

**THE A  
AND THE P  
OF THE T**



**#APT**

**#APT**

**#APT**

**#APwot**





**ADVANCED**  
**[əd'vɑ:n(t)st]**

we don't  
understand it


we detected it  
too late

**PERSISTENT**  
**[pə'sistənt]**

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# A Digital Threat History

VIRUS

TROJAN

INSIDE TARGETED

THREAT THREAT

ADWARE

ROOTKIT

APT

WORM

EXPLOIT


SPYWARE

SURVEILLANCE  
MULTI-COMPONENT

SOFTWARE

MALWARE





# A THREAT DETECTION HISTORY

Source:  
[obsoletemedias.org](http://obsoletemedias.org)

*Your signature update.*



# THINGS HAVE CHANGED

Virus

Detection

Signature

Product

Computer

Server

Threat


Prevention

Definition

Solution

Endpoint

Cloud





Checksums

Byte Patterns

Behavior Patterns

Static / Dynamic Heuristics

Whitelisting

Network Streams

Cloud Protection

2014

..and many, many more!



# BOILS DOWN TO

The binary is known.

The binary is recognized.

The behavior of the binary is recognized.



# BOILS DOWN TO

KNOWLEDGE  
BASED  
THREAT  
DETECTION

PREDICTIVE  
THREAT  
DETECTION



# NOT BEING UNIQUE

Runtime packer trigger heuristics!

Altered compiler settings don't ...

Dynamic API resolving

Character-wise string recovery





# jump table FTW

FindNextFileA

00883938	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	AB	AB	AB	AB	AB	AB	AB	AB	.....XXXXXXXXXX
00883948	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	48	00	03	01	C3	07	18	00	.....H....+...
00883958	9C	70	43	00	68	4F	86	7C	F5	4D	86	7C	1F	5B	86	7C	ÉpC.h0ã )Mã . [ã
00883968	1A	1E	80	7C	6B	23	80	7C	D1	09	83	7C	3B	AB	81	7C	..Ç k#Ç -.â ;½ü
00883978	85	DE	80	7C	B0	99	80	7C	27	D8	81	7C	8E	DE	80	7C	à Ç   ÜÇ  '+ü Â Ç
00883988	9C	32	81	7C	C7	06	81	7C	07	0B	81	7C	46	24	80	7C	£2ü   .ü ..ü F\$Ç
00883998	C5	1E	83	7C	D7	9B	80	7C	A7	A0	80	7C	12	18	80	7C	+..â +çÇ ôáÇ ..Ç
008839A8	28	1A	80	7C	E2	5D	83	7C	7A	4F	81	7C	4B	13	82	7C	(.Ç G]â z0ü K.é
008839B8	67	EE	80	7C	69	38	81	7C	9D	08	83	7C	23	CB	81	7C	geÇ i8ü ¥.â #-ü
008839C8	30	25	80	7C	5F	B5	80	7C	17	0E	81	7C	CB	A0	80	7C	0%Ç _ Ç ..ü -áÇ
008839D8	ED	A0	80	7C	C8	5B	83	7C	94	17	82	7C	2E	93	80	7C	fáÇ +[â ö.é .ôÇ
008839E8	12	28	81	7C	CC	15	81	7C	88	9C	80	7C	AD	A7	80	7C	.(ü   .ü êÉÇ ;oÇ
008839F8	82	27	81	7C	75	13	83	7C	14	82	80	7C	8D	1B	82	7C	é'ü u.â -..é i.é
00883A08	00	00	00	7C	00	00	00	7C	C9	4E	83	7C	00	10	90	7C	..ü fðã +Nâ ..É
00883A18	E0	10	90	7C	5A	13	81	7C	10	9F	80	7C	1D	14	82	7C	a.É Z.æ üÇ ..é
00883A28	01	FE	90	7C	4D	20	BF	76	F4	1E	BF	76	3B	1E	B8	73	.. É M +v(.+v;.+s
00883A38	0F	1B	B8	73	7B	79	DD	77	FC	EF	DD	77	08	C2	DF	77	..+s{y wnn w.-_w
00883A48	42	78	DD	77	12	43	DE	77	17	6C	DD	77	8F	9B	DF	77	Bx w.C w.l wÃÇ w
00883A58	90	B0	B5	76	45	AA	B5	76	46	EE	4F	77	31	EF	4F	77	É   vE- vFe0w1n0w
00883A68	53	2A	50	77	24	0B	A7	7C	50	11	A4	7C	C0	3E	AB	71	S*Pw\$.º P.ñ +>½q
00883A78	11	42	AB	71	2B	3E	AB	71	80	44	AB	71	55	53	AB	71	.B½q+>½qÇD½qUS½q
00883A88	55	6A	AB	71	ED	3F	AB	71	53	2E	AB	71	51	2F	AB	71	Uj½qf?½qS.½qQ/½q

```
text:00404358 lea     ecx, [esp+179D4h+var_16458]
text:0040435F mov     [esp+179D4h+var_179A5], 's'
text:00404364 mov     [esp+179D4h+var_179A4], 'e'
text:00404369 mov     [esp+179D4h+var_179A3], 'H'
text:0040436E mov     [esp+179D4h+var_179A2], 'a'
text:00404373 mov     [esp+179D4h+var_179A1], 'n'
text:00404378 mov     [esp+179D4h+var_179A0], 'd'
text:0040437D mov     [esp+179D4h+var_1799F], 'l'
text:00404382 mov     [esp+179D4h+var_1799E], 'e'
text:00404387 mov     [esp+179D4h+var_1799D], 0
```

spot the  
string



# ONE BINARY TO RULE FOREVER

Filehash-based detection

Updating of binaries in  
irregular intervals

Route traffic through local proxy





# ZEUS E(DDIE) VXSIΔN



%APP%\Uwirpa	10.12.2013	23:50
%APP%\Woyxhi	10.12.2013	23:50
%APP%\Hibyo	19.12.2013	00:10
%APP%\Nezah	19.12.2013	00:10
%APP%\Afqag	19.12.2013	23:29
%APP%\Zasi	19.12.2013	23:29
%APP%\Eqzauf	20.12.2013	22:23
%APP%\Ubapo	20.12.2013	22:23
%APP%\Ydgowa	20.12.2013	22:23
%APP%\Olosu	20.12.2013	23:03
%APP%\Taal	20.12.2013	23:03
%APP%\Taosep	20.12.2013	23:03
%APP%\Wokyco	16.01.2014	13:22
%APP%\Semi	17.01.2014	16:34
%APP%\Uheh	17.01.2014	16:34



# REPETITIVE ARTIFACTS

File names

Domain names

Registry key names / value  
names

Infiltration methods

Persistence methods





# ENVIRONMENTAL INSENSITIVITY

Might want to refuse executing in  
sandboxes, emulators &  
analyst's machines

Potentially targeted systems  
usually homogeneous





Only  
infecting  
Tuesdays,  
sorry.

Or 16, 17 and 18  
next month?

```
0040118C loc_40118C: ; C0
0040118C lea     eax, [ebp+SystemTime]
0040118F push    eax ; lp
00401190 call    GetLocalTime
00401195 movzx   eax, [ebp+SystemTime.wDay]
00401199 mov     [ebp+DAY], eax
0040119C movzx   eax, [ebp+SystemTime.wHour]
004011A0 mov     [ebp+HOUR], eax
004011A3 movzx   eax, [ebp+SystemTime.wMinute]
004011A7 mov     [ebp+MINUTE], eax
004011AA movzx   eax, [ebp+SystenTime.wSecond]
004011AE mov     [ebp+SECOND], eax
004011B1 cmp     [ebp+DAY], 16
004011B5 jnz     short loc_4011B9
004011B7 jmp     short locret_4011CB
004011B9 ; -----
004011B9 loc_4011B9: ; C0
004011B9 cmp     [ebp+DAY], 17
004011BD jnz     short loc_4011C1
004011BF jmp     short locret_4011CB
004011C1 ; -----
004011C1 loc_4011C1: ; C0
004011C1 cmp     [ebp+DAY], 18
004011C5 jnz     short loc_4011C9
004011C7 jmp     short locret_4011CB
004011C9 ; -----
004011C9 loc_4011C9: ; C0
004011C9 jmp     short loc_40118C
004011CB ; -----
```



# SINGULAR PERSISTENCE

Remember the P?

Registry & service list monitored  
One process easy to kill  
MBR regularly scanned

Why not do all?





# SEPARATION OF LAYERS

Runtime packers trigger heuristics!

In-memory scanning identifies  
equal payloads

Consistent evasion tricks  
multiply success





# KNOWN SPHERES

Remember the A?

Find new battle fields

Virtual machine execution

Kernel land code

Bootkits

BIOS





# BATTLE FIELD

you said?





That moment a  
researcher tells you  
what's wrong with  
your system, an  
attacker is already  
exploiting it.





# BLACK ENERGY

**Crimeware going APT: Sandworm**

**Runtime Packer**

**Malware-like startup & infiltration**

**Driven by plugins**



# HAVEX

RAT used by EnergeticBear

Targets ICS data, accessed via  
Windows COM/DCOM

Standard system infiltration


No protection



(T)EDDIE




# BLACK PDS anatomy of a genius hack





# EVIL BUNNY






1. Unique binaries
2. Irregular updates
3. No repetitive artifacts
4. Environmental sensitivity
5. Multiple persistence techniques
6. Consistent evasion
7. Unknown spheres



# The and the of the

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
BlackEnergy							
Havex							
BlackPOS							
EvilBunny							

estimated  
56 Mio.  
credit cards  
compromised





Help





# RESOURCES

- **Havex** - <http://www.cyphort.com/windows-meets-industrial-control-systems-ics-havex-rat-spells-security-risks-2/>
- **BlackPOS** - <http://www.cyphort.com/parallels-among-three-notorious-pos-malwares-attacking-u-s-retailers/>
- **EvilBunny** - <https://drive.google.com/a/cyphort.com/file/d/0B9Mrr-en8FX4M2IXN1B4eElHcE0/view>
- **Eddie** - <http://maiden-world.com/downloads/wallpaper.html>



# Thank you!

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Will help build  
battle station  
for food 🌌