



Smart Contract Audit

FOR

Pepe 4 Trump

DATED : 18 June 24'



AUDIT SUMMARY

Project name - Pepe 4 Trump

Date: 18 June, 2024

Scope of Audit- Audit Ace was consulted to conduct the smart contract audit of the solidity source codes.

Audit Status: Passed

Issues Found

Status	Critical	High	Medium	Low	Suggestion
Open	0	0	1	0	1
Acknowledged	0	0	0	0	0
Resolved	0	0	0	0	0



USED TOOLS

Tools:

1- Manual Review:

A line by line code review has been performed by audit ace team.

2- BSC Test Network: All tests were conducted on the BSC Test network, and each test has a corresponding transaction attached to it. These tests can be found in the "Functional Tests" section of the report.

3- Slither :

The code has undergone static analysis using Slither.

Testnet version:

The tests were performed using the contract deployed on the BSC Testnet, which can be found at the following address:

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/address/0xc9ef70d1738e89397f9c85c061773b8ab419cf19#code>



Token Information

Token Address:

0x3d34562b53580B2c1dc9eAbA780825f361F82fea

Name: Pepe 4 Trump

Symbol: PEPE4TRUMP

Decimals: 18

Network: BscScan

Token Type: BEP-20

Owner: 0x46992aacF7E759BAa86b5dD1FadCfF6519E5F0E9

Deployer:

0x46992aacF7E759BAa86b5dD1FadCfF6519E5F0E9

Token Supply: 1000000000

Checksum: A17acbefe2a12642d388659dff20321

Testnet:

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/address/0xc9ef70d1738e89397f9c85c061773b8ab419cf19#code>



TOKEN OVERVIEW

Buy Fee: 0-25%

Sell Fee: 0-25%

Transfer Fee: 0-25%

Fee Privilege: Owner

Ownership: Owned

Minting: None

Max Tx: No

Blacklist: No



AUDIT METHODOLOGY

The auditing process will follow a routine as special considerations by Auditace:

- Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace to make sure the contract logic meets the intentions of the client without exposing the user's funds to risk.
- Manual review of the entire codebase by our experts, which is the process of reading source code line-by-line in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
- Specification comparison is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Auditace describe.
- Test coverage analysis determines whether the test cases are covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run the test cases.
- Symbolic execution is analysing a program to determine what inputs cause each part of a program to execute.
- Reviewing the codebase to improve maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices.

VULNERABILITY CHECKLIST



Return values of low-level calls



Gasless Send



Private modifier



Using block.timestamp



Multiple Sends



Re-entrancy



Using Suicide



Tautology or contradiction



Gas Limit and Loops



Timestamp Dependence



Address hardcoded



Revert/require functions



Exception Disorder



Use of tx.origin



Using inline assembly



Integer overflow/underflow



Divide before multiply



Dangerous strict equalities



Missing Zero Address Validation



Using SHA3




Compiler version not fixed



Using throw

INHERITANCE TREE





POINTS TO NOTE

- The owner can transfer ownership.
- The owner can renounce ownership.
- The owner can recover the token.
- The owner can update the swap threshold.
- The owner can update the marketing address.
- The owner can set marketing fees setup.
- The owner can set AMM Pair.



STATIC ANALYSIS

```
INFO:Detectors:  
Pepe_4_Trump._update(address,address,uint256) (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#1418-1484) uses a Boolean constant improperly:  
-false || _marketingPending > 0 (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#1457)  
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#misuse-of-a-boolean-constant  
INFO:Detectors:  
Pepe_4_Trump._update(address,address,uint256) (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#1418-1484) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:  
- fees = amount * totalFees[txType] / 10000 (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#1439)  
- _marketingPending += fees * marketingFees[txType] / totalFees[txType] (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#1442)  
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#divide-before-multiply  
INFO:Detectors:  
Ownable2Step.transferOwnership(address).newOwner (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#883) lacks a zero-check on :  
- _pendingOwner = newOwner (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#884)  
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-zero-address-validation  
INFO:Detectors:  
Reentrancy in Pepe_4_Trump._updateRouterV2(address) (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#1393-1400):  
External calls:  
- pairV2 = IUniswapV2Factory(routerV2.factory()).createPair(address(this),routerV2.WETH()) (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#1395)  
State variables written after the call(s):  
- _setAMMPair(pairV2,true) (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#1397)  
- AMMPairs[pair] = isPair (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#1400)  
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-2  
INFO:Detectors:  
Reentrancy in Pepe_4_Trump._update(address,address,uint256) (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#1418-1484):  
External calls:  
- _swapTokensForCoin(token2Swap) (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#1461)  
- routerV2.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#1348)  
- (success,None) = address(marketingAddress).call{value: marketingPortion}() (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#1466)  
External calls sending eth:  
- (success,None) = address(marketingAddress).call{value: marketingPortion}() (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#1466)  
Event emitted after the call(s):  
- Transfer(from,to,value) (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#1113)  
- super._update(from,to,amount) (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#1480)  
- WalletTaxSent(1,marketingAddress,marketingPortion) (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#1468)  
Reentrancy in Pepe_4_Trump._updateRouterV2(address) (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#1393-1400):  
External calls:  
- pairV2 = IUniswapV2Factory(routerV2.factory()).createPair(address(this),routerV2.WETH()) (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#1395)  
Event emitted after the call(s):  
- AMMPairsUpdated(pair,isPair) (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#1414)  
- _setAMMPair(pairV2,true) (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#1397)  
- RouterV2Updated(router) (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#1399)  
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-3  
INFO:Detectors:  
Address._revert(bytes) (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#516-528) uses assembly  
- INLINE ASM (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#521-524)  
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#assembly-usage  
INFO:Detectors:  
Pepe_4_Trump._update(address,address,uint256) (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#1418-1484) has a high cyclomatic complexity (14).  
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#cyclomatic-complexity
```

```
INFO:Detectors:  
Pragma version>0.8.20 (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#84) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.8.18.  
solc-0.8.20 is not recommended for deployment  
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity  
INFO:Detectors:  
Low level call to Address.sendValue(address,uint256) (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#411-428):  
- (success) = recipient.call{value: amount}() (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#416)  
Low level call in Address.functionCallWithValue(address,bytes,uint256) (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#453-459):  
- (success) = target.functionCallWithValue(data,bytes) (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#457)  
Low level call in Address.functionDelegateCall(address,bytes) (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#465-468):  
- (success,returnData) = target.staticcall(data) (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#466)  
Low level call in Address.functionDelegateCall(address,bytes) (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#474-477):  
- (success,returnData) = target.delegatecall(data) (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#475)  
Low level call SafeERC20.reastered._callOptionalReturnBool(IERC20,bytes) (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#846-853):  
- (success,returnData) = address(token).call(data) (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#851)  
Low level call Pepe_4_Trump._update(address,address,uint256) (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#1418-1484):  
- (success,None) = address(marketingAddress).call{value: marketingPortion}() (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#1466)  
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#low-level-calls  
INFO:Detectors:  
Function IUniswapV2Router01.WETH() (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#833) is not in mixedCase  
Function IUniswapV2Pair.DENOMINATOR (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#882) is not in mixedCase  
Function IUniswapV2Pair.PERMIT_TYPEHASH (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#883) is not in mixedCase  
Function SafeERC20.approve(IERC20,address,uint256) (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#706-708) is not in mixedCase  
Function SafeERC20.reastered.safeTransferFrom(IERC20,address,uint256) (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#706-708) is not in mixedCase  
Contract Pepe_4_Trump (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#139-1497) is not in CapWords  
Parameter Pepe_4_Trump._afterConstructor(address)_router (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#1115) is not in mixedCase  
Parameter Pepe_4_Trump._updateSwapThreshold(uint16)_snapThresholdRatio (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#1351) is not in mixedCase  
Parameter Pepe_4_Trump._marketingAddressSetup(address)_newMarketingAddress (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#1367) is not in mixedCase  
Parameter Pepe_4_Trump._marketingFeeSetup(uint16,uint16,uint16)_buyFee (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#1376) is not in mixedCase  
Parameter Pepe_4_Trump._marketingFeeSetup(uint16,uint16,uint16)_sellFee (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#1376) is not in mixedCase  
Parameter Pepe_4_Trump._marketingFeeSetup(uint16,uint16,uint16)_transferFee (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#1376) is not in mixedCase  
Variable Pepe_4_Trump.AMMPairs (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#1207) is not in mixedCase  
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions  
INFO:Detectors:  
Variable IUniswapV2Router01.addLiquidity(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256).amountDesired (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#858) is too similar to IUniswapV2Router01.addLiquidity(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256).amountDesired (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#859)  
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#variable-names-too-similar  
INFO:Detectors:  
Pepe_4_Trump.constructor() (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#1294-1318) uses literals with too many digits:  
- mintSupplyRecipient 100000000000 + (10 + decimals()) / 10 (Pepe_4_Trump.sol#1306)  
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#too-many-digits  
INFO:Slither:Pepe_4_Trump.sol analyzed (18 contracts with 93 detectors), 43 result(s) found
```

Result => A static analysis of contract's source code has been performed using slither, No major issues were found in the output



FUNCTIONAL TESTING

1- Approve (**passed**):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xffbe0ee4162439242f9f19888a91c946470f223fca309c642fc2ff227cbc0e88>

2- Marketing Address Setup (**passed**):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x419cd5045f9a8e7871d04a17d369a76afb5a5c383d06fe1c56d2f0f964dea0f7>

3- Marketing Fees Setup (**passed**):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0xa94f012c2e215774c5bf5f82032a13bf7dc471e7d89c62a4161e8416ab6301c9>

4- Transfer (**passed**):

<https://testnet.bscscan.com/tx/0x1c7efd4a4095718e3e16976ac4325102ff6a7ae158bcda154e3dce5393f02cd7>



CLASSIFICATION OF RISK

Severity	Description
◆ Critical	These vulnerabilities could be exploited easily and can lead to asset loss, data loss, asset, or data manipulation. They should be fixed right away.
◆ High-Risk	A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.
◆ Medium-Risk	A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.
◆ Low-Risk	A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.
◆ Gas Optimization / Suggestion	A vulnerability that has an informational character but is not affecting any of the code.

Findings

Severity	Found
◆ Critical	0
◆ High-Risk	0
◆ Medium-Risk	1
◆ Low-Risk	0
◆ Gas Optimization / Suggestions	1



MANUAL TESTING

Centralization – Missing Require Check.

Severity: Medium

Function: setTreasuryAddress

Status: Open

Overview:

The owner can set any arbitrary address excluding zero address as this is not recommended because if the owner sets the address to the contract address, then the ETH will not be sent to that address and the transaction will fail and this will lead to a potential honeypot in the contract.

```
function marketingAddressSetup(address _newAddress) public  
onlyOwner {  
    if (_newAddress == address(0)) revert  
    InvalidTaxRecipientAddress(address(0));  
  
    marketingAddress = _newAddress;  
    excludeFromFees(_newAddress, true);  
  
    emit WalletTaxAddressUpdated(1, _newAddress);  
}
```

Suggestion:

It is recommended that the address should not be able to be set as a contract address.



MANUAL TESTING

Optimization

Severity: Informational

Subject: FloatingPragma Solidity version

Status: Open

Overview:

It is considered best practice to pick one compiler version and stick with it. With a floating pragma, contracts may accidentally be deployed using an outdated.

```
pragma solidity ^0.8.20;
```

Suggestion:

Adding the latest constant version of solidity is recommended, as this prevents the unintentional deployment of a contract with an outdated compiler that contains unresolved bugs.



DISCLAIMER

All the content provided in this document is for general information only and should not be used as financial advice or a reason to buy any investment. Team provides no guarantees against the sale of team tokens or the removal of liquidity by the project audited in this document. Always Do your own research and protect yourselves from being scammed. The Auditace team has audited this project for general information and only expresses their opinion based on similar projects and checks from popular diagnostic tools. Under no circumstances did Auditace receive a payment to manipulate those results or change the awarding badge that we will be adding in our website. Always Do your own research and protect yourselves from scams. This document should not be presented as a reason to buy or not buy any particular token. The Auditace team disclaims any liability for the resulting losses.



ABOUT AUDITACE

We specialize in providing thorough and reliable audits for Web3 projects. With a team of experienced professionals, we use cutting-edge technology and rigorous methodologies to evaluate the security and integrity of blockchain systems. We are committed to helping our clients ensure the safety and transparency of their digital assets and transactions.



<https://auditace.tech/>



https://t.me/Audit_Ace



https://twitter.com/auditace_



<https://github.com/Audit-Ace>
