

How to compute on encrypted Data

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

Alexandru Eugen Bulboaca, Lilika Markatou

Introduction

Why is Homomorphic Encryption relevant?

- Encryption generally protects data at **rest** and in **transit** but **not during processing**
- Relevant for privacy-critical use cases, such as **Medical Analysis, Confidential Machine Learning, Recommender Systems**

FHE enables **any computation** to be performed **on encrypted data**

In 2009 Craig Gentry[1,2], introduced the first **Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)**

Methodology

How was the research performed?

The research was based on the **Forward Referencing methodology**, based on Pkert FHE taxonomy[3], guided by the **Research Questions**:

- What are HE schemes? How is FHE constructed?
- How does FHE compare in terms of **functionality, performance, and security**?
- How does FHE compare to **other** privacy-enhancing **techniques** (MPC, ORAM, TEE, StE)?
- How does or could FHE **integrate** in the industry?

Background

What are the FHE schemes?

Pre-2009: Limited homomorphic capabilities - PHE, SwHE
Gentry's via **bootstrapping, squashing over Lattices** 1
DGHV[4] over **integers**, introduced **batching (SIMD)** 1
BGV[5] introduced **LFHE** via **mod & key switching** 2
B/FV[6, 7] **scale invariant**, improved **error growth** 2
GSW[8] with **no switching**, better **performance** 2
FHEW[9] via **new NAND** approach, fast **bootstrapping** 3
TFHE[10] reduced **key sizes**, optimised **bootstrapping** 3
CKKS[11] uses **real numbers** - **approximate arithmetic** 4
CHIMERA[12] allows **switching** between schemes 4

Different constructions $\square \rightarrow$ Different characteristics

Characteristics

What attributes do Homomorphic Encryption schemes present?

Why FHE schemes?

Which FHE scheme?

Feature	PHE	LFHE	FHE	Scheme	BGV, B/FV	FHEW, TFHE	CKKS
Supported operations	Add OR Multiply	Add AND Multiply	Add AND Multiply	Features	Batching Fast linear functions	Fast Bootstrapping Fast comparisons	Efficient batching Real Numbers
Number of operations	Unlimited	Limited (fixed depth)	Unlimited	Drawbacks	Slow Bootstrapping, Slow complex operations	No batching, Frequent Bootstrapping	Slow Bootstrapping, Accuracy Loss
Performance	Very High	High	Low	Application	Big data	Data streaming	Machine Learning
Versatility	Low	Medium	High				
Use Cases	Voting Protocols	Bioinformatics Data	BDP, ML				

Security

Schemes can achieve **Semantic Security**, extended to **IND-CCA1** security level

IND-CCA2 infeasible given concept malleability

Performance

Key Generation procedure is very slow
Polynomial overhead compared to plaintext
Displays **large ciphertexts and key sizes**

Comparison

How does FHE compare to other privacy-enhancing techniques?

Other technologies

MPC FHE allows parties to perform computations on **secret shares locally**

Reduces communication rounds, facilitates delegation, **without revealing intermediate data**

ORAM

FHE secures **data content** - **ORAM data patterns**

StE offers fast encrypted index search, **leaking access pattern data**

FHE ensures **confidentiality during updates and queries**, at the cost of efficiency

TEE offers **trusted spaces for secured computation**


FHE offers **computation security in untrusted spaces**

Key Points

FHE does **not require or permit interactions** or shared states

FHE facilitates **confidential data content**, but not **data access patterns**

FHE is a general-purpose non-interactive tool, with **reduced efficiency**



Single-user, low-interaction scenarios

CSE3000 - Research Project

Technische Universiteit Delft

a.e.bulboaca-1@student.tudelft.nl

Discussion and Future Work

How can FHE integrate in the industry?

Impractical for mass adoption due to:

Reduced performance

Lack of standardisation

Insufficient interoperability

FHE computations are **relatively slow** for adoption, despite extensions for SIMD or fast bootstrapping **hardware accelerators advancements are needed**

Common standard schemes, practices, and use accessibility to developer are needed for integration

government-companies-researchers consensus to establish standard schemes, SDKs and APIs

Developing interactive protocols, such as MKFHE [13], can achieve the benefits of multiple technologies, becoming more practical

research FHE interaction with existing infrastructure

Conclusion

Takeaways

FHE helped lay the groundwork for **zero-knowledge computing, supported ethical innovation and increased privacy**, but it does **not replace human responsibility, policy, or oversight**.

FHE makes possible a future where data can be used without being seen.

References

- [1] Craig Gentry, Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices, volume 9, in Proceedings of the 41st Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2009, May 17-18, 2009, Baltimore, Maryland, USA, 2009, pp. 1–12.
- [2] Craig Gentry, Computing arbitrary functions of encrypted data, Communications of the ACM, vol. 53, no. 3, pp. 379–391, 2010.
- [3] Chris Peikert, A randomized algorithm for learning with errors, in Proceedings of the 45th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2013, June 17–19, 2013, Providence, Rhode Island, USA, 2013, pp. 739–750.
- [4] Dan Geronzi, A randomized algorithm for learning with errors, in Proceedings of the 45th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2013, June 17–19, 2013, Providence, Rhode Island, USA, 2013, pp. 739–750.
- [5] Zvika Brakerski, Fully homomorphic encryption without modulus switching from zero to arbitrary moduli, in Proceedings of the 44th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2012, June 17–19, 2012, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, 2012, pp. 799–812.
- [6] Zvika Brakerski, Fully homomorphic encryption without modulus switching from zero to arbitrary moduli, in Proceedings of the 44th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2012, June 17–19, 2012, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, 2012, pp. 799–812.
- [7] Zvika Brakerski, Fully homomorphic encryption without modulus switching from zero to arbitrary moduli, in Proceedings of the 44th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2012, June 17–19, 2012, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, 2012, pp. 799–812.
- [8] Zvika Brakerski, Fully homomorphic encryption without modulus switching from zero to arbitrary moduli, in Proceedings of the 44th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2012, June 17–19, 2012, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, 2012, pp. 799–812.
- [9] Zvika Brakerski, Fully homomorphic encryption without modulus switching from zero to arbitrary moduli, in Proceedings of the 44th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2012, June 17–19, 2012, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, 2012, pp. 799–812.
- [10] Zvika Brakerski, Fully homomorphic encryption without modulus switching from zero to arbitrary moduli, in Proceedings of the 44th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2012, June 17–19, 2012, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, 2012, pp. 799–812.
- [11] Zvika Brakerski, Fully homomorphic encryption without modulus switching from zero to arbitrary moduli, in Proceedings of the 44th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2012, June 17–19, 2012, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, 2012, pp. 799–812.
- [12] Zvika Brakerski, Fully homomorphic encryption without modulus switching from zero to arbitrary moduli, in Proceedings of the 44th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2012, June 17–19, 2012, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, 2012, pp. 799–812.
- [13] Zvika Brakerski, Fully homomorphic encryption without modulus switching from zero to arbitrary moduli, in Proceedings of the 44th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2012, June 17–19, 2012, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, 2012, pp. 799–812.