebrations for peaceful, free and honest elections. Be assured that we, your brothers and pastors, stand together with you in this common effort to build a nation worthy of God's children.

Through our concerted effort, may Jesus truly shine out in our part of the world as "a light for revelation to the nations" (Lk 2:32). Let us all in the Spirit offer ourselves to the Father with Christ in this national exercise. May he, who is God-with-us, and Mary, his mother, the patroness of our beloved country, make their presence felt by all of us in this moment of decision.

For the Catholic Bishops'
Conference of the Philippines
+ Ricardo Cardinal Vidal, D.D.
President of the CBCP

25 January 1986 -- Feast of the Conversion of St. Paul, the Apostle
Betania Retreat House
Tagaytay City



Arzobispado de Manila
1000 General Solano St.
P.O. Box 132
Manila, Philippines

December 28, 1985
Feast of the Holy Innocents

Beloved brothers and sisters in Christ:

Peace be with you! We, your pastors, wish to speak to you about the forthcoming February 7 elections.

We all know how important these elections are. They are so decisive that their failure may plunge our country into even greater instability and violence. It is thus of the utmost importance that every voting Filipino does all in his power: 1) to vote in this election; 2) to assure that it be peaceful and honest in its conduct, and 3) to ensure that it becomes really an expression of the people's sovereign will.


We know from past experience that all this does not come about automatically. Our elections and referenda in the past 20 years have been marred by widespread violence and dishonesty. On the other hand, our experience in Metro Manila in the last elections showed that with the proper vigilance and effort the people can express their will effectively through the ballot, and can ensure that that will be respected and prevail.

We wish to emphatically point out that participation in these coming elections is not only a political act. It is also an exercise of our Christian faith. We should participate in this electoral process as Christians. Our faith must exercise and manifest itself in the public domain by the way we conduct ourselves during these elections. Our Christian faith must be lived not only in the privacy of our consciences and in the sanctuary of our churches but also in our effort to make our country a place where human dignity is respected and peace, the fruit of justice and love, prevails. No one should be more concerned than Christians to shape a society worthy of God's children.

Hence, we ask ALL VOTERS:

1) Inform yourselves well of the persons and issues involved so that you can exercise an enlightened judgment in the polling places.

2) Do what you can, singly and in organized collaboration with others to promote the election into office of worthy candidates.



Arzobispado de Manila
1000 General Solano St.
P.O. Box 132
Manila, Philippines

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3) Be sure to register, and check whether you are properly registered. Be sure you can vote on February 7

4) Vote on February 7, and assure yourselves that your ballots are cast in the proper ballot boxes without being tampered with.

5) Stay around the precincts in organized numbers, especially during counting time, and help ensure that the votes are properly counted and tallied, all the way to the office of the COMELEC.

6) Do not cheat. Do not cast more than one ballot.

7) Do not sell your vote. The acceptance of money to vote for a candidate (a practice we do not encourage) DOES NOT BIND YOU TO VOTE FOR THAT CANDIDATE. No one is obliged to fulfill an evil contract.

To NAMFREL VOLUNTEERS, AND OTHERS LIKE THEM:


1) We praise, support, and endorse fully your selfless efforts. The Lord will reward you as true peacemakers.

2) Our priests and concerned parishioners are willing and ready to extend to you whatever help they can to help you pursue your noble work. Do not hesitate to ask for their cooperation.

To THOSE WHO WILL MAN AND SUPERVISE THE POLLS, AND TO THE COMELEC:

1) We are hopeful that you will do your work in a truly patriotic and Christian way. Please do not fail your country and God.

2) Please remember that you are the servants of the people, and not of any one person or political party. Count and tally the votes honestly. Respect the will of the people. It is a seriously immoral and unChristian act to cheat or make others cheat during these elections. It is a serious act of injustice against your fellow Filipinos, your country, and God, who cannot be mocked.



Arzobispado de Manila
1000 General Solano St.
P.O. Box 132
Manila, Philippines

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To THE CANDIDATES, POLITICAL PARTIES, AND THEIR FOLLOWERS:

- 1) We support your stated wish for clean, peaceful, and honest elections.
- 2) Campaign as hard as you can, but reject deceit, dishonesty and violence during these elections.
- 3) Do not buy votes, coerce, or harm people in any way.
- 4) If you commit injustice, you will be bound to undo the damage by fitting reparation. Election violence and cheating are sins that cry to heaven for vengeance.

And, finally, TO ALL FILIPINOS:

So much is involved in these elections. The very future of our country is at stake. Let no one be uninformed and indifferent. Everybody must do his share. We exhort everyone, even the children, to pray for honest and peaceful elections. We exhort those who can fast to do so for this purpose. And we exhort the sick and suffering to offer their sufferings and prayers also for this intention. By our vigilance and Christian involvement in the February 7 elections, let us prove that we are being converted to the Lord, and that there is an effective non-violent way to change the structures in our society.

May the Lord God of history, lead us all to a better future through the expression of, and respect for, the people's sovereign will. May Mary our Mother accompany us with her maternal love.

Your servants in the Lord,


(SGD) MOST REV. TEODORO BUHAIN (SGD) MOST REV. TEODORO BACANI
(SGD) MOST REV. MANUEL SOBREVIÑAS (SGD) MOST REV. GABRIEL RLYES
(SGD) MOST REV. REGINALD ARLISS (SGD) MOST REV. BIENVENIDO LOPEZ

+ JAIME L. CARDINAL SIN
Archbishop of Manila

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THE NAMFREL CORNER

Cardinal Sin's letter



Arzobispado de Manila
1800 General Santos St.
P.C. 1122
Manila, Philippines

Dear brothers in the priesthood:

Peace! You know how crucial for our country the February 7 elections are. It is certainly God's will that we do our part as religious leaders to help ensure that the elections be honest and peaceful, and truly expressive of the people's will. Hence, I write to you, as the pastor of this archdiocese, to ask you to do the following:

- 1) EVANGELIZE ALL THOSE WHO ARE INVOLVED IN THE ELECTIONS PROCESS: the voters, the persons who will man and supervise the polls (the teachers, the COMELEC personnel, the NAMFREL, people and other poll volunteers, and the members and followers of the different political parties), indeed all the people, even the sick and suffering.
 - a) Do this by personal contacts, through homilies, seminars, recollections, etc.
 - b) instruct the people on the relevance of their faith to these elections (cf. enclosed pastoral letter to the people and the Biblical Texts).
 - c) Form core groups which will conduct or help conduct with you the said seminars and recollections.
 - d) Read in all the Masses on January 1, 5, and 12, 1986 enclosed pastoral letter. Multiply copies and distribute them to your people.
- 2) ENCOURAGE YOUR PARISHIONERS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS AND TO ENSURE THAT THE POLLS BE CLEAN, PEACEFUL, AND REFLECTIVE OF THE PEOPLE'S WILL.
 - a) Ask the people to enlighten themselves on the persons and issues involved in these elections, so that they may vote wisely.
 - b) Ask them to work singly and in organized groups for the election of the candidates they deem worthy.
 - c) Tell them to register and make sure they are registered and listed properly.
 - d) Tell them to vote on February 7, and to make sure their votes are properly cast and tallied.
 - e) Tell them to exercise organized vigilance in the precincts, and all the way to the COMELEC office, to make sure that the counting and tallying of votes is done honestly and accurately. Encourage them to report election violations to the media, NAMFREL volunteers, and the COMELEC.
 - f) Support the NAMFREL. Encourage the formation of NAMFREL units in your parishes. Get your parishioners to collaborate with NAMFREL.

3) PRAY AND FAST, and ENCOURAGE YOUR PARISHIONERS TO PRAY AND FAST FOR PEACEFUL AND HONEST ELECTIONS.

- a) Pray with your people the enclosed prayer of the faithful daily, in every Mass.
- b) Encourage your parishioners to tune in to RADIO VERITAS at 6:00 A.M., 12:00 Noon, and 6:00 P.M., for the Angelus, during which there will also be a prayer for peaceful and honest elections.

Dear fathers, we are not political leaders. But as religious leaders and pastors it is our duty to provide moral guidance and encouragement to our people in these times of grave crisis. Above all, we accompany and lead our people to respond as Christians concerned not only for their own conversion of heart, but for the renewal of the temporal order according to God's will. And we must encourage them to actively seek non-violent solutions to the problems that afflict us all.

May we not fail our people and God in this crucial moment of our country's history. May we be agents of hope for our people.

SGD.

J. Jaime Card. Sin
+ JAIMIE L. CARDINAL SIN
Archbishop of Manila

(b4)

KAMALAYAN '86 REFERENCE MANUAL

I. SITUATION:

The AFP is the primary institution entrusted with the task of securing and maintaining a peaceful society. This task has become more pronounced with the forthcoming polls for the Presidency and Vice Presidency.

In past elections, however, the AFP was perceived to have fallen short of the public's expectations for it to remain impartial and non-partisan. This time the AFP will again be put to the test to help ensure clean and honest elections and to demonstrate its political neutrality. The present popular clamor for an honest, free, fair and clean elections impinges upon the AFP's basic mission. Therefore, it is imperative for the AFP to actively participate in all phases of the activity.

In this light and in line with the President's pronouncements that the conduct of the coming snap Presidential elections should be honest, clean, free and fair, the Reform AFP Movement (RAM) guided by its aspirations, and compelled by a strong sense of professional responsibility will embark on an undertaking known as KAMALAYAN '86.

II. OBJECTIVES:

a) General:

- 1) To operationalize the RAM's response to the call of the Commander-in-Chief for an honest, clean, fair and free elections.
- 2) To counter the boycott movement being encouraged by some sectors.
- 3) To counter the claim of the CPP/NPA that elections are a farce and will not make any difference.
- 4) To emphasize the non-partisan role of the AFP in the coming elections, and obviate the feeling in some quarters that the AFP will be used as a tool to favor certain sectors
- 5) To develop better appreciation and awareness of the individual and collective roles of the soldiers, as well as the public in general, in the electoral process.
- 6) To enhance the credibility of the RAM in particular and the AFP in general vis-a-vis the Filipino people.

b) Specific Objectives:

- 1) To enhance public appreciation and understanding of relevant electoral issues, and the qualifications of the candidates.
- 2) To maximize registration of voters, and encourage public involvement in the clean-up of voter's lists.
- 3) Encourage citizen attendance in political rallies and open discussion of viewpoints.
- 4) Urge the citizens to vote, and not to sell their votes.
- 5) Call for public vigilance against fraud and coercion at all stages of the electoral process.

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6) Impart to AFP personnel the significance of an honest, clean, fair and free elections, and the crucial role of the AFP in preventing attempts to subvert the will of the people.

7) To develop working relationships with civic, business, and religious organizations, and other government institutions, for mutual support and the promotion of a heightened civic-consciousness.

III. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:

a) General:

1) The Reform AFP Movement (RAM), and retired AFP Generals, in coordination with business, civic and religious organizations will conduct a series of prayer-seminars with the theme, "Honest, clean, fair and free Elections". The prayer-seminars will start with an ecumenical service followed by speakers from the COMELEC, NAMFREL, and other institutions, on the electoral process and detection and prevention of electoral frauds.

2) RAM NCR will conduct five (5) mini-symposia in major camps in the region plus a final prayer-seminar in a public area on Sunday--- 020900H Feb '86. In case the prayer-seminar cannot be held inside camp for whatever reason, alternate places outside camp will be designated.

3) Regional RAM organizations will hold prayer-seminars in as many camps as possible in their respective areas, plus a final prayer-seminar on Sunday 020900H Feb '86 at an appropriate public place.

b) Specific:

1) The project, dubbed as "KAMALAYAN 86" will be implemented in NCR by the RAM Election Sub-Committee. In addition, the NCR Election Sub-Committee will establish primary and secondary lines of communications with regional RAM representatives, and monitor, integrate and coordinate all activities related to "KAMALAYAN 86".

2) Regional RAM organizations will create regional election sub-committees to plan and implement regional "KAMALAYAN 86" activities. Regional organizations are free to develop and implement their respective concepts in attaining the objectives of the project. RAM NCR, however, will provide a copy of the Reference Manual to all regional chapters for guidance and possible adoption. Whenever possible, RAM NCR will provide names and affiliations of organizations supportive of the project in NCR, to include names and affiliations of their organizations in each region.

IV. ORGANIZATIONAL CONCEPT

RAM NCR will provide the general guidelines and support for all "KAMALAYAN 86" related activities. Regional organizations retain autonomy in planning and implementing their respective programs. See Annex A for details.

V. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS:

a) All regional organizations are autonomous in planning and implementing "KAMALAYAN 86" activities. The only guiding principles are the general and specific objectives cited, and the holding of simultaneous prayer-seminars in as many places nationwide on Sunday 020900H Feb 86.

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b) All regional organizations will provide respective logistical support. RAM NCR, however, will provide financial support dependent on material support that will be received from the different sectors of society. It is suggested that regional organizations solicit material support from regional business, civic, and religious organizations, along the same lines as NCR RAM.

VI. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS:

a) Implementation of regional plans will commence after media pronouncement by RAM NCR.

b) All attempts to stop, deter or prevent implementation of "KAMALAYAN 86" activities must be reported immediately to NCR RAM.

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San Jose, Antequera
January 26, 1986

ANNEX XXI
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The Commission on Elections
Manila

s i r s :

I wish to bring to your attention the following problems in Antequera:

1. MP Arturo Pacificador campaigns around Antequera with a big convoy of military and Ministry of Public Works trucks loaded with numerous heavily armed men in uniform. Many of them do not wear name tags. We have no way of telling whether they are military personnel or members of his private army.

In coming to and going out of Antequera, he uses military aircraft.

2. His son, Rodolfo "Deng" Pacificador, who has no known official position, also campaigns with a large retinue of heavily armed men in uniform. They also use military and Ministry of Public Works vehicles.
3. The son of Air Force Commanding General Piccio has campaigned here also with a large retinue of armed escorts.
4. The Provincial Election Supervisor is hardly present in his office or anywhere in Antequera. Last week, he was here only once and for a short time. He was in his office late in the morning of Friday, January 24, and left for Iloilo early in the afternoon of the same day.
5. The Municipal Election Registrars of several towns in the province, particularly Subic and Bugsong, hardly report to their offices.
6. The Municipal Election Registrars of some municipalities refuse to accept and/or recognize the authority I have issued to the municipal chairmen of the Dominant Opposition Party. I am enclosing a copy of my authority.

I, therefore, request the following:

1. The Comelec to send to Antequera special composite team from Manila with instructions and authority to stop the use of military personnel and/or private army as bodyguards;

The Comelec to immediately instruct the Provincial Election Supervisor and the Municipal Election Registrars to stay put in their offices and to act promptly on problems and requests relative to election matters;

Antique being one of the critical areas, the Comelec to instruct the Special Composite team to stay in Antique until the elections is over in order to supervise closely the strict enforcement of election laws.

I hope you will give these requests prompt and effective action. Thank you very much.

Very truly yours,

EVELIO B. JAVIER
Party Representative
UNIDO

February 3, 1986.

To: Sally Perez
Desk Officer
Region VI

Yesterday in Culasi after the rally, I went to Municipal Hall looking for Comelec registration. I was met and surrounded by more than 20 soldiers bristling with armalites. They started cracking their guns. They are staying in Municipal Hall. More than 50 are new imports who arrived in Culasi yesterday by helicopter, one military truck and Pacificador helicopter. They are reported to be composite of Marines. On the way to San Jose, I also met another military truck loaded with soldiers headed towards Culasi. Please reiterate request to Comelec and Gen. Ramos to send immediately special action team to stay on until Election Day. Also include Culasi in list for foreign and domestic correspondents and foreign observers. When is Hermie coming so we can adjust our schedule? Suggest tomorrow evening.

From,

EVELIO JAVIER

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Republic of the Philippines
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS.
Intramuros, Manila

LIST OF COMPLAINTS FILED WITH THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH
FEBRUARY 7, 1986 ELECTIONS

IPD DOC. NO.	COMPLAINT (2)	NATURE OF COMPLAINT (3)	ACTION TAKEN (4)
1. : Manila 86 - 1	: Report of Lt. Col Remegio Banania : Jorge Bascuy y Resaneo, et al.	: Liquor Ban violation (Sec. 261 (d), (1), : C.C.	: For investigation
2. :	86 - 2 : Report of Lt. Col Remegio Banania : Christy Apili y Dumanog, et al.	: -do-	: -do-
3. :	86 - 3 : Report of Lt. Col Remegio Banania : Dennis Pangan y Cabato, et al.	: -do-	: -do-
4. : Makati, MM	86 - 4 : Sofrenio C. Untalan, Jr. vs- Teresita : Lizendo	: Falsification of Public Document	: Under investigation
5. : Peranque, MM	86 - 5 : Alleged mauling of Mary Jane Cabrera : -vs- Andres Cruz, Jr.	: Alleged Mauling	: Request that the Commission be furnished with a copy of the re- port of Dir. Boquin.
6. : Makati, MM	86 - 6 : Alberto Lilac, et al. -vs- Cenon : Bungay, et al.	: Violation of Sec. 261 par. (f) (coercion of elective official)	: Under investigation
7. : Las Pinas MM	86 - 7 : Rey Gobenciong -vs- Atty Teresita : Suarez	: Violation of Sec. BP 883 as amplified under Sec 150, (b) in rel. to Sec 262 BP 881 (matters on polling places)	: -do-

page two (2)

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
8. :	86 - 8 : violation by Channels 4 and 13 - : Corazon C. Aquino	: Viol. of equal air or TV time (Sec. 86, OEC)	
9. : Manila	86 - 9 : R. L. V. Sagusang -vs- Cong. Ramon : Durano	: Reported news on betting on result of election (Sec. 261 (c), OEC).	: For investigation
10. : Davao Or.	86 - 10 : Galilio D. Sibala -vs- PC headed by Col: : Carlos Pma and Gov. Francisco Rabat	: Allowing the use of 6 by 6 truck in hauling chairs for the use of KBL caucus (Sec. 89, OEC)	: -do-
11. : Cam. Sur	86 - 11 : Mrs. Leticia R. Molina EB 11 -vs- Lt. : Silahis Laurel	: Violation OEC or BP 881 particularly Art XXII sec. 261, par (f), on coercion of elec. plaint tion officials or employees.	: Requested to formalize com-
12. : Bacolod City	86 - 12 : Joemar R. Golez -vs- D'Mexicano : Night Club	: Liquor Ban violation (Sec. 261 (dd), (1), OEC)	: Memo to Atty. Rodolfo Sarroza
13. : Cam. Sur	86 - 13 : Corazon C. Aquino -vs- Voice of the Phil.	: Vio. of Sec. 86 of BP Blg. 881 (Equal air time violation)	
14. : Lanno N.	86 - 14 : Falao Macabending, et al. -vs- Ms. : Capocac B. Arumpac	: Vio. of the Civil Service Law & the OEC (Sec. 261 (i), OEC)	: Forwarded to FE Supervisor for appropriate action
15. : N. Samar	86 - 15 : Carlito Palacio, et al. -vs- Chairman (San Antonio); : Poll clerks of all Precincts	: Vio. of OEC by convincing voters to vote CORY-AQUINO OR monetary consideration (Sec. 261 (e), OEC)	: Under Prel. investigation on ac- of investigation - Feb. 21/8 Cuterman, Ms - Atty Arnaldo
16. : Makati	86 - 16 : Christian Monsod -vs- Armed Men	: -do-	
17. : Manila	86 - 17 : Complaint against Greg Garcia y : Vibar	: Liquor Ban violation (Sec. 261 (dd), (1), OEC)	
18. :	86 - 18 : Report submitted by Elena Cuachon	: Submits the list of voters and their cor- responding approval by the members of the Citizen Elec. Com. of Makati (Viol. of Registration Law (PD 1096).	: For investigation.
19. : Zamb. N.	86 - 19 : Complaint against Wilfredo Ello, et al.	: Viol. of sub-sec. (bb) of Sec. 261 of Art. I XXII of the OEC (Offenses by bdas. of inspec=pliate action tors or unwar .rs)	: Forwarded to RED for appro-

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
20. : Ormoc : City	86 - 20 : Complaint of Monico V. Jacob :	: Huge Billboard of Pres. Marcos : (Sec. 85 (b), OEC) :	: Telegram to LR directed to : investigate and to take appropriate : action
21. : Cam. Sur	86 - 21 : Sotero Docasa, Jr. & ER Rosalinda : Abordo, et al.	: Viol. Elec. Offense pursuant to the provision of (1) (bb), Sec. 261 Art. XII of OEC (Absenting by board member)	:
22. : Manila	86 - 22 : Teodoro V. Cadelenia -vs- ER of Luna : Isabela	: Liquor Ban (Sec. 261 (dd), (1), OEC) :	:
23. : Agusan : Sur	86 - 23 : Petition for Review filed by Atty Marcelino P. Areas relative to IS No. 85 6582 against Rosita P. Baldiano	: Viol. of Sec. 103 in rel. to Sec. 179 PD 1296 (Election expenditures) :	: Returning Folder to Prov. P. Claudio Mistral for the purpose of conducting Prel. investigation
24. :	86 - 24 : IS No. 65-883 against Alejandro C. Obien	: Change of polling place (Viol. of Sec. 66, RTR 1296, 1984 Batasang elections)	: Returned to P. d. Agusan Sur for prel. investigation
25. : Binago- : nan, Rizal	86 - 25 : Atty. Francisco Sumulong -vs- ER Agrifino de Guzman, Jr.	: Failure to report for duty (Viol. of Sec. 7, RTR 883)	: Forwarded to Atty Cesario P. for action
26. : Davao : Sur	86 - 26 : Gliselda Budinas, et al. -vs- Bgy. Capt. Santiago Lacson	: Viol. of Sec. 83 of BP 881 otherwise known as OEC (Destroying lawful election propaganda)	: Forwarded to Atty. Florentino Balo
27. : Lanco	86 - 27 : Complaint of Samuel Bautista	: About the news report of Jam Maridel about the Ghost Barangay	: Forwarded to Atty. Manasupa for appropriate action
28. :	86 - 28 : KBL represented by Nicanor Yniquez -vs- NMFREL, Jose Concepcion, Jr. and Vicente Jayme	: Viol. of Sec. 261 (y) (9), 180, 178 52 (k) & 96 of BP Blg. 881 (OEC) (also cert. of votes, soliciting from foreigners)	:

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	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
29	86-29 : Raul L. Gonzales vs. Ruling KBL, Burhaman ... Tarawan, et al.	: Terrorism by KBL (Sec. 261 (a), OXC)	: Telegram sent to Lt. Gen. Ramos to investigate and take action	
30	Cadiz City 86-30: Atty. Frances Guanzon vs. Rodriguez Desuyo	: Failure to post list of voters (Sec. 148, OXC)	: For investigation by RDC VI	
31	Dulcean 86-31 : Ruben David et al v. So. Ray Aquia et al	: Threats and coercion (Sec. 261 (a), OXC)	: For investigation by RDC I	
32	So. Leyte 86-32 : Letter of Lt. Pascual Diloy on use of timetable posters.	: Illegal poster (Sec. 85 (b), OXC)	: For investigation	
33	Ar' que 86-33 : Evario Javier vs. Arturo Pacificador	: Campaigning with military personnel and vehicle (Sec. 261 (a), OXC)	: For investigation	
34	Laguna 86-34 : Monico Jacob v. P.S. f. Lopez	: Distributing pre-prepared voters affidavit (Sec. 128, OXC)	: For investigation	
35	Pampanga 86-35 : Reported fake ballots in M.L.Y.M. by Liran Guiao and reported by Benjie Gavarra d. Elmer Cato	: Fake ballots (Sec. 184, OXC)	: For investigation (Complainant failed to appear at initial hearing)	
36	Pasay City 86-36 : Felina Seralico v KBL leaders in Pasay	: Removal of KBL streamers (Sec. 83, OXC)	: Investigation revealed com unknown	
37	Laakati 86-37 : Jojo Gar C. Bincy v. Dr. Strong -maste-	: Intervention of public official (Sec. 261 (1), OXC)	: For investigation	

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(1)	(2)	:	(3)	:	(4)	
38	: Negros Manila 86-38: Namfrol Christian Monksod report	:	: Many voters cannot find their names in list of voters (Sec. 135, ODC)	:	: For investigation	
39	: Several places 86-39 : Namfrol Christian Monksod letter of Feb. 7, 1986 on acts against the NAMFROL volunteers in Antequera, Quirino, Cavite, Maic, Negros del Norte, Bamban, Tarlac, and Isabela	:	: Violation of agreement with Comelec on Namfrol volunteers	:	: For investigation	
40	: Samar, Z. 86-40 : Elec. Reg. Jose M. Capacite	:	: Illegal transfer of civil service personnel (Sec. 261 (h), ODC)	:	: For investigation	
41	: Mandaluyong 86-41: Atty. Mariano Defensor vs. John Does	:	: Gunshots and shouting in polling places (Sec. 261 (z), (11), ODC; Sec. 261 (p), ODC)	:	: For investigation	
42	:	86-42 : Pedro Quidra v. Namfrol Joso Conception, et al.	:	: Alarming reports on election results (Sec. 261 (z), (11), ODC)	:	: For investigation
43	:	Mis. Or. 86-43 : Rosita de los Santos v. Colai Paganipuan	:	: Destruction of lawful elec. propaganda (Sec. 83, ODC)	:	: For investigation
44	: Olongapo 86-44 : Maria Darungao, Pres. Tricycle Assoc. of Olongapo City	:	: Threats for being leader of Mayor Gordon	:	: For investigation	
45	:	Naga City 86-45 : Luis Villafuerte v. Prov. Bd. Canvassers:	: Left canvassing before completing it work (Sec. 231, ODC)	:	: For investigation	

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:	(1)	:	(2)	:	(3)	:	(4)
46	:	Caloocan City 86-46 : Report of E.R. G. Brantista on snatching of ballot boxes	:	: Snatching of ballot boxes (Sec. 261 (z), (11), ODC)	:	: For investigation	
47	:	Laguna Sur 86-47 : DDL of Laguna Sur v. M. Omar Dianalan	:	: Threats, coercion firearms (Sec. 261, (a), (f), (p), ODC)	:	: For investigation	
48	:	86-48 : Pedro Quidra c. NPA and Oppositionists	:	: Armed goons, threats of poll officials (Sec. 261 (a), (f), (p), ODC)	:	: For investigation	
49	:	Naga City 86-49 : NBI report vs. M. B. Cea	:	: Firearms, threats, coercion of poll officials (Sec. 261 (a), (f), (p) ODC)	:	: For investigation	
50	:	Naga City 86-50 : Rufino Villagomos vs. Namfrol	:	: Illegally entering polling places (Sec. 192, ODC)	:	: For investigation	
51	:	Cam. Sur 86-51 : Ruben Icamos vs. M. Bd. Cea	:	: Illegal detention of poll watcher (Sec. 261 (c), ODC)	:	: For investigation	
52	:	Cavite 86-104 : Report of PDS M. Brantista of Cavite on CMC forces entering school campus	:	: CMC forces entering school campus (Sec. 232 or 192, ODC)	:	: For investigation	
53	:	Cebu City 86-105 : Report of Atty. Aurelio Rios by Judge Bundio Arriola	:	: Vote buying (Sec. 261 (a), ODC)	:	: For investigation	
54	:	East. Samar 86-107 : Jose Ramirez	:	: Hiring of CMC forces	:	: For investigation	

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page seven (7)

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
55 : Zambo Norte 86-108: Atty. Ernesto Amatong	: Fraud and terrorism (Sec. 261 (a), OEC)	: For Lt. Col. Ramos to take appropriate action	
56 : Antique 86-109: Tel. of UNIDO Chairman	: Culasi Mun. Bldg. looks like military Edgtris. (Sec. 192, OEC)		: For investigation
57 : Basilan 86-110: Failure of election, UNIDO leader slain : (Sec. 6, OEC) Tel. of RJD Obsequio	: Failure of election (Sec. 6, OEC)		: For consideration and investigation
58 : Quirino 86-111 : Tel. of Mayor M. Pimentel	: Harassing and threatening of voters (Sec. 261 (e), OEC)		: For investigation
59 : S. Cotabato 86-112 : Tel. of UNIDO vs. owner of Station DZKL	: Equal time violation (Sec. 86, OEC)		: For investigation
60 : Sorsogon 86-113: UNILDO chapter v. KBL billboards	: KBL billboards in Bonifacio St. An Highway, (Sec. 65 (b), OEC):		: For investigation
61 : Cebu 86-114 : Tel. of Dr Hurtado	: Snatching of ballot boxes (Sec. 261(z), (12), OEC)		: For investigation
62 : Pasay 86-115 : Tel. of Namfrel	: Gen. Piccio ordered Namfrel rep. to get out of Pct. 356, Villamor Air Base.		: For investigation
63 : Davao Or. 86-116: Tel. complaint in Voting Places of Peta. 48 and 34, Davao Or.	: Stopped voting at 12:15 P.M. and armed men snatched ballot boxes		: For investigation

February 15, 1986.

Submitted by: Law Dep. rt. mt., Comptec, Manila

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ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
TO ENSURE FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS

This paper summarizes the response of the Philippine Government to the eight points the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee considers critical to a free and fair election.

1. NAMFREL and other non-partisan groups accredited as citizens arms of the poll body. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) granted accreditation to the following organizations as its citizens arms:
 - a. National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL)
 - b. Philippine Jaycees
 - c. Movement of Organized Volunteers for Enlightenment and Reform (MOVER)
 - d. Integrated Bar of the Philippines
2. UNIDO accredited as the Dominant Opposition Party (DOP). The United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO) was accredited by COMELEC as the Dominant Opposition Party because it possesses the five criteria enumerated in the relevant law, Batas Pambansa Blg. 883. Other political groups which filed petitions but fell short of the criteria included:

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- a. Laban ng Bayan
- b. Liberal Party
- c. Philippine Labor Party

3. Two (2) COMELEC vacant seats filled. President Marcos appointed two (2) more persons to fill the vacancies in the nine-Man Commission on Elections.

The new Commissioners were:

- a. Jaime J. Layosa, who was recommended by NA REL
- b. Rung Agpalo, who was recommended by the JAYCEES International and other civic groups.

4. The Dominant Opposition Party granted equal access to COMELEC time and space. In accordance with the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC allotted equal time and space to all candidates, with the warnings that franchises of television stations and publications concerned would be revoked if there were violations.

Acting on a complaint by the Opposition Presidential candidate, the Movie and Television

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Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) issued a certificate for television exhibition of two (2) UNIDO commercials on TV Channel 13. The television station reportedly refused to air the commercials because they had to be previewed and approved first by MTRCB.

5. Equal access to paid media ensured. Outside the COMELEC hour and space provisions, decisions on commercial usage are concerns of private business and the strategies of each campaign. The COMELEC is investigating claims of unequal exposure by the two contending parties. The Supreme Court, in the UNIDO vs. COMELEC case, ruled that, owing to his peculiar position, the President's activities and pronouncements are given wider coverage than those of the other candidates.
6. The military's role delineated to be impartial. Various steps have been undertaken to ensure the appropriate role of the military for the election.

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- 4 -

- a. Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Fabian C. Ver urged members of the Armed Forces to be strictly neutral in the presidential election.
- b. As deputized by the COMELEC, Lt. General Fidel V. Ramos, Armed Forces Vice Chief of staff has:
 - i. Designated ten military and police generals to look into preparations to ensure the holding of peaceful and orderly elections.
 - ii. Activated the Philippine Constabulary Monitoring Center to help monitor, coordinate and supervise all election-related law enforcement efforts.
 - iii. Organized a Special Action Office for Honest, Orderly and Peaceful Elections (SAO-HOPE) in Camp Crame to oversee law enforcement efforts and backstop the Special Action Teams created earlier.

- 5 -

- c. Pursuant to COMELEC Resolution 1737^o, Special Action Teams, headed by COMELEC representatives, were created to supervise the conduct of the election and voting.
 - d. COMELEC has denied permission for the Citizens Military Training Corporation (CMT) to be deputized for the presidential election, indicating that the Philippine Constabulary and the Integrated National Police were more than enough to ensure free and peaceful elections.
7. COMELEC and NAMFREL agreed to undertake separate quick ballot count. A quick count operation involving computers was disregarded because of its prohibitive cost. The COMELEC and NAMFREL have agreed to undertake separate unofficial tabulations of the election results. They agreed on a joint system of collecting the results from the precincts and bringing them to Manila where these will be tallied at two tabulations centers. There will be simultaneous public announcements of the results.
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8. International observers welcome to the Philippines.

President Marcos has invited observers to visit the Philippines and study the electoral process.

In January, some 105 foreign observers and journalists have registered with COMELEC.

Representatives of the National Republican and Democratic Institutes for International Affairs visited Manila in mid-January and are coming with Senator Richard Lugar's delegation in February. All foreigners, however, will not be allowed within 50 meters of polling places so as not to interfere with the electoral process.

RADIO PHILIPPINES NETWORK, INC.

Broadcast City, Capitol Hills
Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines
Tel: 977-661 to 69
Telex No 63686 KA12EE PN



29 January 1986

Mrs. Lupita Kashiwahara
Media Director
CORY FOR PRESIDENT
Media Bureau

Madam:

In reply to your letter dated January 25, 1986, we regret to inform you that we cannot provide you television airtime for your candidates Mrs. Cory Aquino and Mr. Salvador Laurel.

This is in compliance with our existing policy memorandum which prohibits the sale of airtime for political programs. This policy had been adopted to avoid disruption of our regular programs which are already doing well in the ratings.

The KBL has approached us in the past to make a similar request and we also had no choice but to turn them down.

Very truly yours,

CASEY FRANCISCO
Asst. General Manager
for RPN Programming

cc: RBasilio;
File.



January 29, 1986

Ms. Lupita A. Kashiwahara
Media Director
Unido/Laban Media Bureau

Dear Madam:

In connection with your letter dated January 25, 1986, we regret to inform you that we are unable to grant your demand for airtime to feature your candidates, Ms. Cory Aquino and Mr Salvador Laurel.

In our continuing effort to maintain the consistency of our entertainment programs, the station has an existing policy of not accepting any programs that are political in nature.

We have declined a similar offer from the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan to buy airtime for its candidates.

Very truly yours,

Vic P. Vianzon
VIC P. VIANZON
General Manager

ESTIMATE OF DISENFRANCHISED VOTERS

TOTAL NO. OF REGISTERED VOTERS : 26,181,829

ACTUAL NO. OF VOTES CANVASSED BY THE BATASAN : 20,150,160

% OF ACTUAL TO REGISTERED VOTERS : 76.96%

IF 1986 ELECTION TURNOUT WERE BASED ON 1984
BATASAN ELECTION TURNOUT : 23,422,264

LESS: ACTUAL NO. OF VOTES CANVASSED BY
THE BATASAN : 20,150,160

ESTIMATED NO. OF DISENFRANCHISED VOTERS : 3,272,104

ESTIMATED NUMBER OF DISENFRANCHISED VOTERS
FEBRUARY 7, 1986 ELECTIONS
VS OF FEBRUARY 17, 1984

REGION/PROVINCE/CITY	NO. OF REGISTERED VOTERS FOR 02-07-86 ELECTIONS	ACTUAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS BY PARTIES	ACTUAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS 1985	% ACTUAL TO REGISTERED VOTERS 1984	ESTIMATED DISENFRANCHISEMENT BASED ON 1984 TURNOUT		
					% IN %	IN NUMBER OF VOTERS	WINNER
NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION							
CITY OF MANILA	1,039,466	797,217	76,75%	83.93%	12.23%	127,100	AQUINO
QUEZON CITY	656,358	618,973	72.27%	87.25%	14.96%	128,294	AQUINO
CALOOCAN CITY	325,205	230,250	70.45%	83.91%	19.46%	60,313	MARCOS
PASAY CITY	203,623	131,912	72.32%	87.64%	16.32%	33,093	MARCOS
NAKATI	350,739	202,451	57.71%	71.67%	13.96%	48,959	MARCOS
MANDALUYONG-SAN JUAN	244,608	161,422	65.99%	80.71%	17.72%	43,347	AQUINO
NAPIKINA-PASIG	331,695	245,547	74.03%	87.43%	13.40%	44,445	AQUINO
NAVOTAS-MALAIZON-VALENZUELA	337,723	251,728	64.94%	82.74%	17.77%	63,993	AQUINO
PARANAQUE-LAGUNA PINAS	265,372	201,702	70.63%	84.81%	14.15%	40,331	AQUINO
PATEROS-TAGUIG-MUNTINLUPA	246,960	158,272	64.10%	85.24%	21.14%	52,213	AQUINO
N C R TOTAL	4,273,410	3,020,071	70.59%	85.77%	15.12%	649,094	AQUINO
REGION I							
→ A B R A	87,366	81,201	92.94%	76.68%	3.74%	3,264	MARCOS
BENGUET	115,154	95,209	82.76%	93.62%	12.86%	14,311	AQUINO
→ ILOCOS NORTE	127,935	190,523	96.26%	97.56%	1.28%	2,527	MARCOS
→ ILOCOS SUR	217,537	217,600	98.78%	97.17%	9.39%	20,780	MARCOS
→ LA UNION	264,103	232,422	88.05%	97.47%	9.44%	24,922	MARCOS
MOUNTAIN PROVINCE	46,245	20,654	45.09%	25.45%	40.36%	18,662	AQUINO
PANGASINAN	757,933	639,179	64.35%	96.66%	12.35%	93,441	MARCOS
BAQUIO CITY	86,158	67,236	78.04%	73.35%	15.31%	13,192	MARCOS
DAGUPAN CITY	53,972	45,371	84.96%	96.07%	11.13%	6,010	AQUINO
→ LADAG CITY	45,775	44,063	96.30%	93.51%	-	-	MARCOS
SAN CARLOS CITY	45,041	38,316	82.70%	96.18%	13.46%	6,530	MARCOS
REGION I TOTAL	1,949,239	1,675,463	85.95%	96.35%	10.40%	203,943	MARCOS
REGION II							
→ BATANES	7,022	5,311	77.75%	85.53%	2.67%	134	AQUINO
→ CAGAYAN	388,974	310,893	81.96%	77.52%	17.74%	57,666	MARCOS
IFUGAO	51,376	11,125	22.25%	93.53%	71.27%	36,500	AQUINO
→ ISABELA	452,237	422,966	91.95%	96.25%	4.27%	19,627	MARCOS
KALINGA-APAYAO	79,225	63,174	82.83%	83.30%	-	-	MARCOS
→ NUEVA VIZCAYA	173,270	102,742	77.05%	96.11%	14.76%	19,332	MARCOS

REGION/PROVINCE/CITY	NO. OF REGISTERED VOTERS FOR 03-07-86 ELECTIONS	ACTUAL NUMBER OF VOTES CANVASSED BY BATASAN	% ACTUAL TO REGISTERED VOTERS 1983		% ACTUAL TO REGISTERED VOTERS 1984		DISENFRANCHISEMENT BASED ON 1984 TURNOUT.		
			IN %	IN %	IN %	IN %	NUMBER OF VOTERS	WINNER	
REGION III									
CATAAN	196,380	137,147	70.58%	71.32%	17.74%	33,055	MARCOS		
BULACAN	630,024	496,116	78.75%	89.09%	0.54%	53,172	AQUINO		
NUEVA ECija	430,876	354,043	83.17%	94.07%	11.90%	51,282	MARCOS		
PAMPANGA	460,307	359,890	77.68%	87.47%	9.59%	44,178	AQUINO		
TARLAC	353,414	296,248	81.00%	94.01%	13.01%	43,997	MARCOS		
ZAMBALES	159,321	133,118	83.29%	96.13%	12.84%	20,518	MARCOS		
ANGELES CITY	98,044	70,130	71.53%	85.92%	14.39%	14,109	AQUINO		
CAFANATUAN CITY	75,436	62,835	83.24%	94.00%	10.76%	6,122	MARCOS		
OLONGAPO CITY	108,244	82,159	75.46%	91.70%	16.22%	17,551	MARCOS		
PALAYAN CITY	9,854	8,847	69.78%	90.40%	0.62%	61	MARCOS		
SAN JOSE CITY	37,385	32,995	88.28%	96.53%	9.27%	3,093	MARCOS		
REGION III TOTAL	2,550,935	2,022,522	79.29%	91.17%	11.38%	303,238	MARCOS		
REGION IV									
AURORA	42,324	38,723	72.15%	94.20%	16.05%	8,007	MARCOS		
BATANGAS	432,645	392,423	31.31%	75.06%	13.75%	55,377	AQUINO		
CAVITE	435,456	339,924	77.04%	90.26%	12.44%	54,166	MARCOS		
LAGUNA	511,084	402,320	78.72%	90.87%	12.15%	62,102	AQUINO		
MAPINDUQUE	32,237	24,577	83.64%	97.54%	13.90%	12,415	AQUINO		
OCIDENTAL MINDORO	110,302	79,144	71.70%	95.35%	21.65%	23,898	MARCOS		
ORIENTAL MINDORO	201,995	152,127	76.62%	87.75%	10.93%	22,064	AQUINO		
PALAWAN	157,136	94,740	62.92%	92.89%	23.96%	61,213	AQUINO		
QUEZON	454,671	342,402	77.22%	93.05%	15.06%	60,974	AQUINO		
PITAL	376,786	291,683	77.31%	87.76%	12.35%	45,520	AQUINO		
SOMELON	35,222	20,224	52.40%	93.52%	11.12%	9,476	AQUINO		
BATANGAS CITY	77,976	64,329	82.50%	94.42%	11.92%	9,296	AQUINO		
CAVITE CITY	56,595	45,571	80.52%	93.58%	13.06%	7,371	MARCOS		
LIPA CITY	64,424	52,317	82.76%	94.31%	11.55%	7,439	AQUINO		
LUCENA CITY	61,221	49,262	79.84%	92.48%	12.82%	7,042	AQUINO		
PUEBLO PRINCESA CITY	41,289	31,071	76.34%	92.05%	16.85%	5,957	MARCOS		
CAN PASCUAL CITY	37,723	25,027	68.05%	84.11%	10.92%	8,495	AQUINO		
TAPOANTAY CITY	11,013	8,000	74.16%	84.16%	11.58%	1,876	MARCOS		
BUENOS MARTIPIES CITY	8,712	7,577	85.80%	93.05%	8.05%	1,354	MARCOS		
REGION IV TOTAL	2,264,782	1,820,162	77.63%	89.16%	11.46%	425,917	AQUINO		

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ANNEX XXV
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REGISTERED VOTERS
CANVASED BY DATASAN
FOR 02-07-84
ELECTIONS
REGION/PROVINCE/CITY

VOTERS
IN
VOTES
WILDER
IN
VOTES

REGION/VII	VOTERS FOR 02-07-84 ELECTIONS 1984	VOTERS CANVASED BY DATASAN 1984	VOTERS IN 1984	PERCENTAGE IN VOTES	WILDER IN VOTES
REGION VII					
BOROBOL	76,992	323,896	85,995	97.23%	11.24%
CEBU	515,489	83,262	95,311	12.04%	74.57%
NEGROS ORIENTAL	314,806	224,275	71,244	89.89%	16.45%
SIGUIJOR	37,428	34,137	91,213	77.44%	6.23%
BAIS CITY	24,879	18,382	23,893	92.72%	18.85%
CANLAON CITY	14,642	10,775	73,661	91.88%	18.32%
CEBU CITY	305,087	228,887	75,027	90.00%	14.98%
DANAOG CITY	38,696	57,568	98,085	93.88%	0.80%
DUMAGUETE CITY	37,887	31,861	84,075	91.70%	7.41%
LAPU-LAPU CITY	53,168	43,852	82,495	93.46%	10.97%
MANDAUE CITY	72,239	57,499	79,605	92.63%	13.23%
TAGBILARAN CITY	26,361	21,895	83,065	95.32%	12.26%
TOLEDO CITY	77,45,298	35,403	78,16%	93.59%	15.43%
REGION VIII TOTAL	1,988,641	1,605,919	60,753	93.64%	13.09%
REGION VIII					
EASTERN SAMAR	134,528	97,451	72,44%	82.25%	9.79%
LEYTE	535,694	444,343	32,95%	74.59%	11.64%
NORTHERN SAMAR	165,909	113,965	68,63%	73.53%	4.90%
SAMAR	172,634	117,350	67,92%	70.31%	2.33%
SOUTHERN LEYTE	150,919	131,439	87,09%	96.53%	9.44%
CALBAYOG CITY	48,687	40,536	83,26%	91.98%	8.72%
ORMOC CITY	54,628	43,622	79,85%	94.48%	14.63%
TACLOBAN CITY	62,814	51,234	81,56%	92.28%	10.72%
REGION VIII TOTAL	1,325,813	1,039,840	73,43%	67.53%	9.10%
REGION IX					
BASILAN	92,481	52,419	56,69%	86.16%	29.50%
SULU	229,282	163,233	71,19%	86.86%	15.67%
TAU-TAU	79,723	76,449	95.89%	79.43%	-
ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE	218,102	148,712	68,12%	87.14%	18.96%
ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR	370,741	263,342	71,05%	81.42%	10.39%
DAPITAN CITY	27,403	22,257	61,21%	91.02%	9.02%
DIPOLOG CITY	34,417	27,713	20,52%	93.56%	13.04%
MAGANIAN CITY	43,554	31,489	72,30%	85.31%	11.01%
ZEPTANGA CITY	182,440	110,403	65,07%	85.31%	12.22%
REGION IX TOTAL	1,070,070	70,070	54,75%	61.70%	11.20%

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REGION/PROVINCE/CITY	NO. OF REGISTERED VOTERS FOR 02-07-84 ELECTIONS	ACTUAL NUMBER OF VOTES LAUNCHED BY BATASAN	% ACTUAL TO REGISTERED VOTERS	NUMBER OF VOTERS IN RANK		NUMBER OF VOTERS REGISTERED IN 1984	NAME OF WINNER
				% OF VOTES LAUNCHED BY BATASAN	% OF VOTES LAUNCHED BY BATASAN		
REGION X							
ADUSAN DEL NORTE	102,132	78,734	77.09%	87.71%	10.62%	10,846	MARCOS
AGUEAN DEL SUR	137,939	102,821	74.54%	70.99%	-	-	MARCOS
BUKIDNON	309,046	230,952	74.73%	88.26%	13.53%	41,812	MARCOS
CAMIGUIN	20,434	26,724	87.81%	97.50%	9.69%	2,949	ABUINO
MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL	113,845	93,762	82.36%	90.59%	8.23%	9,370	MARCOS
MISAMIS ORIENTAL	186,717	144,495	77,39%	84.67%	7.28%	13,598	MARCOS
SURIGAO DEL NORTE	149,801	123,821	82.66%	92.03%	9.37%	14,041	MARCOS
BUTUAN CITY	102,569	75,082	73.20%	76.70%	3.50%	3,598	AQUINO
CABAYAN DE ORO CITY	149,116	75,857	50.87%	90.79%	39.92%	59,525	ABUTING
GINOOOG CITY	39,238	31,887	81.27%	89.53%	6.26%	3,243	MARCOS
ORDOQUIETA CITY	25,486	21,912	83.96%	92.49%	6.51%	1,660	AQUINO
OZAMIZ CITY	45,023	35,132	78.04%	88.90%	10.86%	4,888	ABUINO
SURIGAO CITY	45,243	34,196	75.58%	86.10%	10.32%	4,760	AQUINO
TANGUB CITY	19,210	16,473	35.75%	94.69%	8.94%	1,717	AQUINO
REGION X TOTAL	1,455,601	1,091,853	75.00%	66.45%	11.45%	171,998	MARCOS
REGION XI							
DAVAO DEL NORTE	415,005	315,793	76.34%	87.32%	10.98%	45,387	MARCOS
DAVAO ORIENTAL	164,233	116,391	70.87%	92.15%	21.28%	34,950	AQUINO
DAVAO DEL SUR	243,633	185,132	75.99%	89.45%	13.46%	32,798	MARCOS
SOUTH COTABATO	289,173	204,250	70.67%	84.57%	13.90%	40,203	AQUINO
SURIGAO DEL SUR	188,984	135,897	72.44%	85.06%	12.64%	23,891	AQUINO
DAVAO CITY	363,636	267,479	73.56%	81.95%	8.39%	30,521	AQUINO
GEN. SANTOS CITY	89,113	59,481	66.75%	77.29%	10.54%	9,394	AQUINO
REGION XI TOTAL	1,751,779	1,286,523	73.36%	85.80%	12.44%	217,346	AQUINO
REGION XII							
LANAO DEL NORTE	189,791	144,397	76.33%	67.21%	10.86%	20,620	MARCOS
LANAO DEL SUR	242,151	220,446	91.03%	84.15%	-	-	MARCOS
MAGUITNDANAO	332,575	240,240	72.27%	72.57%	20.30%	67,517	MARCOS
NORTH COTABATO	283,009	184,816	65.20%	32.88%	17.58%	49,742	AQUINO
SULTAN KUDARAT	141,622	95,316	67.49%	86.86%	19.42%	27,497	MARCOS
COTABATO CITY	49,011	27,477	54.40%	76.70%	20.10%	9,858	AQUINO
ILIGAN CITY	95,602	72,612	73.10%	88.13%	15,03%	14,372	AQUINO
MARAWI CITY	39,454	27,072	68.62%	81.61%	12.99%	5,126	MARCOS
REGION XII TOTAL	1,373,251	1,010,716	72.40%	86.58%	12.90%	194,731	MARCOS

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ESTIMATED
DISPENSATION ELEMENT
BASED ON 1978 CENSUS
IN % OF VOTERS
IN RANK
NUMBER
OF VOTERS
REGISTERED
VOTERS
1984
BY BATASAN

ANNEX X
Page 19

BB

TEN (10) CITIES/PROVINCES WITH THE HIGHEST % OF ACTUAL VOTES

<u>PROVINCE/</u> <u>CITY</u>	<u>1986: % ACTUAL</u> <u>TO REGISTERED</u>	<u>1984: % ACTUAL</u> <u>TO REGISTERED</u>	<u>WINNER</u>
DANAO CITY	98.08	98.88	MARCOS
IG CITY	96.32	93.51	MARCOS
MARCUS NORTE	96.28	97.56	MARCOS
TAWI-TAWI	95.89	79.43	MARCOS
ABRA	92.94	96.68	MARCOS
ISABELA	91.97	96.25	MARCOS
SIQUEIJOR	91.20	97.44	MARCOS
DANAO DEL SUR.	90.78	84.15	MARCOS
PALAYAN CITY	89.78	90.40	MARCOS
KALINGA-APAYAO	88.83	83.33	MARCOS

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TEN (10) CITIES/PROVINCES WITH THE LOWEST % OF ACTUAL VOTES

<u>PROVINCE/</u>	<u>1986: % ACTUAL</u>	<u>1984: % ACTUAL</u>	
<u>CITY</u>	<u>TO REGISTERED</u>	<u>TO REGISTERED</u>	<u>WINNER</u>
IFUGAO	22.26	93.53	AQUINO
MIL. PROVINCE	45.09	85.45	AQUINO
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY	50.87	90.79	AQUINO
BUEN	53.93	92.89	AQUINO
CAPIOTA CITY	56.43	89.92	MARCOS
CUTABATO CITY	56.60	76.70	AQUINO
BASILAN	56.68	86.18	AQUINO
MAKATI	57.71	71.67	MARCOS
PATEROS/TAGUIG/			
MUNTINLUPA	64.10	85.24	AQUINO
NIVOTAS/MALARON/			
LALENZUELA	64.94	82.74	AQUINO

TOTALS - AREAS WITH OVER 90% TURNDOUT

	REGISTERED	TOTAL VOTE	TURNOUT	MARCOS	AQUINO	MARCOS	MARGIN	MARCOS
CITY	58,696	57,567	98.08%	57,225	342	99.41%	56,883	ANNEX XXVII.1
	45,775	44,077	96.29%	43,189	888	97.99%	42,301	Page 194
NORI	197,983	190,615	96.28%	189,897	718	99.62%	189,179	
AN	79,723	76,435	95.88%	65,096	11,339	85.17%	53,757	
	87,366	81,180	92.92%	77,386	3,794	95.33%	73,592	
A	459,837	422,932	91.97%	402,860	20,072	95.25%	382,788	
DEL	242,164	220,431	91.03%	191,755	28,676	86.99%	163,079	
TAL	1,171,544	1,093,237	93.32%	1,027,408	65,829	93.98%	961,579	
AL	126,181,829	120,098,913	76.77%	10,807,197	19,291,716	53.77%	1,515,481	

ASANG TOTALS - AREAS WHERE MARCOS WINS BY 90% OR MORE

	REGISTERED	TOTAL VOTE	TURNOUT	MARCOS	AQUINO	MARCOS	MARGIN	MARCOS
DS NORI	197,983	190,615	96.28%	189,897	718	99.62%	189,179	ANNEX
CITY	58,696	57,567	98.06%	57,225	342	99.41%	56,883	XXVII.2
	45,775	44,077	96.29%	43,189	888	97.99%	42,301	Page 194
	87,366	81,180	92.92%	77,386	3,794	95.33%	73,592	
ELA	459,837	422,932	91.97%	402,860	20,072	95.25%	382,788	
Z	50,115	38,751	77.32%	36,061	2,690	93.06%	33,371	
TOTAL	899,772	835,122	92.81%	806,618	28,504	96.59%	778,114	
ONAL	126,181,829	120,098,913	76.77%	10,807,197	19,291,716	53.77%	1,515,481	

ASANG TOTALS - AREAS WHERE MARCOS WINS BY MORE THAN 150,000 VOTES

	REGISTERED	TOTAL VOTE	TURNOUT	MARCOS	AQUINO	MARCOS	MARGIN	MARCOS
BELA	459,837	422,932	91.97%	402,860	20,072	95.25%	382,788	ANNEX
GAYAH	388,976	318,828	81.97%	275,925	42,903	86.54%	233,022	XXVII.3
MARCOS NORI	197,983	190,615	96.28%	189,897	718	99.62%	189,179	Page 194
UNION	264,103	232,324	87.97%	204,844	27,480	88.17%	177,364	
MARCOS SUR	247,587	219,676	88.73%	191,613	28,063	87.23%	163,550	
NAO DEL	242,164	220,431	91.03%	191,755	28,676	86.99%	163,079	
NGASININ	757,935	638,703	84.27%	398,138	240,565	62.34%	157,573	
YUTE	535,694	444,064	82.90%	300,803	143,261	67.74%	157,542	
TOTAL	3,094,279	2,687,573	86.86%	2,155,835	531,738	80.21%	1,624,097	
ONAL	126,181,829	120,098,913	76.77%	10,807,197	19,291,716	53.77%	1,515,481	

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**BATASANG TOTALS BY REGION
AQUINO VICTORY AREAS**

AREA	TOTAL VOTE	TURNOUT	MARCOS	AQUINO	AQUINO	AQUINO MARGIN
QUEZON	615,931	71.92%	272,968	342,963	55.68%	69,995
BULACAN	495,170	78.60%	219,432	275,738	55.69%	56,306
PAMPANGA	358,405	77.78%	114,733	243,672	67.99%	128,939
BATANGAS	392,090	81.24%	155,474	236,616	60.35%	81,142
QUEZON	361,984	77.90%	136,312	225,672	62.34%	89,360
ALBAY	234,564	78.48%	75,354	159,210	67.87%	83,856
CAMARINES	331,985	79.84%	110,078	221,907	66.84%	111,829
CEBU CITY	228,028	74.74%	60,748	167,280	73.36%	106,532
TOTAL	3,018,157	77.02%	1,145,099	1,920,161	63.62%	727,959
NATIONAL	20,098,913	76.77%	10,807,197	9,291,716	46.23%	(1,515,481)
TOTAL/NAT'	15%	0.25%	10.6%	21%	13.78%	787,522

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February 14, 1986

ANNEX XXVIII
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Atty. Emil Ong
Desk Officer, Region VIII
care Mr. Paul Aquino
Valgasons Building
2151 Pasong Tamo, Makati
Metro-Manila

Dear Atty. Emil Ong:

Hereunder is a brief report of the factual events that took place in Eastern Samar shortly before, during and just after the last Snap Presidential and Vice Presidential Elections last February 7, 1986.

I - Before the Election

Harrassment, coercion, intimidation and repression, especially among the civil servants and the lowly civilians were deliberately launched by the KBL leaders headed by Assemblyman Vicente Valley, Mr. Fidel Anacta, Vice Governor Celestino Sabate and with the visible support of our Provincial Commander, Lt. Col. Mario Agda.

Public school teachers were systematically called to District Assembly conferences, and always those conducting the meetings and those deliberating the talks are MF Vicente Valley, former School Superintendent Fidel Anacta and Vice Governor Celestino Sabate. Carabao, pigs and chickens were the ordinary minu in these conferences, including expensive snacks were dutifully served. Pocket money were likewise provided to all teachers and school officials, including ample reimbursement for transportation and other expenses.

II - During the Election, particularly
February 5th, 6th and 7th.

- a) Deliberate and Systematic Disenfranchisement of voters-census were massively conducted by the KBL. Those known to be sympathetic with the opposition candidates were deleted from the voter's lists and included if at all in far away voting centers.

Known opposition bailiwicks, especially in the Barangays were not allowed by the Comales to hold election on the mere certification of the Station Commanders of several municipalities. Here these comales Registrars who were involved in the systematic transfer of the venues from the Barangays to the Poblaciones did so, without amply notifying the voters themselves, the opposition representatives and without notice and hearing as required by the Omnibus Election Code.

As a result of the aforesaid massive disenfranchisement, only 97,444 were able to cast their votes in Eastern Samar out of a total registered and qualified voters of around 149,000 thousand thus depriving over 50,000 voters of their sacred rights of suffrage.

(10)

- b) Massive and Widespread Vote-Buying - KBL
Money was flowing like water, openly, publicly and many time giving the dole-out right inside the precincts. Considering that the people in Eastern Samar are miserably poor being a depressed area many were exploited and abused, some misguided on these Filipino customs of "Utang na Loob" thus depriving many of their real freedom of choice.
- c) Deliberate tampering with election returns and reading the votes for Aquino in favor of Marcos during the canvassing of votes.
We have affidavits and documentations in our possession indicating clearly above mentioned violations of our election law.
- d) Electioneering violations and terrorism.
Government officials were asked by the KBL leadership to campaign openly and publicly for President Marcos. Many were forced to comply a minimum quota of 10 to 20 voters for Marcos. The most anomalous among these career officers and officials is the case of Municipal Trial Judge of Canavid, Eastern Samar, in the person of Galo Alvor, Jr.

On the eve of the election, he circulated the news that there was a curfew, hence the opposition leaders in that town were not able to go out, even only to distribute our sample ballots. To effectively enforced this curfew, the Judge posted several army men and armed men in strategic places, particularly near the houses of the hard core opposition leaders.

Early morning of February 7th, the same Judge (Galo Alvor, Jr.), thru the use of a public sound system which was mounted in a tricycle made a round in the poblacion and the adjoining barangays that: "open ballot is now allowed by law and every voter was asked and ordered by the Judge to disclose openly his ballot". To make this order effective, Judge Galo Alvor, Jr. went to practically all the voting centers in the poblacion and the adjoining barrios, accompanied by three (3) uniformed and fully armed military men, instructing and ordering the chairmen of the Board of Election Inspectors to allow an open ballot of voting as it is now allowed by law according to him.

Earlier, during the public rallies of the KBL in Canavid and in Borongan, Judge Galo Alvor, Jr. spoke publicly endorsing the candidacies of Marcos and Tolentino in flagrant violation of the Civil Service Law and the prohibition as provided for in our Election Laws regarding career officials and employees from campaigning openly and publicly.

III - After the Election

There were cases of fraudulent violation, particularly tampering of election returns in several places in Eastern Samar. Most notorious is the tampering of around 13 election

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returns by the Election Registrar in Sulat, Eastern Samar, Mr. Bedasto Sumbilla. Votes for Maroos in practically every precinct in these voting centers were increased by one hundred (100) votes while the votes for Cory Aquino were correspondingly decreased by one hundred (100) votes also.

The appropriate documentations on these tampering of elections returns are now being readied and in due time the appropriate legal remedies will be applied and pursued.

In our humble judgment, the recent snap election in Eastern Samar was the dirtiest and above all it was tainted with fraud, coercion, harassment, intimidation, massive vote-buying and systematic and deliberate disenfranchisement of voters.

If not for the superb militancy and fearless vigilance of our key leaders and supporters, risking their very lives, our victory in my area would only be a dream and empty. Nevertheless through sheer loyalty and devotion to the people's cause and the ventilation of the real issues, we were able to hold on and happily we Cory Aquino won by a 10,084 votes majority over Res. Maroos. Likewise, Doy Laurel had a majority of 10,905 votes over Tolentino.

Thank you, just the same for whatever support you have unselfishly extended to us.

Respectfully submitted


JOSE I. RAMIREZ
Provincial Coordinator

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Republic of the Philippines
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor
Negros del Norte, Cadiz City
-000-

February 6, 1986

TO : The Board of Election Inspectors
Victorias, Negros del Norte

FROM : Provincial Election Supervisor
Negros del Norte

SUBJECT : REVOCATION OF VICTORIAS NAMFREL ACCREDITATION.

Upon proper investigation, it was verified that NAMFREL representatives, Dr. Patricio Tan, Megr. Antonio Fortich and Atty. Juan Nagad, who are the Provincial NAMFREL leaders in Negros del Norte have in fact been engaging in partisan political activities in favor of UNID candidates, thereby violating Comoleo Resolution No. 85-2210 dated December 24, 1985.

Consequently, the NAMFREL representatives in the different cities and municipalities in Negros del Norte appointed by them can also be considered partisan.

WHEREFORE, effective today, February 6, 1986, NAMFREL Victorias Chapter accreditation is hereby REVOKED.

- 2 -

ATTY. AGUSTIN S. DESUYO
Provincial Election Supervisor

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
OFFICE OF THE ELECTION REGISTRAR
SAN CARLOS CITY, NEGROS DEL NORTE

February 7, 1986

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL BOARD OF INSPECTORS

SUBJECT: REVOCATION OF LOCAL NAMFREL
SAN CARLOS CITY CHAPTER AS
COMELEC CITIZENS' ARMS.

CC: ALL CONCERNED

Please be informed that in accordance with the provision of the Omnibus Election Code and Resolution of the Commission #1732, that a Citizens' Arms duly accredited by the COMELEC would be non-partisan by nature, hence, their probity and integrity must be beyond reproach.

However, in the case of their local chapter here in San Carlos City, Negros Del Norte, the said local chapter NAMFREL has been found to be a PARTISAN ONE, according to reliable information and its members are avid supporters of UNIDO, a dominant opposition party.

In view of the foregoing and in accordance with the authority delegated to the undersigned by the Commission in its Resolution dated December 12, 1985, known as Resolution #1729, the undersigned hereby REVOKE, the accreditation of the local NAMFREL, San Carlos City Chapter, Negros Del Norte.

As per thereto, ALL BOARD OF INSPECTORS, are hereby ordered not to allow NAMFREL Representative to sit as election officer in every voting centers as COMELEC CITIZENS' ARMS. In connection thereto, the Board of Inspectors may utilize the PC/INP to implement and enforced this memorandum.

For strict compliance,

(SGD.) ATTY. ROMEO T. FLORA
Acting Election Registrar

Copy furnished:
1. NAMFREL, San Carlos City 4. UNIDO, San Carlos City
2. Office the City Mayor 5. KBL -do-
3. Station Commander, PC/INP 6. Liberal Party, -do-

A true copy 2-7-86

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January 23, 1986

Memorandum To: THE BOARD OF ELECTION INSPECTOR
Negros del Norte
Re: THE PROVINCIAL COMITTEE SUPERVISOR
Negros del Norte

Per instruction from the Commission on Elections, herein, the following guidelines should be strictly observed during the Presidential Election on February 7, 1986:

1. In the event of absence of a party inspector of any political party in a precinct, the Board, thru its Chairman, shall appoint a voter of the precinct to act as Party Inspector of the precinct.
2. Enforcement of the ban against carrying of firearms with no permits and other deadly weapons should be strictly observed during the campaign period and on election day, pursuant to Article XXII of the Omnibus Election Code. All PC and military personnel are hereby enjoined to comply with this provision of law.
3. Only the Provincial Committee Supervisor or his/her unit official election returns to Comelec, Manila. No Board of Election Inspector is authorized to issue official certification as to election results in their respective precincts.
4. Election observers are limited to a distance of 30 meters from voting place. Beyond this they are not permitted to enter.
5. Watchers of candidates should be with proper appointments and be a resident and a voter of the city/municipality. He or she can be a registered watcher of only one precinct. There shall be no watcher-at-large.
6. Inspectors of any political party shall be appointed by the Comelec Registrar, upon the recommendation of the official party representative. No party inspector therefore, shall sit in the Board of Election Inspectors without the proper appointment from the Comelec.

For compliance,

AUGUSTIN S. DABUR
Provincial Committee Supervisor
Negros del Norte

Copy by the Secretary of this Memo. This re-
quest is in accordance with the instructions
of the Comelec. Please reinforce us the address so
that we may receive our copy of the file.

Jan 24 1986
Copy received

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1/25/86
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KILUSANG BAGUNG LIPUNAN PARTY
PROVINCIAL HEADQUARTERS,
TALAGAN, ISABELA

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN

January 27, 1986

SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS:

- TO: 1. All Municipal Mayors
As KBL Municipal Chairman
Province of Isabela.

2. All KBL barangay Municipal Chairman
Province of Isabela

3. All KBL radio commentators
Province of Isabela

4. All KBL campaign Leaders (KBLU),
supporters/sympathizers
Province of Isabela

5. All Concerned.

SUBJECT: NAMFREL'S DANGEROUS ADVENTURE.

Our experience, and that of our people in the province shows that during the parliamentary elections of May 14, 1984, the alleged NAMFREL volunteers caused provincial confusion and committed acts of intimidation and terrorism in the voting centers and thereby casting of votes thereat. This should not, and must not be tolerated in the forthcoming Presidential election on February 7, 1986, because a second experience of the same nature and magnitude, will destroy the credibility of the electoral process. The accredited citizen arms of the Commission on Elections, one of which being NAMFREL, are only agents and/or representatives to assist the COMELEC in its work. As such agents or representatives, the alleged NAMFREL volunteers must ABSOLUTELY be non-partisan and impartial, otherwise, the purpose of their accreditation will be rendered nugatory.

Therefore, they can not be more powerful than their principal, the COMELEC. Hence, if such NAMFREL agents go beyond the bounds of law

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and General Instructions of the COMELEC; then they will perform, expose themselves for possible criminal prosecution in court for election offenses, punishable under the provisions of Sections 201-202, of Batas Aly. 801, otherwise known as the UNIFORM ELECTION CODE, in relation to Batas Kampanya Aly. 803, known as the "1986 Snap Presidential Election Law".

Consistent with the constitutional mandate for a clean, free, orderly and honest elections in the forthcoming political exercise, the following specific mandatory instructions affecting the activities of the NAMFREL are hereby issued as a precautionary measure, to wit:

1. The NAMFREL provincial representative must be duly appointed and accredited by the Provincial Election Supervisor in accordance with instructions from COMELEC, Manila;

2. The duly accredited provincial representative shall nominate to the Municipal Local Election Registrars in the different municipalities of the province, the names with their addresses, of those persons to be appointed and accredited in the specific precincts they will be assigned.

3. Thereafter, the Municipal/Local Election Registrar concerned shall appoint and accredit the only qualified NAMFREL representative, who shall be a qualified voter in the specific precinct he is to be appointed;

4. There shall be no appointment or accreditation of a NAMFREL representative to other precincts where he is not a qualified voter thereat

FUR EXAMPLE: if JUAN DELA CRUZ, who is a registered voter in Precinct No. 1 of Lalampaya, Ilagan, Isabela, is appointed and duly accredited as NAMFREL representative for Precinct No. 1 of the same town, then the same Juan dela Cruz can not be appointed and accredited as NAMFREL representative at the same time to Precinct No. 3 or Precinct No. 21 of the same municipality. Similarly, PEDRO SAN JUAN who is a resident, and a registered voter of Santay, Isabela, can not be appointed and accredited as NAMFREL representative of Ilagan, Isabela. Never! Therefore, there shall be no general appointment and accreditation of KUVIÑG NAMFREL representatives, although there shall be as many NAMFREL representatives appointed and accredited in as many number of precincts in the town. The rule shall be - one NAMFREL representative for only one precinct and the Board of Election Inspectors

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or Canvassers in the different voting centers or polling places in the towns can deny recognition of other NAMFREL representatives not duly-appointed and accredited to the specific prescints they are assigned;

5. The sole appointing and accrediting authority in the prescint level, is the Local Election Registrar concerned. He issues the prepared corresponding COMELEC citizen arm Identification Card provided for the purpose. This power of appointment and accreditation includes the power to revoke upon notice, should such accredited NAMFREL representative by his actuations, manifested partiality to any political party or candidate and/or has performed acts in excess or in controvention of his functions and duties. (Art. V, Resolution No. 1729. Dec 12, 1965);

6. Should there be an objection raised or filed, against the possible appointment and accreditation of a NAMFREL representative, for the reason that such person is not a registered voter in the prescint he will be assigned; and/or that such person nominated is known to be PARTISAN and the Local Election Registrar is convinced that he is so, after a hearing conducted, then the latter may refuse to issue the appointment and accreditation. He may then accredit any representative from any of the reputable and non partisan civic organizations in the municipality or prescint where he is a registered voter, but must inform immediately COMELEC, Manila, of such action taken;

7. The decision of the Local Election Registrar is FINAL and appealable only direct to the Commission on Elections in Manila and not otherwise;

8. The genuine NAMFREL representative can watch and observe the proceedings of the Board of Election Inspectors and/or Board of Canvassers but they should not actively participate in the deliberation of the Board;

9. All other non accredited NAMFREL representatives, should be barred from entering the rooms except to vote, where the voting is being done and during canvass therof. They shall stay in an area at least 50 meters away from the polling place or voting center.

Simply stated, the qualifications and the functions, duties, responsibilities and liabilities of a "genuine NAMFREL representative" is similar to that of a duly appointed and accredited watcher of the KBL majority party and

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that of the UNIDO, the dominant opposition party, or other groups of candidates, as outlined in the General Instructions contained in Sections 9-12, Resolution No. 1749, for the Board of Election Inspectors and Section 9, of Resolution No. 1749 for the Board of Canvassers, respectively, promulgated by the Commission on Elections, January 10, 1906, and other related orders. Outside of these instructions, the acts of the NAMFREL representatives are considered ULTRA VIRES and the same ought never to be respected or recognized without prejudice to his possible criminal prosecution.

All told; let the KBL machinery work as expected, because there is no substitute for VICTORY, even as there is no room for COMPLACENCY!

Immediate widest dissemination of these instructions is hereby enjoined

Sgn. FAUSTINO N. DY
Governor
Provincial Chairman

Copy furnished:

1. The Provincial Election Supervisor
Ilegan Isabela.
2. The Chairman
COMELEC, Manila

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LISTING OF NAMFREL VOLUNTEERS INJURED / MISSING / DETAINED / KILLED OR HAVE DIED

BASED ON SUBMITTED REPORTS

AS OF FEBRUARY 13, 1986

TIME OF REPORT: 5 PM

DOC #4

NAMFREL VOLUNTEERS INJURED IN THE LINE OF DUTY

SERIAL #	NAME	DESIGNATION	HOW HURT	BY WHOM	PLACE
19	Unidentified	Volunteer	punched	Mayor	Taytay, Rizal.
2387	Unidentified (117)	Volunteers	fired upon ...minor injuries	Armed men	Ma. Clara ES, Grace Park, Caloocan.
141	Unidentified (73)	Volunteers (6)	forced outside and beaten up	goons	Tunasan Elem. School Muntinlupa.
421	(3452)	Volunteers	physically injured and beaten up	Senon Cayetano	Bo. San Jose, Mandaluyong.
0	Unidentified	Volunteer	mauled and shot at	goons	Jolo Elem. School, Mandaluyong.
0	Unidentified	Volunteers (2)	beaten up	goons	Mandaluyong.
262		Volunteer	manhandled	Barromo	Not specified
2816	Unidentified	Volunteer	manhandled	Bgy. Captain	
0	Unidentified	Volunteer	punched and harmed	goons	Near Valley Golf Club
385	Unidentified	Volunteers	harassed and punched	Eusebio Magtanggol	Mandaluyong
260	(2513)	NAMFREL Lawyer	forced outside then mauled	KBL Coordinator	Not specified
18	Unidentified	Volunteer	hit in the face	KBL goons	Not specified
179	Unidentified	Volunteers (3)	mauled	heavily armed men	Makati
73	Unidentified	Volunteers	hauled into car and beaten up by 6 persons	goons	Tunasan, Muntinlupa.
264	Unidentified	NAMFREL Chairman	beaten up	goons	BF Homes, Las Pinas.
336	Unidentified (2519)	Volunteers	mauled, pillbox explosion, hospitalized.	goons	Mandaluyong Munc. ES,
88	Unidentified	Volunteers	severely beaten up, hospitalized.	goons	Mandaluyong.
0	Unidentified	Volunteers (2)	shot at	armed men	Pampang, Sorsogon. Verac, Negros Occ.
792	Unidentified	Female Volunteers	attacked	policemen	Makati.
0	Unidentified	Volunteer	punched	officials	Pasay.
3022	(RF)	MEMO Chairmain	stabbed in front of San Bartolome Church	goons	Tanong, Malabon.
20045			told	Eddie Tagalog	Makati.
400	Unspecified names		swatting up	Makati policemen	Makati Municipal Hall / 20

2433	(290,279)	Volunteer	beaten up	armed goons connected with Jolo ES, Mandaluyong, the mayor's office
2435		Volunteer	hit on the head	armed goons Jolo ES, Prec 147-148 Mandaluyong.
RFM 143 Unspecified names		Volunteers	beaten up	goods Makati. (R. Pangilinan and E. Tagalog)
RFM 66A Unspecified names		Volunteers	manhandled	goons Guadalupe Nuevo ES
213 f		Volunteer	beaten up, big cut on the head	goons Makati Municipal Hall
644		Volunteers	beaten up	goons Makati
1221		Volunteers	beaten up	goons, men in Makati. plain clothes
Ateneo 10Unspecified names (131,2413) (468)		Volunteers	mauled and cameras taken	unspecified Bayanan
1346		Chairman	shot twice	Bgy. Chairman Sta. Maria, Tondo
1546		volunteer	harassed	Region 12, Maguidanao
150		volunteer	slapped	Bgy. Captain Mandaluyong
543		volunteer	shot	Bgy. official 509 Ligaya St., Tondo
3366 Unspecified (RFM 115)		volunteers	ignored and pushed around	unidentified P. Villanueva Street, Pasay City.
1114 Unspecified refer to:(2921,2914,2526)		volunteers	beaten up	Seveng Victorino Benitez ES, Cacarong
2913 Unspecified		volunteers	slapped because of questioning	Buddy Pangilinan Bo. Sta. Cruz, Makati Tanggol Bangkal ES, Makati
RFM 79 Unspecified		volunteers	sent out and beaten up	Yabut Caapaign officer KBL member Sta. Cruz, Mkt.
3004 Unspecified (87)		volunteers	beaten up	KBL Bgy. Captains Tejeros, W Rembo,
637 Unspecified		volunteer - f.	manhandled	unspecified Makati Municipio
2516 refer to:(726,2518)		volunteer	beaten up	Filemon Serano B. Isidro ES, and thugs Bo. Isidro, Makati.
3335 Unspecified refer to:(3332,3383)		photographer	mauled	7 unidentified men Malvar ES, Bankal, Makati...
201			held by goons	
280		Chairman	beaten up, his car was stoned	goons Namayan, Mandaluyong
3362 refer to:(RFM 13,3305)		NAMFREL lawyer	punched in the nose	Segio dela Cruz Isaac Lopez ES, Tejeron, Mand.
2390 Unspecified		unspecified	harassed and beaten with 2X2	Bgy. Captain Prec. C1831-A, Buhagong Bato, Mand.
RFM 39	•=	volunteer	mauled	Cesar Trinidad Abad Santos ES, Tondo, Manila.
3437 Nun	(272)	volunteer	taken at gunpoint but later released unspecified	Bgy. Captain Alabang ES, Munt.
2523 Unspecified		volunteers	firing inside precinct, camera taken	14 armed men Prec. 183, Muntinlup
2034 Unspecified		volunteers	scuffles with armed police	armed police San Pablo Bgy Center
2307 Unspecified (2906)		volunteers	scuffles with minor injuries	Mrs. Cuneta Villamor Pasay South and goons Heights, Psay.
2606 Unspecified (348)		7 volunteers	arrested, beaten up, charred and picked up	10-15 riot police Pasay Municipal Hall
6 Unidentified		volunteers	harassed	Corporal Vida Botangco ES, (policeman) Sincego St., Pasay.
620 Unidentified		volunteers	intimidated	unidentified men Pasay City Mun.:p:c in a yellow van
2097 Unidentified		volunteers	maligned/heated argument	Bgy. Captain Zamora E. Psay Citi
663 A		co-chairman and	threatened	Pasay City Pasay Citi: Mayor's henchman
764 Unspecified (3454)		NAMFREL inspectors	beaten up	Pess Pagcalinavan Capt. H. F. and Mundis Sta. Ana Bgy. Sta.

2300 Unspecified	volunteers	threatened	armed men	P. Gomez, Manila.
92 Unspecified	volunteers	harassed	Bgy. Capt. Jimmy Cleofas and 5 goons	Bgy. Silanagan, Eulogio Rodriguez, EC, QC.
780 Unspecified	volunteers	harassed	KBL men	San Juan Hunic, Pobl., Pedro Cruz Precinct,
3007 Unspecified	volunteers	harassed	Irin Apacible and goons	San Juan.
4307 Unspecified	volunteers	threatened at gunpoint	goon	picture in Malaya
1017	Chairman	threatened	unidentified	Tubao, La Union.
2057	In-Charge(North)	helicopter was forced down	unidentified	Santiago, Isabela.
			helicopters (2)	
1211 Unspecified	volunteers	harassed and not allowed inside VC	goons	Conception, Tarlac.
1218 Unspecified	volunteers	barricaded	goons	Tarlac, Tarlac.
3110 Unspecified	NAMFREL officials and volunteers	harassed	Bgy. Officials	Trece Martires, Cavite.
1343 Unspecified (1803)	volunteers	harassed	driver of Mayor Verata.	Amadeo, Trece Martires, Cavite.
1302 Unspecified	volunteers	harassed, sent out	30 armed goons and Sta. Cruz, Laguna.	
3103 Unspecified	volunteers	refused entry, harassed	Assemblyman Luis Yulo	
			Mayor's men	Sitio Halang, Victoria Felix, Riz.
1315 Unspecified (1308)	volunteers	harassed and punched	Taytay mayor	Taytay, Rizal.
1307 Unspecified	volunteers	confiscated cameras and harassed	Mayor Nicomedes Patina and Unit I Pililia ES, goons	Tabunan, Rizal.
276 Unspecified (3120)	volunteers	harassed and forced out	mayor and goons	Cainta, Rizal.
2390	volunteers	maltreated	KBL reps.	San Mateo, Rizal.
1409 Unspecified (3217)	volunteers	beaten up	police and market guard	Camarines Sur
141 Unspecified (2)	volunteers	shot	unidentified	Pampang, Sorsogon.
1515 Unspecified	volunteers	harassed, film taken and confiscated	mayor	Guimbal, Iloilo.
1601 Unspecified	volunteers	harassed and manhandled	unidentified men	Danao, Cebu.
553	volunteer	gunned down	Olpot Arradaga	Baybay, Leyte.
2343 Namfrel HQ		raided	military men	Baybay, Leyte.
294 Namfrel HQ		attacked	military men	Tacloban, Leyte.
1805 Unspecified	volunteers	harassed	CHDF	Diyanan, Dipolog City
801 Unspecified	volunteers	harassed	mayors	Zamboanga del Norte
939 Unspecified	Dist. Chairman	hunted	on orders of Ali Dimaporo	Maguindanao, Matanog, Cotabato.
	for muslim towns and 1 muslim munic. chairman			Lanao
586	Volunteers	stoned	unspecified	Mandaluyong.
695 Unidentified	Volunteers	shot at	armed men	Muntinlupa.
1 Unidentified	Volunteers	threat, intimidation, terrorism	unspecified	Bamban, Concepcion Capas, Tarlac.
			military men	Pansi, Bulacan.
				Mabalacat, Pampanga.
				Cabanatuan, N. Ecija.
1 Unidentified	Chairman	death threats	unspecified	La Union
1 Unidentified	Volunteers	injuries	unspecified	Bgy. Tabuk & Sto. Rosario, San Juan, La Union.
1 Unspecified				Agoo, La Union.
1 Unspecified				Balaocan, La Union.
1 Unspecified				Isabela.
1 Unspecified				Negros Occidental.
1 Unspecified				Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental.
1 Unspecified				Agusan del Norte

Unspecified	Volunteers	intimidated and harassed	unspecified	Agusan del Norte
Unspecified	Volunteers	slapped	unspecified	Cambagan, Bahi, Tubis, Surigao Sur.

TOTAL REPORTED CASES 99



NAMFREL VOLUNTEERS DETAINED OR MISSING IN ACTION

SERIAL #	NAME	DESIGNATION	HOW HURT	BY WHOM	PLACE
418 Unspecified		volunteer	unspecified	unidentified	Navotas.
702		volunteer	unspecified (arrested)	Makati police.	J.P. Rizal cor. SSHW
2936 Unspecified		volunteers	plate no. NAY 652 - green	goons	E. Bantay ES, Makati.
2173 Unspecified		volunteer	Toyota Corolla	plain clothes	Makati.
1019 Assumption Num		volunteer	arrested while stopping flying voters	police	
4120		strike force to Guadalupe	missing, not yet returned home		
2137 Unspecified (5)		NAMFREL reps.	picked up and snatched IDs	Gov. Faustino Dee Santiago, Isabela.	
2327		volunteer	beaten and arrested.	CHDF	Concepcion, Tarlac.
1338		Chairman and Secretary	locked in a room and harassed	local officials	San Mateo, Rizal.
0		volunteers	arrested and charged with illegal possession of firearms.	unidentified	Camotes Island, Cebu.
551 Unspecified		Volunteer	mauled then imprisoned	officials	Not specified
147 Unidentified		Volunteers	beaten up, still missing	goons	Felipe St., Guadalupe.
Unspecified		Volunteers (2)	held inside a polling center	men of KBL leader	Bgy. Irisan Baguio City
Unspecified		Volunteers (5)	arrested	Gov. Dy's men	Isabela.
		Vice-Chairman	missing		Masinloc, La Union.
-		Volunteer	had PTF nos. 030221, 030024-35 and 37		
Unidentified		Volunteer	detained		
			arrested and freed after 3 hours	Major Perez	Negros del Norte.
					San Miguel,
					Agusan del Sur.

TOTAL CASES REPORTED

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NAMFREL VOLUNTEERS MURDERED, KILLED OR HAVE DIED IN THE LINE OF DUTY

SERIAL #	NAME	DESIGNATION	HOW HURT	BY WHOM	PLACE
1234	(1222)	NAMFREL Vice Chairman for Porac argument due to irregularities	heart attack during a heated argument due to irregularities	natural (police chief)	Porac, Pampanga.
0 K.	Volunteer	volunteer	fatally injured from gunshot, died.	goons	Roxas City, Capiz.
1353			shot to death after bravely challenging the anomalous counting of ballots		Bunawan, Agusan del Sur.

TOTAL CASES REPORTED

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COMELEC - NAMFREL PARTNERS

PARALLEL TABULATION of ELECTION RETURNS

Philippine International Convention Center

February 7, 1986

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COMELEC-NAMFREL PARALLEL TABULATION
OF ELECTION RETURNS (PARTNERS)

The common objective of PARTNERS is the speedy and accurate tabulation and dissemination to the public of the election results. The system spans the entire country and the process begins with the completed precinct election returns involving about 90,000 precincts and ends with the periodic dissemination of national, regional and provincial summaries of election results.

The reporting flow of the advance election returns goes through three major phases: PHASE I - TRANSMISSION, PHASE II - TABULATION, and PHASE III - DISSEMINATION (Flowchart Enclosed).

PHASE I - TRANSMISSION

In the Transmission Phase, COMELEC and NAMFREL join hands in checking the accuracy of election returns and in facilitating the flow of the returns from the precincts to the national tabulation centers.

From the precincts, the fourth (4th) copy of the Election Returns and the accomplished NAMFREL Precinct Tally Forms (PTFs) are brought by the NAMFREL Carrier to the Election

Registrar. The Election Registrar checks the PTF against the 4th copy of the election returns. If they match, the Election Registrar notes the PTF, otherwise the errors are corrected before the PTF is noted.

Noted PTFs are then brought by a NAMFREL Courier to the carrier transmitting station. The Common Carriers send the election returns from the noted PTFs to the National Tabulation Center of COMELEC at PICC and to the NAMFREL National Tabulation Center at La Salle Greenhills. In the case of Metro Manila and outlying areas, the noted PTFs are brought directly to the National Tabulation Center of the COMELEC at PICC where one copy of the PTFs is dropped. From PICC, the Courier proceeds to drop the other copy of the PTF at the NAMFREL National Tabulation Center in La Salle Greenhills.

PHASE II - TABULATION

The National Tabulation of the advance election returns is done in parallel by the COMELEC computer processing system at PICC and the NAMFREL Computer Processing System at La Salle Greenhills.

The COMELEC National Tabulation System

The computerized tabulation of the advance election returns at the COMELEC National Tabulation Center at PICC starts with the receipt of the telex messages and noted PTFs.

Receiving of Telexes and PTFs

Telexes and PTFs are formally received by a COMELEC Representative. The accepted telexes and PTFs are turned over to the Tabulation Center for recording.

Preparation of Telexes and PTFs for Machine Encoding

The recorded telexes and PTEs are then sorted and batched by groups of thirty (30) to facilitate processing. Before turning over the batched documents for machine encoding, the precinct reports are first checked against the authorized listing of precincts in order to eliminate double reporting.

Machine Encoding - The batched documents are machine encoded with the use of 90 microcomputers.

Proofreading - The encoded data are printed out and

sight-verified against the corresponding telexes and PTFs to check on the accuracy of machine encoding.

Computer Consolidation, Tabulation and Printing of Reports

Finally, the machine encoded data are consolidated by Region, by Province, and by Municipality. After consolidation, the election returns are tabulated and printed out in table form with the rows indicating the regions and their respective provinces, and the columns indicating the candidates.


The NAMFREL National Tabulation System

At the NAMFREL National Tabulation Center, the advance election returns will go through a computer processing system and a calculator-aided manual processing system.

PHASE III - DISSEMINATION

Cumulative advance election results will be released to the PUBLIC simultaneously by COMELEC and NAMFREL on a regular basis.

COMELEC-NAMFREL PARALLEL TABULATION OF ELECTION RETURNS (PARTNERS)



**GUIDELINES ON COMELEC NAMFREL PARALLEL TABULATION
OF ADVANCE ELECTION RESULTS**

WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has the constitutional mandate to see to it that the elections are held in a free, orderly, honest and credible manner, which necessarily includes the fast public dissemination of accurate election results;

WHEREAS, COMELEC, pursuant to its mandated duty, will tabulate the advance election results at the PICC;

WHEREAS, the National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) has been accredited as COMELEC'S citizen arm to assist COMELEC in the attainment of its constitutionally mandated duties above-stated in order that the sovereign right of the Filipino people to choose their leaders freely and to be informed of the results of their choice;

WHEREAS, NAMFREL has offered to conduct also a separate but parallel and coordinated tabulation of the advance results at the La Salle Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila;

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing and in order to ensure the accuracy of the tabulation of advance results, COMELEC RESOLVES to authorize NAMFREL to conduct its own tabulation of advance results subject to the following terms and conditions:

1. COMELEC and NAMFREL shall conduct separate but parallel and coordinated tabulation of advance results.

COMELEC will tabulate the results at the PICC while NAMFREL will tabulate at the La Salle Greenhills.

The tabulation shall not be stopped and must be completed until the election returns of all precincts reported to the COMELEC have been tabulated.

2. No transmission of the results from any precinct will be made except on the basis of a complete count of such precinct, indicating therein the votes of all candidates for President and Vice-President.

3. The transmission of results to the COMELEC and NAMFREL Tabulation Centers shall be done simultaneously and made through means that produce a "hard copy" for proper verification.
4. All postings, announcements, and releases of election results shall be done simultaneously at both Tabulation Centers. No trending or extrapolation of election results shall be authorized.
5. The gathering and delivery of all election results shall be mutually monitored at both Tabulation Centers by the representatives of COMELEC and NAMFREL who shall have the right to be present and take note of all deliveries/recpts of the results.

PROCEDURE FOR GATHERING AND TRANSMISSION OF ADVANCE ELECTION RESULTS:

- I. In the National Capital Region -
 - a) Each office of the Election Registrars shall be constituted into a collection center for the 4th copies of the election returns from all election precincts for delivery to the PICC.
 - b) The authorized NAMFREL representative shall take delivery under proper receipt the 4th copy of the election return from the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) and the NAMFREL Precinct Tally Form (PTF) in triplicate duly signed by all the members of the board. The NAMFREL representative shall also be given by the board of inspectors one copy of the Certificate of Votes obtained by Candidates (COMELEC Form 13) in the precinct.
 - c) Upon delivery to the election registrar of the 4th copy of the election return and the PTF and Form 13, he shall note the time of receipt of the return and authenticate the PTF and Form 13 with his signature.
 - d) The Election Registrar shall then retain the 4th copy of the election return of the corresponding precinct and one copy of the PTF and give two other PTF copies and COMELEC

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Form 13 to the NAMFREL representative who shall deliver 1 copy of PTF to PICC Tabulation Center first and then the other copy of PTF and Comelec Form 13 to La Salle Greenhills.

II. In areas near Manila from which election results are to be transmitted by courier -

- a) The board of inspectors of the precincts where the 4th copy of the election returns will be transmitted by courier shall be delivered to the duly authorized representative of the NAMFREL. The board shall also sign the PTF and issue one copy of the certificate of votes obtained by candidates (COMELEC Form 13) to said NAMFREL representative.
- b) The procedure outlined under I(b), I(c) and I(d) above stated is hereby adopted.
- c) Whenever a COMELEC representative is available, he may accompany the NAMFREL representative in making the deliveries.

III. In areas where the advance election results will be transmitted by telegram/telex through RCPI, PT & T and other similar facilities:

- a) NAMFREL shall designate its representative at the precinct level to the Municipal Election Registrar and the BEI who is authorized to secure the fourth copy of the Election Returns (ER) and appropriate transmission forms which consist of the carbonless triplicate NAMFREL Precinct Tally (PTF Form) and a copy of Comelec Form 13, all duly signed by the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI). The forms will all be brought to the Election Registrar.
- b) The Election Registrar shall then open the fourth copy of the advance ER and in the presence of the

NAMFREL representative verify the data called for in the transmission form (PTF) and then sign all the aforesaid forms.

c) Upon verification that the data in the PTF are the same as the fourth copy of the election return, the Election Registrar shall sign the PTF, retain the fourth copy of the return and one copy of the PTF, give to the NAMFREL representative the two copies of the PTF and Comelec Form 13 and direct said NAMFREL representative to transmit simultaneously the election results through PT & T, RCPI or other similar carrier to the PICC and La Salle Greenhills Tabulation Center.

- IV. A "hard" copy of the transmission form, duly acknowledged by the telegraphic station as received for transmission, shall be returned to the Election Registrar by the NAMFREL representative. If the Election Registrar notes any discrepancy between what has been sent to the PICC and NAMFREL Tabulation Centers and the fourth copy of the election return, he shall forthwith order the NAMFREL representative to, or, if he so chooses, personally make re-transmission of the correction(s) to the Tabulation Centers.
- V. With respect to precincts from which the NAMFREL representatives do not have a duly signed triplicate copies of the PTF, the results to be transmitted by the carrier shall be a transmission copy of the election results as copied by the Election Registrar from the fourth copy of the return as provided for in Par. IV above with regards to the "hard" copy and discrepancy, if any.
- VI. In all cases, if there are differences or discrepancies between the fourth copy of the election return and the PTF form and, where applicable, Form 13, the Election Registrar shall so annotate them on the transmission

forms and, in the presence of the NAMFREL representative, copy the results from the fourth copy of the election return in a COMELEC telegraphic form in triplicate which he shall sign. The original of the telegraphic form shall be given to the NAMFREL representative for transmission, the duplicate copy shall be retained and kept by the NAMFREL representative. The Election Registrar shall keep the third copy for his file. The procedure stated in Par. IV above shall also be followed as applicable.

- VII. All Election Registrars and other personnel of COMELEC by virtue of their responsibilities in regard to the tabulation of advance election results, are directed to stay in their offices until all results are transmitted to ensure the prompt transmission of election results.
- VIII. To ensure the successful implementation of the tabulation, COMELEC shall issue the appropriate instruction to its officials, registrars, board of election inspectors, and law enforcement agencies to assist and protect COMELEC and NAMFREL personnel in the performance of their duties in connection with the tabulation of advance election results.
- IX. To allow a reasonable number of representatives of COMELEC and NAMFREL to be present at each other's tabulation centers in Greenhills & PICC to observe and/or monitor operations. It is understood that such representatives of COMELEC and NAMFREL assigned to the other's Center must be civilians and must not be allowed to carry weapons of any kind and must not violate rules for safety, discipline and orderliness.
- X. The COMELEC and NAMFREL shall jointly work out and approve

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the system and procedures for the tabulation of advance election results so that the posting, release or announcement of election data/results in both Tabulation Centers shall be done simultaneously.

XI. The COMELEC shall issue a resolution embodying or accepting all the terms, provisions and conditions in this guidelines and which supercedes and/or modifies provisions in Resolution No. 1763 dated January 28, 1986 which are inconsistent with the above guidelines.

22)

Form PT

PRECINCT TALLY SHEET

Form PT

Province or Highly
Urbanized City
City, Municipality or
District
School
Precinct Number
Number of Votes Cast

Copy 1 - Certification Copy

Barangay _____
Number of Precincts
in the School _____

RESULT OF COUNT	Votes in Figures	Votes in Words
For President		
1. MARCOS		
2. AQUINO		
For Vice-President		
1. TOLENTINO		
2. LAUREL		
3. KALAW		

WE HEREBY CERTIFY that the candidates above have obtained in this precinct
the votes set opposite their respective names:

BOARD OF ELECTION INSPECTORS

Chairman

K. B. L.	Opposition	NAMFREL
Time _____	OQC Precinct Canvasser _____	OQC School Chairman _____
Date _____	(Print Name and Sign) _____	(Print Name and Sign) _____

TO OQC SCHOOL CHAIRMAN,

PLEASE DETACH THIS PAGE AND OBTAIN CERTIFICATION OF BOARD OF
ELECTION INSPECTORS.

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NATIONAL CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR FREE ELECTIONS PRESS RELEASE NO. _____ DATE Feb. 9, 1986

L.G.C. /
STATEMENT OF NAMFREL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

volunteers
In the name of the hundreds of thousands of NAMFREL^{in the field,}
who have exceeded the limits of human endurance^{for} the past three (5)
days defending the will of the people, we would like to make this
statement in response to allegations:

- That NAMFREL has been using "spurious" documents in its Operation Quick Count.
- That NAMFREL has failed to comply with the COMELEC-NAMFREL agreement on OQC.
- That NAMFREL has been causing trouble and violating election regulations in the precincts

Basis of NAMFREL OQC

1. The numbers being posted by NAMFREL at La Salle Greenhills are ALL BASED ON THE NUMBER OF VOTES CERTIFIED BY THE BOARD OF ELECTION INSPECTORS IN EACH PRECINCT, except in those cases where they refused to sign despite accurate figures. Outside of these

FOR INQUIRIES, CONTACT:

SUSAN LAUFIOSA (708353) or NICK REBONG (773711)

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few exceptions, every document we have used, namely the Certificate of Votes (COMELEC Form No. 13) and the NAMFREL carbonless Precinct Tally Form (PTF- in 13 copies) bears the signature and/or thumbmark of the BEI members, namely the Chairman who is a school teacher, the KBL inspector, the UNIDO inspector, and the Poll Clerk, in the precinct. This is true for all courier-transmitted data. For telecom-transmitted results, the documents used are telex reports based on similarly authenticated documents.

These are all verifiable data and WE ARE PREPARED TO SHOW THE SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS FOR OUR TABULATION AT THE SAME TIME THAT THE COMELEC, THE MEDIA POLL COUNT, OR ANY OTHER COUNT, SHOULD ALSO SHOW THE BASIS OF THEIR COUNT, BEFORE ANY IMPARTIAL BODY AND IN FULL VIEW OF THE MEDIA AND THE PUBLIC.

2. The PTF is an official NAMFREL-printed form. The COMELEC Commissioners are aware of this and in fact, as proven in the signed agreement, they have accepted this form as the transmission form for election results and as the joint basis for FOR INQUIRIES. CONTACT:

BENJAMIN V. LOZARE (772472) SUSAN JAVELOSA (708353) or NICK REBONG (773711)



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the tabulation by the COMELEC at the PICC and by NAMFREL at La Salle Greenhills. At no time did the COMELEC question the form or request that we pre-register our PTF as now alleged by Commissione Opinion.

3. All our tabulations at La Salle Greenhills are based on actual, current figures as received. In accordance with our agreement with the COMELEC, WE HAVE NOT DONE ANY TRENDING OR EXTRAPOLATION AT ANY TIME WHATSOEVER. All the votes are recorded as they come in, sometimes in trickles and sometimes in batches, but AT NO TIME HAS NAMFREL "BEEN HIDING ELECTION RETURNS" NOR DOING A SELECTIVE POSTING OF RESULTS.

4. Knowing these considerations, we are confident of the authenticity and accuracy of our OQC at Greenhills and, IF THE FIGURES OF ALL OF COUNTS ARE SIMILARLY BASED ON THE ACTUAL COUNTING AT THE PRECINCT LEVEL AS CERTIFIED BY THE BOARD OF ELECTION INSPECTORS, we are confident that their results will eventually align with our results.

COMELEC-NAMFREL AGREEMENT

1. With respect to the allegation that NAMFREL is violating the FOR INQUIRIES, CONTACT:
BENJAMIN V. LOZARE (772472) SUSAN JAVELOSA (708353) or NICK REBONG (773711)

NAMFREL PRESS RELEASE

NATIONAL CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR FREE ELECTIONS PRESS RELEASE NO. _____ DATE: _____

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the agreement with the COMELEC on the joint Quick Count, because NAMFREL couriers are reportedly not giving the COMELEC Center at PICC the election results, we would like to ~~show everybody what~~ clarify that we have complied with the procedures of the COMELEC-NAMFREL agreement, in so far as the circumstances have allowed.

2. Based on this agreement, NAMFREL has been furnishing copies of the Precinct Tally forms received within NCR to the COMELEC representative stationed near the "action-center" at the NAMFREL OQC tabulation center. Likewise NAMFREL couriers stationed at the COMELEC PICC tabulation center bring reports to the La SM1le Greenhills Tabulation Center.

3. If at all, the delay or breakdown in the OQC can be directly traced ~~to~~ to the following points of the agreement:—

FOR INQUIRIES, CONTACT:
BENJAMIN V. LOZARE (772472) SUSAN JAVELOSA (708353) or NICK REBONG (773711)

NAMFREL National Office: 8th Floor, RFM Building, Pioneer St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila
Tel. Nos.: 77-24-72 • 77-24-74 • 77-24-81

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- a.) To ensure that there is a NAMFREL volunteer in every precinct to get the OQC forms, COMELEC committed to instruct all election registrars to "expedite without delay the appointment of NAMFREL pollwatchers." THIS HAS NOT BEEN DONE. As a result, there were many polling places ^{The Phoenix} where NAMFREL pollwatchers were not able to man because of delays in or lack of appointment. In many others, they were driven out by local and barangay officials. How could our volunteers then be expected to get a copy of the election returns from these precincts?

- b.) COMELEC also committed that the accreditation of NAMFREL would not be withdrawn unless there is prior notice in writing to the Chairman of COMELEC, and only after similar notice and hearing by the supervising COMELEC Commissioner of the region and the NAMFREL chairman. But in places like Isabela, Antique, Negros del Norte, Quirino, etc., ^{abiding by the foregoing procedure} the NAMFREL accreditation was revoked without such a process. despite our repeated appeals to the COMELEC, based on reports from actions had taken place. the field, that these measures had already been made. How could our volunteers then be expected to get the election results in these areas?

- c.) COMELEC also committed to require all other groups engaged in advance

FOR INQUIRIES, CONTACT
BENJAMIN V. LOZARE (772472) SUSAN JAVELOSA (708353) or NICK REBONG (773711)

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tabulation, such as the MEDIA Poll Count and Kapisanan ng Mga Brodcasters sa Pilipinas (KBP), to use only the count posted at either the NAMFREL La Salle Tabulation Center or the COMELEC PICC Center for dissemination. AGAIN THIS WAS NOT DONE. As early as Friday evening, various television stations were broadcasting election results based on the so-called Media Poll Count. ~~This in our view caused the you then avoid the~~ consequent confusion in the public mind about the election counts.

d.) Under the agreement, COMELEC also committed that the fourth copy of the Election Returns, which is COMELEC's copy, would be given by the Board of Election Inspectors to the NAMFREL pollwatcher so he could bring it to the Election Registrar together with the PTF and Form 13 to be signed by the Election Registrar. ~~However, in view of decided on this procedure, only 36 hours before election day the election day and the COMELEC decided on this procedure,~~ MANY BOARDS OF ELECTION INSPECTORS REFUSED TO GIVE THIS FOURTH COPY OF THE ELECTION RETURNS TO OUR VOLUNTEERS FOR TRANSMITTAL TO THE ELECTION REGISTRAR. In addition, they also refused to sign the Certificate

FOR INQUIRIES, CONTACT:
BENJAMIN V. LOZARE (772472) SUSAN JAVELOSA (708353) or NICK REBONG (773711)

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of Votes (COMELEC FORM 13) and the Precinct Tally Forms. ~~_____~~
How could ^{we} ~~we~~ expect our volunteers to deliver the Election Returns
when it is not being given to them?

e.) Under the agreement, COMELEC registrars are supposed to re-authenticate and sign the Certificate of Votes, Form 13 and Precinct TALLY Forms prior to transmission to the tabulation centers. NAMFREL agreed to this step, even if it meant additional delay and even if the forms had already been authenticated and signed by the Board of Election Inspectors at the precinct, to satisfy COMELEC requirements. Yet, in ^{many} ~~some~~ instances, the ELECTION REGISTRAR ~~RE~~ ^{AND} ~~RE~~ HIS AIDE WERE NOT AVAILABLE TO SIGN THE DOCUMENTS, OR EVEN REFUSED TO REVIEW THE DOCUMENTS. We were assured by the COMELEC Commissioners that the Election Registrar will always be available and if he is not available an "aide" will always be present to comply with the agreement. ~~How could you find~~ ^{THE} ~~volunteers~~ ^{THEREFORE} ~~had to despatch~~ election results through the PTF without the second authentication of the Election Registrar ~~P~~ ^P



NATIONAL CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR FREE ELECTIONS PRESS RELEASE NO. _____ DATE: _____

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- f.) Under the agreement, where results have to be transmitted by telecommunication carrier, COMELEC required NAMFREL to transmit results only through means that produce a "hard copy" meaning it backed up by a documented tally. NAMFREL agreed to this requirement even if it meant additional delay again and in spite of its reliance on radio/telephone transmission in the last Batasan election. NAMFREL has been ~~reluctant~~ complying with this requirement: THE IS NO FIGURE ON OUR TABULATION BOARDS THAT IS NOT BASED ON A "HARD COPY". ~~RELYING ON TELECAST.~~ But we would like to ask: ^{WHY ALSO} ~~WHY~~ the Media Poll Count and other counts ~~have~~ not ~~been~~ subjected to this requirement? Why are they not required to produce proof of a "hard copy" of what they have been broadcasting or printing?
- g.) And finally, under the agreement, it was specified that the transmission of telegrams would be done through "RCPI, PT & T or similar carriers." Since RCPI had the most extensive and reliable network as demonstrated in the last Batasan election, our main tabulation center and our volunteers all over the country had made arrangements to use the RCPI network and already conducted t: FOR INQUIRIES, CONTACT .



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runs. But despite two assurances, on Wednesday, Feb. 5 by the COMELEC technical director and on Thursday evening Feb. 6 by one of the Commissioners, on election day itself, COMELEC Chairman Savellano reportedly issued instructions to all election registrars to allow telegrams only through PT & T, thereby resulting in confusion in the field. How can we implement our procedures when the COMELEC agrees to one procedure and subsequently gives contradictory instructions without prior notice to us?

ON THE BASIS OF ALL THESE FACTS, NAMFREL MAINTAINS THAT IT HAS COMPLIED AS MUCH AS PRACTICABLE WITH THE AGREEMENT AND IT IS THE UNWORKABLE PROCEDURES UNILATERALLY INTRODUCED BY COMELEC WHICH ^{WERE THE} MAJOR CAUSE OF THE CONFUSION.

NATIONAL CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR FREE ELECTIONS PRESS RELEASE

NATIONAL CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR FREE ELECTIONS PRESS RELEASE NO. _____ DATE: _____

Disorder and Violations


1. Finally, with respect to allegations that NAMFREL volunteers have been the ones causing trouble and violating election laws at the polling places, we feel THIS IS THE SUPREME INSULT TO THE HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF ORDINARY FILIPINOS WHO ARE OUT THERE GUARDING THE BALLOTS AS NAMFREL VOLUNTEERS, ENDURING HUNGER, FATIGUE, LACK OF SLEEP, TENSION AND HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS, only to make sure that the will of the Filipino people is respected.
2. NAMFREL was organized precisely to ensure that elections are clean and orderly. That is its only aim. Regardless of whether the KBL or UNIDO wins the election, NAMFREL is prepared to give its support FOR AS LONG AS THE ELECTION HAS BEEN ~~REASONABLY~~ CLEAN AND HONEST. Our focus and concern is ~~directed to the~~ integrity of the electoral process. It is, therefore, inconceivable that NAMFREL should be accused of being responsible for disorder and violence at the polls.
3. In fact, what is very clear is that many NAMFREL volunteers have been the VICTIMS, NOT THE PERPETRATORS, of election disorder and violence.

FOR INQUIRIES, CONTACT:

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NAMFREL National Office: 8th Floor, RFM Building, Pioneer St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila

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NATIONAL CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR FREE ELECTIONS PRESS RELEASE NO. _____ DATE: _____

7/12
WITH THEIR CONTINUING SUPPORT, AND WITH THE HELP OF OUR FATHER IN HEAVEN, NAMFREL WILL NOT GIVE UP ITS FIGHT FOR CLEAN AND HONEST ELECTIONS.

FOR INQUIRIES, CONTACT:
BENJAMIN V. LOZARE (772472) SUSAN JAVELOSA (708353) or NICK REBONG (773711)

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COMELEC

As of 7 p.m. yesterday

	TOTAL
MARCOS	3,056,236
AQUINO	2,903,348
TOLENTINO	2,877,058
LAUREL	2,776,596
NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION	
MARCOS	706,730
AQUINO	677,943
TOLENTINO	715,085
LAUREL	735,440
REGION I	
MARCOS	640,494
AQUINO	270,978
TOLENTINO	601,261
LAUREL	236,307
REGION II	
MARCOS	323,596
AQUINO	128,354
TOLENTINO	313,201
LAUREL	136,489
REGION III	
MARCOS	208,440
AQUINO	201,414
TOLENTINO	217,346

NAMFREL

As of 5:55 p.m. yesterday

	TOTAL
MARCOS	4,521,070
AQUINO	5,286,485
TOLENTINO	4,267,011
LAUREL	5,021,249
NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION	
MARCOS	1,254,969
AQUINO	1,470,786
TOLENTINO	1,258,072
LAUREL	1,234,029
REGION I	
MARCOS	533,017
AQUINO	277,124
TOLENTINO	497,135
LAUREL	241,797
REGION II	
MARCOS	59,195
AQUINO	32,185
TOLENTINO	54,997
LAUREL	32,788
REGION III	
MARCOS	453,228
AQUINO	450,977
TOLENTINO	446,909
LAUREL	495,738
REGION IV	
MARCOS	508,925
AQUINO	695,510
TOLENTINO	320,670
LAUREL	849,794
REGION V	
MARCOS	224,229
AQUINO	447,462
TOLENTINO	200,153
LAUREL	457,876
REGION VI	
MARCOS	353,674
AQUINO	329,008
TOLENTINO	332,696
LAUREL	316,544
REGION VII	
MARCOS	353,200
AQUINO	537,934
TOLENTINO	368,681
LAUREL	514,240
REGION VIII	
MARCOS	118,347
AQUINO	78,321
TOLENTINO	115,057
LAUREL	77,676
REGION IX	
MARCOS	126,333
AQUINO	151,301
TOLENTINO	125,775
LAUREL	148,433
REGION X	
MARCOS	172,134
AQUINO	210,915
TOLENTINO	173,754
LAUREL	26,692
REGION XI	
MARCOS	235,367
AQUINO	302,208
TOLENTINO	239,300
LAUREL	275,953
REGION XII	
MARCOS	128,782
AQUINO	182,794
TOLENTINO	133,812
LAUREL	169,689

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	REGION IV
MARCOS	358,944
AQUINO	412,347
TOLENTINO	249,054
LAUREL	501,134
	REGION V
MARCOS	118,479
AQUINO	222,399
TOLENTINO	105,953
LAUREL	222,707
	REGION VI
MARCOS	114,885
AQUINO	101,910
TOLENTINO	102,016
LAUREL	104,992
	REGION VII
MARCOS	132,039
AQUINO	170,106
TOLENTINO	138,462
LAUREL	161,198
	REGION VIII
MARCOS	90,504
AQUINO	55,826
TOLENTINO	87,294
LAUREL	54,908
	REGION IX
MARCOS	69,400
AQUINO	84,939
TOLENTINO	74,342
LAUREL	78,750
	REGION X
MARCOS	154,158
AQUINO	144,688
TOLENTINO	149,116
LAUREL	145,973
	REGION XI
MARCOS	71,059
AQUINO	99,165
TOLENTINO	70,497
LAUREL	90,956
	REGION XII
MARCOS	67,778
AQUINO	96,333
TOLENTINO	69,313
LAUREL	90,387

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COMELEC		NAMFREL	
TOTAL		TOTAL	
MARCOS.....	3,056,236	MARCOS.....	5,785,348
AQUINO.....	2,903,348	AQUINO.....	6,499,817
TOLENTINO.....	2,877,058	TOLENTINO.....	5,443,551
LAUREL.....	2,776,596	LAUREL.....	6,272,104
NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION		NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION	
MARCOS.....	706,730	MARCOS.....	1,306,464
AQUINO.....	877,943	AQUINO.....	1,522,583
TOLENTINO.....	715,085	TOLENTINO.....	1,318,741
LAUREL.....	735,446	LAUREL.....	1,281,232
REGION I		REGION I	
MARCOS.....	640,194	MARCOS.....	532,756
AQUINO.....	270,978	AQUINO.....	277,814
TOLENTINO.....	601,261	TOLENTINO.....	497,675
LAUREL.....	530,207	LAUREL.....	242,496
REGION II		REGION II	
MARCOS.....	323,596	MARCOS.....	162,918
AQUINO.....	128,354	AQUINO.....	96,803
TOLENTINO.....	313,201	TOLENTINO.....	151,862
LAUREL.....	136,489	LAUREL.....	99,340
REGION III		REGION III	
MARCOS.....	208,170	MARCOS.....	640,698
AQUINO.....	238,340	AQUINO.....	756,368
TOLENTINO.....	201,414	TOLENTINO.....	628,056
LAUREL.....	217,346	LAUREL.....	680,094
REGION IV		REGION IV	
MARCOS.....	358,944	MARCOS.....	680,130
AQUINO.....	412,347	AQUINO.....	897,145
TOLENTINO.....	249,054	TOLENTINO.....	437,872
LAUREL.....	501,134	LAUREL.....	1,096,622
REGION V		REGION V	
MARCOS.....	118,479	MARCOS.....	311,970
AQUINO.....	222,399	AQUINO.....	562,173
TOLENTINO.....	105,953	TOLENTINO.....	280,757
LAUREL.....	222,707	LAUREL.....	569,744
REGION VI		REGION VI	
MARCOS.....	114,885	MARCOS.....	464,100
AQUINO.....	101,910	AQUINO.....	456,184
TOLENTINO.....	102,026	TOLENTINO.....	433,520
LAUREL.....	104,992	LAUREL.....	438,496
REGION VII		REGION VII	
MARCOS.....	132,039	MARCOS.....	490,256
AQUINO.....	170,106	AQUINO.....	652,549
TOLENTINO.....	138,462	TOLENTINO.....	505,283
LAUREL.....	161,198	LAUREL.....	626,739
REGION VIII		REGION VIII	
MARCOS.....	90,504	MARCOS.....	317,475
AQUINO.....	55,826	AQUINO.....	241,533
TOLENTINO.....	87,294	TOLENTINO.....	303,302
LAUREL.....	54,908	LAUREL.....	248,933
REGION IX		REGION IX	
MARCOS.....	69,400	MARCOS.....	191,747
AQUINO.....	84,959	AQUINO.....	204,396
TOLENTINO.....	74,382	TOLENTINO.....	189,276
LAUREL.....	78,750	LAUREL.....	200,285
REGION X		REGION X	
MARCOS.....	154,158	MARCOS.....	275,786
AQUINO.....	144,688	AQUINO.....	297,277
TOLENTINO.....	149,116	TOLENTINO.....	275,699
LAUREL.....	145,973	LAUREL.....	293,135
REGION XI		REGION XI	
MARCOS.....	71,059	MARCOS.....	253,817
AQUINO.....	99,163	AQUINO.....	322,132
TOLENTINO.....	70,497	TOLENTINO.....	259,586
LAUREL.....	90,956	LAUREL.....	295,977
REGION XII		REGION XII	
MARCOS.....	67,778	MARCOS.....	157,231
AQUINO.....	96,333	AQUINO.....	212,860
TOLENTINO.....	69,313	TOLENTINO.....	161,922
LAUREL.....	90,38	LAUREL.....	199,011

COMELEC		NAMFREL	
As of 3 p.m.		As of 6 p.m.	
TOTAL		TOTAL	
Marcos.....	5,899,873	Marcos.....	6,281,510
Aquino.....	5,384,368	Aquino.....	5,933,989
Tolentino.....	5,636,386	Tolentino.....	5,906,769
Laurel.....	5,252,390	Laurel.....	5,718,989
NCR		NCR	
Marcos.....	1,031,165	Marcos.....	1,306,484
Aquino.....	1,214,349	Aquino.....	1,522,583
Tolentino.....	1,038,437	Tolentino.....	1,318,741
Laurel.....	1,029,289	Laurel.....	1,281,232
REGION I		REGION I	
Marcos.....	771,265	Marcos.....	522,756
Aquino.....	284,731	Aquino.....	277,814
Tolentino.....	725,152	Tolentino.....	497,675
Laurel.....	734,413	Laurel.....	242,496
REGION II		REGION II	
Marcos.....	422,299	Marcos.....	422,299
Aquino.....	142,591	Aquino.....	142,591
Tolentino.....	408,907	Tolentino.....	408,907
Laurel.....	152,390	Laurel.....	152,390
REGION III		REGION III	
Marcos.....	693,213	Marcos.....	646,018
Aquino.....	689,675	Aquino.....	759,940
Tolentino.....	675,213	Tolentino.....	632,805
Laurel.....	628,323	Laurel.....	683,936
REGION IV		REGION IV	
Marcos.....	607,010	Marcos.....	713,677
Aquino.....	722,151	Aquino.....	941,834
Tolentino.....	412,229	Tolentino.....	461,455
Laurel.....	877,982	Laurel.....	1,148,218
REGION V		REGION V	
Marcos.....	222,830	Marcos.....	344,662
Aquino.....	414,987	Aquino.....	611,822
Tolentino.....	199,192	Tolentino.....	311,261
Laurel.....	421,324	Laurel.....	620,091
REGION VI		REGION VI	
Marcos.....	553,555	Marcos.....	520,888
Aquino.....	434,333	Aquino.....	510,366
Tolentino.....	488,556	Tolentino.....	477,370
Laurel.....	449,444	Laurel.....	497,455
REGION VII		REGION VII	
Marcos.....	381,409	Marcos.....	531,951
Aquino.....	387,081	Aquino.....	695,472
Tolentino.....	3387,066	Tolentino.....	547,494
Laurel.....	376,109	Laurel.....	668,195
REGION VIII		REGION VIII	
Marcos.....	2109,510	Marcos.....	501,716
Aquino.....	183,237	Aquino.....	357,226
Tolentino.....	300,255	Tolentino.....	482,042
Laurel.....	178,441	Laurel.....	362,430
REGION IX		REGION IX	
Marcos.....	203,255	Marcos.....	216,374
Aquino.....	516,813	Aquino.....	232,466
Tolentino.....	206,636	Tolentino.....	213,632
Laurel.....	155,194	Laurel.....	229,486
REGION X		REGION X	
Marcos.....	318,329	Marcos.....	289,201
Aquino.....	335,001	Aquino.....	305,229
Tolentino.....	399,121	Tolentino.....	287,802
Laurel.....	331,520	Laurel.....	301,156
REGION XI		REGION XI	
Marcos.....	192,838	Marcos.....	153,413
Aquino.....	250,474	Aquino.....	404,124
Tolentino.....	193,440	Tolentino.....	156,469
Laurel.....	210,149	Laurel.....	380,691
REGION XII		REGION XII	
Marcos.....	193,163	Marcos.....	161,388
Aquino.....	161,840	Aquino.....	217,597
Tolentino.....	201,900	Tolentino.....	166,015
Laurel.....	161,142	Laurel.....	203,605

COMELEC

As of 5 p.m. yesterday

Percentage of total: 61.07%

TOTAL

MARCOS	6,743,894
AQUINO	6,147,902
TOLENTINO	6,426,569
LAUREL	6,007,426

NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION

MARCOS	1,097,591
AQUINO	1,307,761
TOLENTINO	1,117,881
LAUREL	1,062,396

REGION I

MARCOS	861,198
AQUINO	322,956
TOLENTINO	808,774
LAUREL	292,443

REGION II

MARCOS	422,299
AQUINO	142,591
TOLENTINO	408,907
LAUREL	152,390

REGION III

MARCOS	777,075
AQUINO	759,379
TOLENTINO	756,141
LAUREL	688,116

REGION IV

MARCOS	678,307
AQUINO	816,994
TOLENTINO	455,342
LAUREL	993,619

REGION V

MARCOS	270,811
AQUINO	500,508
TOLENTINO	243,402
LAUREL	509,746

REGION VI

MARCOS	628,245
AQUINO	494,711
TOLENTINO	555,412
LAUREL	511,273

REGION VII

MARCOS	395,784
AQUINO	396,151
TOLENTINO	401,318
LAUREL	385,079

REGION VIII

MARCOS	378,627
AQUINO	233,330
TOLENTINO	366,863
LAUREL	228,387

REGION IX

MARCOS	269,057
AQUINO	211,236
TOLENTINO	269,685
LAUREL	204,231

REGION X

MARCOS	417,370
AQUINO	429,996
TOLENTINO	499,813
LAUREL	423,740

REGION XI

MARCOS	292,254
AQUINO	335,208
TOLENTINO	289,055
LAUREL	315,178

REGION XII

MARCOS	247,048
AQUINO	197,080
TOLENTINO	253,976
LAUREL	192,928

NAMFREL

As of 5 p.m. yesterday

Percentage of total: 66.02%

TOTAL

MARCOS	6,532,363
AQUINO	7,158,679
TOLENTINO	6,140,309
LAUREL	6,950,489

NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION

MARCOS	1,110,892
AQUINO	1,312,592
TOLENTINO	1,123,112
LAUREL	1,111,582

REGION I

MARCOS	578,997
AQUINO	282,506
TOLENTINO	542,691
LAUREL	246,349

REGION II

MARCOS	188,556
AQUINO	142,591
TOLENTINO	408,907
LAUREL	152,390

REGION III

MARCOS	634,084
AQUINO	761,771
TOLENTINO	722,271
LAUREL	685,622

REGION IV

MARCOS	422,299
AQUINO	856,443
TOLENTINO	486,129
LAUREL	1,038,355

REGION V

MARCOS	309,021
AQUINO	576,676
TOLENTINO	278,512
LAUREL	585,052

REGION VI

MARCOS	650,719
AQUINO	519,759
TOLENTINO	575,698
LAUREL	537,225

REGION VII

MARCOS	407,692
AQUINO	404,709
TOLENTINO	412,110
LAUREL	392,914

REGION VIII

MARCOS	446,395
AQUINO	272,025
TOLENTINO	433,136
LAUREL	266,831

REGION IX

MARCOS	307,900
AQUINO	248,564
TOLENTINO	307,676
LAUREL	241,561

REGION X

MARCOS	457,009
AQUINO	484,449
TOLENTINO	557,233
LAUREL	477,346

REGION XI

MARCOS	400,231
AQUINO	431,817
TOLENTINO	395,613
LAUREL	410,851

REGION XII

MARCOS	260,180
AQUINO	204,996
TOLENTINO	267,059
LAUREL	202,477

COMELEC

As of 8 p.m. yesterday

TOTAL

MARCOS	7,139,306
AQUINO	6,597,351
TOLENTINO	6,909,003
LAUREL	6,450,106

NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION

MARCOS	1,110,892
AQUINO	1,312,592
TOLENTINO	1,123,112
LAUREL	1,111,582

REGION I

MARCOS	922,747
AQUINO	343,313
TOLENTINO	868,870
LAUREL	311,251

REGION II

MARCOS	422,299
AQUINO	142,591
TOLENTINO	408,907
LAUREL	152,390

REGION III

MARCOS	816,111
AQUINO	797,827
TOLENTINO	794,948
LAUREL	722,271

REGION IV

MARCOS	710,104
AQUINO	856,443
TOLENTINO	486,129
LAUREL	1,038,355

REGION V

MARCOS	309,021
AQUINO	576,676
TOLENTINO	278,512
LAUREL	585,052

REGION VI

MARCOS	650,719
AQUINO	519,759
TOLENTINO	575,698
LAUREL	537,225

REGION VII

MARCOS	407,692
AQUINO	404,709
TOLENTINO	412,110
LAUREL	392,914

REGION VIII

MARCOS	446,395
AQUINO	272,025
TOLENTINO	433,136
LAUREL	266,831

REGION IX

MARCOS	307,900
AQUINO	248,564
TOLENTINO	307,676
LAUREL	241,561

REGION X

MARCOS	457,009
AQUINO	484,449
TOLENTINO	557,233
LAUREL	477,346

REGION XI

MARCOS	400,231
AQUINO	431,817
TOLENTINO	395,613
LAUREL	410,851

REGION XII

MARCOS	260,180
AQUINO	204,996
TOLENTINO	267,059
LAUREL	202,477

NAMFREL

As of 8 p.m. yesterday

TOTAL

MARCOS	6,532,362
AQUINO	7,158,679
TOLENTINO	6,909,003
LAUREL	6,450,106

NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION

MARCOS	1,312,592
AQUINO	1,320,616
TOLENTINO	1,323,201
LAUREL	1,288,285

REGION I

MARCOS	578,997
AQUINO	282,506
TOLENTINO	542,691
LAUREL	246,349

REGION II

MARCOS	188,556
AQUINO	105,934
TOLENTINO	176,739
LAUREL	108,517

REGION III

MARCOS	647,318
AQUINO	761,771
TOLENTINO	634,084
LAUREL	685,622

REGION IV

MARCOS	757,689
AQUINO	995,238
TOLENTINO	496,182
LAUREL	1,211,806

REGION V

MARCOS	354,784
AQUINO	634,453
TOLENTINO	320,819
LAUREL	641,728

REGION VI

MARCOS	582,075
AQUINO	561,177
TOLENTINO	533,457
LAUREL	550,280

REGION VII

MARCOS	535,363
AQUINO	722,631
TOLENTINO	552,760
LAUREL	694,377

REGION VIII

MARCOS	527,076
AQUINO	372,179
TOLENTINO	506,552
LAUREL	377,735

REGION IX

MARCOS	234,064
AQUINO	256,819
TOLENTINO	233,765
LAUREL	252,371

REGION X

MARCOS	293,799
AQUINO	308,751
TOLENTINO	292,393
LAUREL	304,650

REGION XI

MARCOS	353,413
AQUINO	404,124
TOLENTINO	356,469
LAUREL	380,691

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MARCOS	166,636
AQUINO	222,418
TOLENTINO	171,197
LAUREL	208,058

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OBSERVATIONS/COMMENTS

PROVINCES/CITIES	SEAL	SIGNATURE OF PARTY REP.	AUTHENTICITY	STATISTICAL PROBABILITY	PRECINCTS REPORTED	ERASURES/ALTERATIONS	OTHERS
<u>N C R</u>							
MANILA *	No seal						
QUEZON CITY *							
CALOOCAN CITY *	No signature of UNIDO Rep. on seal				Not specified	Erasures	Place of origin not specified.
PASAY CITY *		No signature of UNIDO rep.		Questioned			
PASIG/MARIKINA *							
LAS PIAS/PARAAQUE *	No seal						
MAKATI *		No signature of UNIDO rep.					Certificate of Canvass not signed by UNIDO Rep.
MALABON/NAVOTAS, VALENZUELA *					Incomplete		Place of origin not specified
SAN JUAN/MANDALUYONG *	No seal						Board to submit election returns of 38 precincts
TAGUIG/PATEROS/MUNTING-LUPA *		No signature of KBL rep.					

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OBSERVATIONS/COMMENTS

PROVINCES/CITIES	SEAL	SIGNATURE OF PARTY REP.	AUTHENTICITY	STATISTICAL PROBABILITY	PRECINCTS REPORTED	TRASURES/ALTERATIONS	OTHERS
<u>REGION I</u>							
ABRA *	No seal		Questioned	Questioned			
BENGUET *	No seal						
BAGUIO CITY *	Not properly sealed		Erasures & alterations				
ILLOCOS NORTE *		No signature of UNIDO rep.			No. of precincts exceeds COMELEC figure		
LAOAG CITY *	No seal			Questioned			
ILLOCOS SUR *	Green masking tape				Not specified	Alterations	Place not specified. UNIDO copy does not contain names of 3 Board Members; original signatures of Members in UNIDO copy.
LA UNION *	No seal			Questioned	Incomplete	Alterations	Discrepancies in signature of the Members of Board of Canvassers with KBL copy.
MT. PROVINCE *							
PANGASINAN *	Not properly sealed						
DAGUPAN CITY *	No seal				Not specified		Place of origin not specified.
SAN CARLOS CITY		UNIDO Rep. not duly authorized					

OBSERVATIONS/COMMENTS

PROVINCES/CITIES	SEAL	SIGNATURE OF PARTY REP.	AUTHENTICITY	STATISTICAL PROBABILITY	PRECINCTS REPORTED	ERASURES/ALTERATIONS	OTHERS
<u>REGION II</u>							
BATANES *					Not specified	Erasures	
CAGAYAN *			Questioned		Incomplete	Erasures	Secure COMELEC copy of Certificate of Canvass.
IFUGAO *	No seal				Not specified		
ISABELA *	No official seal	No signature of UNIDO rep.			Not specified		Place not specified
KALINCA-APAYAO *	No seal & not properly folded	No signature of UNIDO rep.			Not specified		
NUEVA VIZCAYA *	Not properly sealed					Erasures/alterations	COMELEC to submit copy of Certificate of Canvass.
QUIRINO *		No signature of UNIDO rep.					

OBSERVATIONS/COMMENTS

PROVINCES/CITIES	SEAL	SIGNATURE OF PARTY REP.	AUTHENTICITY	STATISTICAL PROBABILITY	PRECINCTS REPORTED	ERASURES/ALTERATIONS	OTHERS
<u>REGION III</u>							
BATAAN *					Incomplete		COMELEC to submit copy of Certificate of Canvass.
BULACAN *							
NUEVA ECIJA *							
CABANATUAN CITY *	No official seal & not properly folded					Alterations Erasures	
PALAYAN CITY *	Improvised seal used					Superimpositions	
SAN JOSE CITY *	Not properly sealed					Erasures	
PAMPANGA *							COMELEC to submit copy of Certificate of Canvass.
ANGELES CITY *	No seal					Erasures/ alterations	
TARJAC	No official seal	No signature & thumbmark of UNIDO Rep.			Incomplete returns		
ZAMBALES *					No election returns in 2 precincts		Subject of pre-proclamation protest with COMELEC.
OLONGAPO CITY *	No seal & not properly folded				Not specified	Superimpositions	

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OBSERVATIONS/COMMENTS

PROVINCES/CITIES	SEAL	SIGNATURE OF PARTY REP.	AUTHENTICITY	STATISTICAL PROBABILITY	PRECINCTS REPORTED	ERASURES/ALTERATIONS	OTHERS
<u>REGION IV</u>							
AURORA *	No seal				Incomplete	Erasures	
BATANGAS *	No seal					Erasures & alterations	
BATANGAS CITY *	No seal				Not specified		
LIPA CITY *	Improvised seal		Questioned		Incomplete returns for some candidates		
CAVITE *						Superimpositions	UNIDO Rep. refused to sign & submitted appeal to Speaker for exclusion of certain precincts.
CAVITE CITY *	No seal & not properly folded					Superimpositions	Subject of an appeal to CONELEC.
TAGAYTAY CITY *	No seal					Alterations on supporting documents	
TRECE MARTIRES CITY *		UNIDO Rep. did not sign certificate					
LAGUNA *		No signature of UNIDO rep.			Incomplete		Board of Canvasser to submit missing returns.
SAN PABLO CITY *	No seal						
MARINDUQUE							

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OBSERVATIONS/COMMENTS

PROVINCES/CITIES	SEAL	SIGNATURE OF PARTY REP.	AUTHENTICITY	STATISTICAL PROBABILITY	PRECINCTS REPORTED	TRASURTS/ALTERATIONS	OTHERS
<u>REGION IV (CONT.)</u>							
OCCIDENTAL MINDORO *	No seal					Superimpositions	
ORIENTAL MINDORO *	No seal & not properly folded						
PALANAN *						Superimpositions	
PTO. PRINCESA CITY *	No seal					Superimpositions	
QUEZON *						Superimpositions	
LUCENA CITY *	No seal					Superimpositions on entries for UNIDO candidates	
RIZAL *	Not properly sealed						Signatures of Members of Board of Canvassers appear not to be genuine.
ROMBLON *						Alterations	

2/27/

OBSERVATIONS/COMMENTS

PROVINCES/CITIES	SEAL	SIGNATURE OF PARTY REP.	AUTHENTICITY	STATISTICAL PROBABILITY	PRECINCTS REPORTED	ERASURES/ALTERATIONS	OTHERS
REGION V							
ALBAY *	No seal				Not specified		Place of origin not specified.
LEGASPI CITY *	No seal				Incomplete	Alterations	COMELEC to submit copy of Certificate of Canvass.
CAMARINES NORTE *						Superimpositions	Secure COMELEC copy of Certificate of Canvass.
CAMARINES SUR *					Not specified		Place not specified.
IRIGA CITY *	No seal & not properly folded				Not specified		Signatures of Board of Canvassers Members not genuine.
NAGA CITY *							
CATANDUANES							
NASBATE *	No seal						
SORSOGON *	Not sealed						

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OBSERVATIONS/COMMENTS

PROVINCES/CITIES	SEAL	SIGNATURE OF AUTHORITY PARTY REP.	STATISTICAL PROBABILITY	PRECINCTS REPORTED	ERASURES/ ALTERATIONS	OTHERS
REGION VI						
ARAN					Not specified Erasures	
ANTIQUE *						
CAPIZ *	No seal			Not complete		Signatures not genuine. Manifested general objections.
BOHOL CITY *	Not sealed				Corrections on entries for Laurel.	
BOHOL *	No seal				Superimpositions	
BOHOL CITY *						Place not specified.
NEGROS DEL NORTE *		UNIDO Rep. not duly authorized		Not specified	Insertions	
CADIZ CITY *	No seal	UNIDO Rep. not duly authorized		Not specified		Place not specified.
SAN CARLOS CITY *	No seal			Not specified		Place of origin not specified.
SILAY CITY *	No seal	UNIDO Rep. not authorized				
NEGROS OCCIDENTAL *	No seal			Incomplete		Board of Canvassers to submit missing returns.
		Statement of members of Board of Can- vassers.				

OBSERVATIONS/COMMENTS

PROVINCES/CITIES	SEAL	SIGNATURE OF PARTY REP.	AUTHENTICITY	STATISTICAL PROBABILITY	PRECINCTS REPORTED	ERASURES/ALTERATIONS	OTHERS
REGION VII							
BOHOL*					Incomplete		
TAGBILARAN CITY*	No seal & not properly folded				lot specified		Board to submit election returns of other precincts
CEBU*	Not properly sealed & folded				Returns in 8 precincts missing 19		Place of origin not specified
CEBU CITY*					ot specified		Board to submit missing returns
DANAO CITY	Improvised seal	UNIDO rep. did not participate					Place of origin not specified. Votes tallied exceed population.
LAPU-LAPU CITY*	No seal				only 123 precincts reported		
MANDAUE CITY*	No seal						Signature of Members of Board appears not genuine
TOLEDO CITY*	No seal						
NEGROS ORIENTAL*					Incomplete		
BASIS CITY*	No seal						Board to submit, Missing returns
CANTAOX CITY*							
DUMAGUETE CITY*	Improvised seal						
SILOMBO*	No seal				ot specified		

OBSERVATIONS/COMMENTS							
PROVINCES/CITIES	SEAL	SIGNATURE OF PARTY REP.	AUTHENTICITY	STATISTICAL PROBABILITY	PRECINCTS REPORTED	ERASURES/ALTERATIONS	OTHERS
<u>REGION VIII</u>							
EASTERN SAMAR*	Improvised seal						
LEYTE*							Improvised Certificate of Canvass
ORMOC CITY*	No seal				Incomplete		Board to submit return from missing precinct
TACLOBAN CITY*	Not properly sealed				Not specified		Not properly prepared
NORTHERN SAMAR*						Erasures & alterations	
SAMAR*	No seal			Returns in 29 precincts not included			Board to submit miss. returns
CALBAYOG CITY*	No seal	No signature of UNIDO Rep.		Incomplete	Erasures		Board to submit miss. returns
SOUTHERN LEYTE*		No signature of UNIDO Rep.			Not specified		Place of origin not specified

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OBSERVATIONS/COMMENTS

PROVINCES/CITIES	SEAL	SIGNATURE OF PARTY REP.	AUTHENTICITY	STATISTICAL PROBABILITY	PRECINCTS REPORTED	MEASURES/ALTERATIONS	OTHERS
ION X							
BASILAN*	No seal	No signature of UNIDO Rep.			Incomplete		Board to submit mis returns
SULU*	No seal & not properly folded	No signature of UNIDO rep.		Questioned	Incomplete		UNIDO Rep. signed certificate under protest
TAMI-TAWI*							
ZAMBANGA DEL NORTE*						Superimpositions	Doubt on genuiness of signatures of Members of Board of Canvassers
DAPITAN CITY*		No signature of UNIDO rep			Not specified	Erasures	
DIPOLOG CITY*							
ZAMBOANGA SUR*	No signature on seal		Questioned				
PAGADIAN CITY*						Alterations in votes for Aquino	COMELEC to submit copy of Certificate of Canver
ZAMBUANGA CITY*						Superimpositions	

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OBSERVATIONS/COMMENTS

PROVINCES/CITIES	SEAL	SIGNATURE OF PARTY REP.	AUTHENTICITY	STATISTICAL PROBABILITY	PRECINCTS REPORTED	TRASURIS/ALTERATIONS	OTHERS
<u>EGION X</u>							
AGUSAN DEL NORTE*	No seal		Incomplete	Incomplete			Board to submit missing returns
BUTUAN CITY*	No seal		Questioned	Questioned	Incomplete		Board to submit missing returns
AGUSAN DEL SUR*					Not specified		
BUKIDNON*							
CAMIGUIN*							
MISAMIS OCC.*	No seal	UNIDO Rep. not duly authorized					
OROQUIETA CITY*	No seal						
OZAMIZ CITY*	No seal						
TANGUB CITY*	Improvised seal						
MISAMIS ORIENTAL*	No seal						
CAGAYAN DE ORO C.*	Improvised seal				Incomplete/ returns		
GINGOOG CITY*	No seal		Questioned	Questioned			
SURIGAO NORTE*							
SURIGAO CITY*	No seal & not properly folded						Illegality of canvas proceedings, protest with COMELEC

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OBSERVATIONS/COMMENTS

PROVINCE/CITY	SEAL	SIGNATURE OF PARTY REP.	AUTHENTICITY	STATISTICAL PROBABILITY	POLLING STATION REPORTED	ERASURES/ALTERATIONS	OTHERS ...
REGION XI							
DAVAO DEL NORTE*	No seal		KBL representative signature			Alterations	COMELEC to submit copy of Certificate of Canvassers Board to submit missing returns
DAVAO ORIENTAL*							
DAVAO DEL SUR*	Not properly sealed				Incomplete	Erasures in votes of KBL candidates	COMELEC to submit copy of Certificate of Candidates
DAVAO CITY*							
SOUTH COTABATO*							Reservation on genuinity of signature of Board Members
GEN. SANTOS CITY*	Not properly sealed					Erasures	
SURIGAO DEL SUR*							Discrepancies in signature of the Members of Board of Canvassers with KBL copy

OBSERVATIONS/COMMENTS

PROVINCES/CITIES	SEAL	SIGNATURE OF PARTY REP.	AUTHENTICITY	STATISTICAL PROBABILITY	PRECINCTS REPORTED	ERASURES/ALTERATIONS	OTHERS
<u>SECTION XII</u>					Not specified		
LANAO DEL NORTE*	No seal & not properly folded						Dissenting opinion of UNIDO Rep. attached
ILIGAN CITY*	No seal & not properly folded						
LANAO DEL SUR*		No signature of UNIDO rep.				Alterations	
MARAWI CITY*	Not properly folded					Erasures	Place not specified
MAGUINDANAO*		No signature of UNIDO rep.			Incomplete		Board to submit missing returns
COTABATO CITY*						Erasures in names of KBL rep.	
NORTH COTABATO*	No seal & not properly folded						No signature of Board of Canvasser Chairman
SULTAN KUDARAT*							UNIDO Rep. signed certificate under protest

REPORT OF THE SPEAKER TO THE BATASANG PAMBANSA
ON THE RECEIPT AND OPENING OF CERTIFICATES OF
CANVASS, AND THE COUNTING OF VOTES APPEARING
THEREON IN CONNECTION WITH THE PRESIDENTIAL
AND VICE-PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION ON FEBRUARY 7, 1986

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Article VII
of the Constitution, the pertinent portion of which is here-
of
by quoted, to wit:
bx

"The returns of every election for President,
duly certified by the board of canvassers of each
province or city, shall be transmitted to the
Speaker at the Batasang Pambansa, who shall, not
later than thirty days after the day of the elec-
tion, and in the presence of the Batasang Pamban-
sa open all the certificates, and the votes shall
then be counted.

"The person having the highest number of
votes shall be proclaimed elected; but in case
two or more shall have an equal and the highest
number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be
chosen by a vote of a majority of all the Members
of the Batasang Pambansa in session assembled,"

the Speaker has the honor to submit the following report:

1. A total of one hundred forty (140) certificates of
canvass, duly certified by the Board of Canvassers of each
ca
province, city, and district, were received by the Office of
pr
the Speaker from February 7 to February 15, 1986
th

Copies of the pertinent reports of the Secretary-
General of the Batasang Pambansa, who has been tasked to re-
Ge:
ceive, for and in behalf of the Speaker, the said certifi-
ce
icates of canvass, are hereto attached as Annex A"

2. On February 10, 1986 the Batasan resumed its ses-
sion. A Board of Tellers was formed to assist the Speaker
si
in the opening of the certificates of canvass, as well as
in
the counting of votes cast for President and Vice-President
th

appearing thereon. The Board of Tellers had four Members from the Majority Party and four Members from the Opposition.

The envelopes containing the certificates of canvass were opened in the presence of the Batasang Pambansa.

In the course of the opening of the envelopes containing the certificates of canvass and the counting of votes appearing on said certificates of canvass, various observations were made by the Members of the Board of Tellers as well as by some Members of the Batasang Pambansa. A tabulation of these observations is hereto attached as Annex "B"

It is worthwhile mentioning that all of the above proceedings were witnessed by the general public and, upon our invitation, by the representatives and legal counsel of the presidential and vice-presidential candidates and the representatives and legal counsels of the KBL, the UNIDO, and the Liberal Party.

The Batasang Pambansa also invited representatives of certain groups and organizations, particularly, the NAMFREL, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Rotary Club of the Philippines, the Philippine Jaycees, and the MOVER, to observe the proceedings.

After considering the observations made by the Members of the Board of Tellers and other Members of the Batasang Pambansa, the results of the counting of votes are as follows:

For President:

FERDINAND E. MARCOS	10,807,197
CORAZON C. AQUINO	9,291,716
REUBEN R. CANOY	34,041
NARCISO S. PADILLA	23,652

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO	10,134,130
SALVADOR H. LAUREL	9,173,105
EVA ESTRADA KALAW	662,185
ROGER ARIENDA	35,974

The tabulation containing the results of the votes counted by province city, and district in Metro Manila is hereby attached as Annex "C"

On the basis of the aforementioned results of the votes counted, the Speaker finds that His Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, garnered the highest number of votes for the position of President of the Philippines, and Honorable Arturo M. Tolentino, MP, garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Vice-President of the Philippines.

Therefore, the Speaker recommends that the Batasang Pambansa proclaim FERDINAND E. MARCOS as the duly elected President of the Philippines and ARTURO M. TOLENTINO as the duly elected Vice-President of the Philippines.

NICANOR E. YNIGUEZ
Speaker



BOARD OF CENSORS

Regular Member

Regular Member

Regular Member

- 4 -

Regular Member	Regular Member
 REGULAR MEMBER Alternate Member	Alternate Member
 R. L. Clegg Alternate Member	Alternate Member
 H. E. D. S. V. A. S. O. Alternate Member	Alternate Member
 J. G. Clegg Alternate Member	Alternate Member

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TO THE SPEAKER
FROM THE SECRETARY- GENERAL
RE NUMBER OF CERTIFICATES OF
CANVASS RECEIVED

ANNEX
XXXVIII.2
Page 259

PURSUANT TO Memorandum Order No. 05-86 (Speaker) dated February 3, 1986, herewith is a report on the number of certificates of canvass received from the various Provincial/City/District Board of Canvassers and the date and time of their receipt by the Office of the Speaker as of 5:00 P.M. today.

Name of Province/City/ District Date and Time of Receipt

Cavite City	Feb. 8	- 2:05 a.m.
Tagaytay City	8	- 10:37 a.m.
Olongapo City	8	- 12:16 p.m.
Lucena City	8	- 12:30 p.m.
Lipa City	8	- 2:20 p.m.
San Jose City, Nueva Ecija	8	- 2:50 p.m.
Trece Martirez City	8	- 5:56 p.m.
Angeles City	8	- 8:20 p.m.
RIZAL	8	- 8:42 p.m.
San Pablo City	8	- 9:10 p.m.
NCR (Las Piñas, Parañaque)	8	- 9:50 p.m.
Region IV (Batangas)	8	- 10:11 p.m.
Pampanga	9	- 12:11 a.m.
CAVITE PROVINCE	9	- 2:50 p.m.
Muntinlupa, Taguig, Pateros	9	- 3:39 p.m.
Cotabato City	9	- 4:00 p.m.
Dapitan City	9	- 5:17 p.m.
General Santos City	9	- 5:41 p.m.
Occidental Mindoro	9	- 6:03 p.m.
Quezon City	9	- 6:21 p.m.
Camiguin Province	9	- 7:10 p.m.
Marinduque	9	- 7:10 p.m.
Bataan	9	- 7:29 p.m.
Pasig Marikina	9	- 8:05 p.m.
Malabon, Navotas, Valenzuela	10	- 12:31 a.m.
BULACAN	10	- 1:00 a.m.
Batangas City	10	- 9:55 a.m.
Naga City	10	- 10:10 a.m.
CATANDUANES	10	- 10:25 a.m.
San Carlos City, Pangasinan	10	- 10:45 a.m.
Laoag City	10	- 11:05 a.m.
ILOCOS NORTE	10	- 11:08 a.m.
Ozamiz City	10	- 11:40 a.m.
Gingoog City	10	- 11:58 a.m.
LA UNION	10	- 12:11 p.m.
BASILAN	10	- 12:50 p.m.

- ? -

Cabanatuan City	Feb. 10	- 2:50 p.m.
Palayan City	10	- 2:35 p.m.
NUEVA ECIJA	10	- 2:35 p.m.
Aurora	10	- 3:42 p.m.
Mandaue City		- 4:00 p.m.
Lapu-Lapu City		- 4:05 p.m.
Toledo city		- 4:04 p.m.
Siquijor		- 4:20 p.m.
Ormoc City		- 4:31 p.m.
Southern Leyte		- 4:37 p.m.
North Cotabato		- 4:50 p.m.
48. Danao City		- 4:55 p.m.

For the Speaker's information.

February 10, 1986.

Guzman
ANTONIO M. DE GUZMAN

25

REGION/PROV. CITY	N	C	M	P	A	Difference
N.C.R.	1,394,815			1,614,662		(219,847)
I	1,239,825			431,877		807,948
II	856,026			139,666		716,360
III	1,011,860			1,008,157		3,703
IV	1,190,804			1,425,143		234,339)
V	433,809			761,538		327,729)
VI	902,682			777,312		125,370
VII	773,604			827,912		54,308)
VIII	627,868			411,284		216,584
IX	540,570			365,195		175,375
X	563,547			519,841		43,706
XI	609,540			662,799		53,259)
XII	662,247			346,330		315,917
Totals:	10,807,197			9,291,716		1,515,481

REGION	REG. NO.	NO. OF PRECINCTS OF VOTERS	NO. OF PRECINCTS CANVASSED	MARCOS (KBL)	AFUINO (UNIDO)	CANOY (SDP)	PADILLA (MOTOR)	TOLENTINO (KBL)	LAUREL (UNIDO)	KALAW (LP)	OSMEÑA STUART AR
PROVINCE/CITY											
NCR	4,278,910	12,330	11	6,244,815	1,614,668	794	10,687	1,411,863	1,366,163	219,763	16,
I	1,949,239	6,180		1,239,825	4,318,777	282	3,399	1,733,112	394,255	962,57	34,
II	1,189,565	4,007		856,026	1,396,666	111	381	825,806	1,505,38	8111	62,
III	2,550,935	7,901		1,011,860	1,008,457	243	2,268	984,045	920,048	104,957	48,
IV	3,364,298	10,668		1,190,804	1,425,143	336	3831	453,600	1,691,011	585,24	59,
V	1,513,203	5,634		4,338,09	761,538	258	376	388,961	774,336	256,54	64,
VI	2,159,736	7,886		703,682	777,318	386	244	814,910	783,183	56,910	35,
VII	1,988,641	6,562		773,604	827,912	4012	394	790,432	799,555	7571	41,
VIII	1,325,813	5,546		622,868	411,284	475	213	606,648	403,660	219,31	110,
IX	1,279,148	4,410		340,570	365,193	3686	505	531,497	359,501	5,192	568,
X	1,455,801	4,632		563,547	519,841	8244	223	552,528	519,502	7451	300,
XI	1,753,779	5,178		609,540	662,779	13413	773	599,462	615,701	376,40	181,
XII	1,373,261	4,809		662,247	346,330	1801	358	601,020	375,495	12224	944,
TOTAL	26,181,829	86,043		10,807,197	9,991,716	34,041	23,682	10,134,130	9,113,105	662,185	35,97

REGION NCR	REG. NO.	NO. OF PRECINCTS OF VOTERS	NO. OF PRECINCTS CANVASSED	MARCOS (KBL)	AFUINO (UNIDO)	CANOY (SDP)	PADILLA (MOTOR)	TOLENTINO (KBL)	LAUREL (UNIDO)	KALAW (LP)	OSMEÑA STUART AR
PROVINCE/CITY											
MANILA	1,039,466	3,549	3546	1,882,66	406,747	217	2587	505,086	322,773	65,249	37,
QUEZON CITY	856,358	2,283	2281	2,729,68	342,961	197	2757	290,701	282,093	40,914	62,
CALOOCAN CITY	326,806	923		116,119	113,381	43	707	115,221	98,300	13,587	14,
PASAY CITY	208,623	615		77469	739,39	42	462	739,26	699,68	8106	14,
Pasig	187,297	529		95206	149,410	46	889	101,000	122,871	19945	14,
Marikina	144,388	413									
Las Piñas	118,846	304	755	80442	120,612	57	581	822,88	109,043	9592	70,
Paranaque	165,246	411									
Malabon	350,289	853	823	110,274	91,462	68	687	102,976	86,667	11,430	14,
Newatac	136,183	1098	1052	110,824	140,244	44	686	113,273	120,308	15456	16,
Valenzuela	101,649	279									
San Juan	747,351	615									
Mandaluyong	96,049	260	656	72118	89,146	44	1001	589,78	72,956	28971	23,
Paglig	148,559	514									
Pateros	102,967	263	585	71129	86,768	28	367	68405	82,191	6512	5,
Muntinlupa	21,487	77									
	722,506	704									
				1,394,815	1,614,668	794	10,687	1,411,863	1,366,163	219,763	35,97
				2,168,422	2,409,829	603	9323	2,299,000	2,101,205	194,746	128

REGION I PROVINCE/CITY	REG. NO.	NO. OF VOTERS	NO. OF PRECINCTS	P R E S I D E N T					V I C E P R E S I D E N T					
				NO. OF PRECINCTS CANVASSED	MARCOS (KBL)	AGUINO (UNIDO)	CANOY (SDP)	PADILL (MOTOR)	TOLENTINO (KBL)	LAUREL (UNIDO)	KALAW (LP)	ESPINA (UNIDO)	STUART (UNIDO)	ARIS (MOT)
ABRA	87,366	340	340	77186	3794	4	17	76231	1,111	159				13
BENGUET	115,154	370	179	41756	51826	73	1644	12638	47939	2624				13
BAGUIO CITY	86,158	243		41640	24803	51	710	40917	22153	3137				753
ILLOCOS NORTE	197,383	624	761	189897	718	2	6	187440	2430	302				9
LAGAIG CITY	45,775	136	136	41189	888	2	4	42460	1342	208				13
ILLOCOS SUR	247,537	960		191613	28063	7	17	184184	12937	785				48
LA UNION	264,103	791		204844	27480	26	149	197273	11834	2479				205
MT. PROVINCE	46,245	171	119	9803	10664	29	358	9407	10340	410				260
PANGASINAN	757,935	2,455	2455	198138	240565	76	400	357257	208983	68443				593
DAGUPAN CITY	53,992	230		22022	2194	10	44	19201	16510	10417				88
SAN CARLOS C.	46,941	151	151	19537	19281	9	6	16282	1,136	7223				0
T O T A L	1,949,214	6,140		1239825	431877	282	3399	1173312	394255	96257				341

REGION II PROVINCE/CITY	REG. NO.	NO. OF VOTERS	NO. OF PRECINCTS	P R E S I D E N T					V I C E P R E S I D E N T					
				NO. OF PRECINCTS CANVASSED	MARCOS (KBL)	AGUINO (UNIDO)	CANOY (SDP)	PADILL (MOTOR)	TOLENTINO (KBL)	LAUREL (UNIDO)	KALAW (LP)	ESPINA (UNIDO)	STUART (UNIDO)	ARIS (MOTOR)
BATAAN	7,022	34		2808	2944	2	7	2817	2944	15				10
CAGAYAN	388,976	1,240	1222	275925	42903	18	37	271387	43823	1305				77
ITOGOD	51,326	192		4742	6600	3	80	4334	6281	589				92
ISABELIA	459,237	1,521		402860	20072	15	19	394085	21016	1008				151
KALAGANAYA	39,285	348		77429	10624	49	92	72797	10624	744				75
MULAWI	133,239	510	490	55847	49734	21	138	51152	52080	1161				201
SULAWI	42,351	162	160	36415	6739	1	8	29114	13768	88				11
T O T A L	1,189,965	4,007		856026	139666	111	381	825886	150538	8111				620

REGION IV PROVINCE/CITY	REG. NO.	NO. OF VOTERS	NO. OF PRECINCTS	P R E S I D E N T					V I C E P R E S I D E N T				
				MARCOS (KBL)	ACUINO (UNIDO)	CANOY (SDP)	PADILLA (MOTOR)	TOLENTINO (KBL)	LAUREL (UNIDO)	KALAW (LP)	OSMEÑA STUART (UNIDO)	AR	
AURORA	49,894	200		19,891	19,777	15	15	16	18,739	19,565	509		
BATANGAS	482,645	1,443		155,474	236,616	26	300		31,711	350,547	2,143		
BATANGAS CITY	77,976	229		23,020	41,226	7	76		5,841	58,023	441		
LIPA CITY	64,424	206		20,525	32,742	9	43		7,620	41,589	4,153		
CAVITE	435,456	1,215	1,218	198,574	139,574	47	769		178,925	147,037	9,861		
CAVITE CITY	56,595	170	170	30,821	15,197	5	152		24,451	15,477	1,244		
TAGAYTAY CITY	11,016	33	33	5,060	3,132	1	10		3,472	4,530	80		
TRECE MARTIRES CITY	8,149	19	19	7,415	162				6,150	1,202			
LAGUNA	511,084	1,571	1,562	180,409	220,924	83	904		127,327	257,366	14,745		
ST. PABLO CITY	77,788	276		27,182	37,902	12	186		15,706	42,452	1,680		
MARINDUQUE	89,289	287	287	34,464	40,181	7	25		26,907	46,521	585		
OCC. MINDORO	110,382	337	327	42,912	36,190	7	30		38,335	39,730	723		
OB. MINDORO	201,895	657	657	71,060	87,142	7	29		46,270	110,278	1,889		
PALAWAN	157,136	519		39,970	44,742	15	22		36,056	47,742	223		
PTRO. PRIN. CESA CITY	41,299	105		16,349	15,380	1	11		15,776	15,554	250		
QUEZON	464,671	1,823		136,312	225,672	40	378		88,349	266,540	3,880		
LUCENA CITY	61,991	209		20,102	29,039	15	213		14,517	33,571	933		
RIZAL	376,786	1,063	1,057	131,225	160,661	36	657		135,976	137,264	14,891		
BOMBON	85,222	104		30,619	30,594	3	8		27,322	41,293	205		
TOTAL	3,364,298	10,668		1,102,804	1,425,143	336	3,831		853,600	1,561,011	58,524		

REGION V PROVINCE/CITY	REG. NO. OF VOTERS	NO. OF PRECINCTS	NO. OF PRECINCTS CANVASSED	P R E S I D E N T					V I C E P R E S I D E N T				
				MARCOS (KBL)	ACUINO (UNIDO)	CANOY (SDP)	PADILLA (MOTOR)	TOLENTINO (KBL)	LAUREL (UNIDO)	KALAW (LP)	OSMENA (UNIDO)	STUART (A.I.M.)	
ALBAY	296,822	1,095	75354	159210	28	92	67733	153530	12291				
LEGASPI CITY	50,681	172	16547	26900	4	29	15396	26463	1350				
CAMARINES NOR	142,516	489	484	35698	73955	14	113	33679	75093	595			
CAMARINES SUR	115,318	1,557	1521	110078	221907			90832	239889	1415			
IRACA CITY	32,772	120	9250	17758	0	8	8637	18263	115				
VAGA CITY	50,986	201	10874	30190	7	28	6855	32876	200				
CATBALLOWS	72,110	162	162	33984	32342	5	6	13530	12090	875			
MISAMIS	238,572	327	72154	19223	167	18	66937	21555	1632				
BUTIG	103,353	831	827	59870	98748	33	92	63305	95577	7131			
TOTAL	1,159,111	5,521		433809	761538	258	376	398961	774136	25654			

REGION VI PROVINCE/CITY	REG. NO. OF VOTERS	NO. OF PRECINCTS	NO. OF PRECINCTS CANVASSED	P R E S I D E N T					V I C E P R E S I D E N T				
				MARCOS (KBL)	ACUINO (UNIDO)	CANOY (SDP)	PADILLA (MOTOR)	TOLENTINO (KBL)	LAUREL (UNIDO)	KALAW (LP)	OSMENA (UNIDO)	STUART (A.I.M.)	
ALBAY	153,815	511	63078	64471	10	24	60149	64759	2117				
ANTIQUE	162,904	774	65225	77694	23	15	52982	82751	987				
CAPIZ	180,932	698	692	78130	64079	19	8	73891	65304	1600			
ROXAS CITY	44,570	154	19016	17709	2	18	18134	17228	1138				
ILLOCO	581,797	2,337	214,617	235,024	108	49	145,818	236,063	22,489				
ILLOCO CITY	147,632	216	55282	61708	7	12	51619	59356	7850				
NEGROS D. NORTE	174,034	585	586	65721	49703	14	9	71106	50289	3610			
CADIZ CITY	50,115	135	36051	2690			29002	4820	39				
SI. CARLOS C.	37,944	134	14554	14069	95	4	14690	13637	109				
SILAY CITY	41,293	125	125	19448	13989	2	0	19311	13413	516			
NEGROS OCC.	154,617	1,180	114	156595	97292	90	51	145019	101145	5511			
BACOLOD CITY	151,525	513	513	52951	65321	13	52	52522	55408	10077			
BAGC CITY	42,993	131	131	22400	13195	0	6	21634	12798	759			
LA CARLTA C.	21,760	81	57	9504	4462	3	2	9043	4643	168			
TOTAL	2,159,716	7,886	901,682	777,312	386	344	814,916	783,183	76,910				

REGION VII PROVINCE/CITY	REG. NO. OF VOTERS	NO. OF PRECINCTS	NO. OF PRECINCTS CANVASSED	P R E S I D E N T				V I C E P R E S I D E N T				
				MARCOS (KBL)	ACUINO (UNIDO)	CANOY (SDP)	PADILLA (MOTOR)	TOLENTINO (KBL)	LAUREL (UNIDO)	KALAH (LP)	OSMEÑA (UNIDO)	ARIZ (MC)
BOHOL	378,992	1,369	1,365	170,635	154,338	815	108	173,802	151,177	1,514	16	
TAGBILARAN C.	26,361	79		8,767	13,043	64	21	10,782	10,957	150	0	
CEBU	619,164	2,046	2,038	264,211	249,998	1,224	56	261,461	248,213	1,532	0	
CEBU CITY	305,087	981		60,748	167,280	745	114	71,266	154,221	2,493	11	
DANAO CITY	58,696	147		57,225	342	3	1	57,167	372	6	0	
LAPU-LAPU C.	53,151	134	134	22,374	21,416	56	6	22,596	20,887	122	0	
MAINDAU CITY	72,235	202	202	14,352	42,974	158	15	15,905	40,989	380	0	
TOLEDO CITY	45,298	130	130	14,652	20,671	79	1	14,970	20,051	97	0	
NEGROS ORIENTAL	314,806	1,052	1,034	113,402	110,187	656	30	113,500	107,334	987	0	
BAIS CITY	24,879	80		9,080	9,257	38	7	9,300	9,035	18	0	
CANIACON C.	14,647	43		7,528	3,149	98	0	7,416	3,136	31	0	
DUMAGUETE C.	37,887	150	150	9,963	21,808	55	35	11,708	19,818	214	0	
SIQUIJOR	37,428	149		20,667	13,449	71	0	20,659	13,375	27	0	
T O T A L	1,949,811	5,062		773,604	827,912	4,012	394	790,452	799,565	7,571	27	

REGION VII PROVINCE/CITY	REG. NO. OF VOTERS	NO. OF PRECINCTS	NO. OF PRECINCTS CANVASSED	P R E S I D E N T				V I C E P R E S I D E N T				
				MARCOS (KBL)	ACUINO (UNIDO)	CANOY (SDP)	PADILLA (MOTOR)	TOLENTINO (KBL)	LAUREL (UNIDO)	KALAH (LP)	OSMEÑA (UNIDO)	ARIZ (MC)
EASTERN SAMAR	134,528	651	596	43,630	53,764	4	3	41,577	52,482	2,627		
LEYTE	535,694	2,012		300,803	143,261	245	34	296,341	142,647	2,089		
ORMOC CITY	54,628	201	301	20,835	22,619	97	11	20,616	22,277	218		
TACLOBAN C.	62,814	211	211	32,809	18,399	10	16	32,481	17,371	1,154		
NORTHERN SAMAR	165,909	679	650	62,892	50,964	4	15	55,675	52,348	4,675		
SAMAR	172,634	863	827	68,291	49,069	0	0	63,110	43,484	10,051		
CALBAYOG C.	49,697	206		-24,584	15,950	2	0	24,228	15,255	907		
SOUTHERN LEYTE	150,919	718		73,934	57,258	113	134	72,620	57,696	210		
T O T A L	1,325,813	5,346		627,808	411,284	475	213	606,648	403,660	21,931	110	

REGION XI PROVINCE/CITY	REG. NO. OF VOTERS	NO. OF PRECINCTS	NO. OF PRECINCTS CANVASSED	P R E S I D E N T				V I C E P R E S I D E N T			
				MARCOS (KBL)	ACUINO (UNIDO)	CANOY (SDP)	PADILLA (MOTOR)	TOLENTINO (KBL)	LAUREL (UNIDO)	KALAW (LP)	MARQUEZ (UNIDO)
DAVAO DEL NORTE	415,605	1,198	1,190	168,720	142,607	5,396	82	162,444	147,857	2,454	116
DAVAO ORIENTAL	164,233	497	497	45,489	69,423	1,430	49	43,188	70,938	1,145	0
DAVAO DEL SUR	241,533	716	712	105,299	77,160	1,630	43	103,820	77,337	1,383	32
DAWAN	161,675	1,075	1,070	120,514	142,828	4,026	311	128,435	127,955	7,579	0
SOUTH COTABATO	282,175	266	833	88,091	115,629	499	141	81,715	101,442	16,092	0
GEM. SANCTOS	89,113	253	253	22,131	37,158	88	104	21,796	31,208	5,798	0
SULTAN KUDARAT	134,984	373	568	58,496	77,994	364	43	58,064	76,957	389	0
T O T A L	1,751,774	1,178		609,543	661,799	13,413	773	599,462	635,701	37,640	148

REGION XII PROVINCE/CITY	REG. NO. OF VOTERS	NO. OF PRECINCTS	NO. OF PRECINCTS CANVASSED	P R E S I D E N T				V I C E P R E S I D E N T			
				MARCOS (KBL)	ACUINO (UNIDO)	CANOY (SDP)	PADILLA (MOTOR)	TOLENTINO (KBL)	LAUREL (UNIDO)	KALAW (LP)	MARQUEZ (UNIDO)
EL NIDO DE NCRT	159,791	649		100,393	44,070	322	22	94,619	46,890	297	0
ILIGAN CITY	95,602	279	273	24,965	44,040	820	57	29,890	38,756	579	0
DAVAO DEL SUR	242,164	1,357		191,755	28,676	14	1	159,339	54,226	356	19
MARAWI CITY	39,454	154		16,205	16,629	17	25	14,456	14,255	114	1
MAGUIINDANAO	332,575	928	859	182,323	57,864	108	56	157,944	70,162	3,989	154
COTABATO CITY	49,044	150	150	8,803	18,931	13	12	10,111	16,930	565	0
NORTH COTABATO	283,029	873	868	83,869	100,515	293	139	81,789	97,645	2,956	0
SULTAN KUDARAT	141,622	419	419	53,949	41,405	114	48	52,872	38,731	3,368	0
T O T A L	1,373,201	4,650		61,317	746,330	1,361	358	611,113	373,595	12,224	173

(b)


REGION XI PROVINCE/CITY	REG. NO. OF VOTERS	NO. OF PRECINCTS	NO. OF PRECINCTS CANVASSED	P R E S I D E N T					V I C E P R E S I D E N T				
				MARCOS (KBL)	ACUINO (UNIDO)	CANOY (SDP)	PADILLA (MOTOR)	TOLENTINO (KBL)	LAUREL (UNIDO)	KALAW (LP)	OSBESA (UNIDO)	STUART (UNIDO)	ARIENI (MOTOR)
AG. DEL NORTE	411,005	1,198	1,190	162,730	145,607	5,386	83	162,444	147,857	3,457			167
AG. ORIENTAL	164,233	497	497	46,489	61,423	1,430	49	43,188	70,938	1,145			73
AG. D. SUR	243,631	716	712	106,099	77,160	1,630	43	105,830	77,337	1,583			104
AVAO CITY	161,446	1,075	1,070	120,312	140,268	4,026	311	105,435	127,955	7,574			514
TH. COTABATO	289,173	866	837	82,091	115,624	489	141	81,715	103,447	1,067.2			524
EN. SANTOS	89,113	253	253	83,131	37,150	88	104	31,796	31,205	3,18			18
IGAO D. SUR	168,984	573	568	58,496	72,942	369	43	58,064	76,957	3,87			27
TOTAL	1,753,779	5,178	5,070	609,670	608,790	5,747	574,407	601,020	635,701				

REGION XII PROVINCE/CITY	REG. NO. OF VOTERS	NO. OF PRECINCTS	NO. OF PRECINCTS CANVASSED	P R E S I D E N T					V I C E P R E S I D E N T				
				MARCOS (KBL)	ACUINO (UNIDO)	CANOY (SDP)	PADILLA (MOTOR)	TOLENTINO (KBL)	LAUREL (UNIDO)	KALAW (LP)	OSBESA (UNIDO)	STUART (UNIDO)	ARIENI (MOTOR)
LANAO DEL NORTE	189,791	649	647	111,382	14,076	953	35	91,617	14,370	2,77			37
ILIGAN CITY	95,602	279	274	54,715	44,040	821	57	39,871	38,745	674			114
LANAO DEL SUR	242,164	1,357	1,354	14,755	28,676	14	1	167,534	57,656	356			17
MARAWI CITY	39,454	154	153	16,343	10,859	17	35	14,132	10,357	114			32
MAGUINDANAO	332,575	928	857	182,590	57,864	108	57	157,428	70,165	3,987			138
COTABATO CITY	49,044	150	150	8,703	18,931	13	12	10,111	16,930	525			61
NORTH COTABATO	283,009	873	815	53,367	100,515	395	139	21,280	22,145	2,482			47
SULTAN KUDARAT	141,622	419	417	55,947	41,105	110	48	50,876	30,731	5,361			136
TOTAL	1,373,261	4,009	3,947	660,647	546,330	5,747	501,020	635,505	706				

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
FIRST BATASANG PAMBANSA
METRO MANILA

Second Regular Session

RESOLUTION NO. 793



Introduced by Hon. Albano, Britanico, Garcia (M.M.),
Asok and Diel

RESOLUTION

PROCLAIMING FERDINAND E. MARCOS AND ARTURO M. TOLENTINO
AS THE DULY ELECTED PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPECTIVELY.

WHEREAS, in pursuance of the provisions of the Constitution, as amended, and of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, the Speaker, assisted by the Board of Tellers, has canvassed the returns and publicly counted the votes cast at the election for the offices of the President and Vice-President of the Philippines, held last February 7, 1986, and has found that for said offices FERDINAND E. MARCOS and ARTURO M. TOLENTINO have received the highest number of votes for the offices of President and Vice-President, respectively:

Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Batasang Pambansa, By virtue of the result of the canvass of election returns of the election held on February 7, 1986, to proclaim, as it hereby proclaims FERDINAND E. MARCOS as the duly elected President of the Philippines, and ARTURO M. TOLENTINO as the duly elected Vice-President of the Philippines.

Adopted,

Santiago / *W.W.M.*
H. Huyle

MUNICIPALITY. SOGOD

Sht. no 1/2

PRECINCT NO.	MARCOS	AGUINO	TOLENTINO	LAUREL
41	258	132	248	139
10	53	29	55	212
4	111	130	115	120
20-A	161	49	160	45
30	74	68	74	67
28	57	36	57	37
16	90	137	88	138
17	141	110	143	106
15	61	71	67	63
6-A*	301	3	301	3
34	179	48	177	50
36	105	144	112	141
25-A	105	83	104	84
11-A	96	145	95	145
37-A	161	119	163	116
24	169	100	168	98
1-A	115	46	112	150
5-A	138	114	140	112
5	122	194	119	194
44	153	154	149	153
20	91	156	93	148
31	100	132	99	130
40	112	198	112	198
27	65	32	63	29
12	64	77	62	77
B8	111	85	112	86
29	82	71	69	80
23	116	60	112	864
45	178	246	170	243

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MUNICIPALITY SOGOOD (Continuation)

sht. no 2/2

PRECINCT NO	MARCOS	AGUINO	TOLENTINO	LAUREL
21	298	171	56	174
14	32	69	32	69
43	39	108	38	108
9	15	69	15	69
7-A*	200	2	300	2
22	47	29	47	30
13	64	65	64	64
3-A	87	130	85	132
39	141	178	138	175
35	52	34	51	35
32	163	207	162	201
11	90	148	88	150
18-A*	300	6	300	6
2-A	113	50	118	45
8	78	119	75	119
15	55	55	29	31
25	131	107	128	110
3	102	152	102	150
6	60	46	62	44
7	74	42	71	42
26	97	159	98	160
42	22	24	21	25
19	77	116	73	119
33	230	170	209	171
2	132	106	121	115
21-A	102	159	93	170
1	129	126	128	124
55	6,371	5,876	6,243	5,873
*	RETURNS UNDER PROTEST / NO RETURN	901	901	9
3	901	9		

Received: 2/10/68
Time: 11:00 AM

PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS
Capital Building
Marin, Southern Leyte

RE: CANVASS OF ELECTION RETURNS FOR
MUNICIPALITY OF SOGOD, SOUTHERN LEYTE

PROTEST

Undersigned UNIDO representatives to the Provincial Board of Canvassers, register a protest to the Election Returns submitted for the Municipality of Sogod, on the following grounds:

1. Sogod has only 53 duly constituted voting centers, and only 51 Election Returns was officially transmitted and received by the Provincial Treasurer, officially, for Sogod, as shown by the copy of the "Transmittal" and Receipt, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "A", hereof;
2. That the result of the voting in said 53 voting centers was: MARCOS-5,463 votes; TECLENTING-5,392 votes; AQUINO-5,646 votes; LAURIL-5,862 votes, or a majority for AQUINO of 431 votes, as shown by copy of the results of the voting hereto attached as Annex "B" hereof;
3. That in the Provincial Canvass conducted at about 10:00 to 11:00 o'clock this morning of February 9, 1968, 55 Election Returns were delivered and canvassed, or an excess of three (3) Election Returns purportedly corresponding to voting centers No. 6-A; No. 7-A and 18-A
4. That said voting centers No. 6-A; 7-A; and 18-A; are "ghost" voting centers, and the election returns corresponding to said voting centers are fake;
5. That the results in said three (3) ghost voting centers is: MARCOS - 301, 300, and 300 votes respectively; AQUINO - 3, 2, and 6 votes respectively, which patently shows that said returns was falsified or manipulated;
6. That the tally of the Provincial Canvass which included the fore-cited 3 ghost voting centers was: MARCOS-6,306 votes; TECLENTING-6,283 votes; AQUINO-5,275 votes, and LAURIL- which materially altered the true and correct results of the voting, and has reversed the majority in favor of MARCOS by 491 votes;
7. That the manipulation (addition of three (3) Election Returns for the ghost precincts) was the handiwork of the Sogod Comelec Registrar Elizabeth Ruis, in connivance with the Provincial Comelec Supervisor Atty. Rafael Iriarte, in that the Sogod Comelec Registrar spirited away the Election Returns for Sogod, without notifying the UNIDO representative Atty. Godofredo Cuarteros, yesterday morning early, but did not show up to deliver the Returns the whole day yesterday while the Sogod UNIDO representatives waited, but made the delivery only today when the Sogod UNIDO representative had gone home in disgust.

- 2 -

WHEREFORE, it urged that the Election Returns for the three (3) "Ghost" Voting Centers No. 5-A; No. 7-A; and 1G-A; be excluded from the canvass for being fake or spurious.

Masin, Southern Leyte, February 9, 1986.

M. V. Tadlo
CASPER V. TADLO
and
C. C. C.
ERNESTO D. COIDCA
UNIDO Representative/Watcher
to the Provincial Board
of Canvassers

Copy Furnished:

Atty. Tobias Aguilas
KBL Representative

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© PROVINCE OF SOUTHERN LEYTE ©

[TOTAL VOTES BY MUNICIPALITIES]

MUNICIPALITIES	No. of PRIC	MARCOS	AQUINO	PONENTINO	LAUREL
1. MAASIN	110	14,137	12,968	14,097	13,009
2. MACROHON	40	3,983	4,655	3,870	4,760
3. MALITBOG	46	3,092	3,562	3,098	3,513
4. BONTOC	54	5,847	3,878	5,763	3,892
5. LIBAGON	19	2,906	1,752	2,710	1,723
6. SAN JUAN	24	2,003	2,724	1,991	2,713
7. HINUNANGAN	43	4,717	3,933	4,542	4,012
8. HINUNDAYAN	19	1,631	2,651	1,599	2,643
9. LILO-AN	28	3,962	3,085	3,873	3,168
10. SAN FRANCISCO	23	2,539	1,966	2,475	2,116
11. PINTUYAN	23	2,047	1,720	1,899	1,812
12. SOGOD	55	6,371	5,870	6,243	5,873
	3.	901	9	301	9
13. TOMAS ODUYOS	30	4,548	1,101	4,466	1,136
	10	1,630	242	1,797	259
14. SAN RICARDO	20	2,360	2,100	2,318	2,140
	4	783	0	738	0
15. PADRE BURGO	24	4,180	1,713	4,114	1,760
	(5)	1,267	217	1,261	280
16. ANAHAWAN	23	2,865	1,434	2,814	1,429
	5	1,421	15	1,431	15
17. ST. BERNARD	37	4,194	3,228	4,122	3,238
	3	270	51	251	66
18. SILAGO	20	2,512	1,966	2,493	2,089
	3	725	25	725	27
CLIPPING RETURNS	TOTAL	638	53,840	50,321	52,487
UNDER PROTESTS					
CONTESTED					
LESS. VOTES	33	7,208	635	7,184	675
	605	66,632	59,686	65,303	60,270
PERCENTAGE GAIN		52.7%	17.3%	52.0%	14.0%

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)
MAKATI, METRO MANILA)

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT

I, DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN, of legal age, Filipino, married, residing at Cotabato City, Philippines, after having been duly sworn in accordance with law, depose and say that:

- 1) I am the official watcher of the UNIDO to the Provincial Board of Canvassers for the Province of Maguindanao relative to the February 7, 1986 elections;
- 2) I have read the affidavit of Doroteo G. Palencia. I affirm the truth thereof and adopt as my own the allegations contained therein;
- 3) Prior to and during the actual canvassing of election returns in the Province of Maguindanao, I noticed that all members of the Board of Canvassers except the UNIDO representative were all hostile to the UNIDO and glaringly partial to the KBL; Most of the objections of the UNIDO during the canvassing were overruled while those of the KBL were sustained;
- 4) Election returns which were ordered set aside by the Board of Canvassers and the results contained therein were included in the Certificate of Canvass prepared in the early morning of February 10, 1986 in our absence without giving opportunity to the UNIDO to be present from the late afternoon of February 9, 1986 and to be heard on any relevant matter thereon; Individual written protests could not be filed with the Board of Canvassers because the Board had finally adjourned in the early morning hours of *1/10/86* 27

February 10, 1986 before the lapse of the 24 hour period provided for that purpose by Secs. 244 and, 245 of the Omnibus Code;

5) The Certificate of Canvass prepared by the members of the Board of Canvassers is questionable, hastily prepared and does not reflect the real number of votes garnered by Presidential Candidate Corazon Quino and President Ferdinand E. Marcos; the same certificate was never signed by Doroteo Palencia, UNIDO representative to the Board of Canvassers, but by a certain Washington Ampatuan, a close relative of Minister Simeon Ampatuan Datumanong; said Washington Ampatuan has no authority whatsoever from the UNIDO to represent it to the Board of Canvassers;

6) FURTHER I SAYETH NAUGHT.

Makati, Metro Manila, February 11, 1986.



DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN
Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 12th day of February, 1986, at Makati, Metro Manila, affiant exhibiting to me his Res. Cert. No. 7621979, issued on March 15, 1985, at Kabuntalan, Maguindanao



NOTARY PUBLIC

AURALOU B. SABANGAN
NOTARY PUBLIC
UNTIL DEC. 31, 1986
CTR # 1801281
T.I. AUGUST 6, 1985

Doc. No. 27;
Page No. 7;
Book No. 7;
Series of 1986.

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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)
MAKATI, METRO MANILA) S.S.

A F F I D A V I T

I, NARCISO CLAR, Filipino, of legal age, married, residing at Malagapas, Cotabato City, after first being duly sworn, depose and say:

- 1) That I am a duly appointed UNIDO Liason Officer in Maguindanao and Cotabato City;
- 2) That about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of February 9, 1986, I was requested by Ex-Gov. Zacaria A. Candao to proceed to the Provincial Capitol in Maganoy, Maguindanao together with Ding Pioquinto and Eia Sema to find out whether the Provincial Board of Canvassers continued to canvass election returns or not;
- 3) That I personally saw the Provincial Board of Canvassers canvassing election returns inspite of the absence of Board Member Doroteo Palencia - UNIDO representative to the Board;
- 4) That I learned that a certain Washington Ampatuan was appointed by the Board of Canvassers to act as UNIDO representative in the absence of Board Member Palencia; I learned also that Washington Ampatuan is a close relative of Minister Simeon A. Datu Manong;
- 5) That I saw two truckloads of PC soldiers and armed men without uniform surrounding the Capitol Building on that same evening;

- 2 -

6) That I also saw one APC vehicle (Armored Personnel Carrier) parked in front of the Capitol Building in Maganoy on the same night;

7) That the men of Ex-Gov. Candao assigned to guard the election returns inside the building, who were all unarmed, requested me that they be allowed to leave the premises and ride with us to Cotabato City as some armed men in the Provincial Capital threatened and intimidated them at the point of a gun if they will not leave the Provincial Capital;

8) That some of the men of Ex-Gov. Candao returned with us to Cotabato City, about 11:00 p.m. of the same evening on the 9th of February.

9) FURTHER I SAYETH NAUGHT.

Makati, Metro Manila, February 11, 1986.


NARCISO CLAR
Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 12th day of February, 1986 at Makati, Metro Manila, affiant exhibiting to me his Res. Gert. No. 145596, issued at Cotabato City, on January 15, 1986


NOTARY PUBLIC

JURALOU B. SABANGAN

NOTARY PUBLIC

UNTIL DEC. 31, 1986

PTR # 1801281

MAKATI, AUGUST 6, 1985

Doc. No. 30; Page No. 1; Book No. II; Series of 1986.

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Republic of the Philippines
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Manila

ANNEX XLII I
Page 280

PETITION TO DECLARE FAILURE
OF ELECTION IN NEGROS DEL
NORTE PROVINCE.

~~CASE NO.~~ SFC NO. 86-3

CORAZON C. A QUI NO,
Petitioner.
X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X

P E T I T I O N

PETITIONER, by counsel to this Honorable Commission on
Elections respectfully states:

1. That the petitioner is the duly registered candidate for President in the February 7, 1986 Presidential Elections, of legal age, Filipino, widow, and a resident of Times Street, Quezon City, Philippines, where she may be served with summons and other court processes;
 2. That immediately before, during and after the February 7, 1986 Presidential Elections, there was a total and absolute failure of elections in the entire Province of Negros Del Norte resulting to the absolute frustration in the free expression of the will of the electorate of said province;
 3. That the failure of elections was caused and attended by the following grounds/circumstances, to wit:
 - a. registrations of voters were conducted even beyond the registration days and in contravention of the form and manner provided by law;
 - b. unqualified/disqualified persons were allowed to be registered and included in the list of voters while qualified voters were illegally excluded from the list of voters resulting to their disenfranchisement sufficient in number to alter and affect the outcome of election;

- c. no publication of list of voters were made/
posted contrary to the provisions of the Election
Code;
- d. illegal composition of the Board of Election
Inspectors;
- e. non-accreditation of the inspectors of the
Dominant Opposition Party;
- f. non-accreditation of the opposition watchers
including those of the NAMFREL;
- g. active and partisan political activities of
the illegally constituted Board of Election Inspectors
inside their respective precincts;
- h. unofficial, falsified, tampered and irregular
ballots and election returns were used;
- i. unauthorized persons were allowed to freely
enter/room the polling places to harass, intimidate,
coerce and brazenly engaged in partisan political acti-
vities;
- j. challenges and protests against illegal voters
were not entertained and unjustly denied;
- k. absence of the minutes of voting and counting
of votes;
- l. counting of votes were not made in public, but
were inside in closed door heavily guarded by armed men
such as CHDF AND many were made in private places;
- m. illegal transfer of polling places;
- n. excess, marked, and spoiled ballots were counted
in favor of the ruling party;
- o. ballots were improperly, erroneously, and
grossly appreciated and counted in favor of the ruling

p. illegal, improper, incomplete and irregular election returns were made and submitted;

ANNEX XLIII
Page 282

q. illegal, irregular and arbitrary proclamation of results by the Board of Election Inspectors/Board of Canvassers;

r. irregular, incomplete and illegal disposition of election returns;

s. massive tampering, falsification, alteration and modification of election returns sufficient to change and alter the result of the election;

t. illegal and irregular composition of the Board of Canvassers of the Province of Negros del Norte and its component cities;

u. illegal and irregular proceedings conducted by the Board of Election Inspectors/Board of Canvassers;

v. unauthorized persons were allowed inside the canvassing rooms;

w. canvassing were made under duress intimidation, coercion, threat, and the results thereof manufactured, falsified and not authentic;

x. canvassed election returns were incomplete, containing material defects, discrepancies, tampered, falsified and not authentic;

y. massive vote-buying, rampant use of flying voters, threats, intimidation, terrorisms, fraudulent devices and other forms of coercion;

z. unlawful electionnering, employment of CHDF, military men, goons and hoodlums and other armed men who harassed and intimidated voters to vote in favor of the ruling party candidates or to drive away known

aa. accreditation of DOP watchers and other
citizens arms of the COMELEC were illegally revoked,
rescinded or withdrawn prior to the holding of the
election.

ANNEX XL
Page 283

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully
prayed of this Honorable Commission to declare as
null and void the result of the elections held in the
Province of Negros Del Norte and its component cities,
and;

1. To immediately stop and enjoin the various City
and Provincial Board of Canvassers of the Negros Del Norte
Province and its component Cities from further continuing
their respective canvass;
2. To schedule/hold a new elections in the province
of Negros Del Norte under the direct supervision of the
Manila COMELEC.

Petitioner further prays for such other reliefs that
are just and equitable under the premises.

Manila, Philippines, February 10, 1986.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
REXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

By:

ATTY. JOBER ARROYO

ATTY. CONSTANCIO V. LEGASPI

FRANCIS E. GARCHIORENA

ATTY. JUANITO AMIHAN

ATTY. SERAFIN GUTTALEN, JR.

2nd Floor, Zeta Building
191 Salcedo St., Legaspi Village
Makati, Metro Manila

COPY FURNISHED:

Milusang Bagong Lipunan

NING LIPUNA

PARTERS

ED

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Annex

2. THE MANILA TIMES

2/13/86

N

'Our dignity is not negotiable'

By SHEILA S. CORONEL

THIRTY-FIVE computer technicians who walked out of the Comelec's quick count Sunday night said that they would not retract their earlier statements alleging manipulation of the poll returns despite threats of criminal charges and fears for their personal safety.

"Our dignity is not negotiable," said Linda Kapunan, 33, supervisor of the data-handling section and the most senior among those who abandoned the counting at the Philippine International Convention Center Sunday night.

Holed up in a house somewhere in Quezon City all of Tuesday night, the technicians, most of them young women in their 20s, agreed that even if they lost their jobs and endangered their security, they would stand by their allegations.

Kapunan also denied charges that the walkout was part of an opposition plot. She said that the final decision to get out was made at about 9 p.m. Sunday at the PICC dining hall by technicians in near tears and greatly agitated as they continued to stumble upon evidence showing that the figures on the Comelec tallyboard were different from those which their computers printed out.

Preparations for the walkout were hastily made by people who did not realize the full impact of what they had done. "We thought we were just walking out of a volleyball game, one of them said.

The technicians started to become suspicious at about midnight Saturday. Some of them noticed that the KBL team was leading by a slight margin on the tallyboard even though they recalled that the computer printout showed a slight Aquino lead. Their suspicions were intensified when they noticed that computer printouts were no longer being passed around, but instead were taken almost immediately after they were printed by either National Computer Center director Col. Pedro Barcidan or his deputy, Roberto Palipe. Only seven copies of the printout were then given the person manning the tallyboard.

The technicians also noted that both men paced the room and hovered around whenever the computer printers made any noise. Kapunan recalled that late Saturday evening, Barcidan

said her to "very discreetly" bring a calculator backstage to an inner room where the REC director was said to be meeting w/ some Comelec commissioners. The technician also received information from telephone operators who intercepted calls that high KBL officials were in touch with Comelec officials.

From midnight of Saturday to 9 a.m. the following day, the figures of the tallyboard were erratic; sometimes they matched the printouts sometimes not.

At 9 a.m. Sunday, when a group of foreign visitors arrived to observe the counting, some technicians noticed that the numbers on the board suddenly changed. The visitors were provided copies of the printouts which coincided perfectly with the tallyboard figures. Almost immediately after the foreigners left, however, the tally figures changed again to show a lead for Marcos.

Very little data came in on Sunday afternoon so the technicians expected only minor additions to the figures. They were shocked when at 7 p.m. the tallyboard posted results showing a big change in the figures and even more surprised to see that Marcos was leading Aquino by 158,884 votes. The computer printout showed the opposite: Aquino leading by 56,305 votes. An examination of the numbers revealed that additional votes for Marcos were added to the figures for Region I and II.

It was then that the decision to walk out was made. "We discussed that we had two choices: we close our eyes to what was happening in which case, nobody will hire us anymore; we be seen as industry (for taking part in a fraudulent count) or walk out, in which case, we are heroes," says Barcidan.

Plans for the walkout were made quickly, but just as quickly aborted by the rare of events. Kapunan arranged for three cars to fetch the group and take them home. "We thought that we'd be told to stop and drink barbecue sauce," she says.

Things turned out differently, however. At 10:30 p.m. the technicians marched single file from either side of the tallyboard, merged in the middle aisle and walked in front of the press gallery as the crowd which filled the PICC plenary hall cheered and cheered. The technicians headed outside surrounded

by cameras, reporters and opposition supporters. As the situation went out of control, the women broke out into tears. Nobody had expected such a reaction. They thought they could just quietly walk over to their cars and leave. That was not to be the case.

The technicians, numbering about 30, hurriedly shoved themselves into two cars and a pickup truck. Kapunan and nine others were squeezed so tightly into a small Ramak. Only much later did they realize that sandwiched among them was a reporter who had her tape recorder on all the time.

The vehicles drove out of the PICC surrounded by scores of cars racing at about 10 kilometers per hour in the direction of EDSA church. The "walkout group" found their place changed by the hundreds of supporters who had decided to accompany them.

"I cried," said Kapunan. "This was not what we had planned." At the church the group decided the only way to keep people away was to have a brief press conference, after which they hoped the crowd would trickle away. In a few hours people who had heard what happened over the radio started bringing in donations of home-made sandwiches, canned goods, cigarettes, even money.

By dawn the following morning, the technicians were whisked away to a secret destination. "It was only then we realized that this thing was bigger than we had planned," said Kapunan.

It was an agonizing decision for her to make as she has worked with Barcidan for the last decade. "We thought it an honor to be asked to handle this project and from the very start Dr. Barcidan assured us it would be a professional job," she said. Even when the evidence of fraud started coming in, she always tried to give her boss the benefit of the doubt.

For Kapunan, the situation is further complicated by the fact that she is the only woman in the organization active in the informal movement. Recent newspaper reports have alleged that the technicians and the reformists are part of an opposition plot. When this rather complex web of circumstances was explained to some of the young women technicians, one of them asked, "What is the reformists?" *281*

Doc. # 8

REPORT OF THE PHILIPPINES.

S.S.

City of Manila

AFFIDAVIT

I, PEDRO F. BARAOIDAN, married, of legal age, and residing at 31 Pines Street, Fairview, Quezon City, after having been sworn to in accordance with law, hereby depose and say:


THAT, I have been deputized as the Project Manager of the COMELEC National Tabulation Project, pursuant to the Commission on Elections Resolution No. 1763, dated January 22, 1986;

THAT in accordance with such deputation, I effected the development of an Advance Election Return Tabulation System through the Project Management Office of the National Computer Center (NCC) pursuant to Section 2 of the aforementioned COMELEC resolution, authorizing me to enlist the component units of the NCC in my assigned mission;

THAT, in addition to the above action I recommended to the Commission the creation of a Board of consultants which would assist me in steering the Tabulation Project until its completion;

THAT, on February 7, 1986 the System designed and developed by the Project Management Office of NCC, after a review and approval by the Board of Consultants, was already in place and ready for implementation;

THAT, on the evening of February 9 at about 10:30 P.M., a group of about thirty (30) programmers and other technicians, primarily from the Tabulation Section of the COMELEC National Tabulation Project Organization, walked out of the plenary hall of PICC where the facilities were installed and were being operated, into the lobby where a group of journalists, newsmen, photographers and TV and broadcast media personnel were waiting; the media men herded/escorted the group into waiting vans and/or cars; the group was then transported to Baclaran Redemptorist Church where they held a press conference, wherein they stated that they walked out of the COMELEC tabulation due to certain discrepancies between the results in computer printouts in their possession and the entries on the tally board; they also stated that this


Baraoidan
2/86

constituted cheating, and did not want to have any part of it.

programmers and other personnel who had walked out could have been fully explained by me had they taken the time to consult me, instead of pre-judging and imputing certain motivations on my alleged action of pacing the plenary hall including my responding to frequent telephone calls on the plenary hall floor and in the backstage of the hall, and my alleged "unusual actuation" of having a calculator brought to the backstage; and that instead of condemning the undersigned for allegedly "unprofessional" conduct these programmers and technicians who walked out could have avoided violations of certain provisions of the Omnibus Election Code, while sparing the country, the Commission on Election and the National Computer Center, the institution where they regularly belong, of undue embarrassment.

THAT, the computer printout upon which the "walkout group" is basing their charge of cheating, is derived from the system which they themselves designed and developed, and which allowed only telexes of precinct level results, NAMFREL tally sheets on the precinct level, and advance election returns as the inputs to the system; telexes covering the same precinct are to be suspended together with the original result until further clarificaton and/or verification from either the election registrar or COMELEC. The system likewise did not allow for the inclusion in the final tally, of telexes which summarize the results for a group of precincts, if the votes could not be broken down by precincts. The action that was envisioned in this case was to suspend these summary telexes, until the breakdown is available from clarificatory telexes from the election registrar. This leads to a delay in the tallying of the results of groups of precincts which are reported in the summary forms with no breakdown by precincts.

THAT, in view of the above and when we noticed a number of results being submitted were large enough to affect the cumulative tally at any point in time, we requested the Chairman of the Commission on February 8, 1986 to allow us to proceed utilizing such summary results in order not to delay reporting of the results from any locality concerned, with the understanding that we would exercise care to ensure no double counting, by deducting the results that had already been reported which are included in the summary results, and that the breakdown by precinct be recorded as they become available.

With the authorization by the Commission, we then implemented a new system whereby available summary telexes would be incorporated in the final tally at the tabulation board. We decided not to inform the system people or the tabulation group about the system, inasmuch as incorporating the provision would

need extensive revision and reprogramming of the existing system and would necessarily disrupt the existing operation. We merely took an intermediate step, that is, after fully accounting for the earlier precinct reports, we incorporated the summary telexes into the computer printout derived from the individual precincts inputs, prior to posting on the board. This was initially done manually but the process has now been computerized.

THAT, the above explanation shows that there is no inconsistency between the claim of the "walkout group" and the results on the tally board, particularly if we take note of the number of precincts included in each report; that there is no basis for the charges of cheating, manipulation or changing of votes for any of the candidates; and that the seeming difference between what the "walkout group" saw in the computer printouts is fully explained by the incorporation of summary reports in the final figures that were posted on the tally board.

THAT, after the walkout, the project personnel I assigned to inventory remaining resources indicated the absence of systems and program diskettes, program listings, tabulation outputs, and some data diskettes with the information that some members of the "walk-out" group were seen carrying these materials.

THAT, I instructed other Project personnel to try taking over the tabulation function; however, these personnel were not able to do so, inasmuch as the people who had walked out had taken with them all the systems and program diskettes, including the passwords needed to enter and use the tabulating computer systems; the tabulation was at a stand still for at least twelve hours until we started our recovery operations to bring back the systems into the appropriate processing stream; although not fully operational, we started processing at about 5:00 P.M. February 10, 1986; we made our update of the tally board about 7:30 P.M. February 10, 1986, about twenty (20) hours after the walkout of the programmers and technicians.

THAT, the walkout of the thirty programmers and technicians was pre-planned and premeditated as evidenced by the unusual number of people in the gallery who had been systematically heckling the COMELEC Project personnel, the shouting of "CORY ! CORY !", "Walk-Out ! Walk-Out !" and the fact that the group stood up simultaneously after a signal from Ms. Linda Kapunan, exiting one after the other into waiting press and media men, who seemed to have been informed beforehand that a walk-out would be staged.

THAT, as a result of the above observation, I began to recall the unusual interest of the above group in being involved and assigned to the operations group; that inasmuch as they had been involved in the design and the development of the system, I

initially looked at them as technical consultants only but they made representations to be directly involved through their immediate supervisor; that the Board of Consultants allowed this exception to the normal data processing practice in view of the time constraint being faced by the Project, not fully realizing that, in effect, we were relinquishing complete control to the group.

THAT, there were computer programming "bugs" or errors which we encountered during the early tabulations: one error hung up the system for about three hours, another error miscomputed the number of precincts, giving unreasonable figures on the tally board; the number of precincts figures had to be changed eventually, but this resulted in giving the impression that the Project personnel were manipulating the figures;

THAT, the system also experienced delays in the processing: data diskette errors kept cropping up and there seemed to be bottle necks in the flow of work data from one section to another;


THAT, on the basis of the above observations and the final act of "walkout", I cannot entirely rule out the fact that the same group who had designed and developed the system had really wanted to slow down and/or paralyze the system from the very beginning, as they had done when they walked out, taking along with them all systems, programs, and data diskettes, passwords and source listings;

THAT, the above notwithstanding, I respectfully submit to the Commission on Elections the matter of taking the appropriate action on this case; I would merely point out that the COMELEC Tabulation Project has suffered delays, and that its credibility has been put in question by the irresponsible and impulsive act of the thirty programmers and other technicians who walked out of the COMELEC Tabulation Project on February 9, 1986.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereby affix my hand this 15th day of February 1986.


DR. PEDRO F. BARAOIDAN
Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me on this 15th
day of February, 1986 at Manila, Philippines, affiant exhibiting to me
his Res. Cert. No. 5182281 E, issued on July 8, 1985 at Quezon City.


Administering Officer

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COMMITTEE REPORT ON THE WALK-OUT OF
COMPUTER/TABULATORS AT THE PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTION CENTER

ANNEX XLV
Page 290

FACTS OF THE CASE

On or about 10:20 P.M. of February 9, 1986, thirty (30) persons employed as Computers/Programmers/Tabulators of the COMELEC Tabulation Center at PICC left their assigned places and marched out of the PICC. Their "walk-out" was preceded by shouts of "CORY, CORY", boos, "WALK-OUT, WALK-OUT" and catcalls against Marcos and general heckling from a portion of the audience at the gallery. They were applauded and cheered when they walked-out of the Center. At the main entrance of PICC, cars and vans appeared to be waiting for them and they were brought to the Redemptorist Church in Baclaran. Their leader and spokesman, Ms. Linda Kapunan answered questions by media representatives and afterwards they were offered and accommodated in a church hostel provided by a priest. The press later on reported that according to Mrs. Kapunan, she sensed something "fishy" when one of the programmers saw some discrepancies between the computer print out of election returns and the figures written on the tally board, showing a slight margin for the Marcos-Tolentino team over the Aquino-Laurel team, which has a slight edge before that. She hinted that there was manipulation of the COMELEC Tabulation.

CREATION OF THE FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE

The above-incident, having been headlined in the newspapers, the Chairman of the Commission on Elections was prompted to create a Fact-Finding Committee, composed of Commissioner Mario D. Ortiz as Chairman and Commissioners Quirino A. Marquinez and Ruben Agpalo as Members. The Fact-Finding Committee then created a sub-committee to conduct an initial investigation and to gather data relative to the reported walk-out of employees at PICC tabulation center. Having performed the duties assigned to it, the sub-committee submitted its report and recommendations to the Fact-Finding Committee, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "A", together with the annexes in support thereof.

ANALYSIS

On the basis of the data submitted by the sub-committee, as well as the statement executed by Dr. Pedro F. Baraoidan, it has been clearly shown that no order was ever given to any of the personnel at the PICC.

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Tabulation Center to alter, amend, modify or delay the tabulation of the election results (see Annexes "A" to "A-91" of the sub-committee's report); that some unruly persons and hecklers have disturbed the proceedings at the Tabulation Center at PICC prior to the walk-out, which may have prompted them to stage the same; and that said walk-out appears to be well-planned as shown by the series of events subsequent to the walk-out. Furthermore, the press release of Linda Kapunan, serialized at the Philippine Daily Inquirer, discloses that her allegations relative to the walk-out are based on mere suspicions without solid pieces of evidence to stand on. Moreover, the fact that she refuses until now to heed the call of the COMELEC to shed light on the incident but rather chose to give her version to the alternative press gives rise to the presumption that her true motive and intent is really to discredit and embarrass the COMELEC.

On the other hand, on the basis of the statement submitted by Dr. Baraoidan, he categorically denied that there was manipulation in the COMELEC advance tabulation at PICC. He explained that several summaries, or telexes of results with no precinct breakdown, were received by the center. The operating system did not allow for the inclusion in the final tally of telexes which summarize the results for a group of precincts if the votes could not be broken down by precincts. The action that was envisioned in this case was to suspend these summary telexes until the breakdown is available from the Election Registrars. Thus, it would lead to a considerable delay in the tallying of results based on summary telexes. Hence, as required by the exigencies as the summary telexes were large enough to affect the cumulative tally, Dr. Baraoidan requested the Chairman of the COMELEC on February 8, 1986 to allow him to proceed utilizing such summary results. With the authority thus given, Dr. Baraoidan then implemented a new system whereby available summary telexes would be incorporated in the final tally at the tabulation board with enough safety measures undertaken to prevent double counting. In the end, unnecessary delay would be prevented without sacrificing the veracity of the tally.

Regrettably, the adverse effects of the premeditated walk-out are immeasurable, not to mention the fact that, after an immediate inventory, systems and program diskettes, program listings, tabulation outputs and some data diskettes were found to be missing. Some members of the "walk-out" group were reported to have carted away with these items. The incident led to the paralyzation of the project for about twenty (20) hours inasmuch as the "walk-out" people had taken even the passwords

needed to enter and use the tabulating computer systems. The recovery operations to bring back the systems into the appropriate processing stream needed at least twelve (12) hours to commence.

It is with great suspicion, therefore, that the computer programming "bugs" or errors which were encountered during the early tabulation could have been put in place by the same "walk-out" group as part of their grand malicious scheme not only to derail the project but also to give the wrong impression that the tabulation is being manipulated.

Furthermore, it is a matter of public knowledge, as repeatedly carried by press reports, that Mrs. Kapunana is the leader and Chief Instigator of the "walk-out" by 30 computer/programmers/tabulators in the evening of February 9, 1986. That the said walk-out appears to have no solid basis because her premise was based merely on assumption, to quote "that she sensed something fishy" which to our mind is more of a product of imagination than real.

Moreover, it is to be noted that there is sufficient basis for the suspicion that the walk-out was pre-planned and deliberate, because it was preceded by chants of "Cory, Cory" and "walk-out walk-out" and other form of partisan heckling from a group of persons at the gallery of the PICC who also cheered Mrs. Kapunana and her companions when they walked-out, and because there appeared to be a ready fleet of cars and van waiting for them at the entrance of the PICC which took them to the Redemptorist Church at Baclaran where they held a press conference.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the data, so far gathered, this Committee finds that there is no credible proof whatsoever that a manipulation was made in the tabulation of results at the COMELEC Tabulation Center.

Considering, however, the national significance of the incident, and the probable impact it would create viz-a-viz the February 7, 1986 Elections, it is our considered view and this Committee hereby submits that the recommendations made by the Sub-Committee be substantially adopted, to wit:


- A. That the thirty (30) persons who walked-out be summoned by the Commission to shed light on the incident relative to their walk-out from the PICC on February 9, 1986.
- B. That appropriate legal action be taken against them, if warranted by the evidence; and

- 4 -



C. That when so warranted, an independent body of private auditors be created to verify the existence of alleged manipulation at the PICC Tabulation Center.

Manila, February 15, 1986.

Respectfully submitted:




MARIO D. ORTIZ
Commissioner
(Chairman)


QUIRINO A. MARQUINEZ
Commissioner
(Member)
RUBEN AGPALO
Commissioner
(Member)

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Boston University

The Center for Democracy
110 New Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004



VOTE TALLY DISCREPANCIES
COMPARISON OF NAMFREL TALLIES
AND OFFICIAL BATASAN CANVASS
FEBRUARY 7, 1986 PHILIPPINE ELECTION

<u>PROVINCE</u>	<u>NAMFREL</u>		<u>BATASAN 99% TALLIED</u>		
	<u>% TALLIED</u>	<u>MARCOS</u>	<u>AQUINO</u>	<u>MARCOS</u>	<u>AQUINO</u>
Ilocos Norte	29%	59,771	1,937	189,897	718
Isabela	19%	58,012	26,443	402,860	20,072
Leyte	103%	301,049	170,978	300,803	143,261
Misamis Occ	54%	24,292	43,002	51,758	41,470
Batangas	103%	159,001	251,160	155,474	236,616
Iloilo City	100%	55,735	64,889	55,282	63,708
Bacolod City	100%	54,464	67,293	52,951	65,231
Baguio City	103%	42,215	25,394	41,640	24,803
Misamis Or	99%	95,050	71,308	81,962	60,899
Lanao Norte	60%	36,373	52,793	100,383	44,070
Cebu City	126%	89,164	220,771	60,748	167,280
Negros Or	118%	129,781	139,205	113,402	110,187
Cagayan Oro	90%	43,453	57,693	31,336	43,377

LOSS OF VOTES: COMPARISON OF
NAMFREL AND BATASAN TALLIES BY CANDIDATE FOR LISTED
PROVINCES AND CITIES

	<u>MARCOS</u>	<u>AQUINO</u>
Ilocos Norte		-1,219
Isabela		-6,371
Leyte	-246	-27,717
Misamis Occ		-1,532
Batangas	-3,527	-14,544
Iloilo City	-453	-1,181
Bacolod City	-1,513	-2,062
Baguio City		-591
Misamis Or	-13,088	-10,409
Lanao Ncrte		-8,732
Cebu City	-28,416	-53,491
Negros Or	-16,379	-29,018
Cagayan Oro	-12,117	-14,316
NET LOSS:	<u>-75,739</u>	<u>-171,183</u>

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Doc. #3

Republic of the Philippines
Province of ILOILO City
Municipality of Bayang

KSL LOCAL HEADQUARTERS

ADVANCE RESULT OF THE FEBRUARY 7, 1936 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

NAME OF CANDIDATES	NUMBER OF VOTES CAST FOR:																
	Prec. 1	Prec. 2	Prec. 3	Prec. 4	Prec. 5	Prec. 6	Prec. 7	Prec. 8	Prec. 9	Prec. 10	Prec. 11	Prec. 12	Prec. 13	Prec. 14	Prec. 15	Prec. 16	Prec. 17
FOR PRESIDENT	/	7	2	?	/	?	?	?	?	/	?	?	?	?	?	?	-
MARCO, Ferdinand E	104	440	201	119	39	162	156	177	53	200	83	158	52	261	177	165	266
AQUINO, Corazon C	68	60	41	34	20	53	26	23	27	27	82	153	22	104	42	72	13
FOR VICE PRESIDENT	/																
TOLENTINO, Arturo	87	66	30	60	27	120	19	107	53	120	72	74	42	52	97	25	55
LAUREL, Salvador	81	57	111	85	30	95	30	30	30	95	93	153	22	116	46	77	223

NAME OF CANDIDATES	NUMBER OF VOTES CAST FOR:																
	Prec. 1	Prec. 2	Prec. 3	Prec. 4	Prec. 5	Prec. 6	Prec. 7	Prec. 8	Prec. 9	Prec. 10	Prec. 11	Prec. 12	Prec. 13	Prec. 14	Prec. 15	Prec. 16	TOTALS
FOR PRESIDENT	/	/	/	?	?	/	/	/	?	/	?	?	?	?	?	/	
MARCO, Ferdinand E	341	46	402	132	223	49	207	156	302	3	288	130	141	192	246	204	6,015
AQUINO, Corazon C	79	15	46	57	37	7	21	105	88	2	48	134	54	109	104	84	1,857
FOR VICE PRESIDENT	/																
TOLENTINO, Arturo	341	42	402	80	114	44	202	118	150	3	280	129	141	53	246	204	3,655
LAUREL, Salvador	79	19	46	57	102	7	27	147	123	2	47	135	89	109	104	84	2,522

Respectfully submitted by:

JOSE R. SICMAN
Principal Election
Municipal Chairman

(?) Excessive Cheating & Fraud

PRECINCT TALLY SHEET

Copy 1 - Provincial
XLVII.2
Page 296

Province

LANAO DEL SUR

Barangay

MARIWANAB

City, or Municipality

BAYANG

Number of Precincts
under School Chairm.

Precinct Number

4

Number of Voter Cast

0 0 4 7

RESULT OF COUNT

VOTES IN FIGURES

PRINTED VOTES IN WORDS

FOR PRESIDENT

1 MARCUS

0 0 1 1 ✓ ELEVEN

2 AQUINO

0 0 3 4 THIRTY FOUR

Control Total

0 0 4 5 ↳

Total of votes for Marcos and Aquino

FOR VICE-PRESIDENT

1 TOLENTINO

0 0 1 0 TEN

LAUREL

0 0 3 5 THIRTY FIVE

3 KALAW

0 0 0 0 NONE

Control Total

0 0 4 5 ↳

Total of votes for Tolentino, Laurel and Kalaw

We HEREBY CERTIFY that the candidates above have obtained in this precinct the
votes and inscribe their respective names

BOARD OF ELECTION INSPECTORS

Adega Carrangan

Mocara Tabua

Lorenzo Rontwas

NOTARY BOLUG

All Member

Poll Clerk

UNIDO Member

AFTER SIGNING, PLEASE FILL IN DATE AND TIME OF RECEIPT

1. Poll Watcher

2. School Chairman

3. Municipal Courier

Adega Carrangan

Date FEB. 7 '66 Time 3:30 PM

Date FEB. 7 '66 Time 3:30 PM

4. Municipal Chapter Chairman

5. Provincial Courier

6. Provincial Chairman/NHQ

Adega Carrangan

Date FEB. 7 '66 Time 3:30 PM

Poll Watcher: Encircle one
the following according to ↳ A B C D

Please Explain why C or D

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PRECINCT TALLY SHEET

ANNEX
XLVII.2
Page 297

Copy 1 - Provincial/NHQ Copy

Province

ZANAO DEL SUR
BAYANG

Barangay

BATIRAN

City or Municipality

Number of Precincts
under School Chairman

3

Precinct Number

3

Number of Votes Cast

0 0 9 4

RESULT OF COUNT

VOTES IN FIGURES:

PRINTED VOTES IN WORDS

FOR PRESIDENT

1. MARCOS

0 0 5 1 FIFTY ONE

2. AQUINO

0 0 4 1 FOURTY ONE

Control Total

0 0 9 2

↳ Total of votes for Marcos and Aquino

FOR VICE-PRESIDENT

1. TOLENTINO

0 0 3 0 THIRTY

LAUREL

0 0 5 7 FIFTY SEVEN

KALAW

0 0 0 0

Control Total

0 0 8 7

↳ Total of votes for Tolentino, Laurel and Kalaw

WE HEREBY CERTIFY that the candidates above have obtained in this precinct the
votes set opposite their respective names

BOARD OF ELECTION INSPECTORS

POLAKOS DECAMBONG

MAR-AZI MAGNOA

ERIKITA PINDO

Poll Clerk

UNIDO Member

AFTER SIGNING PLEASE FILL IN DATE AND TIME OF RECEIPT

1. Watcher

2. School Chairman

3. Municipal Courier

POLAKOS DECAMBONG

(Print Name & Sign)

4. Municipal Chapter Chairman

5. Provincial Courier

6. Provincial Chairman/NHQ

Time

Date

Time

Date

Time

294

PRECINCT TALLY SHEET

ANNEX
XLVII.2
Copy 1 - Provir
Page 298

Province

CAGAYAN DE SUR

City or Municipality

DAYANG

Barangay

CONCARAM

Precinct Number

2

Number of Precincts
under School Chairm.in

2

Number of Voter Card

6138

RESULT OF COUNT

VOTES IN FIGURES

PRINTED VOTES IN WORDS

FOR PRESIDENT

1. MARCOS

0075 SEVENTY FIVE

2. AQUINO

0060 SIXTY

Control Total

Total of votes for Marcos and Aquino

FOR VICE-PRESIDENT

1. TOLENTINO

0066 SIXTY SIX

2. LAUREL

0067 SIXTY SEVEN

3. KALAW

0001 ONE

Control Total

Total of votes for Tolentino, Laurel and Kalaw

We HEREBY CERTIFY that the candidates above have obtained in this precinct the
votes set oppos to their respective names

BOARD OF ELECTION INSPECTORS

Chairman
B. NARIBA ANDRAZ
Naribra Andraza

Chairman
MARIA LIA CATBACATIT
Malia Catbacatit
Secretary
MARY JESUS CARRAPAT
Mary Jesus Carrapat
UNIDO Member

AFTER SIGNING, PLEASE FILL IN DATE AND TIME OF RECEIPT.

1. Poll Watcher

2. School Chairman

3. Municipal Courier

Date FEB. 7 '86 Time 3:15 P.M.

School Chairman
NORITA ANDRAZ

Date FEB. 7 '86 Time 3:15 P.M.

4. Municipal Chapter Chairman

5. Provincial Courier

6. Provincial Chairman/NHQ

Date FEB. 7 '86 Time 3:15 P.M.

Date

Time

Date

Time

7. Poll Watcher Encircle one

Please Explain why C or D

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PRECINCT TALLY SHEET

Copy 1 - Provincial ANNEX
XLVII.2
Page 299

Province: CANAO DEZ SUR

Barangay:

BAYANG ROSEN

City or Municipality: BAYANG

Number of Precincts under School Chairman

6

Precinct Number: 6

Name of Voter List: 0090

RESULT OF COUNT

FOR PRESIDENT

1. MARCOS

0029 TWENTY NINE

2. AGUINO

0053 FIFTY THREE

Central Total

82 ↳

Total of votes for Marcos and Aquino

FOR VICE-PRESIDENT

1. TOLENTINO

0025 TWENTY FIVE

2. LAUREL

0027 TWENTY SEVEN

3. KALAW

0000 NONE

Central Total

0052 ↳

Total of votes for Tolentino, Laurel and Kalaw

I HEREBY CERTIFY that the candidates above have obtained in this precinct the following total votes for names.

BOARD OF ELECTION INSPECTORS

NOMA PINAGAYAO

SIRIPTI RAMDARS

As Member

ESTHER BARAPADA

Poll Watcher

EROTIN CADYONAN

UNIDU AMBUL

AFTER SIGNING PLEASE FILL IN DATE AND TIME OF RECEIPT

Poll Watcher	2. School Chairman <i>(Signature)</i> NOMA PINAGAYAO	3. Municipal Courier <i>(Print Name & Sign)</i> Date FEB. 7 '86 Time 3:48 PM
Municipal Chapter Chairman	4. Provincial Courier <i>(Print Name & Sign)</i>	5. Provincial Chairman/NHQ <i>(Print Name & Sign)</i> Date FEB. 7 '86 Time 3:48 PM
Time	Date	Time
Time	Date	Time

Poll Watcher Encircle one of following according to A B C D

Please Explain why C or D

01.5.961

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PRECINCT TALLY SHEET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Copy 1 - Provincia XLVII.2
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ANNEX

XLVII. 2

Page 300

Province	<u>CAGAYAN DE SUR</u>
City or Municipality	<u>BAYAN</u>
Precinct Number	<u>7</u>
Number of votes Cast	<u>0053</u>

Barangay PACAYONAN
Number of Precincts
under School Chairman 7

RESULT OF COUNT	VOTES IN FIGURES,	PRINTED VOTES IN WORDS
FOR PRESIDENT		
MARCOS	0 0 2 5	TWENTY FIVE
AQUINO	0 0 2 6	TWENTY SIX
Control Total	5 1	Total of votes for Marcos and Aquino
FOR VICE-PRESIDENT		
TOLENTINO	0 0 1 9	NINETEEN
LAUREL	0 0 3 0	THIRTY
KALAW	0 0 0 1	ONE
Control Total	5 0	Total of votes for Tolentino, Laurel and Kalaw

WE HEREBY CERTIFY that the candidates above have obtained in this precinct the
votes set opposite their respective names.

BOARD OF ELECTION INSPECTORS

Chambers

DIAMELA PITILAN

...no se ha apropiado

UNITED MUMPS

AFTER SIGNING, PLEASE FILL IN DATE AND TIME OF RECEIPT.

1. Poll Waechter

12 School Chalms

3. Muncipal Council

July 27, 1955 Time 3:30
1. Murchison Shale, CA 1

Appendix A

6 Provincial Charter/GANN

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[BellWether.com](http://www.bellwether.com)

A B C D

Please Explain why C or D

291

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

The Center for Democracy's analysis of the official canvass of Votes conducted by the Batasan Pambansa (Philippines Parliament), following the February 7, 1986 presidential election, reviews the thoroughness and accuracy of the procedures employed by that body in tabulating the country's precincts.

The Batasan canvassed votes by provinces and cities, with tallies supposedly certified by election registrars at that level. In a number of these official tallies, the Batasan failed to account for the exact number of precincts within a province or city (Columns A, B & C). This lead to under-counting or, in some instances, even over-counting. In numerous cases, the certified Batasan national tally did not indicate any figure whatsoever for the precincts tallied that could be matched with the official number of precincts for that province or city.

Of the 136 provinces and cities (broken down in the Batasan's count and in this analysis by the country's thirteen voting regions, I-XII and the National Capital Region), only in 38 were all the precincts tabulated exactly. In 47, there were significant precinct omissions or additions, and in 53 no precinct figures were provided.

Under the circumstances, the Batasan figures do not meet the requirements set out in the Philippine Electoral Code (BATAS PAMBANSA BLC 881: Art. 2, Sec. 15). In this analysis, the official Batasan Canvass of Votes must be regarded as less reliable than the NAMFREL exact tally based on signed precinct returns from 75-80% of the country's precincts.

COLUMNS

- A: Total number of precincts not tabulated for cited region in official Batasan count.
- B: Total number of precincts tabulated in excess of stated number of precincts for cited region in official Batasan count.
- C: Total number of provinces and cities involved in columns A & B.
- D: Total number of provinces and cities with no precinct figures tabulated in official Batasan count.
- E: Total number of provinces and cities with all precincts tabulated accurately in official Batasan count.

REGION	A	B	C	D	E
NCR	-164	--	6	2	2
I	-52	+137	2	4	14
II	-40	--	3	4	4
III	-119	--	4	3	3
IV	-28	+3	3	10	6
V	-45	--	3	5	5
VI	-119	+1	5	6	2
VII	-30	--	3	6	4
VIII	-128	+20	4	1	5
IX	-92	--	4	1	5
X	-161	--	4	6	4
XI	-51	--	4	2	2
XII	-74	--	2	3	3
TOTALS	-1,103	+161	47	53	38

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

M A N I L A

* * *

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Manila

10:50

PETITION TO DECLARE FAILURE
OF ELECTION IN CADIZ CITY,
NEGROS DEL NORTE

LAW DEPARTMENT
RECEIVED BY: *D. G.*.....
DATE & TIME: *2-17-86*.....

CASE NO. *SPC 86-17*

CORAZON C. AQUINO and
SALVADOR H. LAUREL,
Petitioners.

x-----x

P E T I T I O N

PETITIONERS, by counsel, respectfully state that:

I. They are the candidates for President and Vice-President, respectively of the Dominant Opposition Party, the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (hereafter, "UNJDO") in the February 7, 1986 Presidential elections;

II. For causes that existed immediately before, during and after elections, there was a total and absolute failure of elections in the entire city of Cadiz, Negros del Norte, resulting in the denial of the free will of the electorate of Cadiz City;

III. That the failure of election was caused and characterized by the following circumstances, to wit:

A. Registration anomalies and failure and refusal of the COMELEC Registrar to effect the posting of the list of voters

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- 2 -

1. On registration days of December 28-29, 1986, the UNIDO inspectors were not given their books wherein to copy the list of voters for 1986 so that most of them did not have any on election day. Most of the Chairmen of the Board of election inspectors refused to allow the UNIDO inspectors to copy the list of voters.

2. Notwithstanding the written request of the UNIDO representative in Cadiz City, Atty. Frances V. Guanzon, Atty. Agustin Desuyo, City COMELEC Registrar and acting Provincial Election Supervisor for Negros del Norte, did not entertain such request and could not be found in his office or at his residence.

3. Atty. Agustin Desuyo wilfully and deliberately withheld the instruction to the Chairmen of the Board of Election inspectors to post the list of voters in the precincts as required by the Omnibus Election Code. Lists of voters were posted only on election day and only in some precincts, resulting to the confusion among voters, many of whom were not able to vote because their names were not in their precincts.

B. Anomalies committed by the City
Election Registrar who is also
the Acting Provincial Election
Supervisor showing his bias in
favor of KBL

1. Atty. Agustin Desuyo deliberately absented himself from office and did not attend to election matters posed by the UNIDO between the periods from January 2, 1986 to January 23,

- 3 -

1986 and from January 25, 1986 up to February 9, 1986.

2. Atty. Desuyo deliberately failed and refused to furnish the UNIDO with a copy of the list of voters of Cadiz City despite written demands made by the UNIDO representative.

3. Atty. Desuyo deliberately refused to furnish UNIDO a certified list of polling places and precincts and their locations.

4. He illegally issued appointments of inspectors not nominated by the UNIDO representative, resulting in the ousting of the duly designated UNIDO inspectors from their precinct on the day of the election, who were replaced by men of the KBL. A copy of one of the illegal appointments issued by Atty. Desuyo is attached and made an integral part hereof and marked as Annex "1".

5. He unlawfully ordered the Chairmen of the Board of Election Inspectors that the ballot boxes in the barangays be brought to the City for counting, in gross violation of Section 206 of the Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 1759. Affidavits of UNIDO inspectors attesting to this fact are attached hereto and marked as Annexes "2", "3", "4" and "5".

6. He unlawfully ordered the transfer of some precincts without notice to the UNIDO and without hearing, again in a violation of the Omnibus Election Code. Affidavits of UNIDO

2501

- 4 -

inspectors attesting to this fact are attached and marked as Annexes "6", "7" and "8".

C. Fraud and terrorism on election day

1. Duly appointed UNIDO inspectors and watchers were forcibly ousted from their precincts by the Chairmen of the Board of Election Inspectors, with the help of armed men, on the basis of the illegal appointments signed by Atty. Desuyo, appointing other persons as UNIDO inspectors and watchers though not nominated by the UNIDO representative. An affidavit of a UNIDO inspector in support of this allegation is made an integral part and marked as Annex "9" and "9-A"

2. UNIDO inspectors and watchers who served in their precincts or refused to be ousted were intimidated by KBL leaders, government officials and policemen, as evidenced by affidavits made an integral part hereof and marked as Annexes "10", "11", "12", "13", "14" and "15".

3. The Chief of Police, with his armed policemen and CHDF's, terrorized the voters and supporters of the UNIDO, and in one barangay he cocked his gun at a student, as evidenced by an affidavit made an integral part hereof and marked as Annex "16"; Vice-Mayor Javier, who is a brother of the chief of police, beat up an UNIDO inspector in another barangay, as shown by an affidavit made an integral part hereof and marked as Annex "17".

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4. Ballot boxes of the barangays were forcibly brought to the city for counting by policemen, CHDF's and armed men in plain clothes. UNIDO inspectors and watchers who opposed this transfer were intimidated and threatened to be killed, as shown by affidavits made an integral part hereof and marked as Annexes "18", "19" and "20".

5. The ballots in the ballot boxes which were transported from the Barangays by the Chairmen and armed men to the city, were counted without the presence of UNIDO inspectors and watchers who did not know where the ballot boxes were brought and who were not allowed to accompany the ballot boxes.

6. Some ballot boxes were stuffed with ballots in favor of the KBL candidates, as shown by an affidavit made an integral part hereof and marked as Annex "21".

7. Rampant vote buying was perpetrated by the KBL through the use of colored sample ballots and a stencilled letter in the handwriting of Gov. Armando Gustilo, whereby the voters, after voting for KBL, would get the chairmen of their precincts to sign and would get remuneration for his vote. A copy of the KBL sample ballot and the stencilled letter of Gov. Gustilo are attached and marked as Annex "22".

D. Failure of the Chairman of the City Board of Canvassers to Convene the Board within the period required by the Omnibus Election Code

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- 6 -

1. Contrary to the Omnibus Election Code, the City Board of Canvassers was not convened at 6:00 p.m. of February 7, 1986. Attys. Frances V. Guanzon and Elvira Guanzon , UNIDO representative and watcher respectively, were at the cited place of canvassing, but Atty. Romeo Flores, Chairmen of the Board, could not be located, and when he was finally located after much searching, Atty. Frances V. Guanzon asked him to convene the Board; he refused, saying that City Fiscal Fabroz was not present. At 9:00 p.m., Atty. Flora was obliged by Atty. Guanzon to convene the Board, but the former ordered that the Board adjourn because of the absence of Fiscal Fabroz. During this time, the KBL representative in the Board was Mr. Guillermo Desuyo, a close relative of Atty. Desuyo, City COMELEC Registrar. The joint affidavits of Atty. Frances V. Guanzon and Atty. Elvira Guanzon is attached and marked as Annex "23".

2. As of the date of this Petition, the City Board of Canvassers has not been convened, and the UNIDO representative had to send a telegram to the COMELEC in Manila, as shown by a copy of the telegram marked as Annex "24".

E. Anomalies committed by the
City Treasurer, Tomas Ypil

1. Mr. Tomas Ypil, City Treasurer, verified the election forms without due notice to the UNIDO representative, and failed to furnish the UNIDO representative with a list of the distribution of the election returns.

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2. Election returns were distributed in violation of the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code as they were distributed the day before the election; and in some barangays such as Barangay Sicaba, the chairmen of the precincts did not have election returns; the UNIDO was given a copy of the election returns only at the City Hall, at about 8:00 in the evening of election day, February 7, 1986.

P R A Y E R

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that this Honorable Commission declare a failure of election in Cadiz City, Negros del Norte, and to declare as null and void the purported results of the elections in the same city.

Your petitioners further respectfully pray that it:

- 1) Enjoin the Chairman of the Cadiz City Board of Canvassers from convening or proceeding with the canvassing;
- 2) Schedule and hold new elections in Cadiz City under the direct supervision of the COMELEC in Manila, and with the assistance of a police or Philippine Constabulary force from outside of the province of Negros del Norte;

It is finally respectfully prayed as a separate matter that this Honorable Commission conduct an investigation of the following persons:

7705

3. Atty. Agustin Desuyo for his illegal acts narrated herein, and of Atty. Romeo Flora, Chairman of the City Board of Canvassers, for his wilful failure to convene the same Board;

4. City Fiscal Samuel Fabroz for wilfully absenting himself from the canvass;


5. The City Treasurer Tomas Ypil for his violation of the Omnibus Election Code as above stated.

Petitioners likewise pray for such other reliefs as may be just and equitable under the circumstances.

Manila, Philippines, February 12, 1986.

JOKER P. ARROYO and
FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA

By:


FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA
Counsel for Petitioners
2nd Floor, Zeta Building
191 Salcedo St., Legaspi Village
Makati, Metro Manila
PTR No. 8744115
1-22-86, Makati, Metro Manila
IBP O.R. No. 203795
11-13-85, Manila

VERIFICATION

I, ROWENA V. GUANZON, of legal age, after first being sworn in accordance with law, hereby depose and state that I have read the foregoing Petition and the contents hereof are true and correct of my own knowledge.

Makati, Metro Manila for Manila, February 14, 1986.

ROWENA V. GUANZON
Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 14th day of February, 1986, at Makati, Metro Manila, affiant exhibiting to me her Res. Cert. No. 5624636, issued on July 18, 1985, at Makati, Metro Manila.

Jovenario L. Fajilan
JOVENARIO L. FAJILAN
NOTARY PUBLIC
UNTIL DECEMBER 31, 1986
PTRA NO. 27333T3
MAKATI, M.M. 7, 1986
TAN F2450-J3047-A-0

Doc. No. 262;
Page No. 57;
Book No. 1;
Series of 1986.

COPY FURNISHED:

KILUSAN NG BAGONG LIPUNAN
Roxas Boulevard, Manila

7,07

NAMFREL
REPORT ON ELECTIONS IN
CADIZ, NEGROS DEL NORTE

PRE-ELECTIONS

The Chairman for NAMFREL-Cadiz Chapter, Fr. Manuel C. Regalado requested for an appointment with the Cadiz COMELEC Registrar Atty. Agustin Desuyo for February 4, 1986 at 8:30 a.m. on February 2, 1986. On that appointed day and hour, Fr. Regalado was given the runaround by Atty. Desuyo. Only after a long search was Atty. Desuyo found at 9:30 a.m. The ID's for NAMFREL Cadiz pollwatchers were not signed by the registrar then because he requested for further requirements, thus another appointment was set between him and Fr. Regalado for the next day, February 5th. Atty. Desuyo did not meet the appointment and efforts to locate him on that day until late in the evening of February 6th, even through an intermediary, failed. Thus, an envelope containing instructions from COMELEC Regional Director Sarroza and an envelope from NAMFREL containing a letter from Negros del Norte Chairman Dr. Patricio Tan, a copy of the telegram for transmission from Director Sarroza regarding, among other things, the authorization of NAMFREL Precinct representatives, were delivered to his house at 11:10 p.m. and received by his daughter. (Acknowledgment receipt attached).

ELECTIONS: VOTING PERIOD

NAMFREL volunteers were met at their respective precincts with an order from Atty. Desuyo indicating that the NAMFREL accreditation for the whole of Negros del Norte was revoked (effective February 6, 1986) due to the partisanship of Msgr. Antonio Fortich, Dr. Patricio Tan and Atty. Juan Hagad. (Note that the latter is not even a NAMFREL member). Thus, NAMFREL volunteers were not able to exercise their pollwatching responsibilities inside the precincts but had to maintain the 30-meter distance. (The 30-meter distance was indicated with signs).

Voters List. In almost all of the 135 precincts, complaints were abundant regarding voters who were not able to vote due to the disappearance of their names in the voters lists. Yet, in most of the precincts, too, the number of voters exceeded that 300 requirement ranging from 370 to 530 voters per precinct.

Ballot Boxes. Ballot box colors in the area ranged from gold to green to grey (the color of galvanized iron). The grey ones were of the old type without any transparent portion, while some of the gold ones had cardboards or bond paper covers over the transparent portions. Only approximately 45 ballot boxes had the transparent portions opened, and these belonged mostly to the voting centers in the city proper.

Restrictions. Most NAMFREL volunteers were restricted from taking pictures either verbally, or by blocking of their views by several people who timed themselves to stand or sit in front of the volunteers. One NAMFREL volunteer was also shouted at after taking a photograph.

Unauthorized Persons in Restricted Areas. Military men in uniform and fully armed were present in most polling places, within 30 meters from the precincts. There were also at least 15 men in

Cadiz Election Report, page 2

the precinct when Gov. Armando Gustilo came in to vote. Various other persons also were seen inside the precincts, among them men in "We Love Armin (Gustilo)" T-shirts, some of which were seen handing envelopes to various personnel inside the precincts. Barangay Captains (specifically at Brgy. Bonifacio and Cabahug) were also weaving within the polling site, and Vice Mayor Javier in Brgy. Burgos.

Irregularities. Various forms of cheating and irregularities were seen at the polling places, among these: vote buying in exchange for money or rice, use of non-indelible ink (on some occasions the ink was placed in three different containers, one of them a marked one), lanzadera, overcrowding of precincts, open voting, coded ballpen colors (some voters, including NAMFREL volunteers, were obliged to use particular ink colors), open voting, open booths, teachers filling in ballots and candidates' names not written on the board. Several persons also wearing Marcos-Tolentino shirts were spotted.

Voting Process. Most voting, except for a maximum of a 45 minute delay, started within the first 30 minutes after 7:00 am. Most also ended at 3:00 pm except for one barangay (Bonifacio) wherein voting terminated at 12:30 pm when the ballot boxes were removed by armed men a loaded onto a truck. Some precincts (Hiyang-Hiyan, Alimatok and a portion of Caduha-an) were transferred without prior notice, thus causing some voters to be confused with regard to the location of their precincts.

Ballot Box Transport. NAMFREL volunteers of Brgy. Bonifacio attempted to follow the transport of their ballot boxes at noontime, but they were prevented by doing so by the armed men who threatened to shoot them if they did. There were also several obvious attempts to delay the entourage of those who wanted to follow their ballot boxes. One vehicle was blocked by a slow moving jeep (from Brgy. Burgos) while the vehicles which followed ballot boxes from Brgy. Caduha-an were blocked off by several cars, one of them even being edged off the road onto the shoulder, and finally literally closing the gate of Philippine Normal College (where some of the ballot boxes were delivered) to prevent the pursuit. Although voting at Brgy. Luna was peaceful, an order was produced that there should be no precinct level counting in the said place. When the people contested the order, some military reinforcement came to the place, and about 20 armed men, poised with their firearms demanded that the ballot boxes be moved to the city proper.

Apparently to create confusion, although the COMELEC Registrar had already previously informed the NAMFREL Chairman that the canvassing was to be done at the City Hall, ballot boxes were delivered to three different places: City Hall, Philippine Normal College (main site), and to an unfinished building also at the back of Philippine Normal College.

Canvassing. Only approximately 30 percent of the precincts had precinct level counting. Most of these belong to the precincts within the city proper. There were blatant attempts to prevent the public, especially NAMFREL volunteers from witnessing the canvassing. Of the ballot boxes delivered to the City Hall, a few NAMFREL volunteers succeeded in entering, posing as voters of the Barangay who wished

Cadiz Election Report, page 3

to witness the canvassing. Shortly after, Gov. Armando Gustilo came into the room and demanded to know if there were any NAMFREL volunteers in the room. When the volunteers acknowledged themselves, the Governor said, "Out. Your NAMFREL accreditation has been revoked." The entrance of more armed men into the room obliged them to leave the place. Other NAMFREL volunteers whose ballot boxes were delivered to the CITY HALL were prevented from entering by armed men.

Some of the ballot boxes delivered to the Philippine Normal College were also removed from the place by tricycles. At the unfinished building behind it, some ballot boxes were also delivered, but entrance by others was first prevented due to the presence of some armed men. Most of the ballot boxes in this particular building were delivered either by foot or by tricycle. Later, upon the insistence of NAMFREL and the presence of foreign journalists, entrance into the building was allowed. In this building, however, and also in the main building of the college, there was a classroom each which was locked, and with windows fully closed that it was impossible to witness what was going on inside. Some ballot boxes which came from this room were brought out to the rooms where canvassing started. These two rooms were locked for approximately four hours. A COMELEC official was asked on the goings-on in the room, but he denied any knowledge, but neither would he cause the doors to be opened. (A few blurred shots of the room's interior are enclosed, taken by a camera lens placed on a broken pane at the topmost panel of the window). The photo shows an open ballot box and a book being written on, similar in size to the voters registry book. It should be noted that ballot boxes from a vehicle which had been tailed from the Barangay site (where precinct level counting was not conducted) by NAMFREL volunteers all the way down to the school site at the poblacion, were placed inside one of the closed rooms. Three and a half hours later, the room's doors opened and about 40-50 people trooped out of the closed room.

It was after these dubious actions that NAMFREL decided to pull-out from the farcical canvassing process, rather than give credence to an exercise which was blatantly cheating.

Threats and Intimidation. In addition to what has already been mentioned, it was observed, especially in the evening during the "canvassing" period at the Philippine Normal College main building and at the unfinished building at the back, that armed men began to make themselves more visible and their presence felt. Even a simple question to man leaving one of the closed rooms elicited a brusque response that almost triggered an argument between the Cadiz Chairman and himself, in the meantime that man purposely dropping his cigarette's ashes on the co-chairman's arms. That same man later hit a NAMFREL volunteer's back with his fist. Shortly thereafter, the co-chairman mistakenly approached a vehicle full of men, thinking it was one of the NAMFREL vehicles. As she looked into the pick-up's window a camera's flash bulb activated, and a loud shouting voice asked, in the dialect, "What are you doing," while pointing a gun at her. She explained that she thought it was somebody else's car, and still the shouting voice boomed back, gun still pointed, "This is my vehicle, what do you have to say about it." With a

Cadiz Election Report, page 4

"Well, sorry!" she left them.


Later in the evening, two NAMFREL vehicles were surrounded by vehicles containing armed men and approximately ten armed men pointing their firearms at the vehicles and passengers. The butt of a gun was placed at the driver's back while the vehicles were searched for arms. Three hitchhikers were made to raise their arms in surrender, while one of them was kicked at the back with claims that he was an NPA. The NAMFREL volunteer was berated, shouted at and tagged as a Communist and supporter of the NPA's. He was also accused of carrying firearms, of which he had none. He was brought to the Police Station where his Radio Transceiver, the license of which was not with him, was confiscated. The Receipt of the radio (attached) also claimed that his pick-up was spotted within the premises of the Philippine Normal College, under suspicious movement. (Incidentally, this was one of the vehicles which was used to tail a truck carrying some ballot boxes, while the other car searched for weapons belonged to the co-chairman. That car was used two days before in Cadiz City in the search for the COMELEC Registrar, and, while parked in a Cadiz barangay in the morning of the elections, was looked over several times by the driver of a vehicle which was also present during the evening watch at the college).

Even the day after elections, when some of the NAMFREL volunteers stayed behind to do further work, walked through the Cadiz streets, they were consistently followed and shadowed, perhaps as a form of intimidation.

POST ELECTIONS

Special Public Affairs portions have been shown on television featuring Negros del Norte, specifically Cadiz, alledging that Cadiz was terrorized by NAMFREL over there, and trouble came to Cadiz on election day only because of the presence of NAMFREL. It should be noted however, that most of the Cadiz volunteers were young people and women who did not possess any firearms with them, and were incapable of terrorizing.

Submitted by:


MILLIE L. KILAYKO
Co-chairman
NAMFREL - Cadiz City

February 11, 1986

Republic of the Philippines
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Manila

In the matter of the prompt submission of evidence to substantiate complaints or reports of political parties.

P r e s e n t :

SAVELLANO, Victorino A., Ch.,
OPINION, Jaime, Com.,
BACUNGAN, Froilan M., Com.,
FELIPE, Ramon H. Jr., Com.,
MARQUINEZ, Quirino A., Com.,
ORTIZ, Mario D., Com.,
GURO, Mangontawar B., Com.,
AGPALO, Ruben E., Com.,
LAYOSA, Jaime J., Com.,

x ----- x Promulgated: 13 February 1986

RESOLUTION NO. 1775

WHEREAS, reports of incidents in the February 7, 1986 election have been submitted to the Commission, some of which have been made basis of formal complaints which are now under investigation;

WHEREAS, we consider these incidents material to the canvassing of votes cast for President and Vice-President now being conducted by the Batasang Pambansa as they have to do with the voting process and the counting of votes or the canvassing of results of the last election;

WHEREAS, both the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL), the administration party, and the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO), the opposition party, have submitted reports or filed the complaints alleging anomalies and other irregularities in the past elections;

WHEREAS, the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan has reported or complained about the following incidents:

1. The pattern and conspiracy of fraud and terrorism committed by the communist new people's army and the

Res. No. 1775

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opposition party in known bailwicks of the administration party in Camarines Sur;

2. The pattern of intimidation and terrorism by MP Edmundo Cea of Camarines Sur, as sworn to by Rosario Beloro y Orbina de Fuerta, chairman of the board of election inspectors of Precinct No. 1, barangay Abo (Lourdes) Tigaoan, Camarines Sur. The other witnesses are Florencio Ibalin, Juanito C. Boncodin, Bienvenido I. Buloan, Jr., Felix C. Bonite, Crescenciano Brequel and Melda P. Ret;

3. The prevention of voters from exercising their right of suffrage in the precincts along the boundary of Albay and Camarines Sur by the NAMREL, the Communist New People's Army and the Opposition;

4. The massive vote-buying of the voters in the Poblacion of Panitan, Capiz, whereby the chairman of Barangay Aglowny, Generoso Dirramas, bought the voters at the rate of P100 to P50 and herded all of those who were bought to the precinct to vote for the opposition candidates, notwithstanding the objections of Romulo Dorado and Fe Demontano;

5. Snatching of ballot boxes by the Communists New People's Army (NPA) in precinct No. 9, Manbusao, Capiz, which malicious act was supported by the NAMREL and the Opposition. Thelma Lepardo, Josefa S. Leal and Eduardo Lerona, admitted members of the NPA, executed affidavits stating that ballot boxes in Manbusao, Capiz, were snatched by the NPA. Two active members of the NPA, Saldio Bernal and Noriel Conde, executed affidavits that they were ordered by the Communists or NPA to snatch ballot boxes in areas where the majority party is admittedly strong;

6. In Eastern Samar, more than one-half of the registered voters for the majority party were prevented by the

Res. No. 1775

3

Communists to vote. Eastern Samar has 134,528 registered voters;

7. In Antique, about 30,000 registered voters were likewise not allowed to vote by the Communist NPA, the Opposition Party and NAMFREL;

8. In Nueva Ecija, according to MP Diaz, around 90,000 voters for the majority party could not vote because they were prevented/misled by the Opposition, with the active participation and assistance of Namfrel and Communist (NPA);

9. In Dimalag, Capiz, Efren Gascon, Rufino Tresnido, Remedios Fajardo and Miguel Pano executed affidavits stating that they could not vote and campaign because they were threatened and coerced by the Communist's New People's Army and that should they go out and vote or campaign for the majority party, the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL), harm would befall their family;

10. Member of Parliament Luis Villafuerte or Camarines Sur was charged for robbery and/or theft for having hijacked a government vehicle containing medicines for distribution to rightful beneficiaries. He brought the government vehicle to the radio station and appropriated the medicines there and personally delivering medicines to people he desires.

11. Member of Parliament Edmundo Cea also of Camarines Sur, was charged for violation of the Omnibus Election Code together with his body guards for having entered a polling precinct in violation of the Omnibus Election Code. This has been filed with the Ministry of Justice which has been deputized by the Comelec to handle violations of the Omnibus Election Code;

Res. No. 1775

4

12. A nun did the tallying of the votes in the Iloilo Provincial Capitol, as part of an alleged pattern of mob rule perpetrated by the NAMFREL and the Opposition. Ballot boxes were even transported by them to the Municipal halls in violation of the Omnibus Election Code;

13. As a pattern of the illegal activities of the Communist New People's Army (NPA) and the NAMFREL, representatives of NAMFREL were reported to have handled ballots inside voting centers and participated in the functions of the board of election inspectors, in blatant violations of the Omnibus Election Code;

14. The criminal activities of the Communist New People's Army with the aid and support of the Opposition and the NAMFREL led to the death of Mayor Lorenzo Padua of Goa, Camarines Sur, and is aggravated by the systematic sending of death threats to rabid and strong supporters of President Marcos, such as Mayor Nemesio Yabut of Makati, Metro Manila and Mayor Joseph Estrada of San Juan, Metro Manila, and other mayors of towns where the President is admittedly strong, as reported in Times Journal of January 31, 1986;

15. The NAMFREL violations have been reported repeatedly in daily newspapers in Manila as shown by pictures of nuns and Namfrel representatives in the polling precincts doing the tallying of votes, as published in the Daily Express;

16. The Communist New People's Army in their determined effort to interfere in the elections coerced and intimidated voters who are supporters of President Marcos as evidence by the killing of three (3) members of the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (the majority party), namely, Barangay

Captain Eleuterio Cabuhat of Calbiga, Samar, Leonardo Jakusalem of Zamboanga del Norte and Pedro Ilabore of Albay;

17. Member of Parliament Jose Zytiri, a KBL leader of Bukidnon in Mindanao, and a staunch supporter of the administration (KBL) aborted the ambush that was attempted on his life by the NPA when his security escort was able to fire warning shots to the group that were set up for them along the highway in Pangalpuan town in Bukidnon, a southernmost province in the island of Mindanao, as reported in the People's Journal issue of Sunday, February 2, 1986;

18. In Muntinglupa, Metro Manila, the KBL complained that 29 election returns were excluded from the canvass by the district board of canvassers because the KBL representative and his lawyers were prevented from entering the canvassing room by priests, nuns, and NAMFREL members;

19. Lanao del Sur MP Omar Dianalan was accused of terrorizing voters and stopping the voting in Precinct No. 4 of Barangay Bawolod Chico in Marawi City. Accused with Dianalan in a complaint filed by the KBL chapter of Lanao del Sur and Marawi City were Bantog Maruhom a policeman of Marawi City Hadji Solaiman Wato, husband of Dianalan's aunt and several other persons identified as his bodyguards;

20. One, Mr. Contreras of the town of Batangas, Batangas, was found distributing genuine ballots to the voters in the precinct with the names of Aquino and Laurel already written in the ballots, and they were asking the voters only to sign and put their thumb marks;

21. NAMFREL representatives occupy most of the places for the members of the Board of Inspectors and those voting whereas the law states that only the members of the Board of Inspectors and those voting can enter the polling places.

WHEREAS, there are reports, although not formally filed, from the ranks of the Opposition alleging that:

1. There are "ghost precincts" in Southern Leyte in the Visayans and in Lanao del Sur in Mindanao, without however identifying the location of such precincts;

2. There are also complaints to the effect that the KBL have been

3. There is a complaint to the effect that on February 11, 1986, Ex-Governor Evelio Javier was shot to death by a policeman allegedly allied with the administration. Initial investigation of the incident showed that before the shooting of former Governor Javier he had personally slapped Capt. John Paloy of the PC-INP, humiliating him before his relatives and his friends and that this matter is under active investigation by the Philippine Constabulary and the JACO of the Armed Forces;

4. At the same time, there is news story to the effect that Capt. John Paloy was ordered detained by PC-INP Director General Lt. Fidel V. Ramos on suspicion of having participated in the killing of the former governor.

NOW, THEREFORE, this Commission hereby RESOLVES to:

1. Require every political party or person who has any complaint that will materially affect the result of the February 7, 1986 elections to immediately submit to this Commission the evidence to support or substantiate such complaint;

2. Should any such complaint be substantiated as to materially affect the integrity of the election returns or the certificate of canvass involved, to recommend to the Batasang Pambansa at the opportune time, the exclusion of such return or certificate from the official canvass of votes for President and Vice-President now being undertaken by that body; and

3. Request the political parties or persons concerned, from airing their complaints to the media before this Commission shall have acted on such complaint so as not to generate political animosities.

SO ORDERED.

(SGD) VICTORINO A. SIVELLANO
Chairman

(SGD) JAIME OPPICIO
Commissioner

(SGD) FROILAN M. BACUNGAN
Commissioner

(SGD) RAMON H. FILIPIPE, JR.
Commissioner

(SGD) QUIRINO A. MARQUINEZ
Commissioner

(SGD) MARIO D. ORTEZ
Commissioner

(SGD) MANGONTAMAR B. GURO
Commissioner

(SGD) RUBEN E. AGIMO
Commissioner

(SGD) JAIME J. LAYOSA
Commissioner

BREAKDOWN OF CASUALTIES (KILLED)
As of 18 February 1986

Dec. 6 - Feb. 18
Only election-related
incidents

Gov't Armed Services Casualties

PC	- - - - .	none
INP	- - - - -	5
OTHER AFP SVCS	- - - - -	2
CHDF	- - - - -	<u>3</u>
TOTAL	- - - - -	<u>10</u>

Civilian Casualties

Election Officials	- - .	2
Government Officials	-	22
Others	- - -	<u>55</u>
TOTAL	- - - - -	<u>78</u>

Enemy casualties

subversive terrorist	-	2
GRAND TOTAL	- - - - -	<u>90</u>

**KBL	- - - - -	33 + 1 = 34
UNIDO	- - - - -	25
OTHER PARTY	- - - - -	<u>30</u>
TOTAL	- - - - -	<u>88</u>
+ 2 elec offls	-	<u>2</u>
		<u>90</u>

** KBL and UNIDO including others are only extra classification
of aforementioned casualties.

LIST OF CASUALTIES (KILLED)
As of 16 February 1986

ANNEX LI
Page 319

NAME	NATURE OF INCIDENT - TIME AND PLACE	STATUS	REMARKS
Jesus Miranda	Killing - Pob. Sta Rita, Pampanga - 11 Jan 1986	UNIDO	Civilian
Renato Santos	-do-	UNIDO	Civilian
Alberto Briones	Ambuscade - So. San Agustin, Brgy Odonnell, Capas, Tarlac - 15 Jan 1986	UNIDO	Civilian
Cerminas de Jesus	-do-	UNIDO	Civilian
Andres Borromeo	Killing - Talisay, Cebu - 20 Jan 1986	Undst	Talisay, Sangguniang Bayan Member
Martin dela Herced	Killing - Morong-ray, Bulecan - 21 Jan 1986	Undst	Civilian
Rolando Esquivel	Killing - -do-	Undst	Civilian
Osema Oro	Killing - Castillejos, Zambales - 21 Jan 1986	Undst	Civilian
Leonardo Legaspi	Killing - Pilaranda, Nva Ecija - 11 Jan 1986	UNIDO	Civilian ldr
Jaima Andaya	Killing - Villasis, Pangasinan	KBL	Civilian
Alejandro Abutog	Killing - Brgy Ulayon, Villarsal, Western Samar - 10 Jan 1986	KBL	Brgy Captain
Reymundo Cavallana	Killing - Malate, Manila - 23 Jan 1986	UNIDO	Civilian
Policarpio Pendella	Ambuscade - Lumanit, Midsalip, Zambo Sur - 24 Jan 1986	KBL	CHDF
Domingo Divide Jr.	Killing - Danais, Botolan, Zambales - 26 Jan 1986	UNIDO	Brgy Captain
Ruel Lopez	Killing - Pantar, Lanao Norte - 26 Jan 1986	KBL	CHDF
Munitar Dumal	-do-	KBL	Civilian
Hadjji Ijute Ali	Killing - Pantar, Lanao Norte - 26 Jan 1986	KBL	Civilian
Roberto Sefuejo	Killing - Panabo, Davao Norte - 24 Jan 1986	KBL	Brgy Capt.n
Anastacio Almario	-do-	KBL	Civilian
Vicente Guiono	Killing - Brgy Alug, Autra, Zambo. Sur - 22 Jan 1986	KBL	Brgy Captain
Ernesto Leonorina	Killing - Brgy Napulivay-Josefina, Zambo. Sur - 22 Jan 86	KBL	Brgy Captain

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22. Pequito Caballero	Killing - Minag, Zambo Sur - 3rd wk, Jan 86	KBL	Civilian
23. Santa Caballero	-do-	KBL	Civilian
24. Joime Daligdig	-do-	Undst	Civilian
25. Randy Abong	-do-	Undst	Civilian
26. Claudio Rabosa	-do-	Undst	Civilian
27. Lalang Daligdig	-do-	Undst	Civilian
28. Lorenzo Padua	Killing - Matukio, Com, Camarines Sur - 30 Jan 86	KBL	Mayor
29. Romualdo Bedinas	Killing(Kidnapping)-Villaverde, Nva Vizcaya 2 Jan 86	KBL	Mayor
30. Victoriano Bautista	Killing - Las Piñas, Metro Manila	UNIDO	Civilian ldr
31. Pat Renato Ceisan	Killing - Hda Dorotea, Brgy Kapitan Ramos Silay City	Comelec Escorts, INP	
32. Pat Juancho Medina	Killing - Hda Dorotea, Brgy Kapitan Ramos Silay City	Undst	INP
33. Ricardo Padua	-do-	KBL	Civilian
34. Dominador Nepomuceno	-do-	KBL	Civilian
35. Teresita Haner	Killing - Daraga, Albay - 31 Jan 1986	Election Offl	Teacher
36. Jaime Mediavillo	Killing - Daraga, Albay - 31 Jan 1986	Uncat	Civilian
37. Ruperto Tumaliwan	Killing - Bayo, Igui, Cagayan	KBL	Brgy Captain
38. Rodolfo Basa	-do-	KBL	Civilian
39. Jose Loggin	Killing - Malabu, San Mineo, Isabela - (No Line)	KBL	Brgy Captain
40. Elautorio Cabuhat	Killing - Calibig, Banay - 23 Jan 1986	KUL	Brgy Captain

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ardo Jocosalem	Killing - Zamboanga Norte - 29 Jan 86	KBL	Brgy Captain
e Llators	Killing - Albay - 29 Jan 1986	KBL	Brgy Captain
ito Manjapuz	Missing Tayum, Davao City - 23 Jan 1986	Undat	Civilian ldr
sto Benghiat	Killing - Labangan, Isabela Sur - 4th wk 86	Undat	Civilian
Ilio Banghiat	Killing - Labangan, Zambales Sur - 4th wk 86	UNIDO	Civilian
is Ambucuy	Killing - Libajay, Aklan	KBL	Brgy Captain
lio Mallari	Killing - San Antonio, Nueva Ecija	Undat	Civilian
oro Sico	Killing - Manila	UNIDO	Civilian ldr
lio Caloma	Killing - Bugey, Cagayan - 5 Feb 86	UNIDO	Civilian
edo Salansang	Killing - 3rd Ave., Caloocan City	UNIDO	Civilian
1 dela Cuesta	-do-	KBL	Civilian ldr
usto Palmero	Killing - Lucena City - 5 Feb 86	Comisec Escort	IMP
Victoriano Uriquey	Killing - Cagayan	- do -	IMP
Geoffrey Labadia	- do -	Undat	Civilian
chor Talinagan	- do -	KBL	Sangguniang Bayan
olfo Mallorca	Killing - San Enrique, Iloilo - 3 Feb 86	KBL	Brgy Captain
U) Kaheli	Killing - Bataiso, Bataan - 6 Feb 86	Undat	Civilian
orio Uzogo y. Padua	Killing - Taedinan, Albay - 7 Feb 86	Undat	Civilian
emic Caguioa	Killing - Duhat, Pulong, Guagua, Pamp - 7 Feb 86	KBL	Civilian
Enlistedman	Ambuscade - Mabuhay, San Isidro, Northern Samar - 7 Feb 86	Undat	PA

3.04 Aligado	Shooting - Brgy Tangalan, Don Mariano Murcos, Zambo Sur	KBL	Brgy Captain
1. Purita Deligor	Killing - Sinacuan, Misamis Occ - 8 Feb 86	Undat	Regional Trial Judge
1. Luther Avanceña	- do -	- do -	Civilian
6. Unidentified	Killing - Sorsogon, Sorsogon - 7 Feb 86	UNIDO	Civilian
5. Unidentified	- do -	UNIDO	Civilian
6. David Sacuya	Killing - Davao - 7 Feb 86	Undat	Civilian
7. Rocco Laparan	Killing - Brgy Labor, Sulup, Davao Sur - 6 Feb 86	KBL	Brgy Captain
68. Unidentified ST	Ambuscade - Brgy Bacutin, Banganga, Davao Oz - 7 Feb 86	Undat	NPA
69. Unidentified ST	- do -	- do -	NPA
70. EP (PA)	Encounter - Brgy San Antonio, Tanday, Sur	Undat	PA
71. Artomio Fernandez	Killing - Masbate Comisec Office - 8 Feb 86	UNIDO	Civilian
72. Pat Sergio Castillo	Killing - Tacloban City - 7 Feb 86	Undat	IMP
73. Felipe Guevara	Killing - Tigao, Cortes, Surigao Sur - 6 Feb 86	KEL	Civilian ldr
74. (FMU) CastaRada	Killing - Samboan, Tarlac	Undat	CHDF
75. Rourigo Ponce Jr.	Killing - Mambusao, Capiz - 7 Feb 86	Undat	MAMFREL
76. Leonida Montcalub	Killing - Berona, Bulan, Sorsogon - 7 Feb 86	KEL	Brgy Captain
77. Melchor Abampon	Killing - Tubod, Minglanilla, Cebu - 8 Feb 86	Undat	Brgy Captain
78. Wenceslao Gezonzon	- do -	UNIDO	Civilian
79. Unidentified	Killing - Danais, Botolan, Zambales - 26 Jan 86	UNIDO	Civilian

..	..	Killing - Cebu, in da Ceb City - 4	Civilian
..	..	Killing - Gen Santos City, South 8 Feb 86	Election
..	..	Killing - Ugarte Field, Makati - 11	Civilian
..	..	Killing - Malabon, Metro Manila - 11	Civilian
34.	Lt-Gov Evelio Javier	Killing - San Jose, Antique - 11 Feb 86	Civilian
35.	Francisco Lurillo	Killing - Diffun, Quirino - 10 Feb 86	Civilian
36.	Fernando Pastor Jr	Killing - Diffun, Quirino - 10 Feb 86	Civilian
37.	Narciso Cainglet	Killing - Moncada, Tarlac - 13 Feb 86	Civilian
28.	Melanie Dumapiz	Beheaded - Diffun, Quirino - unspecified	Civilian
89.	Marilyn Bognis	-do-	Civilian
90.	Marilyn Sanggaon	-do-	Civilian
91.			

RECAPITULATION OF ELECTION RELATED INCIDENTS AND CASUALTIES

FOR PERIOD FROM 06 DEC 85 TO 183000 Feb '86 (BY REGION)

REGION	NR OF INCIDENTS	GOVT ARMED SVCS CASUALTIES				SUB TOTAL	CIVILIAN CASUALTIES				SUB TOTAL	ENEMY CASUALTIES			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL	
		INP	PC	OTHER AFP	CHDF		ELECTION OFFICIALS	OTHER GOV OFFICIALS	KBL	UNIDO		STa	MNLF	CTHRS			
NCR	70								3	6	7	7			7	13	
1	7								2	2	1	3			3		
2	17	2				2			3	4	7	8	11		13		
3	41			1	1				3	4	6	10	13	11	14	11	
4	18								1		1	2	5	1	5		
5	62			1					1	3	5	3	6	10	10	12	
6	26	2				1			1	2	2	5	6	1	6	1	
7	10								2	1			2		2		
8	19	1	2			2			2	2			2		4	4	
9	17		2			1			4	7		2	2		13	2	
10	9								2	2		3	5		5		
11	25	1	2	1	3	1	6	1	1	4		3	4	5	2	10	
12	7								1	2		2	2		3		
TOTAL	328	5	3	3	2	5	3	10	11	24	56	53	36	79	2	91	46

PREVIOUS ELECTION YEARS TOTAL

1984	7	5	23	17	42	5	10	77	49	4	1	-	5	1	-	44	10	53	21	24	-	-	130	7
1981	19	5	22	9	18	14	14	8	79	36	-	-	-	-	-	29	19	29	19	-	-	-	106	5
1980	1	13	-	1	-	2	-	3	14	2	-	-	3	6	-	63	388	63	396	-	-	-	59	41

Noted by: COL PEDRO M YANES MNSA (PC)

Recorded by: CAPT JOSE MARCELO PC

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RECAPITULATION BY NATURE OF INCIDENTS
BY REGION AS OF 180800 Feb 86

N I S	NCR	R E G I O N												TOTAL	COMPARATIVE TOTALS		
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12		1980	1981	1984
S NATCHING	A	5	9	2	35	9			5	2	1	10	2	84	16*	83	763
ROBES			1		2	2			5	2	2	4		18	-	23	19
TS/TREATS	40	2	2	11	7	6	6	3	2	2	2			81	129	31	66
INJ	1	1			1		1				2			6	-	5	2
SHOOTING	2		1	1					2				6	25	-	3	
DIS		1	1	1								1		1	4	2	
ILLEGAL FIREARMS	4	1	2	5	9	2	8	5	2	3	5	2	5	53	8	24	30
WORKS ON PLACE	11	2		6	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	30	-	-	-
OF ELECTION	1					1	1							6	1	6	6
5	7	1	3	3	3	6	1	2	5		2	1	2	34	-	2	27
A L	70	1	7	17	41	18	62	26	10	19	17	9	25	328	100	173	918

* INCLUDES SNATCHING OF ELECTION MATERIALS

** INCLUDES AS HARASSMENT

 Score for today Running total starting first month (FROM 6 DEC 85 TO DATE)

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melchor p. aquino

The Lugar mission

SENATOR Richard Lugar, chairman of the potent US Senate committee on foreign relations, is due shortly at the head of a big delegation to observe the presidential election.

According to a Reuter dispatch from Washington, the Philippine government "had made the visit conditional on an official nomination by President Reagan."

The same Reuter story has it that President Reagan gave the green light to Senator Lugar to lead an "official US delegation" to the Philippines to observe next Friday's election.

The Lugar mission is, unfortunately, freighted with a fixed bias and a captious attitude. By his own confession, several members of his own committee "have strong doubts as to the political will of the Marcos government to allow a genuinely free and fair election." Also, Senator Lugar admits that he harbors "significant reservations about the present course of the campaign."

Curiously enough, protracted intervention in Philippine internal affairs has not yielded enough knowledge to enable Lugar and company to spell out the criteria for US observation of the presidential election. It is to be expected, in any event, that the oft-repeated standards of the

American news media will ultimately be adopted by the Lugar mission, formally or otherwise.

Those standards are themselves open to attack on the ground that they are American in concept and practice. It is axiomatic that, due to the different culture, norms, mores, and experience of the American people, US standards do not apply to the Philippine electoral system.

Senator Lugar has shown in public pronouncements that he is aware of the inherent problems that await his delegation. For instance, he told United Press International, "While the delegation may watch the election closely, there are clear limitations on its potential role. Only a few of the 90,000 voting places can be visited. Only a handful of the 20 million Filipino voters can be interviewed."

Lugar underscored the point that the presence of his delegation "should not be interpreted as a validation of the election process or its results."

Pertinent questions, previously raised here, bear repetition. If, indeed, Senator Lugar is aware of the limitations on the task of his delegation, why is the group coming at all? Is it to be assumed that, if the "election process" and "its results" jive with the precon-

ceived notions of the delegation, the group will consider them "valid"? Is it to be assumed, too, that, if the election results run counter to its expectations, the delegation will assail them as fraudulent?

William F. Buckley, the brilliant spokesman for the conservative wing of the Republican Party, recently wrote:

"The big debate about the Filipino engagement has begun not only there, but also in the United States. Jeane Kirkpatrick has written in her column that American purism is causing difficulty in viewing the Filipino election realistically.

"We are asking of (President) Marcos the kind of behavior we don't ask of other world leaders with whom we have normal relations, and this, notwithstanding that Marcos heads a government friendly to the United States, in a country so situated geopolitically as to be critical to American interests in the area."

"We very much hate to be naughty, but what useful purpose is to be served by the Lugar mission?"

The coming of the Lugar group will cast a shadow on Philippine-American relations that may well lengthen and deepen in the years ahead.

1780

Times Journal
1/6/76

EDITORIAL

Let's bar these American meddlers

THERE seems to be no end to the visits here of Americans styling themselves as election experts to observe preparations for the Feb. 7 poll.

A report from Washington the other day said a team of "independent observers" is now on its way to Manila "to assess the prospects" for next month's poll "being free and fair" and which assessment will determine whether or not the US Congress will send a congressional delegation to monitor the conduct of the election.

Republican Sen. Richard Lugar, chairman of the Senate foreign relations committee, was quoted as saying in a press conference that, based on the report of the first team the committee sent here, there are many unsettled issues and factors, including the potential role of the military in the election process. Before that, John C. Monjo, US deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific affairs, has let it be known that the behavior of the military in the coming poll will be under close watch by Washington because "the observance of a politically impartial role by the Philippine military will be central to the integrity of the electoral process..."

The implication of Senator Lugar's statement is that if the Senate foreign relations committee receives a negative assessment from the latest American team, the US will not send a delegation. And if the US Congress does not send a delegation, it will mean that the election is not free and fair. And if the election is not free and fair, the US Congress, as many of its members - both Re-

publicans and Democrats - had been publicly announcing, will work to scuttle all aid to the Philippines.

Big Deal!

Since the start of the campaign, the ruling Kilusang Bagong Lipunan has not passed up any chance to tell its rabid partisans and rooters that the opposition is courting foreign intervention. KBL campaigners - sadly including those who are supposed to be among the few level-headed men in the political arena - have joined the chorus of those suggesting that foreign aid from the United States and West Germany, among other countries, has started pouring into opposition coffers. The charges may be true but the ruling party has yet to prove it.

Yet, while the KBL has been raising all these, none of its stalwarts has raised even as much as a squeak to call the party hierarchy's attention to this seemingly unending caravan of American officials coming here with one-announced and explicit intention - to observe preparations for the election, in simple terms, to meddle, to intervene, to dictate.

What the KBL officials have been good at so far has been to roll out the red carpet and pamper these so-called observers. Is this what they are going to do again with the latest emissaries from the Great White Father?

It is tragic, indeed, that while the ruling party is shouting itself hoarse accusing the opposition of welcoming foreign intervention, it is, in fact, the one doing it.

For crying out loud, what is this?



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
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CONFIDENTIAL

REGION	VOTING POPULATION	F.M. VOTES	PERCENT	C.A VOTES	PERCENT	DIFFERENCE
REGION I	2,003	1,539	76.83	464	23.17	1,075
REGION II	1,213	983	81.04	230	18.96	753
REGION III	2,684	1,375	51.23	1,309	48.77	66
REGION IV	3,434	1,542	44.90	1,892	55.10	(350)
REGION V	1,574	802	50.95	772	49.05	30
REGION VI	2,281	1,105	48.44	1,176	51.56	(71)
REGION VII	2,106	1,183	56.17	923	43.83	260
REGION VIII	1,334	858	64.32	476	35.68	382
REGION IX	1,341	870	64.88	471	35.12	399
REGION X	1,482	777	52.43	705	47.57	72
REGION XI	1,843	922	50.03	921	49.97	1
REGION XII	1,445	983	68.03	462	31.97	521
REGION NCR	4,060	1,320	32.51	2,740	67.49	(1,420)
NATIONAL TOTAL	26,800	14,259	53.21	12,541	46.79	1,718
	=====	=====	=====	=====	=====	=====

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ELECTION SURVEY
(As of February 1, 1986)
('000)

PROVINCE / CITY	VOTING POPULATION	F.M. VOTES	F.M. PERCENT	C.A VOTES	C.A PERCENT	DIFFERENCE
REGION I						
BAGUIO CITY	87	52	59.77	35	40.23	17
DAGUPAN CITY	56	39	69.64	17	30.36	22
SAN CARLOS CITY	49	39	79.59	10	20.41	29
ABRA	90	72	80.00	18	20.00	54
BENGUET	123	80	65.04	43	34.96	37
ILOCOS NORTE	242	230	95.04	12	4.96	218
ILOCOS SUR	254	229	90.16	25	9.84	204
LA UNION	269	215	79.93	54	20.07	161
MT. PROVINCE	46	32	69.57	14	30.43	18
PANGASINAN	787	551	70.01	236	29.99	315
REGIONAL TOTAL	2,003	1,539	76.83	464	23.17	1,075
REGION II						
BATANES	7	6	85.71	1	14.29	5
CAGAYAN	400	340	85.00	60	15.00	280
IFUGAO	54	32	59.26	22	40.74	10
ISABELA	466	373	80.04	93	19.96	280
KALINGA-APAYAO	99	89	89.90	10	10.10	79
NUEVA VIZCAYA	138	104	75.36	34	24.64	70
QUIRINO	49	39	79.59	10	20.41	29
REGIONAL TOTAL	1,213	983	81.04	230	18.96	753
REGION III						
ANGELES CITY	101	40	39.60	61	60.40	(21)
CLONGAPO CITY	113	90	79.65	23	20.35	67
BATAAN	199	100	50.25	99	49.75	1
BULACAN	663	298	44.95	365	55.05	(67)
NUEVA ECIJA	583	350	60.03	233	39.97	117
PAMPANGA	490	196	40.00	294	60.00	(98)
TARLAC	368	184	50.00	184	50.00	0
ZAMBALES	167	117	70.06	50	29.94	67
REGIONAL TOTAL	2,684	1,375	51.23	1,309	48.77	66
REGION IV						
BATANGAS CITY	83	33	39.76	50	60.24	(17)
CAVITE CITY	58	23	39.66	35	60.34	(12)

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LIPA CITY	69	28	40.58	41	59.42	(13)
LUCENA CITY	64	26	40.63	38	59.38	(12)
PUERTO PRINCESA CITY	41	16	39.02	25	60.98	(9)
SAN PABLO CITY	81	32	39.51	49	60.49	(17)
AURORA	53	32	60.38	21	39.62	11
BATANGAS	506	202	39.92	304	60.08	(102)
CAVITE	380	228	60.00	152	40.00	76
LAGUNA	532	213	40.04	319	59.96	(106)
MARINDUQUE	93	74	79.57	19	20.43	55
MINDORO OCCIDENTAL	115	69	60.00	46	40.00	23
MINDORO ORIENTAL	218	109	50.00	109	50.00	0
PALAWAN	166	66	39.76	100	60.24	(34)
QUEZON	494	198	40.08	296	59.92	(98)
RIZAL	392	157	40.05	235	59.95	(78)
ROMBLON	89	36	40.45	53	59.55	(17)
REGIONAL TOTAL	3,434	1,542	44.90	1,892	55.10	(350)
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REGION V

RIGA CITY	33	13	39.39	20	60.61	(7)
EGASPI CITY	53	27	50.94	26	49.06	1
AGA CITY	51	20	39.22	31	60.78	(11)
LBAY	308	154	50.00	154	50.00	0
AMARINES NORTE	150	75	50.00	75	50.00	0
AMARINES SUR	434	174	40.09	260	59.91	(86)
ATANDUANES	77	58	75.32	19	24.68	39
ASBATE	251	151	60.16	100	39.84	51
ORSOGON	217	130	59.91	87	40.09	43
REGIONAL TOTAL	1,574	802	50.95	772	49.05	30
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REGION VI

ACOLOD CITY	165	66	40.00	99	60.00	(33)
AGO CITY	45	25	55.56	20	44.44	5
ADIZ CITY	49	44	89.80	5	10.20	39
BOILO CITY	153	61	39.87	92	60.13	(31)
A CARLOTA CITY	25	18	72.00	7	28.00	11
DXAS CITY	46	18	39.13	28	60.87	(10)
AN CARLOS CITY	40	24	60.00	16	40.00	8
ILAY CITY	43	26	60.47	17	39.53	9
KLAN	165	83	50.30	82	49.70	1
NTIQUE	179	107	59.78	72	40.22	35
APIZ	188	75	39.89	113	60.11	(38)
BOILO	618	247	39.97	371	60.03	(124)
CGRS OCCIDENTAL	565	311	55.04	254	44.96	57
REGIONAL TOTAL	2,281	1,105	48.44	1,176	51.56	(71)
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REGION VII

CEBU CITY	322	113	35.09	209	64.91	(96)
DANAQ CITY	64	58	90.63	6	9.38	52
DUMAGUETE CITY	41	25	60.98	16	39.02	9
LAPU-LAPU CITY	55	22	40.00	33	60.00	(11)
MANDAUE CITY	74	15	20.27	59	79.73	(44)
TAGBILARAN CITY	.26	16	61.54	10	38.46	6
TOLEDO CITY	49	29	59.18	20	40.82	9
BOHOL	400	260	65.00	140	35.00	120
CEBU	656	394	60.06	262	39.94	132
NEGROS ORIENTAL	380	228	60.00	152	40.00	76
SIQUIJOR	39	23	58.97	16	41.03	7
REGIONAL TOTAL	2,106	1,183	56.17	923	43.83	260
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REGION VIII

CALBAYOG CITY	53	42	79.25	11	20.75	31
ORMOC CITY	56	34	60.71	22	39.29	12
TACLOBAN CITY	60	33	55.00	27	45.00	6
EASTERN SAMAR	131	79	60.31	52	39.69	27
LEYTE	545	354	64.95	191	35.05	163
NORTHERN SAMAR	169	110	65.09	59	34.91	51
SOUTHERN LEYTE	146	102	69.86	44	30.14	58
WESTERN SAMAR	174	104	59.77	70	40.23	34
REGIONAL TOTAL	1,334	858	64.32	476	35.68	382
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REGION IX

ZAMBOANGA CITY	196	98	50.00	98	50.00	0
BASILAN	98	59	60.20	39	39.80	20
SULU	244	171	70.08	73	29.92	98
TAWI-TAWI	87	70	80.46	17	19.54	53
ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE	289	173	59.86	116	40.14	57
ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR	427	299	70.02	128	29.98	171
REGIONAL TOTAL	1,341	870	64.88	471	35.12	399
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REGION X

BUTUAN CITY	103	62	60.19	41	39.81	21
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY	159	32	20.13	127	79.87	(95)
OROQUIETA CITY	26	18	69.23	8	30.77	10
OZAMIS CITY	48	34	70.83	14	29.17	20
SURIGAO CITY	48	26	54.17	22	45.83	4
TANGUB CITY	19	10	52.63	9	47.37	1
AGUSAN DEL NORTE	105	63	60.00	42	40.00	21
AGUSAN DEL SUR	148	89	60.14	59	39.86	30

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BUKIDNON	329	197	59.88	132	40.12	65
CAMIGUIN	32	22	68.75	10	31.25	12
MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL	120	84	70.00	36	30.00	48
MISAMIS ORIENTAL	198	59	29.80	139	70.20	(80)
SURIGAO DEL NORTE	147	81	55.10	66	44.90	15
REGIONAL TOTAL	1,482	777	52.43	705	47.57	72

REGION XI

DAVAO CITY	376	188	50.00	188	50.00	0
GEN. SANTOS CITY	92	37	40.22	55	59.78	(18)
DAVAO DEL NORTE	439	241	54.90	198	45.10	43
DAVAO DEL SUR	258	129	50.00	129	50.00	0
DAVAO ORIENTAL	178	98	55.06	80	44.94	18
SOUTH COTABATO	306	122	39.87	184	60.13	(62)
SURIGAO DEL SUR	194	107	55.15	87	44.85	20
REGIONAL TOTAL	1,843	922	50.03	921	49.97	1

REGION XII

COTABATO CITY	51	36	70.59	15	29.41	21
ILIGAN CITY	101	51	50.50	50	49.50	1
MARAWI CITY	40	20	50.00	20	50.00	0
LANAO DEL NORTE	194	155	79.90	39	20.10	116
LANAO DEL SUR	249	199	79.92	50	20.08	149
MAGUINDANAO	355	249	70.14	106	29.86	143
NORTH COTABATO	303	182	60.07	121	39.93	61
SULTAN KUDARAT	152	91	59.87	61	40.13	30
REGIONAL TOTAL	1,445	983	68.03	462	31.97	521

REGION NCR

CITY OF MANILA	1,082	325	30.04	757	69.96	(432)
PASAY CITY	216	86	39.81	130	60.19	(44)
QUEZON CITY	878	263	29.95	615	70.05	(352)
LAS PINAS	123	37	30.08	86	69.92	(49)
MAKATI	358	179	50.00	179	50.00	0
MALABON	141	42	29.79	99	70.21	(57)
MANDALUYONG	151	45	29.80	106	70.20	(61)
MARIKINA	151	45	29.80	106	70.20	(61)
MUNTINLUPA	126	38	30.16	88	69.84	(50)
NAVOTAS	104	31	29.81	73	70.19	(42)
PARANAQUE	166	50	30.12	116	69.88	(66)
PASIG	183	55	30.05	128	69.95	(73)
PATEROS	25	8	32.00	17	68.00	(9)
SAN JUAN	96	38	39.58	58	60.42	(20)
TAGUIG	104	31	29.81	73	70.19	(42)

VALENZUELA	156	47	30.13	109	69.87	(62)
REGIONAL TOTAL	4,060	1,320	32.51	2,740	67.49	(1,420)
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NATIONAL TOTAL	26,800	14,259	53.21	12,541	46.79	1,718
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STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENTIAL DELEGATION

We have spent the past five days in the Philippines observing the presidential election process. President Marcos requested President Reagan to send an official delegation, after which President Reagan requested us, a bipartisan group of congressional leaders and private citizens, to observe the election.

Since arriving, we have met several times with the government's electoral officials of COMELEC and with the leaders of COMELEC's citizen arm, the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL). During the voting itself and the early vote counting period, the delegation divided into eight teams, each headed by a member of Congress. The groups traveled throughout the Philippines, visiting dozens of villages, towns, and cities to observe voting and counting in hundreds of precincts. We talked to many participating citizens as well as election officials, representatives of the candidates, and local COMELEC and NAMFREL leaders.

We have observed the passionate commitment of Filipinos to democracy, and we applaud that commitment. In the weeks preceding the election, the people of the Philippines have been involved in a vigorous campaign characterized by lively debate, active campaigning throughout the country, and the mobilization of NAMFREL to monitor the election. The enormous crowds drawn by the candidates and the zeal displayed by the Filipino electorate would be the envy of politicians in our own country.

We saw thousands of people standing in line patiently, often for hours, waiting to vote. From northern Luzon to southern Mindanao, we have observed dedicated people, inspired and motivated by their faith in democracy. Moreover, we have seen concrete examples, both in voting and counting ballots, of success in the administration of the electoral process.

Sadly, however, we have witnessed and heard disturbing reports of efforts to undermine the integrity of that process, both during the voting and vote counting process which is still underway. Even within the last twenty-four hours, serious charges have been made in regard to the tabulation system.

The count is at a critical moment. We share the concern, expressed to us both by government election officials and citizen monitors, that the remainder of the COMELEC and NAMFREL Quick Count Operations proceed to a credible conclusion without further delay. We join all Filipinos of good will in deplored all incidents of election related violence and intimidation.

The process of counting and certifying the results of this election continues. Our mission as observers also continues.

We leave the Philippines today to deliver an interim report to President Reagan. Our final report will include information provided by those who will continue to observe on our behalf the remainder of the current electoral process. Our observation of this election is by no means completed. We have directed teams from the U.S. Embassy, congressional staff, and the Center for Democracy to monitor closely the efforts by COMELEC and NAMFREL to bring their electoral Quick Counts to a rapid and credible conclusion. We will be receiving and evaluating their findings for our final report. It is our hope that, in the days ahead, the current divergence between the two electoral Quick Count tallies will give way to a uniform electoral result that is broadly accepted by the Filipino people.

Each of us takes back to the United States individual memories and a common prayer. Our memories are those meetings with many Filipinos, meetings which have evidenced the strong and historic bonds of friendship between our peoples. Our prayer is that this election process will end soon with the people of the Philippines reconciled through the triumph of the democratic process.

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