auditace.tech

AuditAce
FROM INCEPTION TO SUCCESS

Smart Contract Audit

FOR

Floki Chairman

DATED : 13 MAR 23'

AUDIT SUMMARY

Project name – Floki Chairman

Date: 13 March, 2023

Scope of Audit- Audit Ace was consulted to conduct the smart contract audit of the solidity source codes.

Audit Status: Passed

Issues Found

Status	Critical	High	Medium	Low	Suggestion
Open	0	0	1	0	0
Acknowledged	0	0	0	0	0
Resolved	0	0	0	0	0

USED TOOLS

Tools:

1- Manual Review:
a line by line code review has been performed by audit ace team.

2- BSC Testnet network:
all tests were done on Bsc Testnet network, each test has its transaction has attached to it.

3- Slither : Static Analysis

Testnet Link: all tests were done using this contract, tests are done on BSC Testnet

https://testnet.bscscan.com/token/0x40C14cBa93b2658aC67E9Ce812f04858abDFC72d#code

Token Information

Token Name : FLOKI CHAIRMAN

Token Symbol: CHAIRMAN

Decimals: 9

Token Supply: 100,000,000,000

Token Address:
0x82A3598dC39b426f47508E2A9a091F753b8ab710

Checksum:
f6cd3819dfe750f683aaa67ce06b2676af8b0447

Owner:
0x047400e53694F803e25A35945e0E97EDA051b0a6

TOKEN OVERVIEW

Fees:

Buy Fees: 8%

Sell Fees: 8%

Transfer Fees: 8%

Fees Privilige: None

Ownership : Owned

Minting: No mint function

Max Tx Amount/ Max Wallet Amount: No

Blacklist: No

Other Priviliges: including and excluding from fees and rewards

AUDIT METHODOLOGY

The auditing process will follow a routine as special considerations by Auditace:

- Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace to make sure the contract logic meets the intentions of the client without exposing the user's funds to risk.
- Manual review of the entire codebase by our experts, which is the process of reading source code line-by-line in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
- Specification comparison is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace describe.
- Test coverage analysis determines whether the test cases are covering the code and how much code isexercised when we run the test cases.
- Symbolic execution is analysing a program to determine what inputs cause each part of a program to execute.
- Reviewing the codebase to improve maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices.

VULNERABILITY CHECKLIST

- [x] Return values of low-level calls
- [x] Private modifier
- [x] Multiple Sends
- [x] Using Suicide
- [x] Gas Limitand Loops
- [x] Address hardcoded
- [x] Exception Disorder
- [x] Using inline assembly
- [x] Divide before multiply
- [x] Missing Zero Address Validation
- [x] Compiler version not fixed
- [x] **Gasless Send**
- [x] Using block.timestamp
- [x] Re-entrancy
- [x] Tautology or contradiction
- [x] Timestamp Dependence
- [x] Revert/require functions
- [x] Use of tx.origin
- [x] Integer overflow/underflow
- [x] Dangerous strict equalities
- [x] Using SHA3
- [x] Using throw

CLASSIFICATION OF RISK

Severity	Description
Critical	These vulnerabilities could be exploited easily and can lead to asset loss, data loss, asset, or data manipulation. They should be fixed right away.
High-Risk	A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.
Medium-Risk	A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.
Low-Risk	A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.
Gas Optimization /Suggestion	A vulnerability that has an informational character but is not affecting any of the code.

Findings

Severity	Found
Critical	0
High-Risk	0
Medium-Risk	1
Low-Risk	0
Gas Optimization / Suggestions	0

INHERITANCE TREE



POINTS TO NOTE

- Owner is not able to change fees (8% fee buy sell and transfers)
- Owner is not able to set max buy/sell/transfer/hold amount
- Owner is not able to blacklist an arbitrary wallet
- Owner is not able to disable trades
- Owner is not able to mint new tokens

TOKEN DISTRIBUTION

It should be noted that the owner currently holds 100% of the total supply. However, information about the distribution of these tokens is not available, and it is recommended that investors exercise caution when considering this aspect.

CONTRACT ASSESMENT

Contract	Type	Bases		
└	**Function Name**	**Visibility**	**Mutability**	**Modifiers**
IBEP20	Interface			
└	totalSupply	External ❗		NO❗
└	balanceOf	External ❗		NO❗
└	transfer	External ❗	🛑	NO❗
└	allowance	External ❗		NO❗
└	approve	External ❗	🛑	NO❗
└	transferFrom	External ❗	🛑	NO❗
Context	Implementation			
└	_msgSender	Internal 🔒		
└	_msgData	Internal 🔒		
Ownable	Implementation	Context		
└	<Constructor>	Public ❗	🛑	NO❗
└	owner	Public ❗		NO❗
└	renounceOwnership	Public ❗	🛑	onlyOwner
└	transferOwnership	Public ❗	🛑	onlyOwner
└	_setOwner	Private 🔐	🛑	
IFactory	Interface			
└	createPair	External ❗	🛑	NO❗
IRouter	Interface			
└	factory	External ❗		NO❗
└	WETH	External ❗		NO❗
└	addLiquidityETH	External ❗	💵	NO❗
└	swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens	External ❗	🛑	NO❗
Address	Library			
└	sendValue	Internal 🔒	🛑	
FLOKICHAIRMAN	Implementation	Context, IBEP20, Ownable		
└	<Constructor>	Public ❗	🛑	NO❗
└	name	Public ❗		NO❗
└	symbol	Public ❗		NO❗
└	decimals	Public ❗		NO❗
└	totalSupply	Public ❗		NO❗
└	balanceOf	Public ❗		NO❗

CONTRACT ASSESMENT

└	allowance	Public ❗		|NO❗
└	approve	Public ❗	🛑	|NO❗
└	transferFrom	Public ❗	🛑	|NO❗
└	increaseAllowance	Public ❗	🛑	|NO❗
└	decreaseAllowance	Public ❗	🛑	|NO❗
└	transfer	Public ❗	🛑	|NO❗
└	isExcludedFromReward	Public ❗		|NO❗
└	reflectionFromToken	Public ❗		|NO❗
└	tokenFromReflection	Public ❗		|NO❗
└	excludeFromReward	Public ❗	🛑	onlyOwner
└	includeInReward	External ❗	🛑	onlyOwner
└	excludeFromFee	Public ❗	🛑	onlyOwner
└	includeInFee	Public ❗	🛑	onlyOwner
└	isExcludedFromFee	Public ❗		|NO❗
└	_reflectRfi	Private 🔐	🛑		
└	_takeMarketing	Private 🔐	🛑		
└	_getValues	Private 🔐			
└	_getTValues	Private 🔐			
└	_getRValues	Private 🔐			
└	_getRate	Private 🔐			
└	_getCurrentSupply	Private 🔐			
└	_approve	Private 🔐	🛑		
└	_transfer	Private 🔐	🛑		
└	_tokenTransfer	Private 🔐	🛑		
└	swapAndLiquify	Private 🔐	🛑	lockTheSwap
└	swapTokensForBNB	Private 🔐	🛑		
└	bulkExcludeFee	External ❗	🛑	onlyOwner
└	updateMarketingWallet	External ❗	🛑	onlyOwner
└	updateSwapTokensAtAmount	External ❗	🛑	onlyOwner
└	rescueBNB	External ❗	🛑	onlyOwner
└	rescueAnyBEP20Tokens	Public ❗	🛑	onlyOwner
└	<Receive Ether>	External ❗	💵	|NO❗

Symbol	Meaning
🛑	Function can modify state
💵	Function is payable

STATIC ANALYSIS



```
Reentrancy in FLOKICHAIRMAN.transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (contracts/Token.sol#264-279):
        External calls:
        - _transfer(sender,recipient,amount) (contracts/Token.sol#269)
                - (success) = recipient.call{value: amount}() (contracts/Token.sol#137)
                - router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (contracts/Token.sol#549-555)
                - address(marketingWallet).sendValue(deltaBalance) (contracts/Token.sol#536)
        External calls sending eth:
        - _transfer(sender,recipient,amount) (contracts/Token.sol#269)
                - (success) = recipient.call{value: amount}() (contracts/Token.sol#137)
        Event emitted after the call(s):
        - Approval(owner,spender,amount) (contracts/Token.sol#474)
                - _approve(sender,_msgSender(),currentAllowance - amount) (contracts/Token.sol#276)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-3

FLOKICHAIRMAN.includeInReward(address) (contracts/Token.sol#354-365) has costly operations inside a loop:
        - _excluded.pop() (contracts/Token.sol#361)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#costly-operations-inside-a-loop

Context._msgData() (contracts/Token.sol#51-54) is never used and should be removed
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dead-code

FLOKICHAIRMAN._rTotal (contracts/Token.sol#165) is set pre-construction with a non-constant function or state variable:
        - (MAX - (MAX % _tTotal))
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#function-initializing-state

Pragma version^0.8.17 (contracts/Token.sol#12) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6/0.8.16
solc-0.8.18 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity

Low level call in Address.sendValue(address,uint256) (contracts/Token.sol#131-142):
        - (success) = recipient.call{value: amount}() (contracts/Token.sol#137)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#low-level-calls

Function IRouter.WETH() (contracts/Token.sol#107) is not in mixedCase
Struct FLOKICHAIRMAN.valuesFromGetValues (contracts/Token.sol#189-197) is not in CapWords
Parameter FLOKICHAIRMAN.rescueAnyBEP20Tokens(address,address,uint256)._tokenAddr (contracts/Token.sol#588) is not in mixedCase
Parameter FLOKICHAIRMAN.rescueAnyBEP20Tokens(address,address,uint256)._to (contracts/Token.sol#589) is not in mixedCase
Parameter FLOKICHAIRMAN.rescueAnyBEP20Tokens(address,address,uint256)._amount (contracts/Token.sol#590) is not in mixedCase
Constant FLOKICHAIRMAN._decimals (contracts/Token.sol#161) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Constant FLOKICHAIRMAN._name (contracts/Token.sol#172) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Constant FLOKICHAIRMAN._symbol (contracts/Token.sol#173) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions

Redundant expression "this (contracts/Token.sol#52)" inContext (contracts/Token.sol#46-55)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#redundant-statements

FLOKICHAIRMAN._tTotal (contracts/Token.sol#164) should be constant
FLOKICHAIRMAN.deadWallet (contracts/Token.sol#169) should be constant
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-constant

FLOKICHAIRMAN.pair (contracts/Token.sol#159) should be immutable
FLOKICHAIRMAN.router (contracts/Token.sol#158) should be immutable
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-immutable
```

Result => A static analysis of contract's source code has been performed using slither,

No issues found

FUNCTIONAL TESTING

Router (PCS V2):
0xD99D1c33F9fC3444f8101754aBC46c52416550D1

1- Adding Liquidity (Passed):
liquidity added on Pancakeswap V2:

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x3442b73a1335a75d410a030c91771140fcd51ad7d78c9e43dd7b1e268f78f5bb

2- Buying when excluded (0%)(Passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x9ae3910957189b907722e27aae2fc7abebb81bd56f8052fb4091f3ecbb3eacdd

3- Selling when excluded (0%)(Passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x7f3a0f583ccd2a21ff018b3ee4a43343fe332e72b11f7d9b89b185f6dbff73a9

4- Transferring when excluded (0% tax) (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x4b9e2ce325dd17149ed3e32c13a9bb9280975f304f8e9edeb39e23e7bd0b42ca

5- Buying when not excluded (8% tax) (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xb4f2cd1f165c23d1aa525dcee44cb6500a19876c586762ed9a510bff603a2d3a

FUNCTIONAL TESTING

6- Selling when not excluded (8% tax) (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xfa986944f301fd29d3f34996009739c201b3a7fa8c141d483c88ade28b66c33b

7- Transferring when not excluded(8% tax) (passed):

https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xb3169db4388f40dbb23682307b9d65a34c7d0e6aa6b6ef23fbce01c869a63aa6

8- Internal swap (passed):

marketing wallet received ETH
https://testnet.bscscan.com/address/0x37c55fdc707cbbd0dfca25a14d06f9840e6ef085#internaltx

9- Reflections (passed):
we monitors wallet balances for testing this features, wallets received reflection after trades, they stop getting reflections after getting excluded from rewards

MANUAL TESTING

Issue: swap threshold can revert some sells

Type: logical

Function: updateSwapTokensAtAmount

Line: 535-538

Severity: Medium

Overview:

If swap threshold and contract balance are both zero, **swapAndLiquify** function will fail the transaction.

```
function swapAndLiquify() private lockTheSwap {
    uint256 contractBalance = balanceOf(address(this));
    swapTokensForBNB(contractBalance);
    uint256 deltaBalance = address(this).balance;

    if (deltaBalance > 0) {
        payable(marketingWallet).sendValue(deltaBalance);
    }
}
```

Recommendation:

• make sure that swap threshold is always higher than 0

Social Media Overview

Here are the Social Media Accounts of

Floki Chairman

https://t.me/flokichairmangroup

https://twitter.com/FlokiChairman

https://www.flokichairman.com

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