



# Smart Contract Audit

FOR  
**ANDY**

DATED : 20 July 23'



# MANUAL TESTING

## Centralization – swaps are disabled by default

**Severity:** High

**function:** EnableTrading

**Status:** Not Resolved

### Overview:

The smart contract owner must enable trades for holders. If trading remain disabled, no one would be able to buy/sell/transfer tokens.

```
function enableTrading() external onlyOwner{  
    require(!tradingEnabled, "Trading already enabled.");  
    tradingEnabled = true;  
    swapEnabled = true;  
}
```

### Suggestion

To mitigate this centralization issue, we propose the following options:

1. Renounce Ownership: Consider relinquishing control of the smart contract by renouncing ownership. This would remove the ability for a single entity to manipulate the router, reducing centralization risks.
2. Multi-signature Wallet: Transfer ownership to a multi-signature wallet. This would require multiple approvals for any changes to the mainRouter, adding an additional layer of security and reducing the centralization risk.
3. Transfer ownership to a trusted and valid 3<sup>rd</sup> party in order to guarantee enabling of the trades



# AUDIT SUMMARY

**Project name - ANDY**

**Date:** 20 July, 2023

**Scope of Audit-** Audit Ace was consulted to conduct the smart contract audit of the solidity source codes.

**Audit Status: Passed with High Risk**

## Issues Found

Status	Critical	High	Medium	Low	Suggestion
Open	0	1	0	0	0
Acknowledged	0	0	0	0	0
Resolved	0	0	0	0	0



# USED TOOLS

---

## Tools:

### 1- Manual Review:

A line by line code review has been performed by audit ace team.

**2- BSC Test Network:** All tests were conducted on the BSC Test network, and each test has a corresponding transaction attached to it. These tests can be found in the "Functional Tests" section of the report.

### 3- Slither :

The code has undergone static analysis using Slither.

### Testnet version:

The tests were performed using the contract deployed on the BSC Testnet, which can be found at the following address:

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/token/0xE36506b401fe365579ac60d4Cb5Bd11E7Df1b1de>

---



# Token Information

---

**Token Name :** Andy Coin

**Token Symbol:** ANDY

**Decimals:** 18

**Token Supply:** 420,690,000

**Token Address:**

0xdE5378071211D243Ba026FB3C8DbA8C90EEFb797

**Checksum:**

4288d966137e156f7e6ec06092b873817bd9da58

**Owner:**

**0xe3C21a021AFe51DfDF95c98affa663770b287d3b**

**(at time of writing the audit)**

**Deployer:**

**0xe3C21a021AFe51DfDF95c98affa663770b287d3b**

---



# TOKEN OVERVIEW

---

## Fees:

Buy Fees: 0-5%

Sell Fees: 0-5%

Transfer Fees: 0-5%

---

**Fees Privilege:** owner

---

**Ownership:** owned

---

**Minting:** No mint function

---

**Max Tx Amount/ Max Wallet Amount:** no

---

**Blacklist:** No

---

**Other Privileges:** Initial distribution of the tokens  
modifying fees  
enabling trades

---



# AUDIT METHODOLOGY

---

The auditing process will follow a routine as special considerations by Auditace:

- Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace to make sure the contract logic meets the intentions of the client without exposing the user's funds to risk.
- Manual review of the entire codebase by our experts, which is the process of reading source code line-by-line in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
- Specification comparison is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace describe.
- Test coverage analysis determines whether the test cases are covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run the test cases.
- Symbolic execution is analysing a program to determine what inputs cause each part of a program to execute.
- Reviewing the codebase to improve maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices.

# VULNERABILITY CHECKLIST



Return values of low-level calls



**Gasless Send**



Private modifier



Using block.timestamp



Multiple Sends



Re-entrancy



Using Suicide



Tautology or contradiction



Gas Limit and Loops



Timestamp Dependence



Address hardcoded



Revert/require functions



Exception Disorder



Use of tx.origin



Using inline assembly



Integer overflow/underflow



Divide before multiply



Dangerous strict equalities



Missing Zero Address Validation



Using SHA3



Compiler version not fixed



Using throw




# CLASSIFICATION OF RISK

Severity	Description
◆ Critical	These vulnerabilities could be exploited easily and can lead to asset loss, data loss, asset, or data manipulation. They should be fixed right away.
◆ High-Risk	A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.
◆ Medium-Risk	A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.
◆ Low-Risk	A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.
◆ Gas Optimization / Suggestion	A vulnerability that has an informational character but is not affecting any of the code.

## Findings

Severity	Found
◆ Critical	0
◆ High-Risk	1
◆ Medium-Risk	0
◆ Low-Risk	0
◆ Gas Optimization / Suggestions	0

# INHERITANCE TREE





## POINTS TO NOTE

---

- Owner is not able to change fees (5% for each type of tax)
- Owner is not able to blacklist an arbitrary address.
- Owner is not able to disable trades
- Owner is not able to mint new tokens
- **Owner must enable trades manually**

# CONTRACT ASSESSMENT

---

Contract	Type	Bases		
	L	**Function Name**	**Visibility**	**Mutability**
				**Modifiers**
	**IUniswapV2Factory**	Interface		
L   feeTo   External !   NO !				
L   feeToSetter   External !   NO !				
L   getPair   External !   NO !				
L   allPairs   External !   NO !				
L   allPairsLength   External !   NO !				
L   createPair   External !      NO !				
L   setFeeTo   External !      NO !				
L   setFeeToSetter   External !      NO !				
	**IUniswapV2Pair**	Interface		
L   name   External !   NO !				
L   symbol   External !   NO !				
L   decimals   External !   NO !				
L   totalSupply   External !   NO !				
L   balanceOf   External !   NO !				
L   allowance   External !   NO !				
L   approve   External !      NO !				
L   transfer   External !      NO !				
L   transferFrom   External !      NO !				
L   DOMAIN_SEPARATOR   External !   NO !				
L   PERMIT_TYPEHASH   External !   NO !				
L   nonces   External !   NO !				
L   permit   External !      NO !				
L   MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY   External !   NO !				
L   factory   External !   NO !				

# CONTRACT ASSESSMENT

---

```

| L | token0 | External ! | NO ! | |
| L | token1 | External ! | NO ! |
| L | getReserves | External ! | NO ! |
| L | price0CumulativeLast | External ! | NO ! |
| L | price1CumulativeLast | External ! | NO ! |
| L | kLast | External ! | NO ! |
| L | mint | External ! | ⚡ | NO ! |
| L | burn | External ! | ⚡ | NO ! |
| L | swap | External ! | ⚡ | NO ! |
| L | skim | External ! | ⚡ | NO ! |
| L | sync | External ! | ⚡ | NO ! |
| L | initialize | External ! | ⚡ | NO ! |
|||||
| **IUniswapV2Router01** | Interface | ||
| L | factory | External ! | NO ! |
| L | WETH | External ! | NO ! |
| L | addLiquidity | External ! | ⚡ | NO ! |
| L | addLiquidityETH | External ! | 💸 | NO ! |
| L | removeLiquidity | External ! | ⚡ | NO ! |
| L | removeLiquidityETH | External ! | ⚡ | NO ! |
| L | removeLiquidityWithPermit | External ! | ⚡ | NO ! |
| L | removeLiquidityETHWithPermit | External ! | ⚡ | NO ! |
| L | swapExactTokensForTokens | External ! | ⚡ | NO ! |
| L | swapTokensForExactTokens | External ! | ⚡ | NO ! |
| L | swapExactETHForTokens | External ! | 💸 | NO ! |
| L | swapTokensForExactETH | External ! | ⚡ | NO ! |
| L | swapExactTokensForETH | External ! | ⚡ | NO ! |
| L | swapETHForExactTokens | External ! | 💸 | NO ! |
| L | quote | External ! | NO ! |
| L | getAmountOut | External ! | NO ! |
| L | getAmountIn | External ! | NO !

```

# CONTRACT ASSESSMENT

---

```

| L | getAmountsOut | External ! | |NO ! |
| L | getAmountsIn | External ! | |NO ! |
|||||
| **IUniswapV2Router02** | Interface | IUniswapV2Router01 ||
| L | removeLiquidityETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External ! | 🔴 |
| NO ! |
| L | removeLiquidityETHWithPermitSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External ! |
| 🔴 | NO !
| L | swapExactTokensForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External ! |
| 🔴 | NO !
| L | swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External ! | ⚡ |
| NO ! |
| L | swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens | External ! | 🔴 |
| NO ! |
||||| |
| **IERC20** | Interface | ||
| L | totalSupply | External ! | |NO ! |
| L | balanceOf | External ! | |NO ! |
| L | transfer | External ! | 🔴 | NO !
| L | allowance | External ! | |NO ! |
| L | approve | External ! | 🔴 | NO !
| L | transferFrom | External ! | 🔴 | NO !
||||| | |
| **IERC20Metadata** | Interface | IERC20 ||
| L | name | External ! | |NO ! |
| L | symbol | External ! | |NO ! |
| L | decimals | External ! | |NO ! |
|||||
| **Address** | Library | ||
| L | sendValue | Internal 🔒 | 🔴 || |
|||||
| **Context** | Implementation | ||
| L | _msgSender | Internal 🔒 | || |
| L | _msgData | Internal 🔒 | || |

```

# CONTRACT ASSESSMENT

---

```

||||| | |
| **Ownable** | Implementation | Context ||
| L | <Constructor> | Public ! | 🔴 | NO ! |
| L | owner | Public ! | | NO ! |
| L | renounceOwnership | Public ! | 🔴 | onlyOwner |
| L | transferOwnership | Public ! | 🔴 | onlyOwner |
|||||
| **ERC20** | Implementation | Context, IERC20, IERC20Metadata ||
| L | <Constructor> | Public ! | 🔴 | NO ! |
| L | name | Public ! | | NO ! |
| L | symbol | Public ! | | NO ! |
| L | decimals | Public ! | | NO ! |
| L | totalSupply | Public ! | | NO ! |
| L | balanceOf | Public ! | | NO ! |
| L | transfer | Public ! | 🔴 | NO ! |
| L | allowance | Public ! | | NO ! |
| L | approve | Public ! | 🔴 | NO ! |
| L | transferFrom | Public ! | 🔴 | NO ! |
| L | increaseAllowance | Public ! | 🔴 | NO ! |
| L | decreaseAllowance | Public ! | 🔴 | NO ! |
| L | _transfer | Internal 🔒 | 🔴 || |
| L | _mint | Internal 🔒 | 🔴 || |
| L | _burn | Internal 🔒 | 🔴 || |
| L | _approve | Internal 🔒 | 🔴 || |
| L | _beforeTokenTransfer | Internal 🔒 | 🔴 || |
| L | _afterTokenTransfer | Internal 🔒 | 🔴 || |
|||||
| **ANDYCOIN** | Implementation | ERC20, Ownable ||
| L | <Constructor> | Public ! | 🔴 | ERC20 |
| L | <Receive Ether> | External ! | 💸 | NO ! |
| L | claimStuckTokens | External ! | 🔴 | onlyOwner |
| L | excludeFromFees | External ! | 🔴 | onlyOwner |

```

# CONTRACT ASSESSMENT

---

```

| L | isExcludedFromFees | Public ! | NO ! | | |
| L | updateFees | External ! | 🔒 | onlyOwner |
| L | changeMarketingWallet | External ! | 🔒 | onlyOwner |
| L | enableTrading | External ! | 🔒 | onlyOwner |
| L | _transfer | Internal 🔒 | 🔒 || |
| L | setSwapEnabled | External ! | 🔒 | onlyOwner |
| L | setSwapTokensAtAmount | External ! | 🔒 | onlyOwner |
| L | swapAndSendMarketing | Private 🔒 | 🔒 || |

```

### ### Legend

Symbol	Meaning
----- -----	
🔒	Function can modify state
💰	Function is payable



# STATIC ANALYSIS

```
Reentrancy in ANDYCOIN.swapAndSendMarketing(uint256) (contracts/Token.sol#630-649):
  External calls:
    - uniswapV2Router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (contracts/Token.sol#637-642)
    - address(marketingWallet).sendValue(newBalance) (contracts/Token.sol#646)
  Event emitted after the call(s):
    - SwapAndSendMarketing(tokenAmount,newBalance) (contracts/Token.sol#648)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-3

Context._msgData() (contracts/Token.sol#255-258) is never used and should be removed
ERC20._burn(address,uint256) (contracts/Token.sol#409-424) is never used and should be removed
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dead-code

Pragma version^0.8.17 (contracts/Token.sol#18) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6/0.8.16
solc-0.8.20 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity

Low level call in Address.sendValue(address,uint256) (contracts/Token.sol#242-247):
  - (success) = recipient.call{value: amount}() (contracts/Token.sol#245)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#low-level-calls

Function IUniswapV2Pair.DOMAIN_SEPARATOR() (contracts/Token.sol#48) is not in mixedCase
Function IUniswapV2Pair.PERMIT_TYPEHASH() (contracts/Token.sol#49) is not in mixedCase
Function IUniswapV2Pair.MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY() (contracts/Token.sol#66) is not in mixedCase
Function IUniswapV2Router01.WETH() (contracts/Token.sol#86) is not in mixedCase
Parameter ANDYCOIN.updateFees(uint256,uint256,uint256).marketingFeeOnSell (contracts/Token.sol#543) is not in mixedCase
Parameter ANDYCOIN.updateFees(uint256,uint256,uint256).marketingFeeOnBuy (contracts/Token.sol#543) is not in mixedCase
Parameter ANDYCOIN.updateFees(uint256,uint256,uint256).marketingFeeOnTransfer (contracts/Token.sol#543) is not in mixedCase
Parameter ANDYCOIN.changeMarketingWallet(address).marketingWallet (contracts/Token.sol#555) is not in mixedCase
Parameter ANDYCOIN.setSwapEnabled(bool).enabled (contracts/Token.sol#618) is not in mixedCase
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions

Redundant expression "this (contracts/Token.sol#256)" inContext (contracts/Token.sol#250-259)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#redundant-statements

Variable IUniswapV2Router01.addLiquidity(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256).amountADesired (contracts/Token.sol#91) is too similar to IUniswapV2Router01.addLiquidity(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256).amountBDesired (contracts/Token.sol#92)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#variable-names-too-similar

ANDYCOIN.uniswapV2Pair (contracts/Token.sol#455) should be immutable
ANDYCOIN.uniswapV2Router (contracts/Token.sol#454) should be immutable
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-immutable
```

**Result => A static analysis of contract's source code has been performed using slither,  
No major issues were found in the output**



# FUNCTIONAL TESTING

---

## 1- Adding liquidity (**passed**):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x79f8295d9719d4ac93be804935766d0bf860642c32cf50ecb8ebf7de01b73f79>

## 2- Buying when excluded from fees (0% tax) (**passed**):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x87facb67b1320ce746a833b089a57115b4678d31bd277a8d767d062779af2a31>

## 3- Selling when excluded from fees (0% tax) (**passed**):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xa1ae3225cf777749b7d3b8d11ec50b40990230bad1f3985f58d0dd36367f80fc>

## 4- Transferring when excluded from fees (0% tax) (**passed**):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xccad376c205b37e11842c2e306dc1f178fe28063ee16d6e80ffb76cd1fbc3788>

## 5- Buying when not excluded from fees (0-5% tax) (**passed**):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x05f044c4edc53ac58b90b45ca8def8b4abfee4949e45ab8575662d2d7b982bb>

## 6- Selling when not excluded from fees (0-5% tax) (**passed**):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x1d92888553664df4ebd7a4fad62491bf668d4e58658a930008271ed5a1361d10>



# FUNCTIONAL TESTING

---

**7- Transferring when not excluded from fees (0% tax) (passed):**

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x6e839a35d814dbb29e41ac8de6bc584d8181a68ef69cce121d372402d534c748>

**8- Internal swap (passed):**

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/address/0xbac32dd7b27f674f51b21471a716584c3a65c1a3#internaltx>



# MANUAL TESTING

## Centralization – swaps are disabled by default

**Severity:** High

**function:** EnableTrading

**Status:** Not Resolved

### Overview:

The smart contract owner must enable trades for holders. If trading remain disabled, no one would be able to buy/sell/transfer tokens.

```
function enableTrading() external onlyOwner{
    require(!tradingEnabled, "Trading already enabled.");
    tradingEnabled = true;
    swapEnabled = true;
}
```

### Suggestion

To mitigate this centralization issue, we propose the following options:

1. Renounce Ownership: Consider relinquishing control of the smart contract by renouncing ownership. This would remove the ability for a single entity to manipulate the router, reducing centralization risks.
2. Multi-signature Wallet: Transfer ownership to a multi-signature wallet. This would require multiple approvals for any changes to the mainRouter, adding an additional layer of security and reducing the centralization risk.
3. Transfer ownership to a trusted and valid 3<sup>rd</sup> party in order to guarantee enabling of the trades



# DISCLAIMER

---

All the content provided in this document is for general information only and should not be used as financial advice or a reason to buy any investment. Team provides no guarantees against the sale of team tokens or the removal of liquidity by the project audited in this document. Always Do your own research and protect yourselves from being scammed. The Auditace team has audited this project for general information and only expresses their opinion based on similar projects and checks from popular diagnostic tools. Under no circumstances did Auditace receive a payment to manipulate those results or change the awarding badge that we will be adding in our website. Always Do your own research and protect yourselves from scams. This document should not be presented as a reason to buy or not buy any particular token. The Auditace team disclaims any liability for the resulting losses.



# ABOUT AUDITACE

---

We specialize in providing thorough and reliable audits for Web3 projects. With a team of experienced professionals, we use cutting-edge technology and rigorous methodologies to evaluate the security and integrity of blockchain systems. We are committed to helping our clients ensure the safety and transparency of their digital assets and transactions.



**<https://auditace.tech/>**



**[https://t.me/Audit\\_Ace](https://t.me/Audit_Ace)**



**[https://twitter.com/auditace\\_](https://twitter.com/auditace_)**



**<https://github.com/Audit-Ace>**

---