

Graphical Passwords: Learning from the First Twelve Years

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[hacia dónde puede evolucionar el concepto de passwd...](#)

Starting around 1999, a great many graphical password schemes have been proposed as alternatives to text-based password authentication. We provide a comprehensive overview of published research in the area, covering both usability and security aspects as well as system evaluation. The article first catalogues existing approaches, highlighting novel features of selected schemes and identifying key usability or security advantages. We then review usability requirements for knowledge-based authentication as they apply to graphical passwords, identify security threats that such systems must address and review known attacks, discuss methodological issues related to empirical evaluation, and identify areas for further research and improved methodology.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Beginning around 1999, a multitude of graphical password schemes have been proposed, motivated by the promise of improved password memorability and thus usability, while at the same time improving strength against guessing attacks. Like text passwords, graphical passwords are knowledge-based authentication mechanisms in which users enter a shared secret as evidence of their identity. However, where text passwords involve alphanumeric and/or special keyboard characters, the idea behind graphical passwords is to leverage human memory for visual information, with the shared secret being related to or composed of images or sketches.

Despite the large number of options for authentication, text passwords remain the most common choice for many reasons [Renaud 2005a; Herley et al. 2009]. They are easy and inexpensive to implement, are familiar to essentially all users, allow users to authenticate themselves while avoiding privacy issues that have been raised about

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biometrics, and have the advantage of portability without, for example, having to carry physical tokens. However, text passwords also suffer from both security and usability disadvantages—for example, passwords are typically difficult to remember and are predictable if user choice is allowed [Morris and Thompson 1979; Klein 1990; Sasse et al. 2001; Yan et al. 2004; Bentley and Mallows 2005].

One proposal for reducing problems related to text passwords is to use password managers. These typically require that users remember only a master password. They store (or regenerate) and send on behalf of the user the appropriate passwords to websites hosting user accounts. Ideally, the latter are generated by the manager itself and are stronger than user-chosen passwords. However, implementations of password managers introduce their own usability issues [Chiasson et al. 2006] that can exacerbate security problems, and their centralized architecture introduces a single point of failure and is an attractive target: attacker access to the master password provides control over all of the user’s managed accounts.

When text password users resort to unsafe coping strategies, such as reusing passwords across accounts to help with memorability, the decrease in security cannot be addressed by simply strengthening, in isolation, the underlying technical security of a system. Usability issues often significantly impact its real-world security. User interface design decisions may unintentionally sway user behaviour towards less secure behaviour. Successful authentication solutions must thus also include improved usability design based on appropriate research, taking into account the abilities and limitations of the target users. In graphical passwords, human memory for visual information is leveraged in the hope that a reduced memory burden will facilitate the selection and use of more secure or less predictable passwords, dissuading users from unsafe coping practices.

Early surveys of graphical passwords are available [Monrose and Reiter 2005; Suo et al. 2005]. More recent papers briefly summarize and categorize 12 schemes [Hafiz et al. 2008] and review numerous graphical password systems while offering usability guidelines for their design [Renaud 2009a]. In this article, we provide a comprehensive review of the first twelve years of published research on graphical passwords and reflect on it. It is now clear that the graphical nature of schemes does not, by itself, avoid the problems typical of text password systems. However, while proposals in this first period of research exhibit some familiar problems, we see signs that an emerging second generation of research will build upon this knowledge and leverage graphical elements in new ways to avoid old problems.

Our motivation is multifold. Knowledge-based authentication has increasing impact on society as its use expands from login for a single computer to large numbers of remote computers hosting personal and corporate information to authorizing online financial transactions via mobile devices. Some schemes, such as PassFaces [Passfaces Corporation 2009] and grIDSure [GrIDSure 2009], have commercial interests. Because of the difficulty of typing on mobile devices, authentication schemes using alternatives to keyboard entry are receiving increased attention. This magnifies the importance of understanding usability and security implications of such schemes. But, for example, as PIN-level graphical schemes are used for unlocking Android smart phones, we see little discussion of the security difference between PIN-level (with password spaces of 10,000 elements or 12–15 bits) and password-level schemes (with spaces of 30–60 bits). Besides providing specific authentication alternatives, we find research into graphical passwords allows for a better understanding of knowledge-based authentication in general by looking at issues such as user choice in password selection, memory interference, and the role of cueing in password memorability.

We classify schemes into three main categories based on recall, recognition, and cued recall, beginning discussion of each with a primary exemplar. We discuss

further schemes and extensions offering interesting additional characteristics and improvements or where significant usability studies or security analysis has allowed for better understanding. Summary tables comparing schemes are given in Section 7. We review usability requirements and features for comparative analysis, highlight specialized analysis techniques, consider threat models, catalogue known attack strategies, and discuss the suitability of different schemes for various environments. We consider methodological issues for evaluation of proposals, discuss challenges related to empirical evaluation, and include an evaluation checklist. Throughout, we also extract lessons that can be learned from the research to date.

2. MEMORABILITY

For over a century, psychology studies have recognized the human brain's apparently superior memory for recognizing and recalling visual information as opposed to verbal or textual information [Kirkpatrick 1894; Madigan 1983; Paivio et al. 1968; Shepard 1967]. The most widely accepted theory is the *dual-coding theory* [Paivio 2006], suggesting that verbal and non-verbal memory (respectively, word-based and image-based) are processed and represented differently in the mind. Images are mentally represented in a way that retains the perceptual features being observed and are assigned perceived meaning based on what is being directly observed. Text is represented symbolically, where symbols are given a meaning cognitively associated with the text, as opposed to a perceived meaning based on the form of the text. For example, 'X' may represent the roman numeral 10 or the multiplication symbol; the exact meaning is associated in relation to some deeper concept. This additional processing required for verbal memory renders this a more difficult cognitive task.

Tasks involving visual memory can also vary in difficulty due to the particular characteristics of the retrieval process. Graphical passwords can be broadly categorized according to the memory task involved in remembering and entering the password: *recall*, *recognition*, and *cued recall* [Raaijmakers and Shiffrin 1992].

Recall requires that a person remember information without cueing. With recognition, a person is provided with the information and has to decide if this matches the information previously memorized. Several theories exist to explain the difference between recognition and recall memory based on whether these are two unique processes or are similar and differ only in their retrieval difficulty [Anderson and Bower 1972]. It is generally accepted, however, that recognition is an easier memory task than recall [Tulving and Watkins 1973; Kintsch 1970]. In cued recall, an external cue is provided to help remember information. Tulving and Pearlstone [1966] explain that items in human memory may be available but not accessible for retrieval. Their results show that previously inaccessible information in a pure recall situation can be retrieved with the aid of a retrieval cue.

3. SECURITY

An authentication system must provide adequate security for its intended environment; otherwise, it fails to meet its primary goal. A proposed system should at minimum be evaluated against common attacks to determine if it satisfies security requirements. A brief introduction is provided here and a more detailed discussion of security follows in Section 9.

We classify the types of attacks on knowledge-based authentication into two general categories: guessing and capture attacks. In successful *guessing attacks*, attackers are able to either exhaustively search through the entire theoretical password space or predict higher probability passwords (i.e., create a dictionary of likely passwords) so as to obtain an acceptable success rate within a manageable number of guesses. Guessing attacks may be conducted *online* (as defined in Section 9.1) through the intended login

interface or *offline* if some verifiable text [Gong et al. 1993] (e.g., hashes) can be used to assess the correctness of guesses. Authentication systems with small theoretical password spaces or with identifiable patterns in user choice of passwords are especially vulnerable to guessing attacks.

Password *capture attacks* involve directly obtaining the password or part thereof by capturing login credentials when entered by the user or by tricking the user into divulging their password. Shoulder surfing phishing, and some kinds of malware are common forms of capture attacks. In shoulder surfing, credentials are captured by direct observation of the login process or through some external recording device, such as a video camera. Phishing is a type of social engineering in which users are tricked into entering their credentials at a fraudulent website recording user input. Malware uses unauthorized software on client computers or servers to capture keyboard, mouse, or screen output, which is then parsed to find login credentials.

As will be seen, early graphical password systems tended to focus on one particular strength, for example, being resistant to shoulder surfing, but testing and analysis showed that they were vulnerable to one or more other types of attacks. Except in very specific environments, these would not provide adequate security.

Often playing an important role related to security is the particular process of encoding or discretization used, that is, transforming the user input into discrete units that can be identified by the system and used for comparison during password reentry. As will be seen, some schemes require that the system retains knowledge of the exact secret (or portion thereof), either to display the correct set of images to the user or to verify password entries. In other cases, encoded or discretized passwords may be hashed, using a one-way cryptographic hash to provide additional security in case the password file is compromised.

4. RECALL-BASED SYSTEMS

Recall-based graphical password systems are occasionally referred to as *drawmetric systems* [De Angeli et al. 2005] because users recall and reproduce a secret drawing. In these systems, users typically draw their password either on a blank canvas or on a grid. Recall is a difficult memory task [Craik and McDowd 1987], because retrieval is done without memory prompts or cues. Users sometimes devise ways of using the interface as a cue even though it is not intended as such, transforming the task into one of cued recall, albeit one in which where the same cue is available to all users and to attackers. Text passwords can also be categorized as using recall. With text passwords, evidence shows that users may use the name of the system as a memory cue and include it within their passwords [Vu et al. 2007; Chiasson et al. 2009b]. Although there is currently no evidence of this happening with graphical passwords, it remains a plausible coping strategy if users can devise a way of relating a recall-based graphical password to a corresponding account name.

A number of security vulnerabilities are common to most recall-based systems, as these systems share similar features. We briefly discuss some attacks here; see Section 9 for background and additional details. These systems are generally susceptible to shoulder surfing to the extent that in many cases, the entire drawing is visible on the screen as it is being entered, and thus, an attacker need accurately observe or record only one login for the entire password to be revealed.

Social engineering attacks remain a concern in cases where users can describe their password by, for example, verbalizing a path through grid squares or by showing a sketch of the password. Phishing attacks are easily mounted. A phishing website can copy the login page from a legitimate site, including the area for drawing the graphical password (see Figure 1). Once users enter their username and password, this information can be used by attackers at the legitimate site. The recall-based schemes




Fig. 1. Draw-A-Secret [Jermyn et al. 1999].

discussed in the following text are also vulnerable to malware attacks based on screen scrapers. Additionally, these schemes may be vulnerable to mouse-loggers if an attacker can identify the position of the password entry grid on the screen through other means.

In typical recall-based systems, users choose their own passwords. Thus, a personalized attack may be more successful than a general attack—someone familiar with the user may have a higher probability of guessing the user’s password. For example, some users may choose to draw the initials of their name. While successful personalized attacks have yet to be reported in the literature for recall-based graphical systems, experimental results have been reported for password recovery mechanisms, such as personal verification questions [Schechter and Brush 2009].

The following sections offer an overview of recall-based graphical password schemes based on Draw-A-Secret [Jermyn et al. 1999].

4.1. Canonical Example: Draw-A-Secret

Draw-A-Secret (DAS) [Jermyn et al. 1999] was the first recall-based graphical password system proposed. Users draw their password on a 2D grid using a stylus or mouse (see Figure 1). A drawing can consist of one continuous pen stroke or preferably several strokes separated by “pen-ups” that restart the next stroke in a different cell. To log in, users repeat the same path through the grid cells. The system encodes the user-drawn password as the sequence of coordinates of the grid cells passed through in the drawing, yielding an *encoded* DAS password. Its length is the number of coordinate pairs summing across all strokes.

There is little information on either the usability or the practical security of the original DAS system, as to date it has only been user tested through paper prototypes (but see also the related Pass-Go system, in the following). Nali and Thorpe [2004] asked 16 participants to draw six doodles and six logos on 6×6 grids. These drawings were visually inspected for symmetry and number of pen strokes. They found that participants tended to draw symmetric images with few pen strokes (1–3) and to place their drawing approximately in the center of the grid. Limitations of this initial study included the following. Users were not told that their drawings were passwords; users did not have to later reproduce their drawings; and data was collected on paper (rather than users drawing using a computer). No usability data (login times, success rates, etc.) was collected. Dunphy and Yan [2007] compared DAS to their BDAS scheme in two paper prototype studies (see the following). For DAS, they found success rates ranging from 57–80%.

The size of the *theoretical password space*, that is, the number of all possible passwords regardless of how small their probabilities in actual practice, is related to the

coarseness of the underlying 2D grid and the maximum password length. For a 5×5 grid and maximum length 12, the theoretical password space of DAS has a cardinality of 2^{58} [Jermyn et al. 1999]. This is often stated as 58 bits for brevity but should not be misinterpreted as 58 bits of entropy, since passwords are far from equiprobable. To allow verification, the system must store the encoded DAS passwords. To avoid storing them cleartext, a one-way function of the password, or cryptographic *hash*, may be stored, as is done with text passwords (see Section 9). Note that there is a many-to-one mapping from user-drawn passwords to encoded DAS passwords; for example, all doodles drawn entirely within one grid square are equivalent to a dot.

In summary, DAS does offer a theoretical space comparable with text passwords, but the possibility that users would prefer predictable passwords, such as symmetric passwords with few strokes [van Oorschot and Thorpe 2008], suggests that, as with text passwords, the effective space would be considerably smaller. Without an implementation and user studies, we can tell little more. Similarly, while a key motivation for DAS was the superior memorability associated with images, the lack of suitable user studies leaves, as an open question, how effectively this can be leveraged in graphical authentication.

4.2. Other Recall-Based Schemes

BDAS, proposed by Dunphy and Yan [2007], added background images to DAS to encourage users to create more complex passwords. In a comparison of BDAS to DAS using paper prototypes, they reported that the background image reduced the amount of symmetry within password images and led users to choose longer passwords that were similarly memorable to the weaker DAS passwords. It is not known whether the background images introduced other types of predictable behaviour, such as targeting similar areas of the images or image-specific patterns. Gao et al. [2008] proposed YAGP (Yet Another Graphical Password), a modification to DAS in which approximately correct drawings can be accepted based on Levenshtein distance string matching and “trend quadrants” looking at the direction of pen strokes. As a consequence of this approximation algorithm, a finer grid may be used, but the original password must be stored in a system-accessible manner (rather than hashed) to allow for comparison with the user’s input.

Passdoodle [Goldberg et al. 2002; Varenhorst 2004] is similar to DAS, allowing users to create a freehand drawing as a password, but uses a more complex matching process without a visible grid. The use of additional characteristics, such as pen color, number of pen strokes, and drawing speed, were suggested to add variability to the doodles. Later, Govindarajulu and Madhvanath [2007] separately proposed a Web-based password manager using a “master doodle” instead of a master password.

The three Passdoodle studies focus on users’ ability to recall and reproduce their doodles and on the matching algorithms used to identify similar entries. While usability metrics, such as login times or success rates, are not reported, the scheme would likely require training of the recognition algorithm during password creation in order to build an accurate model of the password. Passdoodle passwords (i.e., the drawings themselves or a characterization thereof) must apparently be stored in a manner accessible to the system, as opposed to hashed, since the recognition algorithm requires both original and entered doodles to test if they are sufficiently similar.

Weiss and De Luca [2008] proposed a similar system, PassShapes. Passwords are translated into alphanumeric characters based on eight stroke directions recognized at 45° intervals. During login, PassShapes can be drawn in a different size or location on the screen and still be translated into correct output, provided the stroke direction is accurate. The password space is reduced, since only eight possible choices can be made with each stroke, giving a theoretical password space size similar to that of PIN’s if




Fig. 2. Pass-Go [Tao and Adams 2008].

the number of strokes is similar to the number of digits in a PIN. Lab-based studies show that memorability and login times for system-assigned seven-stroke passwords are acceptable according to the authors, but no security analysis has been reported.

The Pass-Go scheme (see Figure 2) designed by Tao and Adams [2008] was motivated by an expected DAS usability issue: the difficulty of accurately duplicating sketches whose lines cross near grid lines or grid line intersections. It is named for the ancient board game Go, which involves strategically placing tokens on the intersection points of a grid. In Pass-Go, users draw their password using grid intersection points (instead of grid cells in DAS). The user's movements are snapped to grid-lines and intersections, eliminating the impact of small variations in the trace. Surprisingly, Pass-Go is the only recall-based graphical password system to date for which testing in a field study has been reported. Results of the 167-participant study showed that login success rates were acceptable (as judged by the study's authors) at 78%; no login times were reported. The theoretical password space of Pass-Go is larger than that of DAS due to having a finer grid (more squares), allowing diagonal movements (DAS encodes only horizontal and vertical movements), and having pen color as an additional parameter. The designers suggest using a finer grid to further increase the theoretical password space. Users selected longer passwords and used color, both resulting in greater password complexity than in DAS. Thus, in Pass-Go, some dictionary attacks (as explained in Section 9) may be less effective, but attacks which exploit patterns [van Oorschot and Thorpe 2008; Chiasson et al. 2009a], for example, remain a concern.

A similar scheme was proposed by Orozco et al. [2006] using a haptic input device that measures pen pressure while users draw their password. Although intended to help protect against shoulder surfing (an observer would have difficulty distinguishing variances in pen pressure), their user study showed that users applied very little pen pressure and hardly lifted the pen while drawing. The differences were so small that the use of haptics did not increase the difficulty of guessing passwords. Por et al. [2008] proposed modifying Pass-Go to include background images to aid memorability, optionally highlighting the user's input to facilitate password entry at times when shoulder surfing is not a threat and adding decoy input traces to confuse an observer.

Gridsure [2009], a commercial product, displays digits in a 5×5 grid. Users select and memorize a pattern consisting of an ordered subset of the 25 grid squares and enter the corresponding digits therein using a keyboard. On subsequent logins, digits are randomly displayed within the grid cells, and users enter the new sequence of digits found within the cells, of their memorized pattern. The system must store the user's

pattern itself in a recoverable manner (i.e., storing it as the equivalent of a password rather than a hashed password) to allow verification of the user's input, which will vary across logins. GrIDSure was user-tested on PDAs brought to participants' homes or work locations [Brostoff et al. 2010]. With passwords of length 4, users achieved a login success rate of 87% on the first attempt. Of the subset of participants taking part in two studies two years apart, 12% were able to recall their password on the first attempt. Initial security analysis by Weber [2006] reported grIDSure passwords as much more secure than traditional PINs, especially against shoulder surfing. Independent analysis by Bond [2008] notes several weaknesses.

A grid-based system resembling a mini Pass-Go has also been deployed commercially for screen-unlock on Google Android cell phones. PatternLock [Tafasa 2010], a similar system, is available for the BlackBerry. Rather than entering a four-digit PIN, users touch-draw their password on a 3×3 grid. The Android screen-unlock scheme has been shown to be susceptible to "smudge attacks" [Aviv et al. 2010], where attackers can determine a user's password through the finger smudges left on the smart phone's surface.

These later recall schemes offer design and understanding beyond DAS. In particular, BDAS suggests that it may be possible to influence the user to select stronger passwords than they might otherwise. Also, the Pass-Go variant was implemented and tested in user studies with results supporting its usability in practice; a comparison with the memorability of text passwords remains to be done.

5. RECOGNITION-BASED SYSTEMS

Recognition-based systems, also known as *cognometric systems* [De Angeli et al. 2005] or *searchmetric systems* [Renaud 2009a], generally require that users memorize a portfolio of images during password creation and then must recognize their images from among decoys to log in. Humans have exceptional ability to recognize images previously seen, even those viewed very briefly [Standing et al. 1970; Nelson et al. 1976]. From a security perspective, such systems are not suitable replacements for text passwords, as they have password spaces comparable in cardinality to only four- or five-digit PINs (assuming a set of images whose cardinality remains reasonable with respect to usability). Proposed recognition-based systems use various types of images, most notably, faces, random art, everyday objects, and icons. Renaud [2009a] discusses specific security and usability considerations and offers usability design guidelines focusing on recognition-based systems.

Phishing attacks are somewhat more difficult with recognition-based systems, as a correct set of images must be presented to the user before password entry. In schemes where the image cues are identical with each login, attackers can retrieve the images beforehand. In schemes with variant responses, only a portion of the user's secret is exposed on any one login attempt, so multiple server probes are necessary. Alternatively, a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack can be used (see Section 9) in which the phishing site relays information between the legitimate site and the user in real-time; the phishing site would get the user to enter a username, pass this to the legitimate site, retrieve the panel of images and display these to the user on the phishing site, then relay the user's selections to the legitimate site. Thus, the attacker gains access to the user's account. While somewhat more involved than phishing attacks on recall-based schemes, similar MITM attacks can be launched against all recognition-based schemes discussed in this section.

Shoulder surfing seems to be of particular concern in recognition-based systems in which an attacker can record or observe the images selected by users during login. This is especially problematic for this category of schemes because there are relatively few images (indeed, the theoretical password space is small), and the images selected




Fig. 3. Passfaces/Faces system. Left: sample panel from the original Faces system [Davis et al. 2004]. Right: panel with decoys similar to the user’s portfolio [Dunphy et al. 2008b].

by users are large discrete units that may be more easily identifiable. Consequently, many recognition-based schemes have specific mechanisms for addressing this threat. For example, in many systems, users perform some action based on the location of their portfolio images within a panel of images without directly selecting their images. Varying the presented location of portfolio images, as determined by the system, creates a form of *challenge-response* system. In such cases, an attacker would need to observe several (ideally, many) successful logins by a user to gather enough information to correctly deduce sufficiently many portfolio images for a later fraudulent login. Screen-scraping malware would similarly require multiple login observations. Shoulder surfing-resistant approaches are often more time consuming and have additional usability costs because they require more effort from users.

In some graphical password schemes, the system must retain knowledge of some details of the shared secret, that is, user-specific profile data. In recognition schemes, the system must know which images belong to a user’s portfolio in order to display them. This information must be stored such that its original form is available to the system (possibly under reversible encryption) and is thus available to anyone gaining access to the stored information. Attackers with access to system-side files may acquire user-specific images or equivalent identifying information. This is true for all recognition-based systems described in this section and may also apply to any scheme requiring that the system retains direct knowledge of the shared secret.

5.1. Canonical Example: Passfaces (and Face)

The recognition-based system studied most extensively to date is Passfaces [Passfaces Corporation 2009]. Users preselect a set of human faces (see Figure 3). During login, a panel of candidate faces is presented. Users must select the face belonging to their set from among decoys. Several such rounds are repeated with different panels. For successful login, each round must be executed correctly. The set of images in a panel remains constant between logins, but images are permuted within a panel, incurring some usability cost. The original test systems had $n = 4$ rounds of $M = 9$ images per panel, with one image per panel from the user portfolio. The user portfolio contains exactly four faces, so all portfolio images are used during each login. The theoretical password space for Passfaces has cardinality M^n , with $M = 9, n = 4$ yielding $6561 \approx 2^{13}$ passwords.

In a study with 77 users, Valentine [1999] found that people could remember their Passfaces password over extended periods of time, with login success rates between 72% and 100% by the third attempt for various time intervals up to five months. The 34-user, Ten-week field study of Brostoff and Sasse [2000] found mixed results. While users made fewer login errors (95% success rate for Passfaces), they tended to log in less frequently than users with text passwords because the login process took too long (although no login times are reported).




Fig. 4. Story system [Davis et al. 2004].

Davis et al. [2004] conducted a 16-week field study where students used one of two graphical password schemes to access class material: Face (their own version of Passfaces) and Story (see Section 5.2). They found that users selected predictable passwords that could be successfully guessed by attackers with little effort, as detailed in Section 9. To avoid this problem, a commercial Passfaces product [Passfaces Corporation 2009] uses system-assigned portfolios that users memorize during an initial training process.

None of the preceding studies reports password creation time. The Passfaces Corporate website [2009] says that password creation takes 3–5 minutes for a panel of nine faces and five rounds.

Dunphy et al. [2008b] investigated whether Passfaces could be made less vulnerable to social engineering attacks in which attackers convince users to describe the images in their portfolio. They found that in 8% of 158 login attempts, participants could log in based on verbal descriptions of the portfolio images. They further found that participants were less likely (statistically significant) to correctly identify the portfolio image within a panel when decoys were strategically selected to be similar to the portfolio image. Alternatively, social engineering attacks could prompt users to take photographs or screenshots of their images for sharing, especially since all portfolio images are revealed with each login.

Comparing shoulder surfing risks between Passfaces, text passwords, and PINs in a lab study, Tari et al. [2006] found that Passfaces using keypad entry rather than a mouse was significantly less vulnerable to shoulder surfing than even text passwords or PINs. If Passfaces uses a keyboard for password entry, then malware attacks would need both a keystroke logger and screen-scraping software to gain enough knowledge for password entry; with regular mouse entry, only a screen scraper is needed. For further resistance against shoulder surfing, Dunphy et al. [2008a] proposed and tested a version of Passfaces using eye gaze as input at a simulated ATM machine. After initial “play” and “enrollment” phases, they found that participants improved in their ability to enter their passwords over time and that login took an average of 20 seconds for passwords consisting of five panels of nine faces.

Everitt et al. [2009] evaluated Passfaces for multiple password interference in a five-week study where users received email prompts asking them to log on to four different fictitious “accounts” according to different schedules. Those who logged in more frequently and those who practiced each new password individually for several days in succession were more successful at remembering their passwords.

5.2. Other Recognition-Based Schemes

Story (see Figure 4) was proposed by Davis et al. [2004] as a comparison system for Face. Users first select a sequence of images for their portfolio. To log in, users are presented with one panel of images, and they must identify their portfolio images from




Fig. 5. Déjà Vu [Dhamija and Perrig 2000].

among decoys. Story introduced a sequential component: users must select images in the correct order. To aid memorability, users were instructed to mentally construct a story to connect the everyday images in their set. In the test system, a password involved selecting a sequence of four images from a panel of nine images for a full password space of $9 \cdot 8 \cdot 7 \cdot 6 = 3,024 \approx 2^{12}$ passwords.

Story was user tested along with Face in a field study. Davis et al. [2004] found that user choices in Story were more varied but still displayed exploitable patterns, such as differences between male and female choices. Users had more difficulty remembering Story passwords ($\approx 85\%$ success rate) and most frequently made ordering errors. Surveys with participants revealed that they were unlikely to have formulated a story as a memory aid, despite the designers' intentions; this may explain the high number of ordering errors. Different instructions or more user experience might possibly result in greater usage of a story strategy.

In Déjà Vu [Dhamija and Perrig 2000] (see Figure 5), users select and memorize a subset of “random art” images from a larger sample for their portfolio. To log in, users must recognize images belonging to their predefined portfolio from a set of decoy images; in the test system, a panel of 25 images was displayed, five of which belonged to the user’s portfolio. Users must identify all images from their portfolio, and only one panel is displayed. Images of random art are used to make it more difficult for users to write down their password or share it with others by describing their images. The authors suggest that a fixed set of 10,000 images suffices but that “attractive” images should be hand selected to increase the likelihood that images have similar probabilities of being selected by users.

The theoretical password space has $\binom{N}{M}$ passwords for N images in the panel and M portfolio images shown. For example, $\binom{25}{5} = 53,130 \approx 2^{16}$. Déjà Vu was asserted [Dhamija and Perrig 2000] to be resistant to dictionary attacks because few images in the user study were selected by more than one user. This claim remains to be rigorously tested. Participants in the user study found it difficult to describe their portfolio images, and users who had the same image gave different descriptions from each other. This may stop social engineering attacks trying to gather enough information to log in by tricking the user to verbalize a password. Similarly, it would seem difficult to identify images belonging to a particular user based on knowing other information about that user; however, problems resulting from predictable user choice remain possible, such as users selecting images that include their favourite colour.

Weinshall [2006] proposed the Cognitive Authentication scheme (see Figure 6) intended to be safe against spyware and shoulder surfing. Keyboard input is used rather than a mouse, and users must recognize images from their previously memorized portfolio. The login task involves computing a path through a panel of images starting




Fig. 6. Cognitive Authentication scheme [Weinshall 2006]. ©2006 IEEE.

from the top-left corner based on whether particular images belong to the user's portfolio, that is, move down if you stand on a picture from your portfolio, move right otherwise; on reaching the panel's right or bottom edge, identify the corresponding label for that row or column. A multiple-choice question is presented which includes the label for the path's correct end point. Users perform several such rounds, each on a different panel. After each round, the system computes the cumulative probability that the correct answer was not entered by chance. When the probability passes a certain threshold, login succeeds. This tolerates some user error. If the threshold is not passed by a certain number of rounds, the login fails.

Users receive a system-assigned portfolio containing a large number (about 100) of randomly chosen images and extensive initial training to memorize it. No times are reported for this training phase. Average login time is 1.5 to 3 minutes. In a user study with nine participants, a 95% login success rate is reported, with users logging in over a period of ten weeks.

Although the main claim [Weinshall 2006] of resisting shoulder surfing was proven false [Golle and Wagner 2007] (see Section 9), Weinshall's scheme offers interesting lessons. The number of different passwords possible from a user's viewpoint is $\binom{N}{M}$ based on unique collections of images. N is the number of images in a panel; M the number of portfolio images displayed; $N = 80$, $M = 30$ gives $\binom{80}{30} = 2^{73}$ passwords. However, the redundancy which encodes the user's portfolio images into row and column labels apparently results in a many-to-one mapping of image sets onto system passwords, reducing the password space. For example, for exactly five rounds and four different multiple-choice answers, there are $4^5 = 2^{10}$ distinct system passwords. Dictionary and personalized attacks have no advantage over exhaustive attacks due to the random assignment of images. It appears impossible to verbalize enough information to convey a password to an attacker to allow successful login, making such social engineering attacks also improbable.

Other recognition-based systems have been proposed with similar usability and security profiles as those of the preceding paragraphs. We therefore mention them only briefly. In the VIP system [De Angeli et al. 2005; Moncur and Leplatte 2007], a panel of images is displayed. Users must select images from their portfolio among decoys. Different configurations allow for multiple rounds or sequencing of images. In the Photographic Authentication system [Pering et al. 2003], users initially provide their own set of digital photos. They must complete ten rounds identifying their own images from among decoys displayed on panels of four images. The decoy images are randomly selected from the images collected from other users. Use Your Illusion [Hayashi et al. 2008] also requires that users select portfolio images from panels of decoys; the selected images are distorted after original selection. The idea is that the legitimate

user can still recognize the images despite distortion, while the distortion creates difficulties for others. The distortion is intended to protect against social engineering and shoulder-surfing attacks. In the Convex Hull Click Scheme [Wiedenbeck et al. 2006], users select and memorize a portfolio of images. To log in, they must complete several rounds in which they recognize these images from among decoys. The images are small icons, and several dozen are randomly positioned on the screen. Each panel contains at least three of the user's icons. Users must identify their icons, visualize the triangle they form, and click anywhere within this triangle. This design is intended to protect against shoulder surfing but comes at a cost of longer login times. In Bicakci et al.'s [2009a] GPI (Graphical Password with Icons) and GPIS (Graphical Password with Icons suggested by the System) systems, users log in by selecting their six icons in order from a panel of 150 icons. The theoretical password space of these two schemes is similar to most cued-recall schemes at 2^{43} (see Section 6). The two systems differ only in how passwords are set. GPI allows users to choose any six icons as their password. In GPIS, passwords are suggested by the system, but users may shuffle until they find an acceptable password, reducing (but not eliminating) problems with user choice.

Renaud [2009b] completed a field study comparing different types of user involvement in selecting portfolio images for recognition-based schemes. Users could select images from a photo archive, take their own photos, or draw doodles that were subsequently scanned and converted to JPEG format. Results show a significant increase in login success rates when user portfolios contain self-drawn doodles rather than either type of photos. The memorability improvements, however, need to be balanced with the additional risk of personalized attacks if attackers know a user's drawing style or recognize personally identifiable features within the doodles.

An important feature in these schemes is the challenge-response approach where users are presented with a panel of images and must respond based on knowledge of a shared secret. In the simplest case, users select their portfolio images directly, while other schemes require additional mental processing by users to identify the correct response. Most of these early recognition-based schemes compromise between the size of the theoretical password space and usability in terms of memorability and login time. As proposed, most schemes offer a password space comparable to a four-digit PIN which, while useful in some environments, does not offer a substitute (with respect to security) for common text passwords. Everitt et al.'s [2009] study of interference in Passfaces is a positive step in understanding multiple password interference in recognition-based schemes. Further work is needed to better understand whether exposure to multiple sets of portfolio and decoy images increases chances of memory interference over time, especially as decoys become familiar.

6. CUED-RECALL SYSTEMS

Cued-recall systems typically require that users remember and target specific locations within an image. This feature, intended to reduce the memory load on users, is an easier memory task than pure recall. Such systems are also called *locimetric* [De Angeli et al. 2005], as they rely on identifying specific locations. This memory task differs from simply recognizing an image as a whole. Hollingworth and Henderson [2002] show that people retain accurate, detailed, visual memories of objects to which they previously attended in visual scenes; this suggests that users may be able to accurately remember specific parts of an image as their password if they initially focused on them. In an ideal design, the cue in an authentication system is helpful only to legitimate users (not to attackers trying to guess a password).

Cued-recall graphical password systems date back to Blonder's patent [1996]. Pass-Points, its successor, launched research in the cued-recall subclass sometimes called *click-based graphical passwords*.




Fig. 7. PassPoints password example. The five numbered boxes (not ordinarily visible to users) illustrate the tolerance area around click-points. Figure reprinted from Wiedenbeck et al. [2005c] with permission from Elsevier.

The schemes discussed next share a vulnerability to shoulder surfing and malware and are vulnerable to MITM phishing attacks similar to recognition-based schemes. To capture a click-based graphical password using malware, a mouse logger may suffice if the attacker can also determine the position of the image on the screen. Alternatively, a screen scraper may identify the image location and be sufficient if the attacker can identify when the user clicked the mouse button (some users very familiar with their password may not necessarily stop moving the cursor while clicking). Shoulder surfing may also reveal a user's password in a single login, as the entire password may be observable on the screen as the user enters it.

6.1. Canonical Example: PassPoints

The literature on cued-recall graphical password systems is dominated by PassPoints [Wiedenbeck et al. 2005a, 2005b, 2005c] and its variations. A password is a sequence of any $n = 5$ user-selected click-points (pixels) on a system-assigned image (see Figure 7). The user selects points by clicking on them using a mouse. During login reentry of the click-points must be in the correct order and accurate within a system-specified tolerance. The image acts as a memory cue to the location of the originally chosen click-points. Note that this is not an optimal cued-recall scenario: users are presented with only one cue but must recall five pieces of information in the correct order. The standard parameterization provides a theoretical password space of 2^{43} conceivable passwords; this increases with larger n and smaller tolerance, though usability impacts are expected.

An important implementation detail is the type of *discretization* used—this is related to how the system determines whether entered click-points are acceptably close to the original points and affects whether the system-side passwords stored for verification can be hashed. *Robust discretization* [Birget et al. 2006], *centered discretization* [Chiasson et al. 2008b], and *optimal discretization* [Bicakci 2008] are possible alternatives. Kirovski et al. [2006] suggest how discretization could be implemented using Voronoi polygon tiling by analyzing image features and centering likely click-points within the polygons.

Wiedenbeck et al. [2005a, 2005b, 2005c] conducted three lab-based user studies of PassPoints. Users took 64 seconds to initially create a password and required an additional 171 seconds of training time on average to memorize their password. Login took between nine and 19 seconds on average. Login success rates varied from 55–90%, with users returning at different intervals to log in again. User performance was found to be similar on the four images tested, and it was recommended that

tolerance areas around click-points be at least 14×14 pixels for acceptable usability. Chiasson et al. [2007a] conducted a lab study and a field study, finding that image choice does impact usability, that tolerance areas could be further reduced, and that memory interference from remembering multiple PassPoints passwords may be problematic. When explored further, memory interference was shown to be less problematic for PassPoints passwords than text passwords [Chiasson et al. 2009b]. Later security analyses found it to be vulnerable to hotspots and simple geometric patterns within images [Golofit 2007; Dirik et al. 2007; Thorpe and van Oorschot 2007; Salehi-Abari et al. 2008; van Oorschot and Thorpe 2011; Chiasson et al. 2009a], as elaborated in Section 9. Bicakci et al. [2009b] conducted a lab study where PassPoints was used as the master password for a Web-based password manager and concluded that it was more usable than an alphanumeric master password. Their implementation used a visible grid dividing the image into discrete sections rather than any of the aforementioned discretization methods.

A commercial version of PassPoints for the PocketPC is available from visKey¹ for screen unlock by tapping on the correct sequence of click-points using a stylus or finger. Users may define settings, such as n , the size of the tolerance regions, and which image is displayed.

6.2. Other Cued-Recall Variants

PassPoints has received attention from others who have proposed modifications. Suo [2006] proposed a shoulder-surfing resistant version as follows. During login, the image is blurred except for a small focus area. Users enter Y (for yes) or N (for no) on the keyboard or use the right and left mouse buttons to indicate if their click-point is within the focused area. The process repeats for at most ten rounds, until all five click-points are identified. We note that as the user's clickpoints are guaranteed to be within the ten focus areas, observing one login narrows the search space considerably, and observing a few logins would allow password recovery.

Cued Click-Points (CCP) [Chiasson et al. 2007b] is a click-based scheme where users select one click-point on each of five images presented in sequence, one at a time; this provides *one-to-one cueing*. Each image after the first is a deterministic function of the current image, the coordinates of the user-entered click-point, and a user identifier. Users receive immediate feedback if they enter an incorrect click-point during login, seeing an image that they do not recognize. At this point, they can restart password entry to correct the error. This *implicit feedback* [Chiasson et al. 2007b] is not helpful to an attacker not knowing the expected image sequence.

In a lab-based user study [Chiasson et al. 2007b] of CCP, users successfully logged in on the first attempt, without errors or restarts, in 96% of the trials. On average, participants took 25 seconds to create a password and seven seconds to login. Analysis of user choice revealed that users tended to select click-points falling within known hotspots [Chiasson et al. 2008a], but that simple patterns of click-points were eliminated (cf. PassPoints) [Chiasson et al. 2009a].

Persuasive Cued Click-Points (PCCP) [Chiasson et al. 2008a] is a variation of CCP designed to persuade users to select more random passwords. It functions like CCP, but during password creation, the image is dimmed except for a small square viewport area randomly positioned on the image. Users select a click-point from within this viewport (see Figure 8) or may press a "shuffle" button to randomly reposition the viewport until a suitable location is found. On subsequent logins, images are displayed in their normal format with no dimming or viewport. Common wisdom that users choose the path of least resistance here means selecting a click-point within the first or first few

¹SFR Software. visKey for Pocket PC. <http://www.sfr-software.de/cms/EN/pocketpc/viskey/>.



Fig. 8. Persuasive Cued Click-Points [Chiasson et al. 2008a]. During password creation, users select a click-point from the highlighted viewport or press the shuffle button to relocate the viewport.

viewports. The design intent of the viewport is to flatten the distribution of click-points across multiple users, reducing hotspots.

In a lab study [Chiasson et al. 2008a], login success rates were similar to those of CCP. Participants took 50 seconds on average to create a password (an increase mainly due to participants who shuffled repeatedly, though most shuffled relatively infrequently) and eight seconds to log in. A later two-week study [Stobert et al. 2010] comparing PCCP configured with different image sizes and numbers of click-points found that both manipulations had similar effects on usability. PCCP reportedly [Chiasson et al. 2009a] removes major concerns related to common patterns and hotspots.

As mentioned earlier, proposed implementations of PassPoints, CCP, and PCCP use a grid-based discretization algorithm to determine whether login click-points are within tolerance. In system-side storage for verification, these passwords can be hashed; additional information, such as a grid identifier (for each click-point), however, is stored in a manner accessible to the system to allow the system to use the appropriate grid to verify login attempts. It is unclear if attackers gaining access to the server-side storage can use these grid identifiers to their advantage.

Inkblot Authentication [Stubblefield and Simon 2004] (see Figure 9) is not strictly a graphical password system but uses images as a cue for text password entry. During password creation, users are shown a series of computer-generated “inkblots” and asked to type the first and last letter of the word/phrase that best describes the inkblot. The letter pairs form the password. The inkblots are displayed in shuffled order as cues during login, and users enter each of their two-character responses. The same shuffled order is used for each subsequent login. It was suggested that with time, users would memorize their password and would no longer need to rely on the inkblots as cues. 25 users in a lab study were presented with ten inkblots and created a corresponding password. After one day, 80% of users entered their entire password correctly; 72% were successful after one week. With only one exception, when users made mistakes, it was on only one of their ten character pairs. The resulting passwords were relatively strong (20 characters long with no recognizable words; although some letters were more popular than others). It is claimed that inkblots are abstract enough that an attacker seeing the inkblots would not have an advantage in guessing a user’s password.

Similarly, Jiminy [Renaud and Smith 2001; Renaud and Angeli 2004] is a graphical tool for remembering text passwords. A grid of alphanumeric characters is placed




Fig. 9. Inkblots from the Inkblot Authentication user study [Stubblefield and Simon 2004]. ©Microsoft Corporation. Used with permission from Microsoft Corporation.

over an image, and users are provided with coloured templates that contain several openings. To log in, users must select the appropriate template, anchor it to the correct location on the image, then enter the sequence of characters visible through the openings. Instead of remembering their text password, users remember the position of the template on the image. Several users in paper-based and Web-based studies selected the same anchor points, indicating that the security impact of hotspots in this scheme is in doubt.

Alsulaiman and El Saddik [2006] proposed a 3D scheme where users navigate a 3D world and perform actions interpreted as their password. Much like the preceding 2D graphical passwords, the 3D environment acts as a cue to prompt users to perform their actions. The designers envision that users could perform various actions, such as clicking on certain areas, typing or drawing on a virtual surface, supplying a biometric, or interacting with parts of the virtual world (like turning on a light switch). A prototype system implements a small portion of the scheme (users can walk through a virtual art gallery and enter text passwords at virtual computers or select pictures as part of a graphical password). Details about other proposed components are conceptual only. No user testing or security results are reported, making usability or security evaluations difficult.

While some analysis of the preceding schemes can be done using standard statistical tests, occasionally novel or specialized approaches are required. For example, in click-based graphical passwords, analysis of the two-dimensional space is desirable for identifying patterns in user behaviour. Conventional statistics do not apply, but point pattern analysis [Diggle 1983] from spatial statistics has been used [Chiasson et al. 2008a] to evaluate and compare clustering of click-points on images.

With click-based graphical passwords, as well as other types of authentication schemes, getting an accurate measure of the effective password space remains a challenge when user choice is involved. One alternative approach is to evaluate whether the set of passwords (or password components) selected by users is representative of the full theoretical password space T . A Monte Carlo approach can determine the likelihood that a particular set of passwords occurred by chance (and thus is similar to a random set taken from T). With Monte Carlo methods, randomly generated datasets are used to identify the range of probable analytical measures which can then be compared to those based on datasets collected from actual usage. This approach has been used to compare models of the effective password spaces for PassPoints, CCP, and PCCP [Chiasson et al. 2009a].

In summary, early cued-recall schemes, such as PassPoints, offered promise as alternatives to text passwords due to their large theoretical password space and short login times. However, analysis revealed reduced security due to the existence of hotspots and simple patterns in user selection of click-points. Later schemes, such as PCCP, aim

Table I. Recall-Based Systems (Summary)

Scheme	Android screen unlock	GrIDsure	PassShapes	DAS	BDAS	PassGo	YAGP	Haptic password	Passdoodle
Theoretical space (bits)	○ 18	○ 18	● 21	● 58	● 58	● 77	● 300	<i>i.d.</i>	<i>i.d.</i>
User-choice resilience	*◊	*◊	♦	*◊	<i>i.d.</i>	◊	*◊	*◊	*◊
Variant response	no	yes	no	no	no	no	no	no	no
Server probes	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Paper study	—	—	3×/1.5wk	1× 2×/1wk	2×/1wk 2×/1wk	—	—	—	2×/1wk
Lab study	—	≥ 11wk ≥ 1.5wk	3×/1.5wk	—	—	—	3×/2wk	1×	1×
Field study	—	—	—	—	—	13wk	—	—	—
Web study	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Login time	—	—	6s	—	—	—	—	—	—
Success rate	—	87%	63–100%	57–80%	50–80%	78%	87–96%	—	38–46%
Interference studied	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

to explicitly address these issues without resorting to system-assigned passwords, and have introduced other features, such as implicit feedback and graphical aids for text passwords, that might benefit other next-generation authentication schemes as well.

7. SUMMARY OF GRAPHICAL PASSWORD SYSTEMS

Tables I–III summarize the 25 graphical password schemes discussed. Cells containing *i.d.* indicate insufficient detail available in the literature to evaluate the scheme on this criterion; an asterisk (*) indicates our best estimate based on available information; a dagger (†) represents an approximation based on reported figures; a dash (—) indicates that to our knowledge, no published results are available in the literature.

We identified four measures to summarize security. First, we labeled schemes based on theoretical password space for the configurations most commonly reported or used in any user testing according to three ranges: under 20 bits (*PIN-level*, ○), 20 to 60 bits (*password-level*, ●), and over 60 bits (*crypto-level*, ●). It remains open to debate exactly what size of theoretical password space is sufficient in different threat environments—for example, some suggest that 2^{20} suffices for online environments with lockout rules [Florencio and Herley 2010]. Next, schemes were rated on the degree to which user-choice issues may weaken security, for example, allowing more efficient dictionary attacks. Schemes known to suffer from skewed password distributions related to user choice were rated weakest (◊), and those with system-assigned passwords rated strongest (♦). Those attempting to influence user choice towards more secure options were rated ♦. In schemes allowing two deployment options (user-chosen or system-generated passwords), the table cell includes a rating for each. In the “variant response” row, ‘yes’ indicates a non-static response (e.g., different parts of a password portfolio are entered across login instances), and a simply recorded response replayed later will fail. In PassFaces, a constant set of images are permuted within a panel, but

Table II. Recognition-Based Systems (Summary)

Scheme	Cognitive Authentication	Use Your Illusion	Story	Passfaces / Face	VIP (type 1)	Déjà Vu	Photographic Authentication	Convex Hull Click	GPI / GPIS
Theoretical space (bits)	○● 10/73	○ 11	○ 12	○ 13	○ 13	○ 16	● 20	● 32	● 43
User-choice resilience	♦	<i>i.d.</i>	◊	◊ / ♦	♦	*◊	*◊	*◊	*◊/*♦
Variant response	yes	no	no	no	no	no	yes	yes	no
Server probes	many	1	1	1	1	1	many	many	1
Paper study	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Lab study	13×/ 10wk	4×/4wk	—	—	2×/1wk 3×/4wk	2×/1wk	1×	2×/1wk	2×/1wk
Field study	—	—	≥16wk	≥16wk 10wk	≥16wk	—	—	—	—
Web study	—	—	—	1-5mth 5wk	—	—	—	—	—
Login time	90–180s	12–26s	—	14–88s	5–†6s	32–36s	†40s	72s	†18s/†19s
Success rate	>95%	89–100%	†85%	72–100%	†11–95%	90–100%	†95–100%	90%	83%/74%
Interference studied	—	—	—	yes	yes	—	—	—	—

users select the same image; we mark such schemes ‘no’ for variant response. Ideally in variant response schemes, shoulder surfing or key logging requires more than one login instance to recover a password equivalent. Finally, we examined the number of probes to the legitimate server an attacker requires to prepare a phishing attack, that is, to acquire the images or cues needed to extract a password from a user. A probe means one login instance with the legitimate server and does not involve interaction with the user (e.g., no probes are needed for DAS, as an attacker need only display a drawing grid on a phishing site; for PassPoints, one probe is needed to retrieve the image for a specified userid).

For usability, we summarize the types of user studies that have been conducted, note whether memory interference from multiple passwords has been studied (‘yes’ indicates at least one study examined interference), and include two of the most commonly reported usability measures: login time and success rate—tabulating the range of results across the reported studies for a given scheme. When available, login success rates on the first attempt are reported. For the user studies, we identify the number of sessions and the duration of study in weeks. For example, two lab studies have been conducted for PassShapes (Table I)—the first consisted of a single lab session, the second of three sessions spread over 1.5 weeks. A row related to hybrid studies is omitted from the tables since, to our knowledge, no hybrid studies have been reported in the literature for any of the schemes.

8. USABILITY ASPECTS

This section is based on an examination of the literature reporting results of usability testing of graphical password systems. As there has been essentially no coordinated work towards an accepted standard for evaluating the usability of graphical password

Table III. Cued-Recall Systems (Summary)

Scheme	Jiminy	Suo's scheme	PassPoints	CCP	PCCP	Inkblot Authentication	3D scheme
Theoretical pswd (bits)	○ 9	○ / ● 16 / 43	● 43	● 43	● 43	● 94	<i>i.d.</i>
User-choice resilience	*◊	*◊	◊	◊	*◆	*◆	<i>i.d.</i>
Variant response	no	yes	no	no	no	no	<i>i.d.</i>
Server probes	1	<i>i.d.</i>	1	many	many	1	<i>i.d.</i>
Paper study	2×/4 wk	—	—	—	—	—	—
Lab study		—	2×/1wk 3×/6wk 1× 2×/2wk	1×	1× 2×/2wk	3×/1wk	—
Field study	12wk	—	7–9wk	—	—	—	—
Web study	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Login time	—	—	9–25s	7s	11–89s	—	—
Success rate	†47–73%	—	38–94%	96%	83–94%	†68–80%	—
Interference studied	—	—	yes	—	—	—	—

schemes, nearly every system evaluated has been tested (if at all) using different criteria. This makes comparison difficult at best. Even when apparently similar measures are reported, they have often been calculated using different methods and may represent completely different measures. In what follows, we provide context and offer specific recommendations intended to facilitate comparisons of such schemes in the future. Some of the observations are common knowledge to human-computer interaction (HCI) experts but are either not widely practiced or widely acknowledged in the graphical password literature to date.

8.1. Target Users

Characteristics of the intended users must be taken into account when designing or selecting an appropriate graphical password scheme. The expertise level of target users may dictate the acceptable complexity of the interaction and the level of training required or expected. The frequency of use may also have a significant influence on usability. Frequently accessed systems should be quick to use and may rely more heavily on users' memory, as frequent repetition aids memory. If passwords are used for infrequently accessed systems, they must be especially memorable, since memory decays over time. Issues of accessibility may arise since different user populations, such as the elderly [Renaud 2005b], have different requirements. Many of the systems we have discussed implicitly require users with good vision, potentially including good color vision (for recognizing cues) and good motor skills (for entering sketches or accurate clicks on an image). Design of graphical password systems therefore needs to either address these issues, provide alternatives, or be very aware of the limitations they impose on who will be able to successfully use the software. Because authentication systems by

their nature act as gatekeepers to computer systems and services, these issues must be taken very seriously and should be addressed in proposals for new schemes.

8.2. Tasks

Ease of login is the most frequently examined task but is only one of many. Ideally, usability should be explored along several dimensions. For usability, essential elements to measure and report include time to create a password and to login, memorability (typically through success rates and number of errors made during login over an extended period), and interference by testing with a normal password load (as opposed to with only one password at a time).

8.2.1. Password Initialization. Authentication systems require initialization. A graphical password can either be assigned or user selected. Training may be conducted, in part to compensate for the novelty of a scheme relative to well-known approaches like text passwords. Password confirmation is usually involved to ensure that users have not made trivial entry errors and can accurately remember and enter their password after a short time before testing longer-term memorability.

Allowing users to select their own password can aid usability, since a password having personal meaning may be easier to remember. However, this design decision has security disadvantages. As discussed later, graphical password systems that suffer from predictability problems due to user choice include the canonical examples of all three main categories: Passfaces, DAS (Pass-Go), and PassPoints. For example, from their study of Face and Story, Davis et al. [2004] conclude that user choice leads to predictable patterns that may be exploited by attackers.

Allowing user-chosen passwords can also encourage password reuse across accounts. Despite obvious usability advantages (e.g., reduced memory load and no need to think of new creative passwords for each new account), password reuse implies that an attacker who gains access to an account on a weakly protected system may then have sufficient information to log in to that user's higher-value accounts. If permitted, users often reuse passwords verbatim; Florencio and Herley [2007] found that text passwords are reused on an average of six different accounts. Many users also form some common strategy or pattern across accounts [Adams et al. 1997]. Both situations may be exploited by an attacker who acquires one of the passwords.

Systems which assign randomly selected passwords preclude attacks exploiting predictability and also eliminate the potential for cross-account password reuse. However, such systems may require time-consuming training to help users remember their passwords (e.g., recall Weinschall [2006]). Even with training, such passwords may remain more difficult to remember, since opportunities for leveraging are removed. In the Passfaces study of Everitt et al. [2009] which assigned passwords to avoid the predictability seen in earlier Passfaces studies, the order of password acquisition and login frequency significantly impacted password memorability. Allowing users to use their own images may improve memorability and encourage positive affective responses [Mannan et al. 2010], but predictability and personalization may weaken security.

It is possible for a system to allow partial user choice in password selection. For example, in PCCP (see Section 6.2), the middle ground between allowing user-choice and system-assigned passwords led to passwords nearly indistinguishable from random on the measures examined [Chiasson et al. 2009a]. Further work is needed to evaluate the effect on long-term memorability.

8.2.2. Login. Login should be quick and simple since it is the most common task completed by users of an authentication system. Deviation from this rule may be acceptable under certain circumstances (see Section 8.3).

Text passwords have an advantage of being ubiquitous and can be typed in a few seconds or less on standard keyboards. It is thus natural to compare the time to enter a graphical password to that for a text password. Error and success rates on login are the usability measures most often reported in user studies of graphical passwords. Unfortunately, they are often calculated in different ways and measured at different times. For example, some studies consider the trial a success if users can log in within three attempts, while others count only trials that are successful with no errors (i.e., first attempt). To allow comparison, we recommend reporting (at least) success rates for the first attempt and after three attempts, due to the common practice of lockout after three failed attempts.

Memorability issues are important when discussing login performance, as memorability is a main factor in determining login success. Measures of memorability address whether passwords can be remembered over short- and long-term and with varying login frequencies. For strategies for testing memorability, see Section 10.1.

Most graphical password studies to date have required users to remember only one password at a time, whereas in real life, users must remember many passwords and may get them confused. In the cognitive psychology literature [Anderson and Neely 1996], *memory interference* is “the impaired ability to remember an item when it is similar to other items stored in memory.” With authentication, interference occurs when remembering a password for one system impairs the user’s memory of a password for another system. This may be of particular concern with graphical passwords, since exposure to similar images from multiple concurrent passwords or from password resets may aggravate the problem. Although an important usability concern, published studies [Everitt et al. 2009; Chiasson et al. 2009b; Moncur and Leplatre 2007; Chiasson et al. 2007a] evaluating interference from multiple passwords are only now beginning to appear.

8.2.3. Password Reset and Password Change. The tasks of resetting or changing passwords are not typically examined during usability testing of new graphical password schemes, but these are often required in practice when users forget passwords. The process may involve the user interacting only with the system or may require contact with help desk personnel. Both involve confirming the user’s identity through some secondary means and issuing a new password (which often must be changed immediately upon the next login). New text passwords can easily be communicated by phone or through email; graphical passwords cannot be communicated as easily. While this provides protection against some social engineering attacks, it also poses a usability challenge. One solution is to assign a temporary non-graphical password during password reset, giving system access to create a new password. Text passwords may also be used as a fallback if, for example, some users must, from time to time, log in from legacy systems having text-only interfaces.

System configuration and design of the password reset and password change mechanisms can impact memorability, interference, and security of the system. For example, if users are presented with the same or similar images as in previous graphical passwords, they may be more likely to confuse the memories of passwords or to reuse passwords. This suggests that reuse of graphical password images should be avoided and also argues against images being uploaded by users.

Most authentication systems must allow password changes (some systems require this at specified intervals). The usability and security concerns are similar to password reset, except users can complete the task themselves without requiring a temporary password, entering their current graphical password as authentication.

8.2.4. Portable Login. Unless restricted to specific environments (e.g., physical presence in a corporate office or at a bank ATM), users of graphical password systems may need

to log in from different physical devices or locations. Usability issues to consider include whether the system is suitable for access from devices having different screen sizes or resolutions and whether local bandwidth constraints impact performance. Moreover, portable login may require a modified login process or completion of additional tasks; these should also be considered and tested.

8.3. Domains

Performance constraints and goals for an authentication system differ depending on the intended environment of use. When presenting a new scheme, the target environment should be clearly declared to allow comparison of systems intended for similar conditions and to avoid deploying systems in inappropriate domains.

For high-risk domains, such as online banking, security is of utmost importance, and it may be acceptable to have a system that is slightly more difficult to use in order to achieve the desired level of security, as long as usability problems do not lead to behaviour triggering other security issues. Conversely, it may be acceptable to have very usable but lower-security schemes for lower-risk domains. In fact, this could improve security for high-risk domains if it eliminates the opportunity for password reuse between high- and low-risk systems; it may also help with memorability by reducing the chances of password interference. Similarly, infrequently used accounts may be better served by a more memorable scheme that has a relatively long login time if this makes it more likely that the user can log in when needed.

It is unlikely that any single scheme will ideally suit all domains, tasks, and target users from a combined usability and security viewpoint. Thus, specifying the target environments and applications for newly proposed schemes is important.

9. SECURITY ASPECTS AND ATTACKS

This section discusses standard threats to password-based authentication systems and how they relate to graphical passwords. Attacks are classified as guessing or capture attacks (including malware which captures passwords). We do not discuss attacks which exploit software vulnerabilities to bypass the authentication system entirely, limiting our scope to attacks which directly obtain password credentials.

9.1. Guessing Attacks

Many standard attacks on text passwords convert directly to attacks on some graphical password schemes once the graphical passwords are encoded in the canonical representation of their password space. For example, since a user response still corresponds to a password, exhaustive search attacks are possible given knowledge of the encoding used (e.g., as binary strings or alphanumeric characters). As such, developers of new graphical schemes must be aware of these to design against them.

Guessing attacks remain a serious threat [Ramsbrock et al. 2007; Seifert 2006; Thames et al. 2008], but statistics are scarce (few organizations publicize breaches). An *online guessing attack* requires interaction with the live system; password guesses are entered in turn to see if login succeeds. For graphical as well as text passwords, defenses may be aided by clever use of CAPTCHAs [Pinkas and Sander 2002], increasingly delaying (e.g., doubling) system response time on successive incorrect guesses, or by limiting, per user account, the number of incorrect login attempts allowed before disabling further attempts. The latter risks locking out legitimate users who forget their password, enables denial-of-service attacks which intentionally provide incorrect passwords, and is less effective against multi-account attacks.

In an *offline guessing attack*, attackers gain access to verifiable text [Gong et al. 1993] and need not interact with the live system to verify guesses. For equivalent password

spaces, schemes vulnerable to offline attack are at higher risk than those requiring online verification offline work is not visible, processing trial guesses can be quicker, and precomputed data structures or special hardware may be used.

Defensive techniques against guessing attacks vary in utility depending on the environment. For most text-based passwords and some graphical systems (though often unspecified) system-side passwords are stored after processing by a one-way hash function for added security in case an attacker gains access to this storage. To check if a (userid, password) attempt is correct, the system hashes the password input and compares it to the value stored for that userid. One way to complicate guessing attacks is *iterated hashing* [Morris and Thompson 1979], requiring, say, 1,000 or many more repeated hashing operations (rather than one); this increases the time for testing password candidates online or to precompute dictionaries. *Salting* [Morris and Thompson 1979] concatenates to a password (before hashing) a user-specific string stored along with the hashed password; this forces hashing for each password guess on a per-salt basis, increasing the cost of precomputed databases. Most graphical password proposals fail to consider important implementation details, such as hashing and salting. Retrofitting such defenses may or may not be possible, depending on design characteristics inherent to individual schemes.

Other defenses, especially important for graphical password schemes subject user-choice issues, include *password rules* or policies [Morris and Thompson 1979] disallowing weak passwords at creation, systems that encourage stronger password choices [Chiasson et al. 2008a; Bicakci et al. 2009a], and both reactive and proactive *password checkers* [Klein 1990; Bergadano et al. 1998]. *System-assigned passwords* are generated randomly to preclude attacks exploiting skewed distributions and drive use of larger portions of the theoretical password space but have high usability costs: longer training times or increased likelihood that users forget passwords. Mnemonic strategies like Story [Davis et al. 2004] may improve both usability and security but often suffer from predictability problems if user choice is allowed.

9.1.1. Exhaustive-Search (Brute-Force) Attacks. Exhaustive-search attacks try all elements in a search space, whether representing graphical or text passwords. For user-chosen passwords which are far from equiprobable, dictionary attacks are preferred (see the following) except for small password spaces.

Exhaustive-search optimizations, such as Oechslin's *rainbow tables* [2003], which trade precomputation time for storage, are relevant for password cracking. Coarse sequencing optimizations include guessing shorter passwords first (e.g., fewer cell-crossings and strokes in DAS). Fine sequencing optimizations, such as ordering passwords in decreasing expected probability and favoring subsets expected to hold higher probability passwords [van Oorschot and Thorpe 2008], are a cross between intelligent brute-force and dictionary attacks.

The advantage to exhaustive offline attacks is that with enough time and computing power, all passwords will be found. However, full search of large password spaces is limited in practice by the time or processing power available; searching only subsets is faster, but doesn't guarantee success. To minimize the threat of exhaustive attacks, the theoretical password space should be too large to search. Note that this is not the case for many recognition-based systems—for example, the most common configuration of Passfaces has nine image panels and four rounds, yielding only $9^4 = 6,561$ passwords. Often such systems require complementary mechanisms, such as limiting the number of online guesses per account or multifactor authentication (e.g., TwoStep Authentication [van Oorschot and Wan 2009]). Helping the defender, attacks may require obtaining the image set used, which involves additional effort; the added barrier depends on the size of the image set and the methods required to access it.

9.1.2. Dictionary Attacks and Optimizations. Dictionary attacks on graphical passwords [Davis et al. 2004; Thorpe and van Oorschot 2004] follow a long line of attacks on text passwords (e.g., [Morris and Thompson 1979; Feldmeier and Karn 1989; Klein 1990; Wu 1999; Yan et al. 2005]). The original idea involved guessing passwords from a relatively short precompiled list (*dictionary*) of high-probability candidate passwords based on empirical data or assumptions about user behaviour. Massive dictionaries and powerful data structures have created a continuum from small dictionaries to prioritized brute-force attacks, with *smart dictionary attacks* combining time-memory trade-offs of exhaustive attacks with higher success probabilities of prioritized dictionaries, in some cases algorithmically generated [Narayanan and Shmatikov 2005].

In systems allowing user choice, dictionary attacks exploit skewed password distributions resulting from certain subsets of passwords being more attractive to non-negligible sets of users. Attacks succeed as users select passwords from predictable relatively small subsets of the theoretical password space known as *weak password subspaces* [van Oorschot and Thorpe 2008], which can be enumerated, are small enough to search, and contain a significant fraction of passwords chosen in practice. These are collectively modeled as an *effective password space*, including passwords with predicted probabilities higher than some threshold. A theoretical space too large to be exhaustively attacked does not guarantee security; the effective password space must also be too large to search. The challenge here is to understand what composes the effective password space which remains an open problem even for text passwords. Many graphical password proposals fall to dictionary attacks due to predictable patterns in user choice, as we discuss next.

9.1.3. Guessing Attacks on Specific Graphical Password Schemes. We now discuss some guessing attacks on specific graphical password schemes. Many are adaptations of known strategies previously discussed. Replicating all details in a comprehensive review of attacks to date is beyond our scope. Instead, our goal is to both give a brief description of some attack methods used in analysis and to emphasize that essentially all new proposals which have been subjected to detailed security analysis have exhibited weaknesses not originally envisioned. Though disappointing, this follows historical precedent in new security mechanisms; iteratively improving on bold new ideas is often necessary. We focus on results for the exemplars of the three major classes of graphical passwords. Flaws in these raise a red flag for the many others which have seen at best superficial security analysis. Many designers making new graphical password proposals have presented functional details but no thorough security analysis. We expect this weakness in the literature will be repaired as the research matures. Until then, optimistic but unsupported security assertions by proponents of new schemes are best viewed skeptically.

Recall-Based Systems. In detailed security analysis of DAS and Pass-Go [Thorpe 2008; van Oorschot and Thorpe 2008], Thorpe used a predictive method built on the reflective symmetry and stroke-count characteristics of passwords to identify DAS weak password subspaces. Supporting evidence that these subspaces accurately modeled user choice included a small 16-user paper-based DAS study [Nali and Thorpe 2004] and more convincingly, a 167-user Pass-Go field study [Tao 2006; Tao and Adams 2008]. In the Pass-Go study, 40% of users chose passwords falling in a subspace defined primarily by symmetry with respect to a central vertical and horizontal axis (without restrictions on stroke count), and 72% chose passwords falling in a subspace characterized by four or fewer strokes. Similar results were found in the DAS study. The field study also revealed 19% of user-chosen Pass-Go passwords were from a third category (a subspace of about 2^{36} elements), namely, drawings of alphabetic characters or symbols. Populating dictionaries using these subspaces which range from 2^{31} to 2^{41}

elements allows an exponential decrease in search space versus the full space of 2^{58} passwords. Thus, successful dictionary attacks on Pass-Go (and DAS) require vastly less effort than initially expected or implied by their full password spaces.

Recognition-Based Systems. The most prominent security analysis to date for recognition-based systems involved a field study dataset of the Face and Story schemes [Davis et al. 2004]; passwords in both consisted of four image items. Random subsets containing 80% of the user-chosen passwords were used to construct dictionaries, allowing calculation of how many guesses an attacker following this strategy would take to correctly guess some or all of the remaining 20% of the dataset passwords. The dictionaries were arranged in nonincreasing order of probability, with the probability distribution over both user choice (as approximated by the dataset itself; see the following) and the details of the scheme. Such a probability model may involve simplifying approximations, for example, assuming that the second and later password elements depend only on the preceding element (a first-order Markov model). The model thus depends on the relative frequencies of pairs of image elements within individual passwords, with the dataset approximating user choice across larger (and different) populations.

For Face, the analysis showed that users tend to select attractive faces of their own race (e.g., Asian, white, black) and selected predictable sets of faces such that an attacker knowing one face could leverage expectations of the face most likely to be selected next in a password. Gender information (male, female) also influenced choice. For the Face dataset, the weakest 25% of user passwords could be guessed in 13 attempts (compared to a full password space of $9^4 = 6,561$), and the weakest 10% (corresponding to male participants) in two guesses. For Story, the weakest 25% could be guessed in 112 attempts (compared to a full space of $9 \cdot 8 \cdot 7 \cdot 6 = 3,024$) and the weakest 10% in 35 guesses. This work highlights the potentially severe (and predictable, thus exploitable) skews in password distribution that may arise from unrestricted user choice in graphical password schemes and the possibility of coarse personalized attacks, for example, exploiting knowledge of user race or gender.

Cued-Recall Systems. PassPoints and its relatives have attracted the most security analysis among graphical schemes. Efficient dictionary attacks have been enabled by two major weaknesses, both related to user choice. *Hotspots* [Dirik et al. 2007; Golofit 2007] are popular points or areas of an image with a higher probability of being chosen by users as click-points. *Patterns* [Chiasson et al. 2009a] are lines or simple geometric shapes formed by user-chosen click-points in a password. The following attacks target PassPoints itself, as opposed to evolved systems like PCCP.

Success in exploiting hotspots with automated image-processing tools has been reported [Dirik et al. 2007; Salehi-Abhari et al. 2008]. The most efficient hotspot attacks to date [Thorpe and van Oorschot 2007; van Oorschot and Thorpe 2011] harvest from different users a small sample of passwords for target images, using the component click-points to build “human-seeded” attack dictionaries. One such attack uses a first-order Markov model (previously mentioned); a second, based on an independent probability model, assumes click-points are independent of their predecessors. We cite an example result for a seed dataset harvested from a lab study and tested on a field study dataset with full password spaces of 2^{43} . Using dictionaries based on the first-order Markov model, 4% and 10% of field study passwords, respectively, were found within 100 guesses on two representative images. As a second example result, using the first-order Markov-model attack with cross validation on the field study data found on average 7–10% of user passwords within three guesses. While roughly comparable in approach to the random subsampling analysis for Face mentioned just previously, the result here is more startling, as the full password space is 2^{43} for PassPoints compared to just 2^{13} for Face.

The prevalence of simple click-order patterns in PassPoints passwords has also been exploited in customized dictionary attacks, some of which (counterintuitively) are image-independent, as some patterns are evident across a wide range of images. The best such attacks to date are purely automated attacks [Salehi-Abari et al. 2008; van Oorschot et al. 2010] not requiring human seeding. The main patterns explored are variations of (i) “loosely defined” lines and (ii) sequences of five points where consecutive points are constrained only by a fixed distance. To cite two example results, one approach using image-independent patterns found 48–54% of passwords on two representative images from a field study dataset using dictionaries of about 2^{35} entries; a second approach, combining a simple pattern with image processing based on a model of visual attention found 7–16% of passwords on the two images using dictionaries of 2^{26} entries (vs. a full space of 2^{43}).

General Comments. Dictionary attacks against recognition and cued-recall graphical password systems may require more effort upfront than against text passwords or (pure) recall-based graphical passwords, since attackers may have to first collect one or more images. Also, images gathered for one system will not help attacks on a second, unless both systems use a common image set.

Offline dictionary attacks of text passwords can be automated using password tools, such as Crack [Muffett 2004], John the Ripper,² and RainbowCrack [Shuanglei 2005]. Some of these may be modified for online attacks. We expect analogous cracking tools to surface for graphical passwords if the latter come into widespread use. Text password attack tools are often generic; attack tools for some graphical schemes may require system-specific images, but for others, pattern-only attacks [Salehi-Abari et al. 2008] are independent of underlying images.

9.2. Capture Attacks

Password capture attacks directly obtain passwords (or parts thereof) by intercepting user-entered data or tricking users into divulging passwords. For systems with time-invariant login responses, simple replay allows fraudulent access; this motivates consideration of systems with some form of challenge-response variation. However, in the face of attacks which capture login instances (e.g., due to malware, shoulder-surfing attacks, or other interception), even challenge-response knowledge-based authentication schemes appear to face a fundamental limitation, as argued by Coskun and Herley [2008], offering at best protection against a limited number of observations. New proposals must consider the following known classes of capture attack; we assume that links over which graphical passwords are sent are encrypted, otherwise simple network sniffing or wire tapping allows for trivial capture.

9.2.1. Shoulder Surfing. Shoulder surfing [Tari et al. 2006; Roth et al. 2004; Backes et al. 2008; Laxton et al. 2008] is a targeted attack exacerbated by the visual aspect of graphical passwords. As users enter login information, an attacker may gain knowledge about their credentials by direct observation or external recording devices, such as video cameras. High-resolution cameras with telephoto lenses and surveillance equipment [Laxton et al. 2008] make shoulder surfing a real concern if attackers target specific users and have access to their geographic location.

Several existing graphical schemes believed to be resistant or immune to shoulder surfing have significant usability drawbacks [Komanduri and Hutchings 2008; Wiedenbeck et al. 2006], usually in the time and effort required to log in, making them less suitable for everyday authentication. Multi-touch tabletop interfaces support novel approaches offering shoulder-surfing resistant properties [Kim et al. 2010].

²<http://www.openwall.com/john/>.

For some graphical passwords, multiple successful logins must be observed to deduce the full password (e.g., when only a subset of user portfolio images are displayed at each login or if the shared secret is not explicitly revealed at login). Passwords in other schemes can be recovered from one successful login.

9.2.2. Reconstruction. Some attacks involve password reconstruction instead of direct capture [Coskun and Herley 2008]. For example, one graphical password scheme [Weinshall 2006] designed specifically to resist shoulder surfing was shown [Golle and Wagner 2007] to fall to an SAT (boolean satisfiability problem) solver, which reconstructs user secrets in a few seconds on observing a small number of logins. In general, these and *intersection attacks* [Dunphy et al. 2010] involve pooling leaked information gathered from observing or recording several logins for schemes in which the authentication response varies across login instances. Acoustic-based reconstruction attacks on text passwords, such as the password cracker of Berger et al. [2006], seem less suited to graphical passwords, though ideas from the reconstruction techniques may apply to graphical schemes involving text input.

9.2.3. Malware. Malicious software includes any unauthorized software installed or downloaded without a user's informed consent, for example, computer viruses and worms, Trojan horse software including login spoofing, code silently installed upon visiting websites [Provost et al. 2008], and mobile code (e.g., JavaScript, Flash components). *Keystroke loggers* [Ross et al. 2005] record keyboard input; *mouse loggers* and *screen scrapers* capture mouse actions and record screen memory, to be sent remotely or made available for retrieval. Many graphical passwords require one or both a mouse-logger and screen scraper for capture and often a keystroke logger as well to collect usernames. Keystroke loggers alone may suffice for schemes like Inkblot Authentication (Section 6), which use keyboard input only. If graphical passwords gain popularity, such malware will likely follow.

9.2.4. Phishing and Pharming. Phishing attacks [Dhamija et al. 2006] trick users into entering their credentials at a fraudulent website, for example, by having the user follow a link in an email or engineered to return as a search engine result. As noted earlier, phishing attacks on recall-based graphical passwords resemble those on text passwords. For phishing attacks on recognition-based or cued-recall systems, specific images must be presented to the user. To do so, a phishing site may conduct earlier server probes to collect the images or may retrieve and relay information from the legitimate site in a *man-in-the-middle* (MITM) attack. *Pharming* [ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee 2005], an advanced form of phishing, subverts the DNS system (by forged DNS responses or DNS cache poisoning) such that domain names are fraudulently resolved to the IP address of an attacker's site. Depending on the password scheme, recording one or more login attempts at a phishing site may provide sufficient information for an attacker to subsequently log in. With an MITM attack, attackers may also log in to the legitimate site at least once by hijacking a single correct authentication response during the attack.

9.2.5. Social Engineering. Phishing is a form of social engineering attack [Workman 2007]; users may be tricked to reveal credentials by any means, for example, phone calls from a fake help desk or credit company. While such methods may require targeted background work (or knowledge of personal details in *personalized attacks*), this is often easier than otherwise breaking into a system [Mitnick and Simon 2002].

Text passwords and alphanumeric information are relatively easy to share with colleagues or attackers. For graphical passwords, a frame of reference must first be coordinated to convey the password in sufficient detail for use. This security advantage (complicating social engineering attacks) has usability drawbacks, for example, complicating password reset by phone and safe backup storage of passwords. Despite

the added difficulty, Dunphy et al. [2008b] give preliminary evidence that users can describe PassPoints passwords sufficiently to enable use by others. Other means of sharing a graphical password include taking photos, screen shots, and drawing.

9.3. Security Summary

The first four rows of Tables I–III in Section 7 give a summary overview of security. The first two lines address guessing attacks and the next two address capture attacks. More specifically, “Theoretical pswd (bits)” reflects resistance to exhaustive search attacks; “User choice resilience” reflects resistance to dictionary attacks and optimizations, including guessing attacks on specific schemes; “Variant response” relates to replay and reconstruction attacks (including those facilitated by shoulder surfing), as explained in Section 7 and the first paragraph of Section 9.2; and “Server probes” relates to steps necessary for pharming, phishing, and other social engineering attacks. As a summary statement on client-side malware, in general, it is safest to assume that password systems (text, graphical, or other) are not sufficiently strong to provide security in the presence of client-side malware.

We may also directly compare the security of text passwords to graphical passwords with respect to the attack approaches under Section 9.2. Graphical passwords are in general more vulnerable to shoulder surfing than text passwords; however, text passwords are in general at least as or more vulnerable with respect to reconstruction, pharming/phishing and other social engineering attacks, and malware. For the latter, graphical passwords require slightly more advanced malware.

10. METHODOLOGY FOR EVALUATION

Establishing whether a graphical password system meets its usability and security goals can be challenging. This section summarizes evaluation approaches used, including user studies, with focus on aspects of special concern for examining graphical password systems. Data collected from such user studies is also critical in the security evaluation previously discussed. Several general approaches exist for user-testing graphical password systems. Each can provide valuable empirical data.

With usability inspection methods (such as *cognitive walkthroughs* [Wharton et al. 1992] and *heuristic evaluations* [Nielsen and Mack 1994]), evaluators inspect and evaluate usability related aspects of a system. These are conducted without end users and require a certain level of expertise in usability [Nielsen and Mack 1994]. They are useful early steps in finding obvious usability problems but are no substitute for user studies. While user testing is necessary to evaluate usability, it is also critically important in evaluating the practical security of graphical passwords as well as the interplay between these two dimensions. The challenge lies in designing the tests so that meaningful and representative data is collected. Security tasks are usually not the user’s primary task in practice, yet they frequently become a focus when user tests are conducted, which may lead to different behaviour than would happen if the system were deployed in practice. Novelty effects can occur; this can be especially problematic with graphical password selection, since users have yet to develop the coping skills that they may adopt with regular use.

Text passwords, as the most common form of knowledge-based authentication, are often used as a benchmark to assess the usability and security of graphical password schemes. While useful, this comparison is biased by years of user experience with text passwords. They are familiar and comfortable with the login process, can complete it quickly, and have developed a wide range of coping behaviours and strategies to deal with memorability issues. The coping strategies can improve user performance for usability but may also lead to weaker password selection. Complicating matters further, the usable security community lacks definitive and comprehensive results on text passwords, so it is difficult to use them as benchmarks.

This raises the issue of user training and familiarization before collecting data for analysis. The type of training, its length, and the instructions given to users can influence their behaviour. Inappropriate training may make users too comfortable and display behaviour not indicative of what would occur in a practical setting, they may become tired of the task and become careless; or they may behave more or less securely based entirely on the instructions (which may not reflect a real-life scenario). It is unclear how much training users should receive, if any, before evaluation, but researchers should carefully consider potential effects when interpreting the results of user studies.

The problem of multiple passwords also needs special consideration. Recent publications [Everitt et al. 2009; Chiasson et al. 2009b; Moncur and Leplatre 2007] have tackled this issue, but ecological validity remains difficult to achieve. Details such as how passwords are introduced, the number of passwords, similarity between passwords, and login frequency may significantly impact results. Furthermore, interference between different types of graphical passwords has yet to be examined. How to best evaluate multiple password interference remains an open issue.

10.1. Lab Studies

Lab studies provide a means to evaluate the success of design decisions in isolation, quantify improvements and performance, discover unexpected usability problems, and identify designs with higher probability of success (or failure) before investing large amounts of time and resources in field studies. While field studies offer superior ecological validity, lab studies have the advantage of being held in a controlled setting and so can be used to establish performance bounds that can indicate whether field tests are worthwhile. The experimenter can ensure that participants are focused on the task at hand, that the study is designed to enable statistical testing of different measures, and that clear comparisons can be made to assess the effectiveness of certain design decisions. For example, a study may have a goal of examining the effectiveness of a new password selection aid. In this case, two versions of the system would be built, differing only in the inclusion or absence of the new selection aid. The system would be instrumented to record the user's choice of passwords and input during password entry and to include measures, such as time, to create a new password and the number of errors made. With security systems, it is especially important to be relatively confident of a system's design in the lab before deploying it in field studies because of the potential for security and privacy breaches of users' real resources and information if problems occur in a field study.

Besides the predetermined measures, lab studies aim to uncover any unforeseen difficulties encountered by the users across a set of predetermined tasks. These tasks should be carefully chosen to reflect realistic usage scenarios. To maximize ecological validity, the environment should be set up to mimic target environments as closely as possible in technical details and instructions given. Users should be closely observed as they perform these tasks, as this is how many usability problems are revealed. Researchers must also try to avoid biasing user behaviour, especially when dealing with security, as users may behave more or less securely than usual to "help the researcher." A method called *think-aloud* is often used, where users are encouraged to voice a running commentary as they perform the tasks. Pre/post questionnaires or interviews are useful to gather users' opinions, attitudes, and feedback. These should be a secondary source of information used in conjunction with observations and system logs, as users' reported views often do not reflect their performance and fail to reveal crucial usability problems.

An often cited guideline advocating smaller quicker usability studies—that five users are enough to discover most usability problems [Nielsen 1993; Virzi 1992]—has long been used to justify small usability studies. Recent work revisiting this suggestion

highlights that this is often not enough and that in some cases, severe usability problems are only discovered after running a larger group of participants [Faulkner 2003; Perfetti and Landesman 2001; Spool and Schroeder 2001]. The likelihood of finding usability problems is not evenly distributed and may vary with the complexity of the system being tested. Some problems only arise under specific circumstances, so a small sample of users may not be sufficient to uncover them. The variability in the problems found by any one user also makes it unlikely that a sample of five users would discover most usability problems. Faulkner [2003] justifies that twenty users “can allow the practitioner to approach increasing levels of certainty that high percentages of existing usability problems have been found in the testing.” More participants are also needed for meaningful statistical analysis. When conducting user studies on authentication schemes involving user choice, there is an additional motivation for larger studies: user behaviour patterns which weaken security may only become apparent with a larger sample.

Memorability must be assessed in authentication systems. One approach is to administer distraction tasks within a session, as done in psychological studies on memory. These are intended to clear a user’s working memory (short-term memory) and simulate the longer passage of time. To be more ecologically valid, many studies have multiple lab sessions, where participants return to reenter their passwords over the course of several days, weeks, or months. Studies, however, that only require users to remember a single password (which often does not protect a meaningful account), raise other ecological validity concerns. Testing multiple passwords raises its own ecological validity issues, as noted earlier.

10.2. Field Studies

In a field study, the system to be tested is deployed for a group of users who incorporate the system into their regular routine over a period of time (typically a few weeks to a few months), so the advantage is strong ecological validity. Field studies offer the best measure of some important characteristics, such as memorability, in a realistic setting. However, they require a significant investment in resources and time and are preferably undertaken only after success has been reached in a lab environment. A field study allows researchers and designers to observe how the system would operate in real life and more accurately judge its acceptability, suitability, and usability. With usable authentication research involving passwords, field studies may provide data on what types of passwords users really select when they need to use them regularly, whether passwords are memorable, what unexpected coping strategies arise, and whether the scheme is usable on computer systems with different configurations (e.g., screen sizes). Other issues, such as multiple password interference or password usage in environments where shoulder surfing is possible, can also be studied. Real-world usage is of particular concern with security systems, because security is often a secondary task [Whitten and Tygar 1999], enabling (or hindering) access to the user’s primary goal. In such cases, user behaviour may vary considerably compared to when users are asked to complete the security tasks in the lab, where it may be their primary focus.

Besides the risk of exposing user resources or information if security vulnerabilities are present and exploited, the data collected from field studies may be affected by factors that are not immediately apparent. It is difficult to know, for example, whether users are employing coping mechanisms, such as printing screen captures of passwords. Issues could be explored during interviews or through post-task questionnaires, but researchers must have a suspicion that particular behaviours are occurring in order to investigate them. Users may not realize that some behaviours are insecure or worthy of mention unless specifically prompted. Another factor to consider is the perceived value of the accounts being protected in the study. While it is inadvisable to risk

compromising high-value information in early field studies, the impact of such design choices must be considered when generalizing the results.

10.3. Other Types of Studies

10.3.1. Web-Based. Web-Based user studies are gaining popularity [Florencio and Herley 2007; Andrews et al. 2003; Moncur and Leplatre 2007; Everitt et al. 2009]. While there is no agreed-upon definition for Web-based studies, herein we use this term for the case where there is no face-to-face contact with the user study participants at all. Advantages of Web studies include the following: large numbers of participants can be recruited, the participant pool is likely more diverse than in most controlled studies, participants can be prompted to complete tasks at several different times, and participant behaviour may be more natural than in a lab setting. Web-based studies are often cheaper, easier, and faster than traditional controlled studies. Challenges include the following: great care is needed in getting informed consent from participants (e.g., through a signature or other means of authentication, as required by organizational ethics review boards), it is nearly impossible to know if demographics information collected is accurate, it is difficult to enforce adherence to procedures, and the collected data may not reflect real behaviour.

Web-based studies offer one measure of ecological validity by being held in the participants' natural environment as opposed to in a controlled lab environment. Additional ecological validity can be gained by integrating realistic tasks and systems rather than using fabricated tasks. For authentication, studies that focus users on primary tasks other than the actual authentication offer a higher degree of ecological validity than those that simply ask users to log in.

Amazon's Mechanical Turk [Amazon 2010] has been used recently to conduct some usable security studies [Kelley et al. 2010; Sheng et al. 2010]. This web-based "mTurk" system allows requesters to post "human intelligence tasks" (HITs) which can be accepted and completed by workers for payment. Advantages of using systems like mTurk include that data can be gathered very quickly and inexpensively from a very large number of users. However, regarding challenges, those previously mentioned for other Web-based studies remain and may in fact be magnified, such as dealing with skewed demographics (compared to actual target users) and ecological validity issues (i.e., is rapid task completion a primary motivation for mTurk workers?). Additional challenges include designing appropriate short, specific micro tasks that are likely to be completed [Kittur et al. 2008]. For these reasons, the overall suitability of mTurk for authentication studies remains an open question.

10.3.2. Hybrid. In hybrid studies, researchers combine lab studies with tasks completed in participants' regular environments, gaining advantages of both an initial controlled environment and increased ecological validity in subsequent tasks. The tasks are usually invented but may be designed to approximate realistic tasks. Instructions for follow-up activities may be provided at the end of the initial lab session or may be sent through email at a later time. For example, in authentication studies, participants may be prompted through email to log in to Web-based test systems at various intervals. These passwords may not protect valuable or personal information, but some ecological validity is gained by having users login from within their regular environments. Furthermore, primary tasks can be assigned, such as asking users to comment on a blog or to access subscription-based material, where login with the authentication scheme is simply part of the process.

10.4. Evaluation Checklist

To summarize, we list a set of usability and security items to include in presentations of new knowledge-based authentication schemes (whether graphical passwords or otherwise) for evaluating complete proposals.

- (1) Are target users, domains, and applications clearly identified?
- (2) Are evaluation parameters and the theoretical password space clearly stated?
- (3) Does the analysis explain the effect of user choice on password distributions with informed discussion of the effective password space?
- (4) Does the analysis consider the full range of attacks plausible in the targeted domain and application and how each attack fails or succeeds? Does a login session leak more information than expected?
- (5) At minimum, has a lab user study been done (or other types of studies with higher ecological validity) with results compared to appropriate alternatives?
- (6) Is password interference discussed (e.g., as informed by a user study)?
- (7) Do the user study and security analysis use the same parameters?

11. FURTHER DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Our tour of graphical password research reveals a rich palette of ideas but few schemes that deliver on the original promise of addressing the known problems with text passwords. Indeed, review of the first era of graphical password schemes indicates that many of the same problems continue to resurface. For graphical passwords to advance as a serious authentication alternative, we believe research must be conducted and presented in a manner allowing systematic examination and comparison of each scheme's main characteristics, showing how each meets the usability and security requirements of specific target environments.

Published research in the area of graphical passwords currently lacks consistency, making it difficult to compare or reproduce results. Where reasonable, researchers should choose methods and measures that allow for comparison with other work. Moreover, research proposals and analyses for new systems should include specific motivation for the work, a description of the system's design including any special instrumentation for prototyping and testing versions, a clear description of the study methodology, and analysis explaining which usability and security aspects are being tested, aside from main results. While early work is often by definition incomplete, a comprehensive evaluation should acknowledge the preceding points and identify foreseeable issues, even if a full evaluation has not yet been conducted.

Many graphical password systems in the literature to date lack rigorous evaluation in security, usability, or both. As Section 9.1.3 notes, significant security flaws have been found in the original versions of all three canonical schemes. A closer look at individual systems has typically revealed less security than promised, matching historical early experience in other areas—usually repaired with maturity. Most systems to date suffer from either small theoretical password spaces (if the system is configured to be usable) or patterns in user choice that reduce the size of the effective password space, highlighting an important insight from the field study and security analysis on Face and Story [Davis et al. 2004]: many graphical password schemes may require “a different posture towards password selection” than text passwords, where selection by the user is the norm. New designs should thus focus on increasing password entropy without sacrificing usability and memorability.

The main purpose of authentication schemes is to allow system access only by legitimate users. To thoroughly evaluate the security of a graphical password proposal and to facilitate comparison with alternatives, all standard threats and known attacks should be analyzed, with convincing arguments on how the scheme precludes (or falls to) them. Moreover, such security analysis must be accompanied by concrete experimental studies and usability analysis. For example, a system is of limited interest if it prevents shoulder surfing but has a password space so small that it falls to a plausible simple brute-force attack. (While shoulder surfing is a threat in public environments, it is only one of many threats; far less literature has considered more scalable threats,

such as keystroke loggers or graphical dictionary attacks.) If a system is intended for use in particular environments where some standard threats are not a concern, then the relevant details should be clearly specified. Essential security measures to be reported include the size of the theoretical password space, the estimated size of the effective password space, details about known or anticipated exploitable patterns in user choice, and an analysis of how the scheme withstands known online and offline attacks. While it may be impossible to prove that graphical passwords can provide greater security than text passwords in the face of the most serious attacks, such as resident malware, graphical passwords nonetheless remain of practical interest due to the possibility of offering at least as much security, with the possibility of greater usability and memorability.

In many systems having poor security, user actions compromise security in favour of memorability. The exploitable patterns evident in Passfaces, DAS, and PassPoints passwords result from users trying to select memorable passwords, which in turn increases predictability and facilitates password guessing. A challenge for designers is to identify memory aids for legitimate users that cannot be leveraged by attackers to guess passwords. Furthermore, systems allowing some degree of user choice should encourage randomization of user-chosen sequences as well as individual items to avoid divide-and-conquer guessing attacks. It remains an open question whether systems can be designed such that user choice does not significantly weaken security or whether a successful combination of system suggestion and user choice can be devised. A complementary method for addressing predictable passwords is the use of so-called “strong” password protocols (e.g., SRP [Wu 1998], EKE [Bellovin and Merritt 1992]) designed to provide protection against offline guessing attacks by avoiding verifiable text [Gong et al. 1993]. This can be important for both text and graphical passwords, but their design is notoriously tricky.

For usability, a major concern is multiple password interference. Visual cues provided by graphical passwords along with the potential of human memory processing for images offer reason for optimism, but further research is required to confirm that these can be translated into schemes with increased security and usability in a realistic setting. As graphical passwords are not widely deployed, it is unknown if we will simply mirror text password problems where users develop coping strategies, devise and reuse common patterns, and choose minimally secure passwords.

The development of password managers for graphical passwords may address the problem of memory interference. However, such managers may well suffer the same usability and security challenges as their text counterparts, noted in Section 1, with additional challenges, such as dealing with challenge-response schemes (variant responses) and coping with the variety of password entry requirements. Further consideration of password managers is beyond the scope of this article. Related to password interference, it would be interesting to investigate user choice if given the opportunity to select both the password schemes and the passwords for multiple accounts, allowing for any number of each type.

We expect tomorrow’s ideal graphical password systems may have many of the following desirable characteristics, reflecting lessons learned from proposals to date.

- (1) Theoretical password space meeting the security policy of the intended domain.
- (2) Avoidance of exploitable reductions in security due to user choice of passwords, for example, through persuading password choice towards flatter distributions.
- (3) At least mild resistance to different types of capture attacks, including shoulder surfing and key logging, through variable response (challenge-response) design.
- (4) Cues aiding memorability and design features minimizing password interference.




Fig. 10. Most graphical password schemes fall along the descending line where increased security implies decreased usability. The design goal is to increase usability and security simultaneously.

- (5) Usability (e.g., login success rates, login times, password creation times) as close as possible to, or better than, text passwords.
- (6) Implicit feedback to legitimate users when passwords are multipart.
- (7) Leveraging of preexisting user-specific knowledge where possible rather than having users memorize entirely new and/or random information.

In addition to the importance of the evaluation checklist of Section 10.4 and these preceding characteristics, we emphasize here two additional lessons learned. First, design decisions related to usability should be evaluated jointly with an exploration of their impact on security, since a usable authentication system without adequate security fails to meet its primary purpose. For example, a system where users can choose memorable but weak passwords may be usable but can provide a false sense of security. Interface design changes that appear to affect only usability may in fact introduce additional security vulnerabilities.

Second, in assessing usability, apples-to-apples comparison requires comparing schemes of comparable security. Usability comparisons between schemes offering significantly different security propositions must highlight the lack of calibration to avoid seriously misleading others. For example, the full password space of many recognition-based systems calibrates to that of four-digit PINs, while recall and cued-recall systems are similar to text passwords of eight-characters or more. Longer login times may be more acceptable for password-level systems than for PIN-level systems (recalling the Section 7 levels) if the former provide greater security.

Security and usability have historically been viewed as items to be traded off, representing opposite ends of a spectrum: increasing one necessarily decreases the other. Most products and mechanisms to date, including for many graphical password schemes, afford only fixed levers such that, for example, adding extra rounds to Passfaces increases security at the cost of an additional memorability burden since each additional round also exposes users to a new set of decoys. As illustrated in Figure 10, the challenge for the second generation of graphical password schemes and in the design for usable security in general is, instead, to find new designs and architectures which afford increases in security and usability together.

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