## **Vulnerability Description**

There is a command injection vulnerability in the Linksys E2000 router with firmware version 1.0.06. If an attacker gains web management privileges, they can inject commands into the post request parameters WL\_atten\_bb, WL\_atten\_radio, and WL\_atten\_ctl in the apply.cgi interface, thereby gaining shell privileges.

## **Code Analysis**

In the function Check\_TSSI, the parameter "param\_1" is the WL\_atten\_bb parameter in the request, while the WL\_atten\_radio and WL\_atten\_ctl parameters also have command injection vulnerabilities.

```
Pecompile: Check_TSSI - (httpd)
   undefined4 Check_SSI (undefined4
                                        param_1)
     FILE *pFVarl:
     undefined4 uVar2;
     undefined4 uVar4;
                                                                   00434920
     undefined1 *puVar5;
     uint __seconds;
int iVar6;
FILE *pFVar7;
11
12
     size_t sVar8;
14
     char *pcVar9;
     char acStack_210 [80];
15
     char acStack_lc0 [80];
18
19
     char acStack_120 [80];
     char acStack d0 [80];
     char acStack_80 [80];
21
22
     pFVarl = fopen ("/dev/console", "w");
     if (pFVarl != (FILE *)0x0) {
24
        fprintf (pFVarl, "%s: init, Check_TSSI=[%s]\n" ,"Check_TSSI",param_1);
25
       fclose (pFVarl);
26
     uVar2 = get_cgi ("WL_atten_radio" );
28
     uVar3 = get_cgi("WL_atten_ctl");
uVar4 = get_cgi("WL_delay");
29
     nvram_set ("wl_atten_bb",param_l);
31
     nvram_set ("wl_atten_radio",uVar2);
32 nvram_set("wl_atten_ctl",uVar3);
33 nvram_set("wl_delay",uVar4);
puVar5 = (undefinedl *)nvram_get("wl_atten_bb");
     if (puVar5 == (undefined1 *)0x0) {
       puVar5 = &DAT_0051dle0;
     __strtol_internal (puVar5,0,10,0);
     puVar5 = (undefined1 *)nvram get ("wl atten radio");
     if (puVar5 == (undefined1 *)0x0) {
        puVar5 = &DAT_0051dle0;
       _strtol_internal (puVar5,0,10,0);
      puVar5 = (undefinedl *)nvram_get ("wl_atten_ctl");
```


```
Decompile: Check_TSSI - (httpd)
    __strtol_internal (puVar5,0,10,0);
14
     puVar5 = (undefinedl *)nvram_get ("wl_atten_ctl" );
    if (puVar5 == (undefined1 *)0x0) {
15
      puVar5 = &DAT_0051dle0;
17
18
    _strtol_internal (puVar5,0,10,0);
puVar5 = (undefined1 *)nvram_get("wl_delay");
i0
    if (puVar5 == (undefined1 *)0x0) {
                                                                    00434920
      puVar5 = &DAT_0051dle0;
;2
;3
        seconds = __strtol_internal (puVar5,0,10,0);
    pFVar1 = fopen("/dev/console","w");
if (pFVar1 != (FILE *)0x0) {
14
55
16
      fprintf (pFVarl, "%s: wl_atten_bb=[%s], wl_atten_radio=[%s], wl_atten_ctl=[%s]\n" , "Check_TSS...
57
                uVar2.uVar3);
      fclose (pFVarl);
9
     iVar6 = validate_xss (uVar2);
50
     if ((iVar6 == 0) || (iVar6 == validate_xss (uVar3), iVar6 == 0)) {
    pFVar1 = fopen ("/dev/console", "w");
51
52
       if (pFVarl != (FILE *)0x0) {
53
54
         fprintf (pFVarl, "%s: parameter error!\n" , "Check_TSSI");
55
         fclose (pFVarl);
56
57
       return 0;
58
   memset (acStack lc0,0,0x50);
sprintf (acStack lc0,"w1 atten %s %s %s",param_1,uVar2,uVar3);
FUN_00475ca0 (acStack_lc0);
pVar1 = from f"...
10
     pFVarl = fopen("/dev/console"
    if (pFVarl != (FILE *)0x0) {
13
      fprintf(pFVarl,"%s: Will delay %d seconds\n" ,"Check_TSSI",__seconds);
       fclose (pFVarl);
     if (_seconds != 0) {
      sleep (__seconds);
     FUN_00475ca0 ("wl tssi > /tmp/get_tssi" );
     memset (acStack_lc0 ,0,0x50);
     memset (acStack_d0,0,0x50);
     memset (acStack_d0,0,0x50);
pFVarl = fopen("/tmp/get_tssi","r");
     if (pFVarl == (FILE *)0x0) {
```

Following the FUN\_00475ca0 function, it was found that the system() function is called.

```
Decompile: FUN_00475ca0 - (httpd)
  void FUN_00475ca0 (char *param_1)
3
4 {
   FILE * stream;
     stream = fopen("/dev/console","w");
  if (_stream != (FILE *)0x0) {
3
     fprintf (__stream, "cmd: [%s]\n", param_1);
9
10
    fclose (__stream);
11
12
  system (param_1);
13
   return;
141
15
```

**Environment setup** 

https://www.linksys.com/support-article?articleNum=148341



#### E2000 Windows® Linksys Connect Setup Software

Ver.1.3.11006.1 Latest Date: 01/07/2011 Download 20.7 MB

Set up the router environment through FirmAE.

Refer to https://www.anquanke.com/post/id/288053 for instructions.

```
root@ubuntu:/FirmAE# ./run.sh -d Linksys /tmp/FW_E2000_1.0.06.001_US_20140310_code.bin

[*] /tmp/FW_E2000_1.0.06.001_US_20140310_code.bin emulation start!!!

[*] extract done!!!

[*] /tmp/FW_E2000_1.0.06.001_US_20140310_code.bin already succeed emulation!!!

[IID] 4

[MODE] debug

[*] Network reachable on 192.168.1.1!

[*] Web service on 192.168.1.1

[*] Run debug!

Creating TAP device tap4_0...

Set 'tap4_0' persistent and owned by uid 1000

Bringing up TAP device...

Creating TAP device tap4_1...

Set 'tap4_1' persistent and owned by uid 1000

Bringing up TAP device...

Creating TAP device...

Set 'tap4_2' persistent and owned by uid 1000

Bringing up TAP device...

Set 'tap4_2' persistent and of imware... 192.168.1.1 true true 3.534515460 4.823942967

[*] firmware - FW_E2000_1.0.06.001_US_20140310_code

[*] IP - 192.168.1.1

[*] connecting to netcat (192.168.1.1:31337)

[*] netcat connected

| FirmAE Debugger |

1. connect to socat

2. connect to shell


3. tcpdump

4. run gdbserver


5. file transfer

6. exit
```

Finished



## Vulnerability reproduction



Command injection successfully demonstrated.

```
root@ubuntu:/home/pwn# python3 -m http.server 88 --bind 192.168.1.2
Serving HTTP on 192.168.1.2 port 88 (http://192.168.1.2:88/) ...

192.168.1.1 - - [19/Apr/2023 14:51:56] code 404, message File not found 192.168.1.1 - - [19/Apr/2023 14:51:56] "GET /RCE HTTP/1.1" 404 -
```

# **Vulnerability Fix**

Filter the characters \ \ \ \ ; | & from the parameters WL\_atten\_bb, WL\_atten\_radio, and WL\_atten\_ctl.