· Plan for the lectures:

Qhilosophy t math

· Interpretations of probability

· Quick refresher on probability distributions

Statistics (Aspects of Bayesian statistics (not ML) (parameter estimation and model comparison)

ML (o Gaussian processes (formalism + applications)

Main references :

· Sivia: "Data analysis, a Bayesian tutorial"

· Rasmussen & Williams: "Gaussian Processes for Machine Learning" (Available for free online!)

A frilliant and provocative gem:

o ET Jaynes: "Probability Theory: The Logic of Science"

Probability

- · Q: How many have taken a course on prob or statistics?
- · Discussion & Discuss meaning of prob. using a coin flip or dice throw
- o What does the statement P(X) = 10% mean?
- o We don't know, or at least don't agree!
- o Useful reference: "Interpretations of Probability", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- o Bertrand Russel, 1929: "Probability is the most important concept in modern science, especially as notody has the slightest notion of what it means. "
- o Two main interpretations:

- Frequentist:
$$P(X) = \lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{n_x}{n}$$

Prof. defined as long-run relative frequency

- Bayesian:
$$P(X) \equiv \text{degree of belief/knowledge}$$
that X is true

- Degree of belief as subjective Bayesian
- Degree of knowledge a objective Bayesian

- a Formal /deductive logic: rules for neasoning with certain statements (Boolean logic)
- · Cox and others: Find values for plausible reasoning, i.e. logic under ancertainty

La Rediscovered" the usual rules of prob. theory!

· Both freq. and Bayesian definitions of prob. agree with the Kolmogorov axioms that define the mathematical properties of the function P(x) - Bayesians and frequentists Kolmogorov: $0 \le P(x) \le 1$ P is additive: $P(x \cup y) = P(x) + P(y)$ when $X \cap Y = \emptyset$ When $X \cap Y = \emptyset$ When $X \cap Y = \emptyset$



Frequentists: P(hypothesis data)

P(data | hypothesis)

Bayesians: P(hypothesis | data)

P (data | hypothesis)

· Subjective and objective Bayesians all happy with

$$P_{\text{me}}(X|I_1) \neq P_{\text{you}}(X|I_2)$$

· But objective Bayesians require that

$$P_{ue}(X|I,) = P_{You}(X|I,)$$

Not required by subjective Bayesians!

o Usual rules for prob theory does not tell us how to assign prob. in the first place, just how to relate probabilities in a consistent way! (malogous with diff. eqs., which relate initistate to final state.)

- Objective Bayesiums must introduce additional rules for assigning probabilities. Important example: "Maximum entropy"

 Roughly saying: Given some information I, e.g. X=0.7 ± 0.7, choose the prob. distribution P(x) that is the most uncertain but still consistent with I.
- · Interpretations of prob have important consequences :
 - 1) Give vise to different approaches to statistics

Example: Bayesians ran ask P(parameter | data) = ?

Freq. connot ask this, since prob of a param. value does not make sense.

- Bayesian 95% credible interval for a parameter 0:
 - "We have a 95% degree of belief that the true value of 0 is between 0.7 and 0.3"
- Frequentist 95% confidence interval for 0:

 [0.1, 0.2]

"If the experiment was repeated an infinite number of times, an interval constructed with this procedure should routain the true of value in 95% of the repetitions

- 2) Are probabilities necessarily linked to randomness?
 - Is anything truly random? (Metaphysics, determinism, apparent us true randomness)

 Example: Is P(heads) in a

 oin flip necessatily 50%?
 - Reyesian view: No necessary link between prob. and randowness. Can simply use prob. to quantify uncertainty. (But does not imply that randowness does not exist.")
 - Probabilities in science, what do they mean? In particular: Interpretations of quantum mechanics.