Changes based on comments from Aaron Gable

docs/BR.md

@@ -1209,25 +1209,25 @@ No stipulation.
 
 The CA SHALL revoke a Certificate within 24 hours and use the corresponding CRLReason (see Section 7.2.2) if one or more of the following occurs:
 
-1. The Subscriber requests in writing, without giving a reason, that the CA revoke the Certificate (CRLReason "unspecified (0)" which results in no reasonCode extension being provided in the CRL);
+1. The Subscriber requests in writing, without specifying a CRLreason, that the CA revoke the Certificate (CRLReason "unspecified (0)" which results in no reasonCode extension being provided in the CRL);
 2. The Subscriber notifies the CA that the original certificate request was not authorized and does not retroactively grant authorization (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn);
 3. The CA obtains evidence that the Subscriber's Private Key corresponding to the Public Key in the Certificate suffered a Key Compromise (CRLReason #1, keyCompromise);
 4. The CA is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that can easily compute the Subscriber's Private Key based on the Public Key in the Certificate (such as a Debian weak key, see <https://wiki.debian.org/SSLkeys>) (CRLReason #1, keyCompromise);
 5. The CA obtains evidence that the validation of domain authorization or control for any Fully-Qualified Domain Name or IP address in the Certificate should not be relied upon (CRLReason #4, superseded).
 
 The CA SHOULD revoke a certificate within 24 hours and MUST revoke a Certificate within 5 days and use the corresponding CRLReason if one or more of the following occurs:
 
-1. The Certificate no longer complies with the requirements of [Section 6.1.5](#615-key-sizes) and [Section 6.1.6](#616-public-key-parameters-generation-and-quality-checking) (CRLReason #4, superseded);
-2. The CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn);
-3. The CA is made aware that a Subscriber has violated one or more of its material obligations under the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn);
-4. The CA is made aware of any circumstance indicating that use of a Fully-Qualified Domain Name or IP address in the Certificate is no longer legally permitted (e.g. a court or arbitrator has revoked a Domain Name Registrant's right to use the Domain Name, a relevant licensing or services agreement between the Domain Name Registrant and the Applicant has terminated, or the Domain Name Registrant has failed to renew the Domain Name) (CRLReason #5, cessationOfOperation);
-5. The CA is made aware that a Wildcard Certificate has been used to authenticate a fraudulently misleading subordinate Fully-Qualified Domain Name (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn);
-6. The CA is made aware of a material change in the information contained in the Certificate (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn);
-7. The CA is made aware that the Certificate was not issued in accordance with these Requirements or the CA's Certificate Policy or Certification Practice Statement (CRLReason #4, superseded);
-8. The CA determines or is made aware that any of the information appearing in the Certificate is inaccurate (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn);
-9. The CA's right to issue Certificates under these Requirements expires or is revoked or terminated, unless the CA has made arrangements to continue maintaining the CRL/OCSP Repository (CRLReason "unspecified (0)" which results in no reasonCode extension being provided in the CRL);
-10. Revocation is required by the CA's Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement for a reason that is not otherwise required to be specified by this section 4.9.1.1 (CRLReason "unspecified (0)" which results in no reasonCode extension being provided in the CRL); or
-11. The CA is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that exposes the Subscriber's Private Key to compromise or if there is clear evidence that the specific method used to generate the Private Key was flawed (CRLReason #1, keyCompromise).
+6. The Certificate no longer complies with the requirements of [Section 6.1.5](#615-key-sizes) and [Section 6.1.6](#616-public-key-parameters-generation-and-quality-checking) (CRLReason #4, superseded);
+7. The CA obtains evidence that the Certificate was misused (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn);
+8. The CA is made aware that a Subscriber has violated one or more of its material obligations under the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn);
+9. The CA is made aware of any circumstance indicating that use of a Fully-Qualified Domain Name or IP address in the Certificate is no longer legally permitted (e.g. a court or arbitrator has revoked a Domain Name Registrant's right to use the Domain Name, a relevant licensing or services agreement between the Domain Name Registrant and the Applicant has terminated, or the Domain Name Registrant has failed to renew the Domain Name) (CRLReason #5, cessationOfOperation);
+10. The CA is made aware that a Wildcard Certificate has been used to authenticate a fraudulently misleading subordinate Fully-Qualified Domain Name (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn);
+11. The CA is made aware of a material change in the information contained in the Certificate (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn);
+12. The CA is made aware that the Certificate was not issued in accordance with these Requirements or the CA's Certificate Policy or Certification Practice Statement (CRLReason #4, superseded);
+13. The CA determines or is made aware that any of the information appearing in the Certificate is inaccurate (CRLReason #9, privilegeWithdrawn);
+14. The CA's right to issue Certificates under these Requirements expires or is revoked or terminated, unless the CA has made arrangements to continue maintaining the CRL/OCSP Repository (CRLReason "unspecified (0)" which results in no reasonCode extension being provided in the CRL);
+15. Revocation is required by the CA's Certificate Policy and/or Certification Practice Statement for a reason that is not otherwise required to be specified by this section 4.9.1.1 (CRLReason "unspecified (0)" which results in no reasonCode extension being provided in the CRL); or
+16. The CA is made aware of a demonstrated or proven method that exposes the Subscriber's Private Key to compromise or if there is clear evidence that the specific method used to generate the Private Key was flawed (CRLReason #1, keyCompromise).
 
 #### 4.9.1.2 Reasons for Revoking a Subordinate CA Certificate
 
@@ -2288,10 +2288,10 @@ Prior to including a Reserved Certificate Policy Identifier, the CA MUST ensure
 Only the following CRLReasons MAY be present in the CRL `reasonCode` extension for Subscriber Certifificates:
 
   * **keyCompromise (RFC 5280 CRLReason #1):** Indicates that it is known or suspected that the Subscriber’s Private Key has been compromised; 
-  * **affiliationChanged (RFC 5280 CRLReason #3):** It is intended to be used to indicate that the Subject's name or other Subject Identity Information in the Certificate has changed, but there is no cause to suspect that the Certificate's Private Key has been compromised;
-  * **superseded (RFC 5280 CRLReason #4):** It is intended to be used to indicate when the Certificate Subscriber has requested a new Certificate to replace an existing Certificate, or the CA operator obtains reasonable evidence that the validation of domain authorization or control for any fully‐qualified domain name or IP address in the Certificate should not be relied upon or the CA operator has revoked the Certificate for compliance reasons such as the Certificate does not comply with this policy, the CA/Browser Forum's Baseline Requirements, or the CA operator's CP or CPS;
-  * **cessationOfOperation (RFC 5280 CRLReason #5):** It is intended to be used when the website with the Certificate is shut down prior to the expiration of the Certificate, or if the Subscriber no longer owns or controls the Domain Name in the Certificate prior to the expiration of the Certificate; or
-  * **privilegeWithdrawn (RFC 5280 CRLReason #9):** It is intended to be used when there has been a subscriber-side infraction that has not resulted in keyCompromise, such as the Certificate Subscriber provided misleading information in their Certificate Request or has not upheld their material obligations under the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use.
+  * **affiliationChanged (RFC 5280 CRLReason #3):** Indicates that the Subject's name or other Subject Identity Information in the Certificate has changed, but there is no cause to suspect that the Certificate's Private Key has been compromised;
+  * **superseded (RFC 5280 CRLReason #4):** Indicates that the Certificate Subscriber has requested a new Certificate to replace an existing Certificate, or the CA has reasonable evidence that the validation of domain authorization or control for any fully‐qualified domain name or IP address in the Certificate should not be relied upon or the CA has revoked the Certificate for compliance reasons such as the Certificate does not comply with these Baseline Requirements or the CA's CP or CPS;
+  * **cessationOfOperation (RFC 5280 CRLReason #5):** Indicates that the website with the Certificate is shut down prior to the expiration of the Certificate, or if the Subscriber no longer owns or controls the Domain Name in the Certificate prior to the expiration of the Certificate; or
+  * **privilegeWithdrawn (RFC 5280 CRLReason #9):** Indicates that there has been a subscriber-side infraction that has not resulted in keyCompromise, such as the Certificate Subscriber provided misleading information in their Certificate Request or has not upheld their material obligations under the Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use.
 
 The Subscriber Agreement, or an online resource referenced therein, MUST inform Subscribers about the revocation reason options listed above and provide explanation about when to choose each option. Tools that the CA provides to the Subscriber MUST allow for these options to be easily specified when the Subscriber requests revocation of their Certificate, with the default value being that no revocation reason is provided (i.e. the default corresponds to the CRLReason “unspecified (0)” which results in no reasonCode extension being provided in the CRL).