

# CyPurr Session: Mobile Security

**Can't live with it, can't live without it, want to throw it  
Over a bridge yeah...I understand**

Cypurr Collective, May 15th 2021, Expiration: 11/2021



# Overview

Intro

Mobile Security

Outro

Q/A



# WHO ARE WE?

**We are...**

To educate the public on cybersecurity in an accessible and holistic way with fun cats.

Our work aims to resist systemic oppressions through community self-defense.

We do that with programs, events, workshops, socials and more!

Established April 2016



# GROUNDRULES

**Saf(er) Space - We DO NOT tolerate language or behavior purposefully meant to demean or harm folks based on their identities**

**Webinar Mode-** Send your questions through the chat, we'll try our best to answer them through the chat, on video, or during the Q/A, depending on what's going on.



# WHO ARE WE?

Slides/Resources available after!  
Video available soon.

## *A note on voice recording...*


We are trying to keep these presentations for posterity, and not to record participants. **Use the chat if possible for questions and discussions if you do not want your voice on the recording.**



And now...

# Cypurr Presents Mobile Security





## First, some terms to keep in mind


**Code:** Instructions for your computer to complete.

**"Open Source":** A program that lets you read the instructions it contains (and even change them)

**Proprietary:** A program that keeps their instructions a secret

# The Problem with Mobile Phones

- Not designed for privacy and security
- More locked down with ***proprietary*** code, making it harder to control than regular computers.
  - Can't change OS
  - Planned obsolescence with updates
  - harder to investigate malware
  - harder to prevent snooping
- Phones and Phone #'s attached to our identity, finances, etc




More at [ssd.eff.org](http://ssd.eff.org)

# Building a smart phone

- Central Processing Unit (CPU)- Completes instructions from code
- IMEI- unique ID assigned to every phone
- Baseband Processor (bbp)- Manages all radio functioning
- The bbp acts as a second mind, running its own ***proprietary code***

CORE



Images from MyShadow.org & Tactical Tech Collective Glass Room

# "Smart" Components

## **SD card- "Secure Digital"**

Similar to a flash drive

## **NFC- "Near Field Communication"**

Can speak to devices within 4cm. e.g.  
used for payments.

## **SIM card - "Subscriber Identity Module"**

Unique card identity, user identity when  
activated, contacts


SMART



# Software

- Before this, any code was provided by the manufacturer(s), e.g. Samsung
- What are the differences between Android and iOS?
- What apps do you use?
  - Any apps you can't remove?
  - How many apps are *proprietary* v. "*open*"?
  - Where do you get your apps?

## OPERATING SYSTEM



# Your info

- What information are you making available to your phone?
- What info is available to 3rd party programs?
- What info can be picked when your phone communicates with other devices?
- How is location tracked?

## DATA TRACES



## RISK ASSESSMENT

“What are you protecting?”

“Who are you protecting it from?”

“What resources do they have to take it from you?”

“What are you willing to do to protect it?”

“What vulnerabilities do you need to fill to better protect it?”



Privacy



Security




Anonymity



@jan\_em\_dee

# PSA Cat Tree



@jan\_em\_dee

Privacy



Security



Anonymity



@jan\_em\_dee

Privacy



Security



Anonymity



@jan\_em\_dee

# Spying on Mobile Communications

Mobile phone networks were not originally designed to use technical means to protect subscribers' calls against eavesdropping. That meant that anybody with the right kind of radio receiver could listen in on the calls.

The situation is somewhat better today with [encryption](#)  technologies have been added to mobile communications standards to try to prevent eavesdropping. But many of these technologies have been [poorly designed](#) (sometimes deliberately, due to government pressure not to use strong encryption). They have been unevenly deployed, so they might be available on one carrier but not another, or in one country but not another, and have sometimes been implemented incorrectly. For example, in some countries carriers do not enable encryption at all, or they use obsolete technical standards. This means it is often still possible for someone with the right kind of radio receiver to intercept calls and text messages as they're transmitted over the air.


The safest practice is to assume that traditional calls and SMS text messages have not been secured against eavesdropping or recording. Even though the technical details vary significantly from place to place and system to system, the technical protections are often weak and can be bypassed in many situations.

**It's not just about data  
It's about *habits***

Behavioral data collected from mobile apps is used primarily by advertising companies and data brokers, usually to do behavioral targeting for commercial or political ads. But governments have been known to piggyback on the surveillance done by private companies.


# SECURITY SETTINGS

- Get to know your settings!
  - UPDATE YOUR PHONE!
  - Settings -> Security
    - Screen Lock
    - Phone Encryption
    - Sim Lock Options
    - Other



# PASSWORDS!

- **Screen Lock**
  - Numeric/AlphaNumeric (6-10 characters)
  - Pattern
  - FaceID/Fingerprint
- **Password Managers**
  - BitWarden
- **2FA Apps**
  - Authy
  - Google Authenticator
  - FreeOTP



# PASSWORDS!

Home > Categories > Cell Phone Bling / Charm Accessories > horchow > **Item#: 9SIASSACSV2083**



## BodyGuardz - Spyglass Edge Privacy Screen Protector Extreme Edge-to-Edge Impact and Scratch Protection for iPhone Xs Max

[Be the first to review this product...](#)

[Ask Or Answer A Question](#)

 [SHARE](#)

In stock.

**[Ships from China.](#)** Most customers receive within **5-17 days**.

- Cell Phone Bling / Charm Accessories

# ACCESS

## Digital Access

- Malware
  - Texts/Email
    - Be aware of links from unknown numbers and emails (spam? phishing?)
  - Unverified Apps
  - Access
    - Phone Content
    - Camera/Mic/GPS

## Physical Access

- Who has access to your physical phone?




# SIM SWAPPING

aka “simjacking”

The process of

- obtaining personal information on a user
- convincing their mobile carrier that the hacker is the user
- switching their SIM over to the attacker's phone
- gaining access to info and accounts



# SIM SWAPPING


**Information obtained through:**

- **Online behavior:** phishing emails

**Ways to Prevent**

- **Account security:**, strong password and strong questions-and-answers (Q&A)
- **PIN codes:** set a separate passcode or PIN for your communications, consider doing it.
- **IDs:** Don't build your security and identity authentication solely around your phone number.
- **Authentication apps**

- via Norton



Privacy



Security



Anonymity




@jan\_em\_dee

Privacy



Security



Anonymity



@jan\_em\_dee

## SIMMER DOWN

Your phone constantly craves connection – with or without your participation. It's also really not picky about what it connects to: mobile networks, Wi-Fi networks, other devices (for example, through Bluetooth).

Your phone's approach to existence is to *broadcast continuously on every available open channel*: “I'm here! Over here! It's meeee!” – and to try to connect to any signals it can.

You may have even heard reports in the news about how **easy** it is for your personal data to get into just about anyone's hands.

But did you know **there are a few steps you can take** to reduce the amount of data you put out there?

[< FURTHER LEARNING](#)

# Mobile Phones: Location Tracking

## Location Tracking

The deepest privacy [threat](#) from mobile phones—yet one that is often completely invisible—is the way that they announce your whereabouts all day (and all night) long through the signals they broadcast. There are at least four ways that an individual phone's location can be tracked by others.

- Mobile Signal Tracking from Towers
- Mobile Signal Tracking from Cell Site Simulators
- Wi-Fi and Bluetooth Tracking
- Location Information Leaks from Apps and Web Browsing

# DEVICE IDENTIFIERS

## DON'T CALL ME BY YOUR NAME

At some point, you may have “named” your phone for *Wi-Fi*, *Bluetooth* or both – or maybe the name was automatically generated during setup.

This means that “*Alex Chung’s Phone*” is what’s visible to the Wi-Fi network owner and, if your Bluetooth is turned on, to everyone in the area who has their Bluetooth on as well.

**You wouldn’t announce your name as you enter a café, restaurant or airport, so neither should your phone.**


You can change the name of your phone to something less personally identifying, yet still uniquely you. Here’s how:

# APPS

## Permissions/Settings

- Access to Phone
  - Contacts
  - Keyboard
  - Camera
  - Other Apps
- Location Data
  - Limiting/Deleting location information

column corresponds to one day.



# **APP CLEANSE!**

(VIA DATA DETOX BY TTC)

**Declutter Unwanted Apps**

**Limit Permissions**

**Replenish with Private**

**Apps**

**Refresh and Renew!**

# PHONE BROWSING

To limit data gathered by phone

- Erase Browser Data
- Use Privacy-Friendly Browser (i.e. Firefox)
- Use browser vs. app
- Use computer vs. phone browser



# BACKUPS

## Spring Cleaning!

- Aware of what data is on your phone
  - Images/Videos
  - Files
  - Notes
  - Texts/Messages/Emails
- **Backup**
  - HardDrive Backup
  - Cloud Backup
  - Cryptomator




# OTHER NUMBERS

## Backup/Fake Phone Numbers

- Burner
- Google Voice

For use in situations where  
you don't want to give out  
your personal number



# WHO ARE WE?

## Cypurr Resources

Website- <https://cypurr.nyc>

Open Collective (Donation/Tshirt)- <https://opencollective.com/cypurr-collective>

## Questions? Comments? Topic Ideas?

- Email- cypurr@protonmail.com
- Join our email list for updates!

**Social Media-** FB/Twitter @cypurnyc

