



## CredShields

# **Smart Contract Audit**

Nov 6th, 2024

## Description

This document details the process and result of the Smart Contract audit performed by CredShields Technologies PTE. LTD. on behalf of Unicoin International between Nov 4th, 2024, and Nov 5th, 2024. A retest was performed on Nov 6th, 2024.

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## Prepared for

Unicoin International

# Table of Contents

| Table of Contents                             | 2  |
|---|----|
| 1. Executive Summary —————                    | 3  |
| State of Security                             | 4  |
| 2. The Methodology —————                      | 5  |
| 2.1 Preparation phase                         | 5  |
| 2.1.1 Scope                                   | 5  |
| 2.1.2 Documentation                           | 5  |
| 2.1.3 Audit Goals                             | 6  |
| 2.2 Retesting phase                           | 6  |
| 2.3 Vulnerability classification and severity | 6  |
| 2.4 CredShields staff                         | 8  |
| 3. Findings Summary —————                     | 9  |
| 3.1 Findings Overview                         | 9  |
| 3.1.1 Vulnerability Summary                   | 9  |
| 3.1.2 Findings Summary                        | 10 |
| 4. Remediation Status                         | 13 |
| 5. Bug Reports —————                          | 14 |
| Bug ID #1[Won't Fix]                          | 14 |
| Floating and Outdated Pragma                  | 14 |
| Bug ID #2[Won't Fix]                          | 16 |
| Use of Ownable2Step                           | 16 |
| 6. The Disclosure                             | 17 |

# 1. Executive Summary

Unicoin International engaged CredShields to perform a Unicoin<sup>x</sup> smart contract audit from Nov 4th, 2024, to Nov 5th, 2024. During this timeframe, Two (2) vulnerabilities were identified. A retest was performed on Nov 6th, 2024, and all the bugs have been addressed.

During the audit, Zero (0) vulnerabilities were found with a severity rating of either High or Critical. These vulnerabilities represent the greatest immediate risk to "Unicoin International" and should be prioritized for remediation, and fortunately, none were found.

The table below shows the in-scope assets and a breakdown of findings by severity per asset. Section 2.3 contains more information on how severity is calculated.

| Assets in Scope | Critical | High | Medium | Low | info | Gas | Σ |
|-----------------|----------|------|--------|-----|------|-----|---|
| Unicoin×        | 0        | 0    | 0      | 1   | 0    | 0   | 1 |
|                 | 0        | 0    | 0      | 1   | 0    | 0   | 1 |

Table: Vulnerabilities Per Asset in Scope

The CredShields team conducted the security audit to focus on identifying vulnerabilities in Smart Contract's scope during the testing window while abiding by the policies set forth by Unicoin International's team.



## **State of Security**

To maintain a robust security posture, it is essential to continuously review and improve upon current security processes. Utilizing CredShields' continuous audit feature allows both Unicoin International's internal security and development teams to not only identify specific vulnerabilities but also gain a deeper understanding of the current security threat landscape.

To ensure that vulnerabilities are not introduced when new features are added, or code is refactored, we recommend conducting regular security assessments. Additionally, by analyzing the root cause of resolved vulnerabilities, the internal teams at Unicoin International can implement both manual and automated procedures to eliminate entire classes of vulnerabilities in the future. By taking a proactive approach, Unicoin International can future-proof its security posture and protect its assets.

# 2. The Methodology

Unicoin International engaged CredShields to perform a Smart Contract audit. The following sections cover how the engagement was put together and executed.

## 2.1 Preparation phase

The CredShields team meticulously reviewed all provided documents and comments in the smart contract code to gain a thorough understanding of the contract's features and functionalities. They meticulously examined all functions and created a mind map to systematically identify potential security vulnerabilities, prioritizing those that were more critical and business-sensitive for the refactored code. To confirm their findings, the team deployed a self-hosted version of the smart contract and performed verifications and validations during the audit phase.

A testing window from Nov 4th, 2024, to Nov 5th, 2024, was agreed upon during the preparation phase.

## 2.1.1 Scope

During the preparation phase, the following scope for the engagement was agreed upon:

#### IN SCOPE ASSETS

Unicoinx - https://github.com/Unicoinx-io/ux-ethereum/tree/main/contracts

## 2.1.2 Documentation

Documentation was not required as the code was self-sufficient for understanding the project.



## 2.1.3 Audit Goals

CredShields uses both in-house tools and manual methods for comprehensive smart contract security auditing. The majority of the audit is done by manually reviewing the contract source code, following SWC registry standards, and an extended industry standard self-developed checklist. The team places emphasis on understanding core concepts, preparing test cases, and evaluating business logic for potential vulnerabilities.

## 2.2 Retesting phase

Unicoin International is actively partnering with CredShields to validate the remediations implemented towards the discovered vulnerabilities.

## 2.3 Vulnerability classification and severity

CredShields follows OWASP's Risk Rating Methodology to determine the risk associated with discovered vulnerabilities. This approach considers two factors - Likelihood and Impact - which are evaluated with three possible values - **Low**, **Medium**, and **High**, based on factors such as Threat agents, Vulnerability factors, and Technical and Business Impacts. The overall severity of the risk is calculated by combining the likelihood and impact estimates.

| Overall Risk Severity |        |                          |                          |                            |  |
|-----------------------|--------|--------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|--|
| Impact                | HIGH   | <ul><li>Medium</li></ul> | <ul><li>High</li></ul>   | <ul><li>Critical</li></ul> |  |
|                       | MEDIUM | • Low                    | <ul><li>Medium</li></ul> | <ul><li>High</li></ul>     |  |
|                       | LOW    | None                     | • Low                    | <ul><li>Medium</li></ul>   |  |
|                       |        | LOW                      | MEDIUM                   | HIGH                       |  |
| Likelihood            |        |                          |                          |                            |  |

Overall, the categories can be defined as described below -

## 1. Informational

We prioritize technical excellence and pay attention to detail in our coding practices. Our guidelines, standards, and best practices help ensure software stability and reliability. Informational vulnerabilities are opportunities for improvement and do not pose a direct risk to the contract. Code maintainers should use their own judgment on whether to address them.

## 2. Low

Low-risk vulnerabilities are those that either have a small impact or can't be exploited repeatedly or those the client considers insignificant based on their specific business circumstances.

## 3. Medium

Medium-severity vulnerabilities are those caused by weak or flawed logic in the code and can lead to exfiltration or modification of private user information. These vulnerabilities can harm the client's reputation under certain conditions and should be fixed within a specified timeframe.

## 4. High

High-severity vulnerabilities pose a significant risk to the Smart Contract and the organization. They can result in the loss of funds for some users, may or may not require specific conditions, and are more complex to exploit. These vulnerabilities can harm the client's reputation and should be fixed immediately.

## 5. Critical

Critical issues are directly exploitable bugs or security vulnerabilities that do not require specific conditions. They often result in the loss of funds and Ether from Smart Contracts or users and put sensitive user information at risk of compromise or modification. The client's reputation and financial stability will be severely impacted if these issues are not addressed immediately.

## 6. Gas

To address the risk and volatility of smart contracts and the use of gas as a method of payment, CredShields has introduced a "Gas" severity category. This category deals with optimizing code and refactoring to conserve gas.

## 2.4 CredShields staff

The following individual at CredShields managed this engagement and produced this report:

Shashank, Co-founder CredShields shashank@CredShields.com

Please feel free to contact this individual with any questions or concerns you have about the engagement or this document.

# 3. Findings Summary

This chapter contains the results of the security assessment. Findings are sorted by their severity and grouped by the asset and SWC classification. Each asset section will include a summary. The table in the executive summary contains the total number of identified security vulnerabilities per asset per risk indication.

## 3.1 Findings Overview

## 3.1.1 Vulnerability Summary

During the security assessment, Two (2) security vulnerabilities were identified in the asset.

| VULNERABILITY TITLE          | SEVERITY | SWC   Vulnerability Type           |
|------------------------------|----------|------------------------------------|
| Floating and Outdated Pragma | Low      | Floating Pragma ( <u>SWC-103</u> ) |
| Use Ownable2Step             | Low      | Missing Best Practices             |

Table: Findings in Smart Contracts

# 3.1.2 Findings Summary

| SWC ID  | SWC Checklist                        | Test Result       | Notes  |
|---------|--------------------------------------|-------------------|--|
| SWC-100 | Function Default Visibility          | Not<br>Vulnerable | Not applicable after v0.5.X (Currently using solidity v >= 0.8.6)  |
| SWC-101 | Integer Overflow and Underflow       | Not<br>Vulnerable | The issue persists in versions before v0.8.X.  |
| SWC-102 | Outdated Compiler Version            | Not<br>Vulnerable | Version 0^.8.0 and above is used   |
| SWC-103 | Floating Pragma                      | Not<br>Vulnerable | Contract uses floating pragma  |
| SWC-104 | <u>Unchecked Call Return Value</u>   | Not<br>Vulnerable | call() is not used   |
| SWC-105 | Unprotected Ether Withdrawal         | Not<br>Vulnerable | Appropriate function modifiers and require validations are used on sensitive functions that allow token or ether withdrawal. |
| SWC-106 | Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction | Not<br>Vulnerable | selfdestruct() is not used anywhere  |
| SWC-107 | Reentrancy                           | Not<br>Vulnerable | No notable functions were vulnerable to it.  |
| SWC-108 | State Variable Default Visibility    | Not<br>Vulnerable | Not Vulnerable   |
| SWC-109 | <u>Uninitialized Storage Pointer</u> | Not<br>Vulnerable | Not vulnerable after compiler version, v0.5.0  |
| SWC-110 | Assert Violation                     | Not<br>Vulnerable | Asserts are not in use.  |
| SWC-111 | Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions | Not<br>Vulnerable | None of the deprecated functions like block.blockhash(), msg.gas, throw, sha3(), callcode(), suicide() are in use            |

| SWC-112 | Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee                    | Not<br>Vulnerable | Not Vulnerable.   |
|---------|---|-------------------|---|
| SWC-113 | DoS with Failed Call                                | Not<br>Vulnerable | No such function was found.   |
| SWC-114 | <u>Transaction Order Dependence</u>                 | Not<br>Vulnerable | Not Vulnerable.   |
| SWC-115 | Authorization through tx.origin                     | Not<br>Vulnerable | tx.origin is not used anywhere in the code  |
| SWC-116 | Block values as a proxy for time                    | Not<br>Vulnerable | Block.timestamp is not used   |
| SWC-117 | Signature Malleability                              | Not<br>Vulnerable | Not used anywhere   |
| SWC-118 | Incorrect Constructor Name                          | Not<br>Vulnerable | All the constructors are created using the constructor keyword rather than functions. |
| SWC-119 | Shadowing State Variables                           | Not<br>Vulnerable | Not applicable as this won't work during compile time after version 0.6.0             |
| SWC-120 | Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes    | Not<br>Vulnerable | Random generators are not used.   |
| SWC-121 | Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks | Not<br>Vulnerable | No such scenario was found  |
| SWC-122 | Lack of Proper Signature Verification               | Not<br>Vulnerable | Not used anywhere   |
| SWC-123 | Requirement Violation                               | Not<br>Vulnerable | Not vulnerable  |
| SWC-124 | Write to Arbitrary Storage Location                 | Not<br>Vulnerable | No such scenario was found  |
| SWC-125 | Incorrect Inheritance Order                         | Not<br>Vulnerable | No such scenario was found  |
| SWC-126 | Insufficient Gas Griefing                           | Not<br>Vulnerable | No such scenario was found  |
| SWC-127 | Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable          | Not<br>Vulnerable | Jump is not used.   |

| SWC-128 | DoS With Block Gas Limit                                | Not<br>Vulnerable | Not Vulnerable.                                     |
|---------|---|-------------------|---|
| SWC-129 | Typographical Error                                     | Not<br>Vulnerable | No such scenario was found                          |
| SWC-130 | Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E)       | Not<br>Vulnerable | No such scenario was found                          |
| SWC-131 | Presence of unused variables                            | Not<br>Vulnerable | No such scenario was found                          |
| SWC-132 | <u>Unexpected Ether balance</u>                         | Not<br>Vulnerable | No such scenario was found                          |
| SWC-133 | Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments | Not<br>Vulnerable | abi.encodePacked() or other functions are not used. |
| SWC-134 | Message call with hardcoded gas amount                  | Not<br>Vulnerable | Not used anywhere in the code                       |
| SWC-135 | Code With No Effects                                    | Not<br>Vulnerable | No such scenario was found                          |
| SWC-136 | Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain                       | Not<br>Vulnerable | No such scenario was found                          |

# 4. Remediation Status -----

Unicoin International is actively partnering with CredShields from this engagement to validate the discovered vulnerabilities' remediations. A retest was performed on Nov 6th, 2024, and all the issues have been addressed.

Also, the table shows the remediation status of each finding.

| VULNERABILITY TITLE          | SEVERITY | REMEDIATION STATUS            |
|------------------------------|----------|-------------------------------|
| Floating and Outdated Pragma | Low      | <b>Won't Fix</b> [05/11/2024] |
| Use Ownable2Step             | Low      | <b>Won't Fix</b> [05/11/2024] |

Table: Summary of findings and status of remediation

## 5. Bug Reports

Bug ID #1[Won't Fix]

## Floating and Outdated Pragma

#### **Vulnerability Type**

Floating Pragma (SWC-103)

#### Severity

Low

#### Description

Locking the pragma helps ensure that the contracts do not accidentally get deployed using an older version of the Solidity compiler affected by vulnerabilities.

The contract allowed floating or unlocked pragma to be used, i.e., ^0.8.0,^0.8.24. This allows the contracts to be compiled with all the solidity compiler versions above the limit specified. The following contracts were found to be affected -

#### **Affected Code**

- https://github.com/Unicoinx-io/ux-ethereum/blob/main/contracts/UNCNToken.sol#
   L3
- <a href="https://github.com/Unicoinx-io/ux-ethereum/blob/main/contracts/uToken.sol#L3">https://github.com/Unicoinx-io/ux-ethereum/blob/main/contracts/uToken.sol#L3</a>

#### **Impacts**

If the smart contract gets compiled and deployed with an older or too recent version of the solidity compiler, there's a chance that it may get compromised due to the bugs present in the older versions or unidentified exploits in the new versions. Incompatibility issues may also arise if the contract code does not support features in other compiler versions, therefore, breaking the logic. The likelihood of exploitation is low.

#### Remediation

Keep the compiler versions consistent in all the smart contract files. Do not allow floating pragmas anywhere. It is suggested to use the 0.8.25 pragma version

Reference: https://swcregistry.io/docs/SWC-103

## Retest

The pragma version is relatively latest and the code is not vulnerable to any of the bugs found on the version deployed and hence this is not exploitable in real life. CredShields team agrees with the decision and hence this will remain as it is.

## Bug ID #2[Won't Fix]

## Use of Ownable2Step

## **Vulnerability Type**

Missing Best Practices

## Severity

Low

#### Description

The "Ownable2Step" pattern is an improvement over the traditional "Ownable" pattern, designed to enhance the security of ownership transfer functionality in a smart contract. Unlike the original "Ownable" pattern, where ownership can be transferred directly to a specified address, the "Ownable2Step" pattern introduces an additional step in the ownership transfer process. Ownership transfer only completes when the proposed new owner explicitly accepts the ownership, mitigating the risk of accidental or unintended ownership transfers to mistyped addresses.

#### **Affected Code**

- https://github.com/Unicoinx-io/ux-ethereum/blob/main/contracts/uToken.sol#L10
- https://github.com/Unicoinx-io/ux-ethereum/blob/main/contracts/UNCNToken.sol#
   L11

#### **Impacts**

Without the "Ownable2Step" pattern, the contract owner might inadvertently transfer ownership to an unintended or mistyped address, potentially leading to a loss of control over the contract. By adopting the "Ownable2Step" pattern, the smart contract becomes more resilient against external attacks aimed at seizing ownership or manipulating the contract's behavior.

## Remediation

It is recommended to use either Ownable2Step or Ownable2StepUpgradeable depending on the smart contract.

#### **Retest**

The team decided not to fix the vulnerability as it has negligible exploitation scenarios and CredShields team agrees with the decision.

## 6. The Disclosure

The Reports provided by CredShields are not an endorsement or condemnation of any specific project or team and do not guarantee the security of any specific project. The contents of this report are not intended to be used to make decisions about buying or selling tokens, products, services, or any other assets and should not be interpreted as such.

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