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UNITED STATES FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES
HEADQUARTERS
ANG MGA MAHARLIKA
Camp Spencer, Luna, La Union

APO 70
18 December 1945

Subject : Tracer of Headquarters Roster

To : The Guerrilla Affairs Section, AFWESPA APO 707
Thru Headquarters, Philippine Army APO 501

1. On 18 August 1945 the roster of the Headquarters of the ANG MGA MAHARLIKA was submitted to that Office through the Luzon Area Command and The Adjutant General, Philippine Army.

2. Inquiries directed to that office as well as to Headquarters Philippine Army and the 86th Division brought the information that neither the letter of transmittal nor the roster of the Headquarters of ANG MGA MAHARLIKA could be located in any of these offices.

3. Five copies of this roster formerly submitted on 18 August 1945 are herein enclosed with a repetition of the same request that this roster be approved.

4. The East Pangasinan Unit of the ANG MGA MAHARLIKA as well as the Special Intelligence Unit had been recognized by AFWESPA but the personnel of the Headquarters of these units have never been recognized to date.

5. The following information is submitted :

a- This organization has been in operation since 1 December 1942. Intelligence and unit reports were submitted to GHQ SWPA as early as 1943 through Colonel Wendell W. FERTIG, Commanding Officer of the 10th Military District. As proof of this, hereto attached is a photostatic copy of the letter of acknowledgment of one of our intelligence reports dated 16 December 1943 from Colonel Wendell W. FERTIG (See Appendix "1").

b- In the compilation entitled "The History of the Resistance Movement in the Philippines" issued by G-2 GHQ SWPA, Ang Mga Maharlika was lengthily treated on and its staff officers listed as well as its activities outlined.

c- On 28 January 1945, a map of detailed enemy defense

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installations in the City of Manila was dispatched from the headquarters of this organization. It was ordered to be delivered to the 37th Division column which was then racing towards Manila. The four couriers bearing the map slipped through the enemy lines around the city and proceeded to the American column. The first American unit contacted was the 2nd Platoon, "E" Co., 2nd Bn., 149th Inf., 37th Div. under Lt. Kankansky. After verification of identity, the map submitted by the couriers was accepted and transmitted to the G-2 Section. Lt. Kankansky commented to the officers of the Maharlika later that the American troops entering Manila utilized duplicate copies of the map submitted by our men. It was the first map submitted designating enemy defenses in Manila in detail.

d- On 3 February 1945, elements of the 1st Cavalry, USA entered Malacañan Palace. On 4 February 1945, scouts of the Maharlika unit operating on the north bank of the Pasig River contacted Capt. Hickerman, 8th Mech. Reg., 1st Cav. USA. The men were identified and attached to this American unit. Intelligence was submitted and the men used for patrolling until the operations in Manila were over.

e- On 31 May 1945, Ang Mga Maharlika was attached and placed under the control of the 5th Cavalry Regiment by order of the Regimental Commander pursuant to authority contained in letter of Headquarters, 6th Army, subject : "Procurement, recognition, use, supply and disposition of guerrilla units" dated 3 May 1945. Attached hereto is a true copy of said attachment order (See Appendix "2").

f- The East Pangasinan Unit was attached to the 32d Infantry Division and according to report of Lieutenant Colonel H.E. SMITH to the Commanding General, 32d Infantry Division, it was the best unit attached to the 128th Infantry. On 11 February 1945, it was duly recognized.

g- The Special Intelligence Section was attached to the G-2 25th Infantry Division and was also subsequently recognized.


h- Some of the men of headquarters Ang Mga Maharlika were attached to the 544th Field Artillery Battalion and served honorably in the fighting most especially in the Marquina-Antipolo Sector. The Commanding Officer of the 544th FA Bn, Captain Elgar A. ST JOHN, certified to this in a letter to Headquarters Philippine Army dated 6 September 1945 (See Appendix "3").

6. As I stated in my letter of transmittal dated 18 August 1945, a grave injustice have been committed against the Headquarters personnel of the ANG MGA MAHARLIKA because while the men listed down in the approved roster of the East Pangasinan Unit

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and the Special Intelligence Section had been granted their guerrilla ranks the Headquarters of Ang Mga Maharlika which had planned and initiated the organization as well as the activities of the recognized units of this guerrilla organization and have served since the start of operations in 1942 have not been credited with their proper ranks. Since it is believed that this has been due to a mere oversight, rectification of the mistake is earnestly requested as early as possible.


Ferdinand E. Marcos
Major, Infantry, PA
Commanding

Incls- 5 copies of roster of
Headquarters, ANG MGA MAHARLIKA ;
Appendices 1 - 3.

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"ANG MGA MAHARLIKA" - ITS HISTORY IN BRIEF

I. ORGANIZATION

a. Introduction

"Ang Mga Maharlika" was spawned from the dragging pain and ignominy of the "Death March" and the filth and disease of Concentration Camp in Capas. In this interim when the Prisoners-of-War suffered the greater mental pain of half wishing death but still hoping once more "to hold a gun again", grew such hatred for the enemy as could be quenched with his blood alone.

Among those whom the Japanese flogged in the summer sun on the road from Bataan to Pampanga were Major Simeon M. Valdez and then Captain Ferdinand E. Marcos. There was not much strength nor opportunity for talk but on those few occasions when their eyes met, over and above the look of pain was the fierce and vehement whisper "never, never to forget this." These two crawled to Capas after several unsuccessful attempts to escape. And there they vowed that whomsoever should come out of that festering hole of lingering death should devote himself to the work of vengeance. Several other officers were gathered around them and sworn into the same oath. Capt. Aurelio Lucero, Adjutant General of the 21st Division, Capt. Celestino C. Juan of the 1st Regular Division, Capt. Demetrio P. Tabije of the 11th Division, Lt. Pedro Bartolome of the Philippine Army Air Corps, Lt. Dante Q. Nagtalon of the 2nd Regular Division, Lt. Magno Topacio of the Intelligence Division, Lt. Juan F. Echiverri of the 71st Division, and Lt. Ricardo D. Galano of the 91st Division, were all agreed on devoting their life to the cause. So, without the formality of written documents, which at the time were not only a superfluity but also sources of danger, these men formed the nucleus of the group which agreed to band together and by all ways possible fight the enemy.

After his supposed release from Capas, on 4 August 1942, then Capt. Ferdinand E. Marcos was taken to Fort Santiago, the headquarters of the dreaded Japanese Kempei Tai. After a week's course of the usual Fort

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Santiago technique of persuasion, he was brought to Tayabas province to identify a sailboat with an auxiliary motor supposed to have been bound for Australia. Within twenty-four hours, he escaped from his guards.

Major Simeon M. Valdez was rounded up with most of the higher-ranking officers then in Capas and transferred to Camp Dau for further rejuvenation and spiritual training. After the period of training, he was slated for whichever he choosed of the puppet Bureau of Constabulary, the Defense Corps or any technical post in the puppet government of the Philippines. He preferred to feign illness and after much investigation by the Japanese he was released as sick.

On October of 1942, hopes for the return of the American Forces were very low. Even the American prisoners-of-war had been heard to curse the United States Army for not coming around to succor the beleaguered forces in Bataan and Corregidor. The Japanese were at the height of their successes and were driving southward. Their propaganda machine circulated the news of continued victories in battle, of the southward sweep of their forces, the supposed near-capture of Australia and the attacks on the American mainland itself. The morale of the Filipino people was low and that of the enemy very high. The spies of the enemy were vigilant, well paid and powerful. The merest suspicion of the possession of thoughts antagonistic to the doctrine of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere were sufficient to cost one's life. The tortures in Fort Santiago and other Kempei Tai Headquarters were proverbial. The tales of horror in the city and the provinces were a thousand. It was in this unhospitable environment that the Maharlika was formally organized.

b. Formal organization

The papers documenting the organization of the Maharlika were actually drawn up as of 1 December 1942 although the groupd had been functioning as such since the release of the different initial members from concentration. The roster was made, although many of the members insisted in the inclusion of their aliases instead of their true names.

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c. Officers

Commanding Officer - Captain Ferdinand E. Marcos was made the leader of this group. In view of the fact that some officers under him held majorships he assumed this rank as of that date. These officers who ranked him insisted upon this procedure and set-up. Captain Ferdinand E. Marcos could not refuse.

Captain Ferdinand E. Marcos had been the Combat Intelligence Officer of the 21st Division, USAFFE until the surrender in Bataan. As such, he had won the Distinguished Service Cross for having attacked with three men, an infiltrating column of not less than a battalion of Japanese which had attacked the Divisions in Reserve (the 21st, 31st and elements of the 51st Divisions) in the town of Balanga, personally blowing up an enemy artillery ammunition dump, destroying four battalion guns and killing in combat no less than six officers and more than twenty enlisted men; the Silver Star for outstanding gallantry in action for having led a counter-attack on a much more superior enemy force driving away such enemy force from the Outpost Line of Resistance of the 21st Division; the Order of the Purple Heart for having been wounded by enemy mortar fire while leading a patrol to save the life of the 21st Division Commanding General, Brigadier General Mateo Capinpin. He was a lawyer, graduating from the College of Law, University of the Philippines with honors and topping the bar examinations for lawyers in 1939. He was well-known throughout the Philippines specially in Manila and the Ilocos provinces not only as a lawyer but as one of the best shots of the country.

Staff Officers - Major Simeon M. Valdez was both Executive Officer and Coordinator of Intelligence. Capt. Aurelio Lucero was Adjutant, Lt.ante Q. Nagtalon was Plans and Operations Officer, and Lt. Juan Cabanos Supply Officer. Lt. Fortunato Guzman Jr. was Assistant Coordinator of Intelligence. Lt. Angel Limjoco Jr was Assistant Plans and Operations Officer and Lt. Jesus de la Paz, Assistant Supply Officer.

Major Simeon M. Valdez was a regular officer of the Philippine Army who had seen seven years service in uniform. He was the Assistant

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Chief of Staff, G-4 of the 11th Division, USAFFE, in the defense of the Philippines in 1941-1942. He too had been awarded the Silver Star in Bataan for outstanding gallantry in action against the Japanese.

The rest of the officers were all college graduates and professionals, holding commissions with the Philippine Army, and adept in the use of firearms.

As the work progressed, however, the problems of one section would be so pressing that all officers of the staff would pitch in it and help until they were solved.

d. Funds and Supplies

At the outset, the problem of funds and supplies was the stumbling block. All the officers of the group contributed all their assets to the organization but these still remained inadequate. There were few contributors to the group as yet because of the fear of the Kempei Tai by the civilian population and the requirement of secrecy which did not allow an open campaign for funds. It was decided that an ex-service men's association be organized ostensibly for the purpose of engaging purely in the commerce and trade of materials not connected whatsoever with the war purposes but actually to serve the double purpose of a front for a headquarters and a continuous source of revenue. It would engage in the manufacture of such goods like toothbrushes and other allied objects. Major Simeon M. Valdez was delegated to organize this company and actively run the business side of its activities. This he did, this association continuing to operate until the last month of 1944 when it was forcibly closed by the arrest of many of the members by the Kempei Tai and the rest hotly pursued.

It is believed that the Maharlika was the only guerrilla organization which attempted to finance its operations in this manner.

The Ex-Service Men's Company offices at Room 421 Regina Building, Escolta, Manila, ultimately turned into a rendezvous for the Maharlikas and liaison officers of other guerrilla units. Lt. Col. Leopoldo Guillermo of the Ramsey's Guerrillas and Lt. Jose de Mesa of Peralta's Panay Guerrillas had the misfortune of being apprehended in these offices during the mid-1944 arrests of Maharlika members.

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II. LIAISON WITH OTHER GUERRILLA GROUPS

a. The Thorpe Organization

At about this time, the rumors were persistent among the released war prisoners that a certain Col. Thorpe was organizing guerrillas in Tarlac and Nueva Ecija. He had sent some agents to the City of Manila with instructions to establish liaison with any other group of underground elements operating in the city. They were further instructed to obtain equipment and supplies with which a wireless transmitter and receiver could be assembled.

Accordingly, Lt. Fortunato Guzman Jr. of the Intelligence Section, Maharlikas, with the aid of his brothers-in-law, Capt. Antonio Quirimo and Lt. Fernando Lao, helped to organize the city group of the Thorpe organization. This group was placed under the command of a certain Col. Santos. The utmost secrecy was maintained. And as was usual among the underground men in those days, it was not considered ethical to ask too many questions about names, locations, modes of operations, headquarters, residences or other such pertinent data for any well-knit organization. The understanding was that the Maharlika should work with this organization, but that it should retain its own identity, liaison being maintained alone through then Capt. Ferdinand E. Marcos, Capt. Antonio Quirino and Lt. Fortunato Guzman Jr.

It was impressed upon everybody that the first priority among all activities was the procurement of intelligence. And that it was necessary to get as close to the sources of intelligence as possible. Thus it was that the order was issued for several of the Maharlika officers to seek employment with the Japanese Kempei Tai, with the puppet Constabulary and the puppet government. Maj. Simeon M. Valdez was the Coordinator of Intelligence as he was not yet wanted by the Japanese and he could move about with ease among the government officials. He organized an intelligence net which covered practically every part of

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the city and every phase of enemy activity. Reports were submitted and coordinated with Capt. Antonio Quirino.

The most difficult problem was the assembling and operation of a radio transmitter. Capt. Antonio Quirino and Lt. Fortunato Guzman, Jr. were engaged in obtaining spare parts and transporting them to the fish ponds of Bulacan where the wireless transmitter was finally assembled. But although they persisted in operating the transmitter, no contact could be established with any American Station.

Several short-wave receiving sets were however operating successfully and the news received circulated by mouth and by the underground newspaper.

The relations with the Thorpe Organization, however, did not last long, because before the end of the year, Col. Thorpe and Capt. Barker, his Executive Officer, were both captured by the enemy, and on January 1943, the Quirino Law Offices, the quarters of Col. Santos and other officers of the group were simultaneously raided by the Kempei Tai and a clean sweep made of almost the entire officer personnel of the organization.

b. The Markings

Next to intelligence work, elimination engrossed most of the men of the Mahalikas. The wounds of Bataan and Corregidor were still fresh. Capas and Dau were still prison camps. The bitterness of the released prisoners of war increased at every added insult heaped by the enemy upon the Filipino nation. The Japanese kept on murdering the men and abusing their women. So these soldiers from Bataan and Corregidor gave vent to their feelings with the weapons they knew and could use. Some had been able to escape with their pistols. Others had somehow or other been able to unearth other firearms. With these weapons, they hunted down the Japanese who had committed particularly heinous crimes against the Filipinos. For each criminal, lots would be drawn to determine the executioner. After the lots were drawn, the lucky one was left to his own devices. He had to report accomplishment only. Or he did not report at all.

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Sometime on the months of November and December, 1942, the officers and men performing these execution missions reported that on several occasions, their quarries had been followed by other hunters obviously prompted by the same design of vengeance. But the identity of the men bent on these similar missions could not be determined.

On the latter part of December, however, Sgt. Tony Kiernian, an American mestizo who was a member of Trigger Squad No. 1 which in turn was called The Hunters was following a Japanese who had participated in the rape of prominent Filipina society girl in the southern suburbs of Manila. When he observed another young and collegiate-looking boy of about eighteen definitely following his target. He was casually sauntering around the object of his hunt for the best angle from which to fire when he saw the young collegian nursing a pistol out of his hip pocket only a meter away from the Japanese. He saw the pistol blaze out and the Japanese crumple before he moved out of sight of the place which would soon be zonified and all persons within the immediate vicinity apprehended for investigation. But he observed where the young boy had darted after the shot and he followed him. The boy was trying to lose himself in the maze of alleys and back streets that abound in that part of the city. Sgt. Kiernian knew a short-cut and so waited for the strange young man at a corner after the short-cut. This almost resulted in another shooting, for the young man was quick to draw his firearm. But Sgt. Kiernian stopped him and identified himself. After some persuasion, the boy revealed that he belonged to the Marking's Guerrillas.

As far as could be gathered, the Marking's was operating from somewhere near Antipolo, Rizal, although it had men in the city. Through the people of the slums of San Nicolas and Tondo, it was discovered that the leader of the Marking's for the city was in Balic-balic. So a conference was arranged between Maj. Ferdinand E. Marcos and him. It turned out that they were cousins. There started a close coordination between the two groups for the city of Manila.

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Plans were drawn up for the operation of the two units in joint action not only within the city but in its environs. At that early date, it was planned that some sort of skeleton organization should be maintained in every province in Northern Luzon.

While there was no definite understanding about the nature of the relationship of the two units, there was close cooperation. There was no question of leadership nor any vying for honors for at the time, leadership was an onerous post and there were hardly any honors to divide. This was the period for the true testing of guerrillas and the determination of comradeship.

III. JANUARY TO MAY, 1943

At that early stage of enemy occupation, the belief was already established that it would be a long war and actual liberation might not take place until after several years. So all efforts were bent towards the attainment of the following aims:

1. The procurement of intelligence
2. The harrassing of the enemy without actually giving occasion for open combat or severe retaliation of the civilian population
3. The propagation of the technique of passive resistance among the greater bulk of the civilian population
4. The maintenance of the faith of the civilian population in the cause
5. The procurement of funds and equipment and supplies for the organization.

a. Intelligence

An intelligence net was spread over the entire island of Luzon. Because of the paucity of funds, a bare skeleton of an intelligence organization could be maintained. Every province had its Intelligence Chief with two pairs of agents coordinating work under him. At the start, no funds could be given the members of the Intelligence net, so that it was a policy to establish agents at their own native provinces in order that they could live on the country.

The office of the Coordinator of Intelligence had several groups

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ambulatory agents who were shuttled around the country as the need required. Most often, though, they were kept in the vicinity of the city of Manila. These men were grouped into three Intelligence Sections.

The first section was composed of:

Lt. Pedro Bartolome	- Leader
Lt. Juan F. Echiverri	- Asst. Leader
Sgt Pilar Ver	- Operative
Cpl Dothy Par	- "
Pfc Justo Bantug	- "
Pvt Gelacio Jose	- "
Pvt Benito Vergara	- "
Pvt Narciso Festin	- "
Pvt Jose de la Cruz	- "
Pvt Bonifacio Tan	- "

The second section was composed of:

Capt Demetrio Tabije	- Leader
Lt Ricardo D. Galano	- Asst. Leader
Cpl Dionisio Fabre	- Operative
Pfc Fermin Cruz	- "
Pvt Julio Estadillo	- "
Pvt Pete Caram	- "
Pvt Dennis Torio	- "
Pvt Bernardo Taking	- "
Pvt Josue Dencio	- "

The third intelligence section was composed of:

Capt Magno Topacio	- Leader
Lt Marcelino N. Sayo	- Asst Leader
Sgt Bill Orlino	- Operative
Cpl Joe Fenwick	- "
Pvt William Stanley	- "
Pvt Antonio Ebreo	- "
Pvt Juan Quineo	- "
Pvt Baby Dario	- "
Evt Fernando Wicks	- "
Pvt Fermin Sanchez	- "

There was a Special Intelligence Section which was dedicated to the task of obtaining intelligence of a political nature. The situation was such that the movements of the enemy were grooved with political developments. So, even as early as January 1942, it was believed necessary that some men deeply versed in the political affairs of the Philippines should be detailed to obtain and compile all the data of a political nature like the personalities aiding the Japanese in the propagation of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the men

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utilizing their offices in the puppet government for personal aggrandizement, men to whom the people looked up for leadership in those trying times, and such subjects. The man unanimously chosen to head this section was the former Congressman of the Fifth District of Pangasinan, Hon. Narciso Ramos.

The others who were chosen to help him in this work were:

Lt. Pio R. Marcos	- Asst Chief
Capt Celestino C. Juan	- Operative
Lt Marcelino N. Sayo	- Operative
Lt Juan F. Echiverri	- "
Lt Ricardo D. Galano	- "
Lt Pedro Bernardo	- "
Sgt Lawag Fonacier	- "
Pfc Antonio Francisco	- "

b. Elimination and Sabotage

In view of the inability of the underground elements in those days to challenge the enemy in open combat, efforts were exerted to limit all actions to such as would convince him that they were the disorganized and unsynchronized activities of those whom he facetiously called bandits. Thus, operations against enemy personnel were limited to the elimination of individual Japanese who were particularly obnoxious. These were the guards who had participated in the "Death March", those who had raped, murdered and looted in the entry into Manila, and members of the Kempei Tai. It was always ordered, however, that these missions should be accomplished with the least possible harm falling upon innocent civilians. Many of these executions were made to appear like robberies and simple hold-ups.

There had to be specialists in these particularly dangerous jobs of elimination. So there were what were called, "The Trigger Squads". While there were three squads of these men permanently working on this detail, the membership was fluid as in almost every line of activity of the organization.

The first Squad was called "The Hunters" and were composed of:

Lt Juan Navarro	- Leader
Lt Joe Castro	- Asst Leader
Sgt Tony Kiernian	- Trigger Man
Cpl Bernardo Sanchez	- Trigger Man

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The Second Squad was known as the "Night Clubbers" in view of their assignment to missions in and around these night spots. It was composed of:

Lt. Guillermo Salvador	- Leader
Lt. Inigo Ventura	- Asst. Leader
Sgt Pedro Naranja	- Trigger Man
Cpl Bonifacio Corte	- Trigger Man

The Third Squad was known as "The Rovers" and was composed of:

Lt. Fortunato Guzman Jr	- Leader
Lt. Jesus de la Paz	- Asst. Leader
Sgt Pete Cubas	- Trigger Man
Cpl Jose Santos	- Trigger Man

The harrassment against the enemy's installations and supplies was carried out by two Sabotage Sections operating in and around Manila. The first section was composed of:

Lt. Inigo Ventura	- Leader
Cpl Amaury Velez	- Asst Leader
Pfc Pedro Vergara	- Member
Pft Senen Fernandez	- "
Pvt Jose Bermudez	- "
Pvt Benito Pancho	- "
Pvt Fernando Belen	- "
Pvt Jesus Darat	- "

The second sabotage section was composed of:

Sgt Isidro Ventura	- Leader
Cpl Pedro Pimentel	- Asst Leader
Pfc John Carson	- Member
Pvt Enrique Casto	- "
Pvt Tomas Barrato	- "
Pvt Herminio Montes	- "
Pvt Ambrocio Fermin	- "
Pvt Domingo Ferrer	- "

At the early part of 1943, it was not yet advisable to engage in the outright demolition of communication lines, ammunition and supply dumps nor in the destruction of enemy equipment. The sabotage which could be engaged in was the pilfering of enemy supplies and equipment such as truck and automobile spare parts, communication wires, fuel, food, medicines and clothes. On rare occasions, firearms and ammunition were stolen.

It was only on the following year that the sabotage sections could be utilized effectively against the enemy. But 1943 served to

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train these men and to acquaint them with the possible targets of their activities.

c. Passive Resistance

No matter what ingenuous methods the enemy applied to win the Filipinos to their side, they could never succeed with the greater bulk of the people. Always, the common man held within himself a secret contempt for these supposed conquerors. There was a potential power in this smoldering hate for the Japanese. It would have been easy to stir this hatred into active manifestation. But it would have disastrously resulted for the civilian population.

So, it was considered more desirable to train the people in the more subtle art of passive resistance. By word of mouth, the campaign gained momentum. The Japanese must be won away from his efficiency and conscientiousness. He must be taught how to drink, how to fritter away his time in idleness and loose talk. He must be kept away from his work as much as possible. He must be made soft with the luxuries to which he was not used. Everything must be done to render him less a soldier than the samurai he claimed to be.

Then, should it not be possible to evade working for him, one should delay, delay and delay in his work. One must never show efficiency even in the puppet government. Inefficiency was the rule of the day.

Then, the campaign of the enemy for food production should not be helped to the extent of allowing excess food to fall into enemy hands. Enough and just enough food should be produced for the members of one's family and nothing more. If necessary, then the fields must be left idle. But by no means must the enemy be allowed to live on the fruits of Philippine soil.

The Maharlika was probably the first guerrilla group to engage in this form of underground activity which later gave handsome dividends in the form of unfinished Japanese military trails and bridges and inadequate military defenses. (As late as December 1944 the Japanese

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Engineers Corps themselves had to work on the trails connecting the Cagayan Valley with the western part of Luzon like the Villa-Verde Trail and the Bokod-Pinkian Trail as the Filipino laborers working therein had not finished the work). So too, did the Japanese go hungry as the rice fields had been left to lie fallow mostly, and the enemy did not receive the food supply which he had expected from Philippine soil.

d. The Faith of Civilians Maintained

The Maharlika kept a propaganda machine of its own. Its work consisted mainly in the publication and distribution of what was openly called the newspaper of the underground elements. This ambitious publication carried the news from the American war front as broadcast by American stations, articles about the Philippine Puppet Government and Puppet Officials, the latest activities of the Kempei Tai, and comments in general by its staff writers in which the Commanding Officer and the Staff Officers often kilitized on the efforts of the enemy to pacify the Islands. At this period of the enemy occupation, news about the true trend of the war was scarce due to the Japanese High Command's order prohibiting the operation of wireless receiving sets on the short wave band or the receipt of any radio broadcasts from any station other than the Japanese or Philippine stations operated by them, imposing severe penalties for any violation of the same.

Almost all the officers of the Maharlika at this period were operating or listening to radio broadcasts from American and English and other Allied stations. A continuous shift of stenographers took down the broadcasts and relayed the copies to waiting runners who rushed the news to the distributing centers. In time the "subscribers" to this newspaper became so used to the morning, afternoon and evening issues that any hitch in the operation was immediately noticed.

While the Filipino people did not require to be won to the cause, their flagging hopes had to be re-awakened and their interests in the

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activities of the underground harnessed for the success of the campaign for passive resistance.

e. Funds, Equipment and Supplies

While the initial members of the Maharlika were willing to devote all their resources and time to the organization, the problem of funds, equipment and supplies, presented itself from the very first day of operations. In view of the fact that the officers and men devoted almost all of their time to the underground activities, they practically had no opportunity to earn a livelihood. Much less was it possible to raise the wherewithal for operations. Prices were going up and the ambitious program set for the organization envisioned the need for a well devised system of finances. Major Simeon M. Valdez, therefore, organized the Finance Section. While its main purpose was to obtain voluntary contributions, it was also intended to study and exploit all possible sources of revenue. The organization of The Ex-Service Men's Corporation for trade and commerce, its profits to be devoted to the organization, was placed under the supervision of this section.

The most needed items of equipment were firearms and ammunitions. Except a few which were bought from civilians, there could hardly be obtained any equipment of this nature on the first month of 1943. However, the enemy was at that time attempting to recover and salvage the USAFFE firearms and other equipments abandoned in Bataan and Corregidor. They were utilizing the services of Filipino laborers in this work. After a few successful missions by Lieutenant Inigo Ventura to smuggle sidearms from Bataan to the city by posing as one of the laborers engaged by the Japanese in the salvage of USAFFE equipment, the smugglers' ring was organized to exploit the possibilities of these successes. The following constituted the "Smugglers' Ring":

1st Lt Inigo Ventura	- Leader
Sgt Isidro Ventura	- Asst Leader
Pvt Bertito Chan	- Member
Pvt Tony Dencio	- "
Pvt Quintin Serapio	- "
Pvt Julio Fulgencio	- "
Pvt Bernardo Biteng	- "
Pvt Johnny Sencio	- "

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The Smugglers' Ring operated with fair success suffering no casualties in the accomplishment of this mission.

All other classes of supplies needed by the organization were either bought in the market or stolen from the Japanese.

IV. JUNE TO DECEMBER 1943

In addition to the activities already outlined in the foregoing paragraphs, efforts were intensified in effecting liaison with the guerilla units operating in Southern Philippines. Rumors had been persistent about the operation of a wireless receiving and transmitting station in Panay as well as other islands of the Visayans and in some parts of Mindanao. These rumors were confirmed by then Lieut. Pacifico E. Marcos who arrived from Mindanao sometime in August 1943 with the news that the guerrillas in the different islands in the Visayas as well as in Mindanao seemed to be well organized and equipped.

Runners were immediately dispatched to the islands of Mindoro, Leyte, Cebu, Bohol, Negros, Panay and Mindanao. They returned with the information that at that time the Japanese were intensifying their mopping-up campaigns in these islands and some of the guerilla groups were disorganized by either the capture of the key men or continuous enemy raids. News were also brought about the incessant rivalry between guerilla groups operating in the same area.

On or about August, however, a Liaison Officer of Colonel Wendel W. Fertig, Dr. Montalban, arrived in the City of Manila with orders to locate the Maraging's Guerrillas. This Officer was contacted. The message of Col. Wendel W. Fertig to guerilla leaders in Luzon to the effect that an intelligence net should be organized under a unified leadership, was received. The Liaison Officer brought the information that the general impression of the Filipinos in Southern Philippines as well as GHQ, SWPA was that there was no organized underground movement in the island of Luzon. He relayed the desire of GHQ, SWPA for up-to-date and complete intelligence reports for Luzon especially the City of Manila.

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Most interesting of the ~~se~~ pieces of information was the news of undersea craft regularly plying between Mindanao and Australia. The message from Col. Fertig enthused the Maharlikas into greater efforts.

Sometime in October 1943, in a small banca which could slip through the enemy guards, Major Ferdinand E. Marcos in the company of then - ^{PQOG} Captain Primitivo San Agustin, then- Lieutenant Vicente Raval, and Captain Leonilo Ocampo, proceeded to Mindanao with the mission to contact the headquarters of Colonel Fertig and if possible to obtain funds and supplies with which to operate the intelligence net sought to be organized for the entire island of Luzon.

Then-Captain Primitivo San Agustin, Colonel Vicente Umali former Mayor of Tiaong, Tayabas, and an officer of the Marking's Guerillas had been organizing the President Quezon's Own Guerillas to operate in Tayabas, Leguna, Batangas and other surrounding provinces. Major Ferdinand E. Marcos had helped them.

Major Ferdinand E. Marcos insistent upon the maintenance of the ~~Maharlikas~~ as a separate unit was interested primarily in transmitting his intelligence reports to GHQ, SWPA. The intelligence data obtained by the Maharlikas since 1 December 1942 had been compiled and included all phases of enemy activity up to October, 1943. This data was embodied in an intelligence report to which was appended a separate report on the political situation of the country organized by the Special Intelligence Section of the Maharlikas with the aid of Mr. Modesto Farolan, formerly a newspaper man with the pre-war DMM publications. The intelligence report was submitted to the headquarters of Colonel Wendel W. Fertig and its receipt properly acknowledged. (Attached is a photostatic copy of the letter of acknowledgement signed by Colonel Wendel W. Fertig, dated 16 December 1943. This was one of the few documents still intact among the files of the Maharlikas which had been buried during the intensification of the Japanese mopping-up operations.)

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In a stop-over in Bohol the guerrilla commander for that island, Major Ingeniero, had suggested the location of possible submarine landing points in Luzon. This would solve our problem of supplies. Captain Fernando Castaneda who was operating as Liaison Officer of Major Villamor who was then in Negros seconded this suggestion and further suggested that intelligence reports be also submitted to Major Villamor. Accordingly, some intelligence reports were transmitted thru that channel.

At about this time, the question of the unification of the guerilla groups operating in the island of Luzon presented itself. The guerilla groups everywhere seemed to be engaged in suicidal strife. More efforts seemed to be spent by the guerilla leaders in the maintenance of their leadership and prestige than in underground work. The Mahalikas were willing to operate under the leadership of any man of integrity, preferably an American but even the American leaders themselves seemed to be engaged in jealousies and recriminations. The Ramsey and Anderson groups were vying for the leadership handed down by Col. Thorpe and Capt. Barker. The Lapham, Mackenzie and Volckmann outfits in the north seemed to be no less united. Cooperation with one always resulted in war with the others. It was, therefore, decided to keep the Mahalika independent from the rest of the guerrilla units but cooperating with all of them in all ways.

V. FIRST MONTHS OF 1944

a. Philippine Conditions

The news coming through our radio receivers were more and more becoming favorable. The American Liberation Forces were closing in on the Philippines.

Even the enemy realized this. The troop movements were very heavy and the Pacific coastal defenses were strengthened. Disembarkations in Manila were no less than three hundred thousand men routed northward on the Manila North Road and eastward on the road via Nueva

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Ecija, Nueva Vizcaya, Isabela and Cagayan. The following was an estimate of enemy strength at the time:

"I. ESTIMATE OF ENEMY STRENGTH

A. Personnel

Ilocos Norte -----	3,000
Ilocos Sur-----	5,000
Abra -----	1,000
La Union -----	10,000
Mt. Province -----	5,000
Baguio -----	15,000
Pangasinan -----	20,000
Pampanga-----	15,000
Zambales -----	200
Bataan -----	1,000
Bulacan-----	3,000
Rizal -----	5,000
Tarlac -----	15,000
Nueva Ecija -----	3,000
Nueva Vizcaya -----	5,000
Isabela -----	10,000
Cagayan -----	25,000
Tayabas -----	20,000
Manila -----	20,000
T O T A L	
	181,200"

But as the news became more inspiring, the living conditions for the Filipino civilian population worsened. Rice had gone up to as high as ₱1,200 a cavan. The prices of prime commodities accordingly rose.

b. Intensification of Kempei Tai Activities

And the Japanese became more vigilant and suspicious. In the first two months of this year there were no less than five raids on suspected headquarters of the Maharlitas and four on the quarters of its men. Among this was the raid on the headquarters at 944-B Padre Faura, Ermita, Manila, where Major Valdez was at the time maintaining contact with the key-men of the organization. Major Valdez had sought to maintain liaison with the original 14th Infantry Regiment, the old organization under Col. Guillermo Nakar, the leadership of which had fallen on Lt. Col. Manuel Enriquez who had been Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 of the 11th Division, USAFFE in which Major Valdez had been Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 up to the date of surrender in Bataan. And in so maintaining liaison

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with Lt. Col. Enriquez, he had joined several conferences in which that arch spy, Franco Vera Reyes, had been present. This was probably the cause of the suspicion of the movements of Major Valdez by the Japanese.

But whatever may have been the cause of the raid on 944-B Padre Faura, the city of Manila was for the moment unsafe for both Majors Simeon M. Valdez and Ferdinand E. Marcos who had been well known all over the Philippines and much more so in Manila even before the war. It was therefore decided that the files of the Maharlikas which had become quite voluminous be burned. Most of the papers were buried in the lot of 1555 Calixto Dyco, Paco, Manila. And from this time on, documentation of the activities of the Maharlikas was avoided.

c. Submarine Landing Points

In the trip to the Visayas and Mindanao while establishing communications with GHQ, SWPA, Major Ferdinand E. Marcos had been advised by the liaison officer of Major Jesus Villamor to locate submarine landing points in Luzon, preferably in northern Luzon. Acting upon this advice, Major Simeon M. Valdez proceeded to Ilocos Norte and Major Ferdinand E. Marcos proceeded to Zambales. These two provinces presented the most possible locations of submarine contact points.

Before this, Major Valdez had maintained contact with the Ablan Guerillas in Ilocos Norte and the surrounding provinces through a certain Lt. Vicente Reyes and Mrs. Ablan. Lt. Reyes had been sent by Major Valdez to Mindoro to obtain funds and equipment for the Ablan Guerillas and to establish liaison with the American officer who was supposed to have established his headquarters in the island. Lt. Reyes was successful in his mission and had brought back some funds and information. But the Kempei Tai had come upon his companion in the second trip to Mindoro and after a few days of torture the latter had revealed the identity and residence of

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Lt. Reyes. That wrote a finish to the activities of this worthy.

However, the liaison with the Ablan Guerillas had been initiated and was maintained.

It was believed that the Ilocos coast along Pasuquin and Bangui, Ilocos Norte was best suited for our purposes. As it turned out later, Lt. Jose Valera and other companions of the reconnaissance units from Australia did land in Bangui, Ilocos Norte.

The men of Governor Ablan had been partially disbanded during the intensive mopping-up operations conducted by the Japanese during the latter part of 1943. Major Simeon M. Valdez then started the organization of the Ilocos Norte Chapter of the Maharlikas. Some of the men of the Ablan Guerillas were taken into this unit.

Major Valdez then proceeded to Ilocos Norte to strengthen the unit that had been organized there, bringing with him samples of the latest magazines that had arrived from the Visayans and Mindanao, and some samples as well of carbine ammunition and hand grenades.

Major Ferdinand E. Marcos decided to proceed to Zambales upon the suggestion of Lt. Ernesto Verzosa who reported that the garrisons on the Zambales coast had been diminished. The coast along the town of San Antonio seemed to be the most acceptable point for a submarine landing. Close to the coast were the Capones islands on which the United States Navy had maintained a lighthouse before the start of the war but which the Japanese had not seen fit to reestablish. This grooved with our conclusion from the intelligence reports of our agents that the Japanese were fortifying the Pacific coast for American landings and were leaving the China coast practically defenseless except along the Lingayen Gulf. Very much later, on 26 July 1944, one of our intelligence reports coursed through Colonel Macario Peralta of Panay carried this information:

"The enemy is concentrating his defenses on the Pacific coast of Luzon. The garrisons in Zambales abandoned the province save for two hundred men constituted by the MP and personnel of the Naval Station at Olongapo."

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The veracity of this report was proved when the American Liberating Force landed on the exact spot of San Antonio, Zambales and met no resistance whatsoever.

Major Ferdinand E. Marcos sought to determine the feasibility of a submarine landing along this coast. After assuring himself that the situation of the enemy and the geographical and physiological characteristics of the land permitted a submarine landing, he reported San Antonio, Zambales as a possible reception center for materiel and equipment through Col. Macario Peralta of Panay.

d. The Manila Unit

With the departure of Majors Ferdinand E. Marcos and Simeon M. Valdez from the city of Manila, Captain Pacifico E. Marcos was placed in command of the headquarters and 1st Lt. Bonifacio Ysip Jr. made the commanding officer of the combat unit which was organized in view of the felt approaching need of combat troops. The finances were handled by two officers, Lts. Juan Gabanos and Eladio Adriano.

The Ex-Service Men's Company was actively run by Lt. Ricardo D. Galano. Funds continued to be drawn from its profits.

The activities of the units as outlined in preceding pages continued notwithstanding the intensification of Kempei Tai reprisals, although the measures of security adopted were strengthened. The different cells constituting the intelligence groups were broken up and new pairs selected, the identity of each secured from discovery by other members. In view of the discovery of many incriminating documents against many guerrilla groups which had buried their records, the file of the Maharlika was dug up and the rosters as originally drawn up were burned.

e. Pangasinan Units.

Pangasinan, in view of the importance of Lingayen Gulf had two units, the Special Intelligence Unit and the East Pangasinan Combat Unit. The first was directly under Capt. Cipriano Allas and the second under Capt. Corrales. These two men had formerly been under

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Major Cushing, but upon the capture of the latter they had sought attachment to other groups. They were brought into the Maharlikas by Major Narciso Ramos the leader of the Headquarters Intelligence Section who is from Pangasinan.

f. The Ilocos Norte Regiment

After the first trip of Major Simeon M. Valdez to Ilocos Norte on or about the first month of 1944, he broached the idea of a regiment in Ilocos Norte. At that time, there was no well organized unit in that province. There were remnants of the Ablan Guerrillas still engaged in propaganda work but there was need for starting the coordination of all the good intentions of the people of that section of the country. At about this time, the influence of Col. Volckman's outfit did not as yet reach Ilocos Norte.

The staff officers of the regiment formally organized on April of that year were:

Major Simeon M. Valdez, Regimental Commander
Captain Gaudencio Sillona, PS, Executive Officer and S-3
Lt. Celestino Layaoen, S-1
Lt. Vicente Castro, S-2
Lt. Miguel Quiacuit, S-4
Captain Juan Asuncion, Regimental Surgeon
Captain Leon Verano, Public Relations Officer

The other officers were either professionals, Philippine Military Academy graduates or ex-USAFTE men.

This organization was depending for arms primarily on the promised submarine landings and the equipment to be captured from or surrendered by the puppet constabulary.

g. Liaison Work

After the trip of Major Ferdinand E. Marcos from Mindanao, liaison had immediately been established with General Manuel Roxas and General Mateo Capinpin. General Roxas and General Capinpin were the only general officers who were willing to give advice to the guerrilla organizations, as far as the Maharlikas knew. They counselled the conservation of strength, never to give the Japanese any cause for brutal reprisals against the civilian population, never to surrender any firearms, and

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always to keep ready with information and aid when the American Landing Force should arrive. They gave suggestions as to organizational work, methods for obtaining intelligence and directly contributed to the funds of the Maharlikas.

At this stage, the only guerilla organization with which the Maharlikas were actively cooperating was the Ramseys Guerrillas otherwise known as the East Central Luzon Guerrilla Force. Coordination came about through their Intelligence Officer, Col. Liberator Bonoan who used to hide out in the quarters of Major Ferdinand E. Marcos. On several occasions, they joined forces in obtaining information and were together in several escapes from the Japanese Kempei Tai.

h. State of Equipment and Supplies

The Maharlikas had the following equipment and supplies at the time:

Arms and ammo....	
Rifles (.30 Enfield)	286
A. R.	32
.45 Pistols	156
	474
.30 rifle ammo	1325 rds.
.45 pistol ammo	2300 rds.

Spare parts none

Sabotage	
Phosphorus	33 kilos
Dynamite	123 sticks
Fuses	50
Glass time bombs	30
Hypnotics	
Morphine	100 tablets
Phenobarbital	50 grams
Pentobarbital sodium	30 grams

Transportation....

Panel delivery wagon (Designed for smuggling)	1
Freight trucks	2
Motorcycle	1
Bicycles	33

Medical supplies NONE

(NOTE: Extracted from UNIT REPORT, dated 26 July 1944)

Most of the arms and ammunition was with the East Pangasinan Combat unit and with the Ilocos Norte Regiment.

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VI. SECOND HALF OF 1944

a. Intensification of Sabotage Work

The belief was current that the American Liberation Force was on the way to the Philippines. Even the conduct of the Japanese showed this.

Accordingly sabotage work was intensified. A unit report on sabotage is hereby quoted:

"Sabotage -

Enemy shipping -

1. On July 16, 1944 Manila was rocked by the explosions in three Japanese ships at anchor in the bay, causing a near-riot in the districts by the bay because of the belief that fighting had broken out inside the metropolis. A warship, probably a destroyer, was slightly damaged but was able to dash to Corregidor or Mariveles. An oil tanker of medium size burned fiercely for about an hour and then sunk. A troopship of Maru dimensions burned for two days but was kept afloat.

When docked at the piers the day before, our saboteurs had loaded them with home-made glass time bombs.

2. A week later, an enemy wooden supply ship anchored off Muelle de la Industria, just below Jones Bridge at the Pasig River, was burned with the same methods.

3. Lingayen and La Union scored one oil tanker each and two small trawlers last month.

4. Fires are frequent in shipyards and lumberyards. Malabon recently had a merry blaze.

Enemy Air Units -

Aviation gasoline mixed with water or dust. Spare parts stolen.

Communications:

On June, 1944, the Japanese Army and the puppet Philippine Republic were forced to announce severe penalties for those caught tampering with electric and telephone wires and apparatus. This was due to the continuous sabotage of telephone lines.

Even wireless equipment have not been free from the ubiquitous saboteur.

Supply dumps.

Mysterious fires often break out in supply dumps. Even Port Area, which is enclosed with barbed wire and semi-tinelled are not free from them, specially in dark rainy nights when crawling under barbed wire is simplified."

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But because of the increase in the tempo of activities, our casualties correspondingly increased. In the sabotage of the three Japanese ships, the following men were lost to the Kempei Tai:

Cpl. Juan Sanchez ----- Asst Leader, First Sabotage Section
Pfc. Pedro Vergara ----- Member
Pvt. Senen Fernandez --- Member
Pvt. Jose Bermudez ----- Member
Pvt. Benito Pancho ----- Member
Pvt. Fernando Belen ----- Member
Pvt. Jesus Barat ----- Member

These men had volunteered as laborers at Pier Seven in the Manila Bay and had planted the home-made glass time bombs which had done the trick. But on the suspicion they were picked up by the Military Police and were never heard of again. But to the honor of their names goes the accolade of their silence about the Maharlikas, their comrades.

It is believed that this is the only feat of its kind performed by any guerilla organization in the Philippines.

The following were also lost in sabotage work:

Cpl. Pedro Pimentel ----- Asst. Leader, Second Sabotage Section
Pfc. John Carson ----- Member
Pvt. Tomas Barrato ----- Member
Pvt. Ambrosio Fermin ----- Member

b. Submarine Landings in Bangui, Ilocos Norte

Some time on the later part of August or the early part of September, 1944, Major Simeon M. Valdez, among other messages, sent the message that a submarine had landed in Caunayan Bay, Bangui, Ilocos Norte leaving a party of Filipinos belonging to the reconnaissance units from Australia with supplies and equipment. Among the papers carried by the leader, Lt. Jose Valera, was a document marked secret which outlined the Luzon Guerrilla Organizations as of 15 June 1944. The following was said of Major Ferdinand E. Marcos in the document:

"9. MARCOS, Lt. Col. Ferdinand E.: Located in the Mountain Province-Ilocos area. The band is also known as the Maharlika and has contact with the MARKING guerrillas (2.p.) and Quezon's Own Guerrillas (2.v.) Little else is known of the organization."

As of 15 Jun 1944, Major Ferdinand E. Marcos therefore assumed

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the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. And on 30 June 1944, he promoted Major Simeon M. Valdez to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

c. Friction with Other Guerilla Groups

In the latter part of August 1944, the quarters of Major Pacifico E. Marcos was raided by two truckloads of Kempei Tai. Lt. Col. Ferdinand E. Marcos was at the time hidden in the Medical Library of the Philippine General Hospital. But it seemed as if the Japanese were after him alone and not after anybody else. And inasmuch as even after a weeks torture, Major Pacifico E. Marcos could not be induced to incriminate himself and would not reveal his brother's whereabouts, he was permitted to escape Fort Santiago life. The enemy probably imagined that Major Pacifico E. Marcos would lead them to Lt. Col. Ferdinand E. Marcos. But instead, they lost track of Major Pacifico E. Marcos too.

With the aid of Col. Fidel Cruz and Captain Alfredo Santos of the puppet constabulary, as well as Major Narciso Ramos, Captain Florentino Herrera Jr., Captain Demetrio Tabije, Lt. Guillermo Salvador and Lt. Inigo Veniza, Lt. Col. Ferdinand E. Marcos escaped from the dragnet which the Japanese had thrown around the city of Manila.

Since the submarine landings in Caunayan Bay, Bangui, Ilocos Norte opened great potentialities for guerilla activity, Lt Col. Marcos planned to proceed to IlcosoNorte after a stop-over at Bilacan and Pangasinan. The stop-over at Pangasinan was necessary because of the instructions of General Manuel Roxas to prepare air-drop reception bases in that area and if possible to build and guard an airfield for reconnaissance planes.

Lt. Col. Ferdinand E. Marcos arrived in Pangasinan to find the East Pangasinan Combat Unit under Capt. Corrales fighting the forces of Major Lapham and Capt. Ray Hunt. It seemed that the two latter officers refused to permit any other unit to operate in East Pangasinan. They had sought to arrest Capt. Corrales and there had been killings on both sides, both claiming self-defense to justify these blood-letting.

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Lt. Col. Ferdinand E. Marcos went so far as to visit the camp of Capt. Ray Hunt un-armed in order to bring about an amicable settlement of the disagreement. But the project of the airfield which had already been started in Natividad, Pangasinan met with his disapproval and suspicion. He could not be convinced that I had orders from General Manuel Roxas and even if he were convinced, that I had such orders, he would not permit the project to be finished as the new arms and equipment coming in might render the Maharlikas much more superior to his group. The impasse continued until the arrival of the Liberating Forces.

The first week of September also brought the news that Lt. Col. Simeon M. Valdez was meeting with the same difficulties in Ilocos Norte. By this month, the forces under Col. Volckman had become interested in Ilocos Norte and the 15th Infantry under Capt. John P. O'Day had begun to operate there. All the towns in the Ilocos coast were suspect and civilian males were liquidated on the merest excuse of suspicion. Ex-USAFFE men were particularly persecuted. Then a message brought the information that Capt. O'Day had succeeded in arresting Lt. Col. Simeon M. Valdez and was threatening to liquidate him.

Lt. Col. Ferdinand E. Marcos immediately sent an order to the Maharlikas in Ilocos Norte to voluntarily join the 15th Infantry, USAFIP, NORTH LUZON under Col. Volckman and accept whatever rank or post they would be given. By this move, it was hoped to save Lt. Col. Simeon M. Valdez. Accordingly on October 1944, the greater bulk of the 15th Infantry composed of the Maharlika Ilocos Norte Regiment were inducted into the USAFIP, NORTH LUZON. Whatever may have brought it about, Lt. Col. Simeon Valdez was not executed.

VII. THE LIBERATION

The East Pangasinan Combat Unit was attached to the 32d Infantry Division and according to the report of Lt. Col. H. E. Smith to the Commanding General, 32d Infantry Division, it was the best guerrilla

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unit attached to the 128th Infantry. It fought in the Villa Verde Trail from Pangasinan to Nueva Vizcaya. On 11 February 1945, it was duly recognized.

The Special Intelligence Section was attached to the G-2 section, 25th Infantry Division, and was also subsequently recognized.

Some of the men of Headquarters, Ang Mga Maharlika were attached to the 544th Field Artillery Battalion and served in the fighting most specially in the Mariguina-Antipolo sector, reaching as far as Baguio, Mountain Province with the unit. Captain Edgar A. St. John, the commanding officer of the 544th FA Battalion certified to this in his letter to Headquarters, Philippine Army dated 6 September 1945.

Some of the men of Headquarters, like Lt. Mladic Adriano were attached to the CIC Detachment in Manila.

On the 28th of January 1945, the first detailed map of the enemy defense of Manila were sent through enemy lines to the 37th Division column approaching Manila. The map was submitted to Lt. Kankansky, 2nd Platoon, "E" Co., 2nd Bn, 149th Infantry, 37th Division.

On 4 February 1945, scouts of Ang Mga Maharlika contacted elements of the 1st Cavalry entering Malacanan Palace. They furnished intelligence and were utilized for patrolling by this unit until the operations in Manila were over. They participated in the crossing of the Pasig River.

The Headquarters, Ang Mga Maharlika was attached and placed under the control of the 5th Cavalry Regiment by order of the Regimental Commander on 31 May 1945. It aided this American unit in all its operations until the Bicol provinces as well as Southern Tayabas.

The Ilocos Norte Regiment which had been converted into the 15th Infantry, USAFIP, NORTH LUZON was the unit which alone and without American troops participating, liberated the province of Ilocos Norte, then chased the Japanese south to Ilocos Sur and pursued them up to the mountains of Abra and Mountain Province. It participated in the operations in Bessang Pass and Loo Valley.

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VIII. CONCLUSION

Ang Ang Mga Maharlika was ordered disbanded by Lt. Col. Ferdinand E. Marcos on 31 December 1945. His order read:

"The members of the underground have cheapened the name of the guerillas by lowly squabbles about rank and remuneration. This organization has always stood over and above these mean considerations. To its members, I have never offered mercenary affiliations, not even the comfort of the continuous memory of a grateful people. We have merely sought for the glory of the combat, victory in the struggle and achievement in the freedoms of liberty at peace.

"It must suffice that we have attained these ends. Self-satisfaction is our only reward.

"Hold no rancor or bitterness against those who have maligned you. The dignity of great souls does not stoop to their detection.

"You have succeeded. You have won. In the dark period of enemy occupation, you gave of yourselves unstintingly, without mercy to yourselves and your loved ones. Around the legend of your intransigence you have rallied the wavering faith of your people bludgeoned into ways of tyranny. You have guided the avenging tide of the Liberation Forces. You have wiped out the ignominy of surrender of Bataan and Corregidor with the victories of other plains and mountains.

"Return to your homes and leave behind the ways of war. Take up the ways of peace --- the peace that you have won.

"And if your name must remain unknown, remember that your greatness lies in this anonymity."

--- The End ---

SPECIAL ROSTER

1 August 1945

1. Guerrilla Unit: ANG MGA MAHARLIKA (Headquarters)

Attached: 5th Cav., 544th FA
1st Cav., 37th Div.a. Commanding Officer - Name: FERDINAND E. MARCOS
Rank: Lieutenant Colonel

Location: Manila

(OFFICERS)

Name and Guerrilla Rank	Period served full-time with Guerrillas and del signation of Guerrilla Unit	Period served with U. S. Army	Status
1. Lt Col Ferdinand E. Marcos	1 Dec '42 to date	16 Nov '41 to date	USAFFE (PA)
2. Lt Col Simeon M. Valdez	- do -	- do -	- do -
3. Major Bonifacio Ysip, Sr	1 July '43 to date	11 Feb '45 to June 25, '45	Guerrilla
4. Major Pacifico E. Marcos	1 Dec '42 to 11 Jun '45	8 Dec '41 to date	USAFFE (PA)
5. Major Aurelio Lucero	1 Oct '43 to 30 May '45	16 Nov '41 to date	USAFFE (PA)
6. Major Bonifacio Ysip, Jr	1 July '43 to date	11 Feb '45 to 25 Jun '45	P.A. (Res)
7. Capt Dante Q. Nagtalon	1 Dec '42 to 30 May '45	16 Nov '41 to date	USAFFE (PA)
8. Capt Angel Limjuco Jr.	1 Dec '42 to date	11 Feb '45 to 25 Jun '45	P.A. (Res)
9. Capt Pio E. Marcos	- do -	- do -	Guerrilla
10. Capt Pedro J. Bartolome	- do -	8 Dec '41 to date	USAFFE (PA)
11. Capt Magno Topacio	- do -	- do -	- do -
12. Capt Florentino Herrera Jr	- do -	11 Feb '45 to 25 Jun '45	P.A. (Res)
13. Capt Juan F. Echiverri	1 Dec '42 to 28 Feb '45	16 Nov '41 to date	USAFFE (PA)
14. Capt Ricardo D. Galano	- do -	13 Dec '41 to date	- do -
15. Capt Celestino G. Juan	1 Dec '43 to 28 Feb '45	8 Dec '41 to date	- do -
16. Capt Marcelino N. Sayo	1 Dec '42 to 28 Feb '45	16 Nov '41 to date	- do -
17. Capt William M. Valdez	1 Dec '42 to date	9 Jan '45 to 31 Jul '45	P.A. (Res)
18. Capt Inigo Ventura	1 Dec '42 to 15 Jul '45	8 Dec '41 to date	USAFFE (PA)
19. Capt Guillermo Salvador	1 Dec '42 to 13 Jul '45	11 Feb '45 to 25 Jun '45	P.A. (Res)
20. 1st Lt Fortunato Guzman, Jr	1 Dec '42 to date	- do -	- do -
21. 1st Lt Pedro Pillo	1 Nov '43 to 15 Jul '45	8 Dec '41 to date	USAFFE (PA)
22. 1st Lt Augusto Poblete	1 Dec '42 to date	11 Feb '45 to 19 Mar '45	Guerrilla
23. 1st Lt Juan Navarro	- do -	11 Feb '45 to 9 Apr '45	P.A. (Res)
24. 1st Lt Juan Cabanos	- do -	- do -	Guerrilla
25. 1st Lt Eladio Adriano	31 Jul '43 to 15 Jul '45	11 Feb '45 to 15 Jul '45	P. A. (Res)
26. 1st Lt Crispin Collado	1 Jul '43 to Nov '44 (date of death in Line of Duty)	Guerrilla	
27. 1st Lt Herman Consunji	1 Jul '43 to date	11 Feb '45 to 25 Jun '45	P. A. (Res)
28. 1st Lt Salvador Abrante	- do -	- do -	PS (Retired)
29. 1st Lt Crispin Aldiosa	14 Jul '43 to date	- do -	Guerrilla
30. 1st Lt Juan Verzosa	1 Dec '42 to date	- do -	PS (Retired)
31. 2d Lt Oscar Banes	- do -	- do -	PS (Res)
32. 2d Lt Jesus de la Paz	- do -	11 Feb '45 to 3 Mar '45	P. A. (Res)
33. 2d Lt Jose Limjap Jr	1 Aug '43 to date	11 Feb '45 to 1 Jun '45	Guerrilla
34. 2d Lt Rachael Cruz	- do -	1 Mar '45 to 30 May '45	- do -
35. 2d Lt Jose Salindong	1 Dec '42 to 15 Apr '45	11 Feb '45 to 15 Apr '45	USAFFE (PA)
36. 2d Lt Ernesto Verzosa	1 Dec '42 to date	11 Feb '45 to date	PS (Res)
37. 2d Lt Diosdado Dizén	1 Dec '43 to 30 May '45	11 Feb '45 to 30 May '45	USAFFE (PA)
38. 2d Lt Mario de Leon Rustia	1 June '44 to date	11 Feb '45 to date	Guerrilla
39. 2d Lt Estanislao Estadilla	1 Jul '42 to 30 Jul '45	11 Feb '45 to 25 Jun '45	Guerrilla
40. 2d Lt Roman Hermosura	1 Jul '43 to date	- do -	PS (Res)
41. 2d Lt Ramon Papa, Jr	- do -	- do -	Guerrilla
42. 2d Lt Francisco Lim	- do -	- do -	- do -
43. 2d Lt Leonardo Munsayoc	- do -	- do -	- do -
44. 2d Lt Jose Villanueva	- do -	- do -	- do -
45. 2d Lt Adriano Estadilla	- do -	- do -	- do -
46. 2d Lt Isidro Ventura	1 Dec '42 to date	9 Jan '45 to date	USAFFE (PA)
47. 2d Lt Faustino Ambuya	1 Jul '43 to date	11 Feb '45 to 25 Jun '45	Guerrilla

(Continued)

(ENLISTED MEN)

Name and Guerrilla Rank	'Period served full-time'		Status
	'with Guerrillas and designation of Guerrilla Unit'	'Period served with U.S. Army'	
1. 1st Sgt Pilar Ver	1 Dec '42 to date	11 Feb '45 to date	Guerrilla
2. 1st Sgt Lawag Fonacier	- do -	8 Dec '41 to date	USFFE(PA)
3. 1st Sgt Francisco Matias, Jr	1 Jul '43 to date	11 Feb '45 to 25 Jun '45	Guerrilla
4. 1st Sgt Antonio Caballero	14 Jul '43 to date	- do -	- do -
5. 1st Sgt Alberto Inocencio	1 Aug '43 to date	- do -	- do -
6. S-Sgt Leonardo Santos	14 Jul '43 to date	- do -	- do -
7. S-Sgt Balbino Gonzales	- do -	- do -	- do -
8. Sergeant Martin Dourso	1 Jul '43 to date	- do -	- do -
9. Sergeant Alfonso Canasa	14 Jul '43 to date	11 Feb '45 to date	Guerrilla
10. Sergeant Gregorio Villanueva	1 Jul '43 to date	11 Feb '45 to date	- do -
11. Sergeant Dominador Adao	14 Jul '43 to date	11 Feb '45 to 25 Jun '45	- do -
12. Sergeant Bel Orlino	1 Dec '42 to date	11 Feb '45 to date	- do -
13. Sergeant Tommy Kiernan	- do -	- do -	- do -
14. Sergeant Pedro Maranja	- do -	- do -	- do -
15. Sergeant Pete Cubas	- do -	- do -	- do -
16. Sergeant Amaury Velez	- do -	11 Feb '45 to 3 Apr '45	PA (Res)
17. Sergeant Jose Miguel	14 Jul '43 to date	11 Feb '45 to 25 Jun '45	Guerrilla
18. Corporal Juan Santiago	1 Dec '42 to date	11 Feb '45 to 30 Mar '45	PA (Res)
19. Corporal Pedro Pimentel	- do -	- do -	- do -
20. Corporal Danny Par	- do -	- do -	- do -
21. Corporal Joe Fernick	1 Dec '42 to date	11 Feb '45 to 1 Apr '45	- do -
22. Corporal Dionisio Fabro	- do -	- do -	- do -
23. Corporal Bernardo Sanchez	- do -	- do -	- do -
24. Corporal Bonifacio Corto	- do -	11 Feb '45 to 30 May '45	- do -
25. Corporal Sagat Velasco	- do -	- do -	- do -
26. Corporal Roman Santos	1 Aug '43 to date	11 Feb '45 to 1 Jun '45	Guerrilla
27. Corporal Francisco Santos	14 Jul '43 to date	11 Feb '45 to 25 Jun '45	- do -
28. Corporal Maximo Jason	- do -	- do -	- do -
29. Corporal Manuel Lapus	- do -	- do -	- do -
30. Corporal Celerino Bartolome	- do -	- do -	- do -
31. Corporal Enrique Abano	- do -	- do -	- do -
32. Corporal Jose Carmona, Jr.	1 Jul '43 to date	- do -	- do -
33. Corporal Alfonso Zapirain	- do -	- do -	- do -
34. Pfc Antonio Francisco	1 Dec '42 to date	11 Feb '45 to date	PA (Res)
35. Pfc Pedro Vergara	- do -	- do -	- do -
36. Pfc John Carson	- do -	- do -	- do -
37. Pfc Josto Mantug	- do -	- do -	- do -
38. Pfc Fermin Cruz	- do -	- do -	- do -
39. Pfc Alfredo Propuso	14 Jul '43 to date	11 Feb '45 to 25 Jun '45	Guerrilla
40. Pfc Damian Dulay	- do -	- do -	- do -
41. Pfc Carlos Acupan	- do -	- do -	- do -
42. Pfc Deogracias Goyena	- do -	- do -	- do -
43. Pfc Santiago Arana	- do -	- do -	- do -
44. Pfc Jose Velasco	- do -	- do -	- do -
45. Pvt Ambrosio Bernardino	- do -	- do -	- do -
46. Pvt Gil Munoz	- do -	- do -	- do -
47. Pvt Juan Punzalan	- do -	- do -	- do -
48. Pvt Elias Garruza	- do -	- do -	- do -
49. Pvt Jose Munoz	- do -	- do -	- do -
50. Pvt Angelo Estrillon	- do -	- do -	- do -
51. Pvt Crispulo Madrono	- do -	- do -	- do -
52. Pvt Gregorio Mercado	- do -	- do -	- do -
53. Pvt Fausto Quesada	- do -	- do -	- do -
54. Pvt Miguel Aldiosa Sr.	- do -	- do -	- do -
55. Pvt Catalino Tingson	- do -	- do -	- do -
56. Pvt Cornelio Saliente	- do -	- do -	- do -
57. Pvt Rayani Garmons	- do -	- do -	- do -
58. Pvt Bayani Arana	- do -	- do -	- do -
59. Pvt Tito Ramos	- do -	- do -	- do -
60. Pvt Esteban Madrono	- do -	- do -	- do -

(Continued)

(ENLISTED MEN)

Name and Guerrilla Rank	Period served full-time with guerrillas and de- signation of Guerrilla Unit	Period served with U.S. Army	Status
61. Pvt Demetrio Sarabia	14 Jul '45 to date	11 Feb '45 to 25 Jun '45	Guerrilla
62. Pvt Miguel Aldiosa, Jr.	- do -	- do -	- do -
63. Pvt Antonio Candelaria	- do -	- do -	- do -
64. Pvt Delfin Vasquez	- do -	- do -	- do -
65. Pvt Silverio Navarro	- do -	- do -	- do -
66. Pvt Filemon Punzalan	- do -	- do -	- do -
67. Pvt Leonilo Bueno	- do -	- do -	- do -
68. Pvt Amador Herrero	- do -	- do -	- do -
69. Pvt Vermundo Valenzuela	- do -	- do -	- do -
70. Pvt Simeon Tomas	- do -	- do -	- do -
71. Pvt Nicanor Garcia	- do -	- do -	- do -
72. Pvt Carlos Reyes	- do -	I - do -	- do -
73. Pvt Bernabe Cruz	- do -	- do -	- do -
74. Pvt Tomas Santos	- do -	- do -	- do -
75. Pvt Jaime Adao	- do -	- do -	- do -
76. Pvt Florencio Santos	- do -	- do -	- do -
77. Pvt Jose Punzalan	- do -	- do -	- do -
78. Pvt Federico Liles	- do -	- do -	- do -
79. Pvt Santos Reyes	- do -	- do -	- do -
80. Pvt Victor Bojar	- do -	- do -	- do -
81. Pvt Remigio Mercado	- do -	- do -	- do -
82. Pvt Antonio Valenzuela	- do -	- do -	- do -
83. Pvt Benito Yabes	- do -	- do -	- do -
84. Pvt Rosendo Abello	- do -	- do -	- do -
85. Pvt Cristeto Tabut	- do -	- do -	- do -
86. Pvt Jose R. Cruz	- do -	- do -	- do -
87. Pvt Simeon Vanta	- do -	- do -	- do -
88. Pvt Gaudencio de la Cruz	- do -	- do -	- do -
89. Pvt Prudencio Cruz	- do -	I - do -	- do -
90. Pvt Lucilo Librando	- do -	- do -	- do -
91. Pvt Conrado Miguel	- do -	- do -	- do -
92. Pvt Pablo Zapanta	- do -	- do -	- do -
93. Pvt Demetrio de Castro	- do -	- do -	- do -
94. Pvt Manuel Andaya	- do -	- do -	- do -
95. Pvt Cecilio Narvaes	- do -	- do -	- do -
96. Pvt Felipe Acupan	- do -	- do -	- do -
97. Pvt Andres Espadilla	- do -	- do -	- do -
98. Pvt Roberto Hernandez	- do -	- do -	- do -
99. Pvt Renato Concepcion	- do -	- do -	- do -
100. Pvt Amancio Jose	- do -	- do -	- do -
101. Pvt Herman Monson	- do -	- do -	- do -
102. Pvt Amado Castillo	- do -	- do -	- do -
103. Pvt Jesus Aligada	- do -	- do -	- do -
104. Pvt Avelino Castil	- do -	- do -	- do -
105. Pvt Dominador Gomez	- do -	- do -	- do -
106. Pvt Carlos Leva	- do -	- do -	- do -
107. Pvt Ranulfo Mollino	- do -	- do -	- do -
108. Pvt Bienvenido Sanchez	- do -	- do -	- do -
109. Pvt Miguel Aquino	- do -	- do -	- do -
110. Pvt Pedro Flores	- do -	- do -	- do -
111. Pvt Antonio Titaan	- do -	- do -	- do -
112. Pvt Eduardo Bernardo	- do -	- do -	- do -
113. Pvt Placido Zarabia	- do -	- do -	- do -
114. Pvt Nicolas Hernandez	- do -	- do -	- do -
115. Pvt Jaime de Jesus	do -	- do -	- do -
116. Pvt Ladislao Mercado	- do -	- do -	- do -
117. Pvt Pablo Magsaysay	- do -	- do -	- do -

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(Continued)

(ENLISTED MEN)

Name and Guerilla Rank	Period served full-time with Guerrillas and de- signation of Guerrilla Unit	Period served with U. S. Army	Status
118. Pvt Resurreccion Garde	14 Jul '43 to date	11 Feb '45 to 25 Jun '45	Guerrilla
119. Pvt Ernesto Bernardino	- do -	- do -	- do -
120. Pvt Guillermo Estrella	- do -	- do -	- do -
121. Pvt Francisco Bernardino	- do -	- do -	- do -
122. Pvt Manuel Lalay	- do -	- do -	- do -
123. Pvt Arsoncio Cruz	- do -	- do -	- do -
124. Pvt Ernesto Cruz	- do -	- do -	- do -
125. Pvt Francisco Lamug	- do -	- do -	- do -
126. Pvt Conrado Andriales	- do -	- do -	- do -
127. Pvt Moises Matriano	- do -	- do -	- do -
128. Pvt Gregorio Gonzales	- do -	- do -	- do -
129. Pvt Angel Concepcion	- do -	- do -	- do -
130. Pvt Juan Ramirez	- do -	- do -	- do -
131. Pvt Antonio del Alcazar	- do -	- do -	- do -

I certify that the above list of officers and enlisted men are members of the "Maharlika Unit", Headquarters Manila and that the accompanying data are correct.



FERDINAND E. MARCOS
Lieutenant Colonel, Inf(PA)
Commanding

OFFICIAL :



PACIFICO E. MARCOS
Major, Infantry, PA
Executive Officer

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NMD883018

REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES



Authority NMD883018
DECLASSIFIED

APPENDIX "2"

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH CAVALRY
APO 201

31 May 1945

SUBJECT: Attachment orders.

TO : Commanding Officer, ANG MANGA MAHARLIKA GUERRILLA UNIT.

1. Pursuant to authority contained in letter Headquarters Sixth Army, Subject: "Procurement, recognition, use, supply and disposition of Guerrilla Units" dated 3 May 1945, the ANG MANGA MAHARLIKA GUERRILLA UNIT is placed under the control of Fifth Cavalry Regiment.

By order of Regimental Commander:

/s/ R. G. Langham
/t/ R. G. LANGHAM
Major, Cavalry
S - 2

A TRUE COPY:


FERDINAND E. MARCOS
Major, Infantry, PA
G.O., ANG MANGA MAHARLIKA

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND883078

APPENDIX "B"

HEADQUARTERS BATTALION
544TH FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION

6 Sept. 1945

SUBJECT: Statement of duty of members of Ang Manga Maharlika
with the 544th FA Bn.
TO : Headquarters, Philippine Army APO #500

1. On 15 March 1945 the following members of the Ang Manga
Maharlika Guerrilla unit joined this organization for duty and
service in combat against the enemy. All have served honorably
and have been of assistance to us in fighting the Japanese being
especially helpful in the Marikina-Antipolo Sector.


Rachel Cruz
Gregorio Villanueva
Dominador Gomez
Avelino Castil
Demetrio Sarabia
German Monzon
Rene Concepcion
Carlos Lova
Amancio Jose
Cornelio Saliente
Enrique Abano

2. The following members are still with this Organization,
the balance having been detached and returned to their homes as of
15 June 1945.

Demetrio Sarabia
German Monzon
Rene Concepcion
Carlos Lova
Amancio Jose

(SGD) EDGAR A. ST JOHN
Capt., F.A.
Commanding

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY


LODIE QUILAL
Lt. Col., AGS.
Asst. Adjutant General

