

# TTP SmartCard-based ElGamal Cryptosystem using Threshold Scheme for Electronic Elections (Extended)<sup>1</sup>

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## Abstract

The private key of electronic elections is a very critical piece of information that, with an incorrect or improper use, may disrupt the elections results. To enforce the privacy and security of the private key, secret sharing schemes (or threshold schemes) are used to generate a *distributed* key into several entities. In this fashion, a threshold of at least  $t$  out of the  $n$  entities will be necessary to decrypt votes. We study in this work the feasibility of developing ElGamal cryptosystem and Shamir's secret sharing scheme into JavaCards, whose API gives no support for it.

# Chapter 1

## Introduction

Electronic elections employ typically asymmetric cryptosystems to encrypt votes and, therefore, guarantee their anonymity and secrecy. In this scenario, the private key of the electoral board is a critical piece of information. An incorrect or improper use of the private key could disrupt the election results. Secret sharing is a cryptographic primitive that is used to solve this problem. In a  $(t,n)$ -threshold secret sharing scheme, the secret is divided in  $n$  shares in such a way that any set of at least  $t$  shares can recover the secret. The ElGamal cryptosystem [4] is widely chosen in e-voting schemes, given its homomorphic properties and its possible use in mixnets [2].

In addition, smartcards are being used to enhance the security and usability of the e-voting system given that they are tamper-proof devices [10] and make easier the shares portability. Smartcards have two parts [5]: (i) the hardware components, which might include a cryptographic co-processor to provide hardware-accelerated cryptographic operations (e.g., RSA, DSA), and (ii) the smartcard operating system, which may allow to develop, deploy and execute user applications in a secure fashion. JavaCards [7, 8] are extensively used smartcards, because they can extend their functionality by means of applications (called *applets*) developed in a subset of the Java programming language. However, even though the smartcard hardware may give support for ElGamal cryptosystem (e.g., [1, pg. 2]), the JavaCard API (Application Programming Interface) does not [7, 8].

## Chapter 2

# Contributions and organization

The contributions of our work are the design and development for JavaCards of the following building blocks: (i) ElGamal cryptosystem to generate the ElGamal key pair, (ii) Shamir's secret sharing scheme to divide the private key in a set of shares, (iii) secure communication channels for the distribution of the shares, and (iv) a decryption function without reconstructing the private key. This solution can be applicable in many different situations but especially, as discussed below, we will show how it applies and how can be useful for a typical e-voting system, specifically in the voting scheme presented by Cramer et al. [3].

In the Chapter, 3 we detail the protocol implemented and its phases. In the Chapter, 4 we explain how we implement the protocol. In the following Chapter 5, we will evaluate the performance of our implementation. Finally, we make conclusions and the analysis of the future work in the Chapter 6.

## Chapter 3

# Smartcard protocol

In order to explain the protocol behavior and its implementation, we make use of a typical e-voting system [3]. In this chapter, we describe our proposed smartcard protocol for initializing the ElGamal cryptosystem and the threshold secret sharing scheme that are used in the electronic elections. The protocol has been designed in order to implement all sensitive operations securely into the JavaCard.

Firstly, we list the participating actors within the protocol, and afterwards, we describe all the subsequent protocol steps within the elections process.

For each electoral district/department there is an **electoral board** ( $\mathcal{M}$ ), formed by a set of **members**  $\mathcal{M} = \{m_1, \dots, m_n\}$ . The electoral board  $\mathcal{M}$  has the responsibility of initializing ElGamal cryptosystem and providing the private key to all members. The set  $\mathcal{M}$  is elected from the set of **users**  $\mathcal{U} = \{u_1, \dots, u_w\}$ ,  $n \leq w$ . Each member  $m_i$  is provided with a **smartcard**  $sc_i \in \mathcal{SC}$ . An **electoral authority**  $\mathcal{A}$  has the function of managing and supervising the elections and, in particular, of generating the certificates  $c_i$  for each member  $m_i \in \mathcal{M}$ .

In the following, we highlight the protocol steps in a typical e-voting system. Firstly, (i) the **electoral board is constituted**, allowing voters to vote; (ii) voters cast their vote **encrypted** to guarantee anonymity and secrecy; and (iii) votes are **decrypted**. The votes can be aggregated before obtaining the tally results if the e-voting scheme is homomorphic or hybrid.

### 3.1 Electoral board constitution

The **electoral board is constituted** by a set of  $m$  members. Any member has a smartcard, public certificates and particular public and private keys. A smartcard  $sc \in \mathcal{SC}$  is used to generate the ElGamal key pair for the current elections, and also all *shares* for the private key using Shamir's secret sharing scheme [11]. Only then the private key is *securely* removed from  $sc$ . This smartcard establishes a secure channel to the rest of  $(n - 1)$  smartcards and sends them the corresponding *shares*. Once this protocol step is concluded, all smartcards have their *verified share*, as well as all the public key and parameters necessary for encryption, decryption and verification operations. We structure the electoral board constitution with the following steps:

1. Election and certification of the members of the electoral board:

- (a) The members of  $\mathcal{M} = \{m_1, \dots, m_n\}$  are drawn from  $\mathcal{U} = \{u_1, \dots, u_w\}$  according to the current legislation.
  - (b)  $\mathcal{A}$  stores in all smartcards elections detail  $\mathcal{E}$  (current elections), list of members  $\mathcal{M}$  and certificate  $c_{\mathcal{A}}$ .
  - (c) All members in  $\mathcal{M}$  meet. Then,  $\mathcal{A}$  provides them their smartcards.
2. Creation of the electoral board:
- (a) For each  $m_i \in \mathcal{M}$ ,  $\mathcal{A}$  builds a (e.g., RSA) key pair  $(p_i, s_i)$  and creates its public certificate  $c_i$ .
  - (b) The key pair  $(p_i, s_i)$  and the set of public certificates  $\mathcal{C} = \{c_1, \dots, c_n\}$  are stored in the corresponding smartcard  $sc_i$ .
  - (c)  $\mathcal{A}$  validates each certificate  $c_i \in \mathcal{C}$ .
  - (d) The electoral board constitution is publicly defined by  $\delta \triangleq SH_{\mathcal{A}}(\mathcal{M}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{E})$ .
3. Creation of the ElGamal key pair for elections  $\mathcal{E}$ :
- (a)  $\delta$  is stored in each  $sc_i \in \mathcal{SC}$ .
  - (b) Every  $sc_i \in \mathcal{SC}$  verifies  $\delta$  using  $c_{\mathcal{A}}$ .
  - (c) Every  $sc_i \in \mathcal{SC}$  stores the ElGamal and threshold scheme public parameters in  $(sc_i \xleftarrow{\mathcal{A}} (p, g, t))$ .
  - (d) One (any) of the  $sc_i \in \mathcal{SC}$  performs the following operations:
    - i. Generates  $s \in \mathbf{Z}_p$ , where  $s$  is the ElGamal private key for elections  $\mathcal{E}$ .
    - ii. Generates  $y = g^s \mod p$ , the ElGamal public key for elections  $\mathcal{E}$ .
4. Generation of the private key shares for the electoral members according to the Shamir's  $(t, n)$ -threshold scheme. To do so, the above selected  $sc_i$  performs the following operations:
- (a) Defines privately  $\mathcal{B} = \{b_1, \dots, b_{t-1}\}$ , where  $b_i \in \mathbf{Z}_p$ ,  $0 < i < t$ .
  - (b) Commits publicly to  $\hat{\mathcal{B}} = \{B_1, \dots, B_{t-1}\} : B_i = g^{b_i} \mod p$ ,  $1 \leq i \leq t-1$ .
  - (c) Defines a polynomial  $f(x) = s + \sum_{i=1}^{t-1} b_i x^i \mod p$ , of degree  $t-1$ , where  $s$  is the zero degree term. This polynomial will be used to generate the shares of the  $(t, n)$ -threshold scheme.
  - (d) Defines the public parameters  $\mathcal{X} = \{x_1, \dots, x_n\} : x_i \in \mathbf{Z}_p \wedge x_i \neq x_j \wedge i \neq j, 1 \leq i \leq n \wedge 1 \leq j \leq n$ .
  - (e) Commits publicly to  $\mathcal{X} = \{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$ .
  - (f) Calculates the set of shares  $\mathcal{H} = \{h_1, \dots, h_n\}$  where  $h_i = f(x_i) = s + \sum_{j=1}^{t-1} b_j x_i^j \mod p$ ,  $x_i \in \mathcal{X}$ .
  - (g) Removes securely  $s$ .
  - (h) Commits publicly to  $\hat{\mathcal{H}} = \{H_1, \dots, H_n\} : H_i = g^{h_i} \mod p$ ,  $1 \leq i \leq t-1$ .

5. Distribution of shares to all electoral members. To do that, the same smartcard  $sc_i$  prepares all  $h_j \in \mathcal{H} \setminus \{h_i\}$  to be sent *privately* to other members  $m_j$  in  $\mathcal{M} \setminus \{m_i\}$ . The goal is to securely transmit and store the share  $h_j$  in the corresponding smartcard  $sc_j$ . We implement a secure communication channel by using symmetric and asymmetric encryption of the data to be sent, and then, send it publicly over any insecure communication channel. In particular, for all  $j \neq i$ ,  $sc_i$  realizes the following operations:
  - (a) Gets a symmetric key  $K_j$  (e.g., AES key).
  - (b) Encrypts  $h_j$  using  $K_j$  and obtains  $\sigma_j = E_{K_j}(h_j)$ .
  - (c) Encrypts  $K_j$  using the public key  $P_{c_j}$  and obtains  $\alpha_j = P_{c_j}(K_j)$ .
  - (d) Calculates the digital signature of  $(\sigma_j, \alpha_j)$  obtaining  $\beta_j = SH_{s_i}(\sigma_j, \alpha_j)$ . Recall that  $s_i$  is the  $m_i$ 's private key, stored in  $sc_i$ .
  - (e) Sends publicly  $(y, \sigma_j, \alpha_j, \beta_j)$  to  $sc_j$ .
  - (f) Securely removes all  $h_j$  from  $sc_i$ .
6. Verification and storage of the received shares by all electoral members. To do so, all smartcards  $sc_j \neq sc_i$  check the received information. That is, for every  $j \neq i$ ,  $sc_j$  performs the following operations:
  - (a) Verifies the digital signature  $\beta_j$ .
  - (b) Decrypts  $\alpha_j$  using its private key  $s_j$ , and obtains  $K_j = S_{s_j}(\alpha_j)$ .
  - (c) Decrypts  $\sigma_j$  using  $K_j$ , and obtains  $h_j = D_{K_j}(\sigma_j)$ .
  - (d) Verifies  $h_j$ , so that  $g^{h_j}$  corresponds to the public parameter  $H_j$ .
  - (e) Verifies that the public parameters  $\hat{\mathcal{H}} = \{H_1, \dots, H_n\}$  are correct.
  - (f) Stores in  $sc_j$  the share  $h_j$ , whether all verifications succeed. Otherwise, smartcard  $sc_j$  from member  $m_j$  addresses a complain to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
7. To complete and confirm the correct reception of the corresponding shares, all smartcards perform a public commitment to the received shares. Every  $sc_i \in \mathcal{SC}$  realizes the following operations:
  - (a) Calculates  $y_i = g^{h_i} \mod p$ .
  - (b) Calculates the digital signature  $\gamma_i = SH_i(y_i)$ .
  - (c) Sends in a public fashion the pair  $(y_i, \gamma_i)$  to the rest of smartcards.

The aforementioned protocol steps guarantee that any  $sc_i \in \mathcal{SC}$  has its *verified* private information, as well as all the public key and parameters necessary for encryption, decryption and verification. Next, we describe the rest of the logical steps in the elections.

### 3.2 Vote encryption and tallying votes

Once the electoral board is constituted, the elections starts. In the voting phase, voters cast their vote **encrypted** in order to guarantee their anonymity and secrecy. Therefore, the vote  $z_i \in \mathbf{Z}_p$  from voter  $v_i$  is encrypted using the ElGamal public key  $y$  from elections  $\mathcal{E}$  and  $r_i$ , where  $\mathbf{Z}_p$  and  $1 < r_i < p - 1$ .

When elections have been concluded, a set of at least  $t$  members of the electoral board  $\mathcal{M} = \{m_1, \dots, m_n\}$ ,  $t \leq n$ , it is necessary to meet for successfully **decrypting** votes. These members compute securely in their smartcards the factor  $Z1_i = Z1(g^{h_i})^{\lambda_i} \bmod p$ , where  $\lambda_i$  is the corresponding Lagrange coefficient, and  $Z1 = \prod_{v_i \in \mathcal{V}} g^{r_i}$ . This factor is used to compute the final tally in a similar way of [3].



## Chapter 4

# Development details

We propose to develop an application to be deployed on JavaCards [7, 8]. We chose this technology because it is one of the most pervasive open platforms for secure devices. Nowadays, there are over 3.5 Billion Java Powered smart cards deployed worldwide [9]. The applications developed using Java card technology can be run on several platforms. Another consideration is its Modular security certification. The platform can be certified once and the applications can be certified separately.

The whole protocol is implemented in the (i) *Java Card* by means of a Java Applet, carrying out the most sensible and secure actions, and in a (ii) *PC application* that commands the execution logic. In the following we describe the both implementations.

### 4.1 Java Card implementation

Smartcards supporting JavaCard 2.2 [7] and superior versions [8] provide a well-defined set of symmetric and asymmetric cryptosystems (e.g., RSA, AES), as well as digital signatures (e.g., DSA). However, there is no support for ElGamal cryptosystem, even though it might be provided by the smartcard hardware. To implement the ElGamal cryptosystem in JavaCards, we need a JavaCard provided with modular arithmetic operations, mainly modular multiplication and exponentiation. Nonetheless, JavaCard 2.2 API provides *no modular arithmetics*, but *only non modular addition, subtraction and multiplication* of big numbers [7, see `javacardx.framework.math.BigInteger`].

Having all this in mind, we identify three building blocks that are necessary in order to offer ElGamal encryption/decryption, as well as the mathematical operations necessary for the construction and use of the Shamir-based threshold scheme: (i) a big number library for JavaCard, (ii) ElGamal API and (iii) threshold scheme API in JavaCard. In particular, the big number library will be used by the ElGamal and threshold scheme API, so that its design and implementation have the (constrained) efficiency in very consideration. In addition, we design the whole solution in pure JavaCard language subset to be as much portable as possible.

#### 4.1.1 Big number library

Developing software for smartcards is very restrictive given the functionality and data types they support. This is also the case of the JavaCards. It is easily noticeable that there are several challenges to solve when dealing with big numbers in JavaCards, even

though they can be categorized into the following two concerns: (i) big number storage and representation and (ii) modular arithmetics.

**Big number storage and representation.** First of all, we have the challenge of storing big numbers into JavaCards. To do so, JavaCards allow defining array of *bytes* (8 bits), *shorts* (16 bits) or *ints* (32 bits). However, *int* data type is *optionally supported* in the standard JavaCard, and not all JavaCards supports array of *shorts* and *ints*. This comes to light by the fact that the whole JavaCard API only uses arrays of data type *byte*. Additionally, the JavaCard language subset restricts that arrays can hold up to 32,767 fields. This requires that *only variables of type byte or short be used* as an array index or to specify the size of an array during array creation.

We have designed this library to overcome all these restrictions by following the *minimum-common-factor* criteria. To do so, we have designed a Java class `MutableBigInteger` as *container of a big number*. `MutableBigIntegers` consist of a byte array as back-end (for true portability) and a minimal set of methods to facilitate their initialization and access. The design of our `MutableBigInteger` is inspired in the Java 6.0 `MutableBigInteger` class [6]. Given that all Java objects must be initialized when the *applet* is registered into the JavaCard, the byte array size has to be *initialized* to the maximum allowed supported key size in the JavaCard standard [7], which is 2048 bits. However, we permit *instantiation* of keys of different sizes ( $\leq 2048$  bits) according to the current key size used in the system.

**Modular arithmetics.** `MutableBigInteger` does not provide any modular arithmetics, but a new `Math` Java class does. Among other methods, `Math` implements the modular addition (`modAdd`), subtraction (`modSubtract`), multiplication (`modMul`), exponentiation (`modPow`) and bitwise right shift (`modRightShift`).

Except `modPow` and `modMul`, all modular operations are implemented according to the *paper and pencil* solution, with cost  $O(n)$  in actual number of bytes long of the largest big number. We designed the complex and costly `modPow` and `modMul` operations in such a way that they tend to be time and computationally efficient. To do so, we used as much as possible the JavaCard cryptographic co-processor. In particular, we implement `modPow` overlaid on the provided JavaCard RSA cryptosystem [12], so that our solution benefits from a hardware-accelerated modular exponentiation (with almost  $O(1)$  cost). Following the same path, we use the binomial theorem (4.1) to transform a modular multiplication into modular exponentiations:

$$(a + b)^2 - (a - b)^2 = 4ab \mod p \quad (4.1)$$

As equation (4.1) depicts, calculating a modular multiplication requires one modular addition, two modular subtractions, two modular exponentiations and two modular bitwise right shifts, with a total cost of  $O(n)$  in current number of bytes long [12]. Therefore, differently from what could be expected, our implementation provides a  $O(n)$  cost in terms of key size.

#### 4.1.2 ElGamal and Threshold Scheme API in JavaCards

We presented in Chapter 3 the protocol to initialize the Shamir's  $(t, n)$ -threshold scheme for the ElGamal cryptosystem. However, we have also designed a version of ElGamal cryptosystem to work in a standalone fashion, without a secret sharing scheme. Actually, it is worth noting that our protocol also includes the generation of the ElGamal

public and private keys. In this section we present the design of classes which support the standalone ElGamal cryptosystem, and leave the description of the threshold scheme version for later in this section. However, we use the ElGamal private key implementation in both cases to store the standalone private key ( $s$ ) or the member's private *share* ( $h_i$ ), respectively.

#### ElGamal API in JavaCards.

The JavaCard API [7, 8] defines an *algorithm* to be any different type of cryptosystem (like RSA or AES) that its API standardizes. The idea behind that is to allow providing different implementations of the set of supported algorithms by the JavaCard API. However, *this set of algorithms is not extensible* [7, see `javacard.crypto.Cipher.ALG_*` and `javacard.security.KeyBuilder.TYPE_*` constants]. A developer aiming to design a new algorithm has to construct his/her own class structure to support it. However, to reduce the learning curve and to support for a rapid adoption of any new algorithm, we believe that it is preferred to study and *inherit* as much as possible the class structure and class lifecycle from the JavaCard API. Following these guidelines, we designed the ElGamal cryptosystem and developed all classes. The main example is `ElGamalCipher` class.

`ElGamalCipher`, which extends from `Cipher` (provided by the JavaCard API), supports the new kind of algorithm. When it is used to ask for existing algorithms in the JavaCard API, `ElGamalCipher` forwards the invocation method to its superclass so that the JavaCard library will lastly dispatch it.

In particular, `ElGamalCipher` mainly provides three functions: (i) **initialize**, which is the mandatory first performed task, that includes (1) loading the public parameters  $g$  and  $p$ , and then (2) generating the ElGamal key pair; (ii) **encrypt** information, and (iii) **decrypt** an ElGamal ciphertext to obtain the content in clear format.

#### Threshold sharing scheme API in JavaCards.

The main difference between the ElGamal cryptosystem implemented by our `ElGamalCipher` and our Shamir's  $(t,n)$ -threshold scheme of ElGamal cryptosystem is in the `ElGamalThresholdApplet` class. This class is the `Cipher` in use, instead of the standalone version `ElGamalCipher`. `ElGamalThresholdApplet` is implemented to follow strictly the protocol described in Chapter 3 and provides all the functions necessary to support our protocol of electoral board constitution.

## 4.2 Execution example

The execution logic is controlled by a application located on the PC. Furthermore, this application, deployed in Java language, is responsible of a secure connection and communication among the Java Cards involved in the protocol. As follows, we show an execution example step by step.

In order to demonstrate a simple example of our implemented protocol we have developed a Graphic User Interface. Next, we detail the most important steps of the protocol:

- Electoral board members meet physically with the aim of obtaining their partial secrets. The main application, with verified code, resident on a PC connected to a set of Smart Card readers is started.



Figure 4.1: This picture shows the PC with the main application in execution and the set of SC readers connected.

- Then, a given set of Smart Cards, with the `ElGamalThresholdApplet` installed, is introduced in the readers.



Figure 4.2: This picture shows a SC that is being placed in a SC reader.

- Once this is done, an authority selects a set of parameters in order to configure the execution. The first parameter is the size of the secret key that may range from 512 to 2048 bits. The second one is the number of SC that will participate in the protocol and so, the number of shares that will be created and placed in each SC. The third is the threshold required to correctly decode the tally result. Next, is the pair of reader and SC that will handle the shares generation processes. Finally, the rest of readers and SCs that will store the shares. You can find the configuration screenshot in Fig. 4.3.
- Once the authority has selected the set of configuration parameters, the shares generation begins. First, the main SC, charged with this proposal, performs a set of initializations, including those of ElGamal, then, it internally builds the set




Figure 4.3: Configuration screenshot.

of shares. Afterwards, the sensitive data are transferred and verified in its SC. Fig. 4.4 shows how the process takes place in the GUI.

- At this point, each authority may take one of the SC which has its own verified share. Therefore, the elections can start.
- After the elections have closed, a number of authorities greater or equal than the threshold meet in order to obtain the election tally. Each authority places its SC in a reader and deciphers partially the tally. Then, each partial result is operate as the protocol fix in Sec. 3.2. It can be found a screenshot in Fig. 4.5.




Figure 4.4: Shares generation and distribution screenshot.

Opcions

Escull les Smart Cards ha utilitzar:

- ☐ SCM Microsystems Inc. SDI010 Smart Card Reader 0
- ☐ OMNIKEY CardMan 5x21-CL 0
- ☐ OMNIKEY CardMan 5x21-CL 1
- ☐ OMNIKEY CardMan 5x21-CL 2
- ☐ OMNIKEY CardMan 5x21-CL 3

missatge:

missatge encriptat:

missatge desencriptat:

Figure 4.5: Tally screenshot.

## Chapter 5

# Evaluation

In order to evaluate the performance and efficiency of our implemented protocol over JavaCards, we carried out a set of tests executing parts of the protocol into JavaCards, with a (3,5)-threshold. Each test has been run for 10 times on a JCOP 21 v2.2 with 72Kb of memory [1], for a 6 different key sizes (512, 736, 896, 1024, 1280 and 2048 bits). Concretely, the tests have been focused on basic protocol operations entirely executed on smartcard (not including the operations executed on computer) such as the (i) shares generation (including ElGamal key pair generation), the (i) share verification (steps 6d and 6e of electoral board constitution), the (iii) vote encryption and finally, the (iv) vote decryption without reconstructing the private key.

Results appear in Fig. 5.1, where *shares generation* and *verification* costs are the highest and grow linearly together with the key size. Generating 5 shares ranges from 5.56 to 20.10 minutes, whilst verifying a single share ranges from 1.14 to 4.26 minutes. Despite their important costs, they are affordable because these operations are realized only once and before elections start. *Encryption* cost is reasonable, grows linearly and ranges from 0.42 to 1.25 minutes. This cost does not depend on the number of shares though. The *decryption* cost also grows linearly and ranges from 0.27 to 0.70 minutes. This behavior is admissible in a real situation where a homomorphic or hybrid e-voting system is used. However, in e-voting systems purely based on mixnets would not be viable because votes should be decrypted one by one and, therefore, the total cost would depend linearly on the number of votes. Notice that this cost does not depend on the number of shares because each decryption, made in each smartcard of the electoral board, can be parallelized.

As introduced in Section 4.1.1, Fig. 5.1 depicts a linear growing in time consumption due to (i) the use of the cryptographic co-processor to execute the costly modular exponentiation with an almost constant cost, whilst (ii) the rest of modular operations (such as addition) have the depicted linear cost.






Figure 5.1: Costs mean (in minutes) of 10 experiments of shares generation, shares verification, encryption and decryption with the given key size (in bits).

## Chapter 6

# Conclusions

We developed a library for Java Cards that allows: (i) a big number storage and representation and (ii) modular arithmetics. Next, we used the library to design and implement the ElGamal cryptosystem for the Java Card platform. Please, note that there is no support for ElGamal cryptosystem in the Java Card API even though it might be provided by the smartcard hardware. We completed the library with the development of the Shamir's  $(t,n)$ -threshold scheme for the ElGamal cryptosystem. Finally, we evaluated the performance and efficiency of our implemented library on a JCOP 21 v2.2 with 72Kb of memory using different key sizes. The encryption and decryption operations show a reasonable cost although it is not advisable to use these operations massively. The shares generation and verification have a significant cost. Nonetheless, we think that they are affordable because they can be realized only once and before their use. We should mention that an e-voting company has shown its interest in our library because it could be used in its research prototypes.

As a future work, we are working in a non-trusted third party (Non-TTP) solution with a distributed generation of the shares. In addition, we would like to improve the efficiency, time and storage of the protocol in smartcard (i.e., using ElGamal on elliptic curves).

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