



CredShields

Smart Contract Audit

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Description

This document details the process and result of the Smart Contract audit performed by CredShields Technologies PTE. LTD. on behalf of Guardian Labs Inc, Panama, between November 25, 2025, and November 25, 2025. A retest was performed on November 26, 2025.

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Prepared for

Guardian Labs Inc, Panama

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1. Executive Summary -----

Guardian Labs Inc., Panama, engaged CredShields to perform a smart contract audit from November 25, 2025, to November 25, 2025. During this timeframe, 4 vulnerabilities were identified. A retest was performed on November 26, 2025, and all the bugs have been addressed.

During the audit, 0 vulnerabilities were found with a severity rating of either High or Critical. These vulnerabilities represent the greatest immediate risk to "Guardian Labs Inc, Panama" and should be prioritized for remediation; fortunately, none were found.

The table below shows the in-scope assets and a breakdown of findings by severity per asset. Section 2.3 contains more information on how severity is calculated.

Assets in Scope	Critical	High	Medium	Low	Info	Gas	Σ
Presale Contracts	0	0	1	0	3	0	4
	0	0	1	0	3	0	4

Table: Vulnerabilities Per Asset in Scope

The CredShields team conducted the security audit to focus on identifying vulnerabilities in the Presale Contract's scope during the testing window while abiding by the policies set forth by Guardian Labs Inc., Panama's team.



State of Security

To maintain a robust security posture, it is essential to continuously review and improve upon current security processes. Utilizing CredShields' continuous audit feature allows both Guardian Labs Inc., Panama's internal security and development teams, to not only identify specific vulnerabilities but also gain a deeper understanding of the current security threat landscape.

To ensure that vulnerabilities are not introduced when new features are added or code is refactored, we recommend conducting regular security assessments. Additionally, by analyzing the root cause of resolved vulnerabilities, the internal teams at Guardian Labs Inc., Panama, can implement both manual and automated procedures to eliminate entire classes of vulnerabilities in the future. By taking a proactive approach, Guardian Labs Inc., Panama, can future-proof its security posture and protect its assets.

2. The Methodology -----

Guardian Labs Inc., Panama, engaged CredShields to perform a Presale Contract audit. The following sections cover how the engagement was put together and executed.

2.1 Preparation Phase

The CredShields team meticulously reviewed all provided documents and comments in the smart contract code to gain a thorough understanding of the contract's features and functionalities. They meticulously examined all functions and created a mind map to systematically identify potential security vulnerabilities, prioritizing those that were more critical and business-sensitive for the refactored code. To confirm their findings, the team deployed a self-hosted version of the smart contract and performed verifications and validations during the audit phase.

A testing window from November 25, 2025, to November 25, 2025, was agreed upon during the preparation phase.

2.1.1 Scope

During the preparation phase, the following scope for the engagement was agreed upon:

IN SCOPE ASSETS

Presale Contracts

2.1.2 Documentation

Documentation was not required as the code was self-sufficient for understanding the project.



2.1.3 Audit Goals

CredShields employs a combination of in-house tools and thorough manual review processes to deliver comprehensive smart contract security audits. The majority of the audit involves manual inspection of the contract's source code, guided by OWASP's Smart Contract Security Weakness Enumeration (SCWE) framework and an extended, self-developed checklist built from industry best practices. The team focuses on deeply understanding the contract's core logic, designing targeted test cases, and assessing business logic for potential vulnerabilities across OWASP's identified weakness classes.

CredShields aligns its auditing methodology with the [OWASP Smart Contract Security](#) projects, including the Smart Contract Security Verification Standard (SCSVS), the Smart Contract Weakness Enumeration (SCWE), and the Smart Contract Secure Testing Guide (SCSTG). These frameworks, actively contributed to and co-developed by the CredShields team, aim to bring consistency, clarity, and depth to smart contract security assessments. By adhering to these OWASP standards, we ensure that each audit is performed against a transparent, community-driven, and technically robust baseline. This approach enables us to deliver structured, high-quality audits that address both common and complex smart contract vulnerabilities systematically.

2.2 Retesting Phase

Guardian Labs Inc., Panama, is actively partnering with CredShields to validate the remediations implemented towards the discovered vulnerabilities.

2.3 Vulnerability classification and severity

CredShields follows OWASP's Risk Rating Methodology to determine the risk associated with discovered vulnerabilities. This approach considers two factors - Likelihood and Impact - which are evaluated with three possible values - **Low**, **Medium**, and **High**, based on factors such as Threat

agents, Vulnerability factors, and Technical and Business Impacts. The overall severity of the risk is calculated by combining the likelihood and impact estimates.

Overall Risk Severity				
Impact	HIGH	● Medium	● High	● Critical
	MEDIUM	● Low	● Medium	● High
	LOW	● None	● Low	● Medium
		LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH
Likelihood				

Overall, the categories can be defined as described below -

1. Informational

We prioritize technical excellence and pay attention to detail in our coding practices. Our guidelines, standards, and best practices help ensure software stability and reliability. Informational vulnerabilities are opportunities for improvement and do not pose a direct risk to the contract. Code maintainers should use their own judgment on whether to address them.

2. Low

Low-risk vulnerabilities are those that either have a small impact or can't be exploited repeatedly or those the client considers insignificant based on their specific business circumstances.

3. Medium

Medium-severity vulnerabilities are those caused by weak or flawed logic in the code and can lead to exfiltration or modification of private user information. These vulnerabilities

can harm the client's reputation under certain conditions and should be fixed within a specified timeframe.

4. High

High-severity vulnerabilities pose a significant risk to the Smart Contract and the organization. They can result in the loss of funds for some users, may or may not require specific conditions, and are more complex to exploit. These vulnerabilities can harm the client's reputation and should be fixed immediately.

5. Critical

Critical issues are directly exploitable bugs or security vulnerabilities that do not require specific conditions. They often result in the loss of funds and Ether from Smart Contracts or users and put sensitive user information at risk of compromise or modification. The client's reputation and financial stability will be severely impacted if these issues are not addressed immediately.

6. Gas

To address the risk and volatility of smart contracts and the use of gas as a method of payment, CredShields has introduced a "Gas" severity category. This category deals with optimizing code and refactoring to conserve gas.

2.4 CredShields staff

The following individual at CredShields managed this engagement and produced this report:

- Shashank, Co-founder CredShields shashank@CredShields.com

Please feel free to contact this individual with any questions or concerns you have about the engagement or this document.

3. Findings Summary -----

This chapter contains the results of the security assessment. Findings are sorted by their severity and grouped by asset and OWASP SCWE classification. Each asset section includes a summary highlighting the key risks and observations. The table in the executive summary presents the total number of identified security vulnerabilities per asset, categorized by risk severity based on the OWASP Smart Contract Security Weakness Enumeration framework.

3.1 Findings Overview

3.1.1 Vulnerability Summary

During the security assessment, 4 security vulnerabilities were identified in the asset.

VULNERABILITY TITLE	SEVERITY	SCWE Vulnerability Type
Missing Price Feed Validation	Medium	Lack of Input Validation (SC04-Lack Of Input Validation)
Use Call instead of Transfer	Informational	Missing Best Practices
Missing zero address validations	Informational	Lack of Input Validation (SC04-Lack Of Input Validation)
Use Ownable2Step	Informational	Missing Best Practices

Table: Findings in Smart Contracts

4. Remediation Status -----

Guardian Labs Inc., Panama, is actively partnering with CredShields from this engagement to validate the discovered vulnerabilities' remediations. A retest was performed on November 26, 2025, and all the issues have been addressed.

Also, the table shows the remediation status of each finding.

VULNERABILITY TITLE	SEVERITY	REMEDIATION STATUS
Missing Price Feed Validation	Medium	Fixed [Nov 26, 2025]
Use Call instead of Transfer	Informational	Fixed [Nov 26, 2025]
Missing zero address validations	Informational	Fixed [Nov 26, 2025]
Use Ownable2Step	Informational	Fixed [Nov 26, 2025]

Table: Summary of findings and status of remediation

5. Bug Reports -----

Bug ID #M001[Fixed]

Missing Price Feed Validation

Vulnerability Type

Lack of Input Validation([SC04-Lack Of Input Validation](#))

Severity

Medium

Description

Chainlink has a library `AggregatorV3Interface` with a function called `latestRoundData()`. This function returns the price feed among other details for the latest round.

The contract was found to be using `latestRoundData()` without proper input validations on the returned parameters which might result in a stale and outdated price.

Affected Code

- Presale#614L

Impacts

Having oracles with functions to fetch price feed without any validation might introduce erroneous or invalid price values that could result in an invalid price calculation further in the contract.

Remediation

It is recommended to have input validations for all the parameters obtained from the Chainlink price feed. Here's a sample implementation:

```
(uint80 roundID ,int256 price, uint256 timestamp, uint80 answeredInRound) =  
AggregatorV3Interface(chainLinkAggregatorMap[underlying]).latestRoundData();  
  
require(answer > 0, "Chainlink price <= 0");  
require(answeredInRound >= roundID, "Stale price");  
require(timestamp != 0, "Round not complete");
```

Retest

This issue has been fixed by adding required input validation.

Bug ID #I001[Fixed]

Use Call instead of Transfer

Vulnerability Type

Missing Best Practices

Severity

Informational

Description:

Using Solidity's transfer function has some notable shortcomings when the withdrawer is a smart contract, which can render ETH deposits impossible to withdraw. Specifically, the withdrawal will inevitably fail when:

- The withdrawer smart contract does not implement a payable fallback function.
- The withdrawer smart contract implements a payable fallback function which uses more than 2300 gas units.
- The withdrawer smart contract implements a payable fallback function which needs less than 2300 gas units but is called through a proxy that raises the call's gas usage above 2300.

Affected Code

- Presale#757L

Impacts

The transfer function has some restrictions when it comes to sending ETH to contracts in terms of gas which could lead to transfer failure in some cases.

Remediation

It is recommended to transfer ETH using the call() function, handle the return value using require statement, and use the nonreentrant modifier wherever necessary to prevent reentrancy.

Ref: <https://solidity-by-example.org/sending-ether/>

Retest

This issue has been fixed by updating to the call() function.

Bug ID #I002 [Fixed]

Missing zero address validations

Vulnerability Type

Lack of Input Validation ([SC04-Lack Of Input Validation](#))

Severity

Informational

Description:

The contracts were found to be setting new addresses without proper validations for zero addresses.

Address type parameters should include a zero-address check otherwise contract functionality may become inaccessible or tokens burned forever.

Depending on the logic of the contract, this could prove fatal and the users or the contracts could lose their funds, or the ownership of the contract could be lost forever.

Affected Code

- Presale#651L

Impacts

If address type parameters do not include a zero-address check, contract functionality may become unavailable or tokens may be burned permanently.

Remediation

Add a zero address validation to all the functions where addresses are being set.

Retest

This issue has been fixed by adding zero address validation.

Bug ID #1003 [Fixed]

Use Ownable2Step

Vulnerability Type

Missing Best Practices

Severity

Informational

Description

The "Ownable2Step" pattern is an improvement over the traditional "Ownable" pattern, designed to enhance the security of ownership transfer functionality in a smart contract. Unlike the original "Ownable" pattern, where ownership can be transferred directly to a specified address, the "Ownable2Step" pattern introduces an additional step in the ownership transfer process. Ownership transfer only completes when the proposed new owner explicitly accepts the ownership, mitigating the risk of accidental or unintended ownership transfers to mistyped addresses.

Affected Code

- Presale#614L

Impacts

Without the "Ownable2Step" pattern, the contract owner might inadvertently transfer ownership to an unintended or mistyped address, potentially leading to a loss of control over the contract. By adopting the "Ownable2Step" pattern, the smart contract becomes more resilient against external attacks aimed at seizing ownership or manipulating the contract's behavior.

Remediation

It is recommended to use either Ownable2Step or Ownable2StepUpgradeable depending on the smart contract.

Retest:

This issue has been fixed by using Ownable2Step.

6. The Disclosure -----

The Reports provided by CredShields are not an endorsement or condemnation of any specific project or team and do not guarantee the security of any specific project. The contents of this report are not intended to be used to make decisions about buying or selling tokens, products, services, or any other assets and should not be interpreted as such.

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