



# Smart Contract Audit

FOR

PepuLock

DATED : 20 August 2025



# AUDIT SUMMARY

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**Project name** – PepuLock

**Date:** 20 August 2025

**Scope of Audit-** Audit Ace was consulted to conduct the smart contract audit of the solidity source codes.

**Audit Status:** **High Risk Major Flag**

## Issues Found

Status	Critical	High	Medium	Low	Informational
Open	0	1	1	1	0
Acknowledged	0	0	0	0	0
Resolved	0	0	0	0	0

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# USED TOOLS

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## Tools:

### 1- Manual Review:

A line by line code review has been performed by audit ace team.

**2- BSC Test Network:** All tests were conducted on the BSC Test network, and each test has a corresponding transaction attached to it.

### 3- Slither :

The code has undergone static analysis using Slither.

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# Token Information

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**Name:** PepuLock

**Symbol:** -

**Decimals:** -

**Network:** -

**Type:** ETH L2 network

**Owner:** -

**Deployer:** -

**Token Supply:** -

**Checksum:** afa6dc77b1f71cf281fa48605b74e722

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# TOKEN OVERVIEW

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**Fees:** 0-100%

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**Fee Privilege:** Owner

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**Ownership:** Owned

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**Minting:** No

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**Max Tx:** No

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# AUDIT METHODOLOGY

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The auditing process will follow a routine as special considerations by Auditace:

- Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace to make sure the contract logic meets the intentions of the client without exposing the user's funds to risk.
  - Manual review of the entire codebase by our experts, which is the process of reading source code line-by-line in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
  - Specification comparison is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace describe.
  - Test coverage analysis determines whether the test cases are covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run the test cases.
  - Symbolic execution is analysing a program to determine what inputs cause each part of a program to execute.
  - Reviewing the codebase to improve maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices.
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# VULNERABILITY CHECKLIST

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- |                                    |                               |
|------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| ✓ Return values of low-level calls | ✓ <b>Gasless Send</b>         |
| ✓ Private modifier                 | ✓ Using block.timestamp       |
| ✓ Multiple Sends                   | ✓ Re-entrancy                 |
| ✓ Using Suicide                    | ✓ Tautology or contradiction  |
| ✓ Gas Limitand Loops               | ✓ Timestamp Dependence        |
| ✓ Address hardcoded                | ✓ Revert/require functions    |
| ✓ Exception Disorder               | ✓ Use of tx.origin            |
| ✓ Using inline assembly            | ✓ Integer overflow/underflow  |
| ✓ Divide before multiply           | ✓ Dangerous strict equalities |
| ✓ Missing Zero Address Validation  | ✓ Using SHA3                  |
| ✓ Compiler version not fixed       | ✓ Using throw                 |
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## POINTS TO NOTE

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- The owner can update the fees by more than 100%.
- The owner can update the fee wallet address.
- The validlock address can unlock and edit the lock.
- The validlock address can edit the lock description.





# CLASSIFICATION OF RISK

## Severity

## Description

◆ Critical	These vulnerabilities could be exploited easily and can lead to asset loss, data loss, asset, or data manipulation. They should be fixed right away.
◆ High-Risk	A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.
◆ Medium-Risk	A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.
◆ Low-Risk	A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.
◆ Gas Optimization /Suggestion	A vulnerability that has an informational character but is not affecting any of the code.

## Findings

### Severity

### Found

◆ Critical	0
◆ High-Risk	1
◆ Medium-Risk	1
◆ Low-Risk	1
◆ Optimization/ Informational	0

# MANUAL TESTING

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**Centralization** – The owner can set high fees

**Severity: High**

**Function: updateFee**

**Status: Open**

## Overview:

*The updateFee function allows the contract owner to set arbitrarily high fees without limits or time delays. This could potentially trap user funds by making the contract economically unusable through excessive fees, posing a significant centralization risk.*

```
function updateFee(uint256 newFee) external onlyOwner {  
    fee = newFee;  
    emit FeeUpdated(newFee);  
}
```

## Suggestions:

*Implement a maximum fee cap of 25% by adding a constant and require statement: require(newFee<= MAX\_FEE\_BPS, "Fee exceeds 25%");*

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# MANUAL TESTING

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## **Centralization** –Insufficient Validation for Fee Wallet Address(Potential Honeypot).

**Severity:** Medium

**Status:** Open

### **Overview:**

While the function checks for a zero address, it doesn't validate if the new wallet address is a contract that may not properly handle ETH transfers. If the fee wallet is set to a contract address that cannot receive ETH, it could block all future token locking operations.

```
function updateFeeWallet(address newWallet) external onlyOwner {  
    if (newWallet == address(0)) revert InvalidFeeWallet();  
    feeWallet = newWallet;  
    emit FeeWalletUpdated(newWallet);  
}
```

### **Suggestions:**

Add validation for contract addresses and ensure they can receive ETH.

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# MANUAL TESTING

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## **Centralization** - Lack of Two-Step Transfer Pattern in Critical Address Updates

**Severity:** Low

**Status:** Open

### **Overview:**

The contract implements critical address changes (like fee wallet updates) in a single step without verification. This common smart contract vulnerability risks permanent loss of funds or protocol functionality if addresses are incorrectly set through human error, typos, or compromised admin keys.

### **Suggestions:**

Implement a two-step transfer pattern requiring explicit acceptance from new addresses before finalizing any critical address changes.

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## GENERAL IMPACT

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- Funds could be permanently lost
- Protocol functionality could be broken
- No recovery mechanism available
- Affects all future fee collections
- Compromised admin keys could cause immediate damage

This is a common security pattern issue that affects many protocols and should be addressed using well-established two-step ownership/role transfer patterns from trusted libraries like OpenZeppelin.

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# ABOUT AUDITACE

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We specializes in providing thorough and reliable audits for Web3 projects. With a team of experienced professionals, we use cutting-edge technology and rigorous methodologies to evaluate the security and integrity of blockchain systems. We are committed to helping our clients ensure the safety and transparency of their digital assets and transactions.



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