feat(route): cfr #15682
Merged
feat(route): cfr #15682
Conversation
This file contains bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
github-actions
bot
added
the
Auto: Route Test Complete
|
Successfully generated as following: http://localhost:1200/cfr/asia/china - Success ✔️<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0">
<channel>
<title>China</title>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/asia/china</link>
<atom:link href="http://localhost:1200/cfr/asia/china" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"></atom:link>
<description>China - Made with love by RSSHub(https://github.com/DIYgod/RSSHub)</description>
<generator>RSSHub</generator>
<webMaster>i@diygod.me (DIYgod)</webMaster>
<language>en</language>
<lastBuildDate>Fri, 24 May 2024 01:11:11 GMT</lastBuildDate>
<ttl>5</ttl>
<item>
<title>Advanced Manufacturing to be a Focus of China’s July Party Plenum</title>
<description><p>China’s long-delayed third Party plenum on economic reform will be held in July. Official commentary suggests that the Party communique which will be issued at this meeting will double-down on the importance of manufacturing as a tool to address China’s pressing domestic economic problems, potentially increasing trade tensions with a range of foreign countries.</p>
<p>On April 30, Chinese authorities&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="0" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.rfa.org%2Fenglish%2Fnews%2Fchina%2Fdelayed-third-plenary-economy-meeting-05022024142612.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503185984%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=6rGd5%2FLSHj1bM81wUd7kavWE%2BfArnHSjbHJl9xnwSRY%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWA21353390-5ead-5dcb-2b03-23d199791392" originalsrc="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/delayed-third-plenary-economy-meeting-05022024142612.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="H0nZtRfp6EVbYT+KTpVqEheb+uLHle+cIEiV0g+4+TJW3Qu25XU/yzbCa1G2aRH/CCZXeUISHDF/gjIEXXg6zrryaT7ofgaXLsCq4t+Ik6Cb4/KAwl81rSRLR+Eb2phf9yd3N/9uq7lw3S0AkysnTIbFN+sOlSXsSMVT6MjV/hw=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/delayed-third-plenary-economy-meeting-05022024142612.html. Click or tap if you trust this link.">announced</a>&nbsp;that the third Party plenum of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee would meet in July. Official commentary&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="1" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.chinadaily.com.cn%2Fa%2F202405%2F01%2FWS66323e19a31082fc043c5050.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503199426%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=2n3UuGo%2FRAWMbRlRHWq%2BEQJSihCvwU%2FgSSy2AXeD2PE%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWA117497f5-e87c-bc4e-01dd-f20665dc9b5e" originalsrc="https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202405/01/WS66323e19a31082fc043c5050.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="bqQQxTFiPd7eWyoW8nBUP4fkYbr+Lnn8xYI19CYTxCJmPQ0cE4NwUv9TvRZM6N7F+C46cUR8Mw1johhx4G2Aca9bsgndQMVxL7ANckuufHWRiWeNv8elRRoWYA824p1Ilt4+VGxxWLXaknoI7+ubjDILGgOZJLlPYVseD4HI/nw=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202405/01/WS66323e19a31082fc043c5050.html. Click or tap if you trust this link.">indicates</a>&nbsp;that economic issues will be the core of the plenum, including a focus on integrated economic plans for the Yangtze Delta region. But specific attention will also be devoted to fostering “new quality productive forces”—a new Party slogan set out by Xi Jinping—with state commentary stating:</p><p><em>“The imperative was stressed... to develop new quality productive forces according to local conditions. The layout of China's strength in strategic science and technology should be improved, emerging industries cultivated and strengthened, the development of industries for the future arranged in advance, and the transformation and upgrading of traditional industries empowered by advanced technologies.”</em></p>
<p>As Chinese authorities&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="2" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Flosangeles.china-consulate.gov.cn%2Feng%2Flghd%2F202404%2Ft20240418_11283727.htm&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503205764%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=IbEShh6%2BllqjRF%2BKcOmhi%2FU7fTx1f9JCGSLpKwYrcBk%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAe743989e-a804-99d8-d203-643dc5ac1cc7" originalsrc="http://losangeles.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/lghd/202404/t20240418_11283727.htm" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="nJFMkJ+NoiMgW4rhQv8Zy1Lr3elJYsunHe4BDryx6OO0YVHvk0kbWP02pfLAsbN1ydtFaaLLI+D2xacSVY5nZse/MXybDN3lKtTtVciINnLLI1oJjosVuWnQLf9+vqKBw/nTo448yRRn+8p/5q4ZAnoGVQEE+nbAkYpuy9tqg0g=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: http://losangeles.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/lghd/202404/t20240418_11283727.htm. Click or tap if you trust this link.">note</a>, “new quality productive forces” includes three specific industries: electric vehicles, lithium-ion batteries, and photovoltaic products, which have registered dramatic export growth, in addition to other fields in biomedicine, artificial intelligence, and the digital economy. In recent years, Beijing has&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="3" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2024%2F05%2F14%2Fbusiness%2Fchina-exports-manufacturing.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503211048%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=1ahyI9wpkevRlu2E672ErhfP7nh3mz%2Fwp4Q4dT76QSc%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAd915b52c-0ef4-2399-4607-1ea63c3f5b6b" originalsrc="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/14/business/china-exports-manufacturing.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="L2sZOeL0lFunPptcQBH8iAhtpk88vF6tbo59ysGysLK+IoJ4HxdgExVjCZ/qZ6o01CYHuZ3WrgTsj9CqTmStycTBTwhf+dMUsXEuw49i+afnKwi/uOCVTlwcjKEcEbF6/gKe+TnSzRXlDzhzF6kuCmKwHA/MVKY/pJPB0BG8OpI=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/14/business/china-exports-manufacturing.html. Click or tap if you trust this link.">identified and promoted</a>&nbsp;key advanced manufacturing industries—including electric vehicles and batteries—as part of China’s industrial strategy. Goals include reducing reliance on foreign technologies and creating new sources of export-driven growth.&nbsp;</p>
<p>For Beijing, such emphasis on manufacturing represents an economic development strategy aimed at responding to serious domestic challenges. China currently faces both continuing high&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="4" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.wsj.com%2Fworld%2Fchina%2Fchinas-youth-unemployment-eased-in-april-a029344f&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503216081%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=eNQrISw%2BXNg3i%2FwuJav7ExYbcv2lBfCg4MzHyblG7p4%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAbd6af401-ab3c-7845-7ea4-53d89f61f617" originalsrc="https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-youth-unemployment-eased-in-april-a029344f" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="AQ4/iQp/hYQGxLkXSn7qmCrCJ/cZPlJ+TV1/fUPl5xi4LmH5GuJJY97e/YzHRaDV7MuK+PCZTCHRcdjAGmcXnkvGUJvpbYYSHjcj+YJoViFXMJd+4ypOZ98eTfbC22clyxh9qg1vg2Dbiab/raJBmkpD+TjrkS5zidNmKWfKPGQ=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-youth-unemployment-eased-in-april-a029344f. Click or tap if you trust this link.">youth unemployment</a>, as well as construction and real estate sectors that are mired in deep distress after the implosion of China’s property bubble, and which constituted a quarter of China’s GDP prior to the pandemic. Recent years have&nbsp;<a data-auth="NotApplicable" data-linkindex="5" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/amid-mounting-youth-unemployment-woes-beijing-looks-towards-vocational-education" id="OWA4f9afd72-27e1-a17f-5c3b-a22fc9dadb5d" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" title="seen">seen</a>&nbsp;Chinese authorities make a concerted effort to raise the status of vocational education programs and steer youth in the direction of skilled manufacturing labor, precisely because of the employment difficulties facing four-year college graduates.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Indeed, recent statements by Xi himself give further support to the likelihood that the July plenum will feature a doubling-down on manufacturing. A front-page&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="6" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fpaper.people.com.cn%2Frmrb%2Fhtml%2F2024-05%2F01%2Fnw.D110000renmrb_20240501_4-01.htm&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503220962%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=LvIQKiUxzrnTL5IJ16VqXtLA2b8mEyKv3lZTT4xqvYk%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWA3964bf46-e856-5cc7-ecc1-e1db928cee93" originalsrc="http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2024-05/01/nw.D110000renmrb_20240501_4-01.htm" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="U+VGUCUN0VJYCDQ2m86YaO3xVtQLf4AFom+BRwX1d9GyfZpjKes/TTI9qMLzcuMXNjvU+HCgSepVli75jPbZ3LIWCwAAZbLulu9txfWvvq83eCkMtoYWI36ftt+PqSliQSPrKlM0wk/5b1NnvWK2u5IeHP12JeLpC0cyv1/ltJI=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2024-05/01/nw.D110000renmrb_20240501_4-01.htm. Click or tap if you trust this link.">article</a>&nbsp;in the Party’s flagship paper accompanying the announcement of the July plenum carried extensive quotations from Xi himself extolling Chinese “craftsmanship” (<em>gongjiang</em>) in numerous fields of advanced manufacturing.</p>
<p>Naturally, any policy moves by Beijing to boost its own export-oriented advanced manufacturing industries run the risk of heightening tensions between China and its trading partners. Fears of Chinese market domination in specific industries led the Biden administration to&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="7" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fapnews.com%2Farticle%2Fbiden-china-tariffs-electric-vehicles-evs-solar-2024ba735c47e04a50898a88425c5e2c&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503225850%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=Lf8uTpZ6O1wJNj%2FSMr8ybHVGEuHjxOTwdJI49t%2BjhmY%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAbf0d4b26-e45d-be24-0f02-464361a12e73" originalsrc="https://apnews.com/article/biden-china-tariffs-electric-vehicles-evs-solar-2024ba735c47e04a50898a88425c5e2c" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="Zial7EJt9mURBt5T7sLNyoDKz3K/3tbjbkvn3tpiLyw16SD1VUaE4xhpY7xPsNzt05pHcsZEOjV3lzvQ09lZ5gjWonBZNBUQKbZdL96lTfPnncvNW3KYIP1mNu9l18reYgYx8EeZGPdwyI/KjsFZU1d3Nd9Aw9+8Kx8cwxUjyMc=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://apnews.com/article/biden-china-tariffs-electric-vehicles-evs-solar-2024ba735c47e04a50898a88425c5e2c. Click or tap if you trust this link.">announce</a>&nbsp;high tariffs on a range of such products last week. In fall 2023, European authorities&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="8" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Frhg.com%2Fresearch%2Faint-no-duty-high-enough%2F&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503230731%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=lyUNGLKjjpnh19ABAO7T6svYM8im%2F1%2Bhg%2BdAw4NUZ1I%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAe6e23327-f57b-65e1-1139-73e7492b7bc3" originalsrc="https://rhg.com/research/aint-no-duty-high-enough/" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="JaDVZAQwTw9fRxuxCWHj8WGhl3dc+jVzZfhMwuGIEkGneAbeDvT4IVpdE7XXcwVyjK8MtOFpBmFteUpAFXZ5EsTvExteNVVizaOmbqPwyBZY+e0plVrdArCFjCjJRKphNkxFyxk3V+dCyvyso5tC5M6sydgpqUCWvii5uiExGdA=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://rhg.com/research/aint-no-duty-high-enough/. Click or tap if you trust this link.">launched</a>&nbsp;an anti-subsidy investigation into China’s electric vehicle industry, and are currently considering imposing countervailing duties.&nbsp;</p></description>
<link>
</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">Advanced Manufacturing to be a Focus of China’s July Party Plenum</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 22 May 2024 20:43:23 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Analyzing Lai Ching-te’s Inaugural Address: More Continuity Than Difference</title>
<description><p>On May 20, Lai Ching-te assumed the presidency in Taiwan and gave an inaugural address scrutinized in Beijing, Washington, and capitals around the world. The speech provided the most authoritative signal to date of his approach to cross-strait relations. The core question for observers: would a Lai administration depart from the course set by his predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen?&nbsp;</p>
<p>The speech gave a clear answer: Lai signaled broad continuity with Tsai and committed to maintain the status quo. He also called for dialogue with Beijing and demonstrated an openness to resuming cross-strait tourism and student exchanges. Even so, Beijing denounced Lai’s speech in particularly harsh language. That reflects China’s concerns about Lai’s history on cross-strait issues. But it also reflects disappointment that Lai departed in some places from Tsai, for instance by not explicitly pledging to conduct cross-strait relations in accordance with the Republic of China (ROC) Constitution, which embodies a one-China framework.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p><p>In the period ahead, cross-strait issues will remain a point of contention between Taipei and Beijing, with official dialogue channels all but certain to remain closed. If both sides come to believe their own restraint will not be reciprocated, then the conditions will be set for a vicious cycle. For example, if Beijing responds to Lai’s efforts to signal continuity in his inaugural address with military and economic pressure, and if Taipei then concludes there is little reason for restraint on political issues, cross-strait tensions will increase. Careful signaling, and deeper dialogue—likely through unofficial channels or even through intermediaries—will be needed to avoid such an outcome.&nbsp;</p>
<p><b>Parsing Lai’s Inaugural Address&nbsp;</b></p>
<p>In his inaugural <a href="https://english.president.gov.tw/News/6726" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="speech">speech</a>, Lai sought to reassure audiences that he would be a source of stability and continuity on cross-strait issues and would not provoke Beijing or seek to change the status quo. Despite frustrations within Taiwan on domestic issues – rising housing prices, stagnating wages, and growing youth unemployment – Tsai still left office as the only president since Taiwan’s democratization to enjoy an approval rating of over 50 percent and is widely credited with ably managing cross-strait relations. It is thus little wonder that Lai sought to embrace and build on her legacy. His personnel appointments in senior national security positions similarly project continuity.&nbsp;</p>
<p>In his address, Lai regularly returned to the language of continuity and stability. “Peace is the only option,” he stressed, “and prosperity, gained through lasting peace and stability, is our objective.” Lai called Taiwan’s leaders “pilots for peace” and indicated he would “neither yield nor provoke” and would instead “maintain the status quo.” Elsewhere in his speech, Lai spoke of providing “stable and principled cross-strait leadership.” Such reassurances are important given Lai’s 2017 <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/taiwans-2024-presidential-election-analyzing-william-lais-foreign-policy-positions" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="statement">statement</a> that he was a “pragmatic worker for Taiwan independence” and questions in Beijing about his intentions.&nbsp;</p>
<p>To that end, Lai mentioned the “Republic of China” over a dozen times – more than Tsai did in her last inaugural address – and pledged to lead “in accordance with the Republic of China Constitution system.” Beijing took exception to Lai’s statement that “the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other.” That phrase has not appeared in an inaugural address before, though it was a formulation Tsai previously included in high-level speeches, and likely does not indicate any change in policy.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Lai also included conciliatory language toward Beijing. He encouraged it to “choose dialogue over confrontation, exchange over containment, and under the principles of parity and dignity, engage in cooperation with the legal government chosen by Taiwan’s people.” Notably, he stressed that, “this can start from the resumption of tourism on a reciprocal basis, and enrollment of degree students in Taiwanese institutions.” China has pointed to the lack of cross-strait tourism and student exchanges as evidence of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)’s lack of commitment to productive cross-strait relations, and Lai’s signal that he was open to practical exchanges was an effort to demonstrate goodwill toward Beijing.&nbsp;</p><p>Lai specifically referenced Tsai’s “Four Commitments” – her unique formulation on cross-strait policy. Beijing likely sees the framework’s first-ever appearance in an inaugural address as escalatory. But Tsai has referenced it in several high-level speeches, and her team had described it as a stakeholder agnostic formulation with propositions acceptable to all of Taiwan rather than one grounded entirely in DPP documents. Lai’s inclusion of it, rather than introducing a completely original approach, was probably intended to be stabilizing and again signal continuity.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>There were some areas, however, where Lai put his own imprint on cross-strait policies. He declared, “Some call this land the Republic of China, some call it the Republic of China Taiwan, and some, Taiwan; but whichever of these names we ourselves or our international friends choose to call our nation, we will resonate and shine all the same.” This could be interpreted as a subtle way of signaling that Lai does not intend to pursue steps that would change Taiwan’s official name – unlike prior president Chen Shui-bian – by essentially setting the issue of nomenclature aside and accepting that Taiwanese citizens have different and equally legitimate views on this question. Beijing could choose to see this as a reassuring evolution. At the same time, though, putting the name “Taiwan” on the same plane as the “Republic of China,” or as an alternative to the “Republic of China,” will raise concerns in Beijing and be seen as a departure from precedent. The fact that a statement could be taken as simultaneously escalatory and de-escalatory highlights the need for greater communication between Beijing and Taipei, whether official or unofficial, to help explain intentions.&nbsp;</p>
<p><b>Putting Lai’s Speech in Perspective&nbsp;</b></p>
<p>Lai’s cross-strait platform did not go as far as Tsai’s first inaugural address on certain elements of cross-strait issues. In her <a href="https://english.president.gov.tw/News/4893" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="2016 inaugural">2016 inaugural</a>, Tsai acknowledged the so-called “1992 consensus” without explicitly defining or endorsing it, going perhaps as far as any DPP leader is likely to go. “In 1992,” she said, “the two institutions representing each side across the Strait (the Straits Exchange Foundation&nbsp;and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits), through communication and negotiations, arrived at various joint acknowledgements and understandings. It was done in a spirit of mutual understanding and a political attitude of seeking common ground while setting aside differences. I respect this historical fact.” In that same speech, she stressed that, “since 1992, over twenty years of interactions and negotiations across the Strait have enabled and accumulated outcomes which both sides must collectively cherish and sustain; and it is based on such existing realities and political foundations that the stable and peaceful development of the cross-Strait relationship must be continuously promoted.” And as a matter of policy, she was clear that, “the new government will conduct cross-Strait affairs in accordance with the Republic of China Constitution, the Act Governing Relations Between the People of Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, and other relevant legislation.”&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>Beijing did not give Tsai much credit for these statements, choosing instead to base their expectations on the policies of her predecessor, Ma Ying-jeou, who had fully endorsed the “1992 consensus,” a term one of his key advisors <a href="https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2006/02/22/2003294106" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="invented">invented</a> in 2000. Accordingly, in her <a href="https://english.president.gov.tw/News/6004" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="second inaugural address">second inaugural address</a>, she did not repeat that detailed construction. But she did commit that she would “continue to handle cross-strait affairs according to the Constitution of the Republic of China and the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area.”&nbsp;</p>
<p>However, Lai did not explicitly state that cross-strait affairs would be conducted in accordance with the Republic of China Constitution and the Act Governing Relations Between the People of Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, both of which embody a one-China framework. He also did not even elliptically reference the “1992 consensus.” This is likely due to a calculation by Lai and his team that there was little to be gained by attempting to find a workaround to the “1992 consensus” in this first articulation of his cross-strait policy as president. Since Beijing famously rejected Tsai’s formulation as an “incomplete test paper” and has an even darker view of Lai than it had of Tsai, his team likely concluded nothing he would do would be enough at this stage. From Beijing’s perspective, however, the omission of these terms could be seen as a more consequential signal that Lai is embarking on a different cross-strait approach, overshadowing the areas where he stressed continuity.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Notably, Tsai refrained from directly criticizing China and certain PRC provocations in her past inaugural addresses, but Lai did not hesitate to do so. He instead declared that “China’s military actions and gray-zone coercion are considered the greatest strategic challenges to global peace and stability.” He called on China “to cease their political and military intimidation against Taiwan” and argued that even as Taiwan pursues peace “we must not harbor any delusions.” He noted that, “so long as China refuses to renounce the use of force against Taiwan, all of us in Taiwan ought to understand, that even if we accept the entirety of China’s position and give up our sovereignty, China’s ambition to annex Taiwan will not simply disappear.” Accordingly, he concluded, “in face of the many threats and attempts of infiltration from China, we must demonstrate our resolution to defend our nation, and we must also raise our defense awareness and strengthen our legal framework for national security.” Lai’s decision to include this language likely reflects the changed strategic context, including China’s military response to then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022, and the desire to ensure that Beijing—rather than Taipei—is seen by the international community as the provocateur in any cross-strait crisis.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p><b>Beijing Responds&nbsp;</b></p>
<p>China has made its distrust of Lai well known throughout his career. During the presidential campaign, the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/taiwan/elections-cross-strait-united-states-china-relations" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="warned">warned</a> that the choice facing Taiwan’s voters was between war and peace, with a vote for Lai tantamount to choosing the former. After Lai’s speech, the <a href="https://english.news.cn/20240520/d9024fcff39b4a7ba6a97a9dda5804d0/c.html" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="TAO’s spokesman">TAO’s spokesman</a> accused him of “flagrantly promoting separatist fallacies and inciting cross-strait confrontation,” heated language that represents a notable escalation compared with how Chinese authorities reacted to Tsai’s past inaugural addresses. A <a href="http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/jmsd/16310117.html" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="commentary">commentary</a> in state-run media accused Lai of filling his speech with “deceitful political lies, aggressively promoting the separatist ideology of ‘Taiwan independence,’ maliciously inciting cross-strait antagonism, and advocating for independence through reliance on foreign support and military means.”&nbsp;</p>
<p>At the same time, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stuck to standard talking points on Taiwan, <a href="https://english.news.cn/20240520/1735085308d0491ea8bf6e8528135e45/c.html?utm_source=substack&amp;utm_medium=email" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="stating">stating</a> that “anyone who attempts to challenge the one-China principle will inevitably fail” and that separatist attempts for “Taiwan independence” are doomed to fail and posed the greatest threat to cross-strait stability.&nbsp;</p>
<p><b>Challenges Ahead&nbsp;</b></p>
<p>Lai faces an array of challenges that will test his team. Foremost is the risk of a vicious cycle of escalation between Beijing and Taipei. Beijing may have written Lai off long ago, refusing to believe that he could be a trusted interlocutor who will exercise adequate restraint. Lai, who undoubtedly&nbsp;believes that he has acted in a restrained manner that has gone unnoticed in Beijing, may deviate from Tsai’s approach at least rhetorically, seeing little reason to adjust to accommodate Beijing’s preferences.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>In recent months, Beijing has acted in ways that might accelerate such a vicious cycle. Public reporting indicates Beijing has broken longstanding precedent with entries into Taiwan’s claimed contiguous zone. That decision suggests Beijing may not appreciate responsible approaches by Washington and Taipei, which in turn may see little reason to exercise restraint of their own in response.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Lai also faces a challenging environment at home. His 40 percent vote share was the lowest of any winning candidate since 2000, which similarly saw a three-way race. For the first time in sixteen years, no party controls the legislature with an outright majority, and the DPP is now a minority given the de facto coalition between the two main opposition parties: the Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP). In this more uncertain political environment, Beijing may look for opportunities to manipulate Taiwan’s politics to advance its aims. It hopes Lai will be a one-term president and likely believes it can increase the likelihood that this comes to pass, and that may reduce its incentive to seek stability.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>For the United States, the key question will be whether a vicious cycle can be avoided. If each side exercises restraint, and if that restraint is acknowledged and reciprocated by the other side, there may be a path to preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. That puts pressure on all sides—Beijing, Taipei, and Washington—to work to manage these complex dynamics.&nbsp;</p></description>
<link>
</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">Analyzing Lai Ching-te’s Inaugural Address: More Continuity Than Difference</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 21 May 2024 20:01:01 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>America’s New Cold Wars, With David Sanger</title>
<description><p><b style="font-weight:700">Mentioned on the Episode&nbsp;</b></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>John Maggio, <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt22525694/" title="Year One: A Political Odyssey" target="_blank"><em style="font-style:italic">Year One: A Political Odyssey</em></a>, HBO Max</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>David E. Sanger, <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/710053/new-cold-wars-by-david-e-sanger-with-mary-k-brooks/" title="New Cold Wars: China's Rise, Russia's Invasion, and America's Struggle to Defend the West" target="_blank"><em style="font-style:italic">New Cold Wars: China's Rise, Russia's Invasion, and America's Struggle to Defend the West</em></a>, with Mary K. Brooks&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>David E. Sanger, <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/547683/the-perfect-weapon-by-david-e-sanger/" title="The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage, and Fear in the Cyber Age" target="_blank"><em style="font-style:italic">The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage, and Fear in the Cyber Age</em></a></p>
</description>
<link>
</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">America’s New Cold Wars, With David Sanger</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 21 May 2024 19:16:35 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Religion in China</title>
<description><div class="summary__container">
<div class="summary__title">Summary</div>
<div class="summary__description"><ul>
<li><span><span><span><span><span><span>The&nbsp;<span>Chinese Communist Party’s nearly 100 million members are required to be atheist, but the party recognizes five religions: Buddhism, Catholicism, Daoism, Islam, and Protestantism.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></li>
<li><span><span><span><span><span><span><span>Authorities tightly monitor registered and unregistered religious groups. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span><span><span><span><span><span>China has one of the largest populations of religious prisoners, and some groups, including Uyghur Muslims, face high levels of persecution.</span></span></span></span></span></span></li>
<li>Since&nbsp;<span><span><span><span><span><span><span>Chinese President Xi Jinping came to power, authorities have sought to enforce stricter regulations to ensure groups conform to doctrines set forth by the communist party.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></li>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
<br><h2>Introduction</h2>
<p>Amid an economic boom and rapid modernization, religion in China has been on the rise in recent decades. Experts point to the emergence of a spiritual vacuum as a trigger for the growing number of religious believers, particularly followers of Christianity and traditional Chinese religious groups.&nbsp;</p>
<p>While China’s constitution allows religious belief, Chinese Buddhism, Daoism, and folk practices are shown more leniency than other religions, such as Islam and Christianity, which are regarded as “foreign” by the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinese-communist-party" title="Chinese Communist Party" target="_blank">Chinese Communist Party</a> (CCP). In recent years, adherents across all religious organizations, including both state-sanctioned and underground and banned groups, face intensifying persecution and repression. They also face pressure to implement President Xi Jinping’s sinicization policies, which aim to make religious groups more aligned with Chinese culture, morality, and doctrines as defined by the CCP.</p>
<h2>Freedom and Regulation</h2><p>China’s relationship with religion has shifted throughout its modern history. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), religions were essentially banned, and followers were forced underground or persecuted as part of a campaign to eliminate “old” customs and ideas. In the 1980s, the CCP acknowledged the Chinese people’s complex relationship with religion. The following decades saw a revival of religious institutions and groups, and even tolerance of underground religions not directly under state control. Although Article 36 of the <a href="https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/lawsregulations/201911/20/content_WS5ed8856ec6d0b3f0e9499913.html#:~:text=Article%2036%20Citizens,by%20foreign%20forces." title="Chinese constitution" target="_blank">Chinese constitution</a> says that citizens “enjoy freedom of religious belief” and bans discrimination based on religion, the law regulates religion by forbidding state organs, public organizations, or individuals from compelling citizens to believe in—or not believe in—any particular faith. Minors are also forbidden from entering places of worship.</p>
<p>The state recognizes five religions: Buddhism, Catholicism, Daoism, Islam, and Protestantism. The practice of any other faith is formally prohibited, although often tolerated, especially in the case of traditional Chinese beliefs. Religious organizations must register with one of five state-sanctioned patriotic religious associations, which are supervised by the United Front Work Department, a branch of the Communist Party.</p>
<p>The government’s tally of registered religious believers is around two hundred million, or less than 10 percent of the population, according to several sources, including the UN Human Rights Council’s 2024 <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/CNIndex.aspx" title="Universal Periodic Review" target="_blank">Universal Periodic Review</a>. However, the number of Chinese adults who practice religion or hold religious belief is <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2023/08/30/measuring-religion-in-china/" title="likely much higher" target="_blank">likely much higher</a> because many believers do not follow organized religion and are said to practice traditional folk religion. These practitioners, along with members of underground house churches and banned religious groups, account for many of the country’s unregistered believers.</p>
<a id="1bcaf1d5-ec8e-4829-92af-c4167af28ab0"></a>
<div class="datawrapper-graph-embed"><div class="dw-responsive-embed-iframe"><iframe title="Religious Affiliation in China" aria-label="Bar Chart" id="datawrapper-chart-9Zk6T" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/9Zk6T/6/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="333" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe></div></div>
<p>Chinese public security officials monitor both registered and unregistered religious groups to prevent activities that “<a href="http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content_1372964.htm" title="disrupt public order" target="_blank">disrupt public order</a>, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the State,” as stipulated by the Chinese constitution. In practice, however, monitoring and crackdowns often target peaceful activities that are protected under international law, say human rights watchdogs.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The State Council, the government’s administrative authority, <a href="http://english.gov.cn/policies/latest_releases/2017/09/07/content_281475842719170.htm" title="passed regulations on religious affairs" target="_blank">passed regulations on religious affairs</a> in 2018 to allow state-registered religious organizations to possess property, publish literature, train and approve clergy, and collect donations. But the revised rules also included restrictions on religious schooling and the times and locations of religious celebrations, as well as monitoring of online religious activity and reporting <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-religion/china-tightens-regulation-of-religion-to-block-extremism-idUSKCN1BI1IH" title="donations that exceed 100,000 yuan" target="_blank">donations that exceed 100,000 yuan</a> (around $15,900).&nbsp;</p><p>Under Xi, the CCP has pushed to sinicize religion, or shape all religions to conform to the doctrines of the Communist Party and the customs of the majority Han Chinese population. New regulations that went into effect in early 2020 require religious groups to accept and <a href="https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/measures-for-the-administration-of-religious-groups/" title="spread CCP ideology" target="_blank">spread CCP ideology</a> and values. Faith organizations must now get approval from the government’s religious affairs office before conducting any activities. The next year, the CCP banned unregistered domestic religious groups from <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china/" title="sharing religious content online" target="_blank">sharing religious content online</a> and prohibited overseas organizations from operating online religious services in China without a permit, particularly targeting Christianity-related content on the messaging service WeChat.&nbsp;</p>
<p>In September 2023, stricter laws required religious sites and activities to support <a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/religion-controls-08032023122520.html" title="sinicization policies" target="_blank">sinicization policies</a>, which&nbsp; included prohibiting religious activity if it could “endanger national security, disrupt social order [or] damage national interests.” Meanwhile, in Hong Kong, where religious groups are not required to register with the government, religious figures have faced tighter scrutiny and have <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58ecfa82e3df284d3a13dd41/t/6549b051117ad12c7c40c783/1699328088263/Sell+Out+My+Soul_final.pdf" title="increased self-censorship" target="_blank">increased self-censorship</a> [PDF] under the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/hong-kong-freedoms-democracy-protests-china-crackdown" title="2020 national security law" target="_blank">2020 national security law</a>. The former Catholic Bishop of Hong Kong, Cardinal Joseph Zen Ze-kiun, was arrested on suspicion of “collusion with foreign forces” in 2021. He was later found guilty and was issued a fine. Since 2022, the Catholic church in Hong Kong has halted its annual commemorative masses to mark the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre.</p>
<figure id="image-82067" class="image-embed embedded_small"><div class="image-embed__picture">
<img width="520" height="347" alt="Cardinal Joseph Zen attends a mass for the Chinese Catholic church in Hong Kong." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" class="lazyload" data-src="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/China_Christianity_BG.jpg.webp" src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/China_Christianity_BG.jpg.webp" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption"><div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Cardinal Joseph Zen Ze-kiun attends a mass for the Chinese Catholic church in Hong Kong.
<span class="image-embed__source">Tyrone Siu/Reuters</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption></figure><p>In addition, China is home to one of the largest populations of religious prisoners, likely numbering from several thousand to <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/441219-CHINA-2022-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf" title="as high as tens of thousands" target="_blank">as high as tens of thousands</a> [PDF]; while in custody, some are tortured or killed, rights groups say. Instances of arbitrary detentions and violence carried out with impunity have led the U.S. State Department to designate China as a country of particular concern&nbsp;over religious freedom annually since 1999.</p>
<h2>Atheism and the CCP</h2>
<p>The CCP is officially atheist. The party prohibits its roughly ninety-eight million party members from holding religious beliefs, and it requires the expulsion of party members who belong to religious organizations. Officials have said that party membership and religious beliefs are incompatible, and they discourage families of CCP members from publicly participating in religious ceremonies. Although these regulations are not always strictly enforced, the party periodically takes steps to draw a clearer line on religion.&nbsp;</p>
<h2><b>Chinese Buddhism and Folk Religions</b></h2>
<p>China has the world’s largest Buddhist population—an estimate of 4 percent to 33 percent of the country’s population (42 million to 362 million people) depending on how religious practices are measured, according to the U.S.-based <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2023/08/30/buddhism/#how-many-buddhists-are-there-in-china" title="Pew Research Center" target="_blank">Pew Research Center</a>. Though Buddhism originated in India, it has a long history and tradition in China and today is the country’s largest institutionalized religion. Chinese folk religions, in contrast, have no rigid organizational structure, blend practices from Buddhism and Daoism, and are manifest in the worship of ancestors, spirits, or other local deities. According to CFR Senior Fellow Ian Johnson, author of <a href="http://www.ian-johnson.com/books/the-souls-of-china" title="The Souls of China: The Return of Religion After Mao" target="_blank"><em style="font-style:italic">The Souls of China: The Return of Religion After Mao</em></a>, “hundreds, if not thousands, of folk religious temples are unregistered,” but are tolerated.</p>
<p>Since China’s opening and reform in the 1980s, the party has been tolerant of, and tacitly approved, the rise in Buddhist and Daoist practice. Under former Chinese leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, the government “<a href="http://www.academia.edu/2262613/Buddhist_revival_under_state_watch" title="passively supported" target="_blank">passively supported</a>” the growth of Buddhism because it believed doing so helped bolster the image of China’s peaceful rise, supported the CCP’s goal of creating a “harmonious society,” and could help to improve relations with Taiwan, according to the University of Ottawa’s André Laliberté. Today, Buddhism, Daoism, and folk religions are <a href="https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/china-reversing-its-crackdown-some-religions-not-all" title="treated more leniently by the party" target="_blank">treated more leniently by the party</a> compared to “foreign” religions, such as Islam or Christianity.</p>
<p>The growth of Buddhism led to heightened visibility of its institutions, particularly <a href="https://www.academia.edu/5024941/Buddhist_Charities_and_China_Social_Policy_An_Opportunity_for_Alternate_Civility" title="Buddhist philanthropic organizations" target="_blank">Buddhist philanthropic organizations</a> [PDF] that deliver social services to the poor amid soaring inequality in China. Since Xi has come to power, experts have noted an apparent easing of tough rhetoric against, and even a promotion of, traditional beliefs in China. Some experts say Xi believes Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism do not challenge the CCP’s rule and therefore can be <a href="https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/the-two-tracks-of-xi-jinping-s-religious-policy" title="advantageous for China’s global diplomacy" target="_blank">advantageous for China’s global diplomacy</a>.</p>
<h2><b>Tibetan Buddhism</b></h2>
<p>According to China’s 2020 census data, the Tibetan region of China is home to<a href="https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/how-much-does-beijing-control-ethnic-makeup-of-tibet" title="seven million Tibetans" target="_blank"> seven million Tibetans</a>, more than 90 percent of the region’s population. Nearly all Tibetans in the region practice a distinct form of Buddhism. The Dalai Lama is the spiritual leader of one of the main schools of Tibetan Buddhism and symbolizes Tibetan identity for both Tibetans in China and in exile. Since 1987, he and the exiled government, known as the Central Tibetan Administration, have played a prominent role in garnering international support for a “<a href="https://www.dalailama.com/messages/tibet/middle-way-approach" title="Middle Way” approach" target="_blank">Middle Way” approach</a> to resolve Tibet’s political disputes within the framework of the People’s Republic of China. Buddhist monks within Tibet have also participated in largely peaceful anti-government demonstrations, though some have included riots and <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/13/self-immolation-and-chinas-state-cult-of-stability-tibet-monks-dalai-lama/" title="self-immolations" target="_blank">self-immolations</a>.</p>
<p>China’s religious policy is inherently tied to political tensions across the Tibetan region, which comprises the Tibet Autonomous Region and adjacent Tibetan autonomous prefectures and counties in neighboring provinces. To quell dissent, China has sought to aggressively assimilate Tibetans, says Tashi Rabgey, research professor of international affairs at George Washington University. A 2021 report by watchdog group the Tibet Action Institute estimates that <a href="https://s7712.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/2021_TAI_ColonialBoardingSchoolReport_Digital.pdf" title="78 percent of Tibetan students" target="_blank">78 percent of Tibetan students</a>&nbsp;[PDF] between six and eighteen years old live in boarding schools, where they are away from their families and taught primarily in Mandarin. Although Beijing has attempted to make the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/world/asia/25tibet.html" title="region more “Chinese”" target="_blank">region more “Chinese”</a> by funding development projects and incentivizing migration to Tibet, it has been largely unsuccessful.</p>
<figure id="image-82068" class="image-embed embedded_small"><div class="image-embed__picture">
<img width="520" height="347" alt="Tibetan Buddhist monks look at a mural in the Tashilhunpo Monastery in Shigatse, Tibet Autonomous Region, China." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" class="lazyload" data-src="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/China_Tibet_BG.jpg.webp" src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/China_Tibet_BG.jpg.webp" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption"><div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Tibetan Buddhist monks look at a mural in the Tashi Lhunpo Monastery in Tibet Autonomous Region, China.
<span class="image-embed__source">He Penglei/CNS/Reuters</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption></figure><p>Tibetan Buddhists face high levels of religious persecution. The state monitors daily operations of major monasteries, with facial-recognition cameras posted outside, and it reserves the right to disapprove an individual’s application to take up religious orders. In 2018, party cadres and officials were <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/01/24/china-new-controls-tibetan-monastery" title="given control" target="_blank">given control</a> over Sichuan Province’s Larung Gar, one of the world’s largest Buddhist study centers. Authorities <a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/tibet/yachen-demolition-10012019181505.html" title="demolished nearly half" target="_blank">demolished nearly half</a> of the center in 2019, displacing up to six thousand monks and nuns.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Authorities have reportedly detained and tortured monks and nuns for refusing to denounce the Dalai Lama, and laypeople have been ordered to replace photos of the Dalai Lama with Chinese leaders. A Tibetan child believed to be a reincarnated, high-ranking religious leader, known as the Panchen Lama, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/15/25-years-after-disappearing-tibetan-panchen-lama-china-no-nearer-its-goal" title="disappeared in 1995" target="_blank">disappeared in 1995</a> and has not been seen since. (Beijing claims that he graduated from college, has a job, and does not want to be disturbed.) After his disappearance, the Chinese government designated another child as the official Panchen Lama, though many Tibetans do not accept him as such.&nbsp;</p>
<p>With the fourteenth Dalai Lama nearing ninety years old, the Tibetan government in exile and the CCP are both preparing for his succession. Each is likely to appoint their own fifteenth Dalai Lama, generating a succession dispute similar to the situation with the current Panchen Lama. Rabgey says that this succession dispute will lead to an escalation of tensions in the region and is likely to trigger future Tibetan political unrest.</p>
<h2>Christian State-Sanctioned and House Churches</h2>
<p>China saw a significant growth in Christianity in the 1980s, after former leader Deng Xiaoping opened China to the outside world. Today, Protestantism is the predominant branch of Christianity practiced in China. There are three state-regulated Christian organizations and many underground house churches, though authorities have been cracking down on non-registered places of worship. Estimates of Christians in China vary widely, but according to a 2023 <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/12/12/chinas-christian-population-appears-to-have-stopped-growing-after-rising-rapidly-in-the-1980s-and-90s/" title="Pew Research Center" target="_blank">Pew Research Center</a> analysis, Chinese survey data show that Chinese adults who identify as Christian have remained stable at about 2 percent of the population (roughly 28 million people).</p>
<p>In recent years, China has witnessed a spike in state repression against both house churches and state-sanctioned Christian organizations, including campaigns to remove hundreds of rooftop crosses from churches, forced demolitions of churches, and harassment and imprisonment of Christian pastors and priests. A <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1deR6dkQpidTsJ0RheaZ2Y8Q-C4XVvEWZ/view" title="2018 report" target="_blank">2018 report</a> [PDF] from ChinaAid, a Texas-based Christian nongovernmental organization, said that religious persecution, primarily against Christians, was on the rise, citing more than one million cases that year. One of China’s most prominent Christian voices and the founder of a large underground church, Pastor <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/30/world/asia/china-wang-yi-christian-sentence.html" title="Wang Yi" target="_blank">Wang Yi</a>, was sentenced to nine years in prison in 2019 after a court charged him with subversion of state power and illegal business operations.</p>
<p>The Vatican does not have diplomatic ties with China, home to some ten to twelve million Catholics. Its recognition of Taiwan and a dispute over the bishop appointment process have been major sticking points. The Communist Party limits the Vatican’s role in selecting Catholic bishops and continues to harass and detain clergy who refuse to join the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association, the state-sanctioned organizational body for Catholics in China. In 2018, the two sides <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/22/world/asia/china-vatican-bishops.html" title="reached a provisional agreement" target="_blank">reached a provisional agreement</a> in which Pope Francis recognized several Chinese state-appointed bishops who had been excommunicated. While the two-year agreement was renewed in 2020 and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/vatican-confirms-renewal-contested-accord-with-china-bishops-appointments-2022-10-22/" title="again in 2022" target="_blank">again in 2022</a>, tensions seemed to rise shortly after, when China installed two bishops as heads of dioceses without permission from the Pope. However, China-Vatican relations appear to be improving after a January 2024 mutual agreement to consecrate two new bishops in China.</p>
<h2>Islam and Uyghurs in Xinjiang</h2>
<p>Muslims make up an around 1 to 1.5 percent of China’s population, accounting for <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2023/08/30/islam/" title="around eighteen million people" target="_blank">around eighteen million people</a>, according to recent estimates&nbsp;by Pew Research Center. China has ten predominantly Muslim ethnic groups, the largest of which is the Hui, an ethnic group closely related to the majority Han population and largely based in western China’s Ningxia Autonomous Region and the Gansu, Qinghai, and Yunnan provinces. Until recently, Hui Muslims had enjoyed relative freedom compared to the government’s tight control on religious activity in Xinjiang, home to a majority of Uyghur Muslims. But CCP policies and rhetoric have become <a href="https://www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-analysis/hui-muslims-and-the-%E2%80%9Cxinjiang-model%E2%80%9D-of-state-suppression-of" title="less tolerant and more repressive" target="_blank">less tolerant and more repressive</a> toward those who practice Islam in general. Officials have held Hui Muslims in formal detention and internment camps over advocating for religious freedom and funding mosque construction.</p>
<p>The Uyghurs are a Turkic people who live primarily in Xinjiang, northwestern China, and are also predominantly Muslim. According to China’s 2020 census, there are more than eleven million Uyghurs in this region, making up approximately half of its population, though many experts agree that increased Han Chinese immigration has lowered this number. For decades, Chinese authorities have cracked down on <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uyghurs-xinjiang" title="Uyghurs in Xinjiang" target="_blank">Uyghurs in Xinjiang</a>, claiming the community holds <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html" title="extremist and separatist ideas." target="_blank">extremist and separatist ideas.</a> They point to occasional outbursts of violence against government workers and civilians in the region and have blamed a group that Beijing calls the East Turkestan Islamic Movement for several terrorist attacks throughout China. Experts say most Uyghurs do not support violence, but many are frustrated by frequent discrimination and the influx of Han Chinese that are disproportionately benefiting from economic opportunities in the region.</p>
<div id="content-promo-82069" class="promo ">
<div class="promo__container">
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-xinjiang-uyghurs-muslims-repression-genocide-human-rights" class="promo__link">
<div class="promo__cta">Dive Deeper</div>
<div class="promo__title">China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang</div>
<div class="promo__icon-circle-and-arrow-right">
</div>
</a>
</div>
</div>
<p>Since 2017, up to two million Muslims, most of them Uyghurs, have been arbitrarily detained in so-called reeducation camps, according to experts and foreign government officials. Detainees have reported being tortured, barred from practicing their religion, and forced to pledge loyalty to the CCP. Outside of the detention centers, Uyghurs are subjected to intense surveillance, widespread religious restrictions, and <a href="https://apnews.com/269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c" title="forced sterilizations" target="_blank">forced sterilizations</a>. Officials have also sought to <a href="https://apnews.com/article/china-muslims-human-rights-watch-mosques-0f40384e264a874a210c08bf25b13d4d" title="shut down, demolish, or convert" target="_blank">shut down, demolish, or convert</a> mosques in Xinjiang and beyond. In February 2024, new laws in Xinjiang required that newly built mosques in China adopt “Chinese characteristics and style.”</p>
<p>Chinese officials deny human rights abuses in the region. They maintain that the reeducation camps have two purposes: to teach Mandarin, Chinese laws, and vocational skills, and to prevent citizens from being influenced by extremist ideas. Beijing has resisted international pressure to allow outside investigators to freely travel in Xinjiang.</p>
<h2>Banned Religious Groups</h2>
<p>Several religious and spiritual groups that fall outside the CCP’s officially recognized religions, dubbed “heterodox cults” by Beijing, are subject to regular government crackdowns. The party-state has banned more than a dozen such faiths on the grounds that adherents use religion “as a camouflage, deifying their leading members, recruiting and controlling their members, and deceiving people by molding and spreading superstitious ideas, and <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2014/eap/238288.htm" title="endangering society" target="_blank">endangering society</a>.” Those banned include Christian-inspired groups such as the Church of Almighty God, also known as Eastern Lightning, and folk religious groups, such as Falun Gong, a spiritual movement that blends aspects of Buddhism, Daoism, and traditional qigong exercise. International human rights groups, scholars of religion, and Chinese human rights lawyers have questioned such designations, criticizing the Chinese government for harsh repression against believers.</p>
<figure id="image-82071" class="image-embed embedded_small"><div class="image-embed__picture">
<img width="520" height="347" alt="Supporters of the Falungong spiritual movement, a group banned in mainland China, take part in a march in Hong K... |
http://localhost:1200/cfr/blog - Success ✔️<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0">
<channel>
<title>Blogs</title>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog</link>
<atom:link href="http://localhost:1200/cfr/blog" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"></atom:link>
<description>Blogs - Made with love by RSSHub(https://github.com/DIYgod/RSSHub)</description>
<generator>RSSHub</generator>
<webMaster>i@diygod.me (DIYgod)</webMaster>
<language>en</language>
<lastBuildDate>Fri, 24 May 2024 01:11:13 GMT</lastBuildDate>
<ttl>5</ttl>
<item>
<title>A Puzzling Attempted Coup in the DRC</title>
<description><p>The news <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/democratic-republic-congo-army-says-it-stopped-attempted-coup-2024-05-19/" title="reports" target="_blank">reports</a> of this past weekend’s failed coup attempt in Kinshasa read like a Mad Lib—a father-son duo from <u>Utah</u> and a <u>cannabis entrepreneur</u> from <u>Maryland</u> were part of a small band <u>livestreaming</u> an attempt to overthrow the government of the <u>Democratic Republic of Congo</u>. In the conspiratorial hothouse of Congolese politics, the bizarre incident, which culminated in deadly consequences for several people including Christian Malanga, leader of the would-be putchists, has raised numerous as yet unanswered questions. Who convinced Malanga that this effort would succeed? How did the amateurish group manage to access the presidential palace? Whose agenda was advanced by this spectacle?</p>
<p>It remains to be seen how the failed coup d’état will influence politics in the DRC, but one clear loser would seem to be the United States. Certainly, the incident made U.S. Ambassador to the DRC Lucy Tamlyn’s job more difficult. As social media accounts buzzed with accusations of CIA involvement, she <a href="https://x.com/USAmbDRC" title="registered" target="_blank">registered</a> “shock and concern” while pledging to cooperate with the Congolese government in investigating the incident. Cooler heads recognized that the failed takeover hardly bore the hallmarks of a professional intelligence organization, but the notion of armed Americans meddling in Congolese politics <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/10/24/congo-lumumba-cia-amends/" title="echoes" target="_blank">echoes</a> the real and sordid history of U.S. policies during the Cold War. As the United States aims to find a constructive way forward with the DRC on a range of issues from critical mineral deals to forest conservation and conflict resolution, developments that stir up historic resentments benefit only those who wish to see the United States on the back foot.</p><p>Yet another unhelpful narrative is buttressed by the bizarre events in the DRC—one about contempt. The story creates the impression that Americans so underestimate African states that they imagine a government can be overthrown by a small group of outsiders with nothing but fatigues, guns, and a can-do attitude. It’s consistent with former President Trump’s vulgar characterization of African countries, with press coverage that uses images from one part of the continent to accompany a story about a completely different country, and with analyses that consistently overlook the agency of Africans themselves in explaining major political developments. A small, misguided group with a sprinkling of American passports have boosted the efforts of America’s adversaries in Africa.</p></description>
<link>
</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">A Puzzling Attempted Coup in the DRC</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2024 16:00:13 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>The President’s Inbox Recap: America’s New Cold Wars</title>
<description><p>The latest episode o<em>f </em><a href="https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/americas-new-cold-wars-david-sanger" title="The President’s Inbox" target="_blank"><em>The President’s Inbox</em></a><em> </em>is live! This week, Jim sat down with <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/by/david-e-sanger" title="David E. Sanger" target="_blank">David E. Sanger</a>, White House and National Security Correspondent for the <em>New York Times</em>. David recently published <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/710053/new-cold-wars-by-david-e-sanger-with-mary-k-brooks/" title="New Cold Wars: China’s Rise, Russia’s Invasion, and America’s Struggle to Defend the West" target="_blank"><em>New Cold Wars: China’s Rise, Russia’s Invasion, and America’s Struggle to Defend the West</em></a>. They discussed the United States’ return to great power competition.</p>
<div class="media-episode-card">
<div class="episode-card__podcast-title">
<section class="series-tag"><a href="https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/presidents-inbox" class="series-tag__link"> The President’s Inbox</a> </section></div>
<h1 class="episode-card__title">
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/americas-new-cold-wars-david-sanger" data-vars-event-label=" America’s New Cold Wars, With David Sanger"> America’s New Cold Wars, With David Sanger</a>
</h1>
<div class="episode-card__summary">
<p></p><p>David Sanger, the White House and national security correspondent for the<em> New York Times</em>, sits down with James M. Lindsay to discuss how the post-Cold War ended and why the new era of geopolitical rivalry began.</p>
</div>
<div class="audio-podcast">
<div id="player-container-node-audio-252435" class="audio-player-wrapper" data-id="-node-audio-252435">
<div id="play-btn-node-audio-252435" class="audio-player-wrapper__btn audio-player-wrapper__play">
<span class="play-btn">
</span>
<span class="pause-btn">
</span>
</div>
<div class="audio-player-wrapper__controls">
<div id="seekObjContainer-node-audio-252435" class="seekObjContainer">
<div id="seekHover-node-audio-252435" class="seekHover"></div>
<input type="range" id="seek-slider-node-audio-252435" max="100" value="0"></div>
</div>
<div class="audio-player-wrapper__time">
<small id="current-time-node-audio-252435" class="time">0:00</small>
<small id="duration-node-audio-252435" class="time">0:00</small>
</div>
<div class="audio-player-wrapper__mute"></div>
<div class="audio-player-wrapper__speed" data-speed="1">x</div>
<div class="audio-player" id="audio-player-container-node-audio-252435">
<audio id="player-node-audio-252435" src="https://cfr-org-prod-media-files.s3.amazonaws.com/audio-files/240521_TPI_MASTER.mp3" preload="”metadata”"></audio></div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="episode-card__date">
May 20, 2024 — 38:18 min </div>
</div>
<p>Here are four highlights from their conversation:</p>
<p><em>1.) The post-Cold War era is over. </em>The United States no longer enjoys its unipolar moment. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and through the 2000s, the United States and the West made a series of misjudgments about where Russia and China were headed. They assumed that Russia and China would want to become more integrated into the U.S.-led world order. David acknowledged that Russian President Vladimir Putin stated explicitly in 2007 that he would do the contrary, while China’s ambitions were unclear initially. David said, “this was a failure of imagining a world in which these powers wanted to return to a past era of greatness and weren’t going to sit still for a unipolar world, run out of Washington under Washington values.”</p><p><em>2.) The new era of great power competition is distinct from the old Cold War. </em>The old Cold War was largely a military competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Today, the United States is engaged in a great power competition that is more complex. The United States is engaged in competition with China and Russia—both of whom have nuclear arsenals. The United States is dealing with, as David put it, “a Russia that has learned with great effectiveness, how to be an agent of disturbance or at least disruption, and a China whose rise, although it has recently run into considerable economic headwinds, has created a range of new problems for us.” At the same time, the United States and its allies and partners—including NATO members, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia—and the “Axis of Resistance”—which is made up of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran—are squaring off. The United States and the Soviet Union, however, were never as interconnected as the United States, China, and Russia are today. He added, “in the new Cold Wars, we are still reliant on the Chinese for chips, other technology. They are reliant on us, and yet none of that has prevented us from descending into what I think is a new era of containment.”</p>
<p><em>3.) The Russia-Ukraine war is a “laboratory” for the United States and its partners against the backdrop of great power competition. </em>The United States is learning what does and doesn’t work in direct conflict with major powers. For example, the United States now realizes that its expensive satellite systems are “sitting ducks.” In the run-up to the war in Ukraine, Russia successfully took out the European Viasat satellite network through a cyberattack on the ground-based modems. Now, the United States is looking to move to a system like Elon Musk’s Starlink—which consists of small satellite constellations. That’s just one example of expensive, modern technology mismatching warfare realities.</p>
<p><em>4.) There is more reason for optimism on the U.S.-China relationship than the U.S.-Russia relationship. </em>David put it this way, “oddly enough, I'm slightly more optimistic, at least in the short term on China than I am on Russia. At least we have conversations underway with them. That's really only in the past year and is driven less by the brilliance of our diplomacy, I think, than by the fact that the Chinese economy has been through a significant downturn that's going to be really hard for them to reverse.” At the same time, when Putin threatened to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, China stated its opposition to the use of nuclear weapons in the conflict. China and the United States have some opportunities for collaboration. David added, “I don’t have any illusions that that’s going to be a broad effort, and I fear the two countries [Russia and China] may grow closer, not further apart, but it is an opportunity for the US.”</p>
<p>If you’re looking to read more of David’s work, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/23/us/politics/ukraine-new-american-technology.html" title="check out" target="_blank">check out</a> this adaptation from his book for the <em>New York Times</em> about the lessons learned from the war in Ukraine.</p></description>
<link>
</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">The President’s Inbox Recap: America’s New Cold Wars</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2024 14:42:21 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Advanced Manufacturing to be a Focus of China’s July Party Plenum</title>
<description><p>China’s long-delayed third Party plenum on economic reform will be held in July. Official commentary suggests that the Party communique which will be issued at this meeting will double-down on the importance of manufacturing as a tool to address China’s pressing domestic economic problems, potentially increasing trade tensions with a range of foreign countries.</p>
<p>On April 30, Chinese authorities&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="0" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.rfa.org%2Fenglish%2Fnews%2Fchina%2Fdelayed-third-plenary-economy-meeting-05022024142612.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503185984%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=6rGd5%2FLSHj1bM81wUd7kavWE%2BfArnHSjbHJl9xnwSRY%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWA21353390-5ead-5dcb-2b03-23d199791392" originalsrc="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/delayed-third-plenary-economy-meeting-05022024142612.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="H0nZtRfp6EVbYT+KTpVqEheb+uLHle+cIEiV0g+4+TJW3Qu25XU/yzbCa1G2aRH/CCZXeUISHDF/gjIEXXg6zrryaT7ofgaXLsCq4t+Ik6Cb4/KAwl81rSRLR+Eb2phf9yd3N/9uq7lw3S0AkysnTIbFN+sOlSXsSMVT6MjV/hw=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/delayed-third-plenary-economy-meeting-05022024142612.html. Click or tap if you trust this link.">announced</a>&nbsp;that the third Party plenum of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee would meet in July. Official commentary&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="1" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.chinadaily.com.cn%2Fa%2F202405%2F01%2FWS66323e19a31082fc043c5050.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503199426%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=2n3UuGo%2FRAWMbRlRHWq%2BEQJSihCvwU%2FgSSy2AXeD2PE%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWA117497f5-e87c-bc4e-01dd-f20665dc9b5e" originalsrc="https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202405/01/WS66323e19a31082fc043c5050.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="bqQQxTFiPd7eWyoW8nBUP4fkYbr+Lnn8xYI19CYTxCJmPQ0cE4NwUv9TvRZM6N7F+C46cUR8Mw1johhx4G2Aca9bsgndQMVxL7ANckuufHWRiWeNv8elRRoWYA824p1Ilt4+VGxxWLXaknoI7+ubjDILGgOZJLlPYVseD4HI/nw=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202405/01/WS66323e19a31082fc043c5050.html. Click or tap if you trust this link.">indicates</a>&nbsp;that economic issues will be the core of the plenum, including a focus on integrated economic plans for the Yangtze Delta region. But specific attention will also be devoted to fostering “new quality productive forces”—a new Party slogan set out by Xi Jinping—with state commentary stating:</p><p><em>“The imperative was stressed... to develop new quality productive forces according to local conditions. The layout of China's strength in strategic science and technology should be improved, emerging industries cultivated and strengthened, the development of industries for the future arranged in advance, and the transformation and upgrading of traditional industries empowered by advanced technologies.”</em></p>
<p>As Chinese authorities&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="2" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Flosangeles.china-consulate.gov.cn%2Feng%2Flghd%2F202404%2Ft20240418_11283727.htm&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503205764%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=IbEShh6%2BllqjRF%2BKcOmhi%2FU7fTx1f9JCGSLpKwYrcBk%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAe743989e-a804-99d8-d203-643dc5ac1cc7" originalsrc="http://losangeles.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/lghd/202404/t20240418_11283727.htm" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="nJFMkJ+NoiMgW4rhQv8Zy1Lr3elJYsunHe4BDryx6OO0YVHvk0kbWP02pfLAsbN1ydtFaaLLI+D2xacSVY5nZse/MXybDN3lKtTtVciINnLLI1oJjosVuWnQLf9+vqKBw/nTo448yRRn+8p/5q4ZAnoGVQEE+nbAkYpuy9tqg0g=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: http://losangeles.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/lghd/202404/t20240418_11283727.htm. Click or tap if you trust this link.">note</a>, “new quality productive forces” includes three specific industries: electric vehicles, lithium-ion batteries, and photovoltaic products, which have registered dramatic export growth, in addition to other fields in biomedicine, artificial intelligence, and the digital economy. In recent years, Beijing has&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="3" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2024%2F05%2F14%2Fbusiness%2Fchina-exports-manufacturing.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503211048%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=1ahyI9wpkevRlu2E672ErhfP7nh3mz%2Fwp4Q4dT76QSc%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAd915b52c-0ef4-2399-4607-1ea63c3f5b6b" originalsrc="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/14/business/china-exports-manufacturing.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="L2sZOeL0lFunPptcQBH8iAhtpk88vF6tbo59ysGysLK+IoJ4HxdgExVjCZ/qZ6o01CYHuZ3WrgTsj9CqTmStycTBTwhf+dMUsXEuw49i+afnKwi/uOCVTlwcjKEcEbF6/gKe+TnSzRXlDzhzF6kuCmKwHA/MVKY/pJPB0BG8OpI=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/14/business/china-exports-manufacturing.html. Click or tap if you trust this link.">identified and promoted</a>&nbsp;key advanced manufacturing industries—including electric vehicles and batteries—as part of China’s industrial strategy. Goals include reducing reliance on foreign technologies and creating new sources of export-driven growth.&nbsp;</p>
<p>For Beijing, such emphasis on manufacturing represents an economic development strategy aimed at responding to serious domestic challenges. China currently faces both continuing high&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="4" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.wsj.com%2Fworld%2Fchina%2Fchinas-youth-unemployment-eased-in-april-a029344f&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503216081%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=eNQrISw%2BXNg3i%2FwuJav7ExYbcv2lBfCg4MzHyblG7p4%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAbd6af401-ab3c-7845-7ea4-53d89f61f617" originalsrc="https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-youth-unemployment-eased-in-april-a029344f" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="AQ4/iQp/hYQGxLkXSn7qmCrCJ/cZPlJ+TV1/fUPl5xi4LmH5GuJJY97e/YzHRaDV7MuK+PCZTCHRcdjAGmcXnkvGUJvpbYYSHjcj+YJoViFXMJd+4ypOZ98eTfbC22clyxh9qg1vg2Dbiab/raJBmkpD+TjrkS5zidNmKWfKPGQ=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-youth-unemployment-eased-in-april-a029344f. Click or tap if you trust this link.">youth unemployment</a>, as well as construction and real estate sectors that are mired in deep distress after the implosion of China’s property bubble, and which constituted a quarter of China’s GDP prior to the pandemic. Recent years have&nbsp;<a data-auth="NotApplicable" data-linkindex="5" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/amid-mounting-youth-unemployment-woes-beijing-looks-towards-vocational-education" id="OWA4f9afd72-27e1-a17f-5c3b-a22fc9dadb5d" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" title="seen">seen</a>&nbsp;Chinese authorities make a concerted effort to raise the status of vocational education programs and steer youth in the direction of skilled manufacturing labor, precisely because of the employment difficulties facing four-year college graduates.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Indeed, recent statements by Xi himself give further support to the likelihood that the July plenum will feature a doubling-down on manufacturing. A front-page&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="6" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fpaper.people.com.cn%2Frmrb%2Fhtml%2F2024-05%2F01%2Fnw.D110000renmrb_20240501_4-01.htm&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503220962%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=LvIQKiUxzrnTL5IJ16VqXtLA2b8mEyKv3lZTT4xqvYk%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWA3964bf46-e856-5cc7-ecc1-e1db928cee93" originalsrc="http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2024-05/01/nw.D110000renmrb_20240501_4-01.htm" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="U+VGUCUN0VJYCDQ2m86YaO3xVtQLf4AFom+BRwX1d9GyfZpjKes/TTI9qMLzcuMXNjvU+HCgSepVli75jPbZ3LIWCwAAZbLulu9txfWvvq83eCkMtoYWI36ftt+PqSliQSPrKlM0wk/5b1NnvWK2u5IeHP12JeLpC0cyv1/ltJI=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2024-05/01/nw.D110000renmrb_20240501_4-01.htm. Click or tap if you trust this link.">article</a>&nbsp;in the Party’s flagship paper accompanying the announcement of the July plenum carried extensive quotations from Xi himself extolling Chinese “craftsmanship” (<em>gongjiang</em>) in numerous fields of advanced manufacturing.</p>
<p>Naturally, any policy moves by Beijing to boost its own export-oriented advanced manufacturing industries run the risk of heightening tensions between China and its trading partners. Fears of Chinese market domination in specific industries led the Biden administration to&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="7" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fapnews.com%2Farticle%2Fbiden-china-tariffs-electric-vehicles-evs-solar-2024ba735c47e04a50898a88425c5e2c&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503225850%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=Lf8uTpZ6O1wJNj%2FSMr8ybHVGEuHjxOTwdJI49t%2BjhmY%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAbf0d4b26-e45d-be24-0f02-464361a12e73" originalsrc="https://apnews.com/article/biden-china-tariffs-electric-vehicles-evs-solar-2024ba735c47e04a50898a88425c5e2c" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="Zial7EJt9mURBt5T7sLNyoDKz3K/3tbjbkvn3tpiLyw16SD1VUaE4xhpY7xPsNzt05pHcsZEOjV3lzvQ09lZ5gjWonBZNBUQKbZdL96lTfPnncvNW3KYIP1mNu9l18reYgYx8EeZGPdwyI/KjsFZU1d3Nd9Aw9+8Kx8cwxUjyMc=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://apnews.com/article/biden-china-tariffs-electric-vehicles-evs-solar-2024ba735c47e04a50898a88425c5e2c. Click or tap if you trust this link.">announce</a>&nbsp;high tariffs on a range of such products last week. In fall 2023, European authorities&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="8" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Frhg.com%2Fresearch%2Faint-no-duty-high-enough%2F&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503230731%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=lyUNGLKjjpnh19ABAO7T6svYM8im%2F1%2Bhg%2BdAw4NUZ1I%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAe6e23327-f57b-65e1-1139-73e7492b7bc3" originalsrc="https://rhg.com/research/aint-no-duty-high-enough/" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="JaDVZAQwTw9fRxuxCWHj8WGhl3dc+jVzZfhMwuGIEkGneAbeDvT4IVpdE7XXcwVyjK8MtOFpBmFteUpAFXZ5EsTvExteNVVizaOmbqPwyBZY+e0plVrdArCFjCjJRKphNkxFyxk3V+dCyvyso5tC5M6sydgpqUCWvii5uiExGdA=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://rhg.com/research/aint-no-duty-high-enough/. Click or tap if you trust this link.">launched</a>&nbsp;an anti-subsidy investigation into China’s electric vehicle industry, and are currently considering imposing countervailing duties.&nbsp;</p></description>
<link>
</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">Advanced Manufacturing to be a Focus of China’s July Party Plenum</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 22 May 2024 20:43:23 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>European Tech Law Faces Test to Address Interference, Threats, and Disinformation in 2024 Elections</title>
<description><img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/full_width_xl/public/image/2024/05/EUvote.jpg.webp" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"><br><p>The European Union (EU) began implementing the Digital Services Act (DSA) this year, just in time to combat online disinformation and other electoral interference in the dozens of elections taking place in Europe’s twenty-seven member countries and the European Parliament elections taking place June 6 through June 9. To prepare, the EU conducted a stress test of the DSA mechanisms to address elections targeted by false and manipulated information, incitement, and attempts to suppress voices. The DSA has also <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/30/business/meta-european-union-disinformation-investigation.html" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="opened investigations">opened investigations</a> against Meta, TikTok, and X out of concern they are not doing enough to prevent these scenarios.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The DSA is a landmark piece of legislation not only because it is the most comprehensive regulatory effort to address digital threats to date and impacts the 740 million people living in the EU; its implementation will also inform other countries’ efforts to provide a secure and safe internet space. Even without additional legislation, the European law may induce the largest technology companies to voluntarily apply the same standards globally, as was the case with the EU’s Global Digital Privacy Regulation, which caused many platforms to routinely seek user permission for data collection and retention.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p><p>Tech companies’ responses to the DSA during the EU elections will be watched closely in the United States, where disinformation and electoral interference could roil the already contentious November elections. Despite years of debate, no U.S. guardrails have been implemented. Concerns over government censorship and free speech have stalled dozens of legislative proposals to require tech companies to address various threats in the digital space and risks arising from powerful new artificial intelligence (AI). The free speech argument overlooks the speech of those who are being doxed, threatened, attacked, and driven out of the public arena by vicious online actors—including women, who are far and away <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/most-online-hate-targets-women-says-eu-report-2023-11-29/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="the most frequent targets of these attacks">the most frequent targets of these attacks</a>. Legislative action has also been impeded by concerns that overly burdensome regulation will inhibit tech companies amid a worldwide race to gain competitive edge through generative artificial intelligence and other innovations.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The DSA is a useful model constructed around three principles: due diligence requirements for tech companies, mandated transparency via public reporting of their compliance with those requirements, and the threat of hefty fines to ensure compliance and accountability. The size of the EU market is large enough that, as with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), some tech companies may be incentivized to comply with the law’s provisions even without sanctions. The DSA’s strictest provisions apply to the world’s largest online platforms and search engines (those with more than 45 million users). These companies are required to routinely assess activity on their platforms and services for “<a href="https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-vlops" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="systemic risks">systemic risks</a>” involving elections, illegal content, human rights, gender-based violence, protection of minors, and public health and safety.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Companies have delivered initial assessments, which are publicly available, as well as information about the actions they have taken to comply. The EU website hosts a massive and growing online archive of hundreds of thousands of content moderation decisions made by the companies. In early enforcement actions, the EU has requested that Meta and other companies take down false ads and sought more information about their safety practices. For example, the EU queried X about its decision to cut its <a href="https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-requests-information-x-decreasing-content-moderation-resources-under-digital-services" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="content moderation team">content moderation team</a> by 20 percent since last October. Reduced content moderation on one of the world’s largest platforms is obviously a great concern given the number of elections and aggressive disinformation and interference campaigns by Russia and its proxies as it seeks to boost the fortunes of rising rightwing populists, Euroskeptic parties, and pro-Russian and anti-Ukraine candidates, as recently <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/04/17/slovakia-president-pellegrini-russia-election-interference-disinformation/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="occurred in Slovakia">occurred in Slovakia</a> and other Central and Eastern European countries.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>Thus far, the DSA has not yet levied fines, but the threat alone of stiff penalties of up to 6 percent of gross revenues has led most companies to provide the required information. This treasure trove of information about how these tech companies are policing their own platforms is itself valuable; it enables governments and researchers to understand the effectiveness of measures being employed by trust and safety divisions of companies, some of which embrace the goal of a safe internet. The EU law explicitly seeks to guard free speech as well as innovation by companies, but the experience of implementation will inform lingering concerns about free speech, direct government decision-making, and censorship of content, including whether an authoritarian government could exercise control over their populations through digital policing and firewalls. Those concerns color the current negotiations at the United Nations over a Global Digital Compact, which is to be announced as part of the Summit of the Future in September.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The essence of the DSA is not to make content decisions directly but to set standards for due diligence and require companies to demonstrate that they are monitoring and mitigating risks via their own codes of conduct. Voluntary standards may vary, but the sharpest debates revolve around defining what constitutes illegal content. The EU has taken additional measures to harmonize laws regarding what is illegal content across the EU member states, which has been a difficult and contentious matter. The United Kingdom (UK) went through a similar multiyear debate over concerns about curtailing free speech before passing its Online Safety Act late last year. The UK law adopted some features in the DSA, including the due diligence reporting requirement and fines of up to ten percent of gross revenue. It defines the scope of risks more narrowly than the DSA, although the UK law does criminalize “extreme” pornography and may criminalize the creation of deepfake porn. Enforcement of the UK law awaits finalization of codes of conduct by year’s end. The EU also has moved to harmonize what constitutes illegal content as the laws of the twenty-seven member states currently vary greatly in defining what is illegal. Germany’s Network Enforcement Act, which was passed in 2018, is one of the world’s stiffest hate speech laws, which aims to stem rising neo-Nazi hate speech. The far-right Alternative fur Deutschland party has <a href="https://www.vox.com/world-politics/2024/3/12/24080074/germany-afd-far-right" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="surged in state elections">surged in state elections</a> and exceeded the popularity of the leading Social Democrats in national polls.&nbsp;</p><p>The process of making the internet safer is iterative; several countries have revised their laws based on the experience of implementing them as well as evolving circumstances. For example, Germany amended its law in 2021 to stiffen its requirement that companies take down “clearly illegal” content within twenty-four hours. Australia has revised its online safety law twice since its initial passage in 2015, to require faster takedown of material deemed illegal and to greatly expand the law’s original focus on stopping child sexual abuse and exploitation and terrorist material. Speed of response is a critical factor in countering mis- and disinformation. Delayed action by tech companies has allowed viral propagation of material to proceed unhindered—as occurred in early January when deepfake porn of pop star Taylor Swift spread to 47 million viewers shortly after it was uploaded from the notorious 4chan message board.&nbsp;</p>
<p>That highly publicized episode drew attention to the disproportionate targeting of women and girls by internet violence, especially women in public life like politicians, journalists, and human rights activists, and minorities. The chilling effect on political participation has also been documented. The UK parliament rushed to act on deepfake porn after a number of women candidates were targeted this spring. Growing attention to the magnitude of the effects on women spurred the Biden administration to form a fourteen-country global partnership for action on online harassment and abuse. And last month, the EU concluded years-long negotiations to issue a directive on online gender-based violence and threats, including nonconsensual sharing of intimate images, deepfake porn, and other forms of attack. Member states are required to pass laws to implement the directive within two years.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The 2024 elections will serve as an initial test case for the DSA’s ability to rein in this wide variety of election interference, threats, and disinformation. Given the nascent regulatory architecture and companies’ varied compliance records, it is certain that further scrutiny and modification will be needed. Big tech will be required to provide public after-action reviews of the effectiveness of their measures to label AI-generated content, moderate discourse, identify foreign interference, and meet other guidelines for each country’s elections. These much-needed first steps will help light the way for others.&nbsp;</p></description>
<link>
</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">European Tech Law Faces Test to Address Interference, Threats, and Disinformation in 2024 Elections</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 22 May 2024 15:54:31 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>On "Outside Agitators" and Gaza Protests</title>
<description><p>Below is a chart showing the numbers of people arrested during Gaza encampments and protests on a number of U.S. campuses.</p>
<p>Data was collected from <em>The New York Times </em>article titled <a href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2Finteractive%2F2024%2Fus%2Fpro-palestinian-college-protests-encampments.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7CEAbrams%40cfr.org%7C79b6f0937c2346ef2f5308dc79a4262b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638518993125924955%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=c1vMu1qHcMFcAe4V9go9nFMUVVZ8eQSGkzA5KFljrXA%3D&amp;reserved=0" title="“Where Protesters on U.S. Campuses Have Been Arrested or Detained,”" target="_blank">“Where Protesters on U.S. Campuses Have Been Arrested or Detained,”</a> and supplemented with additional numbers from local journalists, university papers and statements, and national news agencies. The arrest numbers are <em>not </em>an exhaustive list of total arrests related to Gaza encampments and protests. Rather, it is a sample from a group of institutions where there are reports on the affiliation status of those arrested.</p><p>So these numbers should be considered suggestive, not final or absolutely reliable. And what they suggest is that the protests were indeed seized upon by people unaffiliated with the universities and colleges in question, but determined to disrupt campus life in the service of their political goals. Only half of those "protesting" were students or faculty members.&nbsp;</p>
<p>This suggests other questions. Who were the 50.43% who were unaffiliated? Who financed their activities? Did the affiliated and unaffiliated act in the same ways, or was one group or the other more involved in violence, building takeovers, and extremist rhetoric as opposed to peaceful protest?&nbsp;</p>
<p>The involvement of such a percentage of persons unaffiliated with the universities presents special problems for administrators, because internal discipline such as suspension or expulsion will of course not be available when it comes to the unaffiliated. That may leave no alternative except arrests to bring the activities to an end. In real life, we've very often seen administrators threaten suspensions or expulsions and then back off, or even impose such penalties and then remove them as part of the price of getting protesters to disband. Faculty who violate university rules present a similar but even harder problem because they often have more protections, such as tenure.&nbsp;</p>
<p>My impression, now as the academic year is ending, is that punishment is extremely rare. Most charges have been or likely will be dropped, except perhaps in cases where "protesters" assaulted police. Academic penalties such as suspension appear to be disappearing as well. This sends a clear message: violations of the rules will be forgiven no matter how severe the violation if violators stick to their guns and threaten further disturbances. It is an invitation for more trouble, and quite an education for the vast majority of students who naively assumed rules were <em>not </em>made to be broken.&nbsp;</p>
<figure id="image-82254" class="image-embed embedded_large"><div class="image-embed__picture">
<img width="520" height="332" alt="A list of universities with the number of arrests and affiliation status of those arrested." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" class="lazyload" data-src="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/Arrests%20at%20University%20Gaza%20Encampments%20and%20Protests_2.jpg.webp" src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/Arrests%20at%20University%20Gaza%20Encampments%20and%20Protests_2.jpg.webp" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption"><div class="image-embed__caption-text">
<span class="image-embed__source"></span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption></figure></description>
<link>
</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">On "Outside Agitators" and Gaza Protests</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 21 May 2024 19:45:22 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Cyber Week in Review: May 16, 2024</title>
<description><p><b style="font-weight:700">Senate AI working group releases AI Policy Roadmap</b></p>
<p>A bipartisan group of senators, which consists of Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY), and Sens. Todd Young (R-IN), Martin Heinrich (D-NM), and Mike Rounds (R-S.D.), released a “<a href="https://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000018f-79a9-d62d-ab9f-f9af975d0000" title="roadmap" target="_blank">roadmap </a>for artificial intelligence policy in the U.S. Senate” this week, and identifies areas or uses of AI that are well-suited for regulation, including boosting funding for AI innovation, developing standards for AI fairness, addressing AI’s implications for national security, and addressing AI’s effects on the workforce, among other concerns. The roadmap also calls for Congress to appropriate nearly $32 billion to encourage non-military AI innovation over the coming year. Although the report offers a <a href="https://www.akingump.com/en/insights/alerts/senate-gang-of-four-releases-long-anticipated-ai-whitepaper" title="variety of recommendations" target="_blank">variety of recommendations</a> for how Congress could leverage processes like appropriations, existing acts and funding like the CHIPS and Science Act, and research and development funding mechanisms to meet the goals of the roadmap, the senators have not clarified exactly what action Congress should take or when it would do so. The roadmap reflects the topics of AI Insight Forums that Majority Leader Schumer convened throughout the fall, which brought together business executives, legislators, and a small group of civil society advocates to discuss regulating artificial intelligence in the United States. While <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2024/05/15/congress-ai-road-map-regulation-schumer/" title="tech industry groups generally supported the report" target="_blank">tech industry groups generally supported the report</a> as a step in the right direction, academics and civil society advocates <a href="https://www.fastcompany.com/91126098/chuck-schumer-ai-roadmap-panned" title="derided" target="_blank">derided</a> it for lacking specificity and substance.&nbsp;</p><p><b style="font-weight:700">U.S., Japan, and partners unveil agreement for cross-border data flows</b></p>
<p>The United States, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom have <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Technology/Japan-U.S.-and-others-to-ease-cross-border-personal-data-transfers" title="created" target="_blank">created </a>a new framework to enable the sharing of personal data across their respective borders. The new framework aims to balance the need to encourage online commerce between countries with the data security needs and regulations of each country. The existing mechanism for data sharing, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Cross-Border Privacy Rules, will be phased out in favor of a new system. The new agreement will allow non-APEC countries to participate in data-sharing initiatives, with the United Kingdom being the first such country to join, and will standardize a process for certifying companies from participating countries. Once those companies have been certified by a relevant data protection authority, they will be able to share data more easily among the participating countries. The agreement, which is still being finalized, is likely to be rolled out in the coming months, and the participating countries hope it will expand beyond the additional participating APEC countries, Australia, Canada, Mexico, the Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan.</p>
<p><b style="font-weight:700">Frank McCourt announces a planned bid for TikTok</b></p>
<p>In the wake of congressional and executive action aimed at forcing the divestiture of social media platform TikTok, American billionaire Frank McCourt <a href="https://www.projectliberty.io/news/frank-mccourt-organizing-a-people-s-bid-to-acquire-tiktok" title="announced" target="_blank">announced</a> that he is readying a bid for the U.S. version of the social media app TikTok. McCourt is organizing the bid through Project Liberty, an initiative hehe has founded to reimagine the economic models that currently power Big Tech and to bring forward novel solutions aimed at putting individuals in charge of their own data and digital engagement. experience. that could shape and change the status quo of the web, bring forward novel solutions at every level, and put people back in control of their digital lives. McCourt said that buying TikTok would create value by providing “individuals and creators on [TikTok] the value and control they deserve regarding who has access to their data and how it is used.” ByteDance, the parent company of TikTok, will likely be forced to sell the app after Congress included a provision in an annual defense spending bill that requires ByteDance to either sell TikTok in six months or see the app banned. The ban is currently <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/14/business/media/tiktok-creators-sue-ban.html" title="facing challenges" target="_blank">facing challenges</a> in the U.S. court system, as a group of TikTok creators has filed a lawsuit alleging that the ban violates their First Amendment right to fere speech.</p>
<p><b style="font-weight:700">Biden administration increases tariffs on Chinese technology imports</b></p><p>The Biden administration <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/972cabfb-f587-4cb3-ab21-ec3380b049da" title="announced" target="_blank">announced </a>additional tariffs on nearly $18 billion worth of Chinese goods, i stating the move was necessary to protect certain sectors of the U.S. economy. Chinese-made electric vehicles will see some of the largest increases, with the Biden administration quadrupling tariffs from 25 percent of a car’s value to 100 percent in the coming year. Currently <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/electric-shock-interpreting-chinas-electric-vehicle-export-boom" title="only 2 percent" target="_blank">only 2 percent</a> of all U.S. imports of electric vehicles come from China, but Chinese EVs have proliferated rapidly in other markets, with Chinese automakers accounting for <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-ev-strategy-going-small-cheap-pay-big-dividends-asia-russell-2024-04-23/" title="60 percent" target="_blank">60 percent</a> of all EV sales worldwide in 2023. China’s foreign ministry issued a statement saying Beijing “opposes unilateral tariff increases that violate World Trade Organization rules and will take all necessary measures to safeguard its legitimate rights and interests”. The Biden administration isn’t alone in investigating the potential growth of Chinese electric vehicles, as the European Commission has also begun <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/8e4a9eb4-cd88-4625-a21b-6378d24c6dad" title="investigating" target="_blank">investigating </a>EV imports to the EU, and may impose tariffs in the coming months.</p>
<p><b style="font-weight:700">FBI seizes major online cybercrime marketplace</b></p>
<p>The FBI and a number of international law enforcement partners announced that they had seized the servers used to host BreachForums, a prominent cybercrime website. The seizure, which the FBI conducted in partnership with law enforcement in the U.K., New Zealand, Australia, Switzerland, Ukraine and Iceland, involved seizing BreachForum’s Telegram channel as well. The agencies appeared to be searching for the administrators of the site, known by the aliases Baphomet and ShinyHunters, with the FBI issuing a request for tips on the administrators’ real identities. The FBI and Department of Justice have seized a number of major cybercrime forums over the past two years, including BreachForums’ predecessor, RaidForums. BreachForums offered a variety of criminal items for sale through its services, such as stolen devices, hacking tools, and illegal contraband.</p></description>
<link>
</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">Cyber Week in Review: May 16, 2024</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 17 May 2024 14:25:53 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Power and Financial Interdependence</title>
<description><p>So long as China runs a large trade surplus, Chinese residents (either the government or Chinese firms typically) will need to accumulate financial claims on the rest of the world. Conversely, so long as the United States runs a large trade deficit, the rest of the world will accumulate, in aggregate, claims on the United States. China need not directly finance the U.S. (though it did for a time), but Chinese offshore asset accumulation is necessarily a part of any global equilibrium that sustains U.S. deficits in a world still marked by <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/new-geopolitics-global-finance" title="large Chinese surpluses and large U.S. deficits" target="_blank">large Chinese surpluses and large U.S. deficits</a>.</p>
<p>Trade imbalances thus imply financial interdependence and linkage of one form or another.&nbsp; In today’s world, the risk that such interdependence can be “weaponized” is a very real.</p><p>In my new paper for the <a href="https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/power-and-financial-interdependence" title="Institut Français des Relations Internationales&nbsp;(Ifri)" target="_blank">Institut Français des Relations Internationales&nbsp;(Ifri)</a>, specifically for their new initiative on Geoeconomics and Geofinance, I explore the history of the Sino-American financial relationship – and in particular, try to highlight how perceptions of which country truly holds the leverage within the financially unbalanced relationship have evolved over time.</p>
<p>Two incidents are, I think, especially important.</p>
<p>One is the runup in China’s holdings of Agencies and (less visibly) other forms of credit to U.S. financial institutions in years prior to the global financial crisis. Prior to the global financial crisis, reserve growth (by China and others) was massive, both absolutely and relative to Treasury issuance. This squeezed big sovereign investors (and private investors) into close substitutes for Treasuries. Synthetic AAA didn’t work out well, but it was a real part of global finance for a while.</p>
<p>China’s exposure to the Agency market and other less visible exposures to the U.S. banking system (the China Investment Corporation’s investment in the Reserve Primary money market fund for example) taught China of the dangers of excessive exposure to the U.S. well before the current wave of sanctions against sovereign risk. China had more exposure to Agencies than Treasuries in the summer of 2008 – which wasn’t a comfortable position for China.</p>
<p>It also gave China a bit of leverage over the U.S., at least at the time. This leverage was not directly exercised, but the perception at the top of the U.S. Treasury that China’s actions could determine the success or failure of attempts to stabilize financial markets (notably the Agency market) clearly had an impact on U.S. policymakers. At a minimum, it raised the priority that the U.S. attached to its financial dialogue with China. At a maximum, it put pressure on the U.S. to respect China’s core financial interests, which included assuring the safety and liquidity of its holdings of Agencies. Then again, the need to support the Agency market was wildly overdetermined; the U.S. banking system was far more exposed than China.</p><p>At the end of the day, the fact that the U.S. stabilized the Agency market even as China reduced its exposure quite rapidly (whether by roll-off or outright sales) illustrated that the Fed, far more than China, has the decisive vote when it came to U.S. financial stability. The U.S. has learned, I think, that the Fed can buy more than China can sell.</p>
<p>The second episode is China’s decision after the global financial crisis to reduce its exposure to Treasury bonds – at least its visible holdings of Treasury bonds. China’s flight out of the Agencies was initially a slight back into Treasuries (and supply of Treasuries expanded rapidly after the crisis, making this an easy choice). Visible holdings of Treasuries soared from $500 billion in mid-2008 to $1.3 trillion by mid-2010, and from 2010 on China was a significant user of Euroclear’s custodial service.</p>
<figure id="image-82126" class="image-embed embedded_large"><div class="image-embed__picture">
<img width="520" height="378" alt="China: U.S. Holdings vs. Estimated Dollar Reserves" loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" class="lazyload" data-src="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/JGB%20Chart%20New.png.webp" src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/JGB%20Chart%20New.png.webp" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption"><div class="image-embed__caption-text">
<span class="image-embed__source"></span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption></figure><p>China found this risky – partially because of the domestic “optics” of having so much of Chinese savings in a country that, even then, was viewed as a less than ideal custodian of China’s wealth. China thus has been looking for alternatives to Treasuries for far longer than most contemporary accounts recognize.* The G7’s immobilization of Russia’s risk crystallized the risks of holding large reserve balances in strategic adversaries in the public eye. But China had been thinking about those risks for many years.</p>
<p>China’s response to risks of a concentrated exposure to the Treasury market was partially to continue diversifying the currency composition of its foreign reserves. This process started in 2005, likely ended around 2012 and ended up costing China a bit of interest income. China accumulated large euro reserve balances just when the ECB decided to adopt negative rates.</p>
<p>But a big part of China’s strategy was to diversify the way it holds dollars – making more use of offshore custodians (Belgium’s Euroclear most obviously) and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/fe81e06c-010d-4ddd-ad85-406412ec1bb9" title="private fund managers" target="_blank">private fund managers</a>, but also inching back into Agencies and no doubt other forms of dollar exposure that offer both less visibility and a small yield pickup over Treasuries. For example, Chinese institutions are believed to be active suppliers of dollars in the cross-currency swap market.</p>
<p>Most importantly, China decided to stop holding all its foreign assets as “liquid” foreign exchange reserves. A big part of China’s strategy is what China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) calls the “diversified use” of its reserves. <a href="http://www.safe.gov.cn/en/file/file/20211217/1bdd3ed85dba4d269655b5ce7159893b.pdf?n=Annual%20Report%20of%20the%20State%20Administration%20of%20Foreign%20Exchange%20(2020)" title="SAFE’s 2020 annual report" target="_blank">SAFE’s 2020 annual report</a>, which provides a 10-year progress report on this diversification, remains essential.</p>
<p>Diversified use of reserves effectively meant using foreign exchange not to add to SAFE’s formal foreign exchange reserves, but rather to use China’s foreign exchange to directly fund China’s strategic goals (through what SAFE calls the co-financing platform). SAFE handed foreign exchange over to the Silk Road Fund and its close kin, it provided close to $100 billion in equity capital to the China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export-Import Bank of China (Exim), and no doubt more financing via entrusted loans, and it helped fund the offshore activity of “small, medium, and large” financial instruments. I still think <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/how-hide-your-foreign-exchange-reserves-users-guide" title="my blog on this is pretty good" target="_blank">my blog on this is pretty good</a>, but would welcome a bit more competition.</p>
<p>Broadly speaking, shadow reserves substituted for formal reserves held in Treasuries – as the state commercial banks and the state policy banks both built up offshore assets of around $1 trillion. The Belt and Road thus should be interpreted as part of China’s reserve diversification – and an early effort at sanctions defense.</p>
<p>One side effect of this policy is increased capacity in the hands of the state banks: indeed, most of the responsibility for exchange rate intervention appears to have been outsourced to China’s financial institutions.</p>
<p>SAFE can sit serenely outside the market on its apparently static $3 trillion reserve portfolio, even as the state banks are called on to maintain the yuan inside its narrow trading band.</p>
<p>One key theme of the IFRI paper is that as a result of these shifts, the form of financial interdependence between the U.S. and China has changed over time.</p>
<p>There was an enormous increase in China’s exposure to the U.S. market between 2002 and 2008. At one time, China held 50 percent of its reported GDP in reserves, and 30 percent of its GDP in U.S. financial assets (that would be $9 trillion today, with over $5 trillion in U.S. assets). China’s visible U.S. holdings are now down to around 10 percent of its GDP. It has substantially more indirect exposure but still much less than it did immediately after the global crisis.</p>
<figure id="image-81919" class="image-embed embedded_large"><div class="image-embed__picture">
<img width="520" height="378" alt="Chinese FX and Other Foreign Assets, U.S. Holdings" loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" class="lazyload" data-src="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/Reserves%20and%20Other.png.webp" src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/Reserves%20and%20Other.png.webp" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption"><div class="image-embed__caption-text">
<span class="image-embed__source"></span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption></figure><p>China’s holdings of U.S. assets also increased rapidly relative to U.S. GDP – total reserves rose over 20 percent of U.S. GDP, and U.S. holdings for a while topped 10 percent of U.S. GDP.</p>
<figure id="image-81926" class="image-embed embedded_large"><div class="image-embed__picture">
<img width="520" height="378" alt="Chinese FX Reserves and U.S. Holdings" loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" class="lazyload" data-src="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/Reserves%20and%20Holdings.png.webp" src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/Reserves%20and%20Holdings.png.webp" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption"><div class="image-embed__caption-text">
<span class="image-embed__source"></span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption></figure><p>These holdings – while still large in an absolute sense – have fallen relative to all the available metrics: China’s GDP, U.S. GDP, and the size of the Treasury and Agency markets.</p>
<p>What’s interesting, at least to me, is that the recent rise in China’s trade surplus hasn’t translated into a big rise in China’s reported U.S. holdings – or into its formal foreign exchange reserves. The surge in the trade surplus coincided with a slowdown in China, and rising rates in the U.S. There no doubt has been a large increase in the offshore dollar holdings of China’s exporters. But that is a much harder flow to trace.</p>
<p>So financial interdependence persists, as it must in a world of chronic imbalances. But the direct financial connections between China and the U.S. have shrunk, and much of China’s exposure to the U.S. ... |
http://localhost:1200/cfr/timelines - Success ✔️<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0">
<channel>
<title>Timelines</title>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/timelines</link>
<atom:link href="http://localhost:1200/cfr/timelines" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"></atom:link>
<description>Timelines - Made with love by RSSHub(https://github.com/DIYgod/RSSHub)</description>
<generator>RSSHub</generator>
<webMaster>i@diygod.me (DIYgod)</webMaster>
<language>en</language>
<lastBuildDate>Fri, 24 May 2024 01:11:14 GMT</lastBuildDate>
<ttl>5</ttl>
<item>
<title>Far-Right Terrorism in the United States</title>
<description><br>
<h1>1865</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Formation of the Ku Klux Klan</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77403" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1865_KKK.jpg.webp" width="520" height="550" alt="Illustration showing members of the White League and the Ku Klux Klan clasping hands over a suffering African American family." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
An editorial illustration by Thomas Nast in an 1874 publication of Harper’s Weekly shows members of the White League and the Ku Klux Klan clasping hands over a suffering African American family.
<span class="image-embed__source">Library of Congress</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>The Civil War between the pro-slavery South and anti-slavery North ends, and disgruntled veterans of the South’s defeated Confederate Army form the first iteration of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) in Pulaski, Tennessee. Nathan Bedford Forrest, a former Confederate general, becomes the Klan’s first grand wizard, its national leader. The KKK’s declared goal is “to maintain the supremacy of the White Race in the Republic.” The first Klan was active from 1865 until 1871 and played a major role in the South’s postwar Reconstruction era, fighting to oppress the previously enslaved African American populace and engaging in acts of violence against them.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1963</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>September 15, 1963</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Bombing of Sixteenth Street Baptist Church</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77407" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1963_Birmingham.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="The family of Carol Robertson mourn at her graveside during funeral services. " loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
The family of Carol Robertson, a fourteen-year-old African American girl killed in the bombing of Sixteenth Street Baptist Church, mourn at her graveside during funeral services.
<span class="image-embed__source">Horace Court/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>The church bombing in Birmingham, Alabama, is coordinated by the local chapter of the KKK, which by now is in its third iteration and popular across the South. The bombing of the predominately Black congregation kills four young girls, becoming one of the defining racist attacks of the civil rights era. Between 1947 and 1965, the KKK is linked to upward of fifty dynamite explosions targeting African Americans in Birmingham, Alabama—earning the city the grim nickname “Bombingham.”</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1968</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>April 4, 1968</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Assassination of Martin Luther King</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77408" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1968_AssassinationMLK.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Reverend Martin Luther King Jr.’s body is viewed by his wife, Coretta Scott King, and their four young children look at King in his coffin at his funeral in Atlanta." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Reverend Martin Luther King Jr.’s body is viewed by his wife, Coretta Scott King, and their four young children at King’s funeral in Atlanta.
<span class="image-embed__source">AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>James Earl Ray, a fugitive with multiple past convictions, shoots and kills Reverend Martin Luther King Jr., a leader of the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s, at a motel in Memphis, Tennessee. Ray was a supporter of racial segregation and a white supremacist. King’s death is mourned by millions of Americans and considered a low point in the civil rights movement.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1978</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Publishing of ‘The Turner Diaries’</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77409" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1978_TurnerDiaries.jpg.webp" width="520" height="780" alt="A copy of ‘The Turner Diaries,’ a racist, dystopian novel, sits on a library shelf in Marlinton, West Virginia." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
A copy of “The Turner Diaries,” a racist, dystopian novel, sits on a library shelf in Marlinton, West Virginia.
<span class="image-embed__source">Jeff Gentner/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>William Luther Pierce, a former college physics professor and a prominent neo-Nazi, publishes <em>The Turner Diaries</em> under the pseudonym Andrew Macdonald. The dystopian novel tells the story of a violent overthrow of the federal government, which leads to a nuclear conflict and race war. Notably, the book’s hero, Earl Turner, detonates a bomb at the FBI’s headquarters in Washington, DC. The book is advertised with the slogan, “What will you do when they come to take your guns?” The novel comes to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/12/books/turner-diaries-white-supremacists.html">resonate with far-right groups</a> in the decades ahead.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1978</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Formation of the Aryan Nations </h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77410" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1978_AryanNations.jpg.webp" width="520" height="728" alt="Reverend Richard Butler poses in his church at the headquarters of the Aryan Nations neo-nazi organization, in northern Idaho." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Reverend Richard Butler poses in his church at the headquarters of the Aryan Nations neo-nazi organization, in northern Idaho.
<span class="image-embed__source">Bettmann/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Notorious neo-Nazi Pastor Richard Butler forms the Aryan Nations in Idaho. A small but committed group, its followers subscribe to the so-called <a href="https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounder/christian-identity">Christian Identity doctrine</a>, believing they are God’s true “chosen people,” a designation usually that refers to Jews. They believe a racial war is imminent between Aryan (white) people and Jews and nonwhites, one that they must prepare for and win. Through its annual World Congresses, the Aryan Nations inspires the creation of the terrorist group called the Order.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1984</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">End of The Order </h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77423" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1984_Order.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="FBI agents sift through the ruins of the house where Robert J. Matthews, founder of the neo-Nazi group the Order, died in a fire after a standoff with federal agents." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
FBI agents sift through the ruins of the house where Robert J. Matthews, founder of the neo-Nazi group The Order, died in a fire amid a standoff with federal agents.
<span class="image-embed__source">Tim Klass/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Federal law enforcement officials <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/17/us/fbi-spying-white-supremacists-declassified/index.html">track Robert Mathews</a>, leader of The Order, to a small house on the state of Washington’s Whidbey Island. Mathews, wanted on murder and robbery charges, refuses to surrender, and a gunfight and standoff ensue, during which he’s killed in a fire. With his death, Mathews becomes a martyr for the far right.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1988</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Fort Smith Sedition Trial</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77411" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1988_SeditionTrial.jpg.webp" width="520" height="668" alt="Louis Ray Beam Jr. carries his wife, Sheila, who had fainted, away from the federal courthouse in Fort Smith, Arkansas. after he and twelve other white supremacists are acquitted on sedition charges." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Louis Ray Beam Jr. carries his wife, Sheila, who had fainted, away from the federal courthouse in Fort Smith, Arkansas, after he and twelve other white supremacists are acquitted on sedition charges.
<span class="image-embed__source">Danny Johnson/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Federal prosecutors bring fourteen white supremacists to trial at Fort Smith, Arkansas. They stand accused of plots against the U.S. government (seditious conspiracy) and other violent crimes. An all-white jury <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/04/08/13-white-supremacists-acquitted-in-arkansas-murder-and-sedition-trial/21c30cbe-c120-40ac-8fec-33420d1b0d2e/">acquits all of them</a>. Afterward, defendant Louis Beam, a former KKK leader and later the “ambassador-at-large” for the Aryan Nations, focuses on building a base of support for a white supremacist revolution against the “Zionist-Occupied Government.” To this end, Beam founds a publication called the Seditionist, which promotes his concept of “leaderless resistance.” This revolution strategy argues that guerrilla warfare should be pursued through individual or small cells, not hierarchical organizations.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1992</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>August 1992</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Standoff at Ruby Ridge</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77412" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1992_RubyRidge.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Federal agents draw their weapons on five neo-Nazis a few miles from the Ruby Ridge site in Idaho where Randy Weaver is engaged in a standoff with authorities." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Federal agents draw their weapons on five neo-Nazis a few miles from the Ruby Ridge site in Idaho, where Randy Weaver is engaged in a standoff with authorities.
<span class="image-embed__source">Mason March/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>A large contingent of federal agents descend on a small home in Idaho to arrest Aryan Nations member Randy Weaver on unresolved firearms charges. After Weaver refuses to surrender, the ensuing eleven-day standoff and siege results in the shootout deaths of Weaver’s son, wife, and dog, as well as a federal officer. Weaver ends up surrendering, but his family become <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/05/13/1098735768/weaver-and-the-ruby-ridge-standoff-contributed-to-the-evolution-of-the-radical-r">martyrs for the movement</a>, and the standoff captures the attention of far-right Americans nationwide.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1993</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>February 1993</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Waco Siege</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77413" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1993_Waco.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Smoke billows from the Branch Davidians’ compound as it burns to the ground outside of Waco, Texas, during a raid by federal agents." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
The Branch Davidians’ compound burns to the ground outside of Waco, Texas, during a raid by federal agents.
<span class="image-embed__source">Greg Smith/Corbis/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Federal agents besiege Mount Carmel Center, a compound near Waco, Texas, where residents are suspected of illegally selling machine guns and stockpiling weapons. The compound is home to the Branch Davidians, a religious cult led by David Koresh. When agents try to serve a search warrant, a gunfight breaks out, leaving ten people dead, including four federal officers. A nearly two-month standoff ensues, which ends when federal agents launch an assault on the compound. During the raid, a fire starts, and the compound burns to the ground, killing seventy-six Branch Davidians, including David Koresh and many women and children. Ruby Ridge and Waco both fuel anti-government conspiracy theories by alleging that a predatory government seeks to infringe on individual liberties.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1995</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>April 19, 1995</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Oklahoma City Bombing</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>An anti-government extremist and military veteran named Timothy McVeigh detonates a truck bomb at the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, killing 168 people and injuring hundreds more. The act is directly tied to the government crackdowns at Ruby Ridge and Waco, with McVeigh launching his attack on the second anniversary of the Waco siege. The Oklahoma City bombing is the deadliest domestic terrorist attack in modern U.S. history and leads to a sweeping government crackdown on armed militias, with federal law enforcement agencies significantly raising their efforts to infiltrate anti-government extremist groups. The militia movement therefore suffers a substantial blow in the late 1990s. McVeigh is executed for his crimes in 2001, while a co-conspirator, Terry Nichols, is still serving out a life sentence in prison as of 2024.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2008</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Election of Barack Obama</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77414" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2008_ObamaElection.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Members of the Tea Party hold a sign reading &quot;Obama Where's Your Papers&quot; during a protest." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Members of the Tea Party movement protest outside of San Francisco’s Fairmont Hotel ahead of a fundraiser attended by President Barack Obama in 2010.
<span class="image-embed__source">Justin Sullivan/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>A resurgence of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE49L7D0/">racism</a> and anti-government extremism surfaces with the November election of Barack Obama, the country’s first African American president. Some political opponents and conspiracy theorists allege that Obama is Muslim and foreign-born, falsehoods that they hoped would undermine his presidency and disqualify him from office.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2011</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>July 2011</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">American-Inspired Attacks in Norway</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77415" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2011_Norway.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="A young man is comforted as he mourns the deaths of those killed by Anders Breivik in a mass shooting and bombing in Norway." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
A young man is comforted as he mourns the deaths of those killed by Anders Breivik in a mass shooting and bombing in Norway.
<span class="image-embed__source">Wolfgang Rattay/Reuters</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Anders Breivik, a far-right extremist seeking to emulate Timothy McVeigh, kills seventy-seven people in twin attacks in Oslo, Norway. He murders eight with a truck bomb in the capital’s government quarter, and then drives to a nearby island—home to the summer camp of the youth wing of the country’s Labour Party—where he indiscriminately guns down sixty-nine more victims. Breivik wrote a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE76N14J/">long manifesto</a> accompanying his attack, calling his targets “cultural Marxists” who he felt were orchestrating the cultural and demographic replacement of Norwegians who shared his European heritage.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2015</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>June 2015</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Charleston AME Church Shooting</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77416" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2015_Charleston.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="People line up to attend Sunday services following a mass shooting at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina. " loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
People line up to attend Sunday services following a mass shooting at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina.
<span class="image-embed__source">Joe Raedle/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>White supremacist Dylann Roof opens fire at the “Mother” Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church in Charleston, South Carolina, killing nine African American worshippers. The church is known for hosting civil rights icons over the decades, including Martin Luther King Jr. During the attack, Roof tells victims, “I have to do it. You rape our women, and you’re taking over our country. And you have to go.”</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2016</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Election of Donald Trump</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77417" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2016_TrumpElection.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump speaks at a campaign rally in Rochester, New York." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump speaks at a campaign rally in Rochester, New York.
<span class="image-embed__source">Brett Carlsen/Getty Images </span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Donald Trump is elected president of the United States running as a Republican. Trump’s campaign had featured some far-right themes on immigration and race, and made proposals including a Muslim ban, a possible Muslim registry, and a border wall to keep out “rapist” and “criminal” Mexicans. To many Americans, his election victory proves that far-right rhetoric and policies that for decades had been associated only with extremists could resonate with wider swathes of the electorate, enough to actually win the White House.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2017</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>August 2017</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Charlottesville Car-Ramming</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77418" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2017_Charlottesville.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="White nationalists, holding tiki torches, march on the grounds of the University of Virginia ahead of the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia. " loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
White nationalists march on the grounds of the University of Virginia ahead of the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia.
<span class="image-embed__source">Stephanie Keith/Reuters</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>On August 11, a “Unite the Right” rally against the removal of a statue of Confederate commander Robert E. Lee in Charlottesville, Virginia, begins with a torchlight procession at the University of Virginia amid chants that “Jews will not replace us.” The following day, the protests turn more violent when James Alex Fields Jr., a twenty-year-old neo-Nazi who had traveled from Ohio for the rally, rams his car into a crowd of counter-demonstrators, injuring twenty-eight and killing one. In the wake of the incident, President Trump refused to condemn the rally, stating that there were “very fine people on both sides.” This statement, coupled with the president’s widely criticized handling of the crisis, provides a significant fillip for Americans on the far right, who <a href="https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/443666-richard-spencer-charlottesville-wouldnt-have-occurred-without/">see Trump as an ally in the White House.</a></p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2018</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Tree of Life Synagogue Shooting</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77419" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2018_TreeLife.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="A Jewish man prays at a makeshift memorial of flowers and handwritten notes outside the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
A Jewish man prays at a makeshift memorial of flowers and handwritten notes outside the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh.
<span class="image-embed__source">Cathal McNoughton/Reuters</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Robert Bowers, a forty-six-year-old local man, guns down eleven Jewish worshippers, most of them elderly, at the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Bowers presaged his attack with antisemitic and anti-immigrant posts on the social-networking site Gab, writing, “HIAS [Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society] likes to bring invaders in that kill our people. I can’t sit by and watch my people get slaughtered. Screw your optics, I’m going in.” Bowers was aggrieved about alleged migrant “caravans” coming from Central America, which he believed were being orchestrated by Jewish nonprofit organizations such as HIAS Bowers is sentenced to death in 2023 for the attack, and he remains on death row.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2019</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Christchurch Shootings</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77420" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2019_Christchurch.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="People walk under police tape as they leave after prayers at Linwood Islamic Center in Christchurch, New Zealand." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
People leave after prayers at the site of Brenton Tarrant’s rampage at the Linwood Islamic Centre in Christchurch, New Zealand.
<span class="image-embed__source">Edgar Su/Reuters </span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>During a twenty-minute rampage in Christchurch, New Zealand, gunman Brenton Tarrant murders fifty-one worshippers in two mosques. Seeking to inspire emulation of this violence, Tarrant livestreams most of the carnage on the internet, where it is viewed more than a million times—thus redefining far-right terrorism in the twenty-first century. Tarrant had been active in an eclectic and radical online space that trafficked in extremist ideologies about race, immigration, and environmental degradation. Mimicking Breivik, Tarrant explained his views in a seventy-four-page manifesto. His attack is inspired by U.S. conspiracy theories (including over guns), and in turn inspires follow-on attacks in the United States.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2020</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">COVID-19, Racial Justice, and the ‘Big Lie’</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77421" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2020_Covid.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Armed civilian men stand on the steps of the Michigan State Capitol in Lansing, taking part in a protest against Gov. Gretchen Whitmer's expanded stay-at-home order during the Covid-19 pandemic." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Armed civilian men stand on the steps of the Michigan State Capitol in Lansing, taking part in a protest against Governor Gretchen Whitmer’s expanded stay-at-home order during the COVID-19 pandemic.
<span class="image-embed__source">Jeff Kowalsky/AFP/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>The COVID-19 pandemic and ensuing government “lockdowns” in many jurisdictions provide renewed impetus to extremists across the far-right spectrum, offering perceived proof for many of their conspiracy theories and leading to spikes in online radicalization. Nationwide racial justice protests, catalyzed by the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/photos-how-george-floyds-death-sparked-protests-worldwide">killing of George Floyd</a>, also reenergize far right Americans, some of whom gather in armed counterprotests to “defend” police and businesses from rioting and looting. In the most notable flash of violence, Air Force Sergeant and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/right-wing-extremists-looming-threat-us-election">“boogaloo” adherent</a> Steven Carrillo perpetrates twin attacks in May and June 2020 that kill a federal officer and sheriff’s deputy in California. Both before and after his November 2022 election loss to Joe Biden, President Trump repeatedly airs unfounded concerns over mail-in ballot voting and repeats the falsehood that the election was “stolen.”</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2021</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Riots at the U.S. Capitol Building</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77422" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2021_Jan6Insurrection.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Trump supporters erect gallows amid protests and riots in front of the U.S. Capitol building, where many clash with police and damage government property." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Trump supporters erect gallows amid protests and riots in front of the U.S. Capitol building, where many clash with police and damage government property.
<span class="image-embed__source">Shay Horse/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>On January 6, 2021, a mob storms the U.S. Capitol, driven by Trump-fueled conspiracy theories about the 2020 presidential election. It the first such attack on the institution since British invaders set fire to the Capitol in 1814. Participants erect a gallows outside the building, imagery evoking “The Day of the Rope” from <em>The Turner Diaries</em>, which presaged a nationwide revolt. In the aftermath, federal prosecutors secure <a href="https://apnews.com/article/enrique-tarrio-capitol-riot-seditious-conspiracy-sentencing-da60222b3e1e54902db2bbbb219dc3fb">seditious conspiracy convictions</a> against several planners of the assault, succeeding where their 1988 counterparts had failed in proving that the defendants intended to violently overthrow the U.S. government.</p>
</div>
</div>
</description>
<link>
</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">Far-Right Terrorism in the United States</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 03 Jan 2024 21:04:02 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>The U.S.–South Korea Alliance</title>
<description><br>
<h1>1950</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>June 25, 1950</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">The Korean War Begins With North Korea’s Invasion </h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76281" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_1950_KoreanWar_0.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="American troops withdrawing from Yongsan in Korea." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
American troops withdraw from Yongsan in Korea.
<span class="image-embed__source">Keystone/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>After independence from Japanese colonialism post–World War II, early Cold War tensions lead to the occupation of the Korean Peninsula by Soviet forces in the North and U.S. forces in the South. North Korea, backed by China and the Soviet Union, attempts to reunify the peninsula under communist rule by invading South Korea. The UN Security Council <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1950">denounces the attack</a> as a breach of peace and adopts binding resolutions, which call for an immediate cessation of hostilities and—for the first time—authorize the formation of the UN Command to provide assistance to South Korea. Under the command, sixteen countries, led by the United States, provide troop support to South Korea.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1953</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>July 27, 1953</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">The United Nations, China, and North Korea Sign the Armistice Agreement</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76284" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/12/TL_1953_Armistice2.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Maj. Gen. Blackshear M. Bryan exchanges credentials with Communist Lt. Gen. Lee Sang Cho at the opening session of the Military Armistice Commission at the Panmunjom Conference House on July 27, 1953." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
U.S. Maj. Gen. Blackshear M. Bryan exchanges credentials with Korean Communist Lt. Gen. Lee Sang Cho at the Military Armistice Commission in the Inter-Korean Peace House, situated on the south side of demilitarized zone.
<span class="image-embed__source">AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>The agreement divides the Korean Peninsula along the thirty-eighth parallel and establishes the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) as a buffer between North and South Korea. South Korean President Syngman Rhee opts not to sign the agreement, but he accepts the armistice on the condition that the United States and South Korea sign a mutual defense treaty. Because the Armistice Agreement serves as a cease-fire to the Korean War and the two Koreas did not sign a formal peace treaty, they technically remain in a state of war.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1953</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>October 1, 1953</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">The United States and South Korea Sign the Mutual Defense Treaty </h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76287" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_1953_MutualDefense.jpg.webp" width="520" height="409" alt="South Korean President Rhee Syngman leafs through the mutual defense treaty between the United States and Republic of Korea on January 29, 1954." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
South Korean President Rhee Syngman leafs through the mutual defense treaty between the United States and Republic of Korea on January 29, 1954.
<span class="image-embed__source">George Sweers/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>The U.S.-South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty ensures U.S. defense&nbsp;of&nbsp;South Korea against external aggression and commits to a U.S. military presence in South Korea. The treaty lays the foundation for a robust security alliance between the two countries.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1961</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>May 16, 1961</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">General Park Chung-hee Launches a Military Coup</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76288" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_1961_Coup.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="South Korean President Park Chung-hee stands on a podium next to U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson in Washington, DC." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
South Korean President Park Chung-hee stands on a podium next to U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson in Washington, DC, on May 17, 1965.
<span class="image-embed__source">Universal History Archive/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Amid domestic economic and political turmoil, the military overthrows the government, seizes power, and imposes martial law. Under pressure from the United States, South Korea holds a presidential election in 1963, in which Park is elected as president. Park implements an export-oriented economic modernization plan that transforms South Korea from one of the most impoverished countries in the world to a country with unprecedented economic growth, known as the so-called “<a href="https://www.oecd.org/country/korea/thematic-focus/sustaining-the-miracle-on-the-han-river-103653fa/">Miracle on the Han River</a>.” South Korea’s enhanced economic stature begins to alleviate the asymmetry of the U.S.-South Korea relationship.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1975</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">The United States Discovers South Korea’s Covert Nuclear Weapons Program </h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>President Park initiates the development of an independent nuclear weapons program, following concerns about the United States reducing its security commitment and withdrawing troops from South Korea under the Nixon Doctrine established by U.S. President Richard Nixon. The United States later pressures Park to cancel a nuclear plant agreement with France, offering U.S. nuclear assistance and personnel for peaceful purposes instead. South Korea’s nuclear ambitions cease when Park signs the <a href="https://disarmament.unoda.org/wmd/nuclear/npt/">Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty</a> (NPT).</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1980</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>May 18, 1980</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Pro-democracy Activists Lead the Gwangju Democratization Movement</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76289" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_1980_GwangjuProtest.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Armed South Korean soldiers capture rioters in Gwangju, South Korea." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Armed South Korean soldiers capture rioters in Gwangju, South Korea, on May 27, 1980.
<span class="image-embed__source">Sadayuki Mikami/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>After General Chun Doo-hwan seizes power through a military coup in December 1979,&nbsp;South Korean civilians, led by students and activists, <a href="https://archives.kdemo.or.kr/display/en/1980.html">organize pro-democracy protests</a> demanding an end to military rule. The South Korean government responds by imposing martial law and using violence to suppress activists in the city of Gwangju. The movement marks a turning point in South Korea’s struggle for democracy, inspiring people to resist the military dictatorship across the country and eventually leading to the country’s democratization. U.S.-South Korea relations are hobbled by perceptions within South Korea that the United States sided with the dictatorship rather than support the democratic movement.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1991</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>September 27, 1991</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">The United States Withdraws Tactical Nuclear Weapons</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>U.S. President George H. W. Bush announces his decision to remove all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea. The next year, the two Koreas sign the <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/KR%20KP_920120_JointDeclarationDenuclearizationKoreanPeninsula.pdf">Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization&nbsp;of the Korean Peninsula</a> [PDF]. Under this agreement, the two countries commit not to test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2002</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>June 13, 2002</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Anti-American Protests Arise in South Korea</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76290" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_2002_AntiUSProtests.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="A protester shouts anti-American slogans while holding a poster of the two students accidentally killed by U.S. officers in Seoul." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
A protester shouts anti-American slogans while holding a poster of the two students accidentally killed by U.S. officers in Seoul, South Korea, on December 3, 2002.
<span class="image-embed__source">Lee Jae-Won/Reuters</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Two off-duty U.S. servicemen accidentally kill two South Korean middle-school girls while driving a U.S. military vehicle. The incident and the subsequent acquittal of the soldiers by a U.S. military court trigger anti-American protests across South Korea. Primarily directed at the U.S. military presence in South Korea, the protests reflect a desire for a more equal relationship with the United States.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2003</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>January 10, 2003</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">North Korea Withdraws From the NPT</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76291" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_2003_NPTWithdrawl.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="A crowd of millions of North Koreans gathers to hear political leaders announce the decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in Pyongyang." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Millions of North Koreans gather to hear political leaders announce the decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in Pyongyang, North Korea.
<span class="image-embed__source">Xinhua/AFP/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>North Korea announces its intention to withdraw from the NPT, stating concerns regarding&nbsp;“hostile” U.S. policies toward the country. Pyongyang criticizes the binding obligations stipulated in the safeguard accord under Article 3 of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regulations. Three years later, North Korea <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/north-korea-nuclear-weapons-missile-tests-military-capabilities">successfully tests its first nuclear weapon</a>, changing security dynamics on the Korean Peninsula.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2003</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>August 27, 2003</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Six-Party Talks Aim to Negotiate North Korea’s Denuclearization</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76292" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_2003_6PartyTalks.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="The heads of each of the six country delegations join hands before talks about North Korea’s nuclear crisis in Beijing." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
The heads of each of the six country delegations join hands before talks about North Korea’s nuclear crisis in Beijing.
<span class="image-embed__source">Ng Han Guan/AFP/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Representatives from China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States convene in Beijing to negotiate <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/north-korean-nuclear-negotiations">North Korea’s denuclearization</a> following revelations that North Korea had covertly pursued a uranium enrichment program. The United States insists on complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID), while North Korea seeks diplomatic normalization with the United States and security assurances. Despite multiple rounds of talks, the countries fail to reach a consensus, leading to North Korea’s withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks in April 2009 after the UN Security Council condemns its long-range missile launch.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2012</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>March 15, 2012</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">The Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement Enters Into Force</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76293" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_2012_KORUS.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="South Korean conservative activists raise a banner reading “let’s occupy the world market and become an economic power,”." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
South Korean conservative activists raise a banner reading “let’s occupy the world market and become an economic power,” at a rally supporting the South Korea-U.S. free trade agreement in Seoul, South Korea.
<span class="image-embed__source">Jung Yeon-Je/AFP/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>After six years of negotiations, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak and U.S. President Barack Obama sign the trade treaty, which is then ratified by the South Korean National Assembly. The agreement promotes economic cooperation and access to commercial markets for both countries. The <a href="https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta">Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement</a> (KORUS FTA) is the largest bilateral free trade agreement the United States has signed. The trade agreement paves the way for an economic partnership alongside the military alliance between the two countries.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2016</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>April 27, 2016</h2... |
http://localhost:1200/cfr/books-reports - Success ✔️<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0">
<channel>
<title>Books & Reports</title>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/books-reports</link>
<atom:link href="http://localhost:1200/cfr/books-reports" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"></atom:link>
<description>Books & Reports - Made with love by RSSHub(https://github.com/DIYgod/RSSHub)</description>
<generator>RSSHub</generator>
<webMaster>i@diygod.me (DIYgod)</webMaster>
<language>en</language>
<lastBuildDate>Fri, 24 May 2024 01:11:16 GMT</lastBuildDate>
<ttl>5</ttl>
<item>
<title>Preventing U.S. Election Violence in 2024</title>
<description><h2>Introduction</h2>
<p>There is a serious risk of extremist violence around the 2024 U.S. presidential election. Many of the same sources of instability and grievances that precipitated the January 6, 2021, assault on the U.S. Capitol (along with other challenges to the outcome of the last election) remain present today. And, while the risk of far-right election-related violence is greater, the possibility of far-left extremist violence cannot be dismissed. Such violence threatens individual lives and the domestic political stability of the country.</p>
<p>It could also undermine the United States’ international standing and foreign policy goals, in a year where at least eighty elections will take place around the world. U.S.-based election violence has already <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/america-exporter-far-right-violent-extremism-brazil-and-beyond" title="inspired&nbsp;one similar incident" target="_blank">inspired&nbsp;one similar incident</a>, in Brazil in January 2023, and further disruption could affect the rules-based international order in ways detrimental to U.S. interests as it embarks on a new generation in strategic competition. The United States would also benefit from serving as the standard-setter on several associated issues, such as disinformation on social media and the rise of generative artificial intelligence (AI) and its impact on elections.</p><p>Lessening the risk of such a contingency is therefore an urgent national security imperative. Political leaders and other participants in the political and civic process need to implement a range of measures to prevent and manage violent election-related extremism.</p>
<h2>The Contingency</h2>
<p>Several plausible scenarios could develop between now and Inauguration Day. The scenarios can be broken down into events that occur before the election, during early voting in October and on election day in November, and in the weeks after the election, possibly lingering into the new administration. Each scenario poses different challenges to different constituencies and could be inspired or driven by differing accelerants.</p>
<p><b><em>Pre-election</em></b></p>
<p>The first and most urgent scenario involves assassination threats against campaigning candidates and other public officials<a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-slow-burn-threatening-our-democracy" title=". According to Seamus Hughes and Pete Simi" target="_blank">. According to Seamus Hughes and Pete Simi</a> of the University of Nebraska-Omaha, “over the past 10 years, more than 500 individuals have been arrested for threatening public officials. And the trendline is shooting up.” In recent years, for example, the lives of Vice President Mike Pence, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, and New York Republican gubernatorial candidate Lee Zeldin were all threatened. Nikki Haley, the Republican runner-up, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/nikki-haley-secret-service-2ae5b277396702248af73f89da92b4b9" title="requested Secret Service protection" target="_blank">requested Secret Service protection</a> during her campaign, indicating that violent threats have already surfaced in this cycle as well. The United States has been spared a high-profile assassination for more than a half-century. However, lack of success should not be taken to suggest lack of intent. Precisely this point was underscored on June 14, 2017, when a far-left extremist opened fire at a baseball practice of congressional Republicans, gravely wounding House Majority Whip Steve Scalise before being killed by the congressman’s Capitol Police detail.</p>
<p>Second, large party and voter gatherings, such as the Republican National Convention in Milwaukee in July and the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in August, as well as primary elections and caucuses, could pose attractive targets. The conventions will boast the largest collections of party members and leaders throughout the entire election cycle and could therefore attract individuals or groups with a vendetta. News headquarters will also be potential targets given extremist rhetoric depicting the media the “enemy of the people.”</p>
<p>Third, dates associated with the former president’s legal troubles could also trigger violent extremists. Trump’s legal challenges have thrust the 2024 election into unprecedented territory, with the possibility of a presidential candidate running for office from the courtroom, and possibly jail. The public process and potential legal outcomes could accelerate and spur violent attacks.</p><p><em><b>Election</b></em></p>
<p>Once voting begins, the first and most likely scenario is violence and intimidation at polling places and against election workers, or against drive-by or drop-off balloting sites and their collection points. This could include armed militia groups “observing” the election for fraud but, in reality, intimidating voters. In 2020, for example, Oath Keepers gathered at polling places to, in Oath Keepers founder Stewart Rhodes’s <a href="https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-10-10/what-happens-if-armed-right-wing-groups-polls" title="words" target="_blank">words</a>, “protect people who are voting.” Such gatherings could intimidate voters and disrupt Election Day by <a href="https://www.chicagotribune.com/2023/11/24/munster-incident-puts-focus-on-voter-intimidation-cases-that-can-dampen-turnout-poll-worker-participation/" title="dampening turnout" target="_blank">dampening turnout</a>. This scenario could be driven both by any candidate calls to arms as well as by grassroots voices sensitive to local issues, vulnerabilities, and voting preferences, and to individual poll workers expressing or acting upon their personal political views. Such violence provides less of a model for partners and adversaries in the international space, given that the November election will occur after most other 2024 elections have occurred.</p>
<p>Once voting is completed, threats could turn against those counting the ballots. During the 2020 election, some of the more vitriolic threats were delivered against election officials in swing states. The sequencing of vote counting can play a part, such as when early, mail, and absentee ballots, which tend to lean Democratic, are counted last, leading to “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/oct/31/red-mirage-trump-election-scenario-victory" title="red mirages" target="_blank">red mirages</a>” in which Republican candidates take early leads that fade in the final legal vote tally. In 2020, for example, federal agents&nbsp;<a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/2-men-detained-after-police-learn-possible-threat-philadelphia-vote-n1246774" title="arrested two QAnon supporters" target="_blank">arrested two QAnon supporters</a> from Virginia who showed up with firearms at a convention center in Philadelphia where votes were still being counted three days after Election Day. Political calls to “stop the count” or “stop the steal” can make a violent response more likely.</p>
<div id="pullquote-80929--2" class="pullquote embedded_small">
<figure class="pullquote__container"><blockquote class="pullquote__quote">
<span class="pullquote__quote-content">Once voting is completed, threats could turn against those counting the ballots.</span>
</blockquote>
</figure></div>
<p><em><b>Post-election</b></em></p>
<p>In the post-election era, depending on election results, attacks against government buildings and/or law enforcement officials will likely be the preferred means as violent extremists aim to take the fight directly to those they deem responsible for malfeasance. This scenario was seen at COVID protests in April 2020, sprawling anti-fascist rioting that summer, at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, and the attack against the FBI in Cincinnati. Here, the main accelerant will be political rhetoric interpreted by violently inclined individuals as calls for violence. Perhaps the most significant lesson of January 6 is that even seemingly innocuous moments can provide the impetus for extremist gatherings given the right combination of messaging and momentum. Any number of constitutional milestones—when electors vote in their home states; the January 6, 2025, counting of electoral votes; or Inauguration Day itself—could thus provide the spark, particularly among far-right violent extremists. Far-left violence responding to a disappointing election result will likely be more sporadic and disorganized. Militant anarchists, in particular, could be active, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/protesters-bring-shouts-skirmishes-and-shutdowns-to-inauguration-celebration/2017/01/20/00ea4c72-df11-11e6-acdf-14da832ae861_story.html" title="as seen on inauguration day in 2017" target="_blank">as seen on inauguration day in 2017</a>. Still, the bond between far-left anarchists and the political system is <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/us/live-updates-antifa-riots-1-21-2021" title="not as strong" target="_blank">not as strong</a> as on the right, making it unlikely that extremists respond to any call for violence from politicians.</p>
<p>Should multiple, organized extremist elements take up arms in defense of their candidates or other interests, sustained violence between political factions across broad geographic spaces remains possible. This level of violence has not yet been reached during the current escalation in domestic terrorism, except at a small scale on American streets in clashes between the Proud Boys and anti-fascists. Should those skirmishes escalate, they would pose a serious threat to law and order. The gravest fear, full-scale and total civil war, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/16/opinions/us-brink-of-civil-war-hoffman-ware/index.html" title="remains unlikely" target="_blank">remains unlikely</a>, in large part due to the lack of safe havens or sanctuaries for extremists in the United States. Political divides today run along urban-rural delineations, not northern-southern, which will likely stunt any budding civil war in its infancy.</p>
<h2>Warning Indicators</h2>
<p>The most urgent warning sign of impending violence will be the words of the candidates themselves. Political figures are certain to use divisive and perhaps even <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/09/05/polarization-democracy-and-political-violence-in-united-states-what-research-says-pub-90457?utm_source=carnegieemail&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_campaign=announcement&amp;mkt_tok=ODEzLVhZVS00MjIAAAGOBdngCOU2E0PgTOYMht0Jscfwq-kVZ7BNGEm9S0g9a-6RljRaHw9QWuQJjFo-HOqyY1k8e_LWTFj9poxUJ9iHe4ZzUlTWqS5XnzxluU0" title="existential political rhetoric" target="_blank">existential political rhetoric</a> during the campaign, warning of an urgent threat to the rank-and-file of either political party and to the country as a whole. Politicians deploy such rhetoric to frighten their base into voting, but such action also increases the odds of individuals turning to violent solutions if their candidate loses or appears to be in arrears. Existential rhetoric from within the political system or from candidates or parties can translate into implicit and explicit calls for violence, including against members of one’s own party, another important warning indicator. Even regular political rhetoric could be taken as calls to violence, particularly given that Americans are increasingly divided. Polls show that almost a quarter of Americans (33 percent of Republicans and 13 percent of Democrats) believe that “American patriots may have to resort to violence in order to save the country.”</p>
<div id="pullquote-80930--2" class="pullquote embedded_small">
<figure class="pullquote__container"><blockquote class="pullquote__quote">
<span class="pullquote__quote-content">The most urgent warning sign of impending violence will be the words of the candidates themselves.</span>
</blockquote>
</figure></div>
<p>Casting doubt over election results before voting commences heightens the possibility of violent extremism. “Pre-bunking” of fair election outcomes sows doubts in the minds of voters who then see eventual electoral defeats as confirmation of fraud rather than a rejection of one’s political platform, unlocking inherent confirmation biases. Politicians on both the left and right have been responsible for such rhetoric, the right issuing warnings of stolen dating back to the 2016 race, and the left often expressing concern over alleged voter suppression in predominantly Black southern communities.</p>
<p>The risk of more organized and widespread violence could be heralded by armed paramilitary mobilization, including on social media. January 6 was preceded by an onslaught of threats and public organizing, which was largely ignored by law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Extremist infiltrations of law enforcement agencies (<a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/01/03/could-january-6th-happen-again-526167" title="including the Capitol Police" target="_blank">including the Capitol Police</a>) and the military, coupled with the radicalization of active duty service members, also bears monitoring as both would considerably undermine any mitigative countermeasures arrayed against violent actors.</p>
<p>Finally, national security professionals should be vigilant in tracking foreign interference, whether covert (and therefore likely hidden from public view until after the election) or overt, including foreign leaders casting doubt on election results before voting commences. Adversaries such as China, Iran, and Russia will eagerly exploit any opportunity to weaken the United States and will likely issue widespread disinformation to cause disunity, as in 2016 and 2020. Social media remains a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/defending-year-democracy" title="defining battlefield in twenty-first-century elections" target="_blank">defining battlefield in twenty-first-century elections</a>, and the situation has only grown more fraught with the development of powerful tools such as generative AI, which, for instance, was used to attempt to <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/boston/video/new-hampshire-federal-officials-open-criminal-probe-after-fake-joe-biden-robocalls/" title="dampen the Biden vote" target="_blank">dampen the Biden vote</a> during the New Hampshire primary. The social media platform X poses a particular new challenge. Owner Elon Musk has reduced content moderation and allowed disinformation on the platform, creating an opening for manipulation by domestic and foreign actors alike, as well as AI-generated content.</p>
<h2>Implications for U.S. Interests</h2>
<p>The assassination of a politician or election official could seriously undermine U.S. democratic institutions and traditions. More broadly, the rejection of election results could undermine civil society and further polarize the nation, while the mere threat of violence at polling places could dissuade voters from making their voices heard, further <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-slow-burn-threatening-our-democracy" title="weakening American democracy" target="_blank">weakening American democracy</a>. Threats issued against poll workers undermine American democratic traditions; volunteers seeking to participate in the civic process do not anticipate being targeted for their service, and such threats could deter their participation.</p>
<p>But perhaps equally damaging, American political violence, particularly concentrated around election cycles, poses grave threats to the rules-based international order. U.S. electoral turmoil could provide a model for further seditious organizing in allied states. Such contagion has already been seen in Brazil, and could undermine election integrity in a year with upwards of eighty elections worldwide. Domestic violent extremism also undermines U.S. credibility on international human rights and its international security credentials. On January 7, 2021, for instance, a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry claimed that American support for pro-democratic protests in Hong Kong was now a sign of hypocrisy: “On the issue of human rights, democracy, and freedom, double standard should be discarded. I hope the relevant countries can think about this and learn real lessons from it.” An author linked to al-Qaeda, meanwhile, wrote that <a href="https://twitter.com/colebunzel/status/1382747626521563140" title="January 6 had made amends" target="_blank">January 6 had made amends</a> for mistakes made on 9/11: “I realized the wisdom of God almighty in not guiding the fourth plane to its target, for their destroying the citadel of their democracy by their own hands ... is more damaging to them &amp; more soothing to the hearts of the believers.”</p>
<div id="pullquote-80927--2" class="pullquote embedded_small">
<figure class="pullquote__container"><blockquote class="pullquote__quote">
<span class="pullquote__quote-content">U.S. electoral turmoil could provide a model for further seditious organizing in allied states</span>
</blockquote>
</figure></div>
<p>U.S. electoral turmoil could also offer a “window of opportunity” for state and nonstate adversaries to act—whether through direct terrorism launched at the United States or U.S. interests, or other hybrid measures intended to undermine U.S. security and standing. Hamas’s attack on Israel at a time of <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2023/10/israel-democracy-judicial-reform-netanyahu-hamas-attacks/675713/" title="profound internal turmoil" target="_blank">profound internal turmoil</a> in that country is an example of such opportunism. Russia also launched its invasion of Ukraine at a time of perceived Western weakness and division.</p>
<h2><b>Preventive Options</b></h2>
<p>In the same way that law enforcement officials deconstruct the motives, means, and opportunities behind criminal behavior to design more effective preventive measures, so too can election administrators assess policy options to lessen the risk of domestic political violence around the 2024 election.</p>
<p>The leading reason for the rise in domestic terrorism in recent years is a heightened motive or intent toward acts of violence. <b><em>Reducing motive</em></b>, therefore, is both paramount to prevention and a daunting challenge. In the build-up to the election, mainstream politicians on both sides of the aisle can use their platforms to speak out against division and publicly praise the integrity of U.S. democracy. Although federal politicians have been reluctant to be outspoken against divisive politics (perhaps warily watching the examples of Republicans Liz Cheney and Adam Kinzinger, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/loyal-trump-republican-party-moves-censure-us-reps-cheney-kinzinger-2022-02-04/" title="who no longer serve in Congress" target="_blank">who no longer serve in Congress</a> after sitting on the January 6 committee), state and local officials have been far more committed to upholding democratic norms in their constituencies. Many maintain the trust of a large swathe of the American people and can call for peace and calm. One example of this commitment is Republican Utah Governor (and Chair of the National Governors Association) Spencer Cox’s Disagree Better initiative, which aims “to model how to disagree better, setting an example and creating the permission structure and template for other public officials at every level to follow.” Such measures, critically, do not touch on political or ideological differences, but instead emphasize shared interests such as civil disagreement and trust and faith in democracy.</p>
<p>The Joe Biden administration has several options to lower the country’s temperature and promote a peaceful and orderly election process. For instance, President Biden could task agencies such as the Department of Education or Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to issue nonpartisan educational tools that teach the American public about the electoral process and its resilience to manipulation. Such positive pre-bunking could prevent electoral conspiracy theories from taking root as widely as they did in 2020. The Biden administration could also push states to reverse their vote-counting timelines to count the usually Democratic early, mail, and absentee ballots ahead of the typically Republican day-of votes—or to count votes simultaneously. Although a hard mandate to count votes earlier could violate the Tenth Amendment, gentle encouragement could help reverse the red mirage that contributed to January 6 and the “stop the steal” movement—although there is, of course, the danger of a “blue mirage” instead contributing to violence by far-left extremists. Media organizations could also avoid covering vote tallying, waiting to announce results until they are confirmed and finalized.</p>
<p>The Biden administration, as well as law enforcement professionals, could also look abroad for best practices on reducing intent to commit electoral violence. In <a href="https://dppa.un.org/sites/default/files/ead_pd_preventing_mitigating_election-related_violence_20160601_e.pdf" title="Preventing and Mitigating Election-Related Violence" target="_blank">Preventing and Mitigating Election-Related Violence</a> [PDF], a policy directive issued by the UN Department of Political Affairs in June 2016, the first suggestion is “Reducing high stakes in politics, promoting measures to move away from ‘zero sum’ politics and ensuring against a monopoly of power by one group.” One possible measure to reduce intent to violence, then, would be to promote democracy’s guarantee that the voices and views of the expected losing entity can still be acknowledged and advanced despite electoral defeat. In other words, politicians could employ language promising inclusivity and unity, perhaps on issues of <a href="https://www.texastribune.org/2024/03/12/henry-cuellar-democrats-senate-border-bill/" title="bipartisan concern" target="_blank">bipartisan concern</a> such as immigration, providing assurances that all Americans would have a seat at the table in the new administration. As stated by <a href="https://www.undp.org/publications/elections-and-conflict-prevention-guide" title="UN guidance" target="_blank">UN guidance</a>, “When parties are quite certain of loss or exclusion in an electoral contest, especially when they expect to be ‘permanent minorities’ (to lose not just once, but again and again due to patterns of identity voting), the certainty of outcomes is also a strong causal driver of violence.” In addition, the United States could publicize the <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/international-observers-monitor-midterm-elections-in-us-/6826269.html" title="cadre of international election observers" target="_blank">cadre of international election observers</a> to increase trust in the process.</p>
<p>In a time of unprecedented distrust of politicians and Congress, American civil society can also help bridge the trust deficit that extremist radicalizers often use to prey on vulnerable people, cajoled by politicians but ultimately acting independently of the political system. Religious leaders and educators, especially at the local level, have a unique platform to educate their constituents on the importance of free and fair elections and neighborliness, even if they vote differently. Sports stars and labor leaders, among other civil society actors, can also call for peace and calm without wading into political questions. The Department of Homeland Security, through its Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships, could redouble its grant-making efforts to both national and local nonprofit organizations working to reduce radicalization and violent extremism. The private sector, chiefly social media companies, also bears a responsibility to moderate the most serious calls for sedition and disrupt extremist cells. Social media companies can set stronger standards for AI use on their platforms and work to undermine actors using AI to affect the election process.</p>
<p><b><em>Reducing the capability</em></b> to inflict violence will also be central. Indeed, <a href="https://rollcall.com/2023/07/19/19uscpig/" title="the successful application of lessons learned" target="_blank">the successful application of lessons learned</a> after January 6 would considerably strengthen the United States’ electoral resilience. Intelligence sharing between federal, state, and local partners, as well as <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/fusion-centers" title="with fusion centers" target="_blank">with fusion centers</a> (defined by DHS as “state-owned and operated centers that serve as focal points in states and major urban areas for the receipt, analysis, gathering and sharing of threat-related information between State, Local, Tribal and Territorial (SLTT), federal, and private sector partners”), is critical. Threats issued by extremist groups and networks should be taken seriously, unlike on January 6, when preparations were not commensurate with the volume of intelligence suggesting armed actors planned to descend on the capital. Government officials across the aisle could work with legacy media to emphasize the nonpartisan mandate of the DHS, FBI, and state and local law enforcement to undermine allegations of partisanship and politicization. Leaning on local police forces would also build legitimacy, allowing more trusted law enforcement to adhere to their job of keeping the peace in their communities.</p>
<p>At a tactical counterterrorism level, the Department of Justice’s continued legal efforts to disrupt leading domestic extremist organizations—including the Oath Keepers and Proud Boys—builds deterrence against future acts of violence. Although the leadership of both groups is already serving jail time for <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/05/11/1175465857/extremists-groups-were-found-guilty-of-seditious-conspiracy-for-jan-6-now-what" title="seditious conspiracy" target="_blank">seditious conspiracy</a> as a result of January 6, which has undermined both groups while building a stronger deterrent against violence, such legal efforts could continue as the election cycle heats up. Government efforts to deter or defuse violence will be complicated, however, by extremist networks’ continued adherence to the leaderless resistance (“lone wolf”) strategy, which hampers the ability of law enforcement to penetrate groups and limits the intelligence value of any individual capture. Militant anarchists, for instance, will continue to operate in spontaneous “black blocs,” which similarly complicate infiltration and arrests. Efforts to reduce particularly lethal weaponry will likely fall flat, but could still be attempted.</p>
<p>Finally, law enforcement agencies could <b><em>remove opportunities</em></b> for violence by hardening soft targets and maximizing law enforcement readiness and even preparing for military intervention. The federal government’s law enforcement agencies could seek to designate important events, such as the political conventions and the election itself, as <a href="https://www.secretservice.gov/protection/events/credentialing" title="National Special Security Events" target="_blank">National Special Security Events</a>, which would open a range of new law enforcement tools to prevent and respond to violence. A streamlined electoral process, including the Electoral Count Reform and Presidential Transition Improvement Act passed in response to January 6, could also limit opportunities for violent interventions.</p>
<h2>Mitigation Options</h2>
<p>Mitigation scenarios assume efforts to prevent both motive and means to violence have failed. Therefore, the mitigative options will concentrate on limiting further opportunity while lessening the harmful impact of any early violent events. At the milder end of the spectrum of responses to early violence, a more visible law enforcement presence at various key sites could deter violence and encourage voters to safely cast their ballots. Focusing on local law enforcement would allay concerns of a federal government crackdown, allowing local authorities to emphasize the sanctity of the rule of law within their own communities. The hardening of such soft targets would also allow law enforcement professionals to limit the threat to civilian life should any violence erupt.</p>
<div id="pullquote-80928--2" class="pullquote embedded_small">
<figure class="pullquote__container"><blockquote class="pullquote__quote">
<span class="pullquote__quote-content">Focusing on local law enforcement would allay concerns of a federal government crackdown</span>
</blockquote>
</figure></div>
<p>A variant of the United Kingdom’s <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2021.1902604" title="Operation Temperer" target="_blank">Operation Temperer</a>—which allows soldiers to guard certain locations so police resources can focus elsewhere—could be conducted during several phases of the election cycle using the National Guard. Particularly symbolic or important sites, such as the U.S. Capitol, could be sealed off from the public, as occurred in the aftermath of January 6. This approach has <a href="https://www.nps.gov/articles/000/president-grant-takes-on-the-ku-klux-klan.htm" title="historical antecedents" target="_blank">historical antecedents</a>; the U.S. government deployed the military in the Reconstruction era to suppress threats by the Ku Klux Klan against Black voters. The major downside of such an approach would be the militarization of U.S. elections, which would undermine American democracy and yield a further propaganda victory to adversaries.&nbsp;</p>
<p>In a worst-case scenario, the Biden administration could attempt to declare martial law in order to suspend the electoral process and allow the military to intervene in particularly violent uprisings. However, such a move would pose an existential threat to American democracy, effectively ending America’s status as leader of the free world with few clear and secure paths forward.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The Biden administration could also simply take a hands-off approach, believing that American institutions are stronger than those who would try to undermine them and recognizing that violence has failed in the past to undermine electoral processes, including during January 6. Such a “keep calm and carry on” approach would yield control but could protect American institutions from further internal damage. It would also avoid feeding into right-wing narratives about the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/09/politics/biden-officials-exercise-2024-election-chaos/" title="weaponization of the federal government" target="_blank">weaponization of the federal government</a>, while ensuring that a cure for violence is not worse than the disease.</p>
<h2>Recommendations</h2>
<p>The range of stakeholders, including government, the private sector, and civil society, with the power to help prevent and counter election-related violence in 2024 should prepare countermeasures at the motive, means, and opportunity levels.</p>
<p><em><b>Reducing motive</b></em></p>
<p><em>The Biden administration should encourage early and mail-in voting </em>for voters on both sides of the aisle to thin election day crowds that could otherwise become targets, and states should be encouraged to count absentee and mail-in ballots early to avoid red mirages that could fuel electoral conspiracy theories. Media companies should avoid reporting on vote tallying until final results are confirmed.</p>
<p><em>Responsible poll-watching should be amplified and celebrated</em>, and efforts to introduce trusted authorities into the electoral system, such as the military-linked nonprofit <a href="https://vetthe.vote/" title="Vet the Vote" target="_blank">Vet the Vote</a>, should be encouraged. Publicizing and celebrating the integrity of the vote and of the many civil servants who contribute to its execution will demystify the process and build trust in the system.</p>
<p><em>Candidates and both parties should commit to upholding critical democratic values such as truth, honesty, free press, and the rule of law</em>. Policymakers from both parties should unite around political slogans that enhance trust in the electoral system and delegitimize violence. Such calls should be joined by segments of civil society, such as church groups, sports teams, and universities. Governors and other state and local officials should join the&nbsp;<a href="https://www.nga.org/disagree-better/" title="Disagree Better campaign" target="_blank">Disagree Better campaign</a>. Given their leadership roles in the election process itself, state and local officials should educate their constituencies about the integrity of the electoral process, the nonpartisan makeup of poll workers, and the importance of adhering to democratic traditions.</p>
<p><em>Candidates and party officials should avoid existential rhetoric and absolutist promises</em>, which the United Nations has found to reduce tension in other contexts. Politicians should issue <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/jan/10/election-workers-threats-political-violence" title="frequent reminders" target="_blank">frequent reminders</a> to their followers that they desire peaceful political change.</p>
<p><em>Government agencies at the federal, state, and local levels should work to improve transparency and pre-bunk conspiracy theories questioning the legitimacy of elections</em>. One possible model is how the U.S. intelligence community pre-bunked Russian justifications for its invasion of Ukraine in 2022—although it is unclear who would be able to share such stories beyond party apparatuses and civil society organizations.&nbsp;</p>
<p><em>Social media companies, meanwhile, should take <a href="https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2023/11/07/microsoft-elections-2024-ai-voting-mtac/" title="more aggressive steps" target="_blank">more aggressive steps</a> to limit the free rein of electoral conspiracy theories on their platforms</em>, while legacy media outlets should work to avoid sensationalist reporting, including reporting portraying the opposition party as an existential threat or individual politicians as corrupt or dangerous. Legitimate community note programs should be expanded to ensure bad information can be drowned out by factcheckers. Social media companies <a href="https://apnews.com/article/meta-adds-labels-to-ai-imagery-deepfakes-415163d053ed915042a04f1ec3d9eafa" title="should take aggressive stances" target="_blank">should take aggressive stances</a> against AI-enabled disinformation and deepfakes, particularly as they concern political figures. Intelligence agencies should carefully monitor social media platforms for disinformation campaigns, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2023/11/30/biden-foreign-disinformation-social-media-election-interference/" title="surmounting threats" target="_blank">surmounting threats</a>&nbsp;issued by the political right against such activity.</p>
<p><em>Trusted civil society actors, including religious leaders, labor unions, Hollywood, and sports teams and athletes, should call for peace and goodwill</em>, avoiding discussions of politics or ideology to instead focus on widely shared values such as nonviolence. Trusted leaders should educate their constituencies on civics and election integrity, and should prepare to band together in nonpartisan fashion should violence erupt.</p>
<p><b><em>Reducing means</em></b></p>
<p><em>Law enforcement agencies should <a href="https://twitter.com/CapitolPolice/status/1725877901805899815" title="conduct trainings" target="_blank">conduct trainings</a> and improve <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/01/03/could-january-6th-happen-again-526167" title="intelligence sharing" target="_blank">intelligence sharing</a> across levels of government</em>, as well as with fusion centers and nonprofit organizations. Extremists should be taken at their word—threats of violence or insurrection should not be dismissed as bluster or an unrealistic proposition. Professionals should not ignore lessons learned from January 6—including keeping the National Guard on standby and not ignoring intelligence warnings. As part of such efforts, law enforcement agencies with different and overlapping mandates should establish best practices and plans to ensure smooth coordination. This process should be aided by designating national conventions, Election Day, and January 6 as National Special Security Events.&nbsp;</p>
<p><em>Law enforcement and intelligence agencies should strengthen their protection of political candidates, election workers, and voting infrastructure</em>. The Department of Justice’s Election Threats Task Force should be fully resourced and staffed—and could <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-slow-burn-threatening-our-democracy" title="expand its remit" target="_blank">expand its remit</a> to protect polling places and particularly vulnerable politicians. The volume of threats could be so great that not every site can be protected, and law enforcement should be prepared to prioritize particularly high-value targets, beginning with leading politicians and important political locations.</p>
<p><em>Policymakers and pundits across the political spectrum should work to erode the prevalent framing of January 6 defendants as heroes and martyrs</em>, building a stronger deterrent against acts of political violence. Civil society leaders and state and local officials should emphasize the critical importance of nonviolent means of driving political change.</p>
<p><b><em>Removing opportunity</em></b></p>
<p><em>Any decisions made to dampen unrest or violence with massed law enforcement or military assets should be made as an absolute last resort</em>, with the public blessing of influential civil society actors and mainstream politicians across the aisle. Such measures should be incremental, involving steadily increasing presences of law enforcement or National Guard units, in order to avoid the perception of an overreaching federal response.</p>
<p>Should the United States fail to adequately prepare for the risks of electoral violence in 2024, the integrity of the election will be on the line. In a year featuring at least <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/defending-year-democracy" title="eighty elections" target="_blank">eighty elections</a> around the world, the United States will also provide a blueprint for autocrats elsewhere seeing to contest and undermine their own elections. Ensuring a peaceful, fair, and thriving election is therefore of critical importance, both to American democracy as well as democracy around the world.</p></description>
<link>
</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">Preventing U.S. Election Violence in 2024</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 11 Apr 2024 16:29:22 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Lost Decade</title>
<description><img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/book_large_l/public/book_cover_image/The%20Lost%20Decade_revised.jpg.webp" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"><br>
<h1 class="article-header__title">Lost Decade </h1>
<div class="article-header__subhead">
<div><p>The U.S. Pivot to Asia and the Rise of Chinese Power&nbsp;</p></div>
</div>
<figure class="article-header__image for-tablet-down">
<div class="article-header__image-picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/book_large_l/public/book_cover_image/The%20Lost%20Decade_revised.jpg.webp" alt="" class="article-header__image-img" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
</figure>
<p class="article-header__description">Robert D. Blackwill and Richard Fontaine evaluate the limitations of the Pivot to Asia and offer a compelling vision for the future of U.S. foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific. </p>
<p class="article-header__byline">
<span class="article-header__metadata-type article-header__metadata-type--with-definition">
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/books-reports">Book</a>
</span> by
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/expert/robert-d-blackwill" class="article-header__link">Robert D. Blackwill</a> and
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/bio/richard-fontaine" class="article-header__link">Richard Fontaine</a> </p>
<div class="article-header__book-metadata-group">
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Publisher –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">Oxford University Press</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Release Date –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">Jun 2024</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Pages –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">480</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-isbn">
<em>ISBN 9780197677940</em>
</p>
</div>
<br><p><em>Lost Decade</em>&nbsp;is an essential guide for understanding the historic shift to Asia-centric geopolitics and its implications for the United States’ present and future.&nbsp;<br>
&nbsp;<br>
Across the political spectrum, there is wide agreement that Asia should stand at the center of U.S. foreign policy. But this worldview, first represented in the Barack Obama administration’s 2011 “Pivot to Asia,”&nbsp;marks a dramatic departure from the entire history of American grand strategy. More than a decade on, we now have the perspective to evaluate it in depth. In <em>Lost Decade</em>, Robert D. Blackwill and Richard Fontaine—two eminent figures in American foreign policy—take this long view. They conclude that while the Pivot’s strategic logic is strong, there are few successes to speak of, and that we need a far more coherent approach to the Indo-Pacific region. They examine the Pivot through various lenses: situating it historically in the context of U.S. global foreign policy, revealing the inside story of how it came about, assessing the effort thus far, identifying the ramifications in other regions (namely Europe and the Middle East), and proposing a path forward.&nbsp;<br>
&nbsp;<br>
The authors stress that the United States has far less margin for foreign policy error today than a decade ago. As the international order becomes more unstable, Blackwill and Fontaine argue that it is imperative that policymakers fully understand what the Pivot to Asia aimed to achieve—and where it fell short—in order to muster the resources, alliances, and resolve to preserve an open order in Asia and the world. Crafting an effective policy for the region, they contend, is crucial for preserving American security, prosperity, and democratic values.&nbsp;</p>
</description>
<link>
</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">Lost Decade</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 14 Mar 2024 20:16:29 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>The End of Ambition</title>
<description><img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/book_large_l/public/book_cover_image/9780197578575.jpg.webp" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"><br>
<h1 class="article-header__title">The End of Ambition</h1>
<div class="article-header__subhead">
<div><p>America’s Past, Present, and Future in the Middle East</p></div>
</div>
<figure class="article-header__image for-tablet-down">
<div class="article-header__image-picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/book_large_l/public/book_cover_image/9780197578575.jpg.webp" alt="" class="article-header__image-img" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
</figure>
<p class="article-header__description">A clear-headed vision for the United States' role in the Middle East that highlights the changing nature of U.S. national interests and the challenges of grand strategizing at a time of profound change in the international order.</p>
<p class="article-header__byline">
<span class="article-header__metadata-type article-header__metadata-type--with-definition">
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/books-reports">Book</a>
</span> by
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/expert/steven-cook" class="article-header__link">Steven A. Cook</a> </p>
<div class="article-header__book-metadata-group">
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Publisher –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">Oxford University Press</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Release Date –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">Jun 2024</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Pages –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">208</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-isbn">
<em>ISBN 9780197578575</em>
</p>
</div>
<br><p>Following a long series of catastrophic misadventures in the Middle East over the last two decades, the American foreign policy community has tried to understand what went wrong. After weighing the evidence, they have mostly advised a retreat from the region. The basic view is that when the United States tries to advance change in the Middle East, it only makes matters worse.</p>
<p>In <em>The End of Ambition</em>, Steven A. Cook argues that while these analysts are rightly concerned that engagement drains U.S. resources and distorts its domestic politics, the broader impulse to disengage tends to neglect important lessons from the past. Moreover, advocates of pulling back overlook the potential risks of withdrawal. Covering the relationship between the United States and the Middle East since the end of World War II, Cook makes the bold claim that despite setbacks and moral costs, the United States has been overwhelmingly successful in protecting its core national interests in the Middle East. Conversely, overly ambitious policies to remake the region and leverage U.S. power not only ended in failure, but rendered the region unstable in new and largely misunderstood ways.</p><p>While making the case that retrenchment is not the answer to America’s problems in the Middle East, <em>The End of Ambition</em> highlights how America’s interests in the region have begun to change and critically examines alternative approaches to U.S.-Middle East policy. Cook highlights the challenges that policymakers and analysts confront in developing a new strategy for the United States in the Middle East against the backdrop of both political uncertainty in the United States and a changing global order.</p></description>
<link>
</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">The End of Ambition</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 11 Mar 2024 20:08:17 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>The End of Ambition</title>
<description><img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/book_large_l/public/book_cover_image/9780197578575.jpg.webp" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"><br>
<h1 class="article-header__title">The End of Ambition</h1>
<div class="article-header__subhead">
<div><p>America’s Past, Present, and Future in the Middle East</p></div>
</div>
<figure class="article-header__image for-tablet-down">
<div class="article-header__image-picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/book_large_l/public/book_cover_image/9780197578575.jpg.webp" alt="" class="article-header__image-img" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
</figure>
<p class="article-header__description">A clear-headed vision for the United States' role in the Middle East that highlights the changing nature of U.S. national interests and the challenges of grand strategizing at a time of profound change in the international order.</p>
<p class="article-header__byline">
<span class="article-header__metadata-type article-header__metadata-type--with-definition">
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/books-reports">Book</a>
</span> by
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/expert/steven-cook" class="article-header__link">Steven A. Cook</a> </p>
<div class="article-header__book-metadata-group">
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Publisher –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">Oxford University Press</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Release Date –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">Jun 2024</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Pages –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">208</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-isbn">
<em>ISBN 9780197578575</em>
</p>
</div>
<br><p>Following a long series of catastrophic misadventures in the Middle East over the last two decades, the American foreign policy community has tried to understand what went wrong. After weighing the evidence, they have mostly advised a retreat from the region. The basic view is that when the United States tries to advance change in the Middle East, it only makes matters worse.</p>
<p>In <em>The End of Ambition</em>, Steven A. Cook argues that while these analysts are rightly concerned that engagement drains U.S. resources and distorts its domestic politics, the broader impulse to disengage tends to neglect important lessons from the past. Moreover, advocates of pulling back overlook the potential risks of withdrawal. Covering the relationship between the United States and the Middle East since the end of World War II, Cook makes the bold claim that despite setbacks and moral costs, the United States has been overwhelmingly successful in protecting its core national interests in the Middle East. Conversely, overly ambitious policies to remake the region and leverage U.S. power not only ended in failure, but rendered the region unstable in new and largely misunderstood ways.</p><p>While making the case that retrenchment is not the answer to America’s problems in the Middle East, <em>The End of Ambition</em> highlights how America’s interests in the region have begun to change and critically examines alternative approaches to U.S.-Middle East policy. Cook highlights the challenges that policymakers and analysts confront in developing a new strategy for the United States in the Middle East against the backdrop of both political uncertainty in the United States and a changing global order.</p></description>
<link>
</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">The End of Ambition</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 11 Mar 2024 20:08:17 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>A Conversation With John Kerry</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/0otLx-xeovw" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>John Kerry discusses his work as&nbsp;U.S. special presidential envoy for climate, the challenges the United States faces, and the Biden administration’s priorities as it continues to address climate change.</p>
<p>FROMAN: Good afternoon. It’s a great pleasure to see everybody. My name is Mike Froman. I’m president of the Council on Foreign Relations.&nbsp;</p>
<p>And it is a great honor to welcome Special Envoy for Climate John Kerry to the Council today to give what is in effect a valedictory address on his time in government, on climate, as he prepares to leave that position. He truly is a man who needs no introduction. You all know everything that he’s done, but I would say, on climate, this is something that goes back decades from when he was a senator, when he was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, when he was secretary of state, to his position now. This has been a passion of his and he’s been a consistent advocate for strong policy in this area.&nbsp;</p>
<p>I would say, when we served together in the Obama administration and I would see him in the Situation Room, I was so impressed that he was willing to go anywhere around the world, and indeed everywhere around the world, no matter how difficult the assignment was, no matter what little chance of success there might be in making progress, to represent the United States and to make the very best effort to address our interests all over the world. And I saw this in a very personal way when in—we found ourselves in Indonesia at a time—it was an economic summit there and there was something happening in Washington. I think the government was closing down or something, and President Obama could not come and so he designated Secretary Kerry at the time to be the head of our delegation, and we prepared Secretary Kerry and he went up on the stage of this large group and gave this impassioned speech about issues of fish and trade facilitation and tariffs and dumping. I knew in the back of his mind all he cared about was war and peace and climate and really big issues, but he gave the speech and he seemed to be so into it and so passionate about it that everyone thought these are the most important issues to the secretary of state. He came down off the stage, he sat next to me in the front row, and I said, “Mr. Secretary, that was really fantastic; I think you have a real future in politics”—(laughter)—at which point he said, “Screw you, Froman.” (Laughter.) That’s actually the sanitized version, but—(laughter)—I will leave it with that.&nbsp;</p>
<p>With that, please welcome Special Envoy for Climate Secretary Kerry. (Applause.)&nbsp;</p>
<p>KERRY: Thank you very much. Michael, I think—thank you for that introduction, wayward introduction.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>I want you all to know that representing your government in the middle of a shutdown is really hard, and everybody there would come up to me and say, oh, god, your government—can we buy you lunch? (Laughter.) Do you need a ride home? (Laughter.) Everybody was very solicitous but my preference would have been, honestly, to have had an open government—(laughs)—backing me up.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>This guy is amazing. Mike Froman is a tour de force and so glad you’re at CFR and pleased you’ve taken on those responsibilities, and thank you for your generous introduction.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>But we were talking out in the back room just for a few minutes and I commented to him how—I mean, I watched him labor so hard on TPP and I watched the transition taking place in the Far East about how people were viewing the U.S. and we were engaged and we set the gold standard of business rules and of goods and controls and so forth, and frequently, as I went to China, the Chinese would say to me, when can we join? Can we get in? And they were knocking on the door. And sadly, sadly, sadly, folks, we pulled out of it and watched the other eleven go off and make their own agreement and we lost critical space in that part of the world. So it does matter. It does matter. Every day it matters. It was doing what—who calls the shots, and we will see where we go. I’m still Hatch-ed, so I’m not going at all into the area. You’re sitting there saying, oh, what is he going to say now? (Laughter.) But staying away from that, folks.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>I’m really grateful that Mike has put the climate crisis—he’s placed it right at the center of the CFR’s priorities, and that’s exactly what Richard Haass did before you, and I thank you for doing that.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>Also, I appreciate the opportunity to share thoughts, a few reflections, if you will, on the journey of a little more than three years as the special presidential envoy for climate. And then we’ll get a chance to have some Q&amp;A.&nbsp;</p>
<p>But in November 2020, when President-elect Biden called me about this job, we talked about the world that he was inheriting as president, and America’s reputation on the global stage, I think you will all recall, was in tatters. Tensions with China were already at a high point. The world and the global economy were still reeling from COVID, with many countries still facing shutdowns, lockdowns. And on January 20th, 2021, within hours of being sworn in, President Biden rejoined the Paris Agreement. A few hours later, I was sworn in as envoy and I gathered with a small band of my first-day staff and we began piecing together an office, which we didn’t have, and a strategy.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>The most critical decision of that day was a commitment to do every single thing in our power to be able to limit the Earth’s temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Centigrade, a threshold science decision, not ours, because the basic science told us that it was critical for the health and lives of people, in report after report, to be able to hold that temperature increase at 1.5 and that every point and decimal above that cost you billions more and be much more threatening to life itself and to stability on the planet. So “keep 1.5 alive” became our mantra, our organizational principle. Why? Because the science dictated it. The mathematics and the physics are undeniable—not a point of ideology or politics or geostrategic maneuvering—science, math, and physics. And our government, we thought at that point, had to make a mark that we were done with denial.&nbsp;</p>
<p>So President Biden was determined to earn back America’s credibility and work with all countries, particularly the major economies and the world’s largest emitters, in order to raise ambition and actually address the global crisis.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
&... |
http://localhost:1200/cfr/videos - Success ✔️<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0">
<channel>
<title>Videos</title>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/videos</link>
<atom:link href="http://localhost:1200/cfr/videos" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"></atom:link>
<description>Videos - Made with love by RSSHub(https://github.com/DIYgod/RSSHub)</description>
<generator>RSSHub</generator>
<webMaster>i@diygod.me (DIYgod)</webMaster>
<language>en</language>
<lastBuildDate>Fri, 24 May 2024 01:11:17 GMT</lastBuildDate>
<ttl>5</ttl>
<item>
<title>Ten Most Significant World Events in 2023</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/v7XWcXcI0Sc" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>2023 was a tumultuous year, marked by violent conflicts, democratic erosion, and record-high temperatures. This year, experts at the Council on Foreign Relations, along with visiting world leaders and thinkers, unpacked these issues and more.</p>
<p>Join CFR’s director of studies, Jim Lindsay, in looking back at his list of the ten most impactful events of the year.</p>
<p>For more, check out his blog post, “<a href="https://www.cfr.org/worldevents2023" title="Ten Most Significant World Events in 2023" target="_blank">Ten Most Significant World Events in 2023</a>,” only at CFR.org.</p>
</description>
<link>
</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">Ten Most Significant World Events in 2023</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 07 Dec 2023 22:12:43 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Stakes for Taiwan's Diplomacy in Three Questions</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/aOp2I1d-2Lo" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>Taiwan's relationship with the United States, China, and the rest of the world has a complex history that informs why the island is so consequential to today's geopolitics. To better understand these dynamics, David Sacks, CFR's fellow for Asia studies, answers questions about Taiwan's history and its significance to diplomacy in East Asia.</p>
<p>For more on the relationship between the United States, China, and Taiwan, check out the Council on Foreign Relations–sponsored Independent Task Force, "U.S.-Taiwan Relations in a New Era". cfr.org/us-taiwan</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p><p>&nbsp;</p></description>
<link>
</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">The Stakes for Taiwan's Diplomacy in Three Questions</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 16 Aug 2023 17:35:24 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>How Artificial Intelligence Could Change the World</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/lxCjyfFZxBQ" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>Artificial Intelligence (AI) could transform economies, politics, and everyday life. Some experts believe this increasingly powerful technology could lead to amazing advances and prosperity. Yet, many tech and industry leaders are warning that AI poses substantial risks, and they are calling for a moratorium on AI research so that safety measures can be established. But amid mounting great-power competition, it’s unclear whether national governments will be able to coordinate on regulating this technology that offers so many economic and strategic opportunities.</p>
</description>
<link>
</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">How Artificial Intelligence Could Change the World</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 25 May 2023 16:43:57 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>As Nuclear Tensions Rise, Should the World Be Worried?</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/XDMn4cFllek" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>Since the end of World War II, nuclear weapons have threatened international relations. The Cold War produced stalemates that seemed to reduce the threat of nuclear conflict, but several countries’ more recent acquisitions of nuclear weapons have brought the world into a dangerous new era of nuclear uncertainty. With nuclear tensions on the rise once again, what lies ahead for nuclear diplomacy?</p>
</description>
<link>
</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">As Nuclear Tensions Rise, Should the World Be Worried?</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 02 May 2023 16:13:26 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement Threatened by Brexit Fallout</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/WruVPF00jrg" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>In Northern Ireland, the consequences of the United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union, known as Brexit, are threatening to unravel the twenty-five-year-old Good Friday Agreement. It’s a peace deal that ended decades of violence between nationalists who wanted Northern Ireland to be reunified with the Republic of Ireland and unionists who wanted it to stay part of the United Kingdom. The agreement largely ended the bloodshed, and allowed for freer movement of trade and people across the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. However, Brexit has imperiled that free movement, and there are major concerns that resolving that issue could inflame old divisions and lead to renewed bloodshed in Northern Ireland.</p>
</description>
<link>
</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement Threatened by Brexit Fallout</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 06 Apr 2023 21:21:14 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Is China a Democracy or a Dictatorship?</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/qkjV0kT_90s" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>China’s political system is complicated, and there’s a lot of contradictory information out there. Is China a communist country? Is it democratic, as its own government insists? And what does “freedom” mean to Chinese citizens? Ian Johnson, CFR’s senior fellow for China studies, answers these questions and more.</p>
</description>
<link>
</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">Is China a Democracy or a Dictatorship?</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 15 Mar 2023 18:00:10 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Are Cryptocurrencies Still the Future of Money?</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/T0g3gFYK9Do" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>Since the creation of Bitcoin in 2009, cryptocurrencies have exploded in popularity and accrued over $1 trillion in collective value. But market volatility in 2022 threatened the crypto ecosystem—after peaking at over $68,000 in November 2021, the price of Bitcoin fell to under $17,000 twelve months later. This instability has brought new scrutiny to the industry and the countries that have embraced Bitcoin as currency: El Salvador and the Central African Republic. Financial regulators are now calling for more crypto oversight, but global efforts to regulate the industry have stalled. Given this simultaneous rise in global popularity and concern, what lies ahead for digital currency and the future of finance?</p>
</description>
<link>
</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">Are Cryptocurrencies Still the Future of Money?</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 02 Mar 2023 16:48:34 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>What Happens When the World Hits 1.5°C of Warming?</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/mPCB4FqmoPg" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>The world is running out of time to avoid the worst consequences of climate change. With the 2015 Paris Agreement, countries set a goal of limiting global warming to 1.5°C (2.7°F) compared to 150 years ago. However, the planet is on track to pass 1.5°C by the end of this decade, which would lead to higher sea levels, hotter heat waves, and deadlier natural disasters. But countries can work to prevent those and even worse dangers by sticking to their climate pledges and limiting just how much the world overshoots its Paris Agreement goal.</p>
</description>
<link>
</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">What Happens When the World Hits 1.5°C of Warming?</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 28 Feb 2023 15:44:59 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Will U.S.-Venezuela Relations Thaw?</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/d26XfcY4cxs" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>After years of tension, relations between the United States and Venezuela appear to be headed in a new direction. The Joe Biden administration has temporarily rolled back some U.S. sanctions on Venezuela’s oil industry in an effort to curb energy prices as well as help the Venezuelan people. But the extent of this détente hinges on Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. What’s in store for bilateral relations?</p>
</description>
<link>
</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">Will U.S.-Venezuela Relations Thaw?</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2022 16:57:17 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Video: Seven Most Significant World Events in 2022</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/dt7aBUDXFEU" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>It was a year marked by political tumult, spiking major-power tensions, economic challenges, a waning pandemic, and a war that echoed worldwide.<br><br>
Take a look back at what James M. Lindsay, CFR’s director of studies, thought were the most significant events of 2022. For more, check out his blog post, “<a href="https://www.cfr.org/worldevents2022" title="Ten Most Significant World Events in 2022" target="_blank">Ten Most Significant World Events in 2022</a>,” only at CFR.org.</p>
</description>
<link>
</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">Video: Seven Most Significant World Events in 2022</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 16 Dec 2022 18:48:27 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Growing Instability in Haiti</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/XemLN6oPlbM" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>More than a year after President Jovenel Moïse’s assassination, Haiti remains embroiled in a humanitarian crisis. Economic and political instability persist, and a surge in gang-related violence in and around the capital, Port-au-Prince, has displaced tens of thousands of people. World leaders are now debating whether to send troops to help restore basic governance in the country. What does the future hold for Haiti?</p>
</description>
<link>
</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">Growing Instability in Haiti</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 09 Nov 2022 21:47:27 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Post-Roe v. Wade: Abortion Law Around the World</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/UFrSuxMBcaQ" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>With the U.S. Supreme Court overturning <em style="font-style:italic">Roe v. Wade</em>, it’s up to states to decide their own abortion laws. Watch to see what has changed so far in the United States and how it compares with other countries on abortion access.</p>
</description>
<link>
</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">Post-Roe v. Wade: Abortion Law Around the World</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 25 Oct 2022 21:03:15 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>King Charles III and the Future of the Commonwealth</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/ISczNbnvSZ0" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>As King Charles III ascends to the British throne after the passing of Queen Elizabeth II, Commonwealth countries are debating whether to follow Barbados, which broke ties with the Crown in 2021. Why are countries choosing to leave the monarchy, and what could that mean for its future?</p>
</description>
<link>
</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">King Charles III and the Future of the Commonwealth</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 03 Oct 2022 17:34:20 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Russia-Ukraine War and Europe’s Energy Bind</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/PDP4bT5cDAw" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has led European governments to propose bans on Russian oil and gas, but rising energy costs and a lack of alternatives&nbsp;are&nbsp;undermining the effort. Here’s how Europe has been challenged by Russia’s leverage in the energy market.</p>
</description>
<link>
</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">The Russia-Ukraine War and Europe’s Energy Bind</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 13 Sep 2022 19:09:04 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>How U.S. Gun Policies Compare With the World’s</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/VqAiI8npYk0" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>The debate over gun laws has raged in Washington for decades, often reigniting after high-profile mass shootings. In mid-2022, Congress passed a rare, compromise gun control bill, but critics say it still leaves the United States with some of the loosest gun laws in the world. Here’s how the United States and some other advanced democracies have responded to gun violence.</p>
</description>
<link>
</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">How U.S. Gun Policies Compare With the World’s</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 13 Jul 2022 20:30:13 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
</channel>
</rss> |
TonyRL
reviewed
May 24, 2024
|
Successfully generated as following: http://localhost:1200/cfr/asia/china - Success ✔️<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0">
<channel>
<title>China</title>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/asia/china</link>
<atom:link href="http://localhost:1200/cfr/asia/china" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"></atom:link>
<description>China - Made with love by RSSHub(https://github.com/DIYgod/RSSHub)</description>
<generator>RSSHub</generator>
<webMaster>i@diygod.me (DIYgod)</webMaster>
<language>en</language>
<lastBuildDate>Fri, 24 May 2024 02:06:18 GMT</lastBuildDate>
<ttl>5</ttl>
<item>
<title>Advanced Manufacturing to be a Focus of China’s July Party Plenum</title>
<description><p>China’s long-delayed third Party plenum on economic reform will be held in July. Official commentary suggests that the Party communique which will be issued at this meeting will double-down on the importance of manufacturing as a tool to address China’s pressing domestic economic problems, potentially increasing trade tensions with a range of foreign countries.</p>
<p>On April 30, Chinese authorities&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="0" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.rfa.org%2Fenglish%2Fnews%2Fchina%2Fdelayed-third-plenary-economy-meeting-05022024142612.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503185984%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=6rGd5%2FLSHj1bM81wUd7kavWE%2BfArnHSjbHJl9xnwSRY%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWA21353390-5ead-5dcb-2b03-23d199791392" originalsrc="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/delayed-third-plenary-economy-meeting-05022024142612.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="H0nZtRfp6EVbYT+KTpVqEheb+uLHle+cIEiV0g+4+TJW3Qu25XU/yzbCa1G2aRH/CCZXeUISHDF/gjIEXXg6zrryaT7ofgaXLsCq4t+Ik6Cb4/KAwl81rSRLR+Eb2phf9yd3N/9uq7lw3S0AkysnTIbFN+sOlSXsSMVT6MjV/hw=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/delayed-third-plenary-economy-meeting-05022024142612.html. Click or tap if you trust this link.">announced</a>&nbsp;that the third Party plenum of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee would meet in July. Official commentary&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="1" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.chinadaily.com.cn%2Fa%2F202405%2F01%2FWS66323e19a31082fc043c5050.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503199426%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=2n3UuGo%2FRAWMbRlRHWq%2BEQJSihCvwU%2FgSSy2AXeD2PE%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWA117497f5-e87c-bc4e-01dd-f20665dc9b5e" originalsrc="https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202405/01/WS66323e19a31082fc043c5050.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="bqQQxTFiPd7eWyoW8nBUP4fkYbr+Lnn8xYI19CYTxCJmPQ0cE4NwUv9TvRZM6N7F+C46cUR8Mw1johhx4G2Aca9bsgndQMVxL7ANckuufHWRiWeNv8elRRoWYA824p1Ilt4+VGxxWLXaknoI7+ubjDILGgOZJLlPYVseD4HI/nw=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202405/01/WS66323e19a31082fc043c5050.html. Click or tap if you trust this link.">indicates</a>&nbsp;that economic issues will be the core of the plenum, including a focus on integrated economic plans for the Yangtze Delta region. But specific attention will also be devoted to fostering “new quality productive forces”—a new Party slogan set out by Xi Jinping—with state commentary stating:</p><p><em>“The imperative was stressed... to develop new quality productive forces according to local conditions. The layout of China's strength in strategic science and technology should be improved, emerging industries cultivated and strengthened, the development of industries for the future arranged in advance, and the transformation and upgrading of traditional industries empowered by advanced technologies.”</em></p>
<p>As Chinese authorities&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="2" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Flosangeles.china-consulate.gov.cn%2Feng%2Flghd%2F202404%2Ft20240418_11283727.htm&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503205764%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=IbEShh6%2BllqjRF%2BKcOmhi%2FU7fTx1f9JCGSLpKwYrcBk%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAe743989e-a804-99d8-d203-643dc5ac1cc7" originalsrc="http://losangeles.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/lghd/202404/t20240418_11283727.htm" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="nJFMkJ+NoiMgW4rhQv8Zy1Lr3elJYsunHe4BDryx6OO0YVHvk0kbWP02pfLAsbN1ydtFaaLLI+D2xacSVY5nZse/MXybDN3lKtTtVciINnLLI1oJjosVuWnQLf9+vqKBw/nTo448yRRn+8p/5q4ZAnoGVQEE+nbAkYpuy9tqg0g=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: http://losangeles.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/lghd/202404/t20240418_11283727.htm. Click or tap if you trust this link.">note</a>, “new quality productive forces” includes three specific industries: electric vehicles, lithium-ion batteries, and photovoltaic products, which have registered dramatic export growth, in addition to other fields in biomedicine, artificial intelligence, and the digital economy. In recent years, Beijing has&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="3" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2024%2F05%2F14%2Fbusiness%2Fchina-exports-manufacturing.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503211048%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=1ahyI9wpkevRlu2E672ErhfP7nh3mz%2Fwp4Q4dT76QSc%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAd915b52c-0ef4-2399-4607-1ea63c3f5b6b" originalsrc="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/14/business/china-exports-manufacturing.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="L2sZOeL0lFunPptcQBH8iAhtpk88vF6tbo59ysGysLK+IoJ4HxdgExVjCZ/qZ6o01CYHuZ3WrgTsj9CqTmStycTBTwhf+dMUsXEuw49i+afnKwi/uOCVTlwcjKEcEbF6/gKe+TnSzRXlDzhzF6kuCmKwHA/MVKY/pJPB0BG8OpI=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/14/business/china-exports-manufacturing.html. Click or tap if you trust this link.">identified and promoted</a>&nbsp;key advanced manufacturing industries—including electric vehicles and batteries—as part of China’s industrial strategy. Goals include reducing reliance on foreign technologies and creating new sources of export-driven growth.&nbsp;</p>
<p>For Beijing, such emphasis on manufacturing represents an economic development strategy aimed at responding to serious domestic challenges. China currently faces both continuing high&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="4" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.wsj.com%2Fworld%2Fchina%2Fchinas-youth-unemployment-eased-in-april-a029344f&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503216081%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=eNQrISw%2BXNg3i%2FwuJav7ExYbcv2lBfCg4MzHyblG7p4%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAbd6af401-ab3c-7845-7ea4-53d89f61f617" originalsrc="https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-youth-unemployment-eased-in-april-a029344f" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="AQ4/iQp/hYQGxLkXSn7qmCrCJ/cZPlJ+TV1/fUPl5xi4LmH5GuJJY97e/YzHRaDV7MuK+PCZTCHRcdjAGmcXnkvGUJvpbYYSHjcj+YJoViFXMJd+4ypOZ98eTfbC22clyxh9qg1vg2Dbiab/raJBmkpD+TjrkS5zidNmKWfKPGQ=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-youth-unemployment-eased-in-april-a029344f. Click or tap if you trust this link.">youth unemployment</a>, as well as construction and real estate sectors that are mired in deep distress after the implosion of China’s property bubble, and which constituted a quarter of China’s GDP prior to the pandemic. Recent years have&nbsp;<a data-auth="NotApplicable" data-linkindex="5" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/amid-mounting-youth-unemployment-woes-beijing-looks-towards-vocational-education" id="OWA4f9afd72-27e1-a17f-5c3b-a22fc9dadb5d" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" title="seen">seen</a>&nbsp;Chinese authorities make a concerted effort to raise the status of vocational education programs and steer youth in the direction of skilled manufacturing labor, precisely because of the employment difficulties facing four-year college graduates.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Indeed, recent statements by Xi himself give further support to the likelihood that the July plenum will feature a doubling-down on manufacturing. A front-page&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="6" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fpaper.people.com.cn%2Frmrb%2Fhtml%2F2024-05%2F01%2Fnw.D110000renmrb_20240501_4-01.htm&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503220962%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=LvIQKiUxzrnTL5IJ16VqXtLA2b8mEyKv3lZTT4xqvYk%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWA3964bf46-e856-5cc7-ecc1-e1db928cee93" originalsrc="http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2024-05/01/nw.D110000renmrb_20240501_4-01.htm" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="U+VGUCUN0VJYCDQ2m86YaO3xVtQLf4AFom+BRwX1d9GyfZpjKes/TTI9qMLzcuMXNjvU+HCgSepVli75jPbZ3LIWCwAAZbLulu9txfWvvq83eCkMtoYWI36ftt+PqSliQSPrKlM0wk/5b1NnvWK2u5IeHP12JeLpC0cyv1/ltJI=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2024-05/01/nw.D110000renmrb_20240501_4-01.htm. Click or tap if you trust this link.">article</a>&nbsp;in the Party’s flagship paper accompanying the announcement of the July plenum carried extensive quotations from Xi himself extolling Chinese “craftsmanship” (<em>gongjiang</em>) in numerous fields of advanced manufacturing.</p>
<p>Naturally, any policy moves by Beijing to boost its own export-oriented advanced manufacturing industries run the risk of heightening tensions between China and its trading partners. Fears of Chinese market domination in specific industries led the Biden administration to&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="7" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fapnews.com%2Farticle%2Fbiden-china-tariffs-electric-vehicles-evs-solar-2024ba735c47e04a50898a88425c5e2c&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503225850%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=Lf8uTpZ6O1wJNj%2FSMr8ybHVGEuHjxOTwdJI49t%2BjhmY%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAbf0d4b26-e45d-be24-0f02-464361a12e73" originalsrc="https://apnews.com/article/biden-china-tariffs-electric-vehicles-evs-solar-2024ba735c47e04a50898a88425c5e2c" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="Zial7EJt9mURBt5T7sLNyoDKz3K/3tbjbkvn3tpiLyw16SD1VUaE4xhpY7xPsNzt05pHcsZEOjV3lzvQ09lZ5gjWonBZNBUQKbZdL96lTfPnncvNW3KYIP1mNu9l18reYgYx8EeZGPdwyI/KjsFZU1d3Nd9Aw9+8Kx8cwxUjyMc=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://apnews.com/article/biden-china-tariffs-electric-vehicles-evs-solar-2024ba735c47e04a50898a88425c5e2c. Click or tap if you trust this link.">announce</a>&nbsp;high tariffs on a range of such products last week. In fall 2023, European authorities&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="8" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Frhg.com%2Fresearch%2Faint-no-duty-high-enough%2F&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503230731%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=lyUNGLKjjpnh19ABAO7T6svYM8im%2F1%2Bhg%2BdAw4NUZ1I%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAe6e23327-f57b-65e1-1139-73e7492b7bc3" originalsrc="https://rhg.com/research/aint-no-duty-high-enough/" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="JaDVZAQwTw9fRxuxCWHj8WGhl3dc+jVzZfhMwuGIEkGneAbeDvT4IVpdE7XXcwVyjK8MtOFpBmFteUpAFXZ5EsTvExteNVVizaOmbqPwyBZY+e0plVrdArCFjCjJRKphNkxFyxk3V+dCyvyso5tC5M6sydgpqUCWvii5uiExGdA=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://rhg.com/research/aint-no-duty-high-enough/. Click or tap if you trust this link.">launched</a>&nbsp;an anti-subsidy investigation into China’s electric vehicle industry, and are currently considering imposing countervailing duties.&nbsp;</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog/advanced-manufacturing-be-focus-chinas-july-party-plenum</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/blog/advanced-manufacturing-be-focus-chinas-july-party-plenum</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 22 May 2024 20:43:23 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Analyzing Lai Ching-te’s Inaugural Address: More Continuity Than Difference</title>
<description><p>On May 20, Lai Ching-te assumed the presidency in Taiwan and gave an inaugural address scrutinized in Beijing, Washington, and capitals around the world. The speech provided the most authoritative signal to date of his approach to cross-strait relations. The core question for observers: would a Lai administration depart from the course set by his predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen?&nbsp;</p>
<p>The speech gave a clear answer: Lai signaled broad continuity with Tsai and committed to maintain the status quo. He also called for dialogue with Beijing and demonstrated an openness to resuming cross-strait tourism and student exchanges. Even so, Beijing denounced Lai’s speech in particularly harsh language. That reflects China’s concerns about Lai’s history on cross-strait issues. But it also reflects disappointment that Lai departed in some places from Tsai, for instance by not explicitly pledging to conduct cross-strait relations in accordance with the Republic of China (ROC) Constitution, which embodies a one-China framework.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p><p>In the period ahead, cross-strait issues will remain a point of contention between Taipei and Beijing, with official dialogue channels all but certain to remain closed. If both sides come to believe their own restraint will not be reciprocated, then the conditions will be set for a vicious cycle. For example, if Beijing responds to Lai’s efforts to signal continuity in his inaugural address with military and economic pressure, and if Taipei then concludes there is little reason for restraint on political issues, cross-strait tensions will increase. Careful signaling, and deeper dialogue—likely through unofficial channels or even through intermediaries—will be needed to avoid such an outcome.&nbsp;</p>
<p><b>Parsing Lai’s Inaugural Address&nbsp;</b></p>
<p>In his inaugural <a href="https://english.president.gov.tw/News/6726" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="speech">speech</a>, Lai sought to reassure audiences that he would be a source of stability and continuity on cross-strait issues and would not provoke Beijing or seek to change the status quo. Despite frustrations within Taiwan on domestic issues – rising housing prices, stagnating wages, and growing youth unemployment – Tsai still left office as the only president since Taiwan’s democratization to enjoy an approval rating of over 50 percent and is widely credited with ably managing cross-strait relations. It is thus little wonder that Lai sought to embrace and build on her legacy. His personnel appointments in senior national security positions similarly project continuity.&nbsp;</p>
<p>In his address, Lai regularly returned to the language of continuity and stability. “Peace is the only option,” he stressed, “and prosperity, gained through lasting peace and stability, is our objective.” Lai called Taiwan’s leaders “pilots for peace” and indicated he would “neither yield nor provoke” and would instead “maintain the status quo.” Elsewhere in his speech, Lai spoke of providing “stable and principled cross-strait leadership.” Such reassurances are important given Lai’s 2017 <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/taiwans-2024-presidential-election-analyzing-william-lais-foreign-policy-positions" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="statement">statement</a> that he was a “pragmatic worker for Taiwan independence” and questions in Beijing about his intentions.&nbsp;</p>
<p>To that end, Lai mentioned the “Republic of China” over a dozen times – more than Tsai did in her last inaugural address – and pledged to lead “in accordance with the Republic of China Constitution system.” Beijing took exception to Lai’s statement that “the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other.” That phrase has not appeared in an inaugural address before, though it was a formulation Tsai previously included in high-level speeches, and likely does not indicate any change in policy.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Lai also included conciliatory language toward Beijing. He encouraged it to “choose dialogue over confrontation, exchange over containment, and under the principles of parity and dignity, engage in cooperation with the legal government chosen by Taiwan’s people.” Notably, he stressed that, “this can start from the resumption of tourism on a reciprocal basis, and enrollment of degree students in Taiwanese institutions.” China has pointed to the lack of cross-strait tourism and student exchanges as evidence of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)’s lack of commitment to productive cross-strait relations, and Lai’s signal that he was open to practical exchanges was an effort to demonstrate goodwill toward Beijing.&nbsp;</p><p>Lai specifically referenced Tsai’s “Four Commitments” – her unique formulation on cross-strait policy. Beijing likely sees the framework’s first-ever appearance in an inaugural address as escalatory. But Tsai has referenced it in several high-level speeches, and her team had described it as a stakeholder agnostic formulation with propositions acceptable to all of Taiwan rather than one grounded entirely in DPP documents. Lai’s inclusion of it, rather than introducing a completely original approach, was probably intended to be stabilizing and again signal continuity.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>There were some areas, however, where Lai put his own imprint on cross-strait policies. He declared, “Some call this land the Republic of China, some call it the Republic of China Taiwan, and some, Taiwan; but whichever of these names we ourselves or our international friends choose to call our nation, we will resonate and shine all the same.” This could be interpreted as a subtle way of signaling that Lai does not intend to pursue steps that would change Taiwan’s official name – unlike prior president Chen Shui-bian – by essentially setting the issue of nomenclature aside and accepting that Taiwanese citizens have different and equally legitimate views on this question. Beijing could choose to see this as a reassuring evolution. At the same time, though, putting the name “Taiwan” on the same plane as the “Republic of China,” or as an alternative to the “Republic of China,” will raise concerns in Beijing and be seen as a departure from precedent. The fact that a statement could be taken as simultaneously escalatory and de-escalatory highlights the need for greater communication between Beijing and Taipei, whether official or unofficial, to help explain intentions.&nbsp;</p>
<p><b>Putting Lai’s Speech in Perspective&nbsp;</b></p>
<p>Lai’s cross-strait platform did not go as far as Tsai’s first inaugural address on certain elements of cross-strait issues. In her <a href="https://english.president.gov.tw/News/4893" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="2016 inaugural">2016 inaugural</a>, Tsai acknowledged the so-called “1992 consensus” without explicitly defining or endorsing it, going perhaps as far as any DPP leader is likely to go. “In 1992,” she said, “the two institutions representing each side across the Strait (the Straits Exchange Foundation&nbsp;and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits), through communication and negotiations, arrived at various joint acknowledgements and understandings. It was done in a spirit of mutual understanding and a political attitude of seeking common ground while setting aside differences. I respect this historical fact.” In that same speech, she stressed that, “since 1992, over twenty years of interactions and negotiations across the Strait have enabled and accumulated outcomes which both sides must collectively cherish and sustain; and it is based on such existing realities and political foundations that the stable and peaceful development of the cross-Strait relationship must be continuously promoted.” And as a matter of policy, she was clear that, “the new government will conduct cross-Strait affairs in accordance with the Republic of China Constitution, the Act Governing Relations Between the People of Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, and other relevant legislation.”&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>Beijing did not give Tsai much credit for these statements, choosing instead to base their expectations on the policies of her predecessor, Ma Ying-jeou, who had fully endorsed the “1992 consensus,” a term one of his key advisors <a href="https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2006/02/22/2003294106" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="invented">invented</a> in 2000. Accordingly, in her <a href="https://english.president.gov.tw/News/6004" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="second inaugural address">second inaugural address</a>, she did not repeat that detailed construction. But she did commit that she would “continue to handle cross-strait affairs according to the Constitution of the Republic of China and the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area.”&nbsp;</p>
<p>However, Lai did not explicitly state that cross-strait affairs would be conducted in accordance with the Republic of China Constitution and the Act Governing Relations Between the People of Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, both of which embody a one-China framework. He also did not even elliptically reference the “1992 consensus.” This is likely due to a calculation by Lai and his team that there was little to be gained by attempting to find a workaround to the “1992 consensus” in this first articulation of his cross-strait policy as president. Since Beijing famously rejected Tsai’s formulation as an “incomplete test paper” and has an even darker view of Lai than it had of Tsai, his team likely concluded nothing he would do would be enough at this stage. From Beijing’s perspective, however, the omission of these terms could be seen as a more consequential signal that Lai is embarking on a different cross-strait approach, overshadowing the areas where he stressed continuity.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Notably, Tsai refrained from directly criticizing China and certain PRC provocations in her past inaugural addresses, but Lai did not hesitate to do so. He instead declared that “China’s military actions and gray-zone coercion are considered the greatest strategic challenges to global peace and stability.” He called on China “to cease their political and military intimidation against Taiwan” and argued that even as Taiwan pursues peace “we must not harbor any delusions.” He noted that, “so long as China refuses to renounce the use of force against Taiwan, all of us in Taiwan ought to understand, that even if we accept the entirety of China’s position and give up our sovereignty, China’s ambition to annex Taiwan will not simply disappear.” Accordingly, he concluded, “in face of the many threats and attempts of infiltration from China, we must demonstrate our resolution to defend our nation, and we must also raise our defense awareness and strengthen our legal framework for national security.” Lai’s decision to include this language likely reflects the changed strategic context, including China’s military response to then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022, and the desire to ensure that Beijing—rather than Taipei—is seen by the international community as the provocateur in any cross-strait crisis.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p><b>Beijing Responds&nbsp;</b></p>
<p>China has made its distrust of Lai well known throughout his career. During the presidential campaign, the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/taiwan/elections-cross-strait-united-states-china-relations" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="warned">warned</a> that the choice facing Taiwan’s voters was between war and peace, with a vote for Lai tantamount to choosing the former. After Lai’s speech, the <a href="https://english.news.cn/20240520/d9024fcff39b4a7ba6a97a9dda5804d0/c.html" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="TAO’s spokesman">TAO’s spokesman</a> accused him of “flagrantly promoting separatist fallacies and inciting cross-strait confrontation,” heated language that represents a notable escalation compared with how Chinese authorities reacted to Tsai’s past inaugural addresses. A <a href="http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/jmsd/16310117.html" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="commentary">commentary</a> in state-run media accused Lai of filling his speech with “deceitful political lies, aggressively promoting the separatist ideology of ‘Taiwan independence,’ maliciously inciting cross-strait antagonism, and advocating for independence through reliance on foreign support and military means.”&nbsp;</p>
<p>At the same time, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stuck to standard talking points on Taiwan, <a href="https://english.news.cn/20240520/1735085308d0491ea8bf6e8528135e45/c.html?utm_source=substack&amp;utm_medium=email" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="stating">stating</a> that “anyone who attempts to challenge the one-China principle will inevitably fail” and that separatist attempts for “Taiwan independence” are doomed to fail and posed the greatest threat to cross-strait stability.&nbsp;</p>
<p><b>Challenges Ahead&nbsp;</b></p>
<p>Lai faces an array of challenges that will test his team. Foremost is the risk of a vicious cycle of escalation between Beijing and Taipei. Beijing may have written Lai off long ago, refusing to believe that he could be a trusted interlocutor who will exercise adequate restraint. Lai, who undoubtedly&nbsp;believes that he has acted in a restrained manner that has gone unnoticed in Beijing, may deviate from Tsai’s approach at least rhetorically, seeing little reason to adjust to accommodate Beijing’s preferences.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>In recent months, Beijing has acted in ways that might accelerate such a vicious cycle. Public reporting indicates Beijing has broken longstanding precedent with entries into Taiwan’s claimed contiguous zone. That decision suggests Beijing may not appreciate responsible approaches by Washington and Taipei, which in turn may see little reason to exercise restraint of their own in response.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Lai also faces a challenging environment at home. His 40 percent vote share was the lowest of any winning candidate since 2000, which similarly saw a three-way race. For the first time in sixteen years, no party controls the legislature with an outright majority, and the DPP is now a minority given the de facto coalition between the two main opposition parties: the Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP). In this more uncertain political environment, Beijing may look for opportunities to manipulate Taiwan’s politics to advance its aims. It hopes Lai will be a one-term president and likely believes it can increase the likelihood that this comes to pass, and that may reduce its incentive to seek stability.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>For the United States, the key question will be whether a vicious cycle can be avoided. If each side exercises restraint, and if that restraint is acknowledged and reciprocated by the other side, there may be a path to preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. That puts pressure on all sides—Beijing, Taipei, and Washington—to work to manage these complex dynamics.&nbsp;</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog/analyzing-lai-ching-tes-inaugural-address-more-continuity-difference</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/blog/analyzing-lai-ching-tes-inaugural-address-more-continuity-difference</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 21 May 2024 20:01:01 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>America’s New Cold Wars, With David Sanger</title>
<description><p><b style="font-weight:700">Mentioned on the Episode&nbsp;</b></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>John Maggio, <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt22525694/" title="Year One: A Political Odyssey" target="_blank"><em style="font-style:italic">Year One: A Political Odyssey</em></a>, HBO Max</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>David E. Sanger, <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/710053/new-cold-wars-by-david-e-sanger-with-mary-k-brooks/" title="New Cold Wars: China's Rise, Russia's Invasion, and America's Struggle to Defend the West" target="_blank"><em style="font-style:italic">New Cold Wars: China's Rise, Russia's Invasion, and America's Struggle to Defend the West</em></a>, with Mary K. Brooks&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>David E. Sanger, <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/547683/the-perfect-weapon-by-david-e-sanger/" title="The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage, and Fear in the Cyber Age" target="_blank"><em style="font-style:italic">The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage, and Fear in the Cyber Age</em></a></p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/americas-new-cold-wars-david-sanger</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/americas-new-cold-wars-david-sanger</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 21 May 2024 19:16:35 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Religion in China</title>
<description><div class="summary__container">
<div class="summary__title">Summary</div>
<div class="summary__description"><ul>
<li><span><span><span><span><span><span>The&nbsp;<span>Chinese Communist Party’s nearly 100 million members are required to be atheist, but the party recognizes five religions: Buddhism, Catholicism, Daoism, Islam, and Protestantism.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></li>
<li><span><span><span><span><span><span><span>Authorities tightly monitor registered and unregistered religious groups. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span><span><span><span><span><span>China has one of the largest populations of religious prisoners, and some groups, including Uyghur Muslims, face high levels of persecution.</span></span></span></span></span></span></li>
<li>Since&nbsp;<span><span><span><span><span><span><span>Chinese President Xi Jinping came to power, authorities have sought to enforce stricter regulations to ensure groups conform to doctrines set forth by the communist party.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></li>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
<br><h2>Introduction</h2>
<p>Amid an economic boom and rapid modernization, religion in China has been on the rise in recent decades. Experts point to the emergence of a spiritual vacuum as a trigger for the growing number of religious believers, particularly followers of Christianity and traditional Chinese religious groups.&nbsp;</p>
<p>While China’s constitution allows religious belief, Chinese Buddhism, Daoism, and folk practices are shown more leniency than other religions, such as Islam and Christianity, which are regarded as “foreign” by the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinese-communist-party" title="Chinese Communist Party" target="_blank">Chinese Communist Party</a> (CCP). In recent years, adherents across all religious organizations, including both state-sanctioned and underground and banned groups, face intensifying persecution and repression. They also face pressure to implement President Xi Jinping’s sinicization policies, which aim to make religious groups more aligned with Chinese culture, morality, and doctrines as defined by the CCP.</p>
<h2>Freedom and Regulation</h2><p>China’s relationship with religion has shifted throughout its modern history. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), religions were essentially banned, and followers were forced underground or persecuted as part of a campaign to eliminate “old” customs and ideas. In the 1980s, the CCP acknowledged the Chinese people’s complex relationship with religion. The following decades saw a revival of religious institutions and groups, and even tolerance of underground religions not directly under state control. Although Article 36 of the <a href="https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/lawsregulations/201911/20/content_WS5ed8856ec6d0b3f0e9499913.html#:~:text=Article%2036%20Citizens,by%20foreign%20forces." title="Chinese constitution" target="_blank">Chinese constitution</a> says that citizens “enjoy freedom of religious belief” and bans discrimination based on religion, the law regulates religion by forbidding state organs, public organizations, or individuals from compelling citizens to believe in—or not believe in—any particular faith. Minors are also forbidden from entering places of worship.</p>
<p>The state recognizes five religions: Buddhism, Catholicism, Daoism, Islam, and Protestantism. The practice of any other faith is formally prohibited, although often tolerated, especially in the case of traditional Chinese beliefs. Religious organizations must register with one of five state-sanctioned patriotic religious associations, which are supervised by the United Front Work Department, a branch of the Communist Party.</p>
<p>The government’s tally of registered religious believers is around two hundred million, or less than 10 percent of the population, according to several sources, including the UN Human Rights Council’s 2024 <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/CNIndex.aspx" title="Universal Periodic Review" target="_blank">Universal Periodic Review</a>. However, the number of Chinese adults who practice religion or hold religious belief is <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2023/08/30/measuring-religion-in-china/" title="likely much higher" target="_blank">likely much higher</a> because many believers do not follow organized religion and are said to practice traditional folk religion. These practitioners, along with members of underground house churches and banned religious groups, account for many of the country’s unregistered believers.</p>
<a id="1bcaf1d5-ec8e-4829-92af-c4167af28ab0"></a>
<div class="datawrapper-graph-embed"><div class="dw-responsive-embed-iframe"><iframe title="Religious Affiliation in China" aria-label="Bar Chart" id="datawrapper-chart-9Zk6T" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/9Zk6T/6/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="333" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe></div></div>
<p>Chinese public security officials monitor both registered and unregistered religious groups to prevent activities that “<a href="http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content_1372964.htm" title="disrupt public order" target="_blank">disrupt public order</a>, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the State,” as stipulated by the Chinese constitution. In practice, however, monitoring and crackdowns often target peaceful activities that are protected under international law, say human rights watchdogs.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The State Council, the government’s administrative authority, <a href="http://english.gov.cn/policies/latest_releases/2017/09/07/content_281475842719170.htm" title="passed regulations on religious affairs" target="_blank">passed regulations on religious affairs</a> in 2018 to allow state-registered religious organizations to possess property, publish literature, train and approve clergy, and collect donations. But the revised rules also included restrictions on religious schooling and the times and locations of religious celebrations, as well as monitoring of online religious activity and reporting <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-religion/china-tightens-regulation-of-religion-to-block-extremism-idUSKCN1BI1IH" title="donations that exceed 100,000 yuan" target="_blank">donations that exceed 100,000 yuan</a> (around $15,900).&nbsp;</p><p>Under Xi, the CCP has pushed to sinicize religion, or shape all religions to conform to the doctrines of the Communist Party and the customs of the majority Han Chinese population. New regulations that went into effect in early 2020 require religious groups to accept and <a href="https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/measures-for-the-administration-of-religious-groups/" title="spread CCP ideology" target="_blank">spread CCP ideology</a> and values. Faith organizations must now get approval from the government’s religious affairs office before conducting any activities. The next year, the CCP banned unregistered domestic religious groups from <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china/" title="sharing religious content online" target="_blank">sharing religious content online</a> and prohibited overseas organizations from operating online religious services in China without a permit, particularly targeting Christianity-related content on the messaging service WeChat.&nbsp;</p>
<p>In September 2023, stricter laws required religious sites and activities to support <a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/religion-controls-08032023122520.html" title="sinicization policies" target="_blank">sinicization policies</a>, which&nbsp; included prohibiting religious activity if it could “endanger national security, disrupt social order [or] damage national interests.” Meanwhile, in Hong Kong, where religious groups are not required to register with the government, religious figures have faced tighter scrutiny and have <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58ecfa82e3df284d3a13dd41/t/6549b051117ad12c7c40c783/1699328088263/Sell+Out+My+Soul_final.pdf" title="increased self-censorship" target="_blank">increased self-censorship</a> [PDF] under the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/hong-kong-freedoms-democracy-protests-china-crackdown" title="2020 national security law" target="_blank">2020 national security law</a>. The former Catholic Bishop of Hong Kong, Cardinal Joseph Zen Ze-kiun, was arrested on suspicion of “collusion with foreign forces” in 2021. He was later found guilty and was issued a fine. Since 2022, the Catholic church in Hong Kong has halted its annual commemorative masses to mark the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre.</p>
<figure id="image-82067" class="image-embed embedded_small"><div class="image-embed__picture">
<img width="520" height="347" alt="Cardinal Joseph Zen attends a mass for the Chinese Catholic church in Hong Kong." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" class="lazyload" data-src="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/China_Christianity_BG.jpg.webp" src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/China_Christianity_BG.jpg.webp" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption"><div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Cardinal Joseph Zen Ze-kiun attends a mass for the Chinese Catholic church in Hong Kong.
<span class="image-embed__source">Tyrone Siu/Reuters</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption></figure><p>In addition, China is home to one of the largest populations of religious prisoners, likely numbering from several thousand to <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/441219-CHINA-2022-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf" title="as high as tens of thousands" target="_blank">as high as tens of thousands</a> [PDF]; while in custody, some are tortured or killed, rights groups say. Instances of arbitrary detentions and violence carried out with impunity have led the U.S. State Department to designate China as a country of particular concern&nbsp;over religious freedom annually since 1999.</p>
<h2>Atheism and the CCP</h2>
<p>The CCP is officially atheist. The party prohibits its roughly ninety-eight million party members from holding religious beliefs, and it requires the expulsion of party members who belong to religious organizations. Officials have said that party membership and religious beliefs are incompatible, and they discourage families of CCP members from publicly participating in religious ceremonies. Although these regulations are not always strictly enforced, the party periodically takes steps to draw a clearer line on religion.&nbsp;</p>
<h2><b>Chinese Buddhism and Folk Religions</b></h2>
<p>China has the world’s largest Buddhist population—an estimate of 4 percent to 33 percent of the country’s population (42 million to 362 million people) depending on how religious practices are measured, according to the U.S.-based <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2023/08/30/buddhism/#how-many-buddhists-are-there-in-china" title="Pew Research Center" target="_blank">Pew Research Center</a>. Though Buddhism originated in India, it has a long history and tradition in China and today is the country’s largest institutionalized religion. Chinese folk religions, in contrast, have no rigid organizational structure, blend practices from Buddhism and Daoism, and are manifest in the worship of ancestors, spirits, or other local deities. According to CFR Senior Fellow Ian Johnson, author of <a href="http://www.ian-johnson.com/books/the-souls-of-china" title="The Souls of China: The Return of Religion After Mao" target="_blank"><em style="font-style:italic">The Souls of China: The Return of Religion After Mao</em></a>, “hundreds, if not thousands, of folk religious temples are unregistered,” but are tolerated.</p>
<p>Since China’s opening and reform in the 1980s, the party has been tolerant of, and tacitly approved, the rise in Buddhist and Daoist practice. Under former Chinese leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, the government “<a href="http://www.academia.edu/2262613/Buddhist_revival_under_state_watch" title="passively supported" target="_blank">passively supported</a>” the growth of Buddhism because it believed doing so helped bolster the image of China’s peaceful rise, supported the CCP’s goal of creating a “harmonious society,” and could help to improve relations with Taiwan, according to the University of Ottawa’s André Laliberté. Today, Buddhism, Daoism, and folk religions are <a href="https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/china-reversing-its-crackdown-some-religions-not-all" title="treated more leniently by the party" target="_blank">treated more leniently by the party</a> compared to “foreign” religions, such as Islam or Christianity.</p>
<p>The growth of Buddhism led to heightened visibility of its institutions, particularly <a href="https://www.academia.edu/5024941/Buddhist_Charities_and_China_Social_Policy_An_Opportunity_for_Alternate_Civility" title="Buddhist philanthropic organizations" target="_blank">Buddhist philanthropic organizations</a> [PDF] that deliver social services to the poor amid soaring inequality in China. Since Xi has come to power, experts have noted an apparent easing of tough rhetoric against, and even a promotion of, traditional beliefs in China. Some experts say Xi believes Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism do not challenge the CCP’s rule and therefore can be <a href="https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/the-two-tracks-of-xi-jinping-s-religious-policy" title="advantageous for China’s global diplomacy" target="_blank">advantageous for China’s global diplomacy</a>.</p>
<h2><b>Tibetan Buddhism</b></h2>
<p>According to China’s 2020 census data, the Tibetan region of China is home to<a href="https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/how-much-does-beijing-control-ethnic-makeup-of-tibet" title="seven million Tibetans" target="_blank"> seven million Tibetans</a>, more than 90 percent of the region’s population. Nearly all Tibetans in the region practice a distinct form of Buddhism. The Dalai Lama is the spiritual leader of one of the main schools of Tibetan Buddhism and symbolizes Tibetan identity for both Tibetans in China and in exile. Since 1987, he and the exiled government, known as the Central Tibetan Administration, have played a prominent role in garnering international support for a “<a href="https://www.dalailama.com/messages/tibet/middle-way-approach" title="Middle Way” approach" target="_blank">Middle Way” approach</a> to resolve Tibet’s political disputes within the framework of the People’s Republic of China. Buddhist monks within Tibet have also participated in largely peaceful anti-government demonstrations, though some have included riots and <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/13/self-immolation-and-chinas-state-cult-of-stability-tibet-monks-dalai-lama/" title="self-immolations" target="_blank">self-immolations</a>.</p>
<p>China’s religious policy is inherently tied to political tensions across the Tibetan region, which comprises the Tibet Autonomous Region and adjacent Tibetan autonomous prefectures and counties in neighboring provinces. To quell dissent, China has sought to aggressively assimilate Tibetans, says Tashi Rabgey, research professor of international affairs at George Washington University. A 2021 report by watchdog group the Tibet Action Institute estimates that <a href="https://s7712.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/2021_TAI_ColonialBoardingSchoolReport_Digital.pdf" title="78 percent of Tibetan students" target="_blank">78 percent of Tibetan students</a>&nbsp;[PDF] between six and eighteen years old live in boarding schools, where they are away from their families and taught primarily in Mandarin. Although Beijing has attempted to make the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/world/asia/25tibet.html" title="region more “Chinese”" target="_blank">region more “Chinese”</a> by funding development projects and incentivizing migration to Tibet, it has been largely unsuccessful.</p>
<figure id="image-82068" class="image-embed embedded_small"><div class="image-embed__picture">
<img width="520" height="347" alt="Tibetan Buddhist monks look at a mural in the Tashilhunpo Monastery in Shigatse, Tibet Autonomous Region, China." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" class="lazyload" data-src="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/China_Tibet_BG.jpg.webp" src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/China_Tibet_BG.jpg.webp" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption"><div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Tibetan Buddhist monks look at a mural in the Tashi Lhunpo Monastery in Tibet Autonomous Region, China.
<span class="image-embed__source">He Penglei/CNS/Reuters</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption></figure><p>Tibetan Buddhists face high levels of religious persecution. The state monitors daily operations of major monasteries, with facial-recognition cameras posted outside, and it reserves the right to disapprove an individual’s application to take up religious orders. In 2018, party cadres and officials were <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/01/24/china-new-controls-tibetan-monastery" title="given control" target="_blank">given control</a> over Sichuan Province’s Larung Gar, one of the world’s largest Buddhist study centers. Authorities <a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/tibet/yachen-demolition-10012019181505.html" title="demolished nearly half" target="_blank">demolished nearly half</a> of the center in 2019, displacing up to six thousand monks and nuns.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Authorities have reportedly detained and tortured monks and nuns for refusing to denounce the Dalai Lama, and laypeople have been ordered to replace photos of the Dalai Lama with Chinese leaders. A Tibetan child believed to be a reincarnated, high-ranking religious leader, known as the Panchen Lama, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/15/25-years-after-disappearing-tibetan-panchen-lama-china-no-nearer-its-goal" title="disappeared in 1995" target="_blank">disappeared in 1995</a> and has not been seen since. (Beijing claims that he graduated from college, has a job, and does not want to be disturbed.) After his disappearance, the Chinese government designated another child as the official Panchen Lama, though many Tibetans do not accept him as such.&nbsp;</p>
<p>With the fourteenth Dalai Lama nearing ninety years old, the Tibetan government in exile and the CCP are both preparing for his succession. Each is likely to appoint their own fifteenth Dalai Lama, generating a succession dispute similar to the situation with the current Panchen Lama. Rabgey says that this succession dispute will lead to an escalation of tensions in the region and is likely to trigger future Tibetan political unrest.</p>
<h2>Christian State-Sanctioned and House Churches</h2>
<p>China saw a significant growth in Christianity in the 1980s, after former leader Deng Xiaoping opened China to the outside world. Today, Protestantism is the predominant branch of Christianity practiced in China. There are three state-regulated Christian organizations and many underground house churches, though authorities have been cracking down on non-registered places of worship. Estimates of Christians in China vary widely, but according to a 2023 <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/12/12/chinas-christian-population-appears-to-have-stopped-growing-after-rising-rapidly-in-the-1980s-and-90s/" title="Pew Research Center" target="_blank">Pew Research Center</a> analysis, Chinese survey data show that Chinese adults who identify as Christian have remained stable at about 2 percent of the population (roughly 28 million people).</p>
<p>In recent years, China has witnessed a spike in state repression against both house churches and state-sanctioned Christian organizations, including campaigns to remove hundreds of rooftop crosses from churches, forced demolitions of churches, and harassment and imprisonment of Christian pastors and priests. A <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1deR6dkQpidTsJ0RheaZ2Y8Q-C4XVvEWZ/view" title="2018 report" target="_blank">2018 report</a> [PDF] from ChinaAid, a Texas-based Christian nongovernmental organization, said that religious persecution, primarily against Christians, was on the rise, citing more than one million cases that year. One of China’s most prominent Christian voices and the founder of a large underground church, Pastor <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/30/world/asia/china-wang-yi-christian-sentence.html" title="Wang Yi" target="_blank">Wang Yi</a>, was sentenced to nine years in prison in 2019 after a court charged him with subversion of state power and illegal business operations.</p>
<p>The Vatican does not have diplomatic ties with China, home to some ten to twelve million Catholics. Its recognition of Taiwan and a dispute over the bishop appointment process have been major sticking points. The Communist Party limits the Vatican’s role in selecting Catholic bishops and continues to harass and detain clergy who refuse to join the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association, the state-sanctioned organizational body for Catholics in China. In 2018, the two sides <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/22/world/asia/china-vatican-bishops.html" title="reached a provisional agreement" target="_blank">reached a provisional agreement</a> in which Pope Francis recognized several Chinese state-appointed bishops who had been excommunicated. While the two-year agreement was renewed in 2020 and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/vatican-confirms-renewal-contested-accord-with-china-bishops-appointments-2022-10-22/" title="again in 2022" target="_blank">again in 2022</a>, tensions seemed to rise shortly after, when China installed two bishops as heads of dioceses without permission from the Pope. However, China-Vatican relations appear to be improving after a January 2024 mutual agreement to consecrate two new bishops in China.</p>
<h2>Islam and Uyghurs in Xinjiang</h2>
<p>Muslims make up an around 1 to 1.5 percent of China’s population, accounting for <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2023/08/30/islam/" title="around eighteen million people" target="_blank">around eighteen million people</a>, according to recent estimates&nbsp;by Pew Research Center. China has ten predominantly Muslim ethnic groups, the largest of which is the Hui, an ethnic group closely related to the majority Han population and largely based in western China’s Ningxia Autonomous Region and the Gansu, Qinghai, and Yunnan provinces. Until recently, Hui Muslims had enjoyed relative freedom compared to the government’s tight control on religious activity in Xinjiang, home to a majority of Uyghur Muslims. But CCP policies and rhetoric have become <a href="https://www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-analysis/hui-muslims-and-the-%E2%80%9Cxinjiang-model%E2%80%9D-of-state-suppression-of" title="less tolerant and more repressive" target="_blank">less tolerant and more repressive</a> toward those who practice Islam in general. Officials have held Hui Muslims in formal detention and internment camps over advocating for religious freedom and funding mosque construction.</p>
<p>The Uyghurs are a Turkic people who live primarily in Xinjiang, northwestern China, and are also predominantly Muslim. According to China’s 2020 census, there are more than eleven million Uyghurs in this region, making up approximately half of its population, though many experts agree that increased Han Chinese immigration has lowered this number. For decades, Chinese authorities have cracked down on <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uyghurs-xinjiang" title="Uyghurs in Xinjiang" target="_blank">Uyghurs in Xinjiang</a>, claiming the community holds <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html" title="extremist and separatist ideas." target="_blank">extremist and separatist ideas.</a> They point to occasional outbursts of violence against government workers and civilians in the region and have blamed a group that Beijing calls the East Turkestan Islamic Movement for several terrorist attacks throughout China. Experts say most Uyghurs do not support violence, but many are frustrated by frequent discrimination and the influx of Han Chinese that are disproportionately benefiting from economic opportunities in the region.</p>
<div id="content-promo-82069" class="promo ">
<div class="promo__container">
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-xinjiang-uyghurs-muslims-repression-genocide-human-rights" class="promo__link">
<div class="promo__cta">Dive Deeper</div>
<div class="promo__title">China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang</div>
<div class="promo__icon-circle-and-arrow-right">
</div>
</a>
</div>
</div>
<p>Since 2017, up to two million Muslims, most of them Uyghurs, have been arbitrarily detained in so-called reeducation camps, according to experts and foreign government officials. Detainees have reported being tortured, barred from practicing their religion, and forced to pledge loyalty to the CCP. Outside of the detention centers, Uyghurs are subjected to intense surveillance, widespread religious restrictions, and <a href="https://apnews.com/269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c" title="forced sterilizations" target="_blank">forced sterilizations</a>. Officials have also sought to <a href="https://apnews.com/article/china-muslims-human-rights-watch-mosques-0f40384e264a874a210c08bf25b13d4d" title="shut down, demolish, or convert" target="_blank">shut down, demolish, or convert</a> mosques in Xinjiang and beyond. In February 2024, new laws in Xinjiang required that newly built mosques in China adopt “Chinese characteristics and style.”</p>
<p>Chinese officials deny human rights abuses in the region. They maintain that the reeducation camps have two purposes: to teach Mandarin, Chinese laws, and vocational skills, and to prevent citizens from being influenced by extremist ideas. Beijing has resisted international pressure to allow outside investigators to freely travel in Xinjiang.</p>
<h2>Banned Religious Groups</h2>
<p>Several religious and spiritual groups that fall outside the CCP’s officially recognized religions, dubbed “heterodox cults” by Beijing, are subject to regular government crackdowns. The party-state has banned more than a dozen such faiths on the grounds that adherents use religion “as a camouflage, deifying their leading members, recruiting and controlling their members, and deceiving people by molding and spreading superstitious ideas, and <a href="https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2014/eap/238288.htm" title="endangering society" target="_blank">endangering society</a>.” Those banned include Christian-inspired groups such as the Church of Almighty God, also known as Eastern Lightning, and folk religious groups, such as Falun Gong, a spiritual movement that blends aspects of Buddhism, Daoism, and traditional qigong exercise. International human rights groups, scholars of religion, and Chinese human rights lawyers have questioned such designations, criticizing the Chinese government for harsh repression against believers.</p>
<figure id="image-82071" class=&qu... |
http://localhost:1200/cfr/blog - Success ✔️<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0">
<channel>
<title>Blogs</title>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog</link>
<atom:link href="http://localhost:1200/cfr/blog" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"></atom:link>
<description>Blogs - Made with love by RSSHub(https://github.com/DIYgod/RSSHub)</description>
<generator>RSSHub</generator>
<webMaster>i@diygod.me (DIYgod)</webMaster>
<language>en</language>
<lastBuildDate>Fri, 24 May 2024 02:06:19 GMT</lastBuildDate>
<ttl>5</ttl>
<item>
<title>A Puzzling Attempted Coup in the DRC</title>
<description><p>The news <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/democratic-republic-congo-army-says-it-stopped-attempted-coup-2024-05-19/" title="reports" target="_blank">reports</a> of this past weekend’s failed coup attempt in Kinshasa read like a Mad Lib—a father-son duo from <u>Utah</u> and a <u>cannabis entrepreneur</u> from <u>Maryland</u> were part of a small band <u>livestreaming</u> an attempt to overthrow the government of the <u>Democratic Republic of Congo</u>. In the conspiratorial hothouse of Congolese politics, the bizarre incident, which culminated in deadly consequences for several people including Christian Malanga, leader of the would-be putchists, has raised numerous as yet unanswered questions. Who convinced Malanga that this effort would succeed? How did the amateurish group manage to access the presidential palace? Whose agenda was advanced by this spectacle?</p>
<p>It remains to be seen how the failed coup d’état will influence politics in the DRC, but one clear loser would seem to be the United States. Certainly, the incident made U.S. Ambassador to the DRC Lucy Tamlyn’s job more difficult. As social media accounts buzzed with accusations of CIA involvement, she <a href="https://x.com/USAmbDRC" title="registered" target="_blank">registered</a> “shock and concern” while pledging to cooperate with the Congolese government in investigating the incident. Cooler heads recognized that the failed takeover hardly bore the hallmarks of a professional intelligence organization, but the notion of armed Americans meddling in Congolese politics <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/10/24/congo-lumumba-cia-amends/" title="echoes" target="_blank">echoes</a> the real and sordid history of U.S. policies during the Cold War. As the United States aims to find a constructive way forward with the DRC on a range of issues from critical mineral deals to forest conservation and conflict resolution, developments that stir up historic resentments benefit only those who wish to see the United States on the back foot.</p><p>Yet another unhelpful narrative is buttressed by the bizarre events in the DRC—one about contempt. The story creates the impression that Americans so underestimate African states that they imagine a government can be overthrown by a small group of outsiders with nothing but fatigues, guns, and a can-do attitude. It’s consistent with former President Trump’s vulgar characterization of African countries, with press coverage that uses images from one part of the continent to accompany a story about a completely different country, and with analyses that consistently overlook the agency of Africans themselves in explaining major political developments. A small, misguided group with a sprinkling of American passports have boosted the efforts of America’s adversaries in Africa.</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog/puzzling-attempted-coup-drc</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/blog/puzzling-attempted-coup-drc</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2024 16:00:13 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>The President’s Inbox Recap: America’s New Cold Wars</title>
<description><p>The latest episode o<em>f </em><a href="https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/americas-new-cold-wars-david-sanger" title="The President’s Inbox" target="_blank"><em>The President’s Inbox</em></a><em> </em>is live! This week, Jim sat down with <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/by/david-e-sanger" title="David E. Sanger" target="_blank">David E. Sanger</a>, White House and National Security Correspondent for the <em>New York Times</em>. David recently published <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/710053/new-cold-wars-by-david-e-sanger-with-mary-k-brooks/" title="New Cold Wars: China’s Rise, Russia’s Invasion, and America’s Struggle to Defend the West" target="_blank"><em>New Cold Wars: China’s Rise, Russia’s Invasion, and America’s Struggle to Defend the West</em></a>. They discussed the United States’ return to great power competition.</p>
<div class="media-episode-card">
<div class="episode-card__podcast-title">
<section class="series-tag"><a href="https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/presidents-inbox" class="series-tag__link"> The President’s Inbox</a> </section></div>
<h1 class="episode-card__title">
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/americas-new-cold-wars-david-sanger" data-vars-event-label=" America’s New Cold Wars, With David Sanger"> America’s New Cold Wars, With David Sanger</a>
</h1>
<div class="episode-card__summary">
<p></p><p>David Sanger, the White House and national security correspondent for the<em> New York Times</em>, sits down with James M. Lindsay to discuss how the post-Cold War ended and why the new era of geopolitical rivalry began.</p>
</div>
<div class="audio-podcast">
<div id="player-container-node-audio-252435" class="audio-player-wrapper" data-id="-node-audio-252435">
<div id="play-btn-node-audio-252435" class="audio-player-wrapper__btn audio-player-wrapper__play">
<span class="play-btn">
</span>
<span class="pause-btn">
</span>
</div>
<div class="audio-player-wrapper__controls">
<div id="seekObjContainer-node-audio-252435" class="seekObjContainer">
<div id="seekHover-node-audio-252435" class="seekHover"></div>
<input type="range" id="seek-slider-node-audio-252435" max="100" value="0"></div>
</div>
<div class="audio-player-wrapper__time">
<small id="current-time-node-audio-252435" class="time">0:00</small>
<small id="duration-node-audio-252435" class="time">0:00</small>
</div>
<div class="audio-player-wrapper__mute"></div>
<div class="audio-player-wrapper__speed" data-speed="1">x</div>
<div class="audio-player" id="audio-player-container-node-audio-252435">
<audio id="player-node-audio-252435" src="https://cfr-org-prod-media-files.s3.amazonaws.com/audio-files/240521_TPI_MASTER.mp3" preload="”metadata”"></audio></div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="episode-card__date">
May 20, 2024 — 38:18 min </div>
</div>
<p>Here are four highlights from their conversation:</p>
<p><em>1.) The post-Cold War era is over. </em>The United States no longer enjoys its unipolar moment. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and through the 2000s, the United States and the West made a series of misjudgments about where Russia and China were headed. They assumed that Russia and China would want to become more integrated into the U.S.-led world order. David acknowledged that Russian President Vladimir Putin stated explicitly in 2007 that he would do the contrary, while China’s ambitions were unclear initially. David said, “this was a failure of imagining a world in which these powers wanted to return to a past era of greatness and weren’t going to sit still for a unipolar world, run out of Washington under Washington values.”</p><p><em>2.) The new era of great power competition is distinct from the old Cold War. </em>The old Cold War was largely a military competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Today, the United States is engaged in a great power competition that is more complex. The United States is engaged in competition with China and Russia—both of whom have nuclear arsenals. The United States is dealing with, as David put it, “a Russia that has learned with great effectiveness, how to be an agent of disturbance or at least disruption, and a China whose rise, although it has recently run into considerable economic headwinds, has created a range of new problems for us.” At the same time, the United States and its allies and partners—including NATO members, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia—and the “Axis of Resistance”—which is made up of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran—are squaring off. The United States and the Soviet Union, however, were never as interconnected as the United States, China, and Russia are today. He added, “in the new Cold Wars, we are still reliant on the Chinese for chips, other technology. They are reliant on us, and yet none of that has prevented us from descending into what I think is a new era of containment.”</p>
<p><em>3.) The Russia-Ukraine war is a “laboratory” for the United States and its partners against the backdrop of great power competition. </em>The United States is learning what does and doesn’t work in direct conflict with major powers. For example, the United States now realizes that its expensive satellite systems are “sitting ducks.” In the run-up to the war in Ukraine, Russia successfully took out the European Viasat satellite network through a cyberattack on the ground-based modems. Now, the United States is looking to move to a system like Elon Musk’s Starlink—which consists of small satellite constellations. That’s just one example of expensive, modern technology mismatching warfare realities.</p>
<p><em>4.) There is more reason for optimism on the U.S.-China relationship than the U.S.-Russia relationship. </em>David put it this way, “oddly enough, I'm slightly more optimistic, at least in the short term on China than I am on Russia. At least we have conversations underway with them. That's really only in the past year and is driven less by the brilliance of our diplomacy, I think, than by the fact that the Chinese economy has been through a significant downturn that's going to be really hard for them to reverse.” At the same time, when Putin threatened to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, China stated its opposition to the use of nuclear weapons in the conflict. China and the United States have some opportunities for collaboration. David added, “I don’t have any illusions that that’s going to be a broad effort, and I fear the two countries [Russia and China] may grow closer, not further apart, but it is an opportunity for the US.”</p>
<p>If you’re looking to read more of David’s work, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/23/us/politics/ukraine-new-american-technology.html" title="check out" target="_blank">check out</a> this adaptation from his book for the <em>New York Times</em> about the lessons learned from the war in Ukraine.</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog/presidents-inbox-recap-americas-new-cold-wars</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/blog/presidents-inbox-recap-americas-new-cold-wars</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2024 14:42:21 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Advanced Manufacturing to be a Focus of China’s July Party Plenum</title>
<description><p>China’s long-delayed third Party plenum on economic reform will be held in July. Official commentary suggests that the Party communique which will be issued at this meeting will double-down on the importance of manufacturing as a tool to address China’s pressing domestic economic problems, potentially increasing trade tensions with a range of foreign countries.</p>
<p>On April 30, Chinese authorities&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="0" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.rfa.org%2Fenglish%2Fnews%2Fchina%2Fdelayed-third-plenary-economy-meeting-05022024142612.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503185984%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=6rGd5%2FLSHj1bM81wUd7kavWE%2BfArnHSjbHJl9xnwSRY%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWA21353390-5ead-5dcb-2b03-23d199791392" originalsrc="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/delayed-third-plenary-economy-meeting-05022024142612.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="H0nZtRfp6EVbYT+KTpVqEheb+uLHle+cIEiV0g+4+TJW3Qu25XU/yzbCa1G2aRH/CCZXeUISHDF/gjIEXXg6zrryaT7ofgaXLsCq4t+Ik6Cb4/KAwl81rSRLR+Eb2phf9yd3N/9uq7lw3S0AkysnTIbFN+sOlSXsSMVT6MjV/hw=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/delayed-third-plenary-economy-meeting-05022024142612.html. Click or tap if you trust this link.">announced</a>&nbsp;that the third Party plenum of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee would meet in July. Official commentary&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="1" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.chinadaily.com.cn%2Fa%2F202405%2F01%2FWS66323e19a31082fc043c5050.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503199426%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=2n3UuGo%2FRAWMbRlRHWq%2BEQJSihCvwU%2FgSSy2AXeD2PE%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWA117497f5-e87c-bc4e-01dd-f20665dc9b5e" originalsrc="https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202405/01/WS66323e19a31082fc043c5050.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="bqQQxTFiPd7eWyoW8nBUP4fkYbr+Lnn8xYI19CYTxCJmPQ0cE4NwUv9TvRZM6N7F+C46cUR8Mw1johhx4G2Aca9bsgndQMVxL7ANckuufHWRiWeNv8elRRoWYA824p1Ilt4+VGxxWLXaknoI7+ubjDILGgOZJLlPYVseD4HI/nw=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202405/01/WS66323e19a31082fc043c5050.html. Click or tap if you trust this link.">indicates</a>&nbsp;that economic issues will be the core of the plenum, including a focus on integrated economic plans for the Yangtze Delta region. But specific attention will also be devoted to fostering “new quality productive forces”—a new Party slogan set out by Xi Jinping—with state commentary stating:</p><p><em>“The imperative was stressed... to develop new quality productive forces according to local conditions. The layout of China's strength in strategic science and technology should be improved, emerging industries cultivated and strengthened, the development of industries for the future arranged in advance, and the transformation and upgrading of traditional industries empowered by advanced technologies.”</em></p>
<p>As Chinese authorities&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="2" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Flosangeles.china-consulate.gov.cn%2Feng%2Flghd%2F202404%2Ft20240418_11283727.htm&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503205764%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=IbEShh6%2BllqjRF%2BKcOmhi%2FU7fTx1f9JCGSLpKwYrcBk%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAe743989e-a804-99d8-d203-643dc5ac1cc7" originalsrc="http://losangeles.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/lghd/202404/t20240418_11283727.htm" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="nJFMkJ+NoiMgW4rhQv8Zy1Lr3elJYsunHe4BDryx6OO0YVHvk0kbWP02pfLAsbN1ydtFaaLLI+D2xacSVY5nZse/MXybDN3lKtTtVciINnLLI1oJjosVuWnQLf9+vqKBw/nTo448yRRn+8p/5q4ZAnoGVQEE+nbAkYpuy9tqg0g=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: http://losangeles.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/lghd/202404/t20240418_11283727.htm. Click or tap if you trust this link.">note</a>, “new quality productive forces” includes three specific industries: electric vehicles, lithium-ion batteries, and photovoltaic products, which have registered dramatic export growth, in addition to other fields in biomedicine, artificial intelligence, and the digital economy. In recent years, Beijing has&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="3" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2024%2F05%2F14%2Fbusiness%2Fchina-exports-manufacturing.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503211048%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=1ahyI9wpkevRlu2E672ErhfP7nh3mz%2Fwp4Q4dT76QSc%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAd915b52c-0ef4-2399-4607-1ea63c3f5b6b" originalsrc="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/14/business/china-exports-manufacturing.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="L2sZOeL0lFunPptcQBH8iAhtpk88vF6tbo59ysGysLK+IoJ4HxdgExVjCZ/qZ6o01CYHuZ3WrgTsj9CqTmStycTBTwhf+dMUsXEuw49i+afnKwi/uOCVTlwcjKEcEbF6/gKe+TnSzRXlDzhzF6kuCmKwHA/MVKY/pJPB0BG8OpI=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/14/business/china-exports-manufacturing.html. Click or tap if you trust this link.">identified and promoted</a>&nbsp;key advanced manufacturing industries—including electric vehicles and batteries—as part of China’s industrial strategy. Goals include reducing reliance on foreign technologies and creating new sources of export-driven growth.&nbsp;</p>
<p>For Beijing, such emphasis on manufacturing represents an economic development strategy aimed at responding to serious domestic challenges. China currently faces both continuing high&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="4" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.wsj.com%2Fworld%2Fchina%2Fchinas-youth-unemployment-eased-in-april-a029344f&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503216081%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=eNQrISw%2BXNg3i%2FwuJav7ExYbcv2lBfCg4MzHyblG7p4%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAbd6af401-ab3c-7845-7ea4-53d89f61f617" originalsrc="https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-youth-unemployment-eased-in-april-a029344f" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="AQ4/iQp/hYQGxLkXSn7qmCrCJ/cZPlJ+TV1/fUPl5xi4LmH5GuJJY97e/YzHRaDV7MuK+PCZTCHRcdjAGmcXnkvGUJvpbYYSHjcj+YJoViFXMJd+4ypOZ98eTfbC22clyxh9qg1vg2Dbiab/raJBmkpD+TjrkS5zidNmKWfKPGQ=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-youth-unemployment-eased-in-april-a029344f. Click or tap if you trust this link.">youth unemployment</a>, as well as construction and real estate sectors that are mired in deep distress after the implosion of China’s property bubble, and which constituted a quarter of China’s GDP prior to the pandemic. Recent years have&nbsp;<a data-auth="NotApplicable" data-linkindex="5" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/amid-mounting-youth-unemployment-woes-beijing-looks-towards-vocational-education" id="OWA4f9afd72-27e1-a17f-5c3b-a22fc9dadb5d" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" title="seen">seen</a>&nbsp;Chinese authorities make a concerted effort to raise the status of vocational education programs and steer youth in the direction of skilled manufacturing labor, precisely because of the employment difficulties facing four-year college graduates.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Indeed, recent statements by Xi himself give further support to the likelihood that the July plenum will feature a doubling-down on manufacturing. A front-page&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="6" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fpaper.people.com.cn%2Frmrb%2Fhtml%2F2024-05%2F01%2Fnw.D110000renmrb_20240501_4-01.htm&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503220962%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=LvIQKiUxzrnTL5IJ16VqXtLA2b8mEyKv3lZTT4xqvYk%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWA3964bf46-e856-5cc7-ecc1-e1db928cee93" originalsrc="http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2024-05/01/nw.D110000renmrb_20240501_4-01.htm" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="U+VGUCUN0VJYCDQ2m86YaO3xVtQLf4AFom+BRwX1d9GyfZpjKes/TTI9qMLzcuMXNjvU+HCgSepVli75jPbZ3LIWCwAAZbLulu9txfWvvq83eCkMtoYWI36ftt+PqSliQSPrKlM0wk/5b1NnvWK2u5IeHP12JeLpC0cyv1/ltJI=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2024-05/01/nw.D110000renmrb_20240501_4-01.htm. Click or tap if you trust this link.">article</a>&nbsp;in the Party’s flagship paper accompanying the announcement of the July plenum carried extensive quotations from Xi himself extolling Chinese “craftsmanship” (<em>gongjiang</em>) in numerous fields of advanced manufacturing.</p>
<p>Naturally, any policy moves by Beijing to boost its own export-oriented advanced manufacturing industries run the risk of heightening tensions between China and its trading partners. Fears of Chinese market domination in specific industries led the Biden administration to&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="7" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fapnews.com%2Farticle%2Fbiden-china-tariffs-electric-vehicles-evs-solar-2024ba735c47e04a50898a88425c5e2c&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503225850%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=Lf8uTpZ6O1wJNj%2FSMr8ybHVGEuHjxOTwdJI49t%2BjhmY%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAbf0d4b26-e45d-be24-0f02-464361a12e73" originalsrc="https://apnews.com/article/biden-china-tariffs-electric-vehicles-evs-solar-2024ba735c47e04a50898a88425c5e2c" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="Zial7EJt9mURBt5T7sLNyoDKz3K/3tbjbkvn3tpiLyw16SD1VUaE4xhpY7xPsNzt05pHcsZEOjV3lzvQ09lZ5gjWonBZNBUQKbZdL96lTfPnncvNW3KYIP1mNu9l18reYgYx8EeZGPdwyI/KjsFZU1d3Nd9Aw9+8Kx8cwxUjyMc=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://apnews.com/article/biden-china-tariffs-electric-vehicles-evs-solar-2024ba735c47e04a50898a88425c5e2c. Click or tap if you trust this link.">announce</a>&nbsp;high tariffs on a range of such products last week. In fall 2023, European authorities&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="8" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Frhg.com%2Fresearch%2Faint-no-duty-high-enough%2F&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503230731%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=lyUNGLKjjpnh19ABAO7T6svYM8im%2F1%2Bhg%2BdAw4NUZ1I%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAe6e23327-f57b-65e1-1139-73e7492b7bc3" originalsrc="https://rhg.com/research/aint-no-duty-high-enough/" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="JaDVZAQwTw9fRxuxCWHj8WGhl3dc+jVzZfhMwuGIEkGneAbeDvT4IVpdE7XXcwVyjK8MtOFpBmFteUpAFXZ5EsTvExteNVVizaOmbqPwyBZY+e0plVrdArCFjCjJRKphNkxFyxk3V+dCyvyso5tC5M6sydgpqUCWvii5uiExGdA=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://rhg.com/research/aint-no-duty-high-enough/. Click or tap if you trust this link.">launched</a>&nbsp;an anti-subsidy investigation into China’s electric vehicle industry, and are currently considering imposing countervailing duties.&nbsp;</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog/advanced-manufacturing-be-focus-chinas-july-party-plenum</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/blog/advanced-manufacturing-be-focus-chinas-july-party-plenum</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 22 May 2024 20:43:23 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>European Tech Law Faces Test to Address Interference, Threats, and Disinformation in 2024 Elections</title>
<description><img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/full_width_xl/public/image/2024/05/EUvote.jpg.webp" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"><br><p>The European Union (EU) began implementing the Digital Services Act (DSA) this year, just in time to combat online disinformation and other electoral interference in the dozens of elections taking place in Europe’s twenty-seven member countries and the European Parliament elections taking place June 6 through June 9. To prepare, the EU conducted a stress test of the DSA mechanisms to address elections targeted by false and manipulated information, incitement, and attempts to suppress voices. The DSA has also <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/30/business/meta-european-union-disinformation-investigation.html" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="opened investigations">opened investigations</a> against Meta, TikTok, and X out of concern they are not doing enough to prevent these scenarios.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The DSA is a landmark piece of legislation not only because it is the most comprehensive regulatory effort to address digital threats to date and impacts the 740 million people living in the EU; its implementation will also inform other countries’ efforts to provide a secure and safe internet space. Even without additional legislation, the European law may induce the largest technology companies to voluntarily apply the same standards globally, as was the case with the EU’s Global Digital Privacy Regulation, which caused many platforms to routinely seek user permission for data collection and retention.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p><p>Tech companies’ responses to the DSA during the EU elections will be watched closely in the United States, where disinformation and electoral interference could roil the already contentious November elections. Despite years of debate, no U.S. guardrails have been implemented. Concerns over government censorship and free speech have stalled dozens of legislative proposals to require tech companies to address various threats in the digital space and risks arising from powerful new artificial intelligence (AI). The free speech argument overlooks the speech of those who are being doxed, threatened, attacked, and driven out of the public arena by vicious online actors—including women, who are far and away <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/most-online-hate-targets-women-says-eu-report-2023-11-29/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="the most frequent targets of these attacks">the most frequent targets of these attacks</a>. Legislative action has also been impeded by concerns that overly burdensome regulation will inhibit tech companies amid a worldwide race to gain competitive edge through generative artificial intelligence and other innovations.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The DSA is a useful model constructed around three principles: due diligence requirements for tech companies, mandated transparency via public reporting of their compliance with those requirements, and the threat of hefty fines to ensure compliance and accountability. The size of the EU market is large enough that, as with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), some tech companies may be incentivized to comply with the law’s provisions even without sanctions. The DSA’s strictest provisions apply to the world’s largest online platforms and search engines (those with more than 45 million users). These companies are required to routinely assess activity on their platforms and services for “<a href="https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-vlops" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="systemic risks">systemic risks</a>” involving elections, illegal content, human rights, gender-based violence, protection of minors, and public health and safety.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Companies have delivered initial assessments, which are publicly available, as well as information about the actions they have taken to comply. The EU website hosts a massive and growing online archive of hundreds of thousands of content moderation decisions made by the companies. In early enforcement actions, the EU has requested that Meta and other companies take down false ads and sought more information about their safety practices. For example, the EU queried X about its decision to cut its <a href="https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-requests-information-x-decreasing-content-moderation-resources-under-digital-services" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="content moderation team">content moderation team</a> by 20 percent since last October. Reduced content moderation on one of the world’s largest platforms is obviously a great concern given the number of elections and aggressive disinformation and interference campaigns by Russia and its proxies as it seeks to boost the fortunes of rising rightwing populists, Euroskeptic parties, and pro-Russian and anti-Ukraine candidates, as recently <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/04/17/slovakia-president-pellegrini-russia-election-interference-disinformation/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="occurred in Slovakia">occurred in Slovakia</a> and other Central and Eastern European countries.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>Thus far, the DSA has not yet levied fines, but the threat alone of stiff penalties of up to 6 percent of gross revenues has led most companies to provide the required information. This treasure trove of information about how these tech companies are policing their own platforms is itself valuable; it enables governments and researchers to understand the effectiveness of measures being employed by trust and safety divisions of companies, some of which embrace the goal of a safe internet. The EU law explicitly seeks to guard free speech as well as innovation by companies, but the experience of implementation will inform lingering concerns about free speech, direct government decision-making, and censorship of content, including whether an authoritarian government could exercise control over their populations through digital policing and firewalls. Those concerns color the current negotiations at the United Nations over a Global Digital Compact, which is to be announced as part of the Summit of the Future in September.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The essence of the DSA is not to make content decisions directly but to set standards for due diligence and require companies to demonstrate that they are monitoring and mitigating risks via their own codes of conduct. Voluntary standards may vary, but the sharpest debates revolve around defining what constitutes illegal content. The EU has taken additional measures to harmonize laws regarding what is illegal content across the EU member states, which has been a difficult and contentious matter. The United Kingdom (UK) went through a similar multiyear debate over concerns about curtailing free speech before passing its Online Safety Act late last year. The UK law adopted some features in the DSA, including the due diligence reporting requirement and fines of up to ten percent of gross revenue. It defines the scope of risks more narrowly than the DSA, although the UK law does criminalize “extreme” pornography and may criminalize the creation of deepfake porn. Enforcement of the UK law awaits finalization of codes of conduct by year’s end. The EU also has moved to harmonize what constitutes illegal content as the laws of the twenty-seven member states currently vary greatly in defining what is illegal. Germany’s Network Enforcement Act, which was passed in 2018, is one of the world’s stiffest hate speech laws, which aims to stem rising neo-Nazi hate speech. The far-right Alternative fur Deutschland party has <a href="https://www.vox.com/world-politics/2024/3/12/24080074/germany-afd-far-right" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="surged in state elections">surged in state elections</a> and exceeded the popularity of the leading Social Democrats in national polls.&nbsp;</p><p>The process of making the internet safer is iterative; several countries have revised their laws based on the experience of implementing them as well as evolving circumstances. For example, Germany amended its law in 2021 to stiffen its requirement that companies take down “clearly illegal” content within twenty-four hours. Australia has revised its online safety law twice since its initial passage in 2015, to require faster takedown of material deemed illegal and to greatly expand the law’s original focus on stopping child sexual abuse and exploitation and terrorist material. Speed of response is a critical factor in countering mis- and disinformation. Delayed action by tech companies has allowed viral propagation of material to proceed unhindered—as occurred in early January when deepfake porn of pop star Taylor Swift spread to 47 million viewers shortly after it was uploaded from the notorious 4chan message board.&nbsp;</p>
<p>That highly publicized episode drew attention to the disproportionate targeting of women and girls by internet violence, especially women in public life like politicians, journalists, and human rights activists, and minorities. The chilling effect on political participation has also been documented. The UK parliament rushed to act on deepfake porn after a number of women candidates were targeted this spring. Growing attention to the magnitude of the effects on women spurred the Biden administration to form a fourteen-country global partnership for action on online harassment and abuse. And last month, the EU concluded years-long negotiations to issue a directive on online gender-based violence and threats, including nonconsensual sharing of intimate images, deepfake porn, and other forms of attack. Member states are required to pass laws to implement the directive within two years.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The 2024 elections will serve as an initial test case for the DSA’s ability to rein in this wide variety of election interference, threats, and disinformation. Given the nascent regulatory architecture and companies’ varied compliance records, it is certain that further scrutiny and modification will be needed. Big tech will be required to provide public after-action reviews of the effectiveness of their measures to label AI-generated content, moderate discourse, identify foreign interference, and meet other guidelines for each country’s elections. These much-needed first steps will help light the way for others.&nbsp;</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/article/european-tech-law-faces-test-address-interference-threats-and-disinformation-2024-elections</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/article/european-tech-law-faces-test-address-interference-threats-and-disinformation-2024-elections</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 22 May 2024 15:54:31 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>On "Outside Agitators" and Gaza Protests</title>
<description><p>Below is a chart showing the numbers of people arrested during Gaza encampments and protests on a number of U.S. campuses.</p>
<p>Data was collected from <em>The New York Times </em>article titled <a href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2Finteractive%2F2024%2Fus%2Fpro-palestinian-college-protests-encampments.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7CEAbrams%40cfr.org%7C79b6f0937c2346ef2f5308dc79a4262b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638518993125924955%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=c1vMu1qHcMFcAe4V9go9nFMUVVZ8eQSGkzA5KFljrXA%3D&amp;reserved=0" title="“Where Protesters on U.S. Campuses Have Been Arrested or Detained,”" target="_blank">“Where Protesters on U.S. Campuses Have Been Arrested or Detained,”</a> and supplemented with additional numbers from local journalists, university papers and statements, and national news agencies. The arrest numbers are <em>not </em>an exhaustive list of total arrests related to Gaza encampments and protests. Rather, it is a sample from a group of institutions where there are reports on the affiliation status of those arrested.</p><p>So these numbers should be considered suggestive, not final or absolutely reliable. And what they suggest is that the protests were indeed seized upon by people unaffiliated with the universities and colleges in question, but determined to disrupt campus life in the service of their political goals. Only half of those "protesting" were students or faculty members.&nbsp;</p>
<p>This suggests other questions. Who were the 50.43% who were unaffiliated? Who financed their activities? Did the affiliated and unaffiliated act in the same ways, or was one group or the other more involved in violence, building takeovers, and extremist rhetoric as opposed to peaceful protest?&nbsp;</p>
<p>The involvement of such a percentage of persons unaffiliated with the universities presents special problems for administrators, because internal discipline such as suspension or expulsion will of course not be available when it comes to the unaffiliated. That may leave no alternative except arrests to bring the activities to an end. In real life, we've very often seen administrators threaten suspensions or expulsions and then back off, or even impose such penalties and then remove them as part of the price of getting protesters to disband. Faculty who violate university rules present a similar but even harder problem because they often have more protections, such as tenure.&nbsp;</p>
<p>My impression, now as the academic year is ending, is that punishment is extremely rare. Most charges have been or likely will be dropped, except perhaps in cases where "protesters" assaulted police. Academic penalties such as suspension appear to be disappearing as well. This sends a clear message: violations of the rules will be forgiven no matter how severe the violation if violators stick to their guns and threaten further disturbances. It is an invitation for more trouble, and quite an education for the vast majority of students who naively assumed rules were <em>not </em>made to be broken.&nbsp;</p>
<figure id="image-82254" class="image-embed embedded_large"><div class="image-embed__picture">
<img width="520" height="332" alt="A list of universities with the number of arrests and affiliation status of those arrested." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" class="lazyload" data-src="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/Arrests%20at%20University%20Gaza%20Encampments%20and%20Protests_2.jpg.webp" src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/Arrests%20at%20University%20Gaza%20Encampments%20and%20Protests_2.jpg.webp" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption"><div class="image-embed__caption-text">
<span class="image-embed__source"></span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption></figure></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog/outside-agitators-and-gaza-protests</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/blog/outside-agitators-and-gaza-protests</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 21 May 2024 19:45:22 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Cyber Week in Review: May 16, 2024</title>
<description><p><b style="font-weight:700">Senate AI working group releases AI Policy Roadmap</b></p>
<p>A bipartisan group of senators, which consists of Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY), and Sens. Todd Young (R-IN), Martin Heinrich (D-NM), and Mike Rounds (R-S.D.), released a “<a href="https://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000018f-79a9-d62d-ab9f-f9af975d0000" title="roadmap" target="_blank">roadmap </a>for artificial intelligence policy in the U.S. Senate” this week, and identifies areas or uses of AI that are well-suited for regulation, including boosting funding for AI innovation, developing standards for AI fairness, addressing AI’s implications for national security, and addressing AI’s effects on the workforce, among other concerns. The roadmap also calls for Congress to appropriate nearly $32 billion to encourage non-military AI innovation over the coming year. Although the report offers a <a href="https://www.akingump.com/en/insights/alerts/senate-gang-of-four-releases-long-anticipated-ai-whitepaper" title="variety of recommendations" target="_blank">variety of recommendations</a> for how Congress could leverage processes like appropriations, existing acts and funding like the CHIPS and Science Act, and research and development funding mechanisms to meet the goals of the roadmap, the senators have not clarified exactly what action Congress should take or when it would do so. The roadmap reflects the topics of AI Insight Forums that Majority Leader Schumer convened throughout the fall, which brought together business executives, legislators, and a small group of civil society advocates to discuss regulating artificial intelligence in the United States. While <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2024/05/15/congress-ai-road-map-regulation-schumer/" title="tech industry groups generally supported the report" target="_blank">tech industry groups generally supported the report</a> as a step in the right direction, academics and civil society advocates <a href="https://www.fastcompany.com/91126098/chuck-schumer-ai-roadmap-panned" title="derided" target="_blank">derided</a> it for lacking specificity and substance.&nbsp;</p><p><b style="font-weight:700">U.S., Japan, and partners unveil agreement for cross-border data flows</b></p>
<p>The United States, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom have <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Technology/Japan-U.S.-and-others-to-ease-cross-border-personal-data-transfers" title="created" target="_blank">created </a>a new framework to enable the sharing of personal data across their respective borders. The new framework aims to balance the need to encourage online commerce between countries with the data security needs and regulations of each country. The existing mechanism for data sharing, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Cross-Border Privacy Rules, will be phased out in favor of a new system. The new agreement will allow non-APEC countries to participate in data-sharing initiatives, with the United Kingdom being the first such country to join, and will standardize a process for certifying companies from participating countries. Once those companies have been certified by a relevant data protection authority, they will be able to share data more easily among the participating countries. The agreement, which is still being finalized, is likely to be rolled out in the coming months, and the participating countries hope it will expand beyond the additional participating APEC countries, Australia, Canada, Mexico, the Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan.</p>
<p><b style="font-weight:700">Frank McCourt announces a planned bid for TikTok</b></p>
<p>In the wake of congressional and executive action aimed at forcing the divestiture of social media platform TikTok, American billionaire Frank McCourt <a href="https://www.projectliberty.io/news/frank-mccourt-organizing-a-people-s-bid-to-acquire-tiktok" title="announced" target="_blank">announced</a> that he is readying a bid for the U.S. version of the social media app TikTok. McCourt is organizing the bid through Project Liberty, an initiative hehe has founded to reimagine the economic models that currently power Big Tech and to bring forward novel solutions aimed at putting individuals in charge of their own data and digital engagement. experience. that could shape and change the status quo of the web, bring forward novel solutions at every level, and put people back in control of their digital lives. McCourt said that buying TikTok would create value by providing “individuals and creators on [TikTok] the value and control they deserve regarding who has access to their data and how it is used.” ByteDance, the parent company of TikTok, will likely be forced to sell the app after Congress included a provision in an annual defense spending bill that requires ByteDance to either sell TikTok in six months or see the app banned. The ban is currently <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/14/business/media/tiktok-creators-sue-ban.html" title="facing challenges" target="_blank">facing challenges</a> in the U.S. court system, as a group of TikTok creators has filed a lawsuit alleging that the ban violates their First Amendment right to fere speech.</p>
<p><b style="font-weight:700">Biden administration increases tariffs on Chinese technology imports</b></p><p>The Biden administration <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/972cabfb-f587-4cb3-ab21-ec3380b049da" title="announced" target="_blank">announced </a>additional tariffs on nearly $18 billion worth of Chinese goods, i stating the move was necessary to protect certain sectors of the U.S. economy. Chinese-made electric vehicles will see some of the largest increases, with the Biden administration quadrupling tariffs from 25 percent of a car’s value to 100 percent in the coming year. Currently <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/electric-shock-interpreting-chinas-electric-vehicle-export-boom" title="only 2 percent" target="_blank">only 2 percent</a> of all U.S. imports of electric vehicles come from China, but Chinese EVs have proliferated rapidly in other markets, with Chinese automakers accounting for <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-ev-strategy-going-small-cheap-pay-big-dividends-asia-russell-2024-04-23/" title="60 percent" target="_blank">60 percent</a> of all EV sales worldwide in 2023. China’s foreign ministry issued a statement saying Beijing “opposes unilateral tariff increases that violate World Trade Organization rules and will take all necessary measures to safeguard its legitimate rights and interests”. The Biden administration isn’t alone in investigating the potential growth of Chinese electric vehicles, as the European Commission has also begun <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/8e4a9eb4-cd88-4625-a21b-6378d24c6dad" title="investigating" target="_blank">investigating </a>EV imports to the EU, and may impose tariffs in the coming months.</p>
<p><b style="font-weight:700">FBI seizes major online cybercrime marketplace</b></p>
<p>The FBI and a number of international law enforcement partners announced that they had seized the servers used to host BreachForums, a prominent cybercrime website. The seizure, which the FBI conducted in partnership with law enforcement in the U.K., New Zealand, Australia, Switzerland, Ukraine and Iceland, involved seizing BreachForum’s Telegram channel as well. The agencies appeared to be searching for the administrators of the site, known by the aliases Baphomet and ShinyHunters, with the FBI issuing a request for tips on the administrators’ real identities. The FBI and Department of Justice have seized a number of major cybercrime forums over the past two years, including BreachForums’ predecessor, RaidForums. BreachForums offered a variety of criminal items for sale through its services, such as stolen devices, hacking tools, and illegal contraband.</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog/cyber-week-review-may-16-2024</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/blog/cyber-week-review-may-16-2024</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 17 May 2024 14:25:53 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Power and Financial Interdependence</title>
<description><p>So long as China runs a large trade surplus, Chinese residents (either the government or Chinese firms typically) will need to accumulate financial claims on the rest of the world. Conversely, so long as the United States runs a large trade deficit, the rest of the world will accumulate, in aggregate, claims on the United States. China need not directly finance the U.S. (though it did for a time), but Chinese offshore asset accumulation is necessarily a part of any global equilibrium that sustains U.S. deficits in a world still marked by <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/new-geopolitics-global-finance" title="large Chinese surpluses and large U.S. deficits" target="_blank">large Chinese surpluses and large U.S. deficits</a>.</p>
<p>Trade imbalances thus imply financial interdependence and linkage of one form or another.&nbsp; In today’s world, the risk that such interdependence can be “weaponized” is a very real.</p><p>In my new paper for the <a href="https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/power-and-financial-interdependence" title="Institut Français des Relations Internationales&nbsp;(Ifri)" target="_blank">Institut Français des Relations Internationales&nbsp;(Ifri)</a>, specifically for their new initiative on Geoeconomics and Geofinance, I explore the history of the Sino-American financial relationship – and in particular, try to highlight how perceptions of which country truly holds the leverage within the financially unbalanced relationship have evolved over time.</p>
<p>Two incidents are, I think, especially important.</p>
<p>One is the runup in China’s holdings of Agencies and (less visibly) other forms of credit to U.S. financial institutions in years prior to the global financial crisis. Prior to the global financial crisis, reserve growth (by China and others) was massive, both absolutely and relative to Treasury issuance. This squeezed big sovereign investors (and private investors) into close substitutes for Treasuries. Synthetic AAA didn’t work out well, but it was a real part of global finance for a while.</p>
<p>China’s exposure to the Agency market and other less visible exposures to the U.S. banking system (the China Investment Corporation’s investment in the Reserve Primary money market fund for example) taught China of the dangers of excessive exposure to the U.S. well before the current wave of sanctions against sovereign risk. China had more exposure to Agencies than Treasuries in the summer of 2008 – which wasn’t a comfortable position for China.</p>
<p>It also gave China a bit of leverage over the U.S., at least at the time. This leverage was not directly exercised, but the perception at the top of the U.S. Treasury that China’s actions could determine the success or failure of attempts to stabilize financial markets (notably the Agency market) clearly had an impact on U.S. policymakers. At a minimum, it raised the priority that the U.S. attached to its financial dialogue with China. At a maximum, it put pressure on the U.S. to respect China’s core financial interests, which included assuring the safety and liquidity of its holdings of Agencies. Then again, the need to support the Agency market was wildly overdetermined; the U.S. banking system was far more exposed than China.</p><p>At the end of the day, the fact that the U.S. stabilized the Agency market even as China reduced its exposure quite rapidly (whether by roll-off or outright sales) illustrated that the Fed, far more than China, has the decisive vote when it came to U.S. financial stability. The U.S. has learned, I think, that the Fed can buy more than China can sell.</p>
<p>The second episode is China’s decision after the global financial crisis to reduce its exposure to Treasury bonds – at least its visible holdings of Treasury bonds. China’s flight out of the Agencies was initially a slight back into Treasuries (and supply of Treasuries expanded rapidly after the crisis, making this an easy choice). Visible holdings of Treasuries soared from $500 billion in mid-2008 to $1.3 trillion by mid-2010, and from 2010 on China was a significant user of Euroclear’s custodial service.</p>
<figure id="image-82126" class="image-embed embedded_large"><div class="image-embed__picture">
<img width="520" height="378" alt="China: U.S. Holdings vs. Estimated Dollar Reserves" loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" class="lazyload" data-src="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/JGB%20Chart%20New.png.webp" src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/JGB%20Chart%20New.png.webp" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption"><div class="image-embed__caption-text">
<span class="image-embed__source"></span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption></figure><p>China found this risky – partially because of the domestic “optics” of having so much of Chinese savings in a country that, even then, was viewed as a less than ideal custodian of China’s wealth. China thus has been looking for alternatives to Treasuries for far longer than most contemporary accounts recognize.* The G7’s immobilization of Russia’s risk crystallized the risks of holding large reserve balances in strategic adversaries in the public eye. But China had been thinking about those risks for many years.</p>
<p>China’s response to risks of a concentrated exposure to the Treasury market was partially to continue diversifying the currency composition of its foreign reserves. This process started in 2005, likely ended around 2012 and ended up costing China a bit of interest income. China accumulated large euro reserve balances just when the ECB decided to adopt negative rates.</p>
<p>But a big part of China’s strategy was to diversify the way it holds dollars – making more use of offshore custodians (Belgium’s Euroclear most obviously) and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/fe81e06c-010d-4ddd-ad85-406412ec1bb9" title="private fund managers" target="_blank">private fund managers</a>, but also inching back into Agencies and no doubt other forms of dollar exposure that offer both less visibility and a small yield pickup over Treasuries. For example, Chinese institutions are believed to be active suppliers of dollars in the cross-currency swap market.</p>
<p>Most importantly, China decided to stop holding all its foreign assets as “liquid” foreign exchange reserves. A big part of China’s strategy is what China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) calls the “diversified use” of its reserves. <a href="http://www.safe.gov.cn/en/file/file/20211217/1bdd3ed85dba4d269655b5ce7159893b.pdf?n=Annual%20Report%20of%20the%20State%20Administration%20of%20Foreign%20Exchange%20(2020)" title="SAFE’s 2020 annual report" target="_blank">SAFE’s 2020 annual report</a>, which provides a 10-year progress report on this diversification, remains essential.</p>
<p>Diversified use of reserves effectively meant using foreign exchange not to add to SAFE’s formal foreign exchange reserves, but rather to use China’s foreign exchange to directly fund China’s strategic goals (through what SAFE calls the co-financing platform). SAFE handed foreign exchange over to the Silk Road Fund and its close kin, it provided close to $100 billion in equity capital to the China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export-Import Bank of China (Exim), and no doubt more financing via entrusted loans, and it helped fund the offshore activity of “small, medium, and large” financial instruments. I still think <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/how-hide-your-foreign-exchange-reserves-users-guide" title="my blog on this is pretty good" target="_blank">my blog on this is pretty good</a>, but would welcome a bit more competition.</p>
<p>Broadly speaking, shadow reserves substituted for formal reserves held in Treasuries – as the state commercial banks and the state policy banks both built up offshore assets of around $1 trillion. The Belt and Road thus should be interpreted as part of China’s reserve diversification – and an early effort at sanctions defense.</p>
<p>One side effect of this policy is increased capacity in the hands of the state banks: indeed, most of the responsibility for exchange rate intervention appears to have been outsourced to China’s financial institutions.</p>
<p>SAFE can sit serenely outside the market on its apparently static $3 trillion reserve portfolio, even as the state banks are called on to maintain the yuan inside its narrow trading band.</p>
<p>One key theme of the IFRI paper is that as a result of these shifts, the form of financial interdependence between the U.S. and China has changed over time.</p>
<p>There was an enormous increase in China’s exposure to the U.S. market between 2002 and 2008. At one time, China held 50 percent of its reported GDP in reserves, and 30 percent of its GDP in U.S. financial assets (that would be $9 trillion today, with over $5 trillion in U.S. assets). China’s visible U.S. holdings are now down to around 10 percent of its GDP. It has substantially more indirect exposure but still much less than it did immediately after the global crisis.</p>
<figure id="image-81919" class="image-embed embedded_large"><div class="image-embed__picture">
<img width="520" height="378" alt="Chinese FX and Other Foreign Assets, U.S. Holdings" loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" class="lazyload" data-src="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/Reserves%20and%20Other.png.webp" src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/Reserves%20and%20Other.png.webp" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption"><div class="image-embed__caption-text">
<span class="image-embed__source"></span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption></figure><p>China’s holdings of U.S. assets also increased rapidly relative to U.S. GDP – total reserves rose over 20 percent of U.S. GDP, and U.S. holdings for a while topped 10 percent of U.S. GDP.</p>
<figure id="image-81926" class="image-embed embedded_large"><div class="image-embed__picture">
<img width="520" height="378" alt="Chinese FX Reserves and U.S. Holdings" loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" class="lazyload" data-src="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/Reserves%20and%20Holdings.png.webp" src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/Reserves%20and%20Holdings.png.webp" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption"><div class="image-embed__caption-text">
<span class="image-embed__source"></span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption></figure><p>These holdings – while still large in an absolute sense – have fallen relative to all the available metrics: China’s GDP, U.S. GDP, and the size of the Treasury and Agency markets.</p>
<p>What’s interesting, at least to me, is that the recent rise in China’s trade surplus hasn’t translated into a big rise in China’s reported U.S. holdings – or into its f... |
http://localhost:1200/cfr/timelines - Success ✔️<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0">
<channel>
<title>Timelines</title>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/timelines</link>
<atom:link href="http://localhost:1200/cfr/timelines" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"></atom:link>
<description>Timelines - Made with love by RSSHub(https://github.com/DIYgod/RSSHub)</description>
<generator>RSSHub</generator>
<webMaster>i@diygod.me (DIYgod)</webMaster>
<language>en</language>
<lastBuildDate>Fri, 24 May 2024 02:06:20 GMT</lastBuildDate>
<ttl>5</ttl>
<item>
<title>Far-Right Terrorism in the United States</title>
<description><br>
<h1>1865</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Formation of the Ku Klux Klan</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77403" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1865_KKK.jpg.webp" width="520" height="550" alt="Illustration showing members of the White League and the Ku Klux Klan clasping hands over a suffering African American family." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
An editorial illustration by Thomas Nast in an 1874 publication of Harper’s Weekly shows members of the White League and the Ku Klux Klan clasping hands over a suffering African American family.
<span class="image-embed__source">Library of Congress</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>The Civil War between the pro-slavery South and anti-slavery North ends, and disgruntled veterans of the South’s defeated Confederate Army form the first iteration of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) in Pulaski, Tennessee. Nathan Bedford Forrest, a former Confederate general, becomes the Klan’s first grand wizard, its national leader. The KKK’s declared goal is “to maintain the supremacy of the White Race in the Republic.” The first Klan was active from 1865 until 1871 and played a major role in the South’s postwar Reconstruction era, fighting to oppress the previously enslaved African American populace and engaging in acts of violence against them.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1963</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>September 15, 1963</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Bombing of Sixteenth Street Baptist Church</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77407" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1963_Birmingham.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="The family of Carol Robertson mourn at her graveside during funeral services. " loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
The family of Carol Robertson, a fourteen-year-old African American girl killed in the bombing of Sixteenth Street Baptist Church, mourn at her graveside during funeral services.
<span class="image-embed__source">Horace Court/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>The church bombing in Birmingham, Alabama, is coordinated by the local chapter of the KKK, which by now is in its third iteration and popular across the South. The bombing of the predominately Black congregation kills four young girls, becoming one of the defining racist attacks of the civil rights era. Between 1947 and 1965, the KKK is linked to upward of fifty dynamite explosions targeting African Americans in Birmingham, Alabama—earning the city the grim nickname “Bombingham.”</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1968</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>April 4, 1968</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Assassination of Martin Luther King</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77408" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1968_AssassinationMLK.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Reverend Martin Luther King Jr.’s body is viewed by his wife, Coretta Scott King, and their four young children look at King in his coffin at his funeral in Atlanta." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Reverend Martin Luther King Jr.’s body is viewed by his wife, Coretta Scott King, and their four young children at King’s funeral in Atlanta.
<span class="image-embed__source">AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>James Earl Ray, a fugitive with multiple past convictions, shoots and kills Reverend Martin Luther King Jr., a leader of the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s, at a motel in Memphis, Tennessee. Ray was a supporter of racial segregation and a white supremacist. King’s death is mourned by millions of Americans and considered a low point in the civil rights movement.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1978</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Publishing of ‘The Turner Diaries’</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77409" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1978_TurnerDiaries.jpg.webp" width="520" height="780" alt="A copy of ‘The Turner Diaries,’ a racist, dystopian novel, sits on a library shelf in Marlinton, West Virginia." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
A copy of “The Turner Diaries,” a racist, dystopian novel, sits on a library shelf in Marlinton, West Virginia.
<span class="image-embed__source">Jeff Gentner/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>William Luther Pierce, a former college physics professor and a prominent neo-Nazi, publishes <em>The Turner Diaries</em> under the pseudonym Andrew Macdonald. The dystopian novel tells the story of a violent overthrow of the federal government, which leads to a nuclear conflict and race war. Notably, the book’s hero, Earl Turner, detonates a bomb at the FBI’s headquarters in Washington, DC. The book is advertised with the slogan, “What will you do when they come to take your guns?” The novel comes to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/12/books/turner-diaries-white-supremacists.html">resonate with far-right groups</a> in the decades ahead.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1978</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Formation of the Aryan Nations </h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77410" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1978_AryanNations.jpg.webp" width="520" height="728" alt="Reverend Richard Butler poses in his church at the headquarters of the Aryan Nations neo-nazi organization, in northern Idaho." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Reverend Richard Butler poses in his church at the headquarters of the Aryan Nations neo-nazi organization, in northern Idaho.
<span class="image-embed__source">Bettmann/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Notorious neo-Nazi Pastor Richard Butler forms the Aryan Nations in Idaho. A small but committed group, its followers subscribe to the so-called <a href="https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounder/christian-identity">Christian Identity doctrine</a>, believing they are God’s true “chosen people,” a designation usually that refers to Jews. They believe a racial war is imminent between Aryan (white) people and Jews and nonwhites, one that they must prepare for and win. Through its annual World Congresses, the Aryan Nations inspires the creation of the terrorist group called the Order.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1984</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">End of The Order </h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77423" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1984_Order.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="FBI agents sift through the ruins of the house where Robert J. Matthews, founder of the neo-Nazi group the Order, died in a fire after a standoff with federal agents." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
FBI agents sift through the ruins of the house where Robert J. Matthews, founder of the neo-Nazi group The Order, died in a fire amid a standoff with federal agents.
<span class="image-embed__source">Tim Klass/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Federal law enforcement officials <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/17/us/fbi-spying-white-supremacists-declassified/index.html">track Robert Mathews</a>, leader of The Order, to a small house on the state of Washington’s Whidbey Island. Mathews, wanted on murder and robbery charges, refuses to surrender, and a gunfight and standoff ensue, during which he’s killed in a fire. With his death, Mathews becomes a martyr for the far right.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1988</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Fort Smith Sedition Trial</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77411" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1988_SeditionTrial.jpg.webp" width="520" height="668" alt="Louis Ray Beam Jr. carries his wife, Sheila, who had fainted, away from the federal courthouse in Fort Smith, Arkansas. after he and twelve other white supremacists are acquitted on sedition charges." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Louis Ray Beam Jr. carries his wife, Sheila, who had fainted, away from the federal courthouse in Fort Smith, Arkansas, after he and twelve other white supremacists are acquitted on sedition charges.
<span class="image-embed__source">Danny Johnson/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Federal prosecutors bring fourteen white supremacists to trial at Fort Smith, Arkansas. They stand accused of plots against the U.S. government (seditious conspiracy) and other violent crimes. An all-white jury <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/04/08/13-white-supremacists-acquitted-in-arkansas-murder-and-sedition-trial/21c30cbe-c120-40ac-8fec-33420d1b0d2e/">acquits all of them</a>. Afterward, defendant Louis Beam, a former KKK leader and later the “ambassador-at-large” for the Aryan Nations, focuses on building a base of support for a white supremacist revolution against the “Zionist-Occupied Government.” To this end, Beam founds a publication called the Seditionist, which promotes his concept of “leaderless resistance.” This revolution strategy argues that guerrilla warfare should be pursued through individual or small cells, not hierarchical organizations.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1992</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>August 1992</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Standoff at Ruby Ridge</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77412" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1992_RubyRidge.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Federal agents draw their weapons on five neo-Nazis a few miles from the Ruby Ridge site in Idaho where Randy Weaver is engaged in a standoff with authorities." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Federal agents draw their weapons on five neo-Nazis a few miles from the Ruby Ridge site in Idaho, where Randy Weaver is engaged in a standoff with authorities.
<span class="image-embed__source">Mason March/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>A large contingent of federal agents descend on a small home in Idaho to arrest Aryan Nations member Randy Weaver on unresolved firearms charges. After Weaver refuses to surrender, the ensuing eleven-day standoff and siege results in the shootout deaths of Weaver’s son, wife, and dog, as well as a federal officer. Weaver ends up surrendering, but his family become <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/05/13/1098735768/weaver-and-the-ruby-ridge-standoff-contributed-to-the-evolution-of-the-radical-r">martyrs for the movement</a>, and the standoff captures the attention of far-right Americans nationwide.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1993</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>February 1993</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Waco Siege</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77413" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1993_Waco.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Smoke billows from the Branch Davidians’ compound as it burns to the ground outside of Waco, Texas, during a raid by federal agents." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
The Branch Davidians’ compound burns to the ground outside of Waco, Texas, during a raid by federal agents.
<span class="image-embed__source">Greg Smith/Corbis/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Federal agents besiege Mount Carmel Center, a compound near Waco, Texas, where residents are suspected of illegally selling machine guns and stockpiling weapons. The compound is home to the Branch Davidians, a religious cult led by David Koresh. When agents try to serve a search warrant, a gunfight breaks out, leaving ten people dead, including four federal officers. A nearly two-month standoff ensues, which ends when federal agents launch an assault on the compound. During the raid, a fire starts, and the compound burns to the ground, killing seventy-six Branch Davidians, including David Koresh and many women and children. Ruby Ridge and Waco both fuel anti-government conspiracy theories by alleging that a predatory government seeks to infringe on individual liberties.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1995</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>April 19, 1995</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Oklahoma City Bombing</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>An anti-government extremist and military veteran named Timothy McVeigh detonates a truck bomb at the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, killing 168 people and injuring hundreds more. The act is directly tied to the government crackdowns at Ruby Ridge and Waco, with McVeigh launching his attack on the second anniversary of the Waco siege. The Oklahoma City bombing is the deadliest domestic terrorist attack in modern U.S. history and leads to a sweeping government crackdown on armed militias, with federal law enforcement agencies significantly raising their efforts to infiltrate anti-government extremist groups. The militia movement therefore suffers a substantial blow in the late 1990s. McVeigh is executed for his crimes in 2001, while a co-conspirator, Terry Nichols, is still serving out a life sentence in prison as of 2024.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2008</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Election of Barack Obama</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77414" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2008_ObamaElection.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Members of the Tea Party hold a sign reading &quot;Obama Where's Your Papers&quot; during a protest." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Members of the Tea Party movement protest outside of San Francisco’s Fairmont Hotel ahead of a fundraiser attended by President Barack Obama in 2010.
<span class="image-embed__source">Justin Sullivan/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>A resurgence of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE49L7D0/">racism</a> and anti-government extremism surfaces with the November election of Barack Obama, the country’s first African American president. Some political opponents and conspiracy theorists allege that Obama is Muslim and foreign-born, falsehoods that they hoped would undermine his presidency and disqualify him from office.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2011</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>July 2011</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">American-Inspired Attacks in Norway</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77415" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2011_Norway.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="A young man is comforted as he mourns the deaths of those killed by Anders Breivik in a mass shooting and bombing in Norway." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
A young man is comforted as he mourns the deaths of those killed by Anders Breivik in a mass shooting and bombing in Norway.
<span class="image-embed__source">Wolfgang Rattay/Reuters</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Anders Breivik, a far-right extremist seeking to emulate Timothy McVeigh, kills seventy-seven people in twin attacks in Oslo, Norway. He murders eight with a truck bomb in the capital’s government quarter, and then drives to a nearby island—home to the summer camp of the youth wing of the country’s Labour Party—where he indiscriminately guns down sixty-nine more victims. Breivik wrote a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE76N14J/">long manifesto</a> accompanying his attack, calling his targets “cultural Marxists” who he felt were orchestrating the cultural and demographic replacement of Norwegians who shared his European heritage.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2015</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>June 2015</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Charleston AME Church Shooting</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77416" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2015_Charleston.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="People line up to attend Sunday services following a mass shooting at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina. " loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
People line up to attend Sunday services following a mass shooting at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina.
<span class="image-embed__source">Joe Raedle/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>White supremacist Dylann Roof opens fire at the “Mother” Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church in Charleston, South Carolina, killing nine African American worshippers. The church is known for hosting civil rights icons over the decades, including Martin Luther King Jr. During the attack, Roof tells victims, “I have to do it. You rape our women, and you’re taking over our country. And you have to go.”</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2016</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Election of Donald Trump</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77417" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2016_TrumpElection.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump speaks at a campaign rally in Rochester, New York." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump speaks at a campaign rally in Rochester, New York.
<span class="image-embed__source">Brett Carlsen/Getty Images </span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Donald Trump is elected president of the United States running as a Republican. Trump’s campaign had featured some far-right themes on immigration and race, and made proposals including a Muslim ban, a possible Muslim registry, and a border wall to keep out “rapist” and “criminal” Mexicans. To many Americans, his election victory proves that far-right rhetoric and policies that for decades had been associated only with extremists could resonate with wider swathes of the electorate, enough to actually win the White House.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2017</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>August 2017</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Charlottesville Car-Ramming</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77418" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2017_Charlottesville.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="White nationalists, holding tiki torches, march on the grounds of the University of Virginia ahead of the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia. " loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
White nationalists march on the grounds of the University of Virginia ahead of the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia.
<span class="image-embed__source">Stephanie Keith/Reuters</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>On August 11, a “Unite the Right” rally against the removal of a statue of Confederate commander Robert E. Lee in Charlottesville, Virginia, begins with a torchlight procession at the University of Virginia amid chants that “Jews will not replace us.” The following day, the protests turn more violent when James Alex Fields Jr., a twenty-year-old neo-Nazi who had traveled from Ohio for the rally, rams his car into a crowd of counter-demonstrators, injuring twenty-eight and killing one. In the wake of the incident, President Trump refused to condemn the rally, stating that there were “very fine people on both sides.” This statement, coupled with the president’s widely criticized handling of the crisis, provides a significant fillip for Americans on the far right, who <a href="https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/443666-richard-spencer-charlottesville-wouldnt-have-occurred-without/">see Trump as an ally in the White House.</a></p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2018</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Tree of Life Synagogue Shooting</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77419" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2018_TreeLife.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="A Jewish man prays at a makeshift memorial of flowers and handwritten notes outside the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
A Jewish man prays at a makeshift memorial of flowers and handwritten notes outside the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh.
<span class="image-embed__source">Cathal McNoughton/Reuters</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Robert Bowers, a forty-six-year-old local man, guns down eleven Jewish worshippers, most of them elderly, at the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Bowers presaged his attack with antisemitic and anti-immigrant posts on the social-networking site Gab, writing, “HIAS [Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society] likes to bring invaders in that kill our people. I can’t sit by and watch my people get slaughtered. Screw your optics, I’m going in.” Bowers was aggrieved about alleged migrant “caravans” coming from Central America, which he believed were being orchestrated by Jewish nonprofit organizations such as HIAS Bowers is sentenced to death in 2023 for the attack, and he remains on death row.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2019</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Christchurch Shootings</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77420" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2019_Christchurch.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="People walk under police tape as they leave after prayers at Linwood Islamic Center in Christchurch, New Zealand." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
People leave after prayers at the site of Brenton Tarrant’s rampage at the Linwood Islamic Centre in Christchurch, New Zealand.
<span class="image-embed__source">Edgar Su/Reuters </span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>During a twenty-minute rampage in Christchurch, New Zealand, gunman Brenton Tarrant murders fifty-one worshippers in two mosques. Seeking to inspire emulation of this violence, Tarrant livestreams most of the carnage on the internet, where it is viewed more than a million times—thus redefining far-right terrorism in the twenty-first century. Tarrant had been active in an eclectic and radical online space that trafficked in extremist ideologies about race, immigration, and environmental degradation. Mimicking Breivik, Tarrant explained his views in a seventy-four-page manifesto. His attack is inspired by U.S. conspiracy theories (including over guns), and in turn inspires follow-on attacks in the United States.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2020</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">COVID-19, Racial Justice, and the ‘Big Lie’</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77421" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2020_Covid.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Armed civilian men stand on the steps of the Michigan State Capitol in Lansing, taking part in a protest against Gov. Gretchen Whitmer's expanded stay-at-home order during the Covid-19 pandemic." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Armed civilian men stand on the steps of the Michigan State Capitol in Lansing, taking part in a protest against Governor Gretchen Whitmer’s expanded stay-at-home order during the COVID-19 pandemic.
<span class="image-embed__source">Jeff Kowalsky/AFP/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>The COVID-19 pandemic and ensuing government “lockdowns” in many jurisdictions provide renewed impetus to extremists across the far-right spectrum, offering perceived proof for many of their conspiracy theories and leading to spikes in online radicalization. Nationwide racial justice protests, catalyzed by the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/photos-how-george-floyds-death-sparked-protests-worldwide">killing of George Floyd</a>, also reenergize far right Americans, some of whom gather in armed counterprotests to “defend” police and businesses from rioting and looting. In the most notable flash of violence, Air Force Sergeant and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/right-wing-extremists-looming-threat-us-election">“boogaloo” adherent</a> Steven Carrillo perpetrates twin attacks in May and June 2020 that kill a federal officer and sheriff’s deputy in California. Both before and after his November 2022 election loss to Joe Biden, President Trump repeatedly airs unfounded concerns over mail-in ballot voting and repeats the falsehood that the election was “stolen.”</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2021</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Riots at the U.S. Capitol Building</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77422" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2021_Jan6Insurrection.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Trump supporters erect gallows amid protests and riots in front of the U.S. Capitol building, where many clash with police and damage government property." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Trump supporters erect gallows amid protests and riots in front of the U.S. Capitol building, where many clash with police and damage government property.
<span class="image-embed__source">Shay Horse/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>On January 6, 2021, a mob storms the U.S. Capitol, driven by Trump-fueled conspiracy theories about the 2020 presidential election. It the first such attack on the institution since British invaders set fire to the Capitol in 1814. Participants erect a gallows outside the building, imagery evoking “The Day of the Rope” from <em>The Turner Diaries</em>, which presaged a nationwide revolt. In the aftermath, federal prosecutors secure <a href="https://apnews.com/article/enrique-tarrio-capitol-riot-seditious-conspiracy-sentencing-da60222b3e1e54902db2bbbb219dc3fb">seditious conspiracy convictions</a> against several planners of the assault, succeeding where their 1988 counterparts had failed in proving that the defendants intended to violently overthrow the U.S. government.</p>
</div>
</div>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/timeline/far-right-terrorism-united-states</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/timeline/far-right-terrorism-united-states</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 03 Jan 2024 21:04:02 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>The U.S.–South Korea Alliance</title>
<description><br>
<h1>1950</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>June 25, 1950</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">The Korean War Begins With North Korea’s Invasion </h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76281" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_1950_KoreanWar_0.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="American troops withdrawing from Yongsan in Korea." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
American troops withdraw from Yongsan in Korea.
<span class="image-embed__source">Keystone/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>After independence from Japanese colonialism post–World War II, early Cold War tensions lead to the occupation of the Korean Peninsula by Soviet forces in the North and U.S. forces in the South. North Korea, backed by China and the Soviet Union, attempts to reunify the peninsula under communist rule by invading South Korea. The UN Security Council <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1950">denounces the attack</a> as a breach of peace and adopts binding resolutions, which call for an immediate cessation of hostilities and—for the first time—authorize the formation of the UN Command to provide assistance to South Korea. Under the command, sixteen countries, led by the United States, provide troop support to South Korea.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1953</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>July 27, 1953</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">The United Nations, China, and North Korea Sign the Armistice Agreement</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76284" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/12/TL_1953_Armistice2.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Maj. Gen. Blackshear M. Bryan exchanges credentials with Communist Lt. Gen. Lee Sang Cho at the opening session of the Military Armistice Commission at the Panmunjom Conference House on July 27, 1953." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
U.S. Maj. Gen. Blackshear M. Bryan exchanges credentials with Korean Communist Lt. Gen. Lee Sang Cho at the Military Armistice Commission in the Inter-Korean Peace House, situated on the south side of demilitarized zone.
<span class="image-embed__source">AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>The agreement divides the Korean Peninsula along the thirty-eighth parallel and establishes the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) as a buffer between North and South Korea. South Korean President Syngman Rhee opts not to sign the agreement, but he accepts the armistice on the condition that the United States and South Korea sign a mutual defense treaty. Because the Armistice Agreement serves as a cease-fire to the Korean War and the two Koreas did not sign a formal peace treaty, they technically remain in a state of war.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1953</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>October 1, 1953</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">The United States and South Korea Sign the Mutual Defense Treaty </h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76287" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_1953_MutualDefense.jpg.webp" width="520" height="409" alt="South Korean President Rhee Syngman leafs through the mutual defense treaty between the United States and Republic of Korea on January 29, 1954." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
South Korean President Rhee Syngman leafs through the mutual defense treaty between the United States and Republic of Korea on January 29, 1954.
<span class="image-embed__source">George Sweers/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>The U.S.-South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty ensures U.S. defense&nbsp;of&nbsp;South Korea against external aggression and commits to a U.S. military presence in South Korea. The treaty lays the foundation for a robust security alliance between the two countries.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1961</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>May 16, 1961</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">General Park Chung-hee Launches a Military Coup</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76288" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_1961_Coup.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="South Korean President Park Chung-hee stands on a podium next to U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson in Washington, DC." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
South Korean President Park Chung-hee stands on a podium next to U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson in Washington, DC, on May 17, 1965.
<span class="image-embed__source">Universal History Archive/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Amid domestic economic and political turmoil, the military overthrows the government, seizes power, and imposes martial law. Under pressure from the United States, South Korea holds a presidential election in 1963, in which Park is elected as president. Park implements an export-oriented economic modernization plan that transforms South Korea from one of the most impoverished countries in the world to a country with unprecedented economic growth, known as the so-called “<a href="https://www.oecd.org/country/korea/thematic-focus/sustaining-the-miracle-on-the-han-river-103653fa/">Miracle on the Han River</a>.” South Korea’s enhanced economic stature begins to alleviate the asymmetry of the U.S.-South Korea relationship.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1975</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">The United States Discovers South Korea’s Covert Nuclear Weapons Program </h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>President Park initiates the development of an independent nuclear weapons program, following concerns about the United States reducing its security commitment and withdrawing troops from South Korea under the Nixon Doctrine established by U.S. President Richard Nixon. The United States later pressures Park to cancel a nuclear plant agreement with France, offering U.S. nuclear assistance and personnel for peaceful purposes instead. South Korea’s nuclear ambitions cease when Park signs the <a href="https://disarmament.unoda.org/wmd/nuclear/npt/">Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty</a> (NPT).</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1980</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>May 18, 1980</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Pro-democracy Activists Lead the Gwangju Democratization Movement</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76289" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_1980_GwangjuProtest.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Armed South Korean soldiers capture rioters in Gwangju, South Korea." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Armed South Korean soldiers capture rioters in Gwangju, South Korea, on May 27, 1980.
<span class="image-embed__source">Sadayuki Mikami/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>After General Chun Doo-hwan seizes power through a military coup in December 1979,&nbsp;South Korean civilians, led by students and activists, <a href="https://archives.kdemo.or.kr/display/en/1980.html">organize pro-democracy protests</a> demanding an end to military rule. The South Korean government responds by imposing martial law and using violence to suppress activists in the city of Gwangju. The movement marks a turning point in South Korea’s struggle for democracy, inspiring people to resist the military dictatorship across the country and eventually leading to the country’s democratization. U.S.-South Korea relations are hobbled by perceptions within South Korea that the United States sided with the dictatorship rather than support the democratic movement.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1991</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>September 27, 1991</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">The United States Withdraws Tactical Nuclear Weapons</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>U.S. President George H. W. Bush announces his decision to remove all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea. The next year, the two Koreas sign the <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/KR%20KP_920120_JointDeclarationDenuclearizationKoreanPeninsula.pdf">Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization&nbsp;of the Korean Peninsula</a> [PDF]. Under this agreement, the two countries commit not to test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2002</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>June 13, 2002</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Anti-American Protests Arise in South Korea</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76290" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_2002_AntiUSProtests.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="A protester shouts anti-American slogans while holding a poster of the two students accidentally killed by U.S. officers in Seoul." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
A protester shouts anti-American slogans while holding a poster of the two students accidentally killed by U.S. officers in Seoul, South Korea, on December 3, 2002.
<span class="image-embed__source">Lee Jae-Won/Reuters</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Two off-duty U.S. servicemen accidentally kill two South Korean middle-school girls while driving a U.S. military vehicle. The incident and the subsequent acquittal of the soldiers by a U.S. military court trigger anti-American protests across South Korea. Primarily directed at the U.S. military presence in South Korea, the protests reflect a desire for a more equal relationship with the United States.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2003</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>January 10, 2003</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">North Korea Withdraws From the NPT</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76291" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_2003_NPTWithdrawl.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="A crowd of millions of North Koreans gathers to hear political leaders announce the decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in Pyongyang." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Millions of North Koreans gather to hear political leaders announce the decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in Pyongyang, North Korea.
<span class="image-embed__source">Xinhua/AFP/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>North Korea announces its intention to withdraw from the NPT, stating concerns regarding&nbsp;“hostile” U.S. policies toward the country. Pyongyang criticizes the binding obligations stipulated in the safeguard accord under Article 3 of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regulations. Three years later, North Korea <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/north-korea-nuclear-weapons-missile-tests-military-capabilities">successfully tests its first nuclear weapon</a>, changing security dynamics on the Korean Peninsula.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2003</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>August 27, 2003</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Six-Party Talks Aim to Negotiate North Korea’s Denuclearization</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76292" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_2003_6PartyTalks.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="The heads of each of the six country delegations join hands before talks about North Korea’s nuclear crisis in Beijing." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
The heads of each of the six country delegations join hands before talks about North Korea’s nuclear crisis in Beijing.
<span class="image-embed__source">Ng Han Guan/AFP/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Representatives from China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States convene in Beijing to negotiate <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/north-korean-nuclear-negotiations">North Korea’s denuclearization</a> following revelations that North Korea had covertly pursued a uranium enrichment program. The United States insists on complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID), while North Korea seeks diplomatic normalization with the United States and security assurances. Despite multiple rounds of talks, the countries fail to reach a consensus, leading to North Korea’s withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks in April 2009 after the UN Security Council condemns its long-range missile launch.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2012</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>March 15, 2012</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">The Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement Enters Into Force</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76293" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_2012_KORUS.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="South Korean conservative activists raise a banner reading “let’s occupy the world market and become an economic power,”." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
South Korean conservative activists raise a banner reading “let’s occupy the world market and become an economic power,” at a rally supporting the South Korea-U.S. free trade agreement in Seoul, South Korea.
<span class="image-embed__source">Jung Yeon-Je/AFP/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>After six years of negotiations, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak and U.S. President Barack Obama sign the trade treaty, which is then ratified by the South Korean National Assembly. The agreement promotes economic cooperation and access to commercial markets for both countries. The <a href="https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta">Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement</a> (KORUS FTA) is the largest bilateral free trade agreement the United States has signed. The trade agreement paves the way for an economic partnership alongside the military alliance between the two countries.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2016</h1>
<div class=... |
http://localhost:1200/cfr/books-reports - Success ✔️<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0">
<channel>
<title>Books & Reports</title>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/books-reports</link>
<atom:link href="http://localhost:1200/cfr/books-reports" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"></atom:link>
<description>Books & Reports - Made with love by RSSHub(https://github.com/DIYgod/RSSHub)</description>
<generator>RSSHub</generator>
<webMaster>i@diygod.me (DIYgod)</webMaster>
<language>en</language>
<lastBuildDate>Fri, 24 May 2024 02:06:22 GMT</lastBuildDate>
<ttl>5</ttl>
<item>
<title>Preventing U.S. Election Violence in 2024</title>
<description><h2>Introduction</h2>
<p>There is a serious risk of extremist violence around the 2024 U.S. presidential election. Many of the same sources of instability and grievances that precipitated the January 6, 2021, assault on the U.S. Capitol (along with other challenges to the outcome of the last election) remain present today. And, while the risk of far-right election-related violence is greater, the possibility of far-left extremist violence cannot be dismissed. Such violence threatens individual lives and the domestic political stability of the country.</p>
<p>It could also undermine the United States’ international standing and foreign policy goals, in a year where at least eighty elections will take place around the world. U.S.-based election violence has already <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/america-exporter-far-right-violent-extremism-brazil-and-beyond" title="inspired&nbsp;one similar incident" target="_blank">inspired&nbsp;one similar incident</a>, in Brazil in January 2023, and further disruption could affect the rules-based international order in ways detrimental to U.S. interests as it embarks on a new generation in strategic competition. The United States would also benefit from serving as the standard-setter on several associated issues, such as disinformation on social media and the rise of generative artificial intelligence (AI) and its impact on elections.</p><p>Lessening the risk of such a contingency is therefore an urgent national security imperative. Political leaders and other participants in the political and civic process need to implement a range of measures to prevent and manage violent election-related extremism.</p>
<h2>The Contingency</h2>
<p>Several plausible scenarios could develop between now and Inauguration Day. The scenarios can be broken down into events that occur before the election, during early voting in October and on election day in November, and in the weeks after the election, possibly lingering into the new administration. Each scenario poses different challenges to different constituencies and could be inspired or driven by differing accelerants.</p>
<p><b><em>Pre-election</em></b></p>
<p>The first and most urgent scenario involves assassination threats against campaigning candidates and other public officials<a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-slow-burn-threatening-our-democracy" title=". According to Seamus Hughes and Pete Simi" target="_blank">. According to Seamus Hughes and Pete Simi</a> of the University of Nebraska-Omaha, “over the past 10 years, more than 500 individuals have been arrested for threatening public officials. And the trendline is shooting up.” In recent years, for example, the lives of Vice President Mike Pence, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, and New York Republican gubernatorial candidate Lee Zeldin were all threatened. Nikki Haley, the Republican runner-up, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/nikki-haley-secret-service-2ae5b277396702248af73f89da92b4b9" title="requested Secret Service protection" target="_blank">requested Secret Service protection</a> during her campaign, indicating that violent threats have already surfaced in this cycle as well. The United States has been spared a high-profile assassination for more than a half-century. However, lack of success should not be taken to suggest lack of intent. Precisely this point was underscored on June 14, 2017, when a far-left extremist opened fire at a baseball practice of congressional Republicans, gravely wounding House Majority Whip Steve Scalise before being killed by the congressman’s Capitol Police detail.</p>
<p>Second, large party and voter gatherings, such as the Republican National Convention in Milwaukee in July and the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in August, as well as primary elections and caucuses, could pose attractive targets. The conventions will boast the largest collections of party members and leaders throughout the entire election cycle and could therefore attract individuals or groups with a vendetta. News headquarters will also be potential targets given extremist rhetoric depicting the media the “enemy of the people.”</p>
<p>Third, dates associated with the former president’s legal troubles could also trigger violent extremists. Trump’s legal challenges have thrust the 2024 election into unprecedented territory, with the possibility of a presidential candidate running for office from the courtroom, and possibly jail. The public process and potential legal outcomes could accelerate and spur violent attacks.</p><p><em><b>Election</b></em></p>
<p>Once voting begins, the first and most likely scenario is violence and intimidation at polling places and against election workers, or against drive-by or drop-off balloting sites and their collection points. This could include armed militia groups “observing” the election for fraud but, in reality, intimidating voters. In 2020, for example, Oath Keepers gathered at polling places to, in Oath Keepers founder Stewart Rhodes’s <a href="https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-10-10/what-happens-if-armed-right-wing-groups-polls" title="words" target="_blank">words</a>, “protect people who are voting.” Such gatherings could intimidate voters and disrupt Election Day by <a href="https://www.chicagotribune.com/2023/11/24/munster-incident-puts-focus-on-voter-intimidation-cases-that-can-dampen-turnout-poll-worker-participation/" title="dampening turnout" target="_blank">dampening turnout</a>. This scenario could be driven both by any candidate calls to arms as well as by grassroots voices sensitive to local issues, vulnerabilities, and voting preferences, and to individual poll workers expressing or acting upon their personal political views. Such violence provides less of a model for partners and adversaries in the international space, given that the November election will occur after most other 2024 elections have occurred.</p>
<p>Once voting is completed, threats could turn against those counting the ballots. During the 2020 election, some of the more vitriolic threats were delivered against election officials in swing states. The sequencing of vote counting can play a part, such as when early, mail, and absentee ballots, which tend to lean Democratic, are counted last, leading to “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/oct/31/red-mirage-trump-election-scenario-victory" title="red mirages" target="_blank">red mirages</a>” in which Republican candidates take early leads that fade in the final legal vote tally. In 2020, for example, federal agents&nbsp;<a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/2-men-detained-after-police-learn-possible-threat-philadelphia-vote-n1246774" title="arrested two QAnon supporters" target="_blank">arrested two QAnon supporters</a> from Virginia who showed up with firearms at a convention center in Philadelphia where votes were still being counted three days after Election Day. Political calls to “stop the count” or “stop the steal” can make a violent response more likely.</p>
<div id="pullquote-80929--2" class="pullquote embedded_small">
<figure class="pullquote__container"><blockquote class="pullquote__quote">
<span class="pullquote__quote-content">Once voting is completed, threats could turn against those counting the ballots.</span>
</blockquote>
</figure></div>
<p><em><b>Post-election</b></em></p>
<p>In the post-election era, depending on election results, attacks against government buildings and/or law enforcement officials will likely be the preferred means as violent extremists aim to take the fight directly to those they deem responsible for malfeasance. This scenario was seen at COVID protests in April 2020, sprawling anti-fascist rioting that summer, at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, and the attack against the FBI in Cincinnati. Here, the main accelerant will be political rhetoric interpreted by violently inclined individuals as calls for violence. Perhaps the most significant lesson of January 6 is that even seemingly innocuous moments can provide the impetus for extremist gatherings given the right combination of messaging and momentum. Any number of constitutional milestones—when electors vote in their home states; the January 6, 2025, counting of electoral votes; or Inauguration Day itself—could thus provide the spark, particularly among far-right violent extremists. Far-left violence responding to a disappointing election result will likely be more sporadic and disorganized. Militant anarchists, in particular, could be active, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/protesters-bring-shouts-skirmishes-and-shutdowns-to-inauguration-celebration/2017/01/20/00ea4c72-df11-11e6-acdf-14da832ae861_story.html" title="as seen on inauguration day in 2017" target="_blank">as seen on inauguration day in 2017</a>. Still, the bond between far-left anarchists and the political system is <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/us/live-updates-antifa-riots-1-21-2021" title="not as strong" target="_blank">not as strong</a> as on the right, making it unlikely that extremists respond to any call for violence from politicians.</p>
<p>Should multiple, organized extremist elements take up arms in defense of their candidates or other interests, sustained violence between political factions across broad geographic spaces remains possible. This level of violence has not yet been reached during the current escalation in domestic terrorism, except at a small scale on American streets in clashes between the Proud Boys and anti-fascists. Should those skirmishes escalate, they would pose a serious threat to law and order. The gravest fear, full-scale and total civil war, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/16/opinions/us-brink-of-civil-war-hoffman-ware/index.html" title="remains unlikely" target="_blank">remains unlikely</a>, in large part due to the lack of safe havens or sanctuaries for extremists in the United States. Political divides today run along urban-rural delineations, not northern-southern, which will likely stunt any budding civil war in its infancy.</p>
<h2>Warning Indicators</h2>
<p>The most urgent warning sign of impending violence will be the words of the candidates themselves. Political figures are certain to use divisive and perhaps even <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/09/05/polarization-democracy-and-political-violence-in-united-states-what-research-says-pub-90457?utm_source=carnegieemail&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_campaign=announcement&amp;mkt_tok=ODEzLVhZVS00MjIAAAGOBdngCOU2E0PgTOYMht0Jscfwq-kVZ7BNGEm9S0g9a-6RljRaHw9QWuQJjFo-HOqyY1k8e_LWTFj9poxUJ9iHe4ZzUlTWqS5XnzxluU0" title="existential political rhetoric" target="_blank">existential political rhetoric</a> during the campaign, warning of an urgent threat to the rank-and-file of either political party and to the country as a whole. Politicians deploy such rhetoric to frighten their base into voting, but such action also increases the odds of individuals turning to violent solutions if their candidate loses or appears to be in arrears. Existential rhetoric from within the political system or from candidates or parties can translate into implicit and explicit calls for violence, including against members of one’s own party, another important warning indicator. Even regular political rhetoric could be taken as calls to violence, particularly given that Americans are increasingly divided. Polls show that almost a quarter of Americans (33 percent of Republicans and 13 percent of Democrats) believe that “American patriots may have to resort to violence in order to save the country.”</p>
<div id="pullquote-80930--2" class="pullquote embedded_small">
<figure class="pullquote__container"><blockquote class="pullquote__quote">
<span class="pullquote__quote-content">The most urgent warning sign of impending violence will be the words of the candidates themselves.</span>
</blockquote>
</figure></div>
<p>Casting doubt over election results before voting commences heightens the possibility of violent extremism. “Pre-bunking” of fair election outcomes sows doubts in the minds of voters who then see eventual electoral defeats as confirmation of fraud rather than a rejection of one’s political platform, unlocking inherent confirmation biases. Politicians on both the left and right have been responsible for such rhetoric, the right issuing warnings of stolen dating back to the 2016 race, and the left often expressing concern over alleged voter suppression in predominantly Black southern communities.</p>
<p>The risk of more organized and widespread violence could be heralded by armed paramilitary mobilization, including on social media. January 6 was preceded by an onslaught of threats and public organizing, which was largely ignored by law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Extremist infiltrations of law enforcement agencies (<a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/01/03/could-january-6th-happen-again-526167" title="including the Capitol Police" target="_blank">including the Capitol Police</a>) and the military, coupled with the radicalization of active duty service members, also bears monitoring as both would considerably undermine any mitigative countermeasures arrayed against violent actors.</p>
<p>Finally, national security professionals should be vigilant in tracking foreign interference, whether covert (and therefore likely hidden from public view until after the election) or overt, including foreign leaders casting doubt on election results before voting commences. Adversaries such as China, Iran, and Russia will eagerly exploit any opportunity to weaken the United States and will likely issue widespread disinformation to cause disunity, as in 2016 and 2020. Social media remains a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/defending-year-democracy" title="defining battlefield in twenty-first-century elections" target="_blank">defining battlefield in twenty-first-century elections</a>, and the situation has only grown more fraught with the development of powerful tools such as generative AI, which, for instance, was used to attempt to <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/boston/video/new-hampshire-federal-officials-open-criminal-probe-after-fake-joe-biden-robocalls/" title="dampen the Biden vote" target="_blank">dampen the Biden vote</a> during the New Hampshire primary. The social media platform X poses a particular new challenge. Owner Elon Musk has reduced content moderation and allowed disinformation on the platform, creating an opening for manipulation by domestic and foreign actors alike, as well as AI-generated content.</p>
<h2>Implications for U.S. Interests</h2>
<p>The assassination of a politician or election official could seriously undermine U.S. democratic institutions and traditions. More broadly, the rejection of election results could undermine civil society and further polarize the nation, while the mere threat of violence at polling places could dissuade voters from making their voices heard, further <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-slow-burn-threatening-our-democracy" title="weakening American democracy" target="_blank">weakening American democracy</a>. Threats issued against poll workers undermine American democratic traditions; volunteers seeking to participate in the civic process do not anticipate being targeted for their service, and such threats could deter their participation.</p>
<p>But perhaps equally damaging, American political violence, particularly concentrated around election cycles, poses grave threats to the rules-based international order. U.S. electoral turmoil could provide a model for further seditious organizing in allied states. Such contagion has already been seen in Brazil, and could undermine election integrity in a year with upwards of eighty elections worldwide. Domestic violent extremism also undermines U.S. credibility on international human rights and its international security credentials. On January 7, 2021, for instance, a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry claimed that American support for pro-democratic protests in Hong Kong was now a sign of hypocrisy: “On the issue of human rights, democracy, and freedom, double standard should be discarded. I hope the relevant countries can think about this and learn real lessons from it.” An author linked to al-Qaeda, meanwhile, wrote that <a href="https://twitter.com/colebunzel/status/1382747626521563140" title="January 6 had made amends" target="_blank">January 6 had made amends</a> for mistakes made on 9/11: “I realized the wisdom of God almighty in not guiding the fourth plane to its target, for their destroying the citadel of their democracy by their own hands ... is more damaging to them &amp; more soothing to the hearts of the believers.”</p>
<div id="pullquote-80927--2" class="pullquote embedded_small">
<figure class="pullquote__container"><blockquote class="pullquote__quote">
<span class="pullquote__quote-content">U.S. electoral turmoil could provide a model for further seditious organizing in allied states</span>
</blockquote>
</figure></div>
<p>U.S. electoral turmoil could also offer a “window of opportunity” for state and nonstate adversaries to act—whether through direct terrorism launched at the United States or U.S. interests, or other hybrid measures intended to undermine U.S. security and standing. Hamas’s attack on Israel at a time of <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2023/10/israel-democracy-judicial-reform-netanyahu-hamas-attacks/675713/" title="profound internal turmoil" target="_blank">profound internal turmoil</a> in that country is an example of such opportunism. Russia also launched its invasion of Ukraine at a time of perceived Western weakness and division.</p>
<h2><b>Preventive Options</b></h2>
<p>In the same way that law enforcement officials deconstruct the motives, means, and opportunities behind criminal behavior to design more effective preventive measures, so too can election administrators assess policy options to lessen the risk of domestic political violence around the 2024 election.</p>
<p>The leading reason for the rise in domestic terrorism in recent years is a heightened motive or intent toward acts of violence. <b><em>Reducing motive</em></b>, therefore, is both paramount to prevention and a daunting challenge. In the build-up to the election, mainstream politicians on both sides of the aisle can use their platforms to speak out against division and publicly praise the integrity of U.S. democracy. Although federal politicians have been reluctant to be outspoken against divisive politics (perhaps warily watching the examples of Republicans Liz Cheney and Adam Kinzinger, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/loyal-trump-republican-party-moves-censure-us-reps-cheney-kinzinger-2022-02-04/" title="who no longer serve in Congress" target="_blank">who no longer serve in Congress</a> after sitting on the January 6 committee), state and local officials have been far more committed to upholding democratic norms in their constituencies. Many maintain the trust of a large swathe of the American people and can call for peace and calm. One example of this commitment is Republican Utah Governor (and Chair of the National Governors Association) Spencer Cox’s Disagree Better initiative, which aims “to model how to disagree better, setting an example and creating the permission structure and template for other public officials at every level to follow.” Such measures, critically, do not touch on political or ideological differences, but instead emphasize shared interests such as civil disagreement and trust and faith in democracy.</p>
<p>The Joe Biden administration has several options to lower the country’s temperature and promote a peaceful and orderly election process. For instance, President Biden could task agencies such as the Department of Education or Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to issue nonpartisan educational tools that teach the American public about the electoral process and its resilience to manipulation. Such positive pre-bunking could prevent electoral conspiracy theories from taking root as widely as they did in 2020. The Biden administration could also push states to reverse their vote-counting timelines to count the usually Democratic early, mail, and absentee ballots ahead of the typically Republican day-of votes—or to count votes simultaneously. Although a hard mandate to count votes earlier could violate the Tenth Amendment, gentle encouragement could help reverse the red mirage that contributed to January 6 and the “stop the steal” movement—although there is, of course, the danger of a “blue mirage” instead contributing to violence by far-left extremists. Media organizations could also avoid covering vote tallying, waiting to announce results until they are confirmed and finalized.</p>
<p>The Biden administration, as well as law enforcement professionals, could also look abroad for best practices on reducing intent to commit electoral violence. In <a href="https://dppa.un.org/sites/default/files/ead_pd_preventing_mitigating_election-related_violence_20160601_e.pdf" title="Preventing and Mitigating Election-Related Violence" target="_blank">Preventing and Mitigating Election-Related Violence</a> [PDF], a policy directive issued by the UN Department of Political Affairs in June 2016, the first suggestion is “Reducing high stakes in politics, promoting measures to move away from ‘zero sum’ politics and ensuring against a monopoly of power by one group.” One possible measure to reduce intent to violence, then, would be to promote democracy’s guarantee that the voices and views of the expected losing entity can still be acknowledged and advanced despite electoral defeat. In other words, politicians could employ language promising inclusivity and unity, perhaps on issues of <a href="https://www.texastribune.org/2024/03/12/henry-cuellar-democrats-senate-border-bill/" title="bipartisan concern" target="_blank">bipartisan concern</a> such as immigration, providing assurances that all Americans would have a seat at the table in the new administration. As stated by <a href="https://www.undp.org/publications/elections-and-conflict-prevention-guide" title="UN guidance" target="_blank">UN guidance</a>, “When parties are quite certain of loss or exclusion in an electoral contest, especially when they expect to be ‘permanent minorities’ (to lose not just once, but again and again due to patterns of identity voting), the certainty of outcomes is also a strong causal driver of violence.” In addition, the United States could publicize the <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/international-observers-monitor-midterm-elections-in-us-/6826269.html" title="cadre of international election observers" target="_blank">cadre of international election observers</a> to increase trust in the process.</p>
<p>In a time of unprecedented distrust of politicians and Congress, American civil society can also help bridge the trust deficit that extremist radicalizers often use to prey on vulnerable people, cajoled by politicians but ultimately acting independently of the political system. Religious leaders and educators, especially at the local level, have a unique platform to educate their constituents on the importance of free and fair elections and neighborliness, even if they vote differently. Sports stars and labor leaders, among other civil society actors, can also call for peace and calm without wading into political questions. The Department of Homeland Security, through its Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships, could redouble its grant-making efforts to both national and local nonprofit organizations working to reduce radicalization and violent extremism. The private sector, chiefly social media companies, also bears a responsibility to moderate the most serious calls for sedition and disrupt extremist cells. Social media companies can set stronger standards for AI use on their platforms and work to undermine actors using AI to affect the election process.</p>
<p><b><em>Reducing the capability</em></b> to inflict violence will also be central. Indeed, <a href="https://rollcall.com/2023/07/19/19uscpig/" title="the successful application of lessons learned" target="_blank">the successful application of lessons learned</a> after January 6 would considerably strengthen the United States’ electoral resilience. Intelligence sharing between federal, state, and local partners, as well as <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/fusion-centers" title="with fusion centers" target="_blank">with fusion centers</a> (defined by DHS as “state-owned and operated centers that serve as focal points in states and major urban areas for the receipt, analysis, gathering and sharing of threat-related information between State, Local, Tribal and Territorial (SLTT), federal, and private sector partners”), is critical. Threats issued by extremist groups and networks should be taken seriously, unlike on January 6, when preparations were not commensurate with the volume of intelligence suggesting armed actors planned to descend on the capital. Government officials across the aisle could work with legacy media to emphasize the nonpartisan mandate of the DHS, FBI, and state and local law enforcement to undermine allegations of partisanship and politicization. Leaning on local police forces would also build legitimacy, allowing more trusted law enforcement to adhere to their job of keeping the peace in their communities.</p>
<p>At a tactical counterterrorism level, the Department of Justice’s continued legal efforts to disrupt leading domestic extremist organizations—including the Oath Keepers and Proud Boys—builds deterrence against future acts of violence. Although the leadership of both groups is already serving jail time for <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/05/11/1175465857/extremists-groups-were-found-guilty-of-seditious-conspiracy-for-jan-6-now-what" title="seditious conspiracy" target="_blank">seditious conspiracy</a> as a result of January 6, which has undermined both groups while building a stronger deterrent against violence, such legal efforts could continue as the election cycle heats up. Government efforts to deter or defuse violence will be complicated, however, by extremist networks’ continued adherence to the leaderless resistance (“lone wolf”) strategy, which hampers the ability of law enforcement to penetrate groups and limits the intelligence value of any individual capture. Militant anarchists, for instance, will continue to operate in spontaneous “black blocs,” which similarly complicate infiltration and arrests. Efforts to reduce particularly lethal weaponry will likely fall flat, but could still be attempted.</p>
<p>Finally, law enforcement agencies could <b><em>remove opportunities</em></b> for violence by hardening soft targets and maximizing law enforcement readiness and even preparing for military intervention. The federal government’s law enforcement agencies could seek to designate important events, such as the political conventions and the election itself, as <a href="https://www.secretservice.gov/protection/events/credentialing" title="National Special Security Events" target="_blank">National Special Security Events</a>, which would open a range of new law enforcement tools to prevent and respond to violence. A streamlined electoral process, including the Electoral Count Reform and Presidential Transition Improvement Act passed in response to January 6, could also limit opportunities for violent interventions.</p>
<h2>Mitigation Options</h2>
<p>Mitigation scenarios assume efforts to prevent both motive and means to violence have failed. Therefore, the mitigative options will concentrate on limiting further opportunity while lessening the harmful impact of any early violent events. At the milder end of the spectrum of responses to early violence, a more visible law enforcement presence at various key sites could deter violence and encourage voters to safely cast their ballots. Focusing on local law enforcement would allay concerns of a federal government crackdown, allowing local authorities to emphasize the sanctity of the rule of law within their own communities. The hardening of such soft targets would also allow law enforcement professionals to limit the threat to civilian life should any violence erupt.</p>
<div id="pullquote-80928--2" class="pullquote embedded_small">
<figure class="pullquote__container"><blockquote class="pullquote__quote">
<span class="pullquote__quote-content">Focusing on local law enforcement would allay concerns of a federal government crackdown</span>
</blockquote>
</figure></div>
<p>A variant of the United Kingdom’s <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2021.1902604" title="Operation Temperer" target="_blank">Operation Temperer</a>—which allows soldiers to guard certain locations so police resources can focus elsewhere—could be conducted during several phases of the election cycle using the National Guard. Particularly symbolic or important sites, such as the U.S. Capitol, could be sealed off from the public, as occurred in the aftermath of January 6. This approach has <a href="https://www.nps.gov/articles/000/president-grant-takes-on-the-ku-klux-klan.htm" title="historical antecedents" target="_blank">historical antecedents</a>; the U.S. government deployed the military in the Reconstruction era to suppress threats by the Ku Klux Klan against Black voters. The major downside of such an approach would be the militarization of U.S. elections, which would undermine American democracy and yield a further propaganda victory to adversaries.&nbsp;</p>
<p>In a worst-case scenario, the Biden administration could attempt to declare martial law in order to suspend the electoral process and allow the military to intervene in particularly violent uprisings. However, such a move would pose an existential threat to American democracy, effectively ending America’s status as leader of the free world with few clear and secure paths forward.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The Biden administration could also simply take a hands-off approach, believing that American institutions are stronger than those who would try to undermine them and recognizing that violence has failed in the past to undermine electoral processes, including during January 6. Such a “keep calm and carry on” approach would yield control but could protect American institutions from further internal damage. It would also avoid feeding into right-wing narratives about the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/09/politics/biden-officials-exercise-2024-election-chaos/" title="weaponization of the federal government" target="_blank">weaponization of the federal government</a>, while ensuring that a cure for violence is not worse than the disease.</p>
<h2>Recommendations</h2>
<p>The range of stakeholders, including government, the private sector, and civil society, with the power to help prevent and counter election-related violence in 2024 should prepare countermeasures at the motive, means, and opportunity levels.</p>
<p><em><b>Reducing motive</b></em></p>
<p><em>The Biden administration should encourage early and mail-in voting </em>for voters on both sides of the aisle to thin election day crowds that could otherwise become targets, and states should be encouraged to count absentee and mail-in ballots early to avoid red mirages that could fuel electoral conspiracy theories. Media companies should avoid reporting on vote tallying until final results are confirmed.</p>
<p><em>Responsible poll-watching should be amplified and celebrated</em>, and efforts to introduce trusted authorities into the electoral system, such as the military-linked nonprofit <a href="https://vetthe.vote/" title="Vet the Vote" target="_blank">Vet the Vote</a>, should be encouraged. Publicizing and celebrating the integrity of the vote and of the many civil servants who contribute to its execution will demystify the process and build trust in the system.</p>
<p><em>Candidates and both parties should commit to upholding critical democratic values such as truth, honesty, free press, and the rule of law</em>. Policymakers from both parties should unite around political slogans that enhance trust in the electoral system and delegitimize violence. Such calls should be joined by segments of civil society, such as church groups, sports teams, and universities. Governors and other state and local officials should join the&nbsp;<a href="https://www.nga.org/disagree-better/" title="Disagree Better campaign" target="_blank">Disagree Better campaign</a>. Given their leadership roles in the election process itself, state and local officials should educate their constituencies about the integrity of the electoral process, the nonpartisan makeup of poll workers, and the importance of adhering to democratic traditions.</p>
<p><em>Candidates and party officials should avoid existential rhetoric and absolutist promises</em>, which the United Nations has found to reduce tension in other contexts. Politicians should issue <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/jan/10/election-workers-threats-political-violence" title="frequent reminders" target="_blank">frequent reminders</a> to their followers that they desire peaceful political change.</p>
<p><em>Government agencies at the federal, state, and local levels should work to improve transparency and pre-bunk conspiracy theories questioning the legitimacy of elections</em>. One possible model is how the U.S. intelligence community pre-bunked Russian justifications for its invasion of Ukraine in 2022—although it is unclear who would be able to share such stories beyond party apparatuses and civil society organizations.&nbsp;</p>
<p><em>Social media companies, meanwhile, should take <a href="https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2023/11/07/microsoft-elections-2024-ai-voting-mtac/" title="more aggressive steps" target="_blank">more aggressive steps</a> to limit the free rein of electoral conspiracy theories on their platforms</em>, while legacy media outlets should work to avoid sensationalist reporting, including reporting portraying the opposition party as an existential threat or individual politicians as corrupt or dangerous. Legitimate community note programs should be expanded to ensure bad information can be drowned out by factcheckers. Social media companies <a href="https://apnews.com/article/meta-adds-labels-to-ai-imagery-deepfakes-415163d053ed915042a04f1ec3d9eafa" title="should take aggressive stances" target="_blank">should take aggressive stances</a> against AI-enabled disinformation and deepfakes, particularly as they concern political figures. Intelligence agencies should carefully monitor social media platforms for disinformation campaigns, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2023/11/30/biden-foreign-disinformation-social-media-election-interference/" title="surmounting threats" target="_blank">surmounting threats</a>&nbsp;issued by the political right against such activity.</p>
<p><em>Trusted civil society actors, including religious leaders, labor unions, Hollywood, and sports teams and athletes, should call for peace and goodwill</em>, avoiding discussions of politics or ideology to instead focus on widely shared values such as nonviolence. Trusted leaders should educate their constituencies on civics and election integrity, and should prepare to band together in nonpartisan fashion should violence erupt.</p>
<p><b><em>Reducing means</em></b></p>
<p><em>Law enforcement agencies should <a href="https://twitter.com/CapitolPolice/status/1725877901805899815" title="conduct trainings" target="_blank">conduct trainings</a> and improve <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/01/03/could-january-6th-happen-again-526167" title="intelligence sharing" target="_blank">intelligence sharing</a> across levels of government</em>, as well as with fusion centers and nonprofit organizations. Extremists should be taken at their word—threats of violence or insurrection should not be dismissed as bluster or an unrealistic proposition. Professionals should not ignore lessons learned from January 6—including keeping the National Guard on standby and not ignoring intelligence warnings. As part of such efforts, law enforcement agencies with different and overlapping mandates should establish best practices and plans to ensure smooth coordination. This process should be aided by designating national conventions, Election Day, and January 6 as National Special Security Events.&nbsp;</p>
<p><em>Law enforcement and intelligence agencies should strengthen their protection of political candidates, election workers, and voting infrastructure</em>. The Department of Justice’s Election Threats Task Force should be fully resourced and staffed—and could <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-slow-burn-threatening-our-democracy" title="expand its remit" target="_blank">expand its remit</a> to protect polling places and particularly vulnerable politicians. The volume of threats could be so great that not every site can be protected, and law enforcement should be prepared to prioritize particularly high-value targets, beginning with leading politicians and important political locations.</p>
<p><em>Policymakers and pundits across the political spectrum should work to erode the prevalent framing of January 6 defendants as heroes and martyrs</em>, building a stronger deterrent against acts of political violence. Civil society leaders and state and local officials should emphasize the critical importance of nonviolent means of driving political change.</p>
<p><b><em>Removing opportunity</em></b></p>
<p><em>Any decisions made to dampen unrest or violence with massed law enforcement or military assets should be made as an absolute last resort</em>, with the public blessing of influential civil society actors and mainstream politicians across the aisle. Such measures should be incremental, involving steadily increasing presences of law enforcement or National Guard units, in order to avoid the perception of an overreaching federal response.</p>
<p>Should the United States fail to adequately prepare for the risks of electoral violence in 2024, the integrity of the election will be on the line. In a year featuring at least <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/defending-year-democracy" title="eighty elections" target="_blank">eighty elections</a> around the world, the United States will also provide a blueprint for autocrats elsewhere seeing to contest and undermine their own elections. Ensuring a peaceful, fair, and thriving election is therefore of critical importance, both to American democracy as well as democracy around the world.</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/report/preventing-us-election-violence-2024</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/report/preventing-us-election-violence-2024</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 11 Apr 2024 16:29:22 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Lost Decade</title>
<description><img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/book_large_l/public/book_cover_image/The%20Lost%20Decade_revised.jpg.webp" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"><br>
<h1 class="article-header__title">Lost Decade </h1>
<div class="article-header__subhead">
<div><p>The U.S. Pivot to Asia and the Rise of Chinese Power&nbsp;</p></div>
</div>
<figure class="article-header__image for-tablet-down">
<div class="article-header__image-picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/book_large_l/public/book_cover_image/The%20Lost%20Decade_revised.jpg.webp" alt="" class="article-header__image-img" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
</figure>
<p class="article-header__description">Robert D. Blackwill and Richard Fontaine evaluate the limitations of the Pivot to Asia and offer a compelling vision for the future of U.S. foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific. </p>
<p class="article-header__byline">
<span class="article-header__metadata-type article-header__metadata-type--with-definition">
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/books-reports">Book</a>
</span> by
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/expert/robert-d-blackwill" class="article-header__link">Robert D. Blackwill</a> and
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/bio/richard-fontaine" class="article-header__link">Richard Fontaine</a> </p>
<div class="article-header__book-metadata-group">
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Publisher –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">Oxford University Press</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Release Date –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">Jun 2024</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Pages –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">480</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-isbn">
<em>ISBN 9780197677940</em>
</p>
</div>
<br><p><em>Lost Decade</em>&nbsp;is an essential guide for understanding the historic shift to Asia-centric geopolitics and its implications for the United States’ present and future.&nbsp;<br>
&nbsp;<br>
Across the political spectrum, there is wide agreement that Asia should stand at the center of U.S. foreign policy. But this worldview, first represented in the Barack Obama administration’s 2011 “Pivot to Asia,”&nbsp;marks a dramatic departure from the entire history of American grand strategy. More than a decade on, we now have the perspective to evaluate it in depth. In <em>Lost Decade</em>, Robert D. Blackwill and Richard Fontaine—two eminent figures in American foreign policy—take this long view. They conclude that while the Pivot’s strategic logic is strong, there are few successes to speak of, and that we need a far more coherent approach to the Indo-Pacific region. They examine the Pivot through various lenses: situating it historically in the context of U.S. global foreign policy, revealing the inside story of how it came about, assessing the effort thus far, identifying the ramifications in other regions (namely Europe and the Middle East), and proposing a path forward.&nbsp;<br>
&nbsp;<br>
The authors stress that the United States has far less margin for foreign policy error today than a decade ago. As the international order becomes more unstable, Blackwill and Fontaine argue that it is imperative that policymakers fully understand what the Pivot to Asia aimed to achieve—and where it fell short—in order to muster the resources, alliances, and resolve to preserve an open order in Asia and the world. Crafting an effective policy for the region, they contend, is crucial for preserving American security, prosperity, and democratic values.&nbsp;</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/book/lost-decade</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/book/lost-decade</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 14 Mar 2024 20:16:29 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>The End of Ambition</title>
<description><img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/book_large_l/public/book_cover_image/9780197578575.jpg.webp" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"><br>
<h1 class="article-header__title">The End of Ambition</h1>
<div class="article-header__subhead">
<div><p>America’s Past, Present, and Future in the Middle East</p></div>
</div>
<figure class="article-header__image for-tablet-down">
<div class="article-header__image-picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/book_large_l/public/book_cover_image/9780197578575.jpg.webp" alt="" class="article-header__image-img" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
</figure>
<p class="article-header__description">A clear-headed vision for the United States' role in the Middle East that highlights the changing nature of U.S. national interests and the challenges of grand strategizing at a time of profound change in the international order.</p>
<p class="article-header__byline">
<span class="article-header__metadata-type article-header__metadata-type--with-definition">
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/books-reports">Book</a>
</span> by
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/expert/steven-cook" class="article-header__link">Steven A. Cook</a> </p>
<div class="article-header__book-metadata-group">
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Publisher –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">Oxford University Press</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Release Date –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">Jun 2024</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Pages –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">208</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-isbn">
<em>ISBN 9780197578575</em>
</p>
</div>
<br><p>Following a long series of catastrophic misadventures in the Middle East over the last two decades, the American foreign policy community has tried to understand what went wrong. After weighing the evidence, they have mostly advised a retreat from the region. The basic view is that when the United States tries to advance change in the Middle East, it only makes matters worse.</p>
<p>In <em>The End of Ambition</em>, Steven A. Cook argues that while these analysts are rightly concerned that engagement drains U.S. resources and distorts its domestic politics, the broader impulse to disengage tends to neglect important lessons from the past. Moreover, advocates of pulling back overlook the potential risks of withdrawal. Covering the relationship between the United States and the Middle East since the end of World War II, Cook makes the bold claim that despite setbacks and moral costs, the United States has been overwhelmingly successful in protecting its core national interests in the Middle East. Conversely, overly ambitious policies to remake the region and leverage U.S. power not only ended in failure, but rendered the region unstable in new and largely misunderstood ways.</p><p>While making the case that retrenchment is not the answer to America’s problems in the Middle East, <em>The End of Ambition</em> highlights how America’s interests in the region have begun to change and critically examines alternative approaches to U.S.-Middle East policy. Cook highlights the challenges that policymakers and analysts confront in developing a new strategy for the United States in the Middle East against the backdrop of both political uncertainty in the United States and a changing global order.</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/book/end-ambition</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/book/end-ambition</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 11 Mar 2024 20:08:17 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>The End of Ambition</title>
<description><img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/book_large_l/public/book_cover_image/9780197578575.jpg.webp" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"><br>
<h1 class="article-header__title">The End of Ambition</h1>
<div class="article-header__subhead">
<div><p>America’s Past, Present, and Future in the Middle East</p></div>
</div>
<figure class="article-header__image for-tablet-down">
<div class="article-header__image-picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/book_large_l/public/book_cover_image/9780197578575.jpg.webp" alt="" class="article-header__image-img" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
</figure>
<p class="article-header__description">A clear-headed vision for the United States' role in the Middle East that highlights the changing nature of U.S. national interests and the challenges of grand strategizing at a time of profound change in the international order.</p>
<p class="article-header__byline">
<span class="article-header__metadata-type article-header__metadata-type--with-definition">
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/books-reports">Book</a>
</span> by
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/expert/steven-cook" class="article-header__link">Steven A. Cook</a> </p>
<div class="article-header__book-metadata-group">
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Publisher –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">Oxford University Press</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Release Date –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">Jun 2024</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Pages –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">208</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-isbn">
<em>ISBN 9780197578575</em>
</p>
</div>
<br><p>Following a long series of catastrophic misadventures in the Middle East over the last two decades, the American foreign policy community has tried to understand what went wrong. After weighing the evidence, they have mostly advised a retreat from the region. The basic view is that when the United States tries to advance change in the Middle East, it only makes matters worse.</p>
<p>In <em>The End of Ambition</em>, Steven A. Cook argues that while these analysts are rightly concerned that engagement drains U.S. resources and distorts its domestic politics, the broader impulse to disengage tends to neglect important lessons from the past. Moreover, advocates of pulling back overlook the potential risks of withdrawal. Covering the relationship between the United States and the Middle East since the end of World War II, Cook makes the bold claim that despite setbacks and moral costs, the United States has been overwhelmingly successful in protecting its core national interests in the Middle East. Conversely, overly ambitious policies to remake the region and leverage U.S. power not only ended in failure, but rendered the region unstable in new and largely misunderstood ways.</p><p>While making the case that retrenchment is not the answer to America’s problems in the Middle East, <em>The End of Ambition</em> highlights how America’s interests in the region have begun to change and critically examines alternative approaches to U.S.-Middle East policy. Cook highlights the challenges that policymakers and analysts confront in developing a new strategy for the United States in the Middle East against the backdrop of both political uncertainty in the United States and a changing global order.</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/book/end-ambition</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/book/end-ambition</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 11 Mar 2024 20:08:17 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>A Conversation With John Kerry</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/0otLx-xeovw" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>John Kerry discusses his work as&nbsp;U.S. special presidential envoy for climate, the challenges the United States faces, and the Biden administration’s priorities as it continues to address climate change.</p>
<p>FROMAN: Good afternoon. It’s a great pleasure to see everybody. My name is Mike Froman. I’m president of the Council on Foreign Relations.&nbsp;</p>
<p>And it is a great honor to welcome Special Envoy for Climate John Kerry to the Council today to give what is in effect a valedictory address on his time in government, on climate, as he prepares to leave that position. He truly is a man who needs no introduction. You all know everything that he’s done, but I would say, on climate, this is something that goes back decades from when he was a senator, when he was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, when he was secretary of state, to his position now. This has been a passion of his and he’s been a consistent advocate for strong policy in this area.&nbsp;</p>
<p>I would say, when we served together in the Obama administration and I would see him in the Situation Room, I was so impressed that he was willing to go anywhere around the world, and indeed everywhere around the world, no matter how difficult the assignment was, no matter what little chance of success there might be in making progress, to represent the United States and to make the very best effort to address our interests all over the world. And I saw this in a very personal way when in—we found ourselves in Indonesia at a time—it was an economic summit there and there was something happening in Washington. I think the government was closing down or something, and President Obama could not come and so he designated Secretary Kerry at the time to be the head of our delegation, and we prepared Secretary Kerry and he went up on the stage of this large group and gave this impassioned speech about issues of fish and trade facilitation and tariffs and dumping. I knew in the back of his mind all he cared about was war and peace and climate and really big issues, but he gave the speech and he seemed to be so into it and so passionate about it that everyone thought these are the most important issues to the secretary of state. He came down off the stage, he sat next to me in the front row, and I said, “Mr. Secretary, that was really fantastic; I think you have a real future in politics”—(laughter)—at which point he said, “Screw you, Froman.” (Laughter.) That’s actually the sanitized version, but—(laughter)—I will leave it with that.&nbsp;</p>
<p>With that, please welcome Special Envoy for Climate Secretary Kerry. (Applause.)&nbsp;</p>
<p>KERRY: Thank you very much. Michael, I think—thank you for that introduction, wayward introduction.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>I want you all to know that representing your government in the middle of a shutdown is really hard, and everybody there would come up to me and say, oh, god, your government—can we buy you lunch? (Laughter.) Do you need a ride home? (Laughter.) Everybody was very solicitous but my preference would have been, honestly, to have had an open government—(laughs)—backing me up.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>This guy is amazing. Mike Froman is a tour de force and so glad you’re at CFR and pleased you’ve taken on those responsibilities, and thank you for your generous introduction.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>But we were talking out in the back room just for a few minutes and I commented to him how—I mean, I watched him labor so hard on TPP and I watched the transition taking place in the Far East about how people were viewing the U.S. and we were engaged and we set the gold standard of business rules and of goods and controls and so forth, and frequently, as I went to China, the Chinese would say to me, when can we join? Can we get in? And they were knocking on the door. And sadly, sadly, sadly, folks, we pulled out of it and watched the other eleven go off and make their own agreement and we lost critical space in that part of the world. So it does matter. It does matter. Every day it matters. It was doing what—who calls the shots, and we will see where we go. I’m still Hatch-ed, so I’m not going at all into the area. You’re sitting there saying, oh, what is he going to say now? (Laughter.) But staying away from that, folks.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>I’m really grateful that Mike has put the climate crisis—he’s placed it right at the center of the CFR’s priorities, and that’s exactly what Richard Haass did before you, and I thank you for doing that.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>Also, I appreciate the opportunity to share thoughts, a few reflections, if you will, on the journey of a little more than three years as the special presidential envoy for climate. And then we’ll get a chance to have some Q&amp;A.&nbsp;</p>
<p>But in November 2020, when President-elect Biden called me about this job, we talked about the world that he was inheriting as president, and America’s reputation on the global stage, I think you will all recall, was in tatters. Tensions with China were already at a high point. The world and the global economy were still reeling from COVID, with many countries still facing shutdowns, lockdowns. And on January 20th, 2021, within hours of being sworn in, President Biden rejoined the Paris Agreement. A few hours later, I was sworn in as envoy and I gathered with a small band of my first-day staff and we began piecing together an office, which we didn’t have, and a strategy.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>The most critical decision of that day was a commitment to do every single thing in our power to be able to limit the Earth’s temperature increase to 1.5 degrees Centigrade, a threshold science decision, not ours, because the basic science told us that it was critical for the health and lives of people, in report after report, to be able to hold that temperature increase at 1.5 and that every point and decimal above that cost you billions more and be much more threatening to life itself and to stability on the planet. So “keep 1.5 alive” became our mantra, our organizational principle. Why? Because the science dictated it. The mathematics and the physics are undeniable—not a point of ideology or politics or geostrategic maneuvering—science, math, and physics. And our government, we thought at that point, had to make a mark that we were done with denial.&nbsp;</p>
<p>So President Biden was determined to earn b... |
http://localhost:1200/cfr/videos - Success ✔️<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0">
<channel>
<title>Videos</title>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/videos</link>
<atom:link href="http://localhost:1200/cfr/videos" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"></atom:link>
<description>Videos - Made with love by RSSHub(https://github.com/DIYgod/RSSHub)</description>
<generator>RSSHub</generator>
<webMaster>i@diygod.me (DIYgod)</webMaster>
<language>en</language>
<lastBuildDate>Fri, 24 May 2024 02:06:23 GMT</lastBuildDate>
<ttl>5</ttl>
<item>
<title>Ten Most Significant World Events in 2023</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/v7XWcXcI0Sc" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>2023 was a tumultuous year, marked by violent conflicts, democratic erosion, and record-high temperatures. This year, experts at the Council on Foreign Relations, along with visiting world leaders and thinkers, unpacked these issues and more.</p>
<p>Join CFR’s director of studies, Jim Lindsay, in looking back at his list of the ten most impactful events of the year.</p>
<p>For more, check out his blog post, “<a href="https://www.cfr.org/worldevents2023" title="Ten Most Significant World Events in 2023" target="_blank">Ten Most Significant World Events in 2023</a>,” only at CFR.org.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/ten-most-significant-world-events-2023</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/ten-most-significant-world-events-2023</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 07 Dec 2023 22:12:43 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Stakes for Taiwan's Diplomacy in Three Questions</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/aOp2I1d-2Lo" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>Taiwan's relationship with the United States, China, and the rest of the world has a complex history that informs why the island is so consequential to today's geopolitics. To better understand these dynamics, David Sacks, CFR's fellow for Asia studies, answers questions about Taiwan's history and its significance to diplomacy in East Asia.</p>
<p>For more on the relationship between the United States, China, and Taiwan, check out the Council on Foreign Relations–sponsored Independent Task Force, "U.S.-Taiwan Relations in a New Era". cfr.org/us-taiwan</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p><p>&nbsp;</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/stakes-taiwans-diplomacy-three-questions</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/stakes-taiwans-diplomacy-three-questions</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 16 Aug 2023 17:35:24 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>How Artificial Intelligence Could Change the World</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/lxCjyfFZxBQ" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>Artificial Intelligence (AI) could transform economies, politics, and everyday life. Some experts believe this increasingly powerful technology could lead to amazing advances and prosperity. Yet, many tech and industry leaders are warning that AI poses substantial risks, and they are calling for a moratorium on AI research so that safety measures can be established. But amid mounting great-power competition, it’s unclear whether national governments will be able to coordinate on regulating this technology that offers so many economic and strategic opportunities.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/how-artificial-intelligence-could-change-world</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/how-artificial-intelligence-could-change-world</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 25 May 2023 16:43:57 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>As Nuclear Tensions Rise, Should the World Be Worried?</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/XDMn4cFllek" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>Since the end of World War II, nuclear weapons have threatened international relations. The Cold War produced stalemates that seemed to reduce the threat of nuclear conflict, but several countries’ more recent acquisitions of nuclear weapons have brought the world into a dangerous new era of nuclear uncertainty. With nuclear tensions on the rise once again, what lies ahead for nuclear diplomacy?</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/nuclear-tensions-rise-should-world-be-worried</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/nuclear-tensions-rise-should-world-be-worried</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 02 May 2023 16:13:26 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement Threatened by Brexit Fallout</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/WruVPF00jrg" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>In Northern Ireland, the consequences of the United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union, known as Brexit, are threatening to unravel the twenty-five-year-old Good Friday Agreement. It’s a peace deal that ended decades of violence between nationalists who wanted Northern Ireland to be reunified with the Republic of Ireland and unionists who wanted it to stay part of the United Kingdom. The agreement largely ended the bloodshed, and allowed for freer movement of trade and people across the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. However, Brexit has imperiled that free movement, and there are major concerns that resolving that issue could inflame old divisions and lead to renewed bloodshed in Northern Ireland.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/northern-irelands-good-friday-agreement-threatened-brexit-fallout</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/northern-irelands-good-friday-agreement-threatened-brexit-fallout</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 06 Apr 2023 21:21:14 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Is China a Democracy or a Dictatorship?</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/qkjV0kT_90s" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>China’s political system is complicated, and there’s a lot of contradictory information out there. Is China a communist country? Is it democratic, as its own government insists? And what does “freedom” mean to Chinese citizens? Ian Johnson, CFR’s senior fellow for China studies, answers these questions and more.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/china-democracy-or-dictatorship</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/china-democracy-or-dictatorship</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 15 Mar 2023 18:00:10 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Are Cryptocurrencies Still the Future of Money?</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/T0g3gFYK9Do" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>Since the creation of Bitcoin in 2009, cryptocurrencies have exploded in popularity and accrued over $1 trillion in collective value. But market volatility in 2022 threatened the crypto ecosystem—after peaking at over $68,000 in November 2021, the price of Bitcoin fell to under $17,000 twelve months later. This instability has brought new scrutiny to the industry and the countries that have embraced Bitcoin as currency: El Salvador and the Central African Republic. Financial regulators are now calling for more crypto oversight, but global efforts to regulate the industry have stalled. Given this simultaneous rise in global popularity and concern, what lies ahead for digital currency and the future of finance?</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/are-cryptocurrencies-still-future-money</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/are-cryptocurrencies-still-future-money</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 02 Mar 2023 16:48:34 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>What Happens When the World Hits 1.5°C of Warming?</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/mPCB4FqmoPg" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>The world is running out of time to avoid the worst consequences of climate change. With the 2015 Paris Agreement, countries set a goal of limiting global warming to 1.5°C (2.7°F) compared to 150 years ago. However, the planet is on track to pass 1.5°C by the end of this decade, which would lead to higher sea levels, hotter heat waves, and deadlier natural disasters. But countries can work to prevent those and even worse dangers by sticking to their climate pledges and limiting just how much the world overshoots its Paris Agreement goal.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/what-happens-when-world-hits-15degc-warming</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/what-happens-when-world-hits-15degc-warming</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 28 Feb 2023 15:44:59 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Will U.S.-Venezuela Relations Thaw?</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/d26XfcY4cxs" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>After years of tension, relations between the United States and Venezuela appear to be headed in a new direction. The Joe Biden administration has temporarily rolled back some U.S. sanctions on Venezuela’s oil industry in an effort to curb energy prices as well as help the Venezuelan people. But the extent of this détente hinges on Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. What’s in store for bilateral relations?</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/will-us-venezuela-relations-thaw</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/will-us-venezuela-relations-thaw</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2022 16:57:17 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Video: Seven Most Significant World Events in 2022</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/dt7aBUDXFEU" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>It was a year marked by political tumult, spiking major-power tensions, economic challenges, a waning pandemic, and a war that echoed worldwide.<br><br>
Take a look back at what James M. Lindsay, CFR’s director of studies, thought were the most significant events of 2022. For more, check out his blog post, “<a href="https://www.cfr.org/worldevents2022" title="Ten Most Significant World Events in 2022" target="_blank">Ten Most Significant World Events in 2022</a>,” only at CFR.org.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/video-seven-most-significant-world-events-2022</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/video-seven-most-significant-world-events-2022</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 16 Dec 2022 18:48:27 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Growing Instability in Haiti</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/XemLN6oPlbM" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>More than a year after President Jovenel Moïse’s assassination, Haiti remains embroiled in a humanitarian crisis. Economic and political instability persist, and a surge in gang-related violence in and around the capital, Port-au-Prince, has displaced tens of thousands of people. World leaders are now debating whether to send troops to help restore basic governance in the country. What does the future hold for Haiti?</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/growing-instability-haiti</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/growing-instability-haiti</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 09 Nov 2022 21:47:27 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Post-Roe v. Wade: Abortion Law Around the World</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/UFrSuxMBcaQ" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>With the U.S. Supreme Court overturning <em style="font-style:italic">Roe v. Wade</em>, it’s up to states to decide their own abortion laws. Watch to see what has changed so far in the United States and how it compares with other countries on abortion access.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/post-roe-v-wade-abortion-law-around-world</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/post-roe-v-wade-abortion-law-around-world</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 25 Oct 2022 21:03:15 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>King Charles III and the Future of the Commonwealth</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/ISczNbnvSZ0" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>As King Charles III ascends to the British throne after the passing of Queen Elizabeth II, Commonwealth countries are debating whether to follow Barbados, which broke ties with the Crown in 2021. Why are countries choosing to leave the monarchy, and what could that mean for its future?</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/king-charles-iii-and-future-commonwealth</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/king-charles-iii-and-future-commonwealth</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 03 Oct 2022 17:34:20 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Russia-Ukraine War and Europe’s Energy Bind</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/PDP4bT5cDAw" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has led European governments to propose bans on Russian oil and gas, but rising energy costs and a lack of alternatives&nbsp;are&nbsp;undermining the effort. Here’s how Europe has been challenged by Russia’s leverage in the energy market.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/russia-ukraine-war-and-europes-energy-bind</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/russia-ukraine-war-and-europes-energy-bind</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 13 Sep 2022 19:09:04 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>How U.S. Gun Policies Compare With the World’s</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/VqAiI8npYk0" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>The debate over gun laws has raged in Washington for decades, often reigniting after high-profile mass shootings. In mid-2022, Congress passed a rare, compromise gun control bill, but critics say it still leaves the United States with some of the loosest gun laws in the world. Here’s how the United States and some other advanced democracies have responded to gun violence.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/how-us-gun-policies-compare-worlds</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/how-us-gun-policies-compare-worlds</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 13 Jul 2022 20:30:13 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
</channel>
</rss> |
TonyRL
reviewed
May 24, 2024
Co-authored-by: Tony <TonyRL@users.noreply.github.com>
|
Successfully generated as following: http://localhost:1200/cfr/asia/china - Success ✔️<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0">
<channel>
<title>China</title>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/asia/china</link>
<atom:link href="http://localhost:1200/cfr/asia/china" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"></atom:link>
<description>China - Made with love by RSSHub(https://github.com/DIYgod/RSSHub)</description>
<generator>RSSHub</generator>
<webMaster>i@diygod.me (DIYgod)</webMaster>
<language>en</language>
<lastBuildDate>Fri, 24 May 2024 07:51:10 GMT</lastBuildDate>
<ttl>5</ttl>
<item>
<title>Advanced Manufacturing to be a Focus of China’s July Party Plenum</title>
<description><figure>
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/slide_3_2/public/image/2024/05/2017-10-22T230936Z_41608130_RC13548D61B0_RTRMADP_3_CHINA-BATTERIES-RECYCLING.JPG.webp" alt="A worker inspects batteries for electric vehicles being manufactured at a factory in Dongguan, China. " class="article-header-blog__image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
<figcaption class="article-header-blog__caption">
A worker inspects batteries for electric vehicles being manufactured at a factory in Dongguan, China.
<span class="article-header-blog__credit">Bobby Yip/Reuters</span> </figcaption>
</figure><br><p>China’s long-delayed third Party plenum on economic reform will be held in July. Official commentary suggests that the Party communique which will be issued at this meeting will double-down on the importance of manufacturing as a tool to address China’s pressing domestic economic problems, potentially increasing trade tensions with a range of foreign countries.</p>
<p>On April 30, Chinese authorities&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="0" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.rfa.org%2Fenglish%2Fnews%2Fchina%2Fdelayed-third-plenary-economy-meeting-05022024142612.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503185984%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=6rGd5%2FLSHj1bM81wUd7kavWE%2BfArnHSjbHJl9xnwSRY%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWA21353390-5ead-5dcb-2b03-23d199791392" originalsrc="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/delayed-third-plenary-economy-meeting-05022024142612.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="H0nZtRfp6EVbYT+KTpVqEheb+uLHle+cIEiV0g+4+TJW3Qu25XU/yzbCa1G2aRH/CCZXeUISHDF/gjIEXXg6zrryaT7ofgaXLsCq4t+Ik6Cb4/KAwl81rSRLR+Eb2phf9yd3N/9uq7lw3S0AkysnTIbFN+sOlSXsSMVT6MjV/hw=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/delayed-third-plenary-economy-meeting-05022024142612.html. Click or tap if you trust this link.">announced</a>&nbsp;that the third Party plenum of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee would meet in July. Official commentary&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="1" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.chinadaily.com.cn%2Fa%2F202405%2F01%2FWS66323e19a31082fc043c5050.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503199426%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=2n3UuGo%2FRAWMbRlRHWq%2BEQJSihCvwU%2FgSSy2AXeD2PE%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWA117497f5-e87c-bc4e-01dd-f20665dc9b5e" originalsrc="https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202405/01/WS66323e19a31082fc043c5050.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="bqQQxTFiPd7eWyoW8nBUP4fkYbr+Lnn8xYI19CYTxCJmPQ0cE4NwUv9TvRZM6N7F+C46cUR8Mw1johhx4G2Aca9bsgndQMVxL7ANckuufHWRiWeNv8elRRoWYA824p1Ilt4+VGxxWLXaknoI7+ubjDILGgOZJLlPYVseD4HI/nw=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202405/01/WS66323e19a31082fc043c5050.html. Click or tap if you trust this link.">indicates</a>&nbsp;that economic issues will be the core of the plenum, including a focus on integrated economic plans for the Yangtze Delta region. But specific attention will also be devoted to fostering “new quality productive forces”—a new Party slogan set out by Xi Jinping—with state commentary stating:</p><p><em>“The imperative was stressed... to develop new quality productive forces according to local conditions. The layout of China's strength in strategic science and technology should be improved, emerging industries cultivated and strengthened, the development of industries for the future arranged in advance, and the transformation and upgrading of traditional industries empowered by advanced technologies.”</em></p>
<p>As Chinese authorities&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="2" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Flosangeles.china-consulate.gov.cn%2Feng%2Flghd%2F202404%2Ft20240418_11283727.htm&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503205764%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=IbEShh6%2BllqjRF%2BKcOmhi%2FU7fTx1f9JCGSLpKwYrcBk%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAe743989e-a804-99d8-d203-643dc5ac1cc7" originalsrc="http://losangeles.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/lghd/202404/t20240418_11283727.htm" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="nJFMkJ+NoiMgW4rhQv8Zy1Lr3elJYsunHe4BDryx6OO0YVHvk0kbWP02pfLAsbN1ydtFaaLLI+D2xacSVY5nZse/MXybDN3lKtTtVciINnLLI1oJjosVuWnQLf9+vqKBw/nTo448yRRn+8p/5q4ZAnoGVQEE+nbAkYpuy9tqg0g=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: http://losangeles.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/lghd/202404/t20240418_11283727.htm. Click or tap if you trust this link.">note</a>, “new quality productive forces” includes three specific industries: electric vehicles, lithium-ion batteries, and photovoltaic products, which have registered dramatic export growth, in addition to other fields in biomedicine, artificial intelligence, and the digital economy. In recent years, Beijing has&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="3" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2024%2F05%2F14%2Fbusiness%2Fchina-exports-manufacturing.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503211048%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=1ahyI9wpkevRlu2E672ErhfP7nh3mz%2Fwp4Q4dT76QSc%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAd915b52c-0ef4-2399-4607-1ea63c3f5b6b" originalsrc="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/14/business/china-exports-manufacturing.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="L2sZOeL0lFunPptcQBH8iAhtpk88vF6tbo59ysGysLK+IoJ4HxdgExVjCZ/qZ6o01CYHuZ3WrgTsj9CqTmStycTBTwhf+dMUsXEuw49i+afnKwi/uOCVTlwcjKEcEbF6/gKe+TnSzRXlDzhzF6kuCmKwHA/MVKY/pJPB0BG8OpI=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/14/business/china-exports-manufacturing.html. Click or tap if you trust this link.">identified and promoted</a>&nbsp;key advanced manufacturing industries—including electric vehicles and batteries—as part of China’s industrial strategy. Goals include reducing reliance on foreign technologies and creating new sources of export-driven growth.&nbsp;</p>
<p>For Beijing, such emphasis on manufacturing represents an economic development strategy aimed at responding to serious domestic challenges. China currently faces both continuing high&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="4" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.wsj.com%2Fworld%2Fchina%2Fchinas-youth-unemployment-eased-in-april-a029344f&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503216081%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=eNQrISw%2BXNg3i%2FwuJav7ExYbcv2lBfCg4MzHyblG7p4%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAbd6af401-ab3c-7845-7ea4-53d89f61f617" originalsrc="https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-youth-unemployment-eased-in-april-a029344f" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="AQ4/iQp/hYQGxLkXSn7qmCrCJ/cZPlJ+TV1/fUPl5xi4LmH5GuJJY97e/YzHRaDV7MuK+PCZTCHRcdjAGmcXnkvGUJvpbYYSHjcj+YJoViFXMJd+4ypOZ98eTfbC22clyxh9qg1vg2Dbiab/raJBmkpD+TjrkS5zidNmKWfKPGQ=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-youth-unemployment-eased-in-april-a029344f. Click or tap if you trust this link.">youth unemployment</a>, as well as construction and real estate sectors that are mired in deep distress after the implosion of China’s property bubble, and which constituted a quarter of China’s GDP prior to the pandemic. Recent years have&nbsp;<a data-auth="NotApplicable" data-linkindex="5" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/amid-mounting-youth-unemployment-woes-beijing-looks-towards-vocational-education" id="OWA4f9afd72-27e1-a17f-5c3b-a22fc9dadb5d" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" title="seen">seen</a>&nbsp;Chinese authorities make a concerted effort to raise the status of vocational education programs and steer youth in the direction of skilled manufacturing labor, precisely because of the employment difficulties facing four-year college graduates.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Indeed, recent statements by Xi himself give further support to the likelihood that the July plenum will feature a doubling-down on manufacturing. A front-page&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="6" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fpaper.people.com.cn%2Frmrb%2Fhtml%2F2024-05%2F01%2Fnw.D110000renmrb_20240501_4-01.htm&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503220962%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=LvIQKiUxzrnTL5IJ16VqXtLA2b8mEyKv3lZTT4xqvYk%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWA3964bf46-e856-5cc7-ecc1-e1db928cee93" originalsrc="http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2024-05/01/nw.D110000renmrb_20240501_4-01.htm" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="U+VGUCUN0VJYCDQ2m86YaO3xVtQLf4AFom+BRwX1d9GyfZpjKes/TTI9qMLzcuMXNjvU+HCgSepVli75jPbZ3LIWCwAAZbLulu9txfWvvq83eCkMtoYWI36ftt+PqSliQSPrKlM0wk/5b1NnvWK2u5IeHP12JeLpC0cyv1/ltJI=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2024-05/01/nw.D110000renmrb_20240501_4-01.htm. Click or tap if you trust this link.">article</a>&nbsp;in the Party’s flagship paper accompanying the announcement of the July plenum carried extensive quotations from Xi himself extolling Chinese “craftsmanship” (<em>gongjiang</em>) in numerous fields of advanced manufacturing.</p>
<p>Naturally, any policy moves by Beijing to boost its own export-oriented advanced manufacturing industries run the risk of heightening tensions between China and its trading partners. Fears of Chinese market domination in specific industries led the Biden administration to&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="7" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fapnews.com%2Farticle%2Fbiden-china-tariffs-electric-vehicles-evs-solar-2024ba735c47e04a50898a88425c5e2c&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503225850%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=Lf8uTpZ6O1wJNj%2FSMr8ybHVGEuHjxOTwdJI49t%2BjhmY%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAbf0d4b26-e45d-be24-0f02-464361a12e73" originalsrc="https://apnews.com/article/biden-china-tariffs-electric-vehicles-evs-solar-2024ba735c47e04a50898a88425c5e2c" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="Zial7EJt9mURBt5T7sLNyoDKz3K/3tbjbkvn3tpiLyw16SD1VUaE4xhpY7xPsNzt05pHcsZEOjV3lzvQ09lZ5gjWonBZNBUQKbZdL96lTfPnncvNW3KYIP1mNu9l18reYgYx8EeZGPdwyI/KjsFZU1d3Nd9Aw9+8Kx8cwxUjyMc=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://apnews.com/article/biden-china-tariffs-electric-vehicles-evs-solar-2024ba735c47e04a50898a88425c5e2c. Click or tap if you trust this link.">announce</a>&nbsp;high tariffs on a range of such products last week. In fall 2023, European authorities&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="8" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Frhg.com%2Fresearch%2Faint-no-duty-high-enough%2F&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503230731%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=lyUNGLKjjpnh19ABAO7T6svYM8im%2F1%2Bhg%2BdAw4NUZ1I%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAe6e23327-f57b-65e1-1139-73e7492b7bc3" originalsrc="https://rhg.com/research/aint-no-duty-high-enough/" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="JaDVZAQwTw9fRxuxCWHj8WGhl3dc+jVzZfhMwuGIEkGneAbeDvT4IVpdE7XXcwVyjK8MtOFpBmFteUpAFXZ5EsTvExteNVVizaOmbqPwyBZY+e0plVrdArCFjCjJRKphNkxFyxk3V+dCyvyso5tC5M6sydgpqUCWvii5uiExGdA=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://rhg.com/research/aint-no-duty-high-enough/. Click or tap if you trust this link.">launched</a>&nbsp;an anti-subsidy investigation into China’s electric vehicle industry, and are currently considering imposing countervailing duties.&nbsp;</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog/advanced-manufacturing-be-focus-chinas-july-party-plenum</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/blog/advanced-manufacturing-be-focus-chinas-july-party-plenum</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 22 May 2024 20:43:23 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Analyzing Lai Ching-te’s Inaugural Address: More Continuity Than Difference</title>
<description><figure>
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/slide_3_2/public/image/2024/05/2024-05-20T031537Z_1692445377_RC23U7AO5UHG_RTRMADP_3_TAIWAN-POLITICS.JPG.webp" alt="Taiwan's new President Lai Ching-te delivers his inaugural speech in Taipei, Taiwan on May 20, 2024." class="article-header-blog__image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
<figcaption class="article-header-blog__caption">
Taiwan's new President Lai Ching-te delivers his inaugural speech in Taipei, Taiwan on May 20, 2024.
<span class="article-header-blog__credit">Carlos Garcia Rawlins/Reuters</span> </figcaption>
</figure><br><p>On May 20, Lai Ching-te assumed the presidency in Taiwan and gave an inaugural address scrutinized in Beijing, Washington, and capitals around the world. The speech provided the most authoritative signal to date of his approach to cross-strait relations. The core question for observers: would a Lai administration depart from the course set by his predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen?&nbsp;</p>
<p>The speech gave a clear answer: Lai signaled broad continuity with Tsai and committed to maintain the status quo. He also called for dialogue with Beijing and demonstrated an openness to resuming cross-strait tourism and student exchanges. Even so, Beijing denounced Lai’s speech in particularly harsh language. That reflects China’s concerns about Lai’s history on cross-strait issues. But it also reflects disappointment that Lai departed in some places from Tsai, for instance by not explicitly pledging to conduct cross-strait relations in accordance with the Republic of China (ROC) Constitution, which embodies a one-China framework.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p><p>In the period ahead, cross-strait issues will remain a point of contention between Taipei and Beijing, with official dialogue channels all but certain to remain closed. If both sides come to believe their own restraint will not be reciprocated, then the conditions will be set for a vicious cycle. For example, if Beijing responds to Lai’s efforts to signal continuity in his inaugural address with military and economic pressure, and if Taipei then concludes there is little reason for restraint on political issues, cross-strait tensions will increase. Careful signaling, and deeper dialogue—likely through unofficial channels or even through intermediaries—will be needed to avoid such an outcome.&nbsp;</p>
<p><b>Parsing Lai’s Inaugural Address&nbsp;</b></p>
<p>In his inaugural <a href="https://english.president.gov.tw/News/6726" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="speech">speech</a>, Lai sought to reassure audiences that he would be a source of stability and continuity on cross-strait issues and would not provoke Beijing or seek to change the status quo. Despite frustrations within Taiwan on domestic issues – rising housing prices, stagnating wages, and growing youth unemployment – Tsai still left office as the only president since Taiwan’s democratization to enjoy an approval rating of over 50 percent and is widely credited with ably managing cross-strait relations. It is thus little wonder that Lai sought to embrace and build on her legacy. His personnel appointments in senior national security positions similarly project continuity.&nbsp;</p>
<p>In his address, Lai regularly returned to the language of continuity and stability. “Peace is the only option,” he stressed, “and prosperity, gained through lasting peace and stability, is our objective.” Lai called Taiwan’s leaders “pilots for peace” and indicated he would “neither yield nor provoke” and would instead “maintain the status quo.” Elsewhere in his speech, Lai spoke of providing “stable and principled cross-strait leadership.” Such reassurances are important given Lai’s 2017 <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/taiwans-2024-presidential-election-analyzing-william-lais-foreign-policy-positions" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="statement">statement</a> that he was a “pragmatic worker for Taiwan independence” and questions in Beijing about his intentions.&nbsp;</p>
<p>To that end, Lai mentioned the “Republic of China” over a dozen times – more than Tsai did in her last inaugural address – and pledged to lead “in accordance with the Republic of China Constitution system.” Beijing took exception to Lai’s statement that “the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other.” That phrase has not appeared in an inaugural address before, though it was a formulation Tsai previously included in high-level speeches, and likely does not indicate any change in policy.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Lai also included conciliatory language toward Beijing. He encouraged it to “choose dialogue over confrontation, exchange over containment, and under the principles of parity and dignity, engage in cooperation with the legal government chosen by Taiwan’s people.” Notably, he stressed that, “this can start from the resumption of tourism on a reciprocal basis, and enrollment of degree students in Taiwanese institutions.” China has pointed to the lack of cross-strait tourism and student exchanges as evidence of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)’s lack of commitment to productive cross-strait relations, and Lai’s signal that he was open to practical exchanges was an effort to demonstrate goodwill toward Beijing.&nbsp;</p><p>Lai specifically referenced Tsai’s “Four Commitments” – her unique formulation on cross-strait policy. Beijing likely sees the framework’s first-ever appearance in an inaugural address as escalatory. But Tsai has referenced it in several high-level speeches, and her team had described it as a stakeholder agnostic formulation with propositions acceptable to all of Taiwan rather than one grounded entirely in DPP documents. Lai’s inclusion of it, rather than introducing a completely original approach, was probably intended to be stabilizing and again signal continuity.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>There were some areas, however, where Lai put his own imprint on cross-strait policies. He declared, “Some call this land the Republic of China, some call it the Republic of China Taiwan, and some, Taiwan; but whichever of these names we ourselves or our international friends choose to call our nation, we will resonate and shine all the same.” This could be interpreted as a subtle way of signaling that Lai does not intend to pursue steps that would change Taiwan’s official name – unlike prior president Chen Shui-bian – by essentially setting the issue of nomenclature aside and accepting that Taiwanese citizens have different and equally legitimate views on this question. Beijing could choose to see this as a reassuring evolution. At the same time, though, putting the name “Taiwan” on the same plane as the “Republic of China,” or as an alternative to the “Republic of China,” will raise concerns in Beijing and be seen as a departure from precedent. The fact that a statement could be taken as simultaneously escalatory and de-escalatory highlights the need for greater communication between Beijing and Taipei, whether official or unofficial, to help explain intentions.&nbsp;</p>
<p><b>Putting Lai’s Speech in Perspective&nbsp;</b></p>
<p>Lai’s cross-strait platform did not go as far as Tsai’s first inaugural address on certain elements of cross-strait issues. In her <a href="https://english.president.gov.tw/News/4893" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="2016 inaugural">2016 inaugural</a>, Tsai acknowledged the so-called “1992 consensus” without explicitly defining or endorsing it, going perhaps as far as any DPP leader is likely to go. “In 1992,” she said, “the two institutions representing each side across the Strait (the Straits Exchange Foundation&nbsp;and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits), through communication and negotiations, arrived at various joint acknowledgements and understandings. It was done in a spirit of mutual understanding and a political attitude of seeking common ground while setting aside differences. I respect this historical fact.” In that same speech, she stressed that, “since 1992, over twenty years of interactions and negotiations across the Strait have enabled and accumulated outcomes which both sides must collectively cherish and sustain; and it is based on such existing realities and political foundations that the stable and peaceful development of the cross-Strait relationship must be continuously promoted.” And as a matter of policy, she was clear that, “the new government will conduct cross-Strait affairs in accordance with the Republic of China Constitution, the Act Governing Relations Between the People of Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, and other relevant legislation.”&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>Beijing did not give Tsai much credit for these statements, choosing instead to base their expectations on the policies of her predecessor, Ma Ying-jeou, who had fully endorsed the “1992 consensus,” a term one of his key advisors <a href="https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2006/02/22/2003294106" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="invented">invented</a> in 2000. Accordingly, in her <a href="https://english.president.gov.tw/News/6004" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="second inaugural address">second inaugural address</a>, she did not repeat that detailed construction. But she did commit that she would “continue to handle cross-strait affairs according to the Constitution of the Republic of China and the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area.”&nbsp;</p>
<p>However, Lai did not explicitly state that cross-strait affairs would be conducted in accordance with the Republic of China Constitution and the Act Governing Relations Between the People of Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, both of which embody a one-China framework. He also did not even elliptically reference the “1992 consensus.” This is likely due to a calculation by Lai and his team that there was little to be gained by attempting to find a workaround to the “1992 consensus” in this first articulation of his cross-strait policy as president. Since Beijing famously rejected Tsai’s formulation as an “incomplete test paper” and has an even darker view of Lai than it had of Tsai, his team likely concluded nothing he would do would be enough at this stage. From Beijing’s perspective, however, the omission of these terms could be seen as a more consequential signal that Lai is embarking on a different cross-strait approach, overshadowing the areas where he stressed continuity.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Notably, Tsai refrained from directly criticizing China and certain PRC provocations in her past inaugural addresses, but Lai did not hesitate to do so. He instead declared that “China’s military actions and gray-zone coercion are considered the greatest strategic challenges to global peace and stability.” He called on China “to cease their political and military intimidation against Taiwan” and argued that even as Taiwan pursues peace “we must not harbor any delusions.” He noted that, “so long as China refuses to renounce the use of force against Taiwan, all of us in Taiwan ought to understand, that even if we accept the entirety of China’s position and give up our sovereignty, China’s ambition to annex Taiwan will not simply disappear.” Accordingly, he concluded, “in face of the many threats and attempts of infiltration from China, we must demonstrate our resolution to defend our nation, and we must also raise our defense awareness and strengthen our legal framework for national security.” Lai’s decision to include this language likely reflects the changed strategic context, including China’s military response to then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022, and the desire to ensure that Beijing—rather than Taipei—is seen by the international community as the provocateur in any cross-strait crisis.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p><b>Beijing Responds&nbsp;</b></p>
<p>China has made its distrust of Lai well known throughout his career. During the presidential campaign, the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/taiwan/elections-cross-strait-united-states-china-relations" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="warned">warned</a> that the choice facing Taiwan’s voters was between war and peace, with a vote for Lai tantamount to choosing the former. After Lai’s speech, the <a href="https://english.news.cn/20240520/d9024fcff39b4a7ba6a97a9dda5804d0/c.html" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="TAO’s spokesman">TAO’s spokesman</a> accused him of “flagrantly promoting separatist fallacies and inciting cross-strait confrontation,” heated language that represents a notable escalation compared with how Chinese authorities reacted to Tsai’s past inaugural addresses. A <a href="http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/jmsd/16310117.html" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="commentary">commentary</a> in state-run media accused Lai of filling his speech with “deceitful political lies, aggressively promoting the separatist ideology of ‘Taiwan independence,’ maliciously inciting cross-strait antagonism, and advocating for independence through reliance on foreign support and military means.”&nbsp;</p>
<p>At the same time, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stuck to standard talking points on Taiwan, <a href="https://english.news.cn/20240520/1735085308d0491ea8bf6e8528135e45/c.html?utm_source=substack&amp;utm_medium=email" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="stating">stating</a> that “anyone who attempts to challenge the one-China principle will inevitably fail” and that separatist attempts for “Taiwan independence” are doomed to fail and posed the greatest threat to cross-strait stability.&nbsp;</p>
<p><b>Challenges Ahead&nbsp;</b></p>
<p>Lai faces an array of challenges that will test his team. Foremost is the risk of a vicious cycle of escalation between Beijing and Taipei. Beijing may have written Lai off long ago, refusing to believe that he could be a trusted interlocutor who will exercise adequate restraint. Lai, who undoubtedly&nbsp;believes that he has acted in a restrained manner that has gone unnoticed in Beijing, may deviate from Tsai’s approach at least rhetorically, seeing little reason to adjust to accommodate Beijing’s preferences.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>In recent months, Beijing has acted in ways that might accelerate such a vicious cycle. Public reporting indicates Beijing has broken longstanding precedent with entries into Taiwan’s claimed contiguous zone. That decision suggests Beijing may not appreciate responsible approaches by Washington and Taipei, which in turn may see little reason to exercise restraint of their own in response.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Lai also faces a challenging environment at home. His 40 percent vote share was the lowest of any winning candidate since 2000, which similarly saw a three-way race. For the first time in sixteen years, no party controls the legislature with an outright majority, and the DPP is now a minority given the de facto coalition between the two main opposition parties: the Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP). In this more uncertain political environment, Beijing may look for opportunities to manipulate Taiwan’s politics to advance its aims. It hopes Lai will be a one-term president and likely believes it can increase the likelihood that this comes to pass, and that may reduce its incentive to seek stability.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>For the United States, the key question will be whether a vicious cycle can be avoided. If each side exercises restraint, and if that restraint is acknowledged and reciprocated by the other side, there may be a path to preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. That puts pressure on all sides—Beijing, Taipei, and Washington—to work to manage these complex dynamics.&nbsp;</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog/analyzing-lai-ching-tes-inaugural-address-more-continuity-difference</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/blog/analyzing-lai-ching-tes-inaugural-address-more-continuity-difference</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 21 May 2024 20:01:01 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>America’s New Cold Wars, With David Sanger</title>
<description><audio controls="" src="https://cfr-org-prod-media-files.s3.amazonaws.com/audio-files/240521_TPI_MASTER.mp3"></audio><br><p><b style="font-weight:700">Mentioned on the Episode&nbsp;</b></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>John Maggio, <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt22525694/" title="Year One: A Political Odyssey" target="_blank"><em style="font-style:italic">Year One: A Political Odyssey</em></a>, HBO Max</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>David E. Sanger, <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/710053/new-cold-wars-by-david-e-sanger-with-mary-k-brooks/" title="New Cold Wars: China's Rise, Russia's Invasion, and America's Struggle to Defend the West" target="_blank"><em style="font-style:italic">New Cold Wars: China's Rise, Russia's Invasion, and America's Struggle to Defend the West</em></a>, with Mary K. Brooks&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>David E. Sanger, <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/547683/the-perfect-weapon-by-david-e-sanger/" title="The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage, and Fear in the Cyber Age" target="_blank"><em style="font-style:italic">The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage, and Fear in the Cyber Age</em></a></p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/americas-new-cold-wars-david-sanger</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/americas-new-cold-wars-david-sanger</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 21 May 2024 19:16:35 GMT</pubDate>
<enclosure url="https://cfr-org-prod-media-files.s3.amazonaws.com/audio-files/240521_TPI_MASTER.mp3" type="audio/mpeg"></enclosure>
</item>
<item>
<title>Religion in China</title>
<description><figure>
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/immersive_image_3_2_desktop_2x/public/image/2024/05/ChinaReligion_BG_Lead.jpg.webp" alt="Hui Muslim women stand in front of China’s flag at a mosque in Beijing." class="article-header-backgrounder__image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
<figcaption class="article-header-backgrounder__caption">
Hui Muslim women stand in front of China’s flag at a mosque in Beijing.
<span class="article-header-backgrounder__credit">Kevin Frayer/Getty Images</span> </figcaption>
</figure><br>
<div class="summary__container">
<div class="summary__title">Summary</div>
<div class="summary__description"><ul>
<li><span><span><span><span><span><span>The&nbsp;<span>Chinese Communist Party’s nearly 100 million members are required to be atheist, but the party recognizes five religions: Buddhism, Catholicism, Daoism, Islam, and Protestantism.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></li>
<li><span><span><span><span><span><span><span>Authorities tightly monitor registered and unregistered religious groups. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span><span><span><span><span><span>China has one of the largest populations of religious prisoners, and some groups, including Uyghur Muslims, face high levels of persecution.</span></span></span></span></span></span></li>
<li>Since&nbsp;<span><span><span><span><span><span><span>Chinese President Xi Jinping came to power, authorities have sought to enforce stricter regulations to ensure groups conform to doctrines set forth by the communist party.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></li>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
<br><h2>Introduction</h2>
<p>Amid an economic boom and rapid modernization, religion in China has been on the rise in recent decades. Experts point to the emergence of a spiritual vacuum as a trigger for the growing number of religious believers, particularly followers of Christianity and traditional Chinese religious groups.&nbsp;</p>
<p>While China’s constitution allows religious belief, Chinese Buddhism, Daoism, and folk practices are shown more leniency than other religions, such as Islam and Christianity, which are regarded as “foreign” by the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinese-communist-party" title="Chinese Communist Party" target="_blank">Chinese Communist Party</a> (CCP). In recent years, adherents across all religious organizations, including both state-sanctioned and underground and banned groups, face intensifying persecution and repression. They also face pressure to implement President Xi Jinping’s sinicization policies, which aim to make religious groups more aligned with Chinese culture, morality, and doctrines as defined by the CCP.</p>
<h2>Freedom and Regulation</h2><p>China’s relationship with religion has shifted throughout its modern history. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), religions were essentially banned, and followers were forced underground or persecuted as part of a campaign to eliminate “old” customs and ideas. In the 1980s, the CCP acknowledged the Chinese people’s complex relationship with religion. The following decades saw a revival of religious institutions and groups, and even tolerance of underground religions not directly under state control. Although Article 36 of the <a href="https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/lawsregulations/201911/20/content_WS5ed8856ec6d0b3f0e9499913.html#:~:text=Article%2036%20Citizens,by%20foreign%20forces." title="Chinese constitution" target="_blank">Chinese constitution</a> says that citizens “enjoy freedom of religious belief” and bans discrimination based on religion, the law regulates religion by forbidding state organs, public organizations, or individuals from compelling citizens to believe in—or not believe in—any particular faith. Minors are also forbidden from entering places of worship.</p>
<p>The state recognizes five religions: Buddhism, Catholicism, Daoism, Islam, and Protestantism. The practice of any other faith is formally prohibited, although often tolerated, especially in the case of traditional Chinese beliefs. Religious organizations must register with one of five state-sanctioned patriotic religious associations, which are supervised by the United Front Work Department, a branch of the Communist Party.</p>
<p>The government’s tally of registered religious believers is around two hundred million, or less than 10 percent of the population, according to several sources, including the UN Human Rights Council’s 2024 <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/CNIndex.aspx" title="Universal Periodic Review" target="_blank">Universal Periodic Review</a>. However, the number of Chinese adults who practice religion or hold religious belief is <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2023/08/30/measuring-religion-in-china/" title="likely much higher" target="_blank">likely much higher</a> because many believers do not follow organized religion and are said to practice traditional folk religion. These practitioners, along with members of underground house churches and banned religious groups, account for many of the country’s unregistered believers.</p>
<a id="1bcaf1d5-ec8e-4829-92af-c4167af28ab0"></a>
<div class="datawrapper-graph-embed"><div class="dw-responsive-embed-iframe"><iframe title="Religious Affiliation in China" aria-label="Bar Chart" id="datawrapper-chart-9Zk6T" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/9Zk6T/6/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="333" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe></div></div>
<p>Chinese public security officials monitor both registered and unregistered religious groups to prevent activities that “<a href="http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content_1372964.htm" title="disrupt public order" target="_blank">disrupt public order</a>, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the State,” as stipulated by the Chinese constitution. In practice, however, monitoring and crackdowns often target peaceful activities that are protected under international law, say human rights watchdogs.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The State Council, the government’s administrative authority, <a href="http://english.gov.cn/policies/latest_releases/2017/09/07/content_281475842719170.htm" title="passed regulations on religious affairs" target="_blank">passed regulations on religious affairs</a> in 2018 to allow state-registered religious organizations to possess property, publish literature, train and approve clergy, and collect donations. But the revised rules also included restrictions on religious schooling and the times and locations of religious celebrations, as well as monitoring of online religious activity and reporting <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-religion/china-tightens-regulation-of-religion-to-block-extremism-idUSKCN1BI1IH" title="donations that exceed 100,000 yuan" target="_blank">donations that exceed 100,000 yuan</a> (around $15,900).&nbsp;</p><p>Under Xi, the CCP has pushed to sinicize religion, or shape all religions to conform to the doctrines of the Communist Party and the customs of the majority Han Chinese population. New regulations that went into effect in early 2020 require religious groups to accept and <a href="https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/measures-for-the-administration-of-religious-groups/" title="spread CCP ideology" target="_blank">spread CCP ideology</a> and values. Faith organizations must now get approval from the government’s religious affairs office before conducting any activities. The next year, the CCP banned unregistered domestic religious groups from <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china/" title="sharing religious content online" target="_blank">sharing religious content online</a> and prohibited overseas organizations from operating online religious services in China without a permit, particularly targeting Christianity-related content on the messaging service WeChat.&nbsp;</p>
<p>In September 2023, stricter laws required religious sites and activities to support <a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/religion-controls-08032023122520.html" title="sinicization policies" target="_blank">sinicization policies</a>, which&nbsp; included prohibiting religious activity if it could “endanger national security, disrupt social order [or] damage national interests.” Meanwhile, in Hong Kong, where religious groups are not required to register with the government, religious figures have faced tighter scrutiny and have <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58ecfa82e3df284d3a13dd41/t/6549b051117ad12c7c40c783/1699328088263/Sell+Out+My+Soul_final.pdf" title="increased self-censorship" target="_blank">increased self-censorship</a> [PDF] under the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/hong-kong-freedoms-democracy-protests-china-crackdown" title="2020 national security law" target="_blank">2020 national security law</a>. The former Catholic Bishop of Hong Kong, Cardinal Joseph Zen Ze-kiun, was arrested on suspicion of “collusion with foreign forces” in 2021. He was later found guilty and was issued a fine. Since 2022, the Catholic church in Hong Kong has halted its annual commemorative masses to mark the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre.</p>
<figure id="image-82067" class="image-embed embedded_small"><div class="image-embed__picture">
<img width="520" height="347" alt="Cardinal Joseph Zen attends a mass for the Chinese Catholic church in Hong Kong." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" class="lazyload" data-src="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/China_Christianity_BG.jpg.webp" src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/China_Christianity_BG.jpg.webp" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption"><div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Cardinal Joseph Zen Ze-kiun attends a mass for the Chinese Catholic church in Hong Kong.
<span class="image-embed__source">Tyrone Siu/Reuters</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption></figure><p>In addition, China is home to one of the largest populations of religious prisoners, likely numbering from several thousand to <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/441219-CHINA-2022-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf" title="as high as tens of thousands" target="_blank">as high as tens of thousands</a> [PDF]; while in custody, some are tortured or killed, rights groups say. Instances of arbitrary detentions and violence carried out with impunity have led the U.S. State Department to designate China as a country of particular concern&nbsp;over religious freedom annually since 1999.</p>
<h2>Atheism and the CCP</h2>
<p>The CCP is officially atheist. The party prohibits its roughly ninety-eight million party members from holding religious beliefs, and it requires the expulsion of party members who belong to religious organizations. Officials have said that party membership and religious beliefs are incompatible, and they discourage families of CCP members from publicly participating in religious ceremonies. Although these regulations are not always strictly enforced, the party periodically takes steps to draw a clearer line on religion.&nbsp;</p>
<h2><b>Chinese Buddhism and Folk Religions</b></h2>
<p>China has the world’s largest Buddhist population—an estimate of 4 percent to 33 percent of the country’s population (42 million to 362 million people) depending on how religious practices are measured, according to the U.S.-based <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2023/08/30/buddhism/#how-many-buddhists-are-there-in-china" title="Pew Research Center" target="_blank">Pew Research Center</a>. Though Buddhism originated in India, it has a long history and tradition in China and today is the country’s largest institutionalized religion. Chinese folk religions, in contrast, have no rigid organizational structure, blend practices from Buddhism and Daoism, and are manifest in the worship of ancestors, spirits, or other local deities. According to CFR Senior Fellow Ian Johnson, author of <a href="http://www.ian-johnson.com/books/the-souls-of-china" title="The Souls of China: The Return of Religion After Mao" target="_blank"><em style="font-style:italic">The Souls of China: The Return of Religion After Mao</em></a>, “hundreds, if not thousands, of folk religious temples are unregistered,” but are tolerated.</p>
<p>Since China’s opening and reform in the 1980s, the party has been tolerant of, and tacitly approved, the rise in Buddhist and Daoist practice. Under former Chinese leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, the government “<a href="http://www.academia.edu/2262613/Buddhist_revival_under_state_watch" title="passively supported" target="_blank">passively supported</a>” the growth of Buddhism because it believed doing so helped bolster the image of China’s peaceful rise, supported the CCP’s goal of creating a “harmonious society,” and could help to improve relations with Taiwan, according to the University of Ottawa’s André Laliberté. Today, Buddhism, Daoism, and folk religions are <a href="https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/china-reversing-its-crackdown-some-religions-not-all" title="treated more leniently by the party" target="_blank">treated more leniently by the party</a> compared to “foreign” religions, such as Islam or Christianity.</p>
<p>The growth of Buddhism led to heightened visibility of its institutions, particularly <a href="https://www.academia.edu/5024941/Buddhist_Charities_and_China_Social_Policy_An_Opportunity_for_Alternate_Civility" title="Buddhist philanthropic organizations" target="_blank">Buddhist philanthropic organizations</a> [PDF] that deliver social services to the poor amid soaring inequality in China. Since Xi has come to power, experts have noted an apparent easing of tough rhetoric against, and even a promotion of, traditional beliefs in China. Some experts say Xi believes Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism do not challenge the CCP’s rule and therefore can be <a href="https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/the-two-tracks-of-xi-jinping-s-religious-policy" title="advantageous for China’s global diplomacy" target="_blank">advantageous for China’s global diplomacy</a>.</p>
<h2><b>Tibetan Buddhism</b></h2>
<p>According to China’s 2020 census data, the Tibetan region of China is home to<a href="https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/how-much-does-beijing-control-ethnic-makeup-of-tibet" title="seven million Tibetans" target="_blank"> seven million Tibetans</a>, more than 90 percent of the region’s population. Nearly all Tibetans in the region practice a distinct form of Buddhism. The Dalai Lama is the spiritual leader of one of the main schools of Tibetan Buddhism and symbolizes Tibetan identity for both Tibetans in China and in exile. Since 1987, he and the exiled government, known as the Central Tibetan Administration, have played a prominent role in garnering international support for a “<a href="https://www.dalailama.com/messages/tibet/middle-way-approach" title="Middle Way” approach" target="_blank">Middle Way” approach</a> to resolve Tibet’s political disputes within the framework of the People’s Republic of China. Buddhist monks within Tibet have also participated in largely peaceful anti-government demonstrations, though some have included riots and <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/13/self-immolation-and-chinas-state-cult-of-stability-tibet-monks-dalai-lama/" title="self-immolations" target="_blank">self-immolations</a>.</p>
<p>China’s religious policy is inherently tied to political tensions across the Tibetan region, which comprises the Tibet Autonomous Region and adjacent Tibetan autonomous prefectures and counties in neighboring provinces. To quell dissent, China has sought to aggressively assimilate Tibetans, says Tashi Rabgey, research professor of international affairs at George Washington University. A 2021 report by watchdog group the Tibet Action Institute estimates that <a href="https://s7712.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/2021_TAI_ColonialBoardingSchoolReport_Digital.pdf" title="78 percent of Tibetan students" target="_blank">78 percent of Tibetan students</a>&nbsp;[PDF] between six and eighteen years old live in boarding schools, where they are away from their families and taught primarily in Mandarin. Although Beijing has attempted to make the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/world/asia/25tibet.html" title="region more “Chinese”" target="_blank">region more “Chinese”</a> by funding development projects and incentivizing migration to Tibet, it has been largely unsuccessful.</p>
<figure id="image-82068" class="image-embed embedded_small"><div class="image-embed__picture">
<img width="520" height="347" alt="Tibetan Buddhist monks look at a mural in the Tashilhunpo Monastery in Shigatse, Tibet Autonomous Region, China." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" class="lazyload" data-src="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/China_Tibet_BG.jpg.webp" src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/China_Tibet_BG.jpg.webp" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption"><div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Tibetan Buddhist monks look at a mural in the Tashi Lhunpo Monastery in Tibet Autonomous Region, China.
<span class="image-embed__source">He Penglei/CNS/Reuters</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption></figure><p>Tibetan Buddhists face high levels of religious persecution. The state monitors daily operations of major monasteries, with facial-recognition cameras posted outside, and it reserves the right to disapprove an individual’s application to take up religious orders. In 2018, party cadres and officials were <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/01/24/china-new-controls-tibetan-monastery" title="given control" target="_blank">given control</a> over Sichuan Province’s Larung Gar, one of the world’s largest Buddhist study centers. Authorities <a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/tibet/yachen-demolition-10012019181505.html" title="demolished nearly half" target="_blank">demolished nearly half</a> of the center in 2019, displacing up to six thousand monks and nuns.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Authorities have reportedly detained and tortured monks and nuns for refusing to denounce the Dalai Lama, and laypeople have been ordered to replace photos of the Dalai Lama with Chinese leaders. A Tibetan child believed to be a reincarnated, high-ranking religious leader, known as the Panchen Lama, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/15/25-years-after-disappearing-tibetan-panchen-lama-china-no-nearer-its-goal" title="disappeared in 1995" target="_blank">disappeared in 1995</a> and has not been seen since. (Beijing claims that he graduated from college, has a job, and does not want to be disturbed.) After his disappearance, the Chinese government designated another child as the official Panchen Lama, though many Tibetans do not accept him as such.&nbsp;</p>
<p>With the fourteenth Dalai Lama nearing ninety years old, the Tibetan government in exile and the CCP are both preparing for his succession. Each is likely to appoint their own fifteenth Dalai Lama, generating a succession dispute similar to the situation with the current Panchen Lama. Rabgey says that this succession dispute will lead to an escalation of tensions in the region and is likely to trigger future Tibetan political unrest.</p>
<h2>Christian State-Sanctioned and House Churches</h2>
<p>China saw a significant growth in Christianity in the 1980s, after former leader Deng Xiaoping opened China to the outside world. Today, Protestantism is the predominant branch of Christianity practiced in China. There are three state-regulated Christian organizations and many underground house churches, though authorities have been cracking down on non-registered places of worship. Estimates of Christians in China vary widely, but according to a 2023 <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/12/12/chinas-christian-population-appears-to-have-stopped-growing-after-rising-rapidly-in-the-1980s-and-90s/" title="Pew Research Center" target="_blank">Pew Research Center</a> analysis, Chinese survey data show that Chinese adults who identify as Christian have remained stable at about 2 percent of the population (roughly 28 million people).</p>
<p>In recent years, China has witnessed a spike in state repression against both house churches and state-sanctioned Christian organizations, including campaigns to remove hundreds of rooftop crosses from churches, forced demolitions of churches, and harassment and imprisonment of Christian pastors and priests. A <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1deR6dkQpidTsJ0RheaZ2Y8Q-C4XVvEWZ/view" title="2018 report" target="_blank">2018 report</a> [PDF] from ChinaAid, a Texas-based Christian nongovernmental organization, said that religious persecution, primarily against Christians, was on the rise, citing more than one million cases that year. One of China’s most prominent Christian voices and the founder of a large underground church, Pastor <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/30/world/asia/china-wang-yi-christian-sentence.html" title="Wang Yi" target="_blank">Wang Yi</a>, was sentenced to nine years in prison in 2019 after a court charged him with subversion of state power and illegal business operations.</p>
<p>The Vatican does not have diplomatic ties with China, home to some ten to twelve million Catholics. Its recognition of Taiwan and a dispute over the bishop appointment process have been major sticking points. The Communist Party limits the Vatican’s role in selecting Catholic bishops and continues to harass and detain clergy who refuse to join the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association, the state-sanctioned organizational body for Catholics in China. In 2018, the two sides <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/22/world/asia/china-vatican-bishops.html" title="reached a provisional agreement" target="_blank">reached a provisional agreement</a> in which Pope Francis recognized several Chinese state-appointed bishops who had been excommunicated. While the two-year agreement was renewed in 2020 and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/vatican-confirms-renewal-contested-accord-with-china-bishops-appointments-2022-10-22/" title="again in 2022" target="_blank">again in 2022</a>, tensions seemed to rise shortly after, when China installed two bishops as heads of dioceses without permission from the Pope. However, China-Vatican relations appear to be improving after a January 2024 mutual agreement to consecrate two new bishops in China.</p>
<h2>Islam and Uyghurs in Xinjiang</h2>
<p>Muslims make up an around 1 to 1.5 percent of China’s population, accounting for <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2023/08/30/islam/" title="around eighteen million people" target="_blank">around eighteen million people</a>, according to recent estimates&nbsp;by Pew Research Center. China has ten predominantly Muslim ethnic groups, the largest of which is the Hui, an ethnic group closely related to the majority Han population and largely based in western China’s Ningxia Autonomous Region and the Gansu, Qinghai, and Yunnan provinces. Until recently, Hui Muslims had enjoyed relative freedom compared to the government’s tight control on religious activity in Xinjiang, home to a majority of Uyghur Muslims. But CCP policies and rhetoric have become <a href="https://www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-analysis/hui-muslims-and-the-%E2%80%9Cxinjiang-model%E2%80%9D-of-state-suppression-of" title="less tolerant and more repressive" target="_blank">less tolerant and more repressive</a> toward those who practice Islam in general. Officials have held Hui Muslims in formal detention and internment camps over advocating for religious freedom and funding mosque construction.</p>
<p>The Uyghurs are a Turkic people who live primarily in Xinjiang, northwestern China, and are also predominantly Muslim. According to China’s 2020 census, there are more than eleven million Uyghurs in this region, making up approximately half of its population, though many experts agree that increased Han Chinese immigration has lowered this number. For decades, Chinese authorities have cracked down on <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uyghurs-xinjiang" title="Uyghurs in Xinjiang" target="_blank">Uyghurs in Xinjiang</a>, claiming the community holds <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html" title="extremist and separatist ideas." target="_blank">extremist and separatist ideas.</a> They point to occasional outbursts of violence against government workers and civilians in the region and have blamed a group that Beijing calls the East Turkestan Islamic Movement for several terrorist attacks throughout China. Experts say most Uyghurs do not support violence, but many are frustrated by frequent discrimination and the influx of Han Chinese that are disproportionately benefiting from economic opportunities in the region.</p>
<div id="content-promo-82069" class="promo ">
<div class="promo__container">
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-xinjiang-uyghurs-muslims-repression-genocide-human-rights" class="promo__link">
<div class="promo__cta">Dive Deeper</div>
<div class="promo__title">China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang</div>
<div class="promo__icon-circle-and-arrow-right">
</div>
</a>
</div>
</div>
<p>Since 2017, up to two million Muslims, most of them Uyghurs, have been arbitrarily detained in so-called reeducation camps, a... |
http://localhost:1200/cfr/blog - Success ✔️<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0">
<channel>
<title>Blogs</title>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog</link>
<atom:link href="http://localhost:1200/cfr/blog" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"></atom:link>
<description>Blogs - Made with love by RSSHub(https://github.com/DIYgod/RSSHub)</description>
<generator>RSSHub</generator>
<webMaster>i@diygod.me (DIYgod)</webMaster>
<language>en</language>
<lastBuildDate>Fri, 24 May 2024 07:51:11 GMT</lastBuildDate>
<ttl>5</ttl>
<item>
<title>A Puzzling Attempted Coup in the DRC</title>
<description><figure>
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/slide_3_2/public/image/2024/05/DRC%20Coup%20052324.jpg.webp" alt="The Congolese Republican Guard and police block a road around the scene of an attempted coup d'etat in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo on May 19, 2024." class="article-header-blog__image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
<figcaption class="article-header-blog__caption">
The Congolese Republican Guard and police block a road around the scene of an attempted coup d'etat in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo on May 19, 2024.
<span class="article-header-blog__credit">Arsene Mpiana/AFP via Getty Images</span> </figcaption>
</figure><br><p>The news <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/democratic-republic-congo-army-says-it-stopped-attempted-coup-2024-05-19/" title="reports" target="_blank">reports</a> of this past weekend’s failed coup attempt in Kinshasa read like a Mad Lib—a father-son duo from <u>Utah</u> and a <u>cannabis entrepreneur</u> from <u>Maryland</u> were part of a small band <u>livestreaming</u> an attempt to overthrow the government of the <u>Democratic Republic of Congo</u>. In the conspiratorial hothouse of Congolese politics, the bizarre incident, which culminated in deadly consequences for several people including Christian Malanga, leader of the would-be putchists, has raised numerous as yet unanswered questions. Who convinced Malanga that this effort would succeed? How did the amateurish group manage to access the presidential palace? Whose agenda was advanced by this spectacle?</p>
<p>It remains to be seen how the failed coup d’état will influence politics in the DRC, but one clear loser would seem to be the United States. Certainly, the incident made U.S. Ambassador to the DRC Lucy Tamlyn’s job more difficult. As social media accounts buzzed with accusations of CIA involvement, she <a href="https://x.com/USAmbDRC" title="registered" target="_blank">registered</a> “shock and concern” while pledging to cooperate with the Congolese government in investigating the incident. Cooler heads recognized that the failed takeover hardly bore the hallmarks of a professional intelligence organization, but the notion of armed Americans meddling in Congolese politics <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/10/24/congo-lumumba-cia-amends/" title="echoes" target="_blank">echoes</a> the real and sordid history of U.S. policies during the Cold War. As the United States aims to find a constructive way forward with the DRC on a range of issues from critical mineral deals to forest conservation and conflict resolution, developments that stir up historic resentments benefit only those who wish to see the United States on the back foot.</p><p>Yet another unhelpful narrative is buttressed by the bizarre events in the DRC—one about contempt. The story creates the impression that Americans so underestimate African states that they imagine a government can be overthrown by a small group of outsiders with nothing but fatigues, guns, and a can-do attitude. It’s consistent with former President Trump’s vulgar characterization of African countries, with press coverage that uses images from one part of the continent to accompany a story about a completely different country, and with analyses that consistently overlook the agency of Africans themselves in explaining major political developments. A small, misguided group with a sprinkling of American passports have boosted the efforts of America’s adversaries in Africa.</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog/puzzling-attempted-coup-drc</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/blog/puzzling-attempted-coup-drc</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2024 16:00:13 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>The President’s Inbox Recap: America’s New Cold Wars</title>
<description><figure>
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/slide_3_2/public/image/2024/05/Xi%20and%20Putin%20Gala%20Photo.JPG.webp" alt="Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping attend the gala event celebrating 75th anniversary of China-Russia relations in Beijing, China, on May 16, 2024." class="article-header-blog__image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
<figcaption class="article-header-blog__caption">
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping attend the gala event celebrating 75th anniversary of China-Russia relations in Beijing, China, on May 16, 2024.
<span class="article-header-blog__credit">Alexander Ryumin/Pool via REUTERS</span> </figcaption>
</figure><br><p>The latest episode o<em>f </em><a href="https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/americas-new-cold-wars-david-sanger" title="The President’s Inbox" target="_blank"><em>The President’s Inbox</em></a><em> </em>is live! This week, Jim sat down with <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/by/david-e-sanger" title="David E. Sanger" target="_blank">David E. Sanger</a>, White House and National Security Correspondent for the <em>New York Times</em>. David recently published <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/710053/new-cold-wars-by-david-e-sanger-with-mary-k-brooks/" title="New Cold Wars: China’s Rise, Russia’s Invasion, and America’s Struggle to Defend the West" target="_blank"><em>New Cold Wars: China’s Rise, Russia’s Invasion, and America’s Struggle to Defend the West</em></a>. They discussed the United States’ return to great power competition.</p>
<div class="media-episode-card">
<div class="episode-card__podcast-title">
<section class="series-tag"><a href="https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/presidents-inbox" class="series-tag__link"> The President’s Inbox</a> </section></div>
<h1 class="episode-card__title">
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/americas-new-cold-wars-david-sanger" data-vars-event-label=" America’s New Cold Wars, With David Sanger"> America’s New Cold Wars, With David Sanger</a>
</h1>
<div class="episode-card__summary">
<p></p><p>David Sanger, the White House and national security correspondent for the<em> New York Times</em>, sits down with James M. Lindsay to discuss how the post-Cold War ended and why the new era of geopolitical rivalry began.</p>
</div>
<div class="audio-podcast">
<div id="player-container-node-audio-252435" class="audio-player-wrapper" data-id="-node-audio-252435">
<div id="play-btn-node-audio-252435" class="audio-player-wrapper__btn audio-player-wrapper__play">
<span class="play-btn">
</span>
<span class="pause-btn">
</span>
</div>
<div class="audio-player-wrapper__controls">
<div id="seekObjContainer-node-audio-252435" class="seekObjContainer">
<div id="seekHover-node-audio-252435" class="seekHover"></div>
<input type="range" id="seek-slider-node-audio-252435" max="100" value="0"></div>
</div>
<div class="audio-player-wrapper__time">
<small id="current-time-node-audio-252435" class="time">0:00</small>
<small id="duration-node-audio-252435" class="time">0:00</small>
</div>
<div class="audio-player-wrapper__mute"></div>
<div class="audio-player-wrapper__speed" data-speed="1">x</div>
<div class="audio-player" id="audio-player-container-node-audio-252435">
<audio id="player-node-audio-252435" src="https://cfr-org-prod-media-files.s3.amazonaws.com/audio-files/240521_TPI_MASTER.mp3" preload="”metadata”"></audio></div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="episode-card__date">
May 20, 2024 — 38:18 min </div>
</div>
<p>Here are four highlights from their conversation:</p>
<p><em>1.) The post-Cold War era is over. </em>The United States no longer enjoys its unipolar moment. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and through the 2000s, the United States and the West made a series of misjudgments about where Russia and China were headed. They assumed that Russia and China would want to become more integrated into the U.S.-led world order. David acknowledged that Russian President Vladimir Putin stated explicitly in 2007 that he would do the contrary, while China’s ambitions were unclear initially. David said, “this was a failure of imagining a world in which these powers wanted to return to a past era of greatness and weren’t going to sit still for a unipolar world, run out of Washington under Washington values.”</p><p><em>2.) The new era of great power competition is distinct from the old Cold War. </em>The old Cold War was largely a military competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Today, the United States is engaged in a great power competition that is more complex. The United States is engaged in competition with China and Russia—both of whom have nuclear arsenals. The United States is dealing with, as David put it, “a Russia that has learned with great effectiveness, how to be an agent of disturbance or at least disruption, and a China whose rise, although it has recently run into considerable economic headwinds, has created a range of new problems for us.” At the same time, the United States and its allies and partners—including NATO members, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia—and the “Axis of Resistance”—which is made up of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran—are squaring off. The United States and the Soviet Union, however, were never as interconnected as the United States, China, and Russia are today. He added, “in the new Cold Wars, we are still reliant on the Chinese for chips, other technology. They are reliant on us, and yet none of that has prevented us from descending into what I think is a new era of containment.”</p>
<p><em>3.) The Russia-Ukraine war is a “laboratory” for the United States and its partners against the backdrop of great power competition. </em>The United States is learning what does and doesn’t work in direct conflict with major powers. For example, the United States now realizes that its expensive satellite systems are “sitting ducks.” In the run-up to the war in Ukraine, Russia successfully took out the European Viasat satellite network through a cyberattack on the ground-based modems. Now, the United States is looking to move to a system like Elon Musk’s Starlink—which consists of small satellite constellations. That’s just one example of expensive, modern technology mismatching warfare realities.</p>
<p><em>4.) There is more reason for optimism on the U.S.-China relationship than the U.S.-Russia relationship. </em>David put it this way, “oddly enough, I'm slightly more optimistic, at least in the short term on China than I am on Russia. At least we have conversations underway with them. That's really only in the past year and is driven less by the brilliance of our diplomacy, I think, than by the fact that the Chinese economy has been through a significant downturn that's going to be really hard for them to reverse.” At the same time, when Putin threatened to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, China stated its opposition to the use of nuclear weapons in the conflict. China and the United States have some opportunities for collaboration. David added, “I don’t have any illusions that that’s going to be a broad effort, and I fear the two countries [Russia and China] may grow closer, not further apart, but it is an opportunity for the US.”</p>
<p>If you’re looking to read more of David’s work, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/23/us/politics/ukraine-new-american-technology.html" title="check out" target="_blank">check out</a> this adaptation from his book for the <em>New York Times</em> about the lessons learned from the war in Ukraine.</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog/presidents-inbox-recap-americas-new-cold-wars</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/blog/presidents-inbox-recap-americas-new-cold-wars</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2024 14:42:21 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Advanced Manufacturing to be a Focus of China’s July Party Plenum</title>
<description><figure>
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/slide_3_2/public/image/2024/05/2017-10-22T230936Z_41608130_RC13548D61B0_RTRMADP_3_CHINA-BATTERIES-RECYCLING.JPG.webp" alt="A worker inspects batteries for electric vehicles being manufactured at a factory in Dongguan, China. " class="article-header-blog__image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
<figcaption class="article-header-blog__caption">
A worker inspects batteries for electric vehicles being manufactured at a factory in Dongguan, China.
<span class="article-header-blog__credit">Bobby Yip/Reuters</span> </figcaption>
</figure><br><p>China’s long-delayed third Party plenum on economic reform will be held in July. Official commentary suggests that the Party communique which will be issued at this meeting will double-down on the importance of manufacturing as a tool to address China’s pressing domestic economic problems, potentially increasing trade tensions with a range of foreign countries.</p>
<p>On April 30, Chinese authorities&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="0" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.rfa.org%2Fenglish%2Fnews%2Fchina%2Fdelayed-third-plenary-economy-meeting-05022024142612.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503185984%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=6rGd5%2FLSHj1bM81wUd7kavWE%2BfArnHSjbHJl9xnwSRY%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWA21353390-5ead-5dcb-2b03-23d199791392" originalsrc="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/delayed-third-plenary-economy-meeting-05022024142612.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="H0nZtRfp6EVbYT+KTpVqEheb+uLHle+cIEiV0g+4+TJW3Qu25XU/yzbCa1G2aRH/CCZXeUISHDF/gjIEXXg6zrryaT7ofgaXLsCq4t+Ik6Cb4/KAwl81rSRLR+Eb2phf9yd3N/9uq7lw3S0AkysnTIbFN+sOlSXsSMVT6MjV/hw=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/delayed-third-plenary-economy-meeting-05022024142612.html. Click or tap if you trust this link.">announced</a>&nbsp;that the third Party plenum of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee would meet in July. Official commentary&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="1" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.chinadaily.com.cn%2Fa%2F202405%2F01%2FWS66323e19a31082fc043c5050.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503199426%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=2n3UuGo%2FRAWMbRlRHWq%2BEQJSihCvwU%2FgSSy2AXeD2PE%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWA117497f5-e87c-bc4e-01dd-f20665dc9b5e" originalsrc="https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202405/01/WS66323e19a31082fc043c5050.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="bqQQxTFiPd7eWyoW8nBUP4fkYbr+Lnn8xYI19CYTxCJmPQ0cE4NwUv9TvRZM6N7F+C46cUR8Mw1johhx4G2Aca9bsgndQMVxL7ANckuufHWRiWeNv8elRRoWYA824p1Ilt4+VGxxWLXaknoI7+ubjDILGgOZJLlPYVseD4HI/nw=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202405/01/WS66323e19a31082fc043c5050.html. Click or tap if you trust this link.">indicates</a>&nbsp;that economic issues will be the core of the plenum, including a focus on integrated economic plans for the Yangtze Delta region. But specific attention will also be devoted to fostering “new quality productive forces”—a new Party slogan set out by Xi Jinping—with state commentary stating:</p><p><em>“The imperative was stressed... to develop new quality productive forces according to local conditions. The layout of China's strength in strategic science and technology should be improved, emerging industries cultivated and strengthened, the development of industries for the future arranged in advance, and the transformation and upgrading of traditional industries empowered by advanced technologies.”</em></p>
<p>As Chinese authorities&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="2" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Flosangeles.china-consulate.gov.cn%2Feng%2Flghd%2F202404%2Ft20240418_11283727.htm&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503205764%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=IbEShh6%2BllqjRF%2BKcOmhi%2FU7fTx1f9JCGSLpKwYrcBk%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAe743989e-a804-99d8-d203-643dc5ac1cc7" originalsrc="http://losangeles.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/lghd/202404/t20240418_11283727.htm" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="nJFMkJ+NoiMgW4rhQv8Zy1Lr3elJYsunHe4BDryx6OO0YVHvk0kbWP02pfLAsbN1ydtFaaLLI+D2xacSVY5nZse/MXybDN3lKtTtVciINnLLI1oJjosVuWnQLf9+vqKBw/nTo448yRRn+8p/5q4ZAnoGVQEE+nbAkYpuy9tqg0g=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: http://losangeles.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/lghd/202404/t20240418_11283727.htm. Click or tap if you trust this link.">note</a>, “new quality productive forces” includes three specific industries: electric vehicles, lithium-ion batteries, and photovoltaic products, which have registered dramatic export growth, in addition to other fields in biomedicine, artificial intelligence, and the digital economy. In recent years, Beijing has&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="3" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2024%2F05%2F14%2Fbusiness%2Fchina-exports-manufacturing.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503211048%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=1ahyI9wpkevRlu2E672ErhfP7nh3mz%2Fwp4Q4dT76QSc%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAd915b52c-0ef4-2399-4607-1ea63c3f5b6b" originalsrc="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/14/business/china-exports-manufacturing.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="L2sZOeL0lFunPptcQBH8iAhtpk88vF6tbo59ysGysLK+IoJ4HxdgExVjCZ/qZ6o01CYHuZ3WrgTsj9CqTmStycTBTwhf+dMUsXEuw49i+afnKwi/uOCVTlwcjKEcEbF6/gKe+TnSzRXlDzhzF6kuCmKwHA/MVKY/pJPB0BG8OpI=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/14/business/china-exports-manufacturing.html. Click or tap if you trust this link.">identified and promoted</a>&nbsp;key advanced manufacturing industries—including electric vehicles and batteries—as part of China’s industrial strategy. Goals include reducing reliance on foreign technologies and creating new sources of export-driven growth.&nbsp;</p>
<p>For Beijing, such emphasis on manufacturing represents an economic development strategy aimed at responding to serious domestic challenges. China currently faces both continuing high&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="4" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.wsj.com%2Fworld%2Fchina%2Fchinas-youth-unemployment-eased-in-april-a029344f&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503216081%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=eNQrISw%2BXNg3i%2FwuJav7ExYbcv2lBfCg4MzHyblG7p4%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAbd6af401-ab3c-7845-7ea4-53d89f61f617" originalsrc="https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-youth-unemployment-eased-in-april-a029344f" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="AQ4/iQp/hYQGxLkXSn7qmCrCJ/cZPlJ+TV1/fUPl5xi4LmH5GuJJY97e/YzHRaDV7MuK+PCZTCHRcdjAGmcXnkvGUJvpbYYSHjcj+YJoViFXMJd+4ypOZ98eTfbC22clyxh9qg1vg2Dbiab/raJBmkpD+TjrkS5zidNmKWfKPGQ=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-youth-unemployment-eased-in-april-a029344f. Click or tap if you trust this link.">youth unemployment</a>, as well as construction and real estate sectors that are mired in deep distress after the implosion of China’s property bubble, and which constituted a quarter of China’s GDP prior to the pandemic. Recent years have&nbsp;<a data-auth="NotApplicable" data-linkindex="5" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/amid-mounting-youth-unemployment-woes-beijing-looks-towards-vocational-education" id="OWA4f9afd72-27e1-a17f-5c3b-a22fc9dadb5d" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" title="seen">seen</a>&nbsp;Chinese authorities make a concerted effort to raise the status of vocational education programs and steer youth in the direction of skilled manufacturing labor, precisely because of the employment difficulties facing four-year college graduates.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Indeed, recent statements by Xi himself give further support to the likelihood that the July plenum will feature a doubling-down on manufacturing. A front-page&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="6" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fpaper.people.com.cn%2Frmrb%2Fhtml%2F2024-05%2F01%2Fnw.D110000renmrb_20240501_4-01.htm&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503220962%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=LvIQKiUxzrnTL5IJ16VqXtLA2b8mEyKv3lZTT4xqvYk%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWA3964bf46-e856-5cc7-ecc1-e1db928cee93" originalsrc="http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2024-05/01/nw.D110000renmrb_20240501_4-01.htm" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="U+VGUCUN0VJYCDQ2m86YaO3xVtQLf4AFom+BRwX1d9GyfZpjKes/TTI9qMLzcuMXNjvU+HCgSepVli75jPbZ3LIWCwAAZbLulu9txfWvvq83eCkMtoYWI36ftt+PqSliQSPrKlM0wk/5b1NnvWK2u5IeHP12JeLpC0cyv1/ltJI=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2024-05/01/nw.D110000renmrb_20240501_4-01.htm. Click or tap if you trust this link.">article</a>&nbsp;in the Party’s flagship paper accompanying the announcement of the July plenum carried extensive quotations from Xi himself extolling Chinese “craftsmanship” (<em>gongjiang</em>) in numerous fields of advanced manufacturing.</p>
<p>Naturally, any policy moves by Beijing to boost its own export-oriented advanced manufacturing industries run the risk of heightening tensions between China and its trading partners. Fears of Chinese market domination in specific industries led the Biden administration to&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="7" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fapnews.com%2Farticle%2Fbiden-china-tariffs-electric-vehicles-evs-solar-2024ba735c47e04a50898a88425c5e2c&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503225850%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=Lf8uTpZ6O1wJNj%2FSMr8ybHVGEuHjxOTwdJI49t%2BjhmY%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAbf0d4b26-e45d-be24-0f02-464361a12e73" originalsrc="https://apnews.com/article/biden-china-tariffs-electric-vehicles-evs-solar-2024ba735c47e04a50898a88425c5e2c" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="Zial7EJt9mURBt5T7sLNyoDKz3K/3tbjbkvn3tpiLyw16SD1VUaE4xhpY7xPsNzt05pHcsZEOjV3lzvQ09lZ5gjWonBZNBUQKbZdL96lTfPnncvNW3KYIP1mNu9l18reYgYx8EeZGPdwyI/KjsFZU1d3Nd9Aw9+8Kx8cwxUjyMc=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://apnews.com/article/biden-china-tariffs-electric-vehicles-evs-solar-2024ba735c47e04a50898a88425c5e2c. Click or tap if you trust this link.">announce</a>&nbsp;high tariffs on a range of such products last week. In fall 2023, European authorities&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="8" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Frhg.com%2Fresearch%2Faint-no-duty-high-enough%2F&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503230731%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=lyUNGLKjjpnh19ABAO7T6svYM8im%2F1%2Bhg%2BdAw4NUZ1I%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAe6e23327-f57b-65e1-1139-73e7492b7bc3" originalsrc="https://rhg.com/research/aint-no-duty-high-enough/" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="JaDVZAQwTw9fRxuxCWHj8WGhl3dc+jVzZfhMwuGIEkGneAbeDvT4IVpdE7XXcwVyjK8MtOFpBmFteUpAFXZ5EsTvExteNVVizaOmbqPwyBZY+e0plVrdArCFjCjJRKphNkxFyxk3V+dCyvyso5tC5M6sydgpqUCWvii5uiExGdA=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://rhg.com/research/aint-no-duty-high-enough/. Click or tap if you trust this link.">launched</a>&nbsp;an anti-subsidy investigation into China’s electric vehicle industry, and are currently considering imposing countervailing duties.&nbsp;</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog/advanced-manufacturing-be-focus-chinas-july-party-plenum</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/blog/advanced-manufacturing-be-focus-chinas-july-party-plenum</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 22 May 2024 20:43:23 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>European Tech Law Faces Test to Address Interference, Threats, and Disinformation in 2024 Elections</title>
<description><figure>
<div class="article-header__image-picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/full_width_xl/public/image/2024/05/EUvote.jpg.webp" alt="Pin badges encouraging people to vote in June's European Parliament elections are placed at the Malta office information stand during a conference at the European Parliament, in Rabat, Malta May 22, 2024." class="article-header__image-img" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="article-header__image-caption">
Pin badges encouraging people to vote in June's European Parliament elections are placed at the Malta office information stand during a conference at the European Parliament, in Rabat, Malta May 22, 2024.
<span class="author">REUTERS/Darrin Zammit Lupi</span>
</figcaption>
</figure><br><p>The European Union (EU) began implementing the Digital Services Act (DSA) this year, just in time to combat online disinformation and other electoral interference in the dozens of elections taking place in Europe’s twenty-seven member countries and the European Parliament elections taking place June 6 through June 9. To prepare, the EU conducted a stress test of the DSA mechanisms to address elections targeted by false and manipulated information, incitement, and attempts to suppress voices. The DSA has also <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/30/business/meta-european-union-disinformation-investigation.html" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="opened investigations">opened investigations</a> against Meta, TikTok, and X out of concern they are not doing enough to prevent these scenarios.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The DSA is a landmark piece of legislation not only because it is the most comprehensive regulatory effort to address digital threats to date and impacts the 740 million people living in the EU; its implementation will also inform other countries’ efforts to provide a secure and safe internet space. Even without additional legislation, the European law may induce the largest technology companies to voluntarily apply the same standards globally, as was the case with the EU’s Global Digital Privacy Regulation, which caused many platforms to routinely seek user permission for data collection and retention.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p><p>Tech companies’ responses to the DSA during the EU elections will be watched closely in the United States, where disinformation and electoral interference could roil the already contentious November elections. Despite years of debate, no U.S. guardrails have been implemented. Concerns over government censorship and free speech have stalled dozens of legislative proposals to require tech companies to address various threats in the digital space and risks arising from powerful new artificial intelligence (AI). The free speech argument overlooks the speech of those who are being doxed, threatened, attacked, and driven out of the public arena by vicious online actors—including women, who are far and away <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/most-online-hate-targets-women-says-eu-report-2023-11-29/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="the most frequent targets of these attacks">the most frequent targets of these attacks</a>. Legislative action has also been impeded by concerns that overly burdensome regulation will inhibit tech companies amid a worldwide race to gain competitive edge through generative artificial intelligence and other innovations.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The DSA is a useful model constructed around three principles: due diligence requirements for tech companies, mandated transparency via public reporting of their compliance with those requirements, and the threat of hefty fines to ensure compliance and accountability. The size of the EU market is large enough that, as with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), some tech companies may be incentivized to comply with the law’s provisions even without sanctions. The DSA’s strictest provisions apply to the world’s largest online platforms and search engines (those with more than 45 million users). These companies are required to routinely assess activity on their platforms and services for “<a href="https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-vlops" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="systemic risks">systemic risks</a>” involving elections, illegal content, human rights, gender-based violence, protection of minors, and public health and safety.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Companies have delivered initial assessments, which are publicly available, as well as information about the actions they have taken to comply. The EU website hosts a massive and growing online archive of hundreds of thousands of content moderation decisions made by the companies. In early enforcement actions, the EU has requested that Meta and other companies take down false ads and sought more information about their safety practices. For example, the EU queried X about its decision to cut its <a href="https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-requests-information-x-decreasing-content-moderation-resources-under-digital-services" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="content moderation team">content moderation team</a> by 20 percent since last October. Reduced content moderation on one of the world’s largest platforms is obviously a great concern given the number of elections and aggressive disinformation and interference campaigns by Russia and its proxies as it seeks to boost the fortunes of rising rightwing populists, Euroskeptic parties, and pro-Russian and anti-Ukraine candidates, as recently <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/04/17/slovakia-president-pellegrini-russia-election-interference-disinformation/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="occurred in Slovakia">occurred in Slovakia</a> and other Central and Eastern European countries.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>Thus far, the DSA has not yet levied fines, but the threat alone of stiff penalties of up to 6 percent of gross revenues has led most companies to provide the required information. This treasure trove of information about how these tech companies are policing their own platforms is itself valuable; it enables governments and researchers to understand the effectiveness of measures being employed by trust and safety divisions of companies, some of which embrace the goal of a safe internet. The EU law explicitly seeks to guard free speech as well as innovation by companies, but the experience of implementation will inform lingering concerns about free speech, direct government decision-making, and censorship of content, including whether an authoritarian government could exercise control over their populations through digital policing and firewalls. Those concerns color the current negotiations at the United Nations over a Global Digital Compact, which is to be announced as part of the Summit of the Future in September.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The essence of the DSA is not to make content decisions directly but to set standards for due diligence and require companies to demonstrate that they are monitoring and mitigating risks via their own codes of conduct. Voluntary standards may vary, but the sharpest debates revolve around defining what constitutes illegal content. The EU has taken additional measures to harmonize laws regarding what is illegal content across the EU member states, which has been a difficult and contentious matter. The United Kingdom (UK) went through a similar multiyear debate over concerns about curtailing free speech before passing its Online Safety Act late last year. The UK law adopted some features in the DSA, including the due diligence reporting requirement and fines of up to ten percent of gross revenue. It defines the scope of risks more narrowly than the DSA, although the UK law does criminalize “extreme” pornography and may criminalize the creation of deepfake porn. Enforcement of the UK law awaits finalization of codes of conduct by year’s end. The EU also has moved to harmonize what constitutes illegal content as the laws of the twenty-seven member states currently vary greatly in defining what is illegal. Germany’s Network Enforcement Act, which was passed in 2018, is one of the world’s stiffest hate speech laws, which aims to stem rising neo-Nazi hate speech. The far-right Alternative fur Deutschland party has <a href="https://www.vox.com/world-politics/2024/3/12/24080074/germany-afd-far-right" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="surged in state elections">surged in state elections</a> and exceeded the popularity of the leading Social Democrats in national polls.&nbsp;</p><p>The process of making the internet safer is iterative; several countries have revised their laws based on the experience of implementing them as well as evolving circumstances. For example, Germany amended its law in 2021 to stiffen its requirement that companies take down “clearly illegal” content within twenty-four hours. Australia has revised its online safety law twice since its initial passage in 2015, to require faster takedown of material deemed illegal and to greatly expand the law’s original focus on stopping child sexual abuse and exploitation and terrorist material. Speed of response is a critical factor in countering mis- and disinformation. Delayed action by tech companies has allowed viral propagation of material to proceed unhindered—as occurred in early January when deepfake porn of pop star Taylor Swift spread to 47 million viewers shortly after it was uploaded from the notorious 4chan message board.&nbsp;</p>
<p>That highly publicized episode drew attention to the disproportionate targeting of women and girls by internet violence, especially women in public life like politicians, journalists, and human rights activists, and minorities. The chilling effect on political participation has also been documented. The UK parliament rushed to act on deepfake porn after a number of women candidates were targeted this spring. Growing attention to the magnitude of the effects on women spurred the Biden administration to form a fourteen-country global partnership for action on online harassment and abuse. And last month, the EU concluded years-long negotiations to issue a directive on online gender-based violence and threats, including nonconsensual sharing of intimate images, deepfake porn, and other forms of attack. Member states are required to pass laws to implement the directive within two years.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The 2024 elections will serve as an initial test case for the DSA’s ability to rein in this wide variety of election interference, threats, and disinformation. Given the nascent regulatory architecture and companies’ varied compliance records, it is certain that further scrutiny and modification will be needed. Big tech will be required to provide public after-action reviews of the effectiveness of their measures to label AI-generated content, moderate discourse, identify foreign interference, and meet other guidelines for each country’s elections. These much-needed first steps will help light the way for others.&nbsp;</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/article/european-tech-law-faces-test-address-interference-threats-and-disinformation-2024-elections</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/article/european-tech-law-faces-test-address-interference-threats-and-disinformation-2024-elections</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 22 May 2024 15:54:31 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>On "Outside Agitators" and Gaza Protests</title>
<description><p>Below is a chart showing the numbers of people arrested during Gaza encampments and protests on a number of U.S. campuses.</p>
<p>Data was collected from <em>The New York Times </em>article titled <a href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2Finteractive%2F2024%2Fus%2Fpro-palestinian-college-protests-encampments.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7CEAbrams%40cfr.org%7C79b6f0937c2346ef2f5308dc79a4262b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638518993125924955%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=c1vMu1qHcMFcAe4V9go9nFMUVVZ8eQSGkzA5KFljrXA%3D&amp;reserved=0" title="“Where Protesters on U.S. Campuses Have Been Arrested or Detained,”" target="_blank">“Where Protesters on U.S. Campuses Have Been Arrested or Detained,”</a> and supplemented with additional numbers from local journalists, university papers and statements, and national news agencies. The arrest numbers are <em>not </em>an exhaustive list of total arrests related to Gaza encampments and protests. Rather, it is a sample from a group of institutions where there are reports on the affiliation status of those arrested.</p><p>So these numbers should be considered suggestive, not final or absolutely reliable. And what they suggest is that the protests were indeed seized upon by people unaffiliated with the universities and colleges in question, but determined to disrupt campus life in the service of their political goals. Only half of those "protesting" were students or faculty members.&nbsp;</p>
<p>This suggests other questions. Who were the 50.43% who were unaffiliated? Who financed their activities? Did the affiliated and unaffiliated act in the same ways, or was one group or the other more involved in violence, building takeovers, and extremist rhetoric as opposed to peaceful protest?&nbsp;</p>
<p>The involvement of such a percentage of persons unaffiliated with the universities presents special problems for administrators, because internal discipline such as suspension or expulsion will of course not be available when it comes to the unaffiliated. That may leave no alternative except arrests to bring the activities to an end. In real life, we've very often seen administrators threaten suspensions or expulsions and then back off, or even impose such penalties and then remove them as part of the price of getting protesters to disband. Faculty who violate university rules present a similar but even harder problem because they often have more protections, such as tenure.&nbsp;</p>
<p>My impression, now as the academic year is ending, is that punishment is extremely rare. Most charges have been or likely will be dropped, except perhaps in cases where "protesters" assaulted police. Academic penalties such as suspension appear to be disappearing as well. This sends a clear message: violations of the rules will be forgiven no matter how severe the violation if violators stick to their guns and threaten further disturbances. It is an invitation for more trouble, and quite an education for the vast majority of students who naively assumed rules were <em>not </em>made to be broken.&nbsp;</p>
<figure id="image-82254" class="image-embed embedded_large"><div class="image-embed__picture">
<img width="520" height="332" alt="A list of universities with the number of arrests and affiliation status of those arrested." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" class="lazyload" data-src="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/Arrests%20at%20University%20Gaza%20Encampments%20and%20Protests_2.jpg.webp" src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/Arrests%20at%20University%20Gaza%20Encampments%20and%20Protests_2.jpg.webp" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption"><div class="image-embed__caption-text">
<span class="image-embed__source"></span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption></figure></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog/outside-agitators-and-gaza-protests</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/blog/outside-agitators-and-gaza-protests</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 21 May 2024 19:45:22 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Cyber Week in Review: May 16, 2024</title>
<description><figure>
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/slide_3_2/public/image/2024/05/2023-09-13T183146Z_1763002145_RC2U73AQX2WE_RTRMADP_3_USA-AI-CONGRESS-SCHUMER.JPG.webp" alt="U.S. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) addresses a press conference during a break in a bipartisan Artificial Intelligence (AI) Insight Forum for all U.S. senators at the U.S. Capitol on September 13, 2023." class="article-header-blog__image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
<figcaption class="article-header-blog__caption">
U.S. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) addresses a press conference during a break in a bipartisan Artificial Intelligence (AI) Insight Forum for all U.S. senators at the U.S. Capitol on September 13, 2023.
<span class="article-header-blog__credit">Julia Nikhinson/Reuters</span> </figcaption>
</figure><br><p><b style="font-weight:700">Senate AI working group releases AI Policy Roadmap</b></p>
<p>A bipartisan group of senators, which consists of Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY), and Sens. Todd Young (R-IN), Martin Heinrich (D-NM), and Mike Rounds (R-S.D.), released a “<a href="https://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000018f-79a9-d62d-ab9f-f9af975d0000" title="roadmap" target="_blank">roadmap </a>for artificial intelligence policy in the U.S. Senate” this week, and identifies areas or uses of AI that are well-suited for regulation, including boosting funding for AI innovation, developing standards for AI fairness, addressing AI’s implications for national security, and addressing AI’s effects on the workforce, among other concerns. The roadmap also calls for Congress to appropriate nearly $32 billion to encourage non-military AI innovation over the coming year. Although the report offers a <a href="https://www.akingump.com/en/insights/alerts/senate-gang-of-four-releases-long-anticipated-ai-whitepaper" title="variety of recommendations" target="_blank">variety of recommendations</a> for how Congress could leverage processes like appropriations, existing acts and funding like the CHIPS and Science Act, and research and development funding mechanisms to meet the goals of the roadmap, the senators have not clarified exactly what action Congress should take or when it would do so. The roadmap reflects the topics of AI Insight Forums that Majority Leader Schumer convened throughout the fall, which brought together business executives, legislators, and a small group of civil society advocates to discuss regulating artificial intelligence in the United States. While <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2024/05/15/congress-ai-road-map-regulation-schumer/" title="tech industry groups generally supported the report" target="_blank">tech industry groups generally supported the report</a> as a step in the right direction, academics and civil society advocates <a href="https://www.fastcompany.com/91126098/chuck-schumer-ai-roadmap-panned" title="derided" target="_blank">derided</a> it for lacking specificity and substance.&nbsp;</p><p><b style="font-weight:700">U.S., Japan, and partners unveil agreement for cross-border data flows</b></p>
<p>The United States, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom have <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Technology/Japan-U.S.-and-others-to-ease-cross-border-personal-data-transfers" title="created" target="_blank">created </a>a new framework to enable the sharing of personal data across their respective borders. The new framework aims to balance the need to encourage online commerce between countries with the data security needs and regulations of each country. The existing mechanism for data sharing, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Cross-Border Privacy Rules, will be phased out in favor of a new system. The new agreement will allow non-APEC countries to participate in data-sharing initiatives, with the United Kingdom being the first such country to join, and will standardize a process for certifying companies from participating countries. Once those companies have been certified by a relevant data protection authority, they will be able to share data more easily among the participating countries. The agreement, which is still being finalized, is likely to be rolled out in the coming months, and the participating countries hope it will expand beyond the additional participating APEC countries, Australia, Canada, Mexico, the Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan.</p>
<p><b style="font-weight:700">Frank McCourt announces a planned bid for TikTok</b></p>
<p>In the wake of congressional and executive action aimed at forcing the divestiture of social media platform TikTok, American billionaire Frank McCourt <a href="https://www.projectliberty.io/news/frank-mccourt-organizing-a-people-s-bid-to-acquire-tiktok" title="announced" target="_blank">announced</a> that he is readying a bid for the U.S. version of the social media app TikTok. McCourt is organizing the bid through Project Liberty, an initiative hehe has founded to reimagine the economic models that currently power Big Tech and to bring forward novel solutions aimed at putting individuals in charge of their own data and digital engagement. experience. that could shape and change the status quo of the web, bring forward novel solutions at every level, and put people back in control of their digital lives. McCourt said that buying TikTok would create value by providing “individuals and creators on [TikTok] the value and control they deserve regarding who has access to their data and how it is used.” ByteDance, the parent company of TikTok, will likely be forced to sell the app after Congress included a provision in an annual defense spending bill that requires ByteDance to either sell TikTok in six months or see the app banned. The ban is currently <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/14/business/media/tiktok-creators-sue-ban.html" title="facing challenges" target="_blank">facing challenges</a> in the U.S. court system, as a group of TikTok creators has filed a lawsuit alleging that the ban violates their First Amendment right to fere speech.</p>
<p><b style="font-weight:700">Biden administration increases tariffs on Chinese technology imports</b></p><p>The Biden administration <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/972cabfb-f587-4cb3-ab21-ec3380b049da" title="announced" target="_blank">announced </a>additional tariffs on nearly $18 billion worth of Chinese goods, i stating the move was necessary to protect certain sectors of the U.S. economy. Chinese-made electric vehicles will see some of the largest increases, with the Biden administration quadrupling tariffs from 25 percent of a car’s value to 100 percent in the coming year. Currently <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/electric-shock-interpreting-chinas-electric-vehicle-export-boom" title="only 2 percent" target="_blank">only 2 percent</a> of all U.S. imports of electric vehicles come from China, but Chinese EVs have proliferated rapidly in other markets, with Chinese automakers accounting for <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-ev-strategy-going-small-cheap-pay-big-dividends-asia-russell-2024-04-23/" title="60 percent" target="_blank">60 percent</a> of all EV sales worldwide in 2023. China’s foreign ministry issued a statement saying Beijing “opposes unilateral tariff increases that violate World Trade Organization rules and will take all necessary measures to safeguard its legitimate rights and interests”. The Biden administration isn’t alone in investigating the potential growth of Chinese electric vehicles, as the European Commission has also begun <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/8e4a9eb4-cd88-4625-a21b-6378d24c6dad" title="investigating" target="_blank">investigating </a>EV imports to the EU, and may impose tariffs in the coming months.</p>
<p><b style="font-weight:700">FBI seizes major online cybercrime marketplace</b></p>
<p>The FBI and a number of international law enforcement partners announced that they had seized the servers used to host BreachForums, a prominent cybercrime website. The seizure, which the FBI conducted in partnership with law enforcement in the U.K., New Zealand, Australia, Switzerland, Ukraine and Iceland, involved seizing BreachForum’s Telegram channel as well. The agencies appeared to be searching for the administrators of the site, known by the aliases Baphomet and ShinyHunters, with the FBI issuing a request for tips on the administrators’ real identities. The FBI and Department of Justice have seized a number of major cybercrime forums over the past two years, including BreachForums’ predecessor, RaidForums. BreachForums offered a variety of criminal items for sale through its services, such as stolen devices, hacking tools, and illegal contraband.</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog/cyber-week-review-may-16-2024</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/blog/cyber-week-review-may-16-2024</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 17 May 2024 14:25:53 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Power and Financial Interdependence</title>
<description><p>So long as China runs a large trade surplus, Chinese residents (either the government or Chinese firms typically) will need to accumulate financial claims on the rest of the world. Conversely, so long as the United States runs a large trade deficit, the rest of the world will accumulate, in aggregate, claims on the United States. China need not directly finance the U.S. (though it did for a time), but Chinese offshore asset accumulation is necessarily a part of any global equilibrium that sustains U.S. deficits in a world still marked by <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/new-geopolitics-global-finance" title="large Chinese surpluses and large U.S. deficits" target="_blank">large Chinese surpluses and large U.S. deficits</a>.</p>
<p>Trade imbalances thus imply financial interdependence and linkage of one form or another.&nbsp; In today’s world, the risk that such interdependence can be “weaponized” is a very real.</p><p>In my new paper for the <a href="https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/power-and-financial-interdependence" title="Institut Français des Relations Internationales&nbsp;(Ifri)" target="_blank">Institut Français des Relations Internationales&nbsp;(Ifri)</a>, specifically for their new initiative on Geoeconomics and Geofinance, I explore the history of the Sino-American financial relationship – and in particular, try to highlight how perceptions of which country truly holds the leverage within the financially unbalanced relationship have evolved over time.</p>
<p>Two incidents are, I think, especially important.</p>
<p>One is the runup in China’s holdings of Agencies and (less visibly) other forms of credit to U.S. financial institutions in years prior to the global financial crisis. Prior to the global financial crisis, reserve growth (by China and others) was massive, both absolutely and relative to Treasury issuance. This squeezed big sovereign investors (and private investors) into close substitutes for Treasuries. Synthetic AAA didn’t work out well, but it was a real part of global finance for a while.</p>
<p>China’s exposure to the Agency market and other less visible exposures to the U.S. banking system (the China Investment Corporation’s investment in the Reserve Primary money market fund for example) taught China of the dangers of excessive exposure to the U.S. well before the current wave of sanctions against sovereign risk. China had more exposure to Agencies than Treasuries in the summer of 2008 – which wasn’t a comfortable position for China.</p>
<p>It also gave China a bit of leverage over the U.S., at least at the time. This leverage was not directly exercised, but the perception at the top of the U.S. Treasury that China’s actions could determine the success or failure of attempts to stabilize financial markets (notably the Agency market) clearly had an impact on U.S. policymakers. At a minimum, it raised the priority that the U.S. attached to its financial dialogue with China. At a maximum, it put pressure on the U.S. to respect China’s core financial interests, which included assuring the safety and liquidity of its holdings of Agencies. Then again, the need to support the Agency market was wildly overdetermined; the U.S. banking system was far more exposed than China.</p><p>At the end of the day, the fact that the U.S. stabilized the Agency market even as China reduced its exposure quite rapidly (whether by roll-off or outright sales) illustrated that the Fed, far more than China, has the decisive vote when it came to U.S. financial stability. The U.S. has learned, I think, that the Fed can buy more than China can sell.</p>
<p>The second episode is China’s decision after the global financial crisis to reduce its exposure to Treasury bonds – at least its visible holdings of Treasury bonds. China’s flight out of the Agencies was initially a slight back into Treasuries (and supply of Treasuries expanded rapidly after the crisis, making this an easy choice). Visible holdings of Treasuries soared from $500 billion in mid-2008 to $1.3 trillion by mid-2010, and from 2010 on China was a significant user of Euroclear’s custodial service.</p>
<figure id="image-82126" class="image-embed embedded_large"><div class="image-embed__picture">
<img width="520" height="378" alt="China: U.S. Holdings vs. Estimated Dollar Reserves" loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" class="lazyload" data-src="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/JGB%20Chart%20New.png.webp" src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/JGB%20Chart%20New.png.webp" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption"><div class="image-embed__caption-text">
<span class="image-embed__source"></span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption></figure><p>China found this risky – partially because of the domestic “optics” of having so much of Chinese savings in a country that, even then, was viewed as a less than ideal custodian of China’s wealth. China thus has been looking for alternatives to Treasuries for far longer than most contemporary accounts recognize.* The G7’s immobilization of Russia’s risk crystallized the risks of holding large reserve balances in strategic adversaries in the public eye. But China had been thinking about those risks for many years.</p>
<p>China’s response to risks of a concentrated exposure to the Treasury market was partially to continue diversifying the currency composition of its foreign reserves. This process started in 2005, likely ended around 2012 and ended up costing China a bit of interest income. China accumulated large euro reserve balances just when the ECB decided to adopt negative rates.</p>
<p>But a big part of China’s strategy was to diversify the way it holds dollars – making more use of offshore custodians (Belgium’s Euroclear most obviously) and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/fe81e06c-010d-4ddd-ad85-406412ec1bb9" title="private fund managers" target="_blank">private fund managers</a>, but also inching back into Agencies and no doubt other forms of dollar exposure that offer both less visibility and a small yield pickup over Treasuries. For example, Chinese institutions are believed to be active suppliers of dollars in the cross-currency swap market.</p>
<p>Most importantly, China decided to stop holding all its foreign assets as “liquid” foreign exchange reserves. A big part of China’s strategy is what China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) calls the “diversified use” of its reserves. <a href="http://www.safe.gov.cn/en/file/file/20211217/1bdd3ed85dba4d269655b5ce7159893b.pdf?n=Annual%20Report%20of%20the%20State%20Administration%20of%20Foreign%20Exchange%20(2020)" title="SAFE’s 2020 annual report" target="_blank">SAFE’s 2020 annual report</a>, which provides a 10-year progress report on this diversification, remains essential.</p>
<p>Diversified use of reserves effectively meant using foreign exchange not to add to SAFE’s formal foreign exchange reserves, but rather to use China’s foreign exchange to directly fund China’s strategic goals (through what SAFE calls the co-financing platform). SAFE handed foreign exchange over to the Silk Road Fund and its close kin, it provided close to $100 billion in equity capital to the China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export-Import Bank of China (Exim), and no doubt more financing via entrusted loans, and it helped fund the offshore activity of “small, medium, and large” financial instruments. I still think <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/how-hide-your-foreign-exchange-reserves-users-guide" t... |
http://localhost:1200/cfr/timelines - Success ✔️<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0">
<channel>
<title>Timelines</title>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/timelines</link>
<atom:link href="http://localhost:1200/cfr/timelines" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"></atom:link>
<description>Timelines - Made with love by RSSHub(https://github.com/DIYgod/RSSHub)</description>
<generator>RSSHub</generator>
<webMaster>i@diygod.me (DIYgod)</webMaster>
<language>en</language>
<lastBuildDate>Fri, 24 May 2024 07:51:13 GMT</lastBuildDate>
<ttl>5</ttl>
<item>
<title>Far-Right Terrorism in the United States</title>
<description><br>
<h1>1865</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Formation of the Ku Klux Klan</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77403" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1865_KKK.jpg.webp" width="520" height="550" alt="Illustration showing members of the White League and the Ku Klux Klan clasping hands over a suffering African American family." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
An editorial illustration by Thomas Nast in an 1874 publication of Harper’s Weekly shows members of the White League and the Ku Klux Klan clasping hands over a suffering African American family.
<span class="image-embed__source">Library of Congress</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>The Civil War between the pro-slavery South and anti-slavery North ends, and disgruntled veterans of the South’s defeated Confederate Army form the first iteration of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) in Pulaski, Tennessee. Nathan Bedford Forrest, a former Confederate general, becomes the Klan’s first grand wizard, its national leader. The KKK’s declared goal is “to maintain the supremacy of the White Race in the Republic.” The first Klan was active from 1865 until 1871 and played a major role in the South’s postwar Reconstruction era, fighting to oppress the previously enslaved African American populace and engaging in acts of violence against them.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1963</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>September 15, 1963</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Bombing of Sixteenth Street Baptist Church</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77407" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1963_Birmingham.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="The family of Carol Robertson mourn at her graveside during funeral services. " loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
The family of Carol Robertson, a fourteen-year-old African American girl killed in the bombing of Sixteenth Street Baptist Church, mourn at her graveside during funeral services.
<span class="image-embed__source">Horace Court/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>The church bombing in Birmingham, Alabama, is coordinated by the local chapter of the KKK, which by now is in its third iteration and popular across the South. The bombing of the predominately Black congregation kills four young girls, becoming one of the defining racist attacks of the civil rights era. Between 1947 and 1965, the KKK is linked to upward of fifty dynamite explosions targeting African Americans in Birmingham, Alabama—earning the city the grim nickname “Bombingham.”</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1968</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>April 4, 1968</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Assassination of Martin Luther King</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77408" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1968_AssassinationMLK.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Reverend Martin Luther King Jr.’s body is viewed by his wife, Coretta Scott King, and their four young children look at King in his coffin at his funeral in Atlanta." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Reverend Martin Luther King Jr.’s body is viewed by his wife, Coretta Scott King, and their four young children at King’s funeral in Atlanta.
<span class="image-embed__source">AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>James Earl Ray, a fugitive with multiple past convictions, shoots and kills Reverend Martin Luther King Jr., a leader of the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s, at a motel in Memphis, Tennessee. Ray was a supporter of racial segregation and a white supremacist. King’s death is mourned by millions of Americans and considered a low point in the civil rights movement.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1978</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Publishing of ‘The Turner Diaries’</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77409" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1978_TurnerDiaries.jpg.webp" width="520" height="780" alt="A copy of ‘The Turner Diaries,’ a racist, dystopian novel, sits on a library shelf in Marlinton, West Virginia." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
A copy of “The Turner Diaries,” a racist, dystopian novel, sits on a library shelf in Marlinton, West Virginia.
<span class="image-embed__source">Jeff Gentner/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>William Luther Pierce, a former college physics professor and a prominent neo-Nazi, publishes <em>The Turner Diaries</em> under the pseudonym Andrew Macdonald. The dystopian novel tells the story of a violent overthrow of the federal government, which leads to a nuclear conflict and race war. Notably, the book’s hero, Earl Turner, detonates a bomb at the FBI’s headquarters in Washington, DC. The book is advertised with the slogan, “What will you do when they come to take your guns?” The novel comes to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/12/books/turner-diaries-white-supremacists.html">resonate with far-right groups</a> in the decades ahead.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1978</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Formation of the Aryan Nations </h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77410" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1978_AryanNations.jpg.webp" width="520" height="728" alt="Reverend Richard Butler poses in his church at the headquarters of the Aryan Nations neo-nazi organization, in northern Idaho." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Reverend Richard Butler poses in his church at the headquarters of the Aryan Nations neo-nazi organization, in northern Idaho.
<span class="image-embed__source">Bettmann/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Notorious neo-Nazi Pastor Richard Butler forms the Aryan Nations in Idaho. A small but committed group, its followers subscribe to the so-called <a href="https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounder/christian-identity">Christian Identity doctrine</a>, believing they are God’s true “chosen people,” a designation usually that refers to Jews. They believe a racial war is imminent between Aryan (white) people and Jews and nonwhites, one that they must prepare for and win. Through its annual World Congresses, the Aryan Nations inspires the creation of the terrorist group called the Order.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1984</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">End of The Order </h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77423" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1984_Order.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="FBI agents sift through the ruins of the house where Robert J. Matthews, founder of the neo-Nazi group the Order, died in a fire after a standoff with federal agents." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
FBI agents sift through the ruins of the house where Robert J. Matthews, founder of the neo-Nazi group The Order, died in a fire amid a standoff with federal agents.
<span class="image-embed__source">Tim Klass/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Federal law enforcement officials <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/17/us/fbi-spying-white-supremacists-declassified/index.html">track Robert Mathews</a>, leader of The Order, to a small house on the state of Washington’s Whidbey Island. Mathews, wanted on murder and robbery charges, refuses to surrender, and a gunfight and standoff ensue, during which he’s killed in a fire. With his death, Mathews becomes a martyr for the far right.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1988</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Fort Smith Sedition Trial</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77411" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1988_SeditionTrial.jpg.webp" width="520" height="668" alt="Louis Ray Beam Jr. carries his wife, Sheila, who had fainted, away from the federal courthouse in Fort Smith, Arkansas. after he and twelve other white supremacists are acquitted on sedition charges." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Louis Ray Beam Jr. carries his wife, Sheila, who had fainted, away from the federal courthouse in Fort Smith, Arkansas, after he and twelve other white supremacists are acquitted on sedition charges.
<span class="image-embed__source">Danny Johnson/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Federal prosecutors bring fourteen white supremacists to trial at Fort Smith, Arkansas. They stand accused of plots against the U.S. government (seditious conspiracy) and other violent crimes. An all-white jury <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/04/08/13-white-supremacists-acquitted-in-arkansas-murder-and-sedition-trial/21c30cbe-c120-40ac-8fec-33420d1b0d2e/">acquits all of them</a>. Afterward, defendant Louis Beam, a former KKK leader and later the “ambassador-at-large” for the Aryan Nations, focuses on building a base of support for a white supremacist revolution against the “Zionist-Occupied Government.” To this end, Beam founds a publication called the Seditionist, which promotes his concept of “leaderless resistance.” This revolution strategy argues that guerrilla warfare should be pursued through individual or small cells, not hierarchical organizations.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1992</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>August 1992</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Standoff at Ruby Ridge</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77412" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1992_RubyRidge.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Federal agents draw their weapons on five neo-Nazis a few miles from the Ruby Ridge site in Idaho where Randy Weaver is engaged in a standoff with authorities." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Federal agents draw their weapons on five neo-Nazis a few miles from the Ruby Ridge site in Idaho, where Randy Weaver is engaged in a standoff with authorities.
<span class="image-embed__source">Mason March/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>A large contingent of federal agents descend on a small home in Idaho to arrest Aryan Nations member Randy Weaver on unresolved firearms charges. After Weaver refuses to surrender, the ensuing eleven-day standoff and siege results in the shootout deaths of Weaver’s son, wife, and dog, as well as a federal officer. Weaver ends up surrendering, but his family become <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/05/13/1098735768/weaver-and-the-ruby-ridge-standoff-contributed-to-the-evolution-of-the-radical-r">martyrs for the movement</a>, and the standoff captures the attention of far-right Americans nationwide.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1993</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>February 1993</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Waco Siege</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77413" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1993_Waco.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Smoke billows from the Branch Davidians’ compound as it burns to the ground outside of Waco, Texas, during a raid by federal agents." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
The Branch Davidians’ compound burns to the ground outside of Waco, Texas, during a raid by federal agents.
<span class="image-embed__source">Greg Smith/Corbis/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Federal agents besiege Mount Carmel Center, a compound near Waco, Texas, where residents are suspected of illegally selling machine guns and stockpiling weapons. The compound is home to the Branch Davidians, a religious cult led by David Koresh. When agents try to serve a search warrant, a gunfight breaks out, leaving ten people dead, including four federal officers. A nearly two-month standoff ensues, which ends when federal agents launch an assault on the compound. During the raid, a fire starts, and the compound burns to the ground, killing seventy-six Branch Davidians, including David Koresh and many women and children. Ruby Ridge and Waco both fuel anti-government conspiracy theories by alleging that a predatory government seeks to infringe on individual liberties.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1995</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>April 19, 1995</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Oklahoma City Bombing</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>An anti-government extremist and military veteran named Timothy McVeigh detonates a truck bomb at the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, killing 168 people and injuring hundreds more. The act is directly tied to the government crackdowns at Ruby Ridge and Waco, with McVeigh launching his attack on the second anniversary of the Waco siege. The Oklahoma City bombing is the deadliest domestic terrorist attack in modern U.S. history and leads to a sweeping government crackdown on armed militias, with federal law enforcement agencies significantly raising their efforts to infiltrate anti-government extremist groups. The militia movement therefore suffers a substantial blow in the late 1990s. McVeigh is executed for his crimes in 2001, while a co-conspirator, Terry Nichols, is still serving out a life sentence in prison as of 2024.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2008</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Election of Barack Obama</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77414" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2008_ObamaElection.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Members of the Tea Party hold a sign reading &quot;Obama Where's Your Papers&quot; during a protest." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Members of the Tea Party movement protest outside of San Francisco’s Fairmont Hotel ahead of a fundraiser attended by President Barack Obama in 2010.
<span class="image-embed__source">Justin Sullivan/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>A resurgence of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE49L7D0/">racism</a> and anti-government extremism surfaces with the November election of Barack Obama, the country’s first African American president. Some political opponents and conspiracy theorists allege that Obama is Muslim and foreign-born, falsehoods that they hoped would undermine his presidency and disqualify him from office.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2011</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>July 2011</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">American-Inspired Attacks in Norway</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77415" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2011_Norway.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="A young man is comforted as he mourns the deaths of those killed by Anders Breivik in a mass shooting and bombing in Norway." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
A young man is comforted as he mourns the deaths of those killed by Anders Breivik in a mass shooting and bombing in Norway.
<span class="image-embed__source">Wolfgang Rattay/Reuters</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Anders Breivik, a far-right extremist seeking to emulate Timothy McVeigh, kills seventy-seven people in twin attacks in Oslo, Norway. He murders eight with a truck bomb in the capital’s government quarter, and then drives to a nearby island—home to the summer camp of the youth wing of the country’s Labour Party—where he indiscriminately guns down sixty-nine more victims. Breivik wrote a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE76N14J/">long manifesto</a> accompanying his attack, calling his targets “cultural Marxists” who he felt were orchestrating the cultural and demographic replacement of Norwegians who shared his European heritage.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2015</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>June 2015</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Charleston AME Church Shooting</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77416" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2015_Charleston.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="People line up to attend Sunday services following a mass shooting at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina. " loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
People line up to attend Sunday services following a mass shooting at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina.
<span class="image-embed__source">Joe Raedle/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>White supremacist Dylann Roof opens fire at the “Mother” Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church in Charleston, South Carolina, killing nine African American worshippers. The church is known for hosting civil rights icons over the decades, including Martin Luther King Jr. During the attack, Roof tells victims, “I have to do it. You rape our women, and you’re taking over our country. And you have to go.”</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2016</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Election of Donald Trump</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77417" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2016_TrumpElection.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump speaks at a campaign rally in Rochester, New York." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump speaks at a campaign rally in Rochester, New York.
<span class="image-embed__source">Brett Carlsen/Getty Images </span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Donald Trump is elected president of the United States running as a Republican. Trump’s campaign had featured some far-right themes on immigration and race, and made proposals including a Muslim ban, a possible Muslim registry, and a border wall to keep out “rapist” and “criminal” Mexicans. To many Americans, his election victory proves that far-right rhetoric and policies that for decades had been associated only with extremists could resonate with wider swathes of the electorate, enough to actually win the White House.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2017</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>August 2017</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Charlottesville Car-Ramming</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77418" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2017_Charlottesville.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="White nationalists, holding tiki torches, march on the grounds of the University of Virginia ahead of the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia. " loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
White nationalists march on the grounds of the University of Virginia ahead of the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia.
<span class="image-embed__source">Stephanie Keith/Reuters</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>On August 11, a “Unite the Right” rally against the removal of a statue of Confederate commander Robert E. Lee in Charlottesville, Virginia, begins with a torchlight procession at the University of Virginia amid chants that “Jews will not replace us.” The following day, the protests turn more violent when James Alex Fields Jr., a twenty-year-old neo-Nazi who had traveled from Ohio for the rally, rams his car into a crowd of counter-demonstrators, injuring twenty-eight and killing one. In the wake of the incident, President Trump refused to condemn the rally, stating that there were “very fine people on both sides.” This statement, coupled with the president’s widely criticized handling of the crisis, provides a significant fillip for Americans on the far right, who <a href="https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/443666-richard-spencer-charlottesville-wouldnt-have-occurred-without/">see Trump as an ally in the White House.</a></p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2018</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Tree of Life Synagogue Shooting</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77419" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2018_TreeLife.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="A Jewish man prays at a makeshift memorial of flowers and handwritten notes outside the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
A Jewish man prays at a makeshift memorial of flowers and handwritten notes outside the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh.
<span class="image-embed__source">Cathal McNoughton/Reuters</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Robert Bowers, a forty-six-year-old local man, guns down eleven Jewish worshippers, most of them elderly, at the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Bowers presaged his attack with antisemitic and anti-immigrant posts on the social-networking site Gab, writing, “HIAS [Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society] likes to bring invaders in that kill our people. I can’t sit by and watch my people get slaughtered. Screw your optics, I’m going in.” Bowers was aggrieved about alleged migrant “caravans” coming from Central America, which he believed were being orchestrated by Jewish nonprofit organizations such as HIAS Bowers is sentenced to death in 2023 for the attack, and he remains on death row.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2019</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Christchurch Shootings</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77420" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2019_Christchurch.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="People walk under police tape as they leave after prayers at Linwood Islamic Center in Christchurch, New Zealand." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
People leave after prayers at the site of Brenton Tarrant’s rampage at the Linwood Islamic Centre in Christchurch, New Zealand.
<span class="image-embed__source">Edgar Su/Reuters </span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>During a twenty-minute rampage in Christchurch, New Zealand, gunman Brenton Tarrant murders fifty-one worshippers in two mosques. Seeking to inspire emulation of this violence, Tarrant livestreams most of the carnage on the internet, where it is viewed more than a million times—thus redefining far-right terrorism in the twenty-first century. Tarrant had been active in an eclectic and radical online space that trafficked in extremist ideologies about race, immigration, and environmental degradation. Mimicking Breivik, Tarrant explained his views in a seventy-four-page manifesto. His attack is inspired by U.S. conspiracy theories (including over guns), and in turn inspires follow-on attacks in the United States.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2020</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">COVID-19, Racial Justice, and the ‘Big Lie’</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77421" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2020_Covid.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Armed civilian men stand on the steps of the Michigan State Capitol in Lansing, taking part in a protest against Gov. Gretchen Whitmer's expanded stay-at-home order during the Covid-19 pandemic." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Armed civilian men stand on the steps of the Michigan State Capitol in Lansing, taking part in a protest against Governor Gretchen Whitmer’s expanded stay-at-home order during the COVID-19 pandemic.
<span class="image-embed__source">Jeff Kowalsky/AFP/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>The COVID-19 pandemic and ensuing government “lockdowns” in many jurisdictions provide renewed impetus to extremists across the far-right spectrum, offering perceived proof for many of their conspiracy theories and leading to spikes in online radicalization. Nationwide racial justice protests, catalyzed by the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/photos-how-george-floyds-death-sparked-protests-worldwide">killing of George Floyd</a>, also reenergize far right Americans, some of whom gather in armed counterprotests to “defend” police and businesses from rioting and looting. In the most notable flash of violence, Air Force Sergeant and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/right-wing-extremists-looming-threat-us-election">“boogaloo” adherent</a> Steven Carrillo perpetrates twin attacks in May and June 2020 that kill a federal officer and sheriff’s deputy in California. Both before and after his November 2022 election loss to Joe Biden, President Trump repeatedly airs unfounded concerns over mail-in ballot voting and repeats the falsehood that the election was “stolen.”</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2021</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Riots at the U.S. Capitol Building</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77422" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2021_Jan6Insurrection.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Trump supporters erect gallows amid protests and riots in front of the U.S. Capitol building, where many clash with police and damage government property." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Trump supporters erect gallows amid protests and riots in front of the U.S. Capitol building, where many clash with police and damage government property.
<span class="image-embed__source">Shay Horse/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>On January 6, 2021, a mob storms the U.S. Capitol, driven by Trump-fueled conspiracy theories about the 2020 presidential election. It the first such attack on the institution since British invaders set fire to the Capitol in 1814. Participants erect a gallows outside the building, imagery evoking “The Day of the Rope” from <em>The Turner Diaries</em>, which presaged a nationwide revolt. In the aftermath, federal prosecutors secure <a href="https://apnews.com/article/enrique-tarrio-capitol-riot-seditious-conspiracy-sentencing-da60222b3e1e54902db2bbbb219dc3fb">seditious conspiracy convictions</a> against several planners of the assault, succeeding where their 1988 counterparts had failed in proving that the defendants intended to violently overthrow the U.S. government.</p>
</div>
</div>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/timeline/far-right-terrorism-united-states</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/timeline/far-right-terrorism-united-states</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 03 Jan 2024 21:04:02 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>The U.S.–South Korea Alliance</title>
<description><br>
<h1>1950</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>June 25, 1950</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">The Korean War Begins With North Korea’s Invasion </h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76281" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_1950_KoreanWar_0.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="American troops withdrawing from Yongsan in Korea." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
American troops withdraw from Yongsan in Korea.
<span class="image-embed__source">Keystone/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>After independence from Japanese colonialism post–World War II, early Cold War tensions lead to the occupation of the Korean Peninsula by Soviet forces in the North and U.S. forces in the South. North Korea, backed by China and the Soviet Union, attempts to reunify the peninsula under communist rule by invading South Korea. The UN Security Council <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1950">denounces the attack</a> as a breach of peace and adopts binding resolutions, which call for an immediate cessation of hostilities and—for the first time—authorize the formation of the UN Command to provide assistance to South Korea. Under the command, sixteen countries, led by the United States, provide troop support to South Korea.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1953</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>July 27, 1953</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">The United Nations, China, and North Korea Sign the Armistice Agreement</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76284" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/12/TL_1953_Armistice2.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Maj. Gen. Blackshear M. Bryan exchanges credentials with Communist Lt. Gen. Lee Sang Cho at the opening session of the Military Armistice Commission at the Panmunjom Conference House on July 27, 1953." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
U.S. Maj. Gen. Blackshear M. Bryan exchanges credentials with Korean Communist Lt. Gen. Lee Sang Cho at the Military Armistice Commission in the Inter-Korean Peace House, situated on the south side of demilitarized zone.
<span class="image-embed__source">AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>The agreement divides the Korean Peninsula along the thirty-eighth parallel and establishes the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) as a buffer between North and South Korea. South Korean President Syngman Rhee opts not to sign the agreement, but he accepts the armistice on the condition that the United States and South Korea sign a mutual defense treaty. Because the Armistice Agreement serves as a cease-fire to the Korean War and the two Koreas did not sign a formal peace treaty, they technically remain in a state of war.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1953</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>October 1, 1953</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">The United States and South Korea Sign the Mutual Defense Treaty </h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76287" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_1953_MutualDefense.jpg.webp" width="520" height="409" alt="South Korean President Rhee Syngman leafs through the mutual defense treaty between the United States and Republic of Korea on January 29, 1954." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
South Korean President Rhee Syngman leafs through the mutual defense treaty between the United States and Republic of Korea on January 29, 1954.
<span class="image-embed__source">George Sweers/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>The U.S.-South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty ensures U.S. defense&nbsp;of&nbsp;South Korea against external aggression and commits to a U.S. military presence in South Korea. The treaty lays the foundation for a robust security alliance between the two countries.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1961</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>May 16, 1961</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">General Park Chung-hee Launches a Military Coup</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76288" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_1961_Coup.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="South Korean President Park Chung-hee stands on a podium next to U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson in Washington, DC." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
South Korean President Park Chung-hee stands on a podium next to U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson in Washington, DC, on May 17, 1965.
<span class="image-embed__source">Universal History Archive/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Amid domestic economic and political turmoil, the military overthrows the government, seizes power, and imposes martial law. Under pressure from the United States, South Korea holds a presidential election in 1963, in which Park is elected as president. Park implements an export-oriented economic modernization plan that transforms South Korea from one of the most impoverished countries in the world to a country with unprecedented economic growth, known as the so-called “<a href="https://www.oecd.org/country/korea/thematic-focus/sustaining-the-miracle-on-the-han-river-103653fa/">Miracle on the Han River</a>.” South Korea’s enhanced economic stature begins to alleviate the asymmetry of the U.S.-South Korea relationship.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1975</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">The United States Discovers South Korea’s Covert Nuclear Weapons Program </h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>President Park initiates the development of an independent nuclear weapons program, following concerns about the United States reducing its security commitment and withdrawing troops from South Korea under the Nixon Doctrine established by U.S. President Richard Nixon. The United States later pressures Park to cancel a nuclear plant agreement with France, offering U.S. nuclear assistance and personnel for peaceful purposes instead. South Korea’s nuclear ambitions cease when Park signs the <a href="https://disarmament.unoda.org/wmd/nuclear/npt/">Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty</a> (NPT).</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1980</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>May 18, 1980</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Pro-democracy Activists Lead the Gwangju Democratization Movement</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76289" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_1980_GwangjuProtest.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Armed South Korean soldiers capture rioters in Gwangju, South Korea." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Armed South Korean soldiers capture rioters in Gwangju, South Korea, on May 27, 1980.
<span class="image-embed__source">Sadayuki Mikami/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>After General Chun Doo-hwan seizes power through a military coup in December 1979,&nbsp;South Korean civilians, led by students and activists, <a href="https://archives.kdemo.or.kr/display/en/1980.html">organize pro-democracy protests</a> demanding an end to military rule. The South Korean government responds by imposing martial law and using violence to suppress activists in the city of Gwangju. The movement marks a turning point in South Korea’s struggle for democracy, inspiring people to resist the military dictatorship across the country and eventually leading to the country’s democratization. U.S.-South Korea relations are hobbled by perceptions within South Korea that the United States sided with the dictatorship rather than support the democratic movement.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1991</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>September 27, 1991</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">The United States Withdraws Tactical Nuclear Weapons</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>U.S. President George H. W. Bush announces his decision to remove all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea. The next year, the two Koreas sign the <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/KR%20KP_920120_JointDeclarationDenuclearizationKoreanPeninsula.pdf">Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization&nbsp;of the Korean Peninsula</a> [PDF]. Under this agreement, the two countries commit not to test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2002</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>June 13, 2002</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Anti-American Protests Arise in South Korea</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76290" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_2002_AntiUSProtests.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="A protester shouts anti-American slogans while holding a poster of the two students accidentally killed by U.S. officers in Seoul." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
A protester shouts anti-American slogans while holding a poster of the two students accidentally killed by U.S. officers in Seoul, South Korea, on December 3, 2002.
<span class="image-embed__source">Lee Jae-Won/Reuters</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Two off-duty U.S. servicemen accidentally kill two South Korean middle-school girls while driving a U.S. military vehicle. The incident and the subsequent acquittal of the soldiers by a U.S. military court trigger anti-American protests across South Korea. Primarily directed at the U.S. military presence in South Korea, the protests reflect a desire for a more equal relationship with the United States.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2003</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>January 10, 2003</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">North Korea Withdraws From the NPT</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76291" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_2003_NPTWithdrawl.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="A crowd of millions of North Koreans gathers to hear political leaders announce the decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in Pyongyang." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Millions of North Koreans gather to hear political leaders announce the decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in Pyongyang, North Korea.
<span class="image-embed__source">Xinhua/AFP/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>North Korea announces its intention to withdraw from the NPT, stating concerns regarding&nbsp;“hostile” U.S. policies toward the country. Pyongyang criticizes the binding obligations stipulated in the safeguard accord under Article 3 of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regulations. Three years later, North Korea <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/north-korea-nuclear-weapons-missile-tests-military-capabilities">successfully tests its first nuclear weapon</a>, changing security dynamics on the Korean Peninsula.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2003</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>August 27, 2003</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Six-Party Talks Aim to Negotiate North Korea’s Denuclearization</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76292" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_2003_6PartyTalks.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="The heads of each of the six country delegations join hands before talks about North Korea’s nuclear crisis in Beijing." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
The heads of each of the six country delegations join hands before talks about North Korea’s nuclear crisis in Beijing.
<span class="image-embed__source">Ng Han Guan/AFP/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Representatives from China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States convene in Beijing to negotiate <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/north-korean-nuclear-negotiations">North Korea’s denuclearization</a> following revelations that North Korea had covertly pursued a uranium enrichment program. The United States insists on complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID), while North Korea seeks diplomatic normalization with the United States and security assurances. Despite multiple rounds of talks, the countries fail to reach a consensus, leading to North Korea’s withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks in April 2009 after the UN Security Council condemns its long-range missile launch.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2012</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>March 15, 2012</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">The Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement Enters Into Force</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76293" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_2012_KORUS.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="South Korean conservative activists raise a banner reading “let’s occupy the world market and become an economic power,”." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
South Korean conservative activists raise a banner reading “let’s occupy the world market and become an economic power,” at a rally supporting the South Korea-U.S. free trade agreement in Seoul, South Korea.
<span class="image-embed__source">Jung Yeon-Je/AFP/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>After six years of negotiations, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak and U.S. President Barack Obama sign the trade treaty, which is then ratified by the South Korean National Assembly. The agreement promotes economic cooperation and access to commercial markets for both countries. The <a href="https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta">Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement</a> (KORUS FTA) is the largest bilateral free trade agreement the United States has signed. The trade agreement paves the way for an economic partnership alongside the military alliance between the two countries.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2016</h1>
<div class=... |
http://localhost:1200/cfr/books-reports - Failed ❌http://localhost:1200/cfr/videos - Success ✔️<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0">
<channel>
<title>Videos</title>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/videos</link>
<atom:link href="http://localhost:1200/cfr/videos" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"></atom:link>
<description>Videos - Made with love by RSSHub(https://github.com/DIYgod/RSSHub)</description>
<generator>RSSHub</generator>
<webMaster>i@diygod.me (DIYgod)</webMaster>
<language>en</language>
<lastBuildDate>Fri, 24 May 2024 07:51:16 GMT</lastBuildDate>
<ttl>5</ttl>
<item>
<title>Ten Most Significant World Events in 2023</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/v7XWcXcI0Sc" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>2023 was a tumultuous year, marked by violent conflicts, democratic erosion, and record-high temperatures. This year, experts at the Council on Foreign Relations, along with visiting world leaders and thinkers, unpacked these issues and more.</p>
<p>Join CFR’s director of studies, Jim Lindsay, in looking back at his list of the ten most impactful events of the year.</p>
<p>For more, check out his blog post, “<a href="https://www.cfr.org/worldevents2023" title="Ten Most Significant World Events in 2023" target="_blank">Ten Most Significant World Events in 2023</a>,” only at CFR.org.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/ten-most-significant-world-events-2023</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/ten-most-significant-world-events-2023</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 07 Dec 2023 22:12:43 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Stakes for Taiwan's Diplomacy in Three Questions</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/aOp2I1d-2Lo" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>Taiwan's relationship with the United States, China, and the rest of the world has a complex history that informs why the island is so consequential to today's geopolitics. To better understand these dynamics, David Sacks, CFR's fellow for Asia studies, answers questions about Taiwan's history and its significance to diplomacy in East Asia.</p>
<p>For more on the relationship between the United States, China, and Taiwan, check out the Council on Foreign Relations–sponsored Independent Task Force, "U.S.-Taiwan Relations in a New Era". cfr.org/us-taiwan</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p><p>&nbsp;</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/stakes-taiwans-diplomacy-three-questions</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/stakes-taiwans-diplomacy-three-questions</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 16 Aug 2023 17:35:24 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>How Artificial Intelligence Could Change the World</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/lxCjyfFZxBQ" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>Artificial Intelligence (AI) could transform economies, politics, and everyday life. Some experts believe this increasingly powerful technology could lead to amazing advances and prosperity. Yet, many tech and industry leaders are warning that AI poses substantial risks, and they are calling for a moratorium on AI research so that safety measures can be established. But amid mounting great-power competition, it’s unclear whether national governments will be able to coordinate on regulating this technology that offers so many economic and strategic opportunities.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/how-artificial-intelligence-could-change-world</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/how-artificial-intelligence-could-change-world</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 25 May 2023 16:43:57 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>As Nuclear Tensions Rise, Should the World Be Worried?</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/XDMn4cFllek" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>Since the end of World War II, nuclear weapons have threatened international relations. The Cold War produced stalemates that seemed to reduce the threat of nuclear conflict, but several countries’ more recent acquisitions of nuclear weapons have brought the world into a dangerous new era of nuclear uncertainty. With nuclear tensions on the rise once again, what lies ahead for nuclear diplomacy?</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/nuclear-tensions-rise-should-world-be-worried</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/nuclear-tensions-rise-should-world-be-worried</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 02 May 2023 16:13:26 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement Threatened by Brexit Fallout</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/WruVPF00jrg" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>In Northern Ireland, the consequences of the United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union, known as Brexit, are threatening to unravel the twenty-five-year-old Good Friday Agreement. It’s a peace deal that ended decades of violence between nationalists who wanted Northern Ireland to be reunified with the Republic of Ireland and unionists who wanted it to stay part of the United Kingdom. The agreement largely ended the bloodshed, and allowed for freer movement of trade and people across the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. However, Brexit has imperiled that free movement, and there are major concerns that resolving that issue could inflame old divisions and lead to renewed bloodshed in Northern Ireland.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/northern-irelands-good-friday-agreement-threatened-brexit-fallout</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/northern-irelands-good-friday-agreement-threatened-brexit-fallout</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 06 Apr 2023 21:21:14 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Is China a Democracy or a Dictatorship?</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/qkjV0kT_90s" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>China’s political system is complicated, and there’s a lot of contradictory information out there. Is China a communist country? Is it democratic, as its own government insists? And what does “freedom” mean to Chinese citizens? Ian Johnson, CFR’s senior fellow for China studies, answers these questions and more.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/china-democracy-or-dictatorship</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/china-democracy-or-dictatorship</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 15 Mar 2023 18:00:10 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Are Cryptocurrencies Still the Future of Money?</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/T0g3gFYK9Do" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>Since the creation of Bitcoin in 2009, cryptocurrencies have exploded in popularity and accrued over $1 trillion in collective value. But market volatility in 2022 threatened the crypto ecosystem—after peaking at over $68,000 in November 2021, the price of Bitcoin fell to under $17,000 twelve months later. This instability has brought new scrutiny to the industry and the countries that have embraced Bitcoin as currency: El Salvador and the Central African Republic. Financial regulators are now calling for more crypto oversight, but global efforts to regulate the industry have stalled. Given this simultaneous rise in global popularity and concern, what lies ahead for digital currency and the future of finance?</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/are-cryptocurrencies-still-future-money</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/are-cryptocurrencies-still-future-money</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 02 Mar 2023 16:48:34 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>What Happens When the World Hits 1.5°C of Warming?</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/mPCB4FqmoPg" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>The world is running out of time to avoid the worst consequences of climate change. With the 2015 Paris Agreement, countries set a goal of limiting global warming to 1.5°C (2.7°F) compared to 150 years ago. However, the planet is on track to pass 1.5°C by the end of this decade, which would lead to higher sea levels, hotter heat waves, and deadlier natural disasters. But countries can work to prevent those and even worse dangers by sticking to their climate pledges and limiting just how much the world overshoots its Paris Agreement goal.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/what-happens-when-world-hits-15degc-warming</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/what-happens-when-world-hits-15degc-warming</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 28 Feb 2023 15:44:59 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Will U.S.-Venezuela Relations Thaw?</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/d26XfcY4cxs" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>After years of tension, relations between the United States and Venezuela appear to be headed in a new direction. The Joe Biden administration has temporarily rolled back some U.S. sanctions on Venezuela’s oil industry in an effort to curb energy prices as well as help the Venezuelan people. But the extent of this détente hinges on Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. What’s in store for bilateral relations?</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/will-us-venezuela-relations-thaw</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/will-us-venezuela-relations-thaw</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2022 16:57:17 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Video: Seven Most Significant World Events in 2022</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/dt7aBUDXFEU" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>It was a year marked by political tumult, spiking major-power tensions, economic challenges, a waning pandemic, and a war that echoed worldwide.<br><br>
Take a look back at what James M. Lindsay, CFR’s director of studies, thought were the most significant events of 2022. For more, check out his blog post, “<a href="https://www.cfr.org/worldevents2022" title="Ten Most Significant World Events in 2022" target="_blank">Ten Most Significant World Events in 2022</a>,” only at CFR.org.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/video-seven-most-significant-world-events-2022</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/video-seven-most-significant-world-events-2022</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 16 Dec 2022 18:48:27 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Growing Instability in Haiti</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/XemLN6oPlbM" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>More than a year after President Jovenel Moïse’s assassination, Haiti remains embroiled in a humanitarian crisis. Economic and political instability persist, and a surge in gang-related violence in and around the capital, Port-au-Prince, has displaced tens of thousands of people. World leaders are now debating whether to send troops to help restore basic governance in the country. What does the future hold for Haiti?</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/growing-instability-haiti</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/growing-instability-haiti</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 09 Nov 2022 21:47:27 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Post-Roe v. Wade: Abortion Law Around the World</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/UFrSuxMBcaQ" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>With the U.S. Supreme Court overturning <em style="font-style:italic">Roe v. Wade</em>, it’s up to states to decide their own abortion laws. Watch to see what has changed so far in the United States and how it compares with other countries on abortion access.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/post-roe-v-wade-abortion-law-around-world</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/post-roe-v-wade-abortion-law-around-world</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 25 Oct 2022 21:03:15 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>King Charles III and the Future of the Commonwealth</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/ISczNbnvSZ0" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>As King Charles III ascends to the British throne after the passing of Queen Elizabeth II, Commonwealth countries are debating whether to follow Barbados, which broke ties with the Crown in 2021. Why are countries choosing to leave the monarchy, and what could that mean for its future?</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/king-charles-iii-and-future-commonwealth</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/king-charles-iii-and-future-commonwealth</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 03 Oct 2022 17:34:20 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Russia-Ukraine War and Europe’s Energy Bind</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/PDP4bT5cDAw" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has led European governments to propose bans on Russian oil and gas, but rising energy costs and a lack of alternatives&nbsp;are&nbsp;undermining the effort. Here’s how Europe has been challenged by Russia’s leverage in the energy market.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/russia-ukraine-war-and-europes-energy-bind</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/russia-ukraine-war-and-europes-energy-bind</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 13 Sep 2022 19:09:04 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>How U.S. Gun Policies Compare With the World’s</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/VqAiI8npYk0" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>The debate over gun laws has raged in Washington for decades, often reigniting after high-profile mass shootings. In mid-2022, Congress passed a rare, compromise gun control bill, but critics say it still leaves the United States with some of the loosest gun laws in the world. Here’s how the United States and some other advanced democracies have responded to gun violence.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/how-us-gun-policies-compare-worlds</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/how-us-gun-policies-compare-worlds</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 13 Jul 2022 20:30:13 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
</channel>
</rss>http://localhost:1200/cfr/podcasts - Failed ❌ |
|
Successfully generated as following: http://localhost:1200/cfr/asia/china - Success ✔️<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0">
<channel>
<title>China</title>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/asia/china</link>
<atom:link href="http://localhost:1200/cfr/asia/china" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"></atom:link>
<description>China - Made with love by RSSHub(https://github.com/DIYgod/RSSHub)</description>
<generator>RSSHub</generator>
<webMaster>i@diygod.me (DIYgod)</webMaster>
<language>en</language>
<lastBuildDate>Fri, 24 May 2024 08:03:46 GMT</lastBuildDate>
<ttl>5</ttl>
<item>
<title>Advanced Manufacturing to be a Focus of China’s July Party Plenum</title>
<description><figure>
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/slide_3_2/public/image/2024/05/2017-10-22T230936Z_41608130_RC13548D61B0_RTRMADP_3_CHINA-BATTERIES-RECYCLING.JPG.webp" alt="A worker inspects batteries for electric vehicles being manufactured at a factory in Dongguan, China. " class="article-header-blog__image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
<figcaption class="article-header-blog__caption">
A worker inspects batteries for electric vehicles being manufactured at a factory in Dongguan, China.
<span class="article-header-blog__credit">Bobby Yip/Reuters</span> </figcaption>
</figure><br><p>China’s long-delayed third Party plenum on economic reform will be held in July. Official commentary suggests that the Party communique which will be issued at this meeting will double-down on the importance of manufacturing as a tool to address China’s pressing domestic economic problems, potentially increasing trade tensions with a range of foreign countries.</p>
<p>On April 30, Chinese authorities&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="0" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.rfa.org%2Fenglish%2Fnews%2Fchina%2Fdelayed-third-plenary-economy-meeting-05022024142612.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503185984%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=6rGd5%2FLSHj1bM81wUd7kavWE%2BfArnHSjbHJl9xnwSRY%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWA21353390-5ead-5dcb-2b03-23d199791392" originalsrc="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/delayed-third-plenary-economy-meeting-05022024142612.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="H0nZtRfp6EVbYT+KTpVqEheb+uLHle+cIEiV0g+4+TJW3Qu25XU/yzbCa1G2aRH/CCZXeUISHDF/gjIEXXg6zrryaT7ofgaXLsCq4t+Ik6Cb4/KAwl81rSRLR+Eb2phf9yd3N/9uq7lw3S0AkysnTIbFN+sOlSXsSMVT6MjV/hw=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/delayed-third-plenary-economy-meeting-05022024142612.html. Click or tap if you trust this link.">announced</a>&nbsp;that the third Party plenum of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee would meet in July. Official commentary&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="1" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.chinadaily.com.cn%2Fa%2F202405%2F01%2FWS66323e19a31082fc043c5050.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503199426%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=2n3UuGo%2FRAWMbRlRHWq%2BEQJSihCvwU%2FgSSy2AXeD2PE%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWA117497f5-e87c-bc4e-01dd-f20665dc9b5e" originalsrc="https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202405/01/WS66323e19a31082fc043c5050.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="bqQQxTFiPd7eWyoW8nBUP4fkYbr+Lnn8xYI19CYTxCJmPQ0cE4NwUv9TvRZM6N7F+C46cUR8Mw1johhx4G2Aca9bsgndQMVxL7ANckuufHWRiWeNv8elRRoWYA824p1Ilt4+VGxxWLXaknoI7+ubjDILGgOZJLlPYVseD4HI/nw=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202405/01/WS66323e19a31082fc043c5050.html. Click or tap if you trust this link.">indicates</a>&nbsp;that economic issues will be the core of the plenum, including a focus on integrated economic plans for the Yangtze Delta region. But specific attention will also be devoted to fostering “new quality productive forces”—a new Party slogan set out by Xi Jinping—with state commentary stating:</p><p><em>“The imperative was stressed... to develop new quality productive forces according to local conditions. The layout of China's strength in strategic science and technology should be improved, emerging industries cultivated and strengthened, the development of industries for the future arranged in advance, and the transformation and upgrading of traditional industries empowered by advanced technologies.”</em></p>
<p>As Chinese authorities&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="2" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Flosangeles.china-consulate.gov.cn%2Feng%2Flghd%2F202404%2Ft20240418_11283727.htm&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503205764%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=IbEShh6%2BllqjRF%2BKcOmhi%2FU7fTx1f9JCGSLpKwYrcBk%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAe743989e-a804-99d8-d203-643dc5ac1cc7" originalsrc="http://losangeles.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/lghd/202404/t20240418_11283727.htm" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="nJFMkJ+NoiMgW4rhQv8Zy1Lr3elJYsunHe4BDryx6OO0YVHvk0kbWP02pfLAsbN1ydtFaaLLI+D2xacSVY5nZse/MXybDN3lKtTtVciINnLLI1oJjosVuWnQLf9+vqKBw/nTo448yRRn+8p/5q4ZAnoGVQEE+nbAkYpuy9tqg0g=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: http://losangeles.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/lghd/202404/t20240418_11283727.htm. Click or tap if you trust this link.">note</a>, “new quality productive forces” includes three specific industries: electric vehicles, lithium-ion batteries, and photovoltaic products, which have registered dramatic export growth, in addition to other fields in biomedicine, artificial intelligence, and the digital economy. In recent years, Beijing has&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="3" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2024%2F05%2F14%2Fbusiness%2Fchina-exports-manufacturing.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503211048%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=1ahyI9wpkevRlu2E672ErhfP7nh3mz%2Fwp4Q4dT76QSc%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAd915b52c-0ef4-2399-4607-1ea63c3f5b6b" originalsrc="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/14/business/china-exports-manufacturing.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="L2sZOeL0lFunPptcQBH8iAhtpk88vF6tbo59ysGysLK+IoJ4HxdgExVjCZ/qZ6o01CYHuZ3WrgTsj9CqTmStycTBTwhf+dMUsXEuw49i+afnKwi/uOCVTlwcjKEcEbF6/gKe+TnSzRXlDzhzF6kuCmKwHA/MVKY/pJPB0BG8OpI=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/14/business/china-exports-manufacturing.html. Click or tap if you trust this link.">identified and promoted</a>&nbsp;key advanced manufacturing industries—including electric vehicles and batteries—as part of China’s industrial strategy. Goals include reducing reliance on foreign technologies and creating new sources of export-driven growth.&nbsp;</p>
<p>For Beijing, such emphasis on manufacturing represents an economic development strategy aimed at responding to serious domestic challenges. China currently faces both continuing high&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="4" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.wsj.com%2Fworld%2Fchina%2Fchinas-youth-unemployment-eased-in-april-a029344f&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503216081%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=eNQrISw%2BXNg3i%2FwuJav7ExYbcv2lBfCg4MzHyblG7p4%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAbd6af401-ab3c-7845-7ea4-53d89f61f617" originalsrc="https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-youth-unemployment-eased-in-april-a029344f" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="AQ4/iQp/hYQGxLkXSn7qmCrCJ/cZPlJ+TV1/fUPl5xi4LmH5GuJJY97e/YzHRaDV7MuK+PCZTCHRcdjAGmcXnkvGUJvpbYYSHjcj+YJoViFXMJd+4ypOZ98eTfbC22clyxh9qg1vg2Dbiab/raJBmkpD+TjrkS5zidNmKWfKPGQ=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-youth-unemployment-eased-in-april-a029344f. Click or tap if you trust this link.">youth unemployment</a>, as well as construction and real estate sectors that are mired in deep distress after the implosion of China’s property bubble, and which constituted a quarter of China’s GDP prior to the pandemic. Recent years have&nbsp;<a data-auth="NotApplicable" data-linkindex="5" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/amid-mounting-youth-unemployment-woes-beijing-looks-towards-vocational-education" id="OWA4f9afd72-27e1-a17f-5c3b-a22fc9dadb5d" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" title="seen">seen</a>&nbsp;Chinese authorities make a concerted effort to raise the status of vocational education programs and steer youth in the direction of skilled manufacturing labor, precisely because of the employment difficulties facing four-year college graduates.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Indeed, recent statements by Xi himself give further support to the likelihood that the July plenum will feature a doubling-down on manufacturing. A front-page&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="6" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fpaper.people.com.cn%2Frmrb%2Fhtml%2F2024-05%2F01%2Fnw.D110000renmrb_20240501_4-01.htm&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503220962%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=LvIQKiUxzrnTL5IJ16VqXtLA2b8mEyKv3lZTT4xqvYk%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWA3964bf46-e856-5cc7-ecc1-e1db928cee93" originalsrc="http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2024-05/01/nw.D110000renmrb_20240501_4-01.htm" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="U+VGUCUN0VJYCDQ2m86YaO3xVtQLf4AFom+BRwX1d9GyfZpjKes/TTI9qMLzcuMXNjvU+HCgSepVli75jPbZ3LIWCwAAZbLulu9txfWvvq83eCkMtoYWI36ftt+PqSliQSPrKlM0wk/5b1NnvWK2u5IeHP12JeLpC0cyv1/ltJI=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2024-05/01/nw.D110000renmrb_20240501_4-01.htm. Click or tap if you trust this link.">article</a>&nbsp;in the Party’s flagship paper accompanying the announcement of the July plenum carried extensive quotations from Xi himself extolling Chinese “craftsmanship” (<em>gongjiang</em>) in numerous fields of advanced manufacturing.</p>
<p>Naturally, any policy moves by Beijing to boost its own export-oriented advanced manufacturing industries run the risk of heightening tensions between China and its trading partners. Fears of Chinese market domination in specific industries led the Biden administration to&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="7" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fapnews.com%2Farticle%2Fbiden-china-tariffs-electric-vehicles-evs-solar-2024ba735c47e04a50898a88425c5e2c&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503225850%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=Lf8uTpZ6O1wJNj%2FSMr8ybHVGEuHjxOTwdJI49t%2BjhmY%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAbf0d4b26-e45d-be24-0f02-464361a12e73" originalsrc="https://apnews.com/article/biden-china-tariffs-electric-vehicles-evs-solar-2024ba735c47e04a50898a88425c5e2c" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="Zial7EJt9mURBt5T7sLNyoDKz3K/3tbjbkvn3tpiLyw16SD1VUaE4xhpY7xPsNzt05pHcsZEOjV3lzvQ09lZ5gjWonBZNBUQKbZdL96lTfPnncvNW3KYIP1mNu9l18reYgYx8EeZGPdwyI/KjsFZU1d3Nd9Aw9+8Kx8cwxUjyMc=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://apnews.com/article/biden-china-tariffs-electric-vehicles-evs-solar-2024ba735c47e04a50898a88425c5e2c. Click or tap if you trust this link.">announce</a>&nbsp;high tariffs on a range of such products last week. In fall 2023, European authorities&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="8" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Frhg.com%2Fresearch%2Faint-no-duty-high-enough%2F&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503230731%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=lyUNGLKjjpnh19ABAO7T6svYM8im%2F1%2Bhg%2BdAw4NUZ1I%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAe6e23327-f57b-65e1-1139-73e7492b7bc3" originalsrc="https://rhg.com/research/aint-no-duty-high-enough/" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="JaDVZAQwTw9fRxuxCWHj8WGhl3dc+jVzZfhMwuGIEkGneAbeDvT4IVpdE7XXcwVyjK8MtOFpBmFteUpAFXZ5EsTvExteNVVizaOmbqPwyBZY+e0plVrdArCFjCjJRKphNkxFyxk3V+dCyvyso5tC5M6sydgpqUCWvii5uiExGdA=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://rhg.com/research/aint-no-duty-high-enough/. Click or tap if you trust this link.">launched</a>&nbsp;an anti-subsidy investigation into China’s electric vehicle industry, and are currently considering imposing countervailing duties.&nbsp;</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog/advanced-manufacturing-be-focus-chinas-july-party-plenum</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/blog/advanced-manufacturing-be-focus-chinas-july-party-plenum</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 22 May 2024 20:43:23 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Analyzing Lai Ching-te’s Inaugural Address: More Continuity Than Difference</title>
<description><figure>
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/slide_3_2/public/image/2024/05/2024-05-20T031537Z_1692445377_RC23U7AO5UHG_RTRMADP_3_TAIWAN-POLITICS.JPG.webp" alt="Taiwan's new President Lai Ching-te delivers his inaugural speech in Taipei, Taiwan on May 20, 2024." class="article-header-blog__image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
<figcaption class="article-header-blog__caption">
Taiwan's new President Lai Ching-te delivers his inaugural speech in Taipei, Taiwan on May 20, 2024.
<span class="article-header-blog__credit">Carlos Garcia Rawlins/Reuters</span> </figcaption>
</figure><br><p>On May 20, Lai Ching-te assumed the presidency in Taiwan and gave an inaugural address scrutinized in Beijing, Washington, and capitals around the world. The speech provided the most authoritative signal to date of his approach to cross-strait relations. The core question for observers: would a Lai administration depart from the course set by his predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen?&nbsp;</p>
<p>The speech gave a clear answer: Lai signaled broad continuity with Tsai and committed to maintain the status quo. He also called for dialogue with Beijing and demonstrated an openness to resuming cross-strait tourism and student exchanges. Even so, Beijing denounced Lai’s speech in particularly harsh language. That reflects China’s concerns about Lai’s history on cross-strait issues. But it also reflects disappointment that Lai departed in some places from Tsai, for instance by not explicitly pledging to conduct cross-strait relations in accordance with the Republic of China (ROC) Constitution, which embodies a one-China framework.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p><p>In the period ahead, cross-strait issues will remain a point of contention between Taipei and Beijing, with official dialogue channels all but certain to remain closed. If both sides come to believe their own restraint will not be reciprocated, then the conditions will be set for a vicious cycle. For example, if Beijing responds to Lai’s efforts to signal continuity in his inaugural address with military and economic pressure, and if Taipei then concludes there is little reason for restraint on political issues, cross-strait tensions will increase. Careful signaling, and deeper dialogue—likely through unofficial channels or even through intermediaries—will be needed to avoid such an outcome.&nbsp;</p>
<p><b>Parsing Lai’s Inaugural Address&nbsp;</b></p>
<p>In his inaugural <a href="https://english.president.gov.tw/News/6726" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="speech">speech</a>, Lai sought to reassure audiences that he would be a source of stability and continuity on cross-strait issues and would not provoke Beijing or seek to change the status quo. Despite frustrations within Taiwan on domestic issues – rising housing prices, stagnating wages, and growing youth unemployment – Tsai still left office as the only president since Taiwan’s democratization to enjoy an approval rating of over 50 percent and is widely credited with ably managing cross-strait relations. It is thus little wonder that Lai sought to embrace and build on her legacy. His personnel appointments in senior national security positions similarly project continuity.&nbsp;</p>
<p>In his address, Lai regularly returned to the language of continuity and stability. “Peace is the only option,” he stressed, “and prosperity, gained through lasting peace and stability, is our objective.” Lai called Taiwan’s leaders “pilots for peace” and indicated he would “neither yield nor provoke” and would instead “maintain the status quo.” Elsewhere in his speech, Lai spoke of providing “stable and principled cross-strait leadership.” Such reassurances are important given Lai’s 2017 <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/taiwans-2024-presidential-election-analyzing-william-lais-foreign-policy-positions" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="statement">statement</a> that he was a “pragmatic worker for Taiwan independence” and questions in Beijing about his intentions.&nbsp;</p>
<p>To that end, Lai mentioned the “Republic of China” over a dozen times – more than Tsai did in her last inaugural address – and pledged to lead “in accordance with the Republic of China Constitution system.” Beijing took exception to Lai’s statement that “the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other.” That phrase has not appeared in an inaugural address before, though it was a formulation Tsai previously included in high-level speeches, and likely does not indicate any change in policy.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Lai also included conciliatory language toward Beijing. He encouraged it to “choose dialogue over confrontation, exchange over containment, and under the principles of parity and dignity, engage in cooperation with the legal government chosen by Taiwan’s people.” Notably, he stressed that, “this can start from the resumption of tourism on a reciprocal basis, and enrollment of degree students in Taiwanese institutions.” China has pointed to the lack of cross-strait tourism and student exchanges as evidence of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)’s lack of commitment to productive cross-strait relations, and Lai’s signal that he was open to practical exchanges was an effort to demonstrate goodwill toward Beijing.&nbsp;</p><p>Lai specifically referenced Tsai’s “Four Commitments” – her unique formulation on cross-strait policy. Beijing likely sees the framework’s first-ever appearance in an inaugural address as escalatory. But Tsai has referenced it in several high-level speeches, and her team had described it as a stakeholder agnostic formulation with propositions acceptable to all of Taiwan rather than one grounded entirely in DPP documents. Lai’s inclusion of it, rather than introducing a completely original approach, was probably intended to be stabilizing and again signal continuity.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>There were some areas, however, where Lai put his own imprint on cross-strait policies. He declared, “Some call this land the Republic of China, some call it the Republic of China Taiwan, and some, Taiwan; but whichever of these names we ourselves or our international friends choose to call our nation, we will resonate and shine all the same.” This could be interpreted as a subtle way of signaling that Lai does not intend to pursue steps that would change Taiwan’s official name – unlike prior president Chen Shui-bian – by essentially setting the issue of nomenclature aside and accepting that Taiwanese citizens have different and equally legitimate views on this question. Beijing could choose to see this as a reassuring evolution. At the same time, though, putting the name “Taiwan” on the same plane as the “Republic of China,” or as an alternative to the “Republic of China,” will raise concerns in Beijing and be seen as a departure from precedent. The fact that a statement could be taken as simultaneously escalatory and de-escalatory highlights the need for greater communication between Beijing and Taipei, whether official or unofficial, to help explain intentions.&nbsp;</p>
<p><b>Putting Lai’s Speech in Perspective&nbsp;</b></p>
<p>Lai’s cross-strait platform did not go as far as Tsai’s first inaugural address on certain elements of cross-strait issues. In her <a href="https://english.president.gov.tw/News/4893" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="2016 inaugural">2016 inaugural</a>, Tsai acknowledged the so-called “1992 consensus” without explicitly defining or endorsing it, going perhaps as far as any DPP leader is likely to go. “In 1992,” she said, “the two institutions representing each side across the Strait (the Straits Exchange Foundation&nbsp;and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits), through communication and negotiations, arrived at various joint acknowledgements and understandings. It was done in a spirit of mutual understanding and a political attitude of seeking common ground while setting aside differences. I respect this historical fact.” In that same speech, she stressed that, “since 1992, over twenty years of interactions and negotiations across the Strait have enabled and accumulated outcomes which both sides must collectively cherish and sustain; and it is based on such existing realities and political foundations that the stable and peaceful development of the cross-Strait relationship must be continuously promoted.” And as a matter of policy, she was clear that, “the new government will conduct cross-Strait affairs in accordance with the Republic of China Constitution, the Act Governing Relations Between the People of Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, and other relevant legislation.”&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>Beijing did not give Tsai much credit for these statements, choosing instead to base their expectations on the policies of her predecessor, Ma Ying-jeou, who had fully endorsed the “1992 consensus,” a term one of his key advisors <a href="https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2006/02/22/2003294106" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="invented">invented</a> in 2000. Accordingly, in her <a href="https://english.president.gov.tw/News/6004" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="second inaugural address">second inaugural address</a>, she did not repeat that detailed construction. But she did commit that she would “continue to handle cross-strait affairs according to the Constitution of the Republic of China and the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area.”&nbsp;</p>
<p>However, Lai did not explicitly state that cross-strait affairs would be conducted in accordance with the Republic of China Constitution and the Act Governing Relations Between the People of Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, both of which embody a one-China framework. He also did not even elliptically reference the “1992 consensus.” This is likely due to a calculation by Lai and his team that there was little to be gained by attempting to find a workaround to the “1992 consensus” in this first articulation of his cross-strait policy as president. Since Beijing famously rejected Tsai’s formulation as an “incomplete test paper” and has an even darker view of Lai than it had of Tsai, his team likely concluded nothing he would do would be enough at this stage. From Beijing’s perspective, however, the omission of these terms could be seen as a more consequential signal that Lai is embarking on a different cross-strait approach, overshadowing the areas where he stressed continuity.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Notably, Tsai refrained from directly criticizing China and certain PRC provocations in her past inaugural addresses, but Lai did not hesitate to do so. He instead declared that “China’s military actions and gray-zone coercion are considered the greatest strategic challenges to global peace and stability.” He called on China “to cease their political and military intimidation against Taiwan” and argued that even as Taiwan pursues peace “we must not harbor any delusions.” He noted that, “so long as China refuses to renounce the use of force against Taiwan, all of us in Taiwan ought to understand, that even if we accept the entirety of China’s position and give up our sovereignty, China’s ambition to annex Taiwan will not simply disappear.” Accordingly, he concluded, “in face of the many threats and attempts of infiltration from China, we must demonstrate our resolution to defend our nation, and we must also raise our defense awareness and strengthen our legal framework for national security.” Lai’s decision to include this language likely reflects the changed strategic context, including China’s military response to then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022, and the desire to ensure that Beijing—rather than Taipei—is seen by the international community as the provocateur in any cross-strait crisis.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p><b>Beijing Responds&nbsp;</b></p>
<p>China has made its distrust of Lai well known throughout his career. During the presidential campaign, the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/taiwan/elections-cross-strait-united-states-china-relations" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="warned">warned</a> that the choice facing Taiwan’s voters was between war and peace, with a vote for Lai tantamount to choosing the former. After Lai’s speech, the <a href="https://english.news.cn/20240520/d9024fcff39b4a7ba6a97a9dda5804d0/c.html" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="TAO’s spokesman">TAO’s spokesman</a> accused him of “flagrantly promoting separatist fallacies and inciting cross-strait confrontation,” heated language that represents a notable escalation compared with how Chinese authorities reacted to Tsai’s past inaugural addresses. A <a href="http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/jmsd/16310117.html" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="commentary">commentary</a> in state-run media accused Lai of filling his speech with “deceitful political lies, aggressively promoting the separatist ideology of ‘Taiwan independence,’ maliciously inciting cross-strait antagonism, and advocating for independence through reliance on foreign support and military means.”&nbsp;</p>
<p>At the same time, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stuck to standard talking points on Taiwan, <a href="https://english.news.cn/20240520/1735085308d0491ea8bf6e8528135e45/c.html?utm_source=substack&amp;utm_medium=email" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="stating">stating</a> that “anyone who attempts to challenge the one-China principle will inevitably fail” and that separatist attempts for “Taiwan independence” are doomed to fail and posed the greatest threat to cross-strait stability.&nbsp;</p>
<p><b>Challenges Ahead&nbsp;</b></p>
<p>Lai faces an array of challenges that will test his team. Foremost is the risk of a vicious cycle of escalation between Beijing and Taipei. Beijing may have written Lai off long ago, refusing to believe that he could be a trusted interlocutor who will exercise adequate restraint. Lai, who undoubtedly&nbsp;believes that he has acted in a restrained manner that has gone unnoticed in Beijing, may deviate from Tsai’s approach at least rhetorically, seeing little reason to adjust to accommodate Beijing’s preferences.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>In recent months, Beijing has acted in ways that might accelerate such a vicious cycle. Public reporting indicates Beijing has broken longstanding precedent with entries into Taiwan’s claimed contiguous zone. That decision suggests Beijing may not appreciate responsible approaches by Washington and Taipei, which in turn may see little reason to exercise restraint of their own in response.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Lai also faces a challenging environment at home. His 40 percent vote share was the lowest of any winning candidate since 2000, which similarly saw a three-way race. For the first time in sixteen years, no party controls the legislature with an outright majority, and the DPP is now a minority given the de facto coalition between the two main opposition parties: the Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP). In this more uncertain political environment, Beijing may look for opportunities to manipulate Taiwan’s politics to advance its aims. It hopes Lai will be a one-term president and likely believes it can increase the likelihood that this comes to pass, and that may reduce its incentive to seek stability.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>For the United States, the key question will be whether a vicious cycle can be avoided. If each side exercises restraint, and if that restraint is acknowledged and reciprocated by the other side, there may be a path to preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. That puts pressure on all sides—Beijing, Taipei, and Washington—to work to manage these complex dynamics.&nbsp;</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog/analyzing-lai-ching-tes-inaugural-address-more-continuity-difference</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/blog/analyzing-lai-ching-tes-inaugural-address-more-continuity-difference</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 21 May 2024 20:01:01 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>America’s New Cold Wars, With David Sanger</title>
<description><audio controls="" src="https://cfr-org-prod-media-files.s3.amazonaws.com/audio-files/240521_TPI_MASTER.mp3"></audio><br><p><b style="font-weight:700">Mentioned on the Episode&nbsp;</b></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>John Maggio, <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt22525694/" title="Year One: A Political Odyssey" target="_blank"><em style="font-style:italic">Year One: A Political Odyssey</em></a>, HBO Max</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>David E. Sanger, <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/710053/new-cold-wars-by-david-e-sanger-with-mary-k-brooks/" title="New Cold Wars: China's Rise, Russia's Invasion, and America's Struggle to Defend the West" target="_blank"><em style="font-style:italic">New Cold Wars: China's Rise, Russia's Invasion, and America's Struggle to Defend the West</em></a>, with Mary K. Brooks&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>David E. Sanger, <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/547683/the-perfect-weapon-by-david-e-sanger/" title="The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage, and Fear in the Cyber Age" target="_blank"><em style="font-style:italic">The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage, and Fear in the Cyber Age</em></a></p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/americas-new-cold-wars-david-sanger</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/americas-new-cold-wars-david-sanger</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 21 May 2024 19:16:35 GMT</pubDate>
<enclosure url="https://cfr-org-prod-media-files.s3.amazonaws.com/audio-files/240521_TPI_MASTER.mp3" type="audio/mpeg"></enclosure>
</item>
<item>
<title>Religion in China</title>
<description><figure>
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/immersive_image_3_2_desktop_2x/public/image/2024/05/ChinaReligion_BG_Lead.jpg.webp" alt="Hui Muslim women stand in front of China’s flag at a mosque in Beijing." class="article-header-backgrounder__image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
<figcaption class="article-header-backgrounder__caption">
Hui Muslim women stand in front of China’s flag at a mosque in Beijing.
<span class="article-header-backgrounder__credit">Kevin Frayer/Getty Images</span> </figcaption>
</figure><br>
<div class="summary__container">
<div class="summary__title">Summary</div>
<div class="summary__description"><ul>
<li><span><span><span><span><span><span>The&nbsp;<span>Chinese Communist Party’s nearly 100 million members are required to be atheist, but the party recognizes five religions: Buddhism, Catholicism, Daoism, Islam, and Protestantism.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></li>
<li><span><span><span><span><span><span><span>Authorities tightly monitor registered and unregistered religious groups. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span><span><span><span><span><span>China has one of the largest populations of religious prisoners, and some groups, including Uyghur Muslims, face high levels of persecution.</span></span></span></span></span></span></li>
<li>Since&nbsp;<span><span><span><span><span><span><span>Chinese President Xi Jinping came to power, authorities have sought to enforce stricter regulations to ensure groups conform to doctrines set forth by the communist party.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></li>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
<br><h2>Introduction</h2>
<p>Amid an economic boom and rapid modernization, religion in China has been on the rise in recent decades. Experts point to the emergence of a spiritual vacuum as a trigger for the growing number of religious believers, particularly followers of Christianity and traditional Chinese religious groups.&nbsp;</p>
<p>While China’s constitution allows religious belief, Chinese Buddhism, Daoism, and folk practices are shown more leniency than other religions, such as Islam and Christianity, which are regarded as “foreign” by the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinese-communist-party" title="Chinese Communist Party" target="_blank">Chinese Communist Party</a> (CCP). In recent years, adherents across all religious organizations, including both state-sanctioned and underground and banned groups, face intensifying persecution and repression. They also face pressure to implement President Xi Jinping’s sinicization policies, which aim to make religious groups more aligned with Chinese culture, morality, and doctrines as defined by the CCP.</p>
<h2>Freedom and Regulation</h2><p>China’s relationship with religion has shifted throughout its modern history. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), religions were essentially banned, and followers were forced underground or persecuted as part of a campaign to eliminate “old” customs and ideas. In the 1980s, the CCP acknowledged the Chinese people’s complex relationship with religion. The following decades saw a revival of religious institutions and groups, and even tolerance of underground religions not directly under state control. Although Article 36 of the <a href="https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/lawsregulations/201911/20/content_WS5ed8856ec6d0b3f0e9499913.html#:~:text=Article%2036%20Citizens,by%20foreign%20forces." title="Chinese constitution" target="_blank">Chinese constitution</a> says that citizens “enjoy freedom of religious belief” and bans discrimination based on religion, the law regulates religion by forbidding state organs, public organizations, or individuals from compelling citizens to believe in—or not believe in—any particular faith. Minors are also forbidden from entering places of worship.</p>
<p>The state recognizes five religions: Buddhism, Catholicism, Daoism, Islam, and Protestantism. The practice of any other faith is formally prohibited, although often tolerated, especially in the case of traditional Chinese beliefs. Religious organizations must register with one of five state-sanctioned patriotic religious associations, which are supervised by the United Front Work Department, a branch of the Communist Party.</p>
<p>The government’s tally of registered religious believers is around two hundred million, or less than 10 percent of the population, according to several sources, including the UN Human Rights Council’s 2024 <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/CNIndex.aspx" title="Universal Periodic Review" target="_blank">Universal Periodic Review</a>. However, the number of Chinese adults who practice religion or hold religious belief is <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2023/08/30/measuring-religion-in-china/" title="likely much higher" target="_blank">likely much higher</a> because many believers do not follow organized religion and are said to practice traditional folk religion. These practitioners, along with members of underground house churches and banned religious groups, account for many of the country’s unregistered believers.</p>
<a id="1bcaf1d5-ec8e-4829-92af-c4167af28ab0"></a>
<div class="datawrapper-graph-embed"><div class="dw-responsive-embed-iframe"><iframe title="Religious Affiliation in China" aria-label="Bar Chart" id="datawrapper-chart-9Zk6T" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/9Zk6T/6/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="333" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe></div></div>
<p>Chinese public security officials monitor both registered and unregistered religious groups to prevent activities that “<a href="http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content_1372964.htm" title="disrupt public order" target="_blank">disrupt public order</a>, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the State,” as stipulated by the Chinese constitution. In practice, however, monitoring and crackdowns often target peaceful activities that are protected under international law, say human rights watchdogs.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The State Council, the government’s administrative authority, <a href="http://english.gov.cn/policies/latest_releases/2017/09/07/content_281475842719170.htm" title="passed regulations on religious affairs" target="_blank">passed regulations on religious affairs</a> in 2018 to allow state-registered religious organizations to possess property, publish literature, train and approve clergy, and collect donations. But the revised rules also included restrictions on religious schooling and the times and locations of religious celebrations, as well as monitoring of online religious activity and reporting <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-religion/china-tightens-regulation-of-religion-to-block-extremism-idUSKCN1BI1IH" title="donations that exceed 100,000 yuan" target="_blank">donations that exceed 100,000 yuan</a> (around $15,900).&nbsp;</p><p>Under Xi, the CCP has pushed to sinicize religion, or shape all religions to conform to the doctrines of the Communist Party and the customs of the majority Han Chinese population. New regulations that went into effect in early 2020 require religious groups to accept and <a href="https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/measures-for-the-administration-of-religious-groups/" title="spread CCP ideology" target="_blank">spread CCP ideology</a> and values. Faith organizations must now get approval from the government’s religious affairs office before conducting any activities. The next year, the CCP banned unregistered domestic religious groups from <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china/" title="sharing religious content online" target="_blank">sharing religious content online</a> and prohibited overseas organizations from operating online religious services in China without a permit, particularly targeting Christianity-related content on the messaging service WeChat.&nbsp;</p>
<p>In September 2023, stricter laws required religious sites and activities to support <a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/religion-controls-08032023122520.html" title="sinicization policies" target="_blank">sinicization policies</a>, which&nbsp; included prohibiting religious activity if it could “endanger national security, disrupt social order [or] damage national interests.” Meanwhile, in Hong Kong, where religious groups are not required to register with the government, religious figures have faced tighter scrutiny and have <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58ecfa82e3df284d3a13dd41/t/6549b051117ad12c7c40c783/1699328088263/Sell+Out+My+Soul_final.pdf" title="increased self-censorship" target="_blank">increased self-censorship</a> [PDF] under the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/hong-kong-freedoms-democracy-protests-china-crackdown" title="2020 national security law" target="_blank">2020 national security law</a>. The former Catholic Bishop of Hong Kong, Cardinal Joseph Zen Ze-kiun, was arrested on suspicion of “collusion with foreign forces” in 2021. He was later found guilty and was issued a fine. Since 2022, the Catholic church in Hong Kong has halted its annual commemorative masses to mark the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre.</p>
<figure id="image-82067" class="image-embed embedded_small"><div class="image-embed__picture">
<img width="520" height="347" alt="Cardinal Joseph Zen attends a mass for the Chinese Catholic church in Hong Kong." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" class="lazyload" data-src="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/China_Christianity_BG.jpg.webp" src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/China_Christianity_BG.jpg.webp" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption"><div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Cardinal Joseph Zen Ze-kiun attends a mass for the Chinese Catholic church in Hong Kong.
<span class="image-embed__source">Tyrone Siu/Reuters</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption></figure><p>In addition, China is home to one of the largest populations of religious prisoners, likely numbering from several thousand to <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/441219-CHINA-2022-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf" title="as high as tens of thousands" target="_blank">as high as tens of thousands</a> [PDF]; while in custody, some are tortured or killed, rights groups say. Instances of arbitrary detentions and violence carried out with impunity have led the U.S. State Department to designate China as a country of particular concern&nbsp;over religious freedom annually since 1999.</p>
<h2>Atheism and the CCP</h2>
<p>The CCP is officially atheist. The party prohibits its roughly ninety-eight million party members from holding religious beliefs, and it requires the expulsion of party members who belong to religious organizations. Officials have said that party membership and religious beliefs are incompatible, and they discourage families of CCP members from publicly participating in religious ceremonies. Although these regulations are not always strictly enforced, the party periodically takes steps to draw a clearer line on religion.&nbsp;</p>
<h2><b>Chinese Buddhism and Folk Religions</b></h2>
<p>China has the world’s largest Buddhist population—an estimate of 4 percent to 33 percent of the country’s population (42 million to 362 million people) depending on how religious practices are measured, according to the U.S.-based <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2023/08/30/buddhism/#how-many-buddhists-are-there-in-china" title="Pew Research Center" target="_blank">Pew Research Center</a>. Though Buddhism originated in India, it has a long history and tradition in China and today is the country’s largest institutionalized religion. Chinese folk religions, in contrast, have no rigid organizational structure, blend practices from Buddhism and Daoism, and are manifest in the worship of ancestors, spirits, or other local deities. According to CFR Senior Fellow Ian Johnson, author of <a href="http://www.ian-johnson.com/books/the-souls-of-china" title="The Souls of China: The Return of Religion After Mao" target="_blank"><em style="font-style:italic">The Souls of China: The Return of Religion After Mao</em></a>, “hundreds, if not thousands, of folk religious temples are unregistered,” but are tolerated.</p>
<p>Since China’s opening and reform in the 1980s, the party has been tolerant of, and tacitly approved, the rise in Buddhist and Daoist practice. Under former Chinese leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, the government “<a href="http://www.academia.edu/2262613/Buddhist_revival_under_state_watch" title="passively supported" target="_blank">passively supported</a>” the growth of Buddhism because it believed doing so helped bolster the image of China’s peaceful rise, supported the CCP’s goal of creating a “harmonious society,” and could help to improve relations with Taiwan, according to the University of Ottawa’s André Laliberté. Today, Buddhism, Daoism, and folk religions are <a href="https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/china-reversing-its-crackdown-some-religions-not-all" title="treated more leniently by the party" target="_blank">treated more leniently by the party</a> compared to “foreign” religions, such as Islam or Christianity.</p>
<p>The growth of Buddhism led to heightened visibility of its institutions, particularly <a href="https://www.academia.edu/5024941/Buddhist_Charities_and_China_Social_Policy_An_Opportunity_for_Alternate_Civility" title="Buddhist philanthropic organizations" target="_blank">Buddhist philanthropic organizations</a> [PDF] that deliver social services to the poor amid soaring inequality in China. Since Xi has come to power, experts have noted an apparent easing of tough rhetoric against, and even a promotion of, traditional beliefs in China. Some experts say Xi believes Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism do not challenge the CCP’s rule and therefore can be <a href="https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/the-two-tracks-of-xi-jinping-s-religious-policy" title="advantageous for China’s global diplomacy" target="_blank">advantageous for China’s global diplomacy</a>.</p>
<h2><b>Tibetan Buddhism</b></h2>
<p>According to China’s 2020 census data, the Tibetan region of China is home to<a href="https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/how-much-does-beijing-control-ethnic-makeup-of-tibet" title="seven million Tibetans" target="_blank"> seven million Tibetans</a>, more than 90 percent of the region’s population. Nearly all Tibetans in the region practice a distinct form of Buddhism. The Dalai Lama is the spiritual leader of one of the main schools of Tibetan Buddhism and symbolizes Tibetan identity for both Tibetans in China and in exile. Since 1987, he and the exiled government, known as the Central Tibetan Administration, have played a prominent role in garnering international support for a “<a href="https://www.dalailama.com/messages/tibet/middle-way-approach" title="Middle Way” approach" target="_blank">Middle Way” approach</a> to resolve Tibet’s political disputes within the framework of the People’s Republic of China. Buddhist monks within Tibet have also participated in largely peaceful anti-government demonstrations, though some have included riots and <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/13/self-immolation-and-chinas-state-cult-of-stability-tibet-monks-dalai-lama/" title="self-immolations" target="_blank">self-immolations</a>.</p>
<p>China’s religious policy is inherently tied to political tensions across the Tibetan region, which comprises the Tibet Autonomous Region and adjacent Tibetan autonomous prefectures and counties in neighboring provinces. To quell dissent, China has sought to aggressively assimilate Tibetans, says Tashi Rabgey, research professor of international affairs at George Washington University. A 2021 report by watchdog group the Tibet Action Institute estimates that <a href="https://s7712.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/2021_TAI_ColonialBoardingSchoolReport_Digital.pdf" title="78 percent of Tibetan students" target="_blank">78 percent of Tibetan students</a>&nbsp;[PDF] between six and eighteen years old live in boarding schools, where they are away from their families and taught primarily in Mandarin. Although Beijing has attempted to make the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/world/asia/25tibet.html" title="region more “Chinese”" target="_blank">region more “Chinese”</a> by funding development projects and incentivizing migration to Tibet, it has been largely unsuccessful.</p>
<figure id="image-82068" class="image-embed embedded_small"><div class="image-embed__picture">
<img width="520" height="347" alt="Tibetan Buddhist monks look at a mural in the Tashilhunpo Monastery in Shigatse, Tibet Autonomous Region, China." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" class="lazyload" data-src="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/China_Tibet_BG.jpg.webp" src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/China_Tibet_BG.jpg.webp" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption"><div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Tibetan Buddhist monks look at a mural in the Tashi Lhunpo Monastery in Tibet Autonomous Region, China.
<span class="image-embed__source">He Penglei/CNS/Reuters</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption></figure><p>Tibetan Buddhists face high levels of religious persecution. The state monitors daily operations of major monasteries, with facial-recognition cameras posted outside, and it reserves the right to disapprove an individual’s application to take up religious orders. In 2018, party cadres and officials were <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/01/24/china-new-controls-tibetan-monastery" title="given control" target="_blank">given control</a> over Sichuan Province’s Larung Gar, one of the world’s largest Buddhist study centers. Authorities <a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/tibet/yachen-demolition-10012019181505.html" title="demolished nearly half" target="_blank">demolished nearly half</a> of the center in 2019, displacing up to six thousand monks and nuns.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Authorities have reportedly detained and tortured monks and nuns for refusing to denounce the Dalai Lama, and laypeople have been ordered to replace photos of the Dalai Lama with Chinese leaders. A Tibetan child believed to be a reincarnated, high-ranking religious leader, known as the Panchen Lama, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/15/25-years-after-disappearing-tibetan-panchen-lama-china-no-nearer-its-goal" title="disappeared in 1995" target="_blank">disappeared in 1995</a> and has not been seen since. (Beijing claims that he graduated from college, has a job, and does not want to be disturbed.) After his disappearance, the Chinese government designated another child as the official Panchen Lama, though many Tibetans do not accept him as such.&nbsp;</p>
<p>With the fourteenth Dalai Lama nearing ninety years old, the Tibetan government in exile and the CCP are both preparing for his succession. Each is likely to appoint their own fifteenth Dalai Lama, generating a succession dispute similar to the situation with the current Panchen Lama. Rabgey says that this succession dispute will lead to an escalation of tensions in the region and is likely to trigger future Tibetan political unrest.</p>
<h2>Christian State-Sanctioned and House Churches</h2>
<p>China saw a significant growth in Christianity in the 1980s, after former leader Deng Xiaoping opened China to the outside world. Today, Protestantism is the predominant branch of Christianity practiced in China. There are three state-regulated Christian organizations and many underground house churches, though authorities have been cracking down on non-registered places of worship. Estimates of Christians in China vary widely, but according to a 2023 <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/12/12/chinas-christian-population-appears-to-have-stopped-growing-after-rising-rapidly-in-the-1980s-and-90s/" title="Pew Research Center" target="_blank">Pew Research Center</a> analysis, Chinese survey data show that Chinese adults who identify as Christian have remained stable at about 2 percent of the population (roughly 28 million people).</p>
<p>In recent years, China has witnessed a spike in state repression against both house churches and state-sanctioned Christian organizations, including campaigns to remove hundreds of rooftop crosses from churches, forced demolitions of churches, and harassment and imprisonment of Christian pastors and priests. A <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1deR6dkQpidTsJ0RheaZ2Y8Q-C4XVvEWZ/view" title="2018 report" target="_blank">2018 report</a> [PDF] from ChinaAid, a Texas-based Christian nongovernmental organization, said that religious persecution, primarily against Christians, was on the rise, citing more than one million cases that year. One of China’s most prominent Christian voices and the founder of a large underground church, Pastor <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/30/world/asia/china-wang-yi-christian-sentence.html" title="Wang Yi" target="_blank">Wang Yi</a>, was sentenced to nine years in prison in 2019 after a court charged him with subversion of state power and illegal business operations.</p>
<p>The Vatican does not have diplomatic ties with China, home to some ten to twelve million Catholics. Its recognition of Taiwan and a dispute over the bishop appointment process have been major sticking points. The Communist Party limits the Vatican’s role in selecting Catholic bishops and continues to harass and detain clergy who refuse to join the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association, the state-sanctioned organizational body for Catholics in China. In 2018, the two sides <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/22/world/asia/china-vatican-bishops.html" title="reached a provisional agreement" target="_blank">reached a provisional agreement</a> in which Pope Francis recognized several Chinese state-appointed bishops who had been excommunicated. While the two-year agreement was renewed in 2020 and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/vatican-confirms-renewal-contested-accord-with-china-bishops-appointments-2022-10-22/" title="again in 2022" target="_blank">again in 2022</a>, tensions seemed to rise shortly after, when China installed two bishops as heads of dioceses without permission from the Pope. However, China-Vatican relations appear to be improving after a January 2024 mutual agreement to consecrate two new bishops in China.</p>
<h2>Islam and Uyghurs in Xinjiang</h2>
<p>Muslims make up an around 1 to 1.5 percent of China’s population, accounting for <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2023/08/30/islam/" title="around eighteen million people" target="_blank">around eighteen million people</a>, according to recent estimates&nbsp;by Pew Research Center. China has ten predominantly Muslim ethnic groups, the largest of which is the Hui, an ethnic group closely related to the majority Han population and largely based in western China’s Ningxia Autonomous Region and the Gansu, Qinghai, and Yunnan provinces. Until recently, Hui Muslims had enjoyed relative freedom compared to the government’s tight control on religious activity in Xinjiang, home to a majority of Uyghur Muslims. But CCP policies and rhetoric have become <a href="https://www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-analysis/hui-muslims-and-the-%E2%80%9Cxinjiang-model%E2%80%9D-of-state-suppression-of" title="less tolerant and more repressive" target="_blank">less tolerant and more repressive</a> toward those who practice Islam in general. Officials have held Hui Muslims in formal detention and internment camps over advocating for religious freedom and funding mosque construction.</p>
<p>The Uyghurs are a Turkic people who live primarily in Xinjiang, northwestern China, and are also predominantly Muslim. According to China’s 2020 census, there are more than eleven million Uyghurs in this region, making up approximately half of its population, though many experts agree that increased Han Chinese immigration has lowered this number. For decades, Chinese authorities have cracked down on <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uyghurs-xinjiang" title="Uyghurs in Xinjiang" target="_blank">Uyghurs in Xinjiang</a>, claiming the community holds <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html" title="extremist and separatist ideas." target="_blank">extremist and separatist ideas.</a> They point to occasional outbursts of violence against government workers and civilians in the region and have blamed a group that Beijing calls the East Turkestan Islamic Movement for several terrorist attacks throughout China. Experts say most Uyghurs do not support violence, but many are frustrated by frequent discrimination and the influx of Han Chinese that are disproportionately benefiting from economic opportunities in the region.</p>
<div id="content-promo-82069" class="promo ">
<div class="promo__container">
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-xinjiang-uyghurs-muslims-repression-genocide-human-rights" class="promo__link">
<div class="promo__cta">Dive Deeper</div>
<div class="promo__title">China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang</div>
<div class="promo__icon-circle-and-arrow-right">
</div>
</a>
</div>
</div>
<p>Since 2017, up to two million Muslims, most of them Uyghurs, have been arbitrarily detained in so-called reeducation camps, a... |
http://localhost:1200/cfr/blog - Success ✔️<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0">
<channel>
<title>Blogs</title>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog</link>
<atom:link href="http://localhost:1200/cfr/blog" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"></atom:link>
<description>Blogs - Made with love by RSSHub(https://github.com/DIYgod/RSSHub)</description>
<generator>RSSHub</generator>
<webMaster>i@diygod.me (DIYgod)</webMaster>
<language>en</language>
<lastBuildDate>Fri, 24 May 2024 08:03:47 GMT</lastBuildDate>
<ttl>5</ttl>
<item>
<title>A Puzzling Attempted Coup in the DRC</title>
<description><figure>
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/slide_3_2/public/image/2024/05/DRC%20Coup%20052324.jpg.webp" alt="The Congolese Republican Guard and police block a road around the scene of an attempted coup d'etat in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo on May 19, 2024." class="article-header-blog__image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
<figcaption class="article-header-blog__caption">
The Congolese Republican Guard and police block a road around the scene of an attempted coup d'etat in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo on May 19, 2024.
<span class="article-header-blog__credit">Arsene Mpiana/AFP via Getty Images</span> </figcaption>
</figure><br><p>The news <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/democratic-republic-congo-army-says-it-stopped-attempted-coup-2024-05-19/" title="reports" target="_blank">reports</a> of this past weekend’s failed coup attempt in Kinshasa read like a Mad Lib—a father-son duo from <u>Utah</u> and a <u>cannabis entrepreneur</u> from <u>Maryland</u> were part of a small band <u>livestreaming</u> an attempt to overthrow the government of the <u>Democratic Republic of Congo</u>. In the conspiratorial hothouse of Congolese politics, the bizarre incident, which culminated in deadly consequences for several people including Christian Malanga, leader of the would-be putchists, has raised numerous as yet unanswered questions. Who convinced Malanga that this effort would succeed? How did the amateurish group manage to access the presidential palace? Whose agenda was advanced by this spectacle?</p>
<p>It remains to be seen how the failed coup d’état will influence politics in the DRC, but one clear loser would seem to be the United States. Certainly, the incident made U.S. Ambassador to the DRC Lucy Tamlyn’s job more difficult. As social media accounts buzzed with accusations of CIA involvement, she <a href="https://x.com/USAmbDRC" title="registered" target="_blank">registered</a> “shock and concern” while pledging to cooperate with the Congolese government in investigating the incident. Cooler heads recognized that the failed takeover hardly bore the hallmarks of a professional intelligence organization, but the notion of armed Americans meddling in Congolese politics <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/10/24/congo-lumumba-cia-amends/" title="echoes" target="_blank">echoes</a> the real and sordid history of U.S. policies during the Cold War. As the United States aims to find a constructive way forward with the DRC on a range of issues from critical mineral deals to forest conservation and conflict resolution, developments that stir up historic resentments benefit only those who wish to see the United States on the back foot.</p><p>Yet another unhelpful narrative is buttressed by the bizarre events in the DRC—one about contempt. The story creates the impression that Americans so underestimate African states that they imagine a government can be overthrown by a small group of outsiders with nothing but fatigues, guns, and a can-do attitude. It’s consistent with former President Trump’s vulgar characterization of African countries, with press coverage that uses images from one part of the continent to accompany a story about a completely different country, and with analyses that consistently overlook the agency of Africans themselves in explaining major political developments. A small, misguided group with a sprinkling of American passports have boosted the efforts of America’s adversaries in Africa.</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog/puzzling-attempted-coup-drc</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/blog/puzzling-attempted-coup-drc</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2024 16:00:13 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>The President’s Inbox Recap: America’s New Cold Wars</title>
<description><figure>
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/slide_3_2/public/image/2024/05/Xi%20and%20Putin%20Gala%20Photo.JPG.webp" alt="Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping attend the gala event celebrating 75th anniversary of China-Russia relations in Beijing, China, on May 16, 2024." class="article-header-blog__image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
<figcaption class="article-header-blog__caption">
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping attend the gala event celebrating 75th anniversary of China-Russia relations in Beijing, China, on May 16, 2024.
<span class="article-header-blog__credit">Alexander Ryumin/Pool via REUTERS</span> </figcaption>
</figure><br><p>The latest episode o<em>f </em><a href="https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/americas-new-cold-wars-david-sanger" title="The President’s Inbox" target="_blank"><em>The President’s Inbox</em></a><em> </em>is live! This week, Jim sat down with <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/by/david-e-sanger" title="David E. Sanger" target="_blank">David E. Sanger</a>, White House and National Security Correspondent for the <em>New York Times</em>. David recently published <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/710053/new-cold-wars-by-david-e-sanger-with-mary-k-brooks/" title="New Cold Wars: China’s Rise, Russia’s Invasion, and America’s Struggle to Defend the West" target="_blank"><em>New Cold Wars: China’s Rise, Russia’s Invasion, and America’s Struggle to Defend the West</em></a>. They discussed the United States’ return to great power competition.</p>
<div class="media-episode-card">
<div class="episode-card__podcast-title">
<section class="series-tag"><a href="https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/presidents-inbox" class="series-tag__link"> The President’s Inbox</a> </section></div>
<h1 class="episode-card__title">
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/americas-new-cold-wars-david-sanger" data-vars-event-label=" America’s New Cold Wars, With David Sanger"> America’s New Cold Wars, With David Sanger</a>
</h1>
<div class="episode-card__summary">
<p></p><p>David Sanger, the White House and national security correspondent for the<em> New York Times</em>, sits down with James M. Lindsay to discuss how the post-Cold War ended and why the new era of geopolitical rivalry began.</p>
</div>
<div class="audio-podcast">
<div id="player-container-node-audio-252435" class="audio-player-wrapper" data-id="-node-audio-252435">
<div id="play-btn-node-audio-252435" class="audio-player-wrapper__btn audio-player-wrapper__play">
<span class="play-btn">
</span>
<span class="pause-btn">
</span>
</div>
<div class="audio-player-wrapper__controls">
<div id="seekObjContainer-node-audio-252435" class="seekObjContainer">
<div id="seekHover-node-audio-252435" class="seekHover"></div>
<input type="range" id="seek-slider-node-audio-252435" max="100" value="0"></div>
</div>
<div class="audio-player-wrapper__time">
<small id="current-time-node-audio-252435" class="time">0:00</small>
<small id="duration-node-audio-252435" class="time">0:00</small>
</div>
<div class="audio-player-wrapper__mute"></div>
<div class="audio-player-wrapper__speed" data-speed="1">x</div>
<div class="audio-player" id="audio-player-container-node-audio-252435">
<audio id="player-node-audio-252435" src="https://cfr-org-prod-media-files.s3.amazonaws.com/audio-files/240521_TPI_MASTER.mp3" preload="”metadata”"></audio></div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="episode-card__date">
May 20, 2024 — 38:18 min </div>
</div>
<p>Here are four highlights from their conversation:</p>
<p><em>1.) The post-Cold War era is over. </em>The United States no longer enjoys its unipolar moment. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and through the 2000s, the United States and the West made a series of misjudgments about where Russia and China were headed. They assumed that Russia and China would want to become more integrated into the U.S.-led world order. David acknowledged that Russian President Vladimir Putin stated explicitly in 2007 that he would do the contrary, while China’s ambitions were unclear initially. David said, “this was a failure of imagining a world in which these powers wanted to return to a past era of greatness and weren’t going to sit still for a unipolar world, run out of Washington under Washington values.”</p><p><em>2.) The new era of great power competition is distinct from the old Cold War. </em>The old Cold War was largely a military competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Today, the United States is engaged in a great power competition that is more complex. The United States is engaged in competition with China and Russia—both of whom have nuclear arsenals. The United States is dealing with, as David put it, “a Russia that has learned with great effectiveness, how to be an agent of disturbance or at least disruption, and a China whose rise, although it has recently run into considerable economic headwinds, has created a range of new problems for us.” At the same time, the United States and its allies and partners—including NATO members, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia—and the “Axis of Resistance”—which is made up of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran—are squaring off. The United States and the Soviet Union, however, were never as interconnected as the United States, China, and Russia are today. He added, “in the new Cold Wars, we are still reliant on the Chinese for chips, other technology. They are reliant on us, and yet none of that has prevented us from descending into what I think is a new era of containment.”</p>
<p><em>3.) The Russia-Ukraine war is a “laboratory” for the United States and its partners against the backdrop of great power competition. </em>The United States is learning what does and doesn’t work in direct conflict with major powers. For example, the United States now realizes that its expensive satellite systems are “sitting ducks.” In the run-up to the war in Ukraine, Russia successfully took out the European Viasat satellite network through a cyberattack on the ground-based modems. Now, the United States is looking to move to a system like Elon Musk’s Starlink—which consists of small satellite constellations. That’s just one example of expensive, modern technology mismatching warfare realities.</p>
<p><em>4.) There is more reason for optimism on the U.S.-China relationship than the U.S.-Russia relationship. </em>David put it this way, “oddly enough, I'm slightly more optimistic, at least in the short term on China than I am on Russia. At least we have conversations underway with them. That's really only in the past year and is driven less by the brilliance of our diplomacy, I think, than by the fact that the Chinese economy has been through a significant downturn that's going to be really hard for them to reverse.” At the same time, when Putin threatened to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, China stated its opposition to the use of nuclear weapons in the conflict. China and the United States have some opportunities for collaboration. David added, “I don’t have any illusions that that’s going to be a broad effort, and I fear the two countries [Russia and China] may grow closer, not further apart, but it is an opportunity for the US.”</p>
<p>If you’re looking to read more of David’s work, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/23/us/politics/ukraine-new-american-technology.html" title="check out" target="_blank">check out</a> this adaptation from his book for the <em>New York Times</em> about the lessons learned from the war in Ukraine.</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog/presidents-inbox-recap-americas-new-cold-wars</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/blog/presidents-inbox-recap-americas-new-cold-wars</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2024 14:42:21 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Advanced Manufacturing to be a Focus of China’s July Party Plenum</title>
<description><figure>
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/slide_3_2/public/image/2024/05/2017-10-22T230936Z_41608130_RC13548D61B0_RTRMADP_3_CHINA-BATTERIES-RECYCLING.JPG.webp" alt="A worker inspects batteries for electric vehicles being manufactured at a factory in Dongguan, China. " class="article-header-blog__image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
<figcaption class="article-header-blog__caption">
A worker inspects batteries for electric vehicles being manufactured at a factory in Dongguan, China.
<span class="article-header-blog__credit">Bobby Yip/Reuters</span> </figcaption>
</figure><br><p>China’s long-delayed third Party plenum on economic reform will be held in July. Official commentary suggests that the Party communique which will be issued at this meeting will double-down on the importance of manufacturing as a tool to address China’s pressing domestic economic problems, potentially increasing trade tensions with a range of foreign countries.</p>
<p>On April 30, Chinese authorities&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="0" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.rfa.org%2Fenglish%2Fnews%2Fchina%2Fdelayed-third-plenary-economy-meeting-05022024142612.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503185984%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=6rGd5%2FLSHj1bM81wUd7kavWE%2BfArnHSjbHJl9xnwSRY%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWA21353390-5ead-5dcb-2b03-23d199791392" originalsrc="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/delayed-third-plenary-economy-meeting-05022024142612.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="H0nZtRfp6EVbYT+KTpVqEheb+uLHle+cIEiV0g+4+TJW3Qu25XU/yzbCa1G2aRH/CCZXeUISHDF/gjIEXXg6zrryaT7ofgaXLsCq4t+Ik6Cb4/KAwl81rSRLR+Eb2phf9yd3N/9uq7lw3S0AkysnTIbFN+sOlSXsSMVT6MjV/hw=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/delayed-third-plenary-economy-meeting-05022024142612.html. Click or tap if you trust this link.">announced</a>&nbsp;that the third Party plenum of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee would meet in July. Official commentary&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="1" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.chinadaily.com.cn%2Fa%2F202405%2F01%2FWS66323e19a31082fc043c5050.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503199426%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=2n3UuGo%2FRAWMbRlRHWq%2BEQJSihCvwU%2FgSSy2AXeD2PE%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWA117497f5-e87c-bc4e-01dd-f20665dc9b5e" originalsrc="https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202405/01/WS66323e19a31082fc043c5050.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="bqQQxTFiPd7eWyoW8nBUP4fkYbr+Lnn8xYI19CYTxCJmPQ0cE4NwUv9TvRZM6N7F+C46cUR8Mw1johhx4G2Aca9bsgndQMVxL7ANckuufHWRiWeNv8elRRoWYA824p1Ilt4+VGxxWLXaknoI7+ubjDILGgOZJLlPYVseD4HI/nw=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202405/01/WS66323e19a31082fc043c5050.html. Click or tap if you trust this link.">indicates</a>&nbsp;that economic issues will be the core of the plenum, including a focus on integrated economic plans for the Yangtze Delta region. But specific attention will also be devoted to fostering “new quality productive forces”—a new Party slogan set out by Xi Jinping—with state commentary stating:</p><p><em>“The imperative was stressed... to develop new quality productive forces according to local conditions. The layout of China's strength in strategic science and technology should be improved, emerging industries cultivated and strengthened, the development of industries for the future arranged in advance, and the transformation and upgrading of traditional industries empowered by advanced technologies.”</em></p>
<p>As Chinese authorities&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="2" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Flosangeles.china-consulate.gov.cn%2Feng%2Flghd%2F202404%2Ft20240418_11283727.htm&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503205764%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=IbEShh6%2BllqjRF%2BKcOmhi%2FU7fTx1f9JCGSLpKwYrcBk%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAe743989e-a804-99d8-d203-643dc5ac1cc7" originalsrc="http://losangeles.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/lghd/202404/t20240418_11283727.htm" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="nJFMkJ+NoiMgW4rhQv8Zy1Lr3elJYsunHe4BDryx6OO0YVHvk0kbWP02pfLAsbN1ydtFaaLLI+D2xacSVY5nZse/MXybDN3lKtTtVciINnLLI1oJjosVuWnQLf9+vqKBw/nTo448yRRn+8p/5q4ZAnoGVQEE+nbAkYpuy9tqg0g=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: http://losangeles.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/lghd/202404/t20240418_11283727.htm. Click or tap if you trust this link.">note</a>, “new quality productive forces” includes three specific industries: electric vehicles, lithium-ion batteries, and photovoltaic products, which have registered dramatic export growth, in addition to other fields in biomedicine, artificial intelligence, and the digital economy. In recent years, Beijing has&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="3" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2024%2F05%2F14%2Fbusiness%2Fchina-exports-manufacturing.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503211048%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=1ahyI9wpkevRlu2E672ErhfP7nh3mz%2Fwp4Q4dT76QSc%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAd915b52c-0ef4-2399-4607-1ea63c3f5b6b" originalsrc="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/14/business/china-exports-manufacturing.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="L2sZOeL0lFunPptcQBH8iAhtpk88vF6tbo59ysGysLK+IoJ4HxdgExVjCZ/qZ6o01CYHuZ3WrgTsj9CqTmStycTBTwhf+dMUsXEuw49i+afnKwi/uOCVTlwcjKEcEbF6/gKe+TnSzRXlDzhzF6kuCmKwHA/MVKY/pJPB0BG8OpI=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/14/business/china-exports-manufacturing.html. Click or tap if you trust this link.">identified and promoted</a>&nbsp;key advanced manufacturing industries—including electric vehicles and batteries—as part of China’s industrial strategy. Goals include reducing reliance on foreign technologies and creating new sources of export-driven growth.&nbsp;</p>
<p>For Beijing, such emphasis on manufacturing represents an economic development strategy aimed at responding to serious domestic challenges. China currently faces both continuing high&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="4" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.wsj.com%2Fworld%2Fchina%2Fchinas-youth-unemployment-eased-in-april-a029344f&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503216081%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=eNQrISw%2BXNg3i%2FwuJav7ExYbcv2lBfCg4MzHyblG7p4%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAbd6af401-ab3c-7845-7ea4-53d89f61f617" originalsrc="https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-youth-unemployment-eased-in-april-a029344f" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="AQ4/iQp/hYQGxLkXSn7qmCrCJ/cZPlJ+TV1/fUPl5xi4LmH5GuJJY97e/YzHRaDV7MuK+PCZTCHRcdjAGmcXnkvGUJvpbYYSHjcj+YJoViFXMJd+4ypOZ98eTfbC22clyxh9qg1vg2Dbiab/raJBmkpD+TjrkS5zidNmKWfKPGQ=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-youth-unemployment-eased-in-april-a029344f. Click or tap if you trust this link.">youth unemployment</a>, as well as construction and real estate sectors that are mired in deep distress after the implosion of China’s property bubble, and which constituted a quarter of China’s GDP prior to the pandemic. Recent years have&nbsp;<a data-auth="NotApplicable" data-linkindex="5" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/amid-mounting-youth-unemployment-woes-beijing-looks-towards-vocational-education" id="OWA4f9afd72-27e1-a17f-5c3b-a22fc9dadb5d" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" title="seen">seen</a>&nbsp;Chinese authorities make a concerted effort to raise the status of vocational education programs and steer youth in the direction of skilled manufacturing labor, precisely because of the employment difficulties facing four-year college graduates.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Indeed, recent statements by Xi himself give further support to the likelihood that the July plenum will feature a doubling-down on manufacturing. A front-page&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="6" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fpaper.people.com.cn%2Frmrb%2Fhtml%2F2024-05%2F01%2Fnw.D110000renmrb_20240501_4-01.htm&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503220962%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=LvIQKiUxzrnTL5IJ16VqXtLA2b8mEyKv3lZTT4xqvYk%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWA3964bf46-e856-5cc7-ecc1-e1db928cee93" originalsrc="http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2024-05/01/nw.D110000renmrb_20240501_4-01.htm" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="U+VGUCUN0VJYCDQ2m86YaO3xVtQLf4AFom+BRwX1d9GyfZpjKes/TTI9qMLzcuMXNjvU+HCgSepVli75jPbZ3LIWCwAAZbLulu9txfWvvq83eCkMtoYWI36ftt+PqSliQSPrKlM0wk/5b1NnvWK2u5IeHP12JeLpC0cyv1/ltJI=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2024-05/01/nw.D110000renmrb_20240501_4-01.htm. Click or tap if you trust this link.">article</a>&nbsp;in the Party’s flagship paper accompanying the announcement of the July plenum carried extensive quotations from Xi himself extolling Chinese “craftsmanship” (<em>gongjiang</em>) in numerous fields of advanced manufacturing.</p>
<p>Naturally, any policy moves by Beijing to boost its own export-oriented advanced manufacturing industries run the risk of heightening tensions between China and its trading partners. Fears of Chinese market domination in specific industries led the Biden administration to&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="7" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fapnews.com%2Farticle%2Fbiden-china-tariffs-electric-vehicles-evs-solar-2024ba735c47e04a50898a88425c5e2c&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503225850%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=Lf8uTpZ6O1wJNj%2FSMr8ybHVGEuHjxOTwdJI49t%2BjhmY%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAbf0d4b26-e45d-be24-0f02-464361a12e73" originalsrc="https://apnews.com/article/biden-china-tariffs-electric-vehicles-evs-solar-2024ba735c47e04a50898a88425c5e2c" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="Zial7EJt9mURBt5T7sLNyoDKz3K/3tbjbkvn3tpiLyw16SD1VUaE4xhpY7xPsNzt05pHcsZEOjV3lzvQ09lZ5gjWonBZNBUQKbZdL96lTfPnncvNW3KYIP1mNu9l18reYgYx8EeZGPdwyI/KjsFZU1d3Nd9Aw9+8Kx8cwxUjyMc=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://apnews.com/article/biden-china-tariffs-electric-vehicles-evs-solar-2024ba735c47e04a50898a88425c5e2c. Click or tap if you trust this link.">announce</a>&nbsp;high tariffs on a range of such products last week. In fall 2023, European authorities&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="8" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Frhg.com%2Fresearch%2Faint-no-duty-high-enough%2F&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503230731%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=lyUNGLKjjpnh19ABAO7T6svYM8im%2F1%2Bhg%2BdAw4NUZ1I%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAe6e23327-f57b-65e1-1139-73e7492b7bc3" originalsrc="https://rhg.com/research/aint-no-duty-high-enough/" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="JaDVZAQwTw9fRxuxCWHj8WGhl3dc+jVzZfhMwuGIEkGneAbeDvT4IVpdE7XXcwVyjK8MtOFpBmFteUpAFXZ5EsTvExteNVVizaOmbqPwyBZY+e0plVrdArCFjCjJRKphNkxFyxk3V+dCyvyso5tC5M6sydgpqUCWvii5uiExGdA=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://rhg.com/research/aint-no-duty-high-enough/. Click or tap if you trust this link.">launched</a>&nbsp;an anti-subsidy investigation into China’s electric vehicle industry, and are currently considering imposing countervailing duties.&nbsp;</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog/advanced-manufacturing-be-focus-chinas-july-party-plenum</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/blog/advanced-manufacturing-be-focus-chinas-july-party-plenum</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 22 May 2024 20:43:23 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>European Tech Law Faces Test to Address Interference, Threats, and Disinformation in 2024 Elections</title>
<description><figure>
<div class="article-header__image-picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/full_width_xl/public/image/2024/05/EUvote.jpg.webp" alt="Pin badges encouraging people to vote in June's European Parliament elections are placed at the Malta office information stand during a conference at the European Parliament, in Rabat, Malta May 22, 2024." class="article-header__image-img" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="article-header__image-caption">
Pin badges encouraging people to vote in June's European Parliament elections are placed at the Malta office information stand during a conference at the European Parliament, in Rabat, Malta May 22, 2024.
<span class="author">REUTERS/Darrin Zammit Lupi</span>
</figcaption>
</figure><br><p>The European Union (EU) began implementing the Digital Services Act (DSA) this year, just in time to combat online disinformation and other electoral interference in the dozens of elections taking place in Europe’s twenty-seven member countries and the European Parliament elections taking place June 6 through June 9. To prepare, the EU conducted a stress test of the DSA mechanisms to address elections targeted by false and manipulated information, incitement, and attempts to suppress voices. The DSA has also <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/30/business/meta-european-union-disinformation-investigation.html" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="opened investigations">opened investigations</a> against Meta, TikTok, and X out of concern they are not doing enough to prevent these scenarios.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The DSA is a landmark piece of legislation not only because it is the most comprehensive regulatory effort to address digital threats to date and impacts the 740 million people living in the EU; its implementation will also inform other countries’ efforts to provide a secure and safe internet space. Even without additional legislation, the European law may induce the largest technology companies to voluntarily apply the same standards globally, as was the case with the EU’s Global Digital Privacy Regulation, which caused many platforms to routinely seek user permission for data collection and retention.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p><p>Tech companies’ responses to the DSA during the EU elections will be watched closely in the United States, where disinformation and electoral interference could roil the already contentious November elections. Despite years of debate, no U.S. guardrails have been implemented. Concerns over government censorship and free speech have stalled dozens of legislative proposals to require tech companies to address various threats in the digital space and risks arising from powerful new artificial intelligence (AI). The free speech argument overlooks the speech of those who are being doxed, threatened, attacked, and driven out of the public arena by vicious online actors—including women, who are far and away <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/most-online-hate-targets-women-says-eu-report-2023-11-29/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="the most frequent targets of these attacks">the most frequent targets of these attacks</a>. Legislative action has also been impeded by concerns that overly burdensome regulation will inhibit tech companies amid a worldwide race to gain competitive edge through generative artificial intelligence and other innovations.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The DSA is a useful model constructed around three principles: due diligence requirements for tech companies, mandated transparency via public reporting of their compliance with those requirements, and the threat of hefty fines to ensure compliance and accountability. The size of the EU market is large enough that, as with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), some tech companies may be incentivized to comply with the law’s provisions even without sanctions. The DSA’s strictest provisions apply to the world’s largest online platforms and search engines (those with more than 45 million users). These companies are required to routinely assess activity on their platforms and services for “<a href="https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-vlops" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="systemic risks">systemic risks</a>” involving elections, illegal content, human rights, gender-based violence, protection of minors, and public health and safety.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Companies have delivered initial assessments, which are publicly available, as well as information about the actions they have taken to comply. The EU website hosts a massive and growing online archive of hundreds of thousands of content moderation decisions made by the companies. In early enforcement actions, the EU has requested that Meta and other companies take down false ads and sought more information about their safety practices. For example, the EU queried X about its decision to cut its <a href="https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-requests-information-x-decreasing-content-moderation-resources-under-digital-services" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="content moderation team">content moderation team</a> by 20 percent since last October. Reduced content moderation on one of the world’s largest platforms is obviously a great concern given the number of elections and aggressive disinformation and interference campaigns by Russia and its proxies as it seeks to boost the fortunes of rising rightwing populists, Euroskeptic parties, and pro-Russian and anti-Ukraine candidates, as recently <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/04/17/slovakia-president-pellegrini-russia-election-interference-disinformation/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="occurred in Slovakia">occurred in Slovakia</a> and other Central and Eastern European countries.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>Thus far, the DSA has not yet levied fines, but the threat alone of stiff penalties of up to 6 percent of gross revenues has led most companies to provide the required information. This treasure trove of information about how these tech companies are policing their own platforms is itself valuable; it enables governments and researchers to understand the effectiveness of measures being employed by trust and safety divisions of companies, some of which embrace the goal of a safe internet. The EU law explicitly seeks to guard free speech as well as innovation by companies, but the experience of implementation will inform lingering concerns about free speech, direct government decision-making, and censorship of content, including whether an authoritarian government could exercise control over their populations through digital policing and firewalls. Those concerns color the current negotiations at the United Nations over a Global Digital Compact, which is to be announced as part of the Summit of the Future in September.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The essence of the DSA is not to make content decisions directly but to set standards for due diligence and require companies to demonstrate that they are monitoring and mitigating risks via their own codes of conduct. Voluntary standards may vary, but the sharpest debates revolve around defining what constitutes illegal content. The EU has taken additional measures to harmonize laws regarding what is illegal content across the EU member states, which has been a difficult and contentious matter. The United Kingdom (UK) went through a similar multiyear debate over concerns about curtailing free speech before passing its Online Safety Act late last year. The UK law adopted some features in the DSA, including the due diligence reporting requirement and fines of up to ten percent of gross revenue. It defines the scope of risks more narrowly than the DSA, although the UK law does criminalize “extreme” pornography and may criminalize the creation of deepfake porn. Enforcement of the UK law awaits finalization of codes of conduct by year’s end. The EU also has moved to harmonize what constitutes illegal content as the laws of the twenty-seven member states currently vary greatly in defining what is illegal. Germany’s Network Enforcement Act, which was passed in 2018, is one of the world’s stiffest hate speech laws, which aims to stem rising neo-Nazi hate speech. The far-right Alternative fur Deutschland party has <a href="https://www.vox.com/world-politics/2024/3/12/24080074/germany-afd-far-right" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="surged in state elections">surged in state elections</a> and exceeded the popularity of the leading Social Democrats in national polls.&nbsp;</p><p>The process of making the internet safer is iterative; several countries have revised their laws based on the experience of implementing them as well as evolving circumstances. For example, Germany amended its law in 2021 to stiffen its requirement that companies take down “clearly illegal” content within twenty-four hours. Australia has revised its online safety law twice since its initial passage in 2015, to require faster takedown of material deemed illegal and to greatly expand the law’s original focus on stopping child sexual abuse and exploitation and terrorist material. Speed of response is a critical factor in countering mis- and disinformation. Delayed action by tech companies has allowed viral propagation of material to proceed unhindered—as occurred in early January when deepfake porn of pop star Taylor Swift spread to 47 million viewers shortly after it was uploaded from the notorious 4chan message board.&nbsp;</p>
<p>That highly publicized episode drew attention to the disproportionate targeting of women and girls by internet violence, especially women in public life like politicians, journalists, and human rights activists, and minorities. The chilling effect on political participation has also been documented. The UK parliament rushed to act on deepfake porn after a number of women candidates were targeted this spring. Growing attention to the magnitude of the effects on women spurred the Biden administration to form a fourteen-country global partnership for action on online harassment and abuse. And last month, the EU concluded years-long negotiations to issue a directive on online gender-based violence and threats, including nonconsensual sharing of intimate images, deepfake porn, and other forms of attack. Member states are required to pass laws to implement the directive within two years.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The 2024 elections will serve as an initial test case for the DSA’s ability to rein in this wide variety of election interference, threats, and disinformation. Given the nascent regulatory architecture and companies’ varied compliance records, it is certain that further scrutiny and modification will be needed. Big tech will be required to provide public after-action reviews of the effectiveness of their measures to label AI-generated content, moderate discourse, identify foreign interference, and meet other guidelines for each country’s elections. These much-needed first steps will help light the way for others.&nbsp;</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/article/european-tech-law-faces-test-address-interference-threats-and-disinformation-2024-elections</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/article/european-tech-law-faces-test-address-interference-threats-and-disinformation-2024-elections</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 22 May 2024 15:54:31 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>On "Outside Agitators" and Gaza Protests</title>
<description><p>Below is a chart showing the numbers of people arrested during Gaza encampments and protests on a number of U.S. campuses.</p>
<p>Data was collected from <em>The New York Times </em>article titled <a href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2Finteractive%2F2024%2Fus%2Fpro-palestinian-college-protests-encampments.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7CEAbrams%40cfr.org%7C79b6f0937c2346ef2f5308dc79a4262b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638518993125924955%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=c1vMu1qHcMFcAe4V9go9nFMUVVZ8eQSGkzA5KFljrXA%3D&amp;reserved=0" title="“Where Protesters on U.S. Campuses Have Been Arrested or Detained,”" target="_blank">“Where Protesters on U.S. Campuses Have Been Arrested or Detained,”</a> and supplemented with additional numbers from local journalists, university papers and statements, and national news agencies. The arrest numbers are <em>not </em>an exhaustive list of total arrests related to Gaza encampments and protests. Rather, it is a sample from a group of institutions where there are reports on the affiliation status of those arrested.</p><p>So these numbers should be considered suggestive, not final or absolutely reliable. And what they suggest is that the protests were indeed seized upon by people unaffiliated with the universities and colleges in question, but determined to disrupt campus life in the service of their political goals. Only half of those "protesting" were students or faculty members.&nbsp;</p>
<p>This suggests other questions. Who were the 50.43% who were unaffiliated? Who financed their activities? Did the affiliated and unaffiliated act in the same ways, or was one group or the other more involved in violence, building takeovers, and extremist rhetoric as opposed to peaceful protest?&nbsp;</p>
<p>The involvement of such a percentage of persons unaffiliated with the universities presents special problems for administrators, because internal discipline such as suspension or expulsion will of course not be available when it comes to the unaffiliated. That may leave no alternative except arrests to bring the activities to an end. In real life, we've very often seen administrators threaten suspensions or expulsions and then back off, or even impose such penalties and then remove them as part of the price of getting protesters to disband. Faculty who violate university rules present a similar but even harder problem because they often have more protections, such as tenure.&nbsp;</p>
<p>My impression, now as the academic year is ending, is that punishment is extremely rare. Most charges have been or likely will be dropped, except perhaps in cases where "protesters" assaulted police. Academic penalties such as suspension appear to be disappearing as well. This sends a clear message: violations of the rules will be forgiven no matter how severe the violation if violators stick to their guns and threaten further disturbances. It is an invitation for more trouble, and quite an education for the vast majority of students who naively assumed rules were <em>not </em>made to be broken.&nbsp;</p>
<figure id="image-82254" class="image-embed embedded_large"><div class="image-embed__picture">
<img width="520" height="332" alt="A list of universities with the number of arrests and affiliation status of those arrested." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" class="lazyload" data-src="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/Arrests%20at%20University%20Gaza%20Encampments%20and%20Protests_2.jpg.webp" src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/Arrests%20at%20University%20Gaza%20Encampments%20and%20Protests_2.jpg.webp" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption"><div class="image-embed__caption-text">
<span class="image-embed__source"></span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption></figure></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog/outside-agitators-and-gaza-protests</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/blog/outside-agitators-and-gaza-protests</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 21 May 2024 19:45:22 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Cyber Week in Review: May 16, 2024</title>
<description><figure>
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/slide_3_2/public/image/2024/05/2023-09-13T183146Z_1763002145_RC2U73AQX2WE_RTRMADP_3_USA-AI-CONGRESS-SCHUMER.JPG.webp" alt="U.S. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) addresses a press conference during a break in a bipartisan Artificial Intelligence (AI) Insight Forum for all U.S. senators at the U.S. Capitol on September 13, 2023." class="article-header-blog__image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
<figcaption class="article-header-blog__caption">
U.S. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) addresses a press conference during a break in a bipartisan Artificial Intelligence (AI) Insight Forum for all U.S. senators at the U.S. Capitol on September 13, 2023.
<span class="article-header-blog__credit">Julia Nikhinson/Reuters</span> </figcaption>
</figure><br><p><b style="font-weight:700">Senate AI working group releases AI Policy Roadmap</b></p>
<p>A bipartisan group of senators, which consists of Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY), and Sens. Todd Young (R-IN), Martin Heinrich (D-NM), and Mike Rounds (R-S.D.), released a “<a href="https://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000018f-79a9-d62d-ab9f-f9af975d0000" title="roadmap" target="_blank">roadmap </a>for artificial intelligence policy in the U.S. Senate” this week, and identifies areas or uses of AI that are well-suited for regulation, including boosting funding for AI innovation, developing standards for AI fairness, addressing AI’s implications for national security, and addressing AI’s effects on the workforce, among other concerns. The roadmap also calls for Congress to appropriate nearly $32 billion to encourage non-military AI innovation over the coming year. Although the report offers a <a href="https://www.akingump.com/en/insights/alerts/senate-gang-of-four-releases-long-anticipated-ai-whitepaper" title="variety of recommendations" target="_blank">variety of recommendations</a> for how Congress could leverage processes like appropriations, existing acts and funding like the CHIPS and Science Act, and research and development funding mechanisms to meet the goals of the roadmap, the senators have not clarified exactly what action Congress should take or when it would do so. The roadmap reflects the topics of AI Insight Forums that Majority Leader Schumer convened throughout the fall, which brought together business executives, legislators, and a small group of civil society advocates to discuss regulating artificial intelligence in the United States. While <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2024/05/15/congress-ai-road-map-regulation-schumer/" title="tech industry groups generally supported the report" target="_blank">tech industry groups generally supported the report</a> as a step in the right direction, academics and civil society advocates <a href="https://www.fastcompany.com/91126098/chuck-schumer-ai-roadmap-panned" title="derided" target="_blank">derided</a> it for lacking specificity and substance.&nbsp;</p><p><b style="font-weight:700">U.S., Japan, and partners unveil agreement for cross-border data flows</b></p>
<p>The United States, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom have <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Technology/Japan-U.S.-and-others-to-ease-cross-border-personal-data-transfers" title="created" target="_blank">created </a>a new framework to enable the sharing of personal data across their respective borders. The new framework aims to balance the need to encourage online commerce between countries with the data security needs and regulations of each country. The existing mechanism for data sharing, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Cross-Border Privacy Rules, will be phased out in favor of a new system. The new agreement will allow non-APEC countries to participate in data-sharing initiatives, with the United Kingdom being the first such country to join, and will standardize a process for certifying companies from participating countries. Once those companies have been certified by a relevant data protection authority, they will be able to share data more easily among the participating countries. The agreement, which is still being finalized, is likely to be rolled out in the coming months, and the participating countries hope it will expand beyond the additional participating APEC countries, Australia, Canada, Mexico, the Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan.</p>
<p><b style="font-weight:700">Frank McCourt announces a planned bid for TikTok</b></p>
<p>In the wake of congressional and executive action aimed at forcing the divestiture of social media platform TikTok, American billionaire Frank McCourt <a href="https://www.projectliberty.io/news/frank-mccourt-organizing-a-people-s-bid-to-acquire-tiktok" title="announced" target="_blank">announced</a> that he is readying a bid for the U.S. version of the social media app TikTok. McCourt is organizing the bid through Project Liberty, an initiative hehe has founded to reimagine the economic models that currently power Big Tech and to bring forward novel solutions aimed at putting individuals in charge of their own data and digital engagement. experience. that could shape and change the status quo of the web, bring forward novel solutions at every level, and put people back in control of their digital lives. McCourt said that buying TikTok would create value by providing “individuals and creators on [TikTok] the value and control they deserve regarding who has access to their data and how it is used.” ByteDance, the parent company of TikTok, will likely be forced to sell the app after Congress included a provision in an annual defense spending bill that requires ByteDance to either sell TikTok in six months or see the app banned. The ban is currently <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/14/business/media/tiktok-creators-sue-ban.html" title="facing challenges" target="_blank">facing challenges</a> in the U.S. court system, as a group of TikTok creators has filed a lawsuit alleging that the ban violates their First Amendment right to fere speech.</p>
<p><b style="font-weight:700">Biden administration increases tariffs on Chinese technology imports</b></p><p>The Biden administration <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/972cabfb-f587-4cb3-ab21-ec3380b049da" title="announced" target="_blank">announced </a>additional tariffs on nearly $18 billion worth of Chinese goods, i stating the move was necessary to protect certain sectors of the U.S. economy. Chinese-made electric vehicles will see some of the largest increases, with the Biden administration quadrupling tariffs from 25 percent of a car’s value to 100 percent in the coming year. Currently <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/electric-shock-interpreting-chinas-electric-vehicle-export-boom" title="only 2 percent" target="_blank">only 2 percent</a> of all U.S. imports of electric vehicles come from China, but Chinese EVs have proliferated rapidly in other markets, with Chinese automakers accounting for <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-ev-strategy-going-small-cheap-pay-big-dividends-asia-russell-2024-04-23/" title="60 percent" target="_blank">60 percent</a> of all EV sales worldwide in 2023. China’s foreign ministry issued a statement saying Beijing “opposes unilateral tariff increases that violate World Trade Organization rules and will take all necessary measures to safeguard its legitimate rights and interests”. The Biden administration isn’t alone in investigating the potential growth of Chinese electric vehicles, as the European Commission has also begun <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/8e4a9eb4-cd88-4625-a21b-6378d24c6dad" title="investigating" target="_blank">investigating </a>EV imports to the EU, and may impose tariffs in the coming months.</p>
<p><b style="font-weight:700">FBI seizes major online cybercrime marketplace</b></p>
<p>The FBI and a number of international law enforcement partners announced that they had seized the servers used to host BreachForums, a prominent cybercrime website. The seizure, which the FBI conducted in partnership with law enforcement in the U.K., New Zealand, Australia, Switzerland, Ukraine and Iceland, involved seizing BreachForum’s Telegram channel as well. The agencies appeared to be searching for the administrators of the site, known by the aliases Baphomet and ShinyHunters, with the FBI issuing a request for tips on the administrators’ real identities. The FBI and Department of Justice have seized a number of major cybercrime forums over the past two years, including BreachForums’ predecessor, RaidForums. BreachForums offered a variety of criminal items for sale through its services, such as stolen devices, hacking tools, and illegal contraband.</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog/cyber-week-review-may-16-2024</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/blog/cyber-week-review-may-16-2024</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 17 May 2024 14:25:53 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Power and Financial Interdependence</title>
<description><p>So long as China runs a large trade surplus, Chinese residents (either the government or Chinese firms typically) will need to accumulate financial claims on the rest of the world. Conversely, so long as the United States runs a large trade deficit, the rest of the world will accumulate, in aggregate, claims on the United States. China need not directly finance the U.S. (though it did for a time), but Chinese offshore asset accumulation is necessarily a part of any global equilibrium that sustains U.S. deficits in a world still marked by <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/new-geopolitics-global-finance" title="large Chinese surpluses and large U.S. deficits" target="_blank">large Chinese surpluses and large U.S. deficits</a>.</p>
<p>Trade imbalances thus imply financial interdependence and linkage of one form or another.&nbsp; In today’s world, the risk that such interdependence can be “weaponized” is a very real.</p><p>In my new paper for the <a href="https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/power-and-financial-interdependence" title="Institut Français des Relations Internationales&nbsp;(Ifri)" target="_blank">Institut Français des Relations Internationales&nbsp;(Ifri)</a>, specifically for their new initiative on Geoeconomics and Geofinance, I explore the history of the Sino-American financial relationship – and in particular, try to highlight how perceptions of which country truly holds the leverage within the financially unbalanced relationship have evolved over time.</p>
<p>Two incidents are, I think, especially important.</p>
<p>One is the runup in China’s holdings of Agencies and (less visibly) other forms of credit to U.S. financial institutions in years prior to the global financial crisis. Prior to the global financial crisis, reserve growth (by China and others) was massive, both absolutely and relative to Treasury issuance. This squeezed big sovereign investors (and private investors) into close substitutes for Treasuries. Synthetic AAA didn’t work out well, but it was a real part of global finance for a while.</p>
<p>China’s exposure to the Agency market and other less visible exposures to the U.S. banking system (the China Investment Corporation’s investment in the Reserve Primary money market fund for example) taught China of the dangers of excessive exposure to the U.S. well before the current wave of sanctions against sovereign risk. China had more exposure to Agencies than Treasuries in the summer of 2008 – which wasn’t a comfortable position for China.</p>
<p>It also gave China a bit of leverage over the U.S., at least at the time. This leverage was not directly exercised, but the perception at the top of the U.S. Treasury that China’s actions could determine the success or failure of attempts to stabilize financial markets (notably the Agency market) clearly had an impact on U.S. policymakers. At a minimum, it raised the priority that the U.S. attached to its financial dialogue with China. At a maximum, it put pressure on the U.S. to respect China’s core financial interests, which included assuring the safety and liquidity of its holdings of Agencies. Then again, the need to support the Agency market was wildly overdetermined; the U.S. banking system was far more exposed than China.</p><p>At the end of the day, the fact that the U.S. stabilized the Agency market even as China reduced its exposure quite rapidly (whether by roll-off or outright sales) illustrated that the Fed, far more than China, has the decisive vote when it came to U.S. financial stability. The U.S. has learned, I think, that the Fed can buy more than China can sell.</p>
<p>The second episode is China’s decision after the global financial crisis to reduce its exposure to Treasury bonds – at least its visible holdings of Treasury bonds. China’s flight out of the Agencies was initially a slight back into Treasuries (and supply of Treasuries expanded rapidly after the crisis, making this an easy choice). Visible holdings of Treasuries soared from $500 billion in mid-2008 to $1.3 trillion by mid-2010, and from 2010 on China was a significant user of Euroclear’s custodial service.</p>
<figure id="image-82126" class="image-embed embedded_large"><div class="image-embed__picture">
<img width="520" height="378" alt="China: U.S. Holdings vs. Estimated Dollar Reserves" loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" class="lazyload" data-src="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/JGB%20Chart%20New.png.webp" src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/JGB%20Chart%20New.png.webp" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption"><div class="image-embed__caption-text">
<span class="image-embed__source"></span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption></figure><p>China found this risky – partially because of the domestic “optics” of having so much of Chinese savings in a country that, even then, was viewed as a less than ideal custodian of China’s wealth. China thus has been looking for alternatives to Treasuries for far longer than most contemporary accounts recognize.* The G7’s immobilization of Russia’s risk crystallized the risks of holding large reserve balances in strategic adversaries in the public eye. But China had been thinking about those risks for many years.</p>
<p>China’s response to risks of a concentrated exposure to the Treasury market was partially to continue diversifying the currency composition of its foreign reserves. This process started in 2005, likely ended around 2012 and ended up costing China a bit of interest income. China accumulated large euro reserve balances just when the ECB decided to adopt negative rates.</p>
<p>But a big part of China’s strategy was to diversify the way it holds dollars – making more use of offshore custodians (Belgium’s Euroclear most obviously) and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/fe81e06c-010d-4ddd-ad85-406412ec1bb9" title="private fund managers" target="_blank">private fund managers</a>, but also inching back into Agencies and no doubt other forms of dollar exposure that offer both less visibility and a small yield pickup over Treasuries. For example, Chinese institutions are believed to be active suppliers of dollars in the cross-currency swap market.</p>
<p>Most importantly, China decided to stop holding all its foreign assets as “liquid” foreign exchange reserves. A big part of China’s strategy is what China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) calls the “diversified use” of its reserves. <a href="http://www.safe.gov.cn/en/file/file/20211217/1bdd3ed85dba4d269655b5ce7159893b.pdf?n=Annual%20Report%20of%20the%20State%20Administration%20of%20Foreign%20Exchange%20(2020)" title="SAFE’s 2020 annual report" target="_blank">SAFE’s 2020 annual report</a>, which provides a 10-year progress report on this diversification, remains essential.</p>
<p>Diversified use of reserves effectively meant using foreign exchange not to add to SAFE’s formal foreign exchange reserves, but rather to use China’s foreign exchange to directly fund China’s strategic goals (through what SAFE calls the co-financing platform). SAFE handed foreign exchange over to the Silk Road Fund and its close kin, it provided close to $100 billion in equity capital to the China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export-Import Bank of China (Exim), and no doubt more financing via entrusted loans, and it helped fund the offshore activity of “small, medium, and large” financial instruments. I still think <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/how-hide-your-foreign-exchange-reserves-users-guide" t... |
http://localhost:1200/cfr/timelines - Success ✔️<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0">
<channel>
<title>Timelines</title>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/timelines</link>
<atom:link href="http://localhost:1200/cfr/timelines" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"></atom:link>
<description>Timelines - Made with love by RSSHub(https://github.com/DIYgod/RSSHub)</description>
<generator>RSSHub</generator>
<webMaster>i@diygod.me (DIYgod)</webMaster>
<language>en</language>
<lastBuildDate>Fri, 24 May 2024 08:03:49 GMT</lastBuildDate>
<ttl>5</ttl>
<item>
<title>Far-Right Terrorism in the United States</title>
<description><br>
<h1>1865</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Formation of the Ku Klux Klan</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77403" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1865_KKK.jpg.webp" width="520" height="550" alt="Illustration showing members of the White League and the Ku Klux Klan clasping hands over a suffering African American family." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
An editorial illustration by Thomas Nast in an 1874 publication of Harper’s Weekly shows members of the White League and the Ku Klux Klan clasping hands over a suffering African American family.
<span class="image-embed__source">Library of Congress</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>The Civil War between the pro-slavery South and anti-slavery North ends, and disgruntled veterans of the South’s defeated Confederate Army form the first iteration of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) in Pulaski, Tennessee. Nathan Bedford Forrest, a former Confederate general, becomes the Klan’s first grand wizard, its national leader. The KKK’s declared goal is “to maintain the supremacy of the White Race in the Republic.” The first Klan was active from 1865 until 1871 and played a major role in the South’s postwar Reconstruction era, fighting to oppress the previously enslaved African American populace and engaging in acts of violence against them.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1963</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>September 15, 1963</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Bombing of Sixteenth Street Baptist Church</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77407" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1963_Birmingham.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="The family of Carol Robertson mourn at her graveside during funeral services. " loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
The family of Carol Robertson, a fourteen-year-old African American girl killed in the bombing of Sixteenth Street Baptist Church, mourn at her graveside during funeral services.
<span class="image-embed__source">Horace Court/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>The church bombing in Birmingham, Alabama, is coordinated by the local chapter of the KKK, which by now is in its third iteration and popular across the South. The bombing of the predominately Black congregation kills four young girls, becoming one of the defining racist attacks of the civil rights era. Between 1947 and 1965, the KKK is linked to upward of fifty dynamite explosions targeting African Americans in Birmingham, Alabama—earning the city the grim nickname “Bombingham.”</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1968</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>April 4, 1968</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Assassination of Martin Luther King</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77408" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1968_AssassinationMLK.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Reverend Martin Luther King Jr.’s body is viewed by his wife, Coretta Scott King, and their four young children look at King in his coffin at his funeral in Atlanta." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Reverend Martin Luther King Jr.’s body is viewed by his wife, Coretta Scott King, and their four young children at King’s funeral in Atlanta.
<span class="image-embed__source">AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>James Earl Ray, a fugitive with multiple past convictions, shoots and kills Reverend Martin Luther King Jr., a leader of the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s, at a motel in Memphis, Tennessee. Ray was a supporter of racial segregation and a white supremacist. King’s death is mourned by millions of Americans and considered a low point in the civil rights movement.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1978</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Publishing of ‘The Turner Diaries’</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77409" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1978_TurnerDiaries.jpg.webp" width="520" height="780" alt="A copy of ‘The Turner Diaries,’ a racist, dystopian novel, sits on a library shelf in Marlinton, West Virginia." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
A copy of “The Turner Diaries,” a racist, dystopian novel, sits on a library shelf in Marlinton, West Virginia.
<span class="image-embed__source">Jeff Gentner/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>William Luther Pierce, a former college physics professor and a prominent neo-Nazi, publishes <em>The Turner Diaries</em> under the pseudonym Andrew Macdonald. The dystopian novel tells the story of a violent overthrow of the federal government, which leads to a nuclear conflict and race war. Notably, the book’s hero, Earl Turner, detonates a bomb at the FBI’s headquarters in Washington, DC. The book is advertised with the slogan, “What will you do when they come to take your guns?” The novel comes to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/12/books/turner-diaries-white-supremacists.html">resonate with far-right groups</a> in the decades ahead.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1978</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Formation of the Aryan Nations </h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77410" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1978_AryanNations.jpg.webp" width="520" height="728" alt="Reverend Richard Butler poses in his church at the headquarters of the Aryan Nations neo-nazi organization, in northern Idaho." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Reverend Richard Butler poses in his church at the headquarters of the Aryan Nations neo-nazi organization, in northern Idaho.
<span class="image-embed__source">Bettmann/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Notorious neo-Nazi Pastor Richard Butler forms the Aryan Nations in Idaho. A small but committed group, its followers subscribe to the so-called <a href="https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounder/christian-identity">Christian Identity doctrine</a>, believing they are God’s true “chosen people,” a designation usually that refers to Jews. They believe a racial war is imminent between Aryan (white) people and Jews and nonwhites, one that they must prepare for and win. Through its annual World Congresses, the Aryan Nations inspires the creation of the terrorist group called the Order.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1984</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">End of The Order </h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77423" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1984_Order.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="FBI agents sift through the ruins of the house where Robert J. Matthews, founder of the neo-Nazi group the Order, died in a fire after a standoff with federal agents." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
FBI agents sift through the ruins of the house where Robert J. Matthews, founder of the neo-Nazi group The Order, died in a fire amid a standoff with federal agents.
<span class="image-embed__source">Tim Klass/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Federal law enforcement officials <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/17/us/fbi-spying-white-supremacists-declassified/index.html">track Robert Mathews</a>, leader of The Order, to a small house on the state of Washington’s Whidbey Island. Mathews, wanted on murder and robbery charges, refuses to surrender, and a gunfight and standoff ensue, during which he’s killed in a fire. With his death, Mathews becomes a martyr for the far right.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1988</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Fort Smith Sedition Trial</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77411" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1988_SeditionTrial.jpg.webp" width="520" height="668" alt="Louis Ray Beam Jr. carries his wife, Sheila, who had fainted, away from the federal courthouse in Fort Smith, Arkansas. after he and twelve other white supremacists are acquitted on sedition charges." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Louis Ray Beam Jr. carries his wife, Sheila, who had fainted, away from the federal courthouse in Fort Smith, Arkansas, after he and twelve other white supremacists are acquitted on sedition charges.
<span class="image-embed__source">Danny Johnson/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Federal prosecutors bring fourteen white supremacists to trial at Fort Smith, Arkansas. They stand accused of plots against the U.S. government (seditious conspiracy) and other violent crimes. An all-white jury <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/04/08/13-white-supremacists-acquitted-in-arkansas-murder-and-sedition-trial/21c30cbe-c120-40ac-8fec-33420d1b0d2e/">acquits all of them</a>. Afterward, defendant Louis Beam, a former KKK leader and later the “ambassador-at-large” for the Aryan Nations, focuses on building a base of support for a white supremacist revolution against the “Zionist-Occupied Government.” To this end, Beam founds a publication called the Seditionist, which promotes his concept of “leaderless resistance.” This revolution strategy argues that guerrilla warfare should be pursued through individual or small cells, not hierarchical organizations.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1992</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>August 1992</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Standoff at Ruby Ridge</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77412" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1992_RubyRidge.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Federal agents draw their weapons on five neo-Nazis a few miles from the Ruby Ridge site in Idaho where Randy Weaver is engaged in a standoff with authorities." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Federal agents draw their weapons on five neo-Nazis a few miles from the Ruby Ridge site in Idaho, where Randy Weaver is engaged in a standoff with authorities.
<span class="image-embed__source">Mason March/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>A large contingent of federal agents descend on a small home in Idaho to arrest Aryan Nations member Randy Weaver on unresolved firearms charges. After Weaver refuses to surrender, the ensuing eleven-day standoff and siege results in the shootout deaths of Weaver’s son, wife, and dog, as well as a federal officer. Weaver ends up surrendering, but his family become <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/05/13/1098735768/weaver-and-the-ruby-ridge-standoff-contributed-to-the-evolution-of-the-radical-r">martyrs for the movement</a>, and the standoff captures the attention of far-right Americans nationwide.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1993</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>February 1993</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Waco Siege</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77413" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1993_Waco.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Smoke billows from the Branch Davidians’ compound as it burns to the ground outside of Waco, Texas, during a raid by federal agents." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
The Branch Davidians’ compound burns to the ground outside of Waco, Texas, during a raid by federal agents.
<span class="image-embed__source">Greg Smith/Corbis/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Federal agents besiege Mount Carmel Center, a compound near Waco, Texas, where residents are suspected of illegally selling machine guns and stockpiling weapons. The compound is home to the Branch Davidians, a religious cult led by David Koresh. When agents try to serve a search warrant, a gunfight breaks out, leaving ten people dead, including four federal officers. A nearly two-month standoff ensues, which ends when federal agents launch an assault on the compound. During the raid, a fire starts, and the compound burns to the ground, killing seventy-six Branch Davidians, including David Koresh and many women and children. Ruby Ridge and Waco both fuel anti-government conspiracy theories by alleging that a predatory government seeks to infringe on individual liberties.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1995</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>April 19, 1995</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Oklahoma City Bombing</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>An anti-government extremist and military veteran named Timothy McVeigh detonates a truck bomb at the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, killing 168 people and injuring hundreds more. The act is directly tied to the government crackdowns at Ruby Ridge and Waco, with McVeigh launching his attack on the second anniversary of the Waco siege. The Oklahoma City bombing is the deadliest domestic terrorist attack in modern U.S. history and leads to a sweeping government crackdown on armed militias, with federal law enforcement agencies significantly raising their efforts to infiltrate anti-government extremist groups. The militia movement therefore suffers a substantial blow in the late 1990s. McVeigh is executed for his crimes in 2001, while a co-conspirator, Terry Nichols, is still serving out a life sentence in prison as of 2024.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2008</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Election of Barack Obama</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77414" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2008_ObamaElection.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Members of the Tea Party hold a sign reading &quot;Obama Where's Your Papers&quot; during a protest." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Members of the Tea Party movement protest outside of San Francisco’s Fairmont Hotel ahead of a fundraiser attended by President Barack Obama in 2010.
<span class="image-embed__source">Justin Sullivan/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>A resurgence of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE49L7D0/">racism</a> and anti-government extremism surfaces with the November election of Barack Obama, the country’s first African American president. Some political opponents and conspiracy theorists allege that Obama is Muslim and foreign-born, falsehoods that they hoped would undermine his presidency and disqualify him from office.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2011</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>July 2011</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">American-Inspired Attacks in Norway</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77415" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2011_Norway.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="A young man is comforted as he mourns the deaths of those killed by Anders Breivik in a mass shooting and bombing in Norway." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
A young man is comforted as he mourns the deaths of those killed by Anders Breivik in a mass shooting and bombing in Norway.
<span class="image-embed__source">Wolfgang Rattay/Reuters</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Anders Breivik, a far-right extremist seeking to emulate Timothy McVeigh, kills seventy-seven people in twin attacks in Oslo, Norway. He murders eight with a truck bomb in the capital’s government quarter, and then drives to a nearby island—home to the summer camp of the youth wing of the country’s Labour Party—where he indiscriminately guns down sixty-nine more victims. Breivik wrote a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE76N14J/">long manifesto</a> accompanying his attack, calling his targets “cultural Marxists” who he felt were orchestrating the cultural and demographic replacement of Norwegians who shared his European heritage.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2015</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>June 2015</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Charleston AME Church Shooting</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77416" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2015_Charleston.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="People line up to attend Sunday services following a mass shooting at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina. " loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
People line up to attend Sunday services following a mass shooting at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina.
<span class="image-embed__source">Joe Raedle/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>White supremacist Dylann Roof opens fire at the “Mother” Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church in Charleston, South Carolina, killing nine African American worshippers. The church is known for hosting civil rights icons over the decades, including Martin Luther King Jr. During the attack, Roof tells victims, “I have to do it. You rape our women, and you’re taking over our country. And you have to go.”</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2016</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Election of Donald Trump</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77417" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2016_TrumpElection.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump speaks at a campaign rally in Rochester, New York." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump speaks at a campaign rally in Rochester, New York.
<span class="image-embed__source">Brett Carlsen/Getty Images </span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Donald Trump is elected president of the United States running as a Republican. Trump’s campaign had featured some far-right themes on immigration and race, and made proposals including a Muslim ban, a possible Muslim registry, and a border wall to keep out “rapist” and “criminal” Mexicans. To many Americans, his election victory proves that far-right rhetoric and policies that for decades had been associated only with extremists could resonate with wider swathes of the electorate, enough to actually win the White House.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2017</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>August 2017</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Charlottesville Car-Ramming</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77418" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2017_Charlottesville.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="White nationalists, holding tiki torches, march on the grounds of the University of Virginia ahead of the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia. " loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
White nationalists march on the grounds of the University of Virginia ahead of the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia.
<span class="image-embed__source">Stephanie Keith/Reuters</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>On August 11, a “Unite the Right” rally against the removal of a statue of Confederate commander Robert E. Lee in Charlottesville, Virginia, begins with a torchlight procession at the University of Virginia amid chants that “Jews will not replace us.” The following day, the protests turn more violent when James Alex Fields Jr., a twenty-year-old neo-Nazi who had traveled from Ohio for the rally, rams his car into a crowd of counter-demonstrators, injuring twenty-eight and killing one. In the wake of the incident, President Trump refused to condemn the rally, stating that there were “very fine people on both sides.” This statement, coupled with the president’s widely criticized handling of the crisis, provides a significant fillip for Americans on the far right, who <a href="https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/443666-richard-spencer-charlottesville-wouldnt-have-occurred-without/">see Trump as an ally in the White House.</a></p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2018</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Tree of Life Synagogue Shooting</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77419" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2018_TreeLife.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="A Jewish man prays at a makeshift memorial of flowers and handwritten notes outside the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
A Jewish man prays at a makeshift memorial of flowers and handwritten notes outside the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh.
<span class="image-embed__source">Cathal McNoughton/Reuters</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Robert Bowers, a forty-six-year-old local man, guns down eleven Jewish worshippers, most of them elderly, at the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Bowers presaged his attack with antisemitic and anti-immigrant posts on the social-networking site Gab, writing, “HIAS [Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society] likes to bring invaders in that kill our people. I can’t sit by and watch my people get slaughtered. Screw your optics, I’m going in.” Bowers was aggrieved about alleged migrant “caravans” coming from Central America, which he believed were being orchestrated by Jewish nonprofit organizations such as HIAS Bowers is sentenced to death in 2023 for the attack, and he remains on death row.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2019</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Christchurch Shootings</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77420" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2019_Christchurch.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="People walk under police tape as they leave after prayers at Linwood Islamic Center in Christchurch, New Zealand." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
People leave after prayers at the site of Brenton Tarrant’s rampage at the Linwood Islamic Centre in Christchurch, New Zealand.
<span class="image-embed__source">Edgar Su/Reuters </span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>During a twenty-minute rampage in Christchurch, New Zealand, gunman Brenton Tarrant murders fifty-one worshippers in two mosques. Seeking to inspire emulation of this violence, Tarrant livestreams most of the carnage on the internet, where it is viewed more than a million times—thus redefining far-right terrorism in the twenty-first century. Tarrant had been active in an eclectic and radical online space that trafficked in extremist ideologies about race, immigration, and environmental degradation. Mimicking Breivik, Tarrant explained his views in a seventy-four-page manifesto. His attack is inspired by U.S. conspiracy theories (including over guns), and in turn inspires follow-on attacks in the United States.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2020</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">COVID-19, Racial Justice, and the ‘Big Lie’</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77421" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2020_Covid.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Armed civilian men stand on the steps of the Michigan State Capitol in Lansing, taking part in a protest against Gov. Gretchen Whitmer's expanded stay-at-home order during the Covid-19 pandemic." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Armed civilian men stand on the steps of the Michigan State Capitol in Lansing, taking part in a protest against Governor Gretchen Whitmer’s expanded stay-at-home order during the COVID-19 pandemic.
<span class="image-embed__source">Jeff Kowalsky/AFP/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>The COVID-19 pandemic and ensuing government “lockdowns” in many jurisdictions provide renewed impetus to extremists across the far-right spectrum, offering perceived proof for many of their conspiracy theories and leading to spikes in online radicalization. Nationwide racial justice protests, catalyzed by the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/photos-how-george-floyds-death-sparked-protests-worldwide">killing of George Floyd</a>, also reenergize far right Americans, some of whom gather in armed counterprotests to “defend” police and businesses from rioting and looting. In the most notable flash of violence, Air Force Sergeant and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/right-wing-extremists-looming-threat-us-election">“boogaloo” adherent</a> Steven Carrillo perpetrates twin attacks in May and June 2020 that kill a federal officer and sheriff’s deputy in California. Both before and after his November 2022 election loss to Joe Biden, President Trump repeatedly airs unfounded concerns over mail-in ballot voting and repeats the falsehood that the election was “stolen.”</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2021</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Riots at the U.S. Capitol Building</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77422" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2021_Jan6Insurrection.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Trump supporters erect gallows amid protests and riots in front of the U.S. Capitol building, where many clash with police and damage government property." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Trump supporters erect gallows amid protests and riots in front of the U.S. Capitol building, where many clash with police and damage government property.
<span class="image-embed__source">Shay Horse/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>On January 6, 2021, a mob storms the U.S. Capitol, driven by Trump-fueled conspiracy theories about the 2020 presidential election. It the first such attack on the institution since British invaders set fire to the Capitol in 1814. Participants erect a gallows outside the building, imagery evoking “The Day of the Rope” from <em>The Turner Diaries</em>, which presaged a nationwide revolt. In the aftermath, federal prosecutors secure <a href="https://apnews.com/article/enrique-tarrio-capitol-riot-seditious-conspiracy-sentencing-da60222b3e1e54902db2bbbb219dc3fb">seditious conspiracy convictions</a> against several planners of the assault, succeeding where their 1988 counterparts had failed in proving that the defendants intended to violently overthrow the U.S. government.</p>
</div>
</div>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/timeline/far-right-terrorism-united-states</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/timeline/far-right-terrorism-united-states</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 03 Jan 2024 21:04:02 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>The U.S.–South Korea Alliance</title>
<description><br>
<h1>1950</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>June 25, 1950</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">The Korean War Begins With North Korea’s Invasion </h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76281" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_1950_KoreanWar_0.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="American troops withdrawing from Yongsan in Korea." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
American troops withdraw from Yongsan in Korea.
<span class="image-embed__source">Keystone/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>After independence from Japanese colonialism post–World War II, early Cold War tensions lead to the occupation of the Korean Peninsula by Soviet forces in the North and U.S. forces in the South. North Korea, backed by China and the Soviet Union, attempts to reunify the peninsula under communist rule by invading South Korea. The UN Security Council <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1950">denounces the attack</a> as a breach of peace and adopts binding resolutions, which call for an immediate cessation of hostilities and—for the first time—authorize the formation of the UN Command to provide assistance to South Korea. Under the command, sixteen countries, led by the United States, provide troop support to South Korea.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1953</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>July 27, 1953</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">The United Nations, China, and North Korea Sign the Armistice Agreement</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76284" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/12/TL_1953_Armistice2.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Maj. Gen. Blackshear M. Bryan exchanges credentials with Communist Lt. Gen. Lee Sang Cho at the opening session of the Military Armistice Commission at the Panmunjom Conference House on July 27, 1953." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
U.S. Maj. Gen. Blackshear M. Bryan exchanges credentials with Korean Communist Lt. Gen. Lee Sang Cho at the Military Armistice Commission in the Inter-Korean Peace House, situated on the south side of demilitarized zone.
<span class="image-embed__source">AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>The agreement divides the Korean Peninsula along the thirty-eighth parallel and establishes the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) as a buffer between North and South Korea. South Korean President Syngman Rhee opts not to sign the agreement, but he accepts the armistice on the condition that the United States and South Korea sign a mutual defense treaty. Because the Armistice Agreement serves as a cease-fire to the Korean War and the two Koreas did not sign a formal peace treaty, they technically remain in a state of war.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1953</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>October 1, 1953</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">The United States and South Korea Sign the Mutual Defense Treaty </h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76287" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_1953_MutualDefense.jpg.webp" width="520" height="409" alt="South Korean President Rhee Syngman leafs through the mutual defense treaty between the United States and Republic of Korea on January 29, 1954." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
South Korean President Rhee Syngman leafs through the mutual defense treaty between the United States and Republic of Korea on January 29, 1954.
<span class="image-embed__source">George Sweers/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>The U.S.-South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty ensures U.S. defense&nbsp;of&nbsp;South Korea against external aggression and commits to a U.S. military presence in South Korea. The treaty lays the foundation for a robust security alliance between the two countries.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1961</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>May 16, 1961</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">General Park Chung-hee Launches a Military Coup</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76288" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_1961_Coup.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="South Korean President Park Chung-hee stands on a podium next to U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson in Washington, DC." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
South Korean President Park Chung-hee stands on a podium next to U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson in Washington, DC, on May 17, 1965.
<span class="image-embed__source">Universal History Archive/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Amid domestic economic and political turmoil, the military overthrows the government, seizes power, and imposes martial law. Under pressure from the United States, South Korea holds a presidential election in 1963, in which Park is elected as president. Park implements an export-oriented economic modernization plan that transforms South Korea from one of the most impoverished countries in the world to a country with unprecedented economic growth, known as the so-called “<a href="https://www.oecd.org/country/korea/thematic-focus/sustaining-the-miracle-on-the-han-river-103653fa/">Miracle on the Han River</a>.” South Korea’s enhanced economic stature begins to alleviate the asymmetry of the U.S.-South Korea relationship.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1975</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">The United States Discovers South Korea’s Covert Nuclear Weapons Program </h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>President Park initiates the development of an independent nuclear weapons program, following concerns about the United States reducing its security commitment and withdrawing troops from South Korea under the Nixon Doctrine established by U.S. President Richard Nixon. The United States later pressures Park to cancel a nuclear plant agreement with France, offering U.S. nuclear assistance and personnel for peaceful purposes instead. South Korea’s nuclear ambitions cease when Park signs the <a href="https://disarmament.unoda.org/wmd/nuclear/npt/">Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty</a> (NPT).</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1980</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>May 18, 1980</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Pro-democracy Activists Lead the Gwangju Democratization Movement</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76289" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_1980_GwangjuProtest.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Armed South Korean soldiers capture rioters in Gwangju, South Korea." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Armed South Korean soldiers capture rioters in Gwangju, South Korea, on May 27, 1980.
<span class="image-embed__source">Sadayuki Mikami/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>After General Chun Doo-hwan seizes power through a military coup in December 1979,&nbsp;South Korean civilians, led by students and activists, <a href="https://archives.kdemo.or.kr/display/en/1980.html">organize pro-democracy protests</a> demanding an end to military rule. The South Korean government responds by imposing martial law and using violence to suppress activists in the city of Gwangju. The movement marks a turning point in South Korea’s struggle for democracy, inspiring people to resist the military dictatorship across the country and eventually leading to the country’s democratization. U.S.-South Korea relations are hobbled by perceptions within South Korea that the United States sided with the dictatorship rather than support the democratic movement.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1991</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>September 27, 1991</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">The United States Withdraws Tactical Nuclear Weapons</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>U.S. President George H. W. Bush announces his decision to remove all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea. The next year, the two Koreas sign the <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/KR%20KP_920120_JointDeclarationDenuclearizationKoreanPeninsula.pdf">Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization&nbsp;of the Korean Peninsula</a> [PDF]. Under this agreement, the two countries commit not to test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2002</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>June 13, 2002</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Anti-American Protests Arise in South Korea</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76290" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_2002_AntiUSProtests.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="A protester shouts anti-American slogans while holding a poster of the two students accidentally killed by U.S. officers in Seoul." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
A protester shouts anti-American slogans while holding a poster of the two students accidentally killed by U.S. officers in Seoul, South Korea, on December 3, 2002.
<span class="image-embed__source">Lee Jae-Won/Reuters</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Two off-duty U.S. servicemen accidentally kill two South Korean middle-school girls while driving a U.S. military vehicle. The incident and the subsequent acquittal of the soldiers by a U.S. military court trigger anti-American protests across South Korea. Primarily directed at the U.S. military presence in South Korea, the protests reflect a desire for a more equal relationship with the United States.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2003</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>January 10, 2003</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">North Korea Withdraws From the NPT</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76291" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_2003_NPTWithdrawl.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="A crowd of millions of North Koreans gathers to hear political leaders announce the decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in Pyongyang." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Millions of North Koreans gather to hear political leaders announce the decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in Pyongyang, North Korea.
<span class="image-embed__source">Xinhua/AFP/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>North Korea announces its intention to withdraw from the NPT, stating concerns regarding&nbsp;“hostile” U.S. policies toward the country. Pyongyang criticizes the binding obligations stipulated in the safeguard accord under Article 3 of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regulations. Three years later, North Korea <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/north-korea-nuclear-weapons-missile-tests-military-capabilities">successfully tests its first nuclear weapon</a>, changing security dynamics on the Korean Peninsula.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2003</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>August 27, 2003</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Six-Party Talks Aim to Negotiate North Korea’s Denuclearization</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76292" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_2003_6PartyTalks.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="The heads of each of the six country delegations join hands before talks about North Korea’s nuclear crisis in Beijing." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
The heads of each of the six country delegations join hands before talks about North Korea’s nuclear crisis in Beijing.
<span class="image-embed__source">Ng Han Guan/AFP/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Representatives from China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States convene in Beijing to negotiate <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/north-korean-nuclear-negotiations">North Korea’s denuclearization</a> following revelations that North Korea had covertly pursued a uranium enrichment program. The United States insists on complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID), while North Korea seeks diplomatic normalization with the United States and security assurances. Despite multiple rounds of talks, the countries fail to reach a consensus, leading to North Korea’s withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks in April 2009 after the UN Security Council condemns its long-range missile launch.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2012</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>March 15, 2012</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">The Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement Enters Into Force</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76293" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_2012_KORUS.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="South Korean conservative activists raise a banner reading “let’s occupy the world market and become an economic power,”." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
South Korean conservative activists raise a banner reading “let’s occupy the world market and become an economic power,” at a rally supporting the South Korea-U.S. free trade agreement in Seoul, South Korea.
<span class="image-embed__source">Jung Yeon-Je/AFP/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>After six years of negotiations, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak and U.S. President Barack Obama sign the trade treaty, which is then ratified by the South Korean National Assembly. The agreement promotes economic cooperation and access to commercial markets for both countries. The <a href="https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta">Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement</a> (KORUS FTA) is the largest bilateral free trade agreement the United States has signed. The trade agreement paves the way for an economic partnership alongside the military alliance between the two countries.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2016</h1>
<div class=... |
http://localhost:1200/cfr/books-reports - Success ✔️<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0">
<channel>
<title>Books & Reports</title>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/books-reports</link>
<atom:link href="http://localhost:1200/cfr/books-reports" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"></atom:link>
<description>Books & Reports - Made with love by RSSHub(https://github.com/DIYgod/RSSHub)</description>
<generator>RSSHub</generator>
<webMaster>i@diygod.me (DIYgod)</webMaster>
<language>en</language>
<lastBuildDate>Fri, 24 May 2024 08:03:50 GMT</lastBuildDate>
<ttl>5</ttl>
<item>
<title>Preventing U.S. Election Violence in 2024</title>
<description><figure>
<div class="article-header__image-picture">
<picture>
<source srcset="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_16x9_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 1x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_2x_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 2x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_3x_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 3x" media="all and (min-width: 1280px)" type="image/webp" width="1800" height="1014">
<source srcset="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_m_480px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 1x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_m_2x_480px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 2x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_m_3x_480px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 3x" media="all and (max-width: 1279px) and (min-width: 1024px)" type="image/webp" width="1440" height="810">
<source srcset="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_16x9_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 1x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_2x_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 2x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_3x_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 3x" media="all and (max-width: 1023px) and (min-width: 750px)" type="image/webp" width="1800" height="1014">
<source srcset="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_s_260px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 1x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_s_2x_260px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 2x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_s_3x_260px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 3x" media="all and (max-width: 749px)" type="image/webp" width="780" height="438">
<source srcset="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_16x9_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 1x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_2x_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 2x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_3x_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 3x" media="all and (min-width: 1280px)" type="image/webp" width="1800" height="1014">
<source srcset="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_m_480px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 1x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_m_2x_480px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 2x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_m_3x_480px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 3x" media="all and (max-width: 1279px) and (min-width: 1024px)" type="image/webp" width="1440" height="810">
<source srcset="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_16x9_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 1x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_2x_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 2x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_3x_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 3x" media="all and (max-width: 1023px) and (min-width: 750px)" type="image/webp" width="1800" height="1014">
<source srcset="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_s_260px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 1x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_s_2x_260px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 2x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_s_3x_260px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 3x" media="all and (max-width: 749px)" type="image/webp" width="780" height="438">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_16x9_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp" width="600" height="338" alt="" loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</picture>
</div>
<figcaption class="article-header__image-caption">
Supporters of former U.S. President Donald Trump riot in front of the U.S. Capitol Building in Washington, DC, on January 6, 2021.
<span class="author">Leah Millis/Reuters</span>
</figcaption>
</figure><br><h2>Introduction</h2>
<p>There is a serious risk of extremist violence around the 2024 U.S. presidential election. Many of the same sources of instability and grievances that precipitated the January 6, 2021, assault on the U.S. Capitol (along with other challenges to the outcome of the last election) remain present today. And, while the risk of far-right election-related violence is greater, the possibility of far-left extremist violence cannot be dismissed. Such violence threatens individual lives and the domestic political stability of the country.</p>
<p>It could also undermine the United States’ international standing and foreign policy goals, in a year where at least eighty elections will take place around the world. U.S.-based election violence has already <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/america-exporter-far-right-violent-extremism-brazil-and-beyond" title="inspired&nbsp;one similar incident" target="_blank">inspired&nbsp;one similar incident</a>, in Brazil in January 2023, and further disruption could affect the rules-based international order in ways detrimental to U.S. interests as it embarks on a new generation in strategic competition. The United States would also benefit from serving as the standard-setter on several associated issues, such as disinformation on social media and the rise of generative artificial intelligence (AI) and its impact on elections.</p><p>Lessening the risk of such a contingency is therefore an urgent national security imperative. Political leaders and other participants in the political and civic process need to implement a range of measures to prevent and manage violent election-related extremism.</p>
<h2>The Contingency</h2>
<p>Several plausible scenarios could develop between now and Inauguration Day. The scenarios can be broken down into events that occur before the election, during early voting in October and on election day in November, and in the weeks after the election, possibly lingering into the new administration. Each scenario poses different challenges to different constituencies and could be inspired or driven by differing accelerants.</p>
<p><b><em>Pre-election</em></b></p>
<p>The first and most urgent scenario involves assassination threats against campaigning candidates and other public officials<a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-slow-burn-threatening-our-democracy" title=". According to Seamus Hughes and Pete Simi" target="_blank">. According to Seamus Hughes and Pete Simi</a> of the University of Nebraska-Omaha, “over the past 10 years, more than 500 individuals have been arrested for threatening public officials. And the trendline is shooting up.” In recent years, for example, the lives of Vice President Mike Pence, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, and New York Republican gubernatorial candidate Lee Zeldin were all threatened. Nikki Haley, the Republican runner-up, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/nikki-haley-secret-service-2ae5b277396702248af73f89da92b4b9" title="requested Secret Service protection" target="_blank">requested Secret Service protection</a> during her campaign, indicating that violent threats have already surfaced in this cycle as well. The United States has been spared a high-profile assassination for more than a half-century. However, lack of success should not be taken to suggest lack of intent. Precisely this point was underscored on June 14, 2017, when a far-left extremist opened fire at a baseball practice of congressional Republicans, gravely wounding House Majority Whip Steve Scalise before being killed by the congressman’s Capitol Police detail.</p>
<p>Second, large party and voter gatherings, such as the Republican National Convention in Milwaukee in July and the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in August, as well as primary elections and caucuses, could pose attractive targets. The conventions will boast the largest collections of party members and leaders throughout the entire election cycle and could therefore attract individuals or groups with a vendetta. News headquarters will also be potential targets given extremist rhetoric depicting the media the “enemy of the people.”</p>
<p>Third, dates associated with the former president’s legal troubles could also trigger violent extremists. Trump’s legal challenges have thrust the 2024 election into unprecedented territory, with the possibility of a presidential candidate running for office from the courtroom, and possibly jail. The public process and potential legal outcomes could accelerate and spur violent attacks.</p><p><em><b>Election</b></em></p>
<p>Once voting begins, the first and most likely scenario is violence and intimidation at polling places and against election workers, or against drive-by or drop-off balloting sites and their collection points. This could include armed militia groups “observing” the election for fraud but, in reality, intimidating voters. In 2020, for example, Oath Keepers gathered at polling places to, in Oath Keepers founder Stewart Rhodes’s <a href="https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-10-10/what-happens-if-armed-right-wing-groups-polls" title="words" target="_blank">words</a>, “protect people who are voting.” Such gatherings could intimidate voters and disrupt Election Day by <a href="https://www.chicagotribune.com/2023/11/24/munster-incident-puts-focus-on-voter-intimidation-cases-that-can-dampen-turnout-poll-worker-participation/" title="dampening turnout" target="_blank">dampening turnout</a>. This scenario could be driven both by any candidate calls to arms as well as by grassroots voices sensitive to local issues, vulnerabilities, and voting preferences, and to individual poll workers expressing or acting upon their personal political views. Such violence provides less of a model for partners and adversaries in the international space, given that the November election will occur after most other 2024 elections have occurred.</p>
<p>Once voting is completed, threats could turn against those counting the ballots. During the 2020 election, some of the more vitriolic threats were delivered against election officials in swing states. The sequencing of vote counting can play a part, such as when early, mail, and absentee ballots, which tend to lean Democratic, are counted last, leading to “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/oct/31/red-mirage-trump-election-scenario-victory" title="red mirages" target="_blank">red mirages</a>” in which Republican candidates take early leads that fade in the final legal vote tally. In 2020, for example, federal agents&nbsp;<a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/2-men-detained-after-police-learn-possible-threat-philadelphia-vote-n1246774" title="arrested two QAnon supporters" target="_blank">arrested two QAnon supporters</a> from Virginia who showed up with firearms at a convention center in Philadelphia where votes were still being counted three days after Election Day. Political calls to “stop the count” or “stop the steal” can make a violent response more likely.</p>
<div id="pullquote-80929--2" class="pullquote embedded_small">
<figure class="pullquote__container"><blockquote class="pullquote__quote">
<span class="pullquote__quote-content">Once voting is completed, threats could turn against those counting the ballots.</span>
</blockquote>
</figure></div>
<p><em><b>Post-election</b></em></p>
<p>In the post-election era, depending on election results, attacks against government buildings and/or law enforcement officials will likely be the preferred means as violent extremists aim to take the fight directly to those they deem responsible for malfeasance. This scenario was seen at COVID protests in April 2020, sprawling anti-fascist rioting that summer, at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, and the attack against the FBI in Cincinnati. Here, the main accelerant will be political rhetoric interpreted by violently inclined individuals as calls for violence. Perhaps the most significant lesson of January 6 is that even seemingly innocuous moments can provide the impetus for extremist gatherings given the right combination of messaging and momentum. Any number of constitutional milestones—when electors vote in their home states; the January 6, 2025, counting of electoral votes; or Inauguration Day itself—could thus provide the spark, particularly among far-right violent extremists. Far-left violence responding to a disappointing election result will likely be more sporadic and disorganized. Militant anarchists, in particular, could be active, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/protesters-bring-shouts-skirmishes-and-shutdowns-to-inauguration-celebration/2017/01/20/00ea4c72-df11-11e6-acdf-14da832ae861_story.html" title="as seen on inauguration day in 2017" target="_blank">as seen on inauguration day in 2017</a>. Still, the bond between far-left anarchists and the political system is <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/us/live-updates-antifa-riots-1-21-2021" title="not as strong" target="_blank">not as strong</a> as on the right, making it unlikely that extremists respond to any call for violence from politicians.</p>
<p>Should multiple, organized extremist elements take up arms in defense of their candidates or other interests, sustained violence between political factions across broad geographic spaces remains possible. This level of violence has not yet been reached during the current escalation in domestic terrorism, except at a small scale on American streets in clashes between the Proud Boys and anti-fascists. Should those skirmishes escalate, they would pose a serious threat to law and order. The gravest fear, full-scale and total civil war, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/16/opinions/us-brink-of-civil-war-hoffman-ware/index.html" title="remains unlikely" target="_blank">remains unlikely</a>, in large part due to the lack of safe havens or sanctuaries for extremists in the United States. Political divides today run along urban-rural delineations, not northern-southern, which will likely stunt any budding civil war in its infancy.</p>
<h2>Warning Indicators</h2>
<p>The most urgent warning sign of impending violence will be the words of the candidates themselves. Political figures are certain to use divisive and perhaps even <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/09/05/polarization-democracy-and-political-violence-in-united-states-what-research-says-pub-90457?utm_source=carnegieemail&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_campaign=announcement&amp;mkt_tok=ODEzLVhZVS00MjIAAAGOBdngCOU2E0PgTOYMht0Jscfwq-kVZ7BNGEm9S0g9a-6RljRaHw9QWuQJjFo-HOqyY1k8e_LWTFj9poxUJ9iHe4ZzUlTWqS5XnzxluU0" title="existential political rhetoric" target="_blank">existential political rhetoric</a> during the campaign, warning of an urgent threat to the rank-and-file of either political party and to the country as a whole. Politicians deploy such rhetoric to frighten their base into voting, but such action also increases the odds of individuals turning to violent solutions if their candidate loses or appears to be in arrears. Existential rhetoric from within the political system or from candidates or parties can translate into implicit and explicit calls for violence, including against members of one’s own party, another important warning indicator. Even regular political rhetoric could be taken as calls to violence, particularly given that Americans are increasingly divided. Polls show that almost a quarter of Americans (33 percent of Republicans and 13 percent of Democrats) believe that “American patriots may have to resort to violence in order to save the country.”</p>
<div id="pullquote-80930--2" class="pullquote embedded_small">
<figure class="pullquote__container"><blockquote class="pullquote__quote">
<span class="pullquote__quote-content">The most urgent warning sign of impending violence will be the words of the candidates themselves.</span>
</blockquote>
</figure></div>
<p>Casting doubt over election results before voting commences heightens the possibility of violent extremism. “Pre-bunking” of fair election outcomes sows doubts in the minds of voters who then see eventual electoral defeats as confirmation of fraud rather than a rejection of one’s political platform, unlocking inherent confirmation biases. Politicians on both the left and right have been responsible for such rhetoric, the right issuing warnings of stolen dating back to the 2016 race, and the left often expressing concern over alleged voter suppression in predominantly Black southern communities.</p>
<p>The risk of more organized and widespread violence could be heralded by armed paramilitary mobilization, including on social media. January 6 was preceded by an onslaught of threats and public organizing, which was largely ignored by law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Extremist infiltrations of law enforcement agencies (<a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/01/03/could-january-6th-happen-again-526167" title="including the Capitol Police" target="_blank">including the Capitol Police</a>) and the military, coupled with the radicalization of active duty service members, also bears monitoring as both would considerably undermine any mitigative countermeasures arrayed against violent actors.</p>
<p>Finally, national security professionals should be vigilant in tracking foreign interference, whether covert (and therefore likely hidden from public view until after the election) or overt, including foreign leaders casting doubt on election results before voting commences. Adversaries such as China, Iran, and Russia will eagerly exploit any opportunity to weaken the United States and will likely issue widespread disinformation to cause disunity, as in 2016 and 2020. Social media remains a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/defending-year-democracy" title="defining battlefield in twenty-first-century elections" target="_blank">defining battlefield in twenty-first-century elections</a>, and the situation has only grown more fraught with the development of powerful tools such as generative AI, which, for instance, was used to attempt to <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/boston/video/new-hampshire-federal-officials-open-criminal-probe-after-fake-joe-biden-robocalls/" title="dampen the Biden vote" target="_blank">dampen the Biden vote</a> during the New Hampshire primary. The social media platform X poses a particular new challenge. Owner Elon Musk has reduced content moderation and allowed disinformation on the platform, creating an opening for manipulation by domestic and foreign actors alike, as well as AI-generated content.</p>
<h2>Implications for U.S. Interests</h2>
<p>The assassination of a politician or election official could seriously undermine U.S. democratic institutions and traditions. More broadly, the rejection of election results could undermine civil society and further polarize the nation, while the mere threat of violence at polling places could dissuade voters from making their voices heard, further <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-slow-burn-threatening-our-democracy" title="weakening American democracy" target="_blank">weakening American democracy</a>. Threats issued against poll workers undermine American democratic traditions; volunteers seeking to participate in the civic process do not anticipate being targeted for their service, and such threats could deter their participation.</p>
<p>But perhaps equally damaging, American political violence, particularly concentrated around election cycles, poses grave threats to the rules-based international order. U.S. electoral turmoil could provide a model for further seditious organizing in allied states. Such contagion has already been seen in Brazil, and could undermine election integrity in a year with upwards of eighty elections worldwide. Domestic violent extremism also undermines U.S. credibility on international human rights and its international security credentials. On January 7, 2021, for instance, a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry claimed that American support for pro-democratic protests in Hong Kong was now a sign of hypocrisy: “On the issue of human rights, democracy, and freedom, double standard should be discarded. I hope the relevant countries can think about this and learn real lessons from it.” An author linked to al-Qaeda, meanwhile, wrote that <a href="https://twitter.com/colebunzel/status/1382747626521563140" title="January 6 had made amends" target="_blank">January 6 had made amends</a> for mistakes made on 9/11: “I realized the wisdom of God almighty in not guiding the fourth plane to its target, for their destroying the citadel of their democracy by their own hands ... is more damaging to them &amp; more soothing to the hearts of the believers.”</p>
<div id="pullquote-80927--2" class="pullquote embedded_small">
<figure class="pullquote__container"><blockquote class="pullquote__quote">
<span class="pullquote__quote-content">U.S. electoral turmoil could provide a model for further seditious organizing in allied states</span>
</blockquote>
</figure></div>
<p>U.S. electoral turmoil could also offer a “window of opportunity” for state and nonstate adversaries to act—whether through direct terrorism launched at the United States or U.S. interests, or other hybrid measures intended to undermine U.S. security and standing. Hamas’s attack on Israel at a time of <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2023/10/israel-democracy-judicial-reform-netanyahu-hamas-attacks/675713/" title="profound internal turmoil" target="_blank">profound internal turmoil</a> in that country is an example of such opportunism. Russia also launched its invasion of Ukraine at a time of perceived Western weakness and division.</p>
<h2><b>Preventive Options</b></h2>
<p>In the same way that law enforcement officials deconstruct the motives, means, and opportunities behind criminal behavior to design more effective preventive measures, so too can election administrators assess policy options to lessen the risk of domestic political violence around the 2024 election.</p>
<p>The leading reason for the rise in domestic terrorism in recent years is a heightened motive or intent toward acts of violence. <b><em>Reducing motive</em></b>, therefore, is both paramount to prevention and a daunting challenge. In the build-up to the election, mainstream politicians on both sides of the aisle can use their platforms to speak out against division and publicly praise the integrity of U.S. democracy. Although federal politicians have been reluctant to be outspoken against divisive politics (perhaps warily watching the examples of Republicans Liz Cheney and Adam Kinzinger, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/loyal-trump-republican-party-moves-censure-us-reps-cheney-kinzinger-2022-02-04/" title="who no longer serve in Congress" target="_blank">who no longer serve in Congress</a> after sitting on the January 6 committee), state and local officials have been far more committed to upholding democratic norms in their constituencies. Many maintain the trust of a large swathe of the American people and can call for peace and calm. One example of this commitment is Republican Utah Governor (and Chair of the National Governors Association) Spencer Cox’s Disagree Better initiative, which aims “to model how to disagree better, setting an example and creating the permission structure and template for other public officials at every level to follow.” Such measures, critically, do not touch on political or ideological differences, but instead emphasize shared interests such as civil disagreement and trust and faith in democracy.</p>
<p>The Joe Biden administration has several options to lower the country’s temperature and promote a peaceful and orderly election process. For instance, President Biden could task agencies such as the Department of Education or Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to issue nonpartisan educational tools that teach the American public about the electoral process and its resilience to manipulation. Such positive pre-bunking could prevent electoral conspiracy theories from taking root as widely as they did in 2020. The Biden administration could also push states to reverse their vote-counting timelines to count the usually Democratic early, mail, and absentee ballots ahead of the typically Republican day-of votes—or to count votes simultaneously. Although a hard mandate to count votes earlier could violate the Tenth Amendment, gentle encouragement could help reverse the red mirage that contributed to January 6 and the “stop the steal” movement—although there is, of course, the danger of a “blue mirage” instead contributing to violence by far-left extremists. Media organizations could also avoid covering vote tallying, waiting to announce results until they are confirmed and finalized.</p>
<p>The Biden administration, as well as law enforcement professionals, could also look abroad for best practices on reducing intent to commit electoral violence. In <a href="https://dppa.un.org/sites/default/files/ead_pd_preventing_mitigating_election-related_violence_20160601_e.pdf" title="Preventing and Mitigating Election-Related Violence" target="_blank">Preventing and Mitigating Election-Related Violence</a> [PDF], a policy directive issued by the UN Department of Political Affairs in June 2016, the first suggestion is “Reducing high stakes in politics, promoting measures to move away from ‘zero sum’ politics and ensuring against a monopoly of power by one group.” One possible measure to reduce intent to violence, then, would be to promote democracy’s guarantee that the voices and views of the expected losing entity can still be acknowledged and advanced despite electoral defeat. In other words, politicians could employ language promising inclusivity and unity, perhaps on issues of <a href="https://www.texastribune.org/2024/03/12/henry-cuellar-democrats-senate-border-bill/" title="bipartisan concern" target="_blank">bipartisan concern</a> such as immigration, providing assurances that all Americans would have a seat at the table in the new administration. As stated by <a href="https://www.undp.org/publications/elections-and-conflict-prevention-guide" title="UN guidance" target="_blank">UN guidance</a>, “When parties are quite certain of loss or exclusion in an electoral contest, especially when they expect to be ‘permanent minorities’ (to lose not just once, but again and again due to patterns of identity voting), the certainty of outcomes is also a strong causal driver of violence.” In addition, the United States could publicize the <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/international-observers-monitor-midterm-elections-in-us-/6826269.html" title="cadre of international election observers" target="_blank">cadre of international election observers</a> to increase trust in the process.</p>
<p>In a time of unprecedented distrust of politicians and Congress, American civil society can also help bridge the trust deficit that extremist radicalizers often use to prey on vulnerable people, cajoled by politicians but ultimately acting independently of the political system. Religious leaders and educators, especially at the local level, have a unique platform to educate their constituents on the importance of free and fair elections and neighborliness, even if they vote differently. Sports stars and labor leaders, among other civil society actors, can also call for peace and calm without wading into political questions. The Department of Homeland Security, through its Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships, could redouble its grant-making efforts to both national and local nonprofit organizations working to reduce radicalization and violent extremism. The private sector, chiefly social media companies, also bears a responsibility to moderate the most serious calls for sedition and disrupt extremist cells. Social media companies can set stronger standards for AI use on their platforms and work to undermine actors using AI to affect the election process.</p>
<p><b><em>Reducing the capability</em></b> to inflict violence will also be central. Indeed, <a href="https://rollcall.com/2023/07/19/19uscpig/" title="the successful application of lessons learned" target="_blank">the successful application of lessons learned</a> after January 6 would considerably strengthen the United States’ electoral resilience. Intelligence sharing between federal, state, and local partners, as well as <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/fusion-centers" title="with fusion centers" target="_blank">with fusion centers</a> (defined by DHS as “state-owned and operated centers that serve as focal points in states and major urban areas for the receipt, analysis, gathering and sharing of threat-related information between State, Local, Tribal and Territorial (SLTT), federal, and private sector partners”), is critical. Threats issued by extremist groups and networks should be taken seriously, unlike on January 6, when preparations were not commensurate with the volume of intelligence suggesting armed actors planned to descend on the capital. Government officials across the aisle could work with legacy media to emphasize the nonpartisan mandate of the DHS, FBI, and state and local law enforcement to undermine allegations of partisanship and politicization. Leaning on local police forces would also build legitimacy, allowing more trusted law enforcement to adhere to their job of keeping the peace in their communities.</p>
<p>At a tactical counterterrorism level, the Department of Justice’s continued legal efforts to disrupt leading domestic extremist organizations—including the Oath Keepers and Proud Boys—builds deterrence against future acts of violence. Although the leadership of both groups is already serving jail time for <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/05/11/1175465857/extremists-groups-were-found-guilty-of-seditious-conspiracy-for-jan-6-now-what" title="seditious conspiracy" target="_blank">seditious conspiracy</a> as a result of January 6, which has undermined both groups while building a stronger deterrent against violence, such legal efforts could continue as the election cycle heats up. Government efforts to deter or defuse violence will be complicated, however, by extremist networks’ continued adherence to the leaderless resistance (“lone wolf”) strategy, which hampers the ability of law enforcement to penetrate groups and limits the intelligence value of any individual capture. Militant anarchists, for instance, will continue to operate in spontaneous “black blocs,” which similarly complicate infiltration and arrests. Efforts to reduce particularly lethal weaponry will likely fall flat, but could still be attempted.</p>
<p>Finally, law enforcement agencies could <b><em>remove opportunities</em></b> for violence by hardening soft targets and maximizing law enforcement readiness and even preparing for military intervention. The federal government’s law enforcement agencies could seek to designate important events, such as the political conventions and the election itself, as <a href="https://www.secretservice.gov/protection/events/credentialing" title="National Special Security Events" target="_blank">National Special Security Events</a>, which would open a range of new law enforcement tools to prevent and respond to violence. A streamlined electoral process, including the Electoral Count Reform and Presidential Transition Improvement Act passed in response to January 6, could also limit opportunities for violent interventions.</p>
<h2>Mitigation Options</h2>
<p>Mitigation scenarios assume efforts to prevent both motive and means to violence have failed. Therefore, the mitigative options will concentrate on limiting further opportunity while lessening the harmful impact of any early violent events. At the milder end of the spectrum of responses to early violence, a more visible law enforcement presence at various key sites could deter violence and encourage voters to safely cast their ballots. Focusing on local law enforcement would allay concerns of a federal government crackdown, allowing local authorities to emphasize the sanctity of the rule of law within their own communities. The hardening of such soft targets would also allow law enforcement professionals to limit the threat to civilian life should any violence erupt.</p>
<div id="pullquote-80928--2" class="pullquote embedded_small">
<figure class="pullquote__container"><blockquote class="pullquote__quote">
<span class="pullquote__quote-content">Focusing on local law enforcement would allay concerns of a federal government crackdown</span>
</blockquote>
</figure></div>
<p>A variant of the United Kingdom’s <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2021.1902604" title="Operation Temperer" target="_blank">Operation Temperer</a>—which allows soldiers to guard certain locations so police resources can focus elsewhere—could be conducted during several phases of the election cycle using the National Guard. Particularly symbolic or important sites, such as the U.S. Capitol, could be sealed off from the public, as occurred in the aftermath of January 6. This approach has <a href="https://www.nps.gov/articles/000/president-grant-takes-on-the-ku-klux-klan.htm" title="historical antecedents" target="_blank">historical antecedents</a>; the U.S. government deployed the military in the Reconstruction era to suppress threats by the Ku Klux Klan against Black voters. The major downside of such an approach would be the militarization of U.S. elections, which would undermine American democracy and yield a further propaganda victory to adversaries.&nbsp;</p>
<p>In a worst-case scenario, the Biden administration could attempt to declare martial law in order to suspend the electoral process and allow the military to intervene in particularly violent uprisings. However, such a move would pose an existential threat to American democracy, effectively ending America’s status as leader of the free world with few clear and secure paths forward.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The Biden administration could also simply take a hands-off approach, believing that American institutions are stronger than those who would try to undermine them and recognizing that violence has failed in the past to undermine electoral processes, including during January 6. Such a “keep calm and carry on” approach would yield control but could protect American institutions from further internal damage. It would also avoid feeding into right-wing narratives about the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/09/politics/biden-officials-exercise-2024-election-chaos/" title="weaponization of the federal government" target="_blank">weaponization of the federal government</a>, while ensuring that a cure for violence is not worse than the disease.</p>
<h2>Recommendations</h2>
<p>The range of stakeholders, including government, the private sector, and civil society, with the power to help prevent and counter election-related violence in 2024 should prepare countermeasures at the motive, means, and opportunity levels.</p>
<p><em><b>Reducing motive</b></em></p>
<p><em>The Biden administration should encourage early and mail-in voting </em>for voters on both sides of the aisle to thin election day crowds that could otherwise become targets, and states should be encouraged to count absentee and mail-in ballots early to avoid red mirages that could fuel electoral conspiracy theories. Media companies should avoid reporting on vote tallying until final results are confirmed.</p>
<p><em>Responsible poll-watching should be amplified and celebrated</em>, and efforts to introduce trusted authorities into the electoral system, such as the military-linked nonprofit <a href="https://vetthe.vote/" title="Vet the Vote" target="_blank">Vet the Vote</a>, should be encouraged. Publicizing and celebrating the integrity of the vote and of the many civil servants who contribute to its execution will demystify the process and build trust in the system.</p>
<p><em>Candidates and both parties should commit to upholding critical democratic values such as truth, honesty, free press, and the rule of law</em>. Policymakers from both parties should unite around political slogans that enhance trust in the electoral system and delegitimize violence. Such calls should be joined by segments of civil society, such as church groups, sports teams, and universities. Governors and other state and local officials should join the&nbsp;<a href="https://www.nga.org/disagree-better/" title="Disagree Better campaign" target="_blank">Disagree Better campaign</a>. Given their leadership roles in the election process itself, state and local officials should educate their constituencies about the integrity of the electoral process, the nonpartisan makeup of poll workers, and the importance of adhering to democratic traditions.</p>
<p><em>Candidates and party officials should avoid existential rhetoric and absolutist promises</em>, which the United Nations has found to reduce tension in other contexts. Politicians should issue <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/jan/10/election-workers-threats-political-violence" title="frequent reminders" target="_blank">frequent reminders</a> to their followers that they desire peaceful political change.</p>
<p><em>Government agencies at the federal, state, and local levels should work to improve transparency and pre-bunk conspiracy theories questioning the legitimacy of elections</em>. One possible model is how the U.S. intelligence community pre-bunked Russian justifications for its invasion of Ukraine in 2022—although it is unclear who would be able to share such stories beyond party apparatuses and civil society organizations.&nbsp;</p>
<p><em>Social media companies, meanwhile, should take <a href="https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2023/11/07/microsoft-elections-2024-ai-voting-mtac/" title="more aggressive steps" target="_blank">more aggressive steps</a> to limit the free rein of electoral conspiracy theories on their platforms</em>, while legacy media outlets should work to avoid sensationalist reporting, including reporting portraying the opposition party as an existential threat or individual politicians as corrupt or dangerous. Legitimate community note programs should be expanded to ensure bad information can be drowned out by factcheckers. Social media companies <a href="https://apnews.com/article/meta-adds-labels-to-ai-imagery-deepfakes-415163d053ed915042a04f1ec3d9eafa" title="should take aggressive stances" target="_blank">should take aggressive stances</a> against AI-enabled disinformation and deepfakes, particularly as they concern political figures. Intelligence agencies should carefully monitor social media platforms for disinformation campaigns, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2023/11/30/biden-foreign-disinformation-social-media-election-interference/" title="surmounting threats" target="_blank">surmounting threats</a>&nbsp;issued by the political right against such activity.</p>
<p><em>Trusted civil society actors, including religious leaders, labor unions, Hollywood, and sports teams and athletes, should call for peace and goodwill</em>, avoiding discussions of politics or ideology to instead focus on widely shared values such as nonviolence. Trusted leaders should educate their constituencies on civics and election integrity, and should prepare to band together in nonpartisan fashion should violence erupt.</p>
<p><b><em>Reducing means</em></b></p>
<p><em>Law enforcement agencies should <a href="https://twitter.com/CapitolPolice/status/1725877901805899815" title="conduct trainings" target="_blank">conduct trainings</a> and improve <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/01/03/could-january-6th-happen-again-526167" title="intelligence sharing" target="_blank">intelligence sharing</a> across levels of government</em>, as well as with fusion centers and nonprofit organizations. Extremists should be taken at their word—threats of violence or insurrection should not be dismissed as bluster or an unrealistic proposition. Professionals should not ignore lessons learned from January 6—including keeping the National Guard on standby and not ignoring intelligence warnings. As part of such efforts, law enforcement agencies with different and overlapping mandates should establish best practices and plans to ensure smooth coordination. This process should be aided by designating national conventions, Election Day, and January 6 as National Special Security Events.&nbsp;</p>
<p><em>Law enforcement and intelligence agencies should strengthen their protection of political candidates, election workers, and voting infrastructure</em>. The Department of Justice’s Election Threats Task Force should be fully resourced and staffed—and could <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-slow-burn-threatening-our-democracy" title="expand its remit" target="_blank">expand its remit</a> to protect polling places and particularly vulnerable politicians. The volume of threats could be so great that not every site can be protected, and law enforcement should be prepared to prioritize particularly high-value targets, beginning with leading politicians and important political locations.</p>
<p><em>Policymakers and pundits across the political spectrum should work to erode the prevalent framing of January 6 defendants as heroes and martyrs</em>, building a stronger deterrent against acts of political violence. Civil society leaders and state and local officials should emphasize the critical importance of nonviolent means of driving political change.</p>
<p><b><em>Removing opportunity</em></b></p>
<p><em>Any decisions made to dampen unrest or violence with massed law enforcement or military assets should be made as an absolute last resort</em>, with the public blessing of influential civil society actors and mainstream politicians across the aisle. Such measures should be incremental, involving steadily increasing presences of law enforcement or National Guard units, in order to avoid the perception of an overreaching federal response.</p>
<p>Should the United States fail to adequately prepare for the risks of electoral violence in 2024, the integrity of the election will be on the line. In a year featuring at least <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/defending-year-democracy" title="eighty elections" target="_blank">eighty elections</a> around the world, the United States will also provide a blueprint for autocrats elsewhere seeing to contest and undermine their own elections. Ensuring a peaceful, fair, and thriving election is therefore of critical importance, both to American democracy as well as democracy around the world.</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/report/preventing-us-election-violence-2024</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/report/preventing-us-election-violence-2024</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 11 Apr 2024 16:29:22 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Lost Decade</title>
<description><h1 class="article-header__title">Lost Decade </h1>
<div class="article-header__subhead">
<div><p>The U.S. Pivot to Asia and the Rise of Chinese Power&nbsp;</p></div>
</div>
<figure class="article-header__image for-tablet-down">
<div class="article-header__image-picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/book_large_l/public/book_cover_image/The%20Lost%20Decade_revised.jpg.webp" alt="" class="article-header__image-img" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
</figure>
<p class="article-header__description">Robert D. Blackwill and Richard Fontaine evaluate the limitations of the Pivot to Asia and offer a compelling vision for the future of U.S. foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific. </p>
<p class="article-header__byline">
<span class="article-header__metadata-type article-header__metadata-type--with-definition">
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/books-reports">Book</a>
</span> by
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/expert/robert-d-blackwill" class="article-header__link">Robert D. Blackwill</a> and
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/bio/richard-fontaine" class="article-header__link">Richard Fontaine</a> </p>
<div class="article-header__book-metadata-group">
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Publisher –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">Oxford University Press</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Release Date –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">Jun 2024</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Pages –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">480</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-isbn">
<em>ISBN 9780197677940</em>
</p>
</div>
<br><p><em>Lost Decade</em>&nbsp;is an essential guide for understanding the historic shift to Asia-centric geopolitics and its implications for the United States’ present and future.&nbsp;<br>
&nbsp;<br>
Across the political spectrum, there is wide agreement that Asia should stand at the center of U.S. foreign policy. But this worldview, first represented in the Barack Obama administration’s 2011 “Pivot to Asia,”&nbsp;marks a dramatic departure from the entire history of American grand strategy. More than a decade on, we now have the perspective to evaluate it in depth. In <em>Lost Decade</em>, Robert D. Blackwill and Richard Fontaine—two eminent figures in American foreign policy—take this long view. They conclude that while the Pivot’s strategic logic is strong, there are few successes to speak of, and that we need a far more coherent approach to the Indo-Pacific region. They examine the Pivot through various lenses: situating it historically in the context of U.S. global foreign policy, revealing the inside story of how it came about, assessing the effort thus far, identifying the ramifications in other regions (namely Europe and the Middle East), and proposing a path forward.&nbsp;<br>
&nbsp;<br>
The authors stress that the United States has far less margin for foreign policy error today than a decade ago. As the international order becomes more unstable, Blackwill and Fontaine argue that it is imperative that policymakers fully understand what the Pivot to Asia aimed to achieve—and where it fell short—in order to muster the resources, alliances, and resolve to preserve an open order in Asia and the world. Crafting an effective policy for the region, they contend, is crucial for preserving American security, prosperity, and democratic values.&nbsp;</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/book/lost-decade</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/book/lost-decade</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 14 Mar 2024 20:16:29 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>The End of Ambition</title>
<description><h1 class="article-header__title">The End of Ambition</h1>
<div class="article-header__subhead">
<div><p>America’s Past, Present, and Future in the Middle East</p></div>
</div>
<figure class="article-header__image for-tablet-down">
<div class="article-header__image-picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/book_large_l/public/book_cover_image/9780197578575.jpg.webp" alt="" class="article-header__image-img" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
</figure>
<p class="article-header__description">A clear-headed vision for the United States' role in the Middle East that highlights the changing nature of U.S. national interests and the challenges of grand strategizing at a time of profound change in the international order.</p>
<p class="article-header__byline">
<span class="article-header__metadata-type article-header__metadata-type--with-definition">
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/books-reports">Book</a>
</span> by
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/expert/steven-cook" class="article-header__link">Steven A. Cook</a> </p>
<div class="article-header__book-metadata-group">
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Publisher –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">Oxford University Press</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Release Date –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">Jun 2024</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Pages –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">208</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-isbn">
<em>ISBN 9780197578575</em>
</p>
</div>
<br><p>Following a long series of catastrophic misadventures in the Middle East over the last two decades, the American foreign policy community has tried to understand what went wrong. After weighing the evidence, they have mostly advised a retreat from the region. The basic view is that when the United States tries to advance change in the Middle East, it only makes matters worse.</p>
<p>In <em>The End of Ambition</em>, Steven A. Cook argues that while these analysts are rightly concerned that engagement drains U.S. resources and distorts its domestic politics, the broader impulse to disengage tends to neglect important lessons from the past. Moreover, advocates of pulling back overlook the potential risks of withdrawal. Covering the relationship between the United States and the Middle East since the end of World War II, Cook makes the bold claim that despite setbacks and moral costs, the United States has been overwhelmingly successful in protecting its core national interests in the Middle East. Conversely, overly ambitious policies to remake the region and leverage U.S. power not only ended in failure, but rendered the region unstable in new and largely misunderstood ways.</p><p>While making the case that retrenchment is not the answer to America’s problems in the Middle East, <em>The End of Ambition</em> highlights how America’s interests in the region have begun to change and critically examines alternative approaches to U.S.-Middle East policy. Cook highlights the challenges that policymakers and analysts confront in developing a new strategy for the United States in the Middle East against the backdrop of both political uncertainty in the United States and a changing global order.</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/book/end-ambition</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/book/end-ambition</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 11 Mar 2024 20:08:17 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>The End of Ambition</title>
<description><h1 class="article-header__title">The End of Ambition</h1>
<div class="article-header__subhead">
<div><p>America’s Past, Present, and Future in the Middle East</p></div>
</div>
<figure class="article-header__image for-tablet-down">
<div class="article-header__image-picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/book_large_l/public/book_cover_image/9780197578575.jpg.webp" alt="" class="article-header__image-img" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
</figure>
<p class="article-header__description">A clear-headed vision for the United States' role in the Middle East that highlights the changing nature of U.S. national interests and the challenges of grand strategizing at a time of profound change in the international order.</p>
<p class="article-header__byline">
<span class="article-header__metadata-type article-header__metadata-type--with-definition">
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/books-reports">Book</a>
</span> by
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/expert/steven-cook" class="article-header__link">Steven A. Cook</a> </p>
<div class="article-header__book-metadata-group">
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Publisher –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">Oxford University Press</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Release Date –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">Jun 2024</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Pages –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">208</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-isbn">
<em>ISBN 9780197578575</em>
</p>
</div>
<br><p>Following a long series of catastrophic misadventures in the Middle East over the last two decades, the American foreign policy community has tried to understand what went wrong. After weighing the evidence, they have mostly advised a retreat from the region. The basic view is that when the United States tries to advance change in the Middle East, it only makes matters worse.</p>
<p>In <em>The End of Ambition</em>, Steven A. Cook argues that while these analysts are rightly concerned that engagement drains U.S. resources and distorts its domestic politics, the broader impulse to disengage tends to neglect important lessons from the past. Moreover, advocates of pulling back overlook the potential risks of withdrawal. Covering the relationship between the United States and the Middle East since the end of World War II, Cook makes the bold claim that despite setbacks and moral costs, the United States has been overwhelmingly successful in protecting its core national interests in the Middle East. Conversely, overly ambitious policies to remake the region and leverage U.S. power not only ended in failure, but rendered the region unstable in new and largely misunderstood ways.</p><p>While making the case that retrenchment is not the answer to America’s problems in the Middle East, <em>The End of Ambition</em> highlights how America’s interests in the region have begun to change and critically examines alternative approaches to U.S.-Middle East policy. Cook highlights the challenges that policymakers and analysts confront in developing a new strategy for the United States in the Middle East against the backdrop of both political uncertainty in the United States and a changing global order.</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/book/end-ambition</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/book/end-ambition</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 11 Mar 2024 20:08:17 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>A Conversation With John Kerry</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/0otLx-xeovw" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>John Kerry discusses his work as&nbsp;U.S. special presidential envoy for climate, the challenges the United States faces, and the Biden administration’s priorities as it continues to address climate change.</p>
<p>FROMAN: Good afternoon. It’s a great pleasure to see everybody. My name is Mike Froman. I’m president of the Council on Foreign Relations.&nbsp;</p>
<p>And it is a great honor to welcome Special Envoy for Climate John Kerry to the Council today to give what is in effect a valedictory address on his time in government, on climate, as he prepares to leave that position. He truly is a man who needs no introduction. You all know everything that he’s done, but I would say, on climate, this is something that goes back decades from when he was a senator, when he was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, when he was secretary of state, to his position now. This has been a passion of his and he’s been a consistent advocate for strong policy in this area.&nbsp;</p>
<p>I would say, when we served together in the Obama administration and I would see him in the Situation Room, I was so impressed that he was willing to go anywhere around the world, and indeed everywhere around the world, no matter how difficult the assignment was, no matter what little chance of success there might be in making progress, to represent the United States and to make the very best effort to address our interests all over the world. And I saw this in a very personal way when in—we found ourselves in Indonesia at a time—it was an economic summit there and there was something happening in Washington. I think the government was closing down or something, and President Obama could not come and so he designated Secretary Kerry at the time to be the head of our delegation, and we prepared Secretary Kerry and he went up on the stage of this large group and gave this impassioned speech about issues of fish and trade facilitation and tariffs and dumping. I knew in the back of his mind all he cared about was war and peace and climate and really big issues, but he gave the speech and he seemed to be so into it and so passionate about it that everyone thought these are the most important issues to the secretary of state. He came down off the stage, he sat next to me in the front row, and I said, “Mr. Secretary, that was really fantastic; I think you have a real future in politics”—(laughter)—at which point he said, “Screw you, Froman.” (Laug... |
http://localhost:1200/cfr/videos - Success ✔️<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0">
<channel>
<title>Videos</title>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/videos</link>
<atom:link href="http://localhost:1200/cfr/videos" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"></atom:link>
<description>Videos - Made with love by RSSHub(https://github.com/DIYgod/RSSHub)</description>
<generator>RSSHub</generator>
<webMaster>i@diygod.me (DIYgod)</webMaster>
<language>en</language>
<lastBuildDate>Fri, 24 May 2024 08:03:51 GMT</lastBuildDate>
<ttl>5</ttl>
<item>
<title>Ten Most Significant World Events in 2023</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/v7XWcXcI0Sc" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>2023 was a tumultuous year, marked by violent conflicts, democratic erosion, and record-high temperatures. This year, experts at the Council on Foreign Relations, along with visiting world leaders and thinkers, unpacked these issues and more.</p>
<p>Join CFR’s director of studies, Jim Lindsay, in looking back at his list of the ten most impactful events of the year.</p>
<p>For more, check out his blog post, “<a href="https://www.cfr.org/worldevents2023" title="Ten Most Significant World Events in 2023" target="_blank">Ten Most Significant World Events in 2023</a>,” only at CFR.org.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/ten-most-significant-world-events-2023</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/ten-most-significant-world-events-2023</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 07 Dec 2023 22:12:43 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Stakes for Taiwan's Diplomacy in Three Questions</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/aOp2I1d-2Lo" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>Taiwan's relationship with the United States, China, and the rest of the world has a complex history that informs why the island is so consequential to today's geopolitics. To better understand these dynamics, David Sacks, CFR's fellow for Asia studies, answers questions about Taiwan's history and its significance to diplomacy in East Asia.</p>
<p>For more on the relationship between the United States, China, and Taiwan, check out the Council on Foreign Relations–sponsored Independent Task Force, "U.S.-Taiwan Relations in a New Era". cfr.org/us-taiwan</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p><p>&nbsp;</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/stakes-taiwans-diplomacy-three-questions</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/stakes-taiwans-diplomacy-three-questions</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 16 Aug 2023 17:35:24 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>How Artificial Intelligence Could Change the World</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/lxCjyfFZxBQ" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>Artificial Intelligence (AI) could transform economies, politics, and everyday life. Some experts believe this increasingly powerful technology could lead to amazing advances and prosperity. Yet, many tech and industry leaders are warning that AI poses substantial risks, and they are calling for a moratorium on AI research so that safety measures can be established. But amid mounting great-power competition, it’s unclear whether national governments will be able to coordinate on regulating this technology that offers so many economic and strategic opportunities.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/how-artificial-intelligence-could-change-world</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/how-artificial-intelligence-could-change-world</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 25 May 2023 16:43:57 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>As Nuclear Tensions Rise, Should the World Be Worried?</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/XDMn4cFllek" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>Since the end of World War II, nuclear weapons have threatened international relations. The Cold War produced stalemates that seemed to reduce the threat of nuclear conflict, but several countries’ more recent acquisitions of nuclear weapons have brought the world into a dangerous new era of nuclear uncertainty. With nuclear tensions on the rise once again, what lies ahead for nuclear diplomacy?</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/nuclear-tensions-rise-should-world-be-worried</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/nuclear-tensions-rise-should-world-be-worried</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 02 May 2023 16:13:26 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement Threatened by Brexit Fallout</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/WruVPF00jrg" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>In Northern Ireland, the consequences of the United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union, known as Brexit, are threatening to unravel the twenty-five-year-old Good Friday Agreement. It’s a peace deal that ended decades of violence between nationalists who wanted Northern Ireland to be reunified with the Republic of Ireland and unionists who wanted it to stay part of the United Kingdom. The agreement largely ended the bloodshed, and allowed for freer movement of trade and people across the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. However, Brexit has imperiled that free movement, and there are major concerns that resolving that issue could inflame old divisions and lead to renewed bloodshed in Northern Ireland.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/northern-irelands-good-friday-agreement-threatened-brexit-fallout</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/northern-irelands-good-friday-agreement-threatened-brexit-fallout</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 06 Apr 2023 21:21:14 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Is China a Democracy or a Dictatorship?</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/qkjV0kT_90s" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>China’s political system is complicated, and there’s a lot of contradictory information out there. Is China a communist country? Is it democratic, as its own government insists? And what does “freedom” mean to Chinese citizens? Ian Johnson, CFR’s senior fellow for China studies, answers these questions and more.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/china-democracy-or-dictatorship</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/china-democracy-or-dictatorship</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 15 Mar 2023 18:00:10 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Are Cryptocurrencies Still the Future of Money?</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/T0g3gFYK9Do" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>Since the creation of Bitcoin in 2009, cryptocurrencies have exploded in popularity and accrued over $1 trillion in collective value. But market volatility in 2022 threatened the crypto ecosystem—after peaking at over $68,000 in November 2021, the price of Bitcoin fell to under $17,000 twelve months later. This instability has brought new scrutiny to the industry and the countries that have embraced Bitcoin as currency: El Salvador and the Central African Republic. Financial regulators are now calling for more crypto oversight, but global efforts to regulate the industry have stalled. Given this simultaneous rise in global popularity and concern, what lies ahead for digital currency and the future of finance?</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/are-cryptocurrencies-still-future-money</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/are-cryptocurrencies-still-future-money</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 02 Mar 2023 16:48:34 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>What Happens When the World Hits 1.5°C of Warming?</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/mPCB4FqmoPg" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>The world is running out of time to avoid the worst consequences of climate change. With the 2015 Paris Agreement, countries set a goal of limiting global warming to 1.5°C (2.7°F) compared to 150 years ago. However, the planet is on track to pass 1.5°C by the end of this decade, which would lead to higher sea levels, hotter heat waves, and deadlier natural disasters. But countries can work to prevent those and even worse dangers by sticking to their climate pledges and limiting just how much the world overshoots its Paris Agreement goal.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/what-happens-when-world-hits-15degc-warming</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/what-happens-when-world-hits-15degc-warming</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 28 Feb 2023 15:44:59 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Will U.S.-Venezuela Relations Thaw?</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/d26XfcY4cxs" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>After years of tension, relations between the United States and Venezuela appear to be headed in a new direction. The Joe Biden administration has temporarily rolled back some U.S. sanctions on Venezuela’s oil industry in an effort to curb energy prices as well as help the Venezuelan people. But the extent of this détente hinges on Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. What’s in store for bilateral relations?</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/will-us-venezuela-relations-thaw</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/will-us-venezuela-relations-thaw</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2022 16:57:17 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Video: Seven Most Significant World Events in 2022</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/dt7aBUDXFEU" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>It was a year marked by political tumult, spiking major-power tensions, economic challenges, a waning pandemic, and a war that echoed worldwide.<br><br>
Take a look back at what James M. Lindsay, CFR’s director of studies, thought were the most significant events of 2022. For more, check out his blog post, “<a href="https://www.cfr.org/worldevents2022" title="Ten Most Significant World Events in 2022" target="_blank">Ten Most Significant World Events in 2022</a>,” only at CFR.org.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/video-seven-most-significant-world-events-2022</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/video-seven-most-significant-world-events-2022</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 16 Dec 2022 18:48:27 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Growing Instability in Haiti</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/XemLN6oPlbM" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>More than a year after President Jovenel Moïse’s assassination, Haiti remains embroiled in a humanitarian crisis. Economic and political instability persist, and a surge in gang-related violence in and around the capital, Port-au-Prince, has displaced tens of thousands of people. World leaders are now debating whether to send troops to help restore basic governance in the country. What does the future hold for Haiti?</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/growing-instability-haiti</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/growing-instability-haiti</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 09 Nov 2022 21:47:27 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Post-Roe v. Wade: Abortion Law Around the World</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/UFrSuxMBcaQ" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>With the U.S. Supreme Court overturning <em style="font-style:italic">Roe v. Wade</em>, it’s up to states to decide their own abortion laws. Watch to see what has changed so far in the United States and how it compares with other countries on abortion access.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/post-roe-v-wade-abortion-law-around-world</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/post-roe-v-wade-abortion-law-around-world</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 25 Oct 2022 21:03:15 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>King Charles III and the Future of the Commonwealth</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/ISczNbnvSZ0" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>As King Charles III ascends to the British throne after the passing of Queen Elizabeth II, Commonwealth countries are debating whether to follow Barbados, which broke ties with the Crown in 2021. Why are countries choosing to leave the monarchy, and what could that mean for its future?</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/king-charles-iii-and-future-commonwealth</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/king-charles-iii-and-future-commonwealth</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 03 Oct 2022 17:34:20 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Russia-Ukraine War and Europe’s Energy Bind</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/PDP4bT5cDAw" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has led European governments to propose bans on Russian oil and gas, but rising energy costs and a lack of alternatives&nbsp;are&nbsp;undermining the effort. Here’s how Europe has been challenged by Russia’s leverage in the energy market.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/russia-ukraine-war-and-europes-energy-bind</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/russia-ukraine-war-and-europes-energy-bind</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 13 Sep 2022 19:09:04 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>How U.S. Gun Policies Compare With the World’s</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/VqAiI8npYk0" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>The debate over gun laws has raged in Washington for decades, often reigniting after high-profile mass shootings. In mid-2022, Congress passed a rare, compromise gun control bill, but critics say it still leaves the United States with some of the loosest gun laws in the world. Here’s how the United States and some other advanced democracies have responded to gun violence.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/how-us-gun-policies-compare-worlds</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/how-us-gun-policies-compare-worlds</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 13 Jul 2022 20:30:13 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
</channel>
</rss>http://localhost:1200/cfr/podcasts/why-it-matters - Failed ❌ |
|
Successfully generated as following: http://localhost:1200/cfr/asia/china - Success ✔️<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0">
<channel>
<title>China</title>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/asia/china</link>
<atom:link href="http://localhost:1200/cfr/asia/china" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"></atom:link>
<description>China - Made with love by RSSHub(https://github.com/DIYgod/RSSHub)</description>
<generator>RSSHub</generator>
<webMaster>i@diygod.me (DIYgod)</webMaster>
<language>en</language>
<lastBuildDate>Fri, 24 May 2024 08:26:38 GMT</lastBuildDate>
<ttl>5</ttl>
<item>
<title>Advanced Manufacturing to be a Focus of China’s July Party Plenum</title>
<description><figure>
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/slide_3_2/public/image/2024/05/2017-10-22T230936Z_41608130_RC13548D61B0_RTRMADP_3_CHINA-BATTERIES-RECYCLING.JPG.webp" alt="A worker inspects batteries for electric vehicles being manufactured at a factory in Dongguan, China. " class="article-header-blog__image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
<figcaption class="article-header-blog__caption">
A worker inspects batteries for electric vehicles being manufactured at a factory in Dongguan, China.
<span class="article-header-blog__credit">Bobby Yip/Reuters</span> </figcaption>
</figure><br><p>China’s long-delayed third Party plenum on economic reform will be held in July. Official commentary suggests that the Party communique which will be issued at this meeting will double-down on the importance of manufacturing as a tool to address China’s pressing domestic economic problems, potentially increasing trade tensions with a range of foreign countries.</p>
<p>On April 30, Chinese authorities&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="0" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.rfa.org%2Fenglish%2Fnews%2Fchina%2Fdelayed-third-plenary-economy-meeting-05022024142612.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503185984%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=6rGd5%2FLSHj1bM81wUd7kavWE%2BfArnHSjbHJl9xnwSRY%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWA21353390-5ead-5dcb-2b03-23d199791392" originalsrc="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/delayed-third-plenary-economy-meeting-05022024142612.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="H0nZtRfp6EVbYT+KTpVqEheb+uLHle+cIEiV0g+4+TJW3Qu25XU/yzbCa1G2aRH/CCZXeUISHDF/gjIEXXg6zrryaT7ofgaXLsCq4t+Ik6Cb4/KAwl81rSRLR+Eb2phf9yd3N/9uq7lw3S0AkysnTIbFN+sOlSXsSMVT6MjV/hw=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/delayed-third-plenary-economy-meeting-05022024142612.html. Click or tap if you trust this link.">announced</a>&nbsp;that the third Party plenum of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee would meet in July. Official commentary&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="1" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.chinadaily.com.cn%2Fa%2F202405%2F01%2FWS66323e19a31082fc043c5050.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503199426%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=2n3UuGo%2FRAWMbRlRHWq%2BEQJSihCvwU%2FgSSy2AXeD2PE%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWA117497f5-e87c-bc4e-01dd-f20665dc9b5e" originalsrc="https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202405/01/WS66323e19a31082fc043c5050.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="bqQQxTFiPd7eWyoW8nBUP4fkYbr+Lnn8xYI19CYTxCJmPQ0cE4NwUv9TvRZM6N7F+C46cUR8Mw1johhx4G2Aca9bsgndQMVxL7ANckuufHWRiWeNv8elRRoWYA824p1Ilt4+VGxxWLXaknoI7+ubjDILGgOZJLlPYVseD4HI/nw=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202405/01/WS66323e19a31082fc043c5050.html. Click or tap if you trust this link.">indicates</a>&nbsp;that economic issues will be the core of the plenum, including a focus on integrated economic plans for the Yangtze Delta region. But specific attention will also be devoted to fostering “new quality productive forces”—a new Party slogan set out by Xi Jinping—with state commentary stating:</p><p><em>“The imperative was stressed... to develop new quality productive forces according to local conditions. The layout of China's strength in strategic science and technology should be improved, emerging industries cultivated and strengthened, the development of industries for the future arranged in advance, and the transformation and upgrading of traditional industries empowered by advanced technologies.”</em></p>
<p>As Chinese authorities&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="2" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Flosangeles.china-consulate.gov.cn%2Feng%2Flghd%2F202404%2Ft20240418_11283727.htm&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503205764%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=IbEShh6%2BllqjRF%2BKcOmhi%2FU7fTx1f9JCGSLpKwYrcBk%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAe743989e-a804-99d8-d203-643dc5ac1cc7" originalsrc="http://losangeles.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/lghd/202404/t20240418_11283727.htm" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="nJFMkJ+NoiMgW4rhQv8Zy1Lr3elJYsunHe4BDryx6OO0YVHvk0kbWP02pfLAsbN1ydtFaaLLI+D2xacSVY5nZse/MXybDN3lKtTtVciINnLLI1oJjosVuWnQLf9+vqKBw/nTo448yRRn+8p/5q4ZAnoGVQEE+nbAkYpuy9tqg0g=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: http://losangeles.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/lghd/202404/t20240418_11283727.htm. Click or tap if you trust this link.">note</a>, “new quality productive forces” includes three specific industries: electric vehicles, lithium-ion batteries, and photovoltaic products, which have registered dramatic export growth, in addition to other fields in biomedicine, artificial intelligence, and the digital economy. In recent years, Beijing has&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="3" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2024%2F05%2F14%2Fbusiness%2Fchina-exports-manufacturing.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503211048%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=1ahyI9wpkevRlu2E672ErhfP7nh3mz%2Fwp4Q4dT76QSc%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAd915b52c-0ef4-2399-4607-1ea63c3f5b6b" originalsrc="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/14/business/china-exports-manufacturing.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="L2sZOeL0lFunPptcQBH8iAhtpk88vF6tbo59ysGysLK+IoJ4HxdgExVjCZ/qZ6o01CYHuZ3WrgTsj9CqTmStycTBTwhf+dMUsXEuw49i+afnKwi/uOCVTlwcjKEcEbF6/gKe+TnSzRXlDzhzF6kuCmKwHA/MVKY/pJPB0BG8OpI=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/14/business/china-exports-manufacturing.html. Click or tap if you trust this link.">identified and promoted</a>&nbsp;key advanced manufacturing industries—including electric vehicles and batteries—as part of China’s industrial strategy. Goals include reducing reliance on foreign technologies and creating new sources of export-driven growth.&nbsp;</p>
<p>For Beijing, such emphasis on manufacturing represents an economic development strategy aimed at responding to serious domestic challenges. China currently faces both continuing high&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="4" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.wsj.com%2Fworld%2Fchina%2Fchinas-youth-unemployment-eased-in-april-a029344f&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503216081%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=eNQrISw%2BXNg3i%2FwuJav7ExYbcv2lBfCg4MzHyblG7p4%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAbd6af401-ab3c-7845-7ea4-53d89f61f617" originalsrc="https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-youth-unemployment-eased-in-april-a029344f" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="AQ4/iQp/hYQGxLkXSn7qmCrCJ/cZPlJ+TV1/fUPl5xi4LmH5GuJJY97e/YzHRaDV7MuK+PCZTCHRcdjAGmcXnkvGUJvpbYYSHjcj+YJoViFXMJd+4ypOZ98eTfbC22clyxh9qg1vg2Dbiab/raJBmkpD+TjrkS5zidNmKWfKPGQ=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-youth-unemployment-eased-in-april-a029344f. Click or tap if you trust this link.">youth unemployment</a>, as well as construction and real estate sectors that are mired in deep distress after the implosion of China’s property bubble, and which constituted a quarter of China’s GDP prior to the pandemic. Recent years have&nbsp;<a data-auth="NotApplicable" data-linkindex="5" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/amid-mounting-youth-unemployment-woes-beijing-looks-towards-vocational-education" id="OWA4f9afd72-27e1-a17f-5c3b-a22fc9dadb5d" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" title="seen">seen</a>&nbsp;Chinese authorities make a concerted effort to raise the status of vocational education programs and steer youth in the direction of skilled manufacturing labor, precisely because of the employment difficulties facing four-year college graduates.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Indeed, recent statements by Xi himself give further support to the likelihood that the July plenum will feature a doubling-down on manufacturing. A front-page&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="6" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fpaper.people.com.cn%2Frmrb%2Fhtml%2F2024-05%2F01%2Fnw.D110000renmrb_20240501_4-01.htm&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503220962%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=LvIQKiUxzrnTL5IJ16VqXtLA2b8mEyKv3lZTT4xqvYk%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWA3964bf46-e856-5cc7-ecc1-e1db928cee93" originalsrc="http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2024-05/01/nw.D110000renmrb_20240501_4-01.htm" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="U+VGUCUN0VJYCDQ2m86YaO3xVtQLf4AFom+BRwX1d9GyfZpjKes/TTI9qMLzcuMXNjvU+HCgSepVli75jPbZ3LIWCwAAZbLulu9txfWvvq83eCkMtoYWI36ftt+PqSliQSPrKlM0wk/5b1NnvWK2u5IeHP12JeLpC0cyv1/ltJI=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2024-05/01/nw.D110000renmrb_20240501_4-01.htm. Click or tap if you trust this link.">article</a>&nbsp;in the Party’s flagship paper accompanying the announcement of the July plenum carried extensive quotations from Xi himself extolling Chinese “craftsmanship” (<em>gongjiang</em>) in numerous fields of advanced manufacturing.</p>
<p>Naturally, any policy moves by Beijing to boost its own export-oriented advanced manufacturing industries run the risk of heightening tensions between China and its trading partners. Fears of Chinese market domination in specific industries led the Biden administration to&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="7" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fapnews.com%2Farticle%2Fbiden-china-tariffs-electric-vehicles-evs-solar-2024ba735c47e04a50898a88425c5e2c&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503225850%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=Lf8uTpZ6O1wJNj%2FSMr8ybHVGEuHjxOTwdJI49t%2BjhmY%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAbf0d4b26-e45d-be24-0f02-464361a12e73" originalsrc="https://apnews.com/article/biden-china-tariffs-electric-vehicles-evs-solar-2024ba735c47e04a50898a88425c5e2c" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="Zial7EJt9mURBt5T7sLNyoDKz3K/3tbjbkvn3tpiLyw16SD1VUaE4xhpY7xPsNzt05pHcsZEOjV3lzvQ09lZ5gjWonBZNBUQKbZdL96lTfPnncvNW3KYIP1mNu9l18reYgYx8EeZGPdwyI/KjsFZU1d3Nd9Aw9+8Kx8cwxUjyMc=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://apnews.com/article/biden-china-tariffs-electric-vehicles-evs-solar-2024ba735c47e04a50898a88425c5e2c. Click or tap if you trust this link.">announce</a>&nbsp;high tariffs on a range of such products last week. In fall 2023, European authorities&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="8" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Frhg.com%2Fresearch%2Faint-no-duty-high-enough%2F&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503230731%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=lyUNGLKjjpnh19ABAO7T6svYM8im%2F1%2Bhg%2BdAw4NUZ1I%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAe6e23327-f57b-65e1-1139-73e7492b7bc3" originalsrc="https://rhg.com/research/aint-no-duty-high-enough/" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="JaDVZAQwTw9fRxuxCWHj8WGhl3dc+jVzZfhMwuGIEkGneAbeDvT4IVpdE7XXcwVyjK8MtOFpBmFteUpAFXZ5EsTvExteNVVizaOmbqPwyBZY+e0plVrdArCFjCjJRKphNkxFyxk3V+dCyvyso5tC5M6sydgpqUCWvii5uiExGdA=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://rhg.com/research/aint-no-duty-high-enough/. Click or tap if you trust this link.">launched</a>&nbsp;an anti-subsidy investigation into China’s electric vehicle industry, and are currently considering imposing countervailing duties.&nbsp;</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog/advanced-manufacturing-be-focus-chinas-july-party-plenum</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/blog/advanced-manufacturing-be-focus-chinas-july-party-plenum</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 22 May 2024 20:43:23 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Analyzing Lai Ching-te’s Inaugural Address: More Continuity Than Difference</title>
<description><figure>
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/slide_3_2/public/image/2024/05/2024-05-20T031537Z_1692445377_RC23U7AO5UHG_RTRMADP_3_TAIWAN-POLITICS.JPG.webp" alt="Taiwan's new President Lai Ching-te delivers his inaugural speech in Taipei, Taiwan on May 20, 2024." class="article-header-blog__image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
<figcaption class="article-header-blog__caption">
Taiwan's new President Lai Ching-te delivers his inaugural speech in Taipei, Taiwan on May 20, 2024.
<span class="article-header-blog__credit">Carlos Garcia Rawlins/Reuters</span> </figcaption>
</figure><br><p>On May 20, Lai Ching-te assumed the presidency in Taiwan and gave an inaugural address scrutinized in Beijing, Washington, and capitals around the world. The speech provided the most authoritative signal to date of his approach to cross-strait relations. The core question for observers: would a Lai administration depart from the course set by his predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen?&nbsp;</p>
<p>The speech gave a clear answer: Lai signaled broad continuity with Tsai and committed to maintain the status quo. He also called for dialogue with Beijing and demonstrated an openness to resuming cross-strait tourism and student exchanges. Even so, Beijing denounced Lai’s speech in particularly harsh language. That reflects China’s concerns about Lai’s history on cross-strait issues. But it also reflects disappointment that Lai departed in some places from Tsai, for instance by not explicitly pledging to conduct cross-strait relations in accordance with the Republic of China (ROC) Constitution, which embodies a one-China framework.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p><p>In the period ahead, cross-strait issues will remain a point of contention between Taipei and Beijing, with official dialogue channels all but certain to remain closed. If both sides come to believe their own restraint will not be reciprocated, then the conditions will be set for a vicious cycle. For example, if Beijing responds to Lai’s efforts to signal continuity in his inaugural address with military and economic pressure, and if Taipei then concludes there is little reason for restraint on political issues, cross-strait tensions will increase. Careful signaling, and deeper dialogue—likely through unofficial channels or even through intermediaries—will be needed to avoid such an outcome.&nbsp;</p>
<p><b>Parsing Lai’s Inaugural Address&nbsp;</b></p>
<p>In his inaugural <a href="https://english.president.gov.tw/News/6726" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="speech">speech</a>, Lai sought to reassure audiences that he would be a source of stability and continuity on cross-strait issues and would not provoke Beijing or seek to change the status quo. Despite frustrations within Taiwan on domestic issues – rising housing prices, stagnating wages, and growing youth unemployment – Tsai still left office as the only president since Taiwan’s democratization to enjoy an approval rating of over 50 percent and is widely credited with ably managing cross-strait relations. It is thus little wonder that Lai sought to embrace and build on her legacy. His personnel appointments in senior national security positions similarly project continuity.&nbsp;</p>
<p>In his address, Lai regularly returned to the language of continuity and stability. “Peace is the only option,” he stressed, “and prosperity, gained through lasting peace and stability, is our objective.” Lai called Taiwan’s leaders “pilots for peace” and indicated he would “neither yield nor provoke” and would instead “maintain the status quo.” Elsewhere in his speech, Lai spoke of providing “stable and principled cross-strait leadership.” Such reassurances are important given Lai’s 2017 <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/taiwans-2024-presidential-election-analyzing-william-lais-foreign-policy-positions" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="statement">statement</a> that he was a “pragmatic worker for Taiwan independence” and questions in Beijing about his intentions.&nbsp;</p>
<p>To that end, Lai mentioned the “Republic of China” over a dozen times – more than Tsai did in her last inaugural address – and pledged to lead “in accordance with the Republic of China Constitution system.” Beijing took exception to Lai’s statement that “the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other.” That phrase has not appeared in an inaugural address before, though it was a formulation Tsai previously included in high-level speeches, and likely does not indicate any change in policy.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Lai also included conciliatory language toward Beijing. He encouraged it to “choose dialogue over confrontation, exchange over containment, and under the principles of parity and dignity, engage in cooperation with the legal government chosen by Taiwan’s people.” Notably, he stressed that, “this can start from the resumption of tourism on a reciprocal basis, and enrollment of degree students in Taiwanese institutions.” China has pointed to the lack of cross-strait tourism and student exchanges as evidence of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)’s lack of commitment to productive cross-strait relations, and Lai’s signal that he was open to practical exchanges was an effort to demonstrate goodwill toward Beijing.&nbsp;</p><p>Lai specifically referenced Tsai’s “Four Commitments” – her unique formulation on cross-strait policy. Beijing likely sees the framework’s first-ever appearance in an inaugural address as escalatory. But Tsai has referenced it in several high-level speeches, and her team had described it as a stakeholder agnostic formulation with propositions acceptable to all of Taiwan rather than one grounded entirely in DPP documents. Lai’s inclusion of it, rather than introducing a completely original approach, was probably intended to be stabilizing and again signal continuity.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>There were some areas, however, where Lai put his own imprint on cross-strait policies. He declared, “Some call this land the Republic of China, some call it the Republic of China Taiwan, and some, Taiwan; but whichever of these names we ourselves or our international friends choose to call our nation, we will resonate and shine all the same.” This could be interpreted as a subtle way of signaling that Lai does not intend to pursue steps that would change Taiwan’s official name – unlike prior president Chen Shui-bian – by essentially setting the issue of nomenclature aside and accepting that Taiwanese citizens have different and equally legitimate views on this question. Beijing could choose to see this as a reassuring evolution. At the same time, though, putting the name “Taiwan” on the same plane as the “Republic of China,” or as an alternative to the “Republic of China,” will raise concerns in Beijing and be seen as a departure from precedent. The fact that a statement could be taken as simultaneously escalatory and de-escalatory highlights the need for greater communication between Beijing and Taipei, whether official or unofficial, to help explain intentions.&nbsp;</p>
<p><b>Putting Lai’s Speech in Perspective&nbsp;</b></p>
<p>Lai’s cross-strait platform did not go as far as Tsai’s first inaugural address on certain elements of cross-strait issues. In her <a href="https://english.president.gov.tw/News/4893" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="2016 inaugural">2016 inaugural</a>, Tsai acknowledged the so-called “1992 consensus” without explicitly defining or endorsing it, going perhaps as far as any DPP leader is likely to go. “In 1992,” she said, “the two institutions representing each side across the Strait (the Straits Exchange Foundation&nbsp;and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits), through communication and negotiations, arrived at various joint acknowledgements and understandings. It was done in a spirit of mutual understanding and a political attitude of seeking common ground while setting aside differences. I respect this historical fact.” In that same speech, she stressed that, “since 1992, over twenty years of interactions and negotiations across the Strait have enabled and accumulated outcomes which both sides must collectively cherish and sustain; and it is based on such existing realities and political foundations that the stable and peaceful development of the cross-Strait relationship must be continuously promoted.” And as a matter of policy, she was clear that, “the new government will conduct cross-Strait affairs in accordance with the Republic of China Constitution, the Act Governing Relations Between the People of Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, and other relevant legislation.”&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>Beijing did not give Tsai much credit for these statements, choosing instead to base their expectations on the policies of her predecessor, Ma Ying-jeou, who had fully endorsed the “1992 consensus,” a term one of his key advisors <a href="https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2006/02/22/2003294106" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="invented">invented</a> in 2000. Accordingly, in her <a href="https://english.president.gov.tw/News/6004" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="second inaugural address">second inaugural address</a>, she did not repeat that detailed construction. But she did commit that she would “continue to handle cross-strait affairs according to the Constitution of the Republic of China and the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area.”&nbsp;</p>
<p>However, Lai did not explicitly state that cross-strait affairs would be conducted in accordance with the Republic of China Constitution and the Act Governing Relations Between the People of Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, both of which embody a one-China framework. He also did not even elliptically reference the “1992 consensus.” This is likely due to a calculation by Lai and his team that there was little to be gained by attempting to find a workaround to the “1992 consensus” in this first articulation of his cross-strait policy as president. Since Beijing famously rejected Tsai’s formulation as an “incomplete test paper” and has an even darker view of Lai than it had of Tsai, his team likely concluded nothing he would do would be enough at this stage. From Beijing’s perspective, however, the omission of these terms could be seen as a more consequential signal that Lai is embarking on a different cross-strait approach, overshadowing the areas where he stressed continuity.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Notably, Tsai refrained from directly criticizing China and certain PRC provocations in her past inaugural addresses, but Lai did not hesitate to do so. He instead declared that “China’s military actions and gray-zone coercion are considered the greatest strategic challenges to global peace and stability.” He called on China “to cease their political and military intimidation against Taiwan” and argued that even as Taiwan pursues peace “we must not harbor any delusions.” He noted that, “so long as China refuses to renounce the use of force against Taiwan, all of us in Taiwan ought to understand, that even if we accept the entirety of China’s position and give up our sovereignty, China’s ambition to annex Taiwan will not simply disappear.” Accordingly, he concluded, “in face of the many threats and attempts of infiltration from China, we must demonstrate our resolution to defend our nation, and we must also raise our defense awareness and strengthen our legal framework for national security.” Lai’s decision to include this language likely reflects the changed strategic context, including China’s military response to then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022, and the desire to ensure that Beijing—rather than Taipei—is seen by the international community as the provocateur in any cross-strait crisis.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p><b>Beijing Responds&nbsp;</b></p>
<p>China has made its distrust of Lai well known throughout his career. During the presidential campaign, the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/taiwan/elections-cross-strait-united-states-china-relations" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="warned">warned</a> that the choice facing Taiwan’s voters was between war and peace, with a vote for Lai tantamount to choosing the former. After Lai’s speech, the <a href="https://english.news.cn/20240520/d9024fcff39b4a7ba6a97a9dda5804d0/c.html" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="TAO’s spokesman">TAO’s spokesman</a> accused him of “flagrantly promoting separatist fallacies and inciting cross-strait confrontation,” heated language that represents a notable escalation compared with how Chinese authorities reacted to Tsai’s past inaugural addresses. A <a href="http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/jmsd/16310117.html" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="commentary">commentary</a> in state-run media accused Lai of filling his speech with “deceitful political lies, aggressively promoting the separatist ideology of ‘Taiwan independence,’ maliciously inciting cross-strait antagonism, and advocating for independence through reliance on foreign support and military means.”&nbsp;</p>
<p>At the same time, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stuck to standard talking points on Taiwan, <a href="https://english.news.cn/20240520/1735085308d0491ea8bf6e8528135e45/c.html?utm_source=substack&amp;utm_medium=email" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="stating">stating</a> that “anyone who attempts to challenge the one-China principle will inevitably fail” and that separatist attempts for “Taiwan independence” are doomed to fail and posed the greatest threat to cross-strait stability.&nbsp;</p>
<p><b>Challenges Ahead&nbsp;</b></p>
<p>Lai faces an array of challenges that will test his team. Foremost is the risk of a vicious cycle of escalation between Beijing and Taipei. Beijing may have written Lai off long ago, refusing to believe that he could be a trusted interlocutor who will exercise adequate restraint. Lai, who undoubtedly&nbsp;believes that he has acted in a restrained manner that has gone unnoticed in Beijing, may deviate from Tsai’s approach at least rhetorically, seeing little reason to adjust to accommodate Beijing’s preferences.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>In recent months, Beijing has acted in ways that might accelerate such a vicious cycle. Public reporting indicates Beijing has broken longstanding precedent with entries into Taiwan’s claimed contiguous zone. That decision suggests Beijing may not appreciate responsible approaches by Washington and Taipei, which in turn may see little reason to exercise restraint of their own in response.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Lai also faces a challenging environment at home. His 40 percent vote share was the lowest of any winning candidate since 2000, which similarly saw a three-way race. For the first time in sixteen years, no party controls the legislature with an outright majority, and the DPP is now a minority given the de facto coalition between the two main opposition parties: the Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP). In this more uncertain political environment, Beijing may look for opportunities to manipulate Taiwan’s politics to advance its aims. It hopes Lai will be a one-term president and likely believes it can increase the likelihood that this comes to pass, and that may reduce its incentive to seek stability.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>For the United States, the key question will be whether a vicious cycle can be avoided. If each side exercises restraint, and if that restraint is acknowledged and reciprocated by the other side, there may be a path to preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. That puts pressure on all sides—Beijing, Taipei, and Washington—to work to manage these complex dynamics.&nbsp;</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog/analyzing-lai-ching-tes-inaugural-address-more-continuity-difference</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/blog/analyzing-lai-ching-tes-inaugural-address-more-continuity-difference</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 21 May 2024 20:01:01 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>America’s New Cold Wars, With David Sanger</title>
<description><audio controls="" src="https://cfr-org-prod-media-files.s3.amazonaws.com/audio-files/240521_TPI_MASTER.mp3"></audio><br><p><b style="font-weight:700">Mentioned on the Episode&nbsp;</b></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>John Maggio, <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt22525694/" title="Year One: A Political Odyssey" target="_blank"><em style="font-style:italic">Year One: A Political Odyssey</em></a>, HBO Max</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>David E. Sanger, <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/710053/new-cold-wars-by-david-e-sanger-with-mary-k-brooks/" title="New Cold Wars: China's Rise, Russia's Invasion, and America's Struggle to Defend the West" target="_blank"><em style="font-style:italic">New Cold Wars: China's Rise, Russia's Invasion, and America's Struggle to Defend the West</em></a>, with Mary K. Brooks&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>David E. Sanger, <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/547683/the-perfect-weapon-by-david-e-sanger/" title="The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage, and Fear in the Cyber Age" target="_blank"><em style="font-style:italic">The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage, and Fear in the Cyber Age</em></a></p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/americas-new-cold-wars-david-sanger</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/americas-new-cold-wars-david-sanger</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 21 May 2024 19:16:35 GMT</pubDate>
<enclosure url="https://cfr-org-prod-media-files.s3.amazonaws.com/audio-files/240521_TPI_MASTER.mp3" type="audio/mpeg"></enclosure>
</item>
<item>
<title>Religion in China</title>
<description><figure>
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/immersive_image_3_2_desktop_2x/public/image/2024/05/ChinaReligion_BG_Lead.jpg.webp" alt="Hui Muslim women stand in front of China’s flag at a mosque in Beijing." class="article-header-backgrounder__image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
<figcaption class="article-header-backgrounder__caption">
Hui Muslim women stand in front of China’s flag at a mosque in Beijing.
<span class="article-header-backgrounder__credit">Kevin Frayer/Getty Images</span> </figcaption>
</figure><br>
<div class="summary__container">
<div class="summary__title">Summary</div>
<div class="summary__description"><ul>
<li><span><span><span><span><span><span>The&nbsp;<span>Chinese Communist Party’s nearly 100 million members are required to be atheist, but the party recognizes five religions: Buddhism, Catholicism, Daoism, Islam, and Protestantism.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></li>
<li><span><span><span><span><span><span><span>Authorities tightly monitor registered and unregistered religious groups. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span><span><span><span><span><span>China has one of the largest populations of religious prisoners, and some groups, including Uyghur Muslims, face high levels of persecution.</span></span></span></span></span></span></li>
<li>Since&nbsp;<span><span><span><span><span><span><span>Chinese President Xi Jinping came to power, authorities have sought to enforce stricter regulations to ensure groups conform to doctrines set forth by the communist party.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></li>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
<br><h2>Introduction</h2>
<p>Amid an economic boom and rapid modernization, religion in China has been on the rise in recent decades. Experts point to the emergence of a spiritual vacuum as a trigger for the growing number of religious believers, particularly followers of Christianity and traditional Chinese religious groups.&nbsp;</p>
<p>While China’s constitution allows religious belief, Chinese Buddhism, Daoism, and folk practices are shown more leniency than other religions, such as Islam and Christianity, which are regarded as “foreign” by the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinese-communist-party" title="Chinese Communist Party" target="_blank">Chinese Communist Party</a> (CCP). In recent years, adherents across all religious organizations, including both state-sanctioned and underground and banned groups, face intensifying persecution and repression. They also face pressure to implement President Xi Jinping’s sinicization policies, which aim to make religious groups more aligned with Chinese culture, morality, and doctrines as defined by the CCP.</p>
<h2>Freedom and Regulation</h2><p>China’s relationship with religion has shifted throughout its modern history. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), religions were essentially banned, and followers were forced underground or persecuted as part of a campaign to eliminate “old” customs and ideas. In the 1980s, the CCP acknowledged the Chinese people’s complex relationship with religion. The following decades saw a revival of religious institutions and groups, and even tolerance of underground religions not directly under state control. Although Article 36 of the <a href="https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/lawsregulations/201911/20/content_WS5ed8856ec6d0b3f0e9499913.html#:~:text=Article%2036%20Citizens,by%20foreign%20forces." title="Chinese constitution" target="_blank">Chinese constitution</a> says that citizens “enjoy freedom of religious belief” and bans discrimination based on religion, the law regulates religion by forbidding state organs, public organizations, or individuals from compelling citizens to believe in—or not believe in—any particular faith. Minors are also forbidden from entering places of worship.</p>
<p>The state recognizes five religions: Buddhism, Catholicism, Daoism, Islam, and Protestantism. The practice of any other faith is formally prohibited, although often tolerated, especially in the case of traditional Chinese beliefs. Religious organizations must register with one of five state-sanctioned patriotic religious associations, which are supervised by the United Front Work Department, a branch of the Communist Party.</p>
<p>The government’s tally of registered religious believers is around two hundred million, or less than 10 percent of the population, according to several sources, including the UN Human Rights Council’s 2024 <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/CNIndex.aspx" title="Universal Periodic Review" target="_blank">Universal Periodic Review</a>. However, the number of Chinese adults who practice religion or hold religious belief is <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2023/08/30/measuring-religion-in-china/" title="likely much higher" target="_blank">likely much higher</a> because many believers do not follow organized religion and are said to practice traditional folk religion. These practitioners, along with members of underground house churches and banned religious groups, account for many of the country’s unregistered believers.</p>
<a id="1bcaf1d5-ec8e-4829-92af-c4167af28ab0"></a>
<div class="datawrapper-graph-embed"><div class="dw-responsive-embed-iframe"><iframe title="Religious Affiliation in China" aria-label="Bar Chart" id="datawrapper-chart-9Zk6T" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/9Zk6T/6/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="333" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe></div></div>
<p>Chinese public security officials monitor both registered and unregistered religious groups to prevent activities that “<a href="http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content_1372964.htm" title="disrupt public order" target="_blank">disrupt public order</a>, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the State,” as stipulated by the Chinese constitution. In practice, however, monitoring and crackdowns often target peaceful activities that are protected under international law, say human rights watchdogs.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The State Council, the government’s administrative authority, <a href="http://english.gov.cn/policies/latest_releases/2017/09/07/content_281475842719170.htm" title="passed regulations on religious affairs" target="_blank">passed regulations on religious affairs</a> in 2018 to allow state-registered religious organizations to possess property, publish literature, train and approve clergy, and collect donations. But the revised rules also included restrictions on religious schooling and the times and locations of religious celebrations, as well as monitoring of online religious activity and reporting <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-religion/china-tightens-regulation-of-religion-to-block-extremism-idUSKCN1BI1IH" title="donations that exceed 100,000 yuan" target="_blank">donations that exceed 100,000 yuan</a> (around $15,900).&nbsp;</p><p>Under Xi, the CCP has pushed to sinicize religion, or shape all religions to conform to the doctrines of the Communist Party and the customs of the majority Han Chinese population. New regulations that went into effect in early 2020 require religious groups to accept and <a href="https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/measures-for-the-administration-of-religious-groups/" title="spread CCP ideology" target="_blank">spread CCP ideology</a> and values. Faith organizations must now get approval from the government’s religious affairs office before conducting any activities. The next year, the CCP banned unregistered domestic religious groups from <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china/" title="sharing religious content online" target="_blank">sharing religious content online</a> and prohibited overseas organizations from operating online religious services in China without a permit, particularly targeting Christianity-related content on the messaging service WeChat.&nbsp;</p>
<p>In September 2023, stricter laws required religious sites and activities to support <a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/religion-controls-08032023122520.html" title="sinicization policies" target="_blank">sinicization policies</a>, which&nbsp; included prohibiting religious activity if it could “endanger national security, disrupt social order [or] damage national interests.” Meanwhile, in Hong Kong, where religious groups are not required to register with the government, religious figures have faced tighter scrutiny and have <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58ecfa82e3df284d3a13dd41/t/6549b051117ad12c7c40c783/1699328088263/Sell+Out+My+Soul_final.pdf" title="increased self-censorship" target="_blank">increased self-censorship</a> [PDF] under the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/hong-kong-freedoms-democracy-protests-china-crackdown" title="2020 national security law" target="_blank">2020 national security law</a>. The former Catholic Bishop of Hong Kong, Cardinal Joseph Zen Ze-kiun, was arrested on suspicion of “collusion with foreign forces” in 2021. He was later found guilty and was issued a fine. Since 2022, the Catholic church in Hong Kong has halted its annual commemorative masses to mark the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre.</p>
<figure id="image-82067" class="image-embed embedded_small"><div class="image-embed__picture">
<img width="520" height="347" alt="Cardinal Joseph Zen attends a mass for the Chinese Catholic church in Hong Kong." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" class="lazyload" data-src="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/China_Christianity_BG.jpg.webp" src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/China_Christianity_BG.jpg.webp" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption"><div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Cardinal Joseph Zen Ze-kiun attends a mass for the Chinese Catholic church in Hong Kong.
<span class="image-embed__source">Tyrone Siu/Reuters</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption></figure><p>In addition, China is home to one of the largest populations of religious prisoners, likely numbering from several thousand to <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/441219-CHINA-2022-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf" title="as high as tens of thousands" target="_blank">as high as tens of thousands</a> [PDF]; while in custody, some are tortured or killed, rights groups say. Instances of arbitrary detentions and violence carried out with impunity have led the U.S. State Department to designate China as a country of particular concern&nbsp;over religious freedom annually since 1999.</p>
<h2>Atheism and the CCP</h2>
<p>The CCP is officially atheist. The party prohibits its roughly ninety-eight million party members from holding religious beliefs, and it requires the expulsion of party members who belong to religious organizations. Officials have said that party membership and religious beliefs are incompatible, and they discourage families of CCP members from publicly participating in religious ceremonies. Although these regulations are not always strictly enforced, the party periodically takes steps to draw a clearer line on religion.&nbsp;</p>
<h2><b>Chinese Buddhism and Folk Religions</b></h2>
<p>China has the world’s largest Buddhist population—an estimate of 4 percent to 33 percent of the country’s population (42 million to 362 million people) depending on how religious practices are measured, according to the U.S.-based <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2023/08/30/buddhism/#how-many-buddhists-are-there-in-china" title="Pew Research Center" target="_blank">Pew Research Center</a>. Though Buddhism originated in India, it has a long history and tradition in China and today is the country’s largest institutionalized religion. Chinese folk religions, in contrast, have no rigid organizational structure, blend practices from Buddhism and Daoism, and are manifest in the worship of ancestors, spirits, or other local deities. According to CFR Senior Fellow Ian Johnson, author of <a href="http://www.ian-johnson.com/books/the-souls-of-china" title="The Souls of China: The Return of Religion After Mao" target="_blank"><em style="font-style:italic">The Souls of China: The Return of Religion After Mao</em></a>, “hundreds, if not thousands, of folk religious temples are unregistered,” but are tolerated.</p>
<p>Since China’s opening and reform in the 1980s, the party has been tolerant of, and tacitly approved, the rise in Buddhist and Daoist practice. Under former Chinese leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, the government “<a href="http://www.academia.edu/2262613/Buddhist_revival_under_state_watch" title="passively supported" target="_blank">passively supported</a>” the growth of Buddhism because it believed doing so helped bolster the image of China’s peaceful rise, supported the CCP’s goal of creating a “harmonious society,” and could help to improve relations with Taiwan, according to the University of Ottawa’s André Laliberté. Today, Buddhism, Daoism, and folk religions are <a href="https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/china-reversing-its-crackdown-some-religions-not-all" title="treated more leniently by the party" target="_blank">treated more leniently by the party</a> compared to “foreign” religions, such as Islam or Christianity.</p>
<p>The growth of Buddhism led to heightened visibility of its institutions, particularly <a href="https://www.academia.edu/5024941/Buddhist_Charities_and_China_Social_Policy_An_Opportunity_for_Alternate_Civility" title="Buddhist philanthropic organizations" target="_blank">Buddhist philanthropic organizations</a> [PDF] that deliver social services to the poor amid soaring inequality in China. Since Xi has come to power, experts have noted an apparent easing of tough rhetoric against, and even a promotion of, traditional beliefs in China. Some experts say Xi believes Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism do not challenge the CCP’s rule and therefore can be <a href="https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/the-two-tracks-of-xi-jinping-s-religious-policy" title="advantageous for China’s global diplomacy" target="_blank">advantageous for China’s global diplomacy</a>.</p>
<h2><b>Tibetan Buddhism</b></h2>
<p>According to China’s 2020 census data, the Tibetan region of China is home to<a href="https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/how-much-does-beijing-control-ethnic-makeup-of-tibet" title="seven million Tibetans" target="_blank"> seven million Tibetans</a>, more than 90 percent of the region’s population. Nearly all Tibetans in the region practice a distinct form of Buddhism. The Dalai Lama is the spiritual leader of one of the main schools of Tibetan Buddhism and symbolizes Tibetan identity for both Tibetans in China and in exile. Since 1987, he and the exiled government, known as the Central Tibetan Administration, have played a prominent role in garnering international support for a “<a href="https://www.dalailama.com/messages/tibet/middle-way-approach" title="Middle Way” approach" target="_blank">Middle Way” approach</a> to resolve Tibet’s political disputes within the framework of the People’s Republic of China. Buddhist monks within Tibet have also participated in largely peaceful anti-government demonstrations, though some have included riots and <a href="http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/13/self-immolation-and-chinas-state-cult-of-stability-tibet-monks-dalai-lama/" title="self-immolations" target="_blank">self-immolations</a>.</p>
<p>China’s religious policy is inherently tied to political tensions across the Tibetan region, which comprises the Tibet Autonomous Region and adjacent Tibetan autonomous prefectures and counties in neighboring provinces. To quell dissent, China has sought to aggressively assimilate Tibetans, says Tashi Rabgey, research professor of international affairs at George Washington University. A 2021 report by watchdog group the Tibet Action Institute estimates that <a href="https://s7712.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/2021_TAI_ColonialBoardingSchoolReport_Digital.pdf" title="78 percent of Tibetan students" target="_blank">78 percent of Tibetan students</a>&nbsp;[PDF] between six and eighteen years old live in boarding schools, where they are away from their families and taught primarily in Mandarin. Although Beijing has attempted to make the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/25/world/asia/25tibet.html" title="region more “Chinese”" target="_blank">region more “Chinese”</a> by funding development projects and incentivizing migration to Tibet, it has been largely unsuccessful.</p>
<figure id="image-82068" class="image-embed embedded_small"><div class="image-embed__picture">
<img width="520" height="347" alt="Tibetan Buddhist monks look at a mural in the Tashilhunpo Monastery in Shigatse, Tibet Autonomous Region, China." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" class="lazyload" data-src="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/China_Tibet_BG.jpg.webp" src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/China_Tibet_BG.jpg.webp" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption"><div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Tibetan Buddhist monks look at a mural in the Tashi Lhunpo Monastery in Tibet Autonomous Region, China.
<span class="image-embed__source">He Penglei/CNS/Reuters</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption></figure><p>Tibetan Buddhists face high levels of religious persecution. The state monitors daily operations of major monasteries, with facial-recognition cameras posted outside, and it reserves the right to disapprove an individual’s application to take up religious orders. In 2018, party cadres and officials were <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/01/24/china-new-controls-tibetan-monastery" title="given control" target="_blank">given control</a> over Sichuan Province’s Larung Gar, one of the world’s largest Buddhist study centers. Authorities <a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/tibet/yachen-demolition-10012019181505.html" title="demolished nearly half" target="_blank">demolished nearly half</a> of the center in 2019, displacing up to six thousand monks and nuns.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Authorities have reportedly detained and tortured monks and nuns for refusing to denounce the Dalai Lama, and laypeople have been ordered to replace photos of the Dalai Lama with Chinese leaders. A Tibetan child believed to be a reincarnated, high-ranking religious leader, known as the Panchen Lama, <a href="https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/15/25-years-after-disappearing-tibetan-panchen-lama-china-no-nearer-its-goal" title="disappeared in 1995" target="_blank">disappeared in 1995</a> and has not been seen since. (Beijing claims that he graduated from college, has a job, and does not want to be disturbed.) After his disappearance, the Chinese government designated another child as the official Panchen Lama, though many Tibetans do not accept him as such.&nbsp;</p>
<p>With the fourteenth Dalai Lama nearing ninety years old, the Tibetan government in exile and the CCP are both preparing for his succession. Each is likely to appoint their own fifteenth Dalai Lama, generating a succession dispute similar to the situation with the current Panchen Lama. Rabgey says that this succession dispute will lead to an escalation of tensions in the region and is likely to trigger future Tibetan political unrest.</p>
<h2>Christian State-Sanctioned and House Churches</h2>
<p>China saw a significant growth in Christianity in the 1980s, after former leader Deng Xiaoping opened China to the outside world. Today, Protestantism is the predominant branch of Christianity practiced in China. There are three state-regulated Christian organizations and many underground house churches, though authorities have been cracking down on non-registered places of worship. Estimates of Christians in China vary widely, but according to a 2023 <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2023/12/12/chinas-christian-population-appears-to-have-stopped-growing-after-rising-rapidly-in-the-1980s-and-90s/" title="Pew Research Center" target="_blank">Pew Research Center</a> analysis, Chinese survey data show that Chinese adults who identify as Christian have remained stable at about 2 percent of the population (roughly 28 million people).</p>
<p>In recent years, China has witnessed a spike in state repression against both house churches and state-sanctioned Christian organizations, including campaigns to remove hundreds of rooftop crosses from churches, forced demolitions of churches, and harassment and imprisonment of Christian pastors and priests. A <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/1deR6dkQpidTsJ0RheaZ2Y8Q-C4XVvEWZ/view" title="2018 report" target="_blank">2018 report</a> [PDF] from ChinaAid, a Texas-based Christian nongovernmental organization, said that religious persecution, primarily against Christians, was on the rise, citing more than one million cases that year. One of China’s most prominent Christian voices and the founder of a large underground church, Pastor <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/30/world/asia/china-wang-yi-christian-sentence.html" title="Wang Yi" target="_blank">Wang Yi</a>, was sentenced to nine years in prison in 2019 after a court charged him with subversion of state power and illegal business operations.</p>
<p>The Vatican does not have diplomatic ties with China, home to some ten to twelve million Catholics. Its recognition of Taiwan and a dispute over the bishop appointment process have been major sticking points. The Communist Party limits the Vatican’s role in selecting Catholic bishops and continues to harass and detain clergy who refuse to join the Chinese Catholic Patriotic Association, the state-sanctioned organizational body for Catholics in China. In 2018, the two sides <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/22/world/asia/china-vatican-bishops.html" title="reached a provisional agreement" target="_blank">reached a provisional agreement</a> in which Pope Francis recognized several Chinese state-appointed bishops who had been excommunicated. While the two-year agreement was renewed in 2020 and <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/vatican-confirms-renewal-contested-accord-with-china-bishops-appointments-2022-10-22/" title="again in 2022" target="_blank">again in 2022</a>, tensions seemed to rise shortly after, when China installed two bishops as heads of dioceses without permission from the Pope. However, China-Vatican relations appear to be improving after a January 2024 mutual agreement to consecrate two new bishops in China.</p>
<h2>Islam and Uyghurs in Xinjiang</h2>
<p>Muslims make up an around 1 to 1.5 percent of China’s population, accounting for <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2023/08/30/islam/" title="around eighteen million people" target="_blank">around eighteen million people</a>, according to recent estimates&nbsp;by Pew Research Center. China has ten predominantly Muslim ethnic groups, the largest of which is the Hui, an ethnic group closely related to the majority Han population and largely based in western China’s Ningxia Autonomous Region and the Gansu, Qinghai, and Yunnan provinces. Until recently, Hui Muslims had enjoyed relative freedom compared to the government’s tight control on religious activity in Xinjiang, home to a majority of Uyghur Muslims. But CCP policies and rhetoric have become <a href="https://www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-analysis/hui-muslims-and-the-%E2%80%9Cxinjiang-model%E2%80%9D-of-state-suppression-of" title="less tolerant and more repressive" target="_blank">less tolerant and more repressive</a> toward those who practice Islam in general. Officials have held Hui Muslims in formal detention and internment camps over advocating for religious freedom and funding mosque construction.</p>
<p>The Uyghurs are a Turkic people who live primarily in Xinjiang, northwestern China, and are also predominantly Muslim. According to China’s 2020 census, there are more than eleven million Uyghurs in this region, making up approximately half of its population, though many experts agree that increased Han Chinese immigration has lowered this number. For decades, Chinese authorities have cracked down on <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-repression-uyghurs-xinjiang" title="Uyghurs in Xinjiang" target="_blank">Uyghurs in Xinjiang</a>, claiming the community holds <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html" title="extremist and separatist ideas." target="_blank">extremist and separatist ideas.</a> They point to occasional outbursts of violence against government workers and civilians in the region and have blamed a group that Beijing calls the East Turkestan Islamic Movement for several terrorist attacks throughout China. Experts say most Uyghurs do not support violence, but many are frustrated by frequent discrimination and the influx of Han Chinese that are disproportionately benefiting from economic opportunities in the region.</p>
<div id="content-promo-82069" class="promo ">
<div class="promo__container">
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-xinjiang-uyghurs-muslims-repression-genocide-human-rights" class="promo__link">
<div class="promo__cta">Dive Deeper</div>
<div class="promo__title">China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang</div>
<div class="promo__icon-circle-and-arrow-right">
</div>
</a>
</div>
</div>
<p>Since 2017, up to two million Muslims, most of them Uyghurs, have been arbitrarily detained in so-called reeducation camps, a... |
http://localhost:1200/cfr/blog - Success ✔️<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0">
<channel>
<title>Blogs</title>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog</link>
<atom:link href="http://localhost:1200/cfr/blog" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"></atom:link>
<description>Blogs - Made with love by RSSHub(https://github.com/DIYgod/RSSHub)</description>
<generator>RSSHub</generator>
<webMaster>i@diygod.me (DIYgod)</webMaster>
<language>en</language>
<lastBuildDate>Fri, 24 May 2024 08:26:39 GMT</lastBuildDate>
<ttl>5</ttl>
<item>
<title>A Puzzling Attempted Coup in the DRC</title>
<description><figure>
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/slide_3_2/public/image/2024/05/DRC%20Coup%20052324.jpg.webp" alt="The Congolese Republican Guard and police block a road around the scene of an attempted coup d'etat in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo on May 19, 2024." class="article-header-blog__image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
<figcaption class="article-header-blog__caption">
The Congolese Republican Guard and police block a road around the scene of an attempted coup d'etat in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo on May 19, 2024.
<span class="article-header-blog__credit">Arsene Mpiana/AFP via Getty Images</span> </figcaption>
</figure><br><p>The news <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/democratic-republic-congo-army-says-it-stopped-attempted-coup-2024-05-19/" title="reports" target="_blank">reports</a> of this past weekend’s failed coup attempt in Kinshasa read like a Mad Lib—a father-son duo from <u>Utah</u> and a <u>cannabis entrepreneur</u> from <u>Maryland</u> were part of a small band <u>livestreaming</u> an attempt to overthrow the government of the <u>Democratic Republic of Congo</u>. In the conspiratorial hothouse of Congolese politics, the bizarre incident, which culminated in deadly consequences for several people including Christian Malanga, leader of the would-be putchists, has raised numerous as yet unanswered questions. Who convinced Malanga that this effort would succeed? How did the amateurish group manage to access the presidential palace? Whose agenda was advanced by this spectacle?</p>
<p>It remains to be seen how the failed coup d’état will influence politics in the DRC, but one clear loser would seem to be the United States. Certainly, the incident made U.S. Ambassador to the DRC Lucy Tamlyn’s job more difficult. As social media accounts buzzed with accusations of CIA involvement, she <a href="https://x.com/USAmbDRC" title="registered" target="_blank">registered</a> “shock and concern” while pledging to cooperate with the Congolese government in investigating the incident. Cooler heads recognized that the failed takeover hardly bore the hallmarks of a professional intelligence organization, but the notion of armed Americans meddling in Congolese politics <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/10/24/congo-lumumba-cia-amends/" title="echoes" target="_blank">echoes</a> the real and sordid history of U.S. policies during the Cold War. As the United States aims to find a constructive way forward with the DRC on a range of issues from critical mineral deals to forest conservation and conflict resolution, developments that stir up historic resentments benefit only those who wish to see the United States on the back foot.</p><p>Yet another unhelpful narrative is buttressed by the bizarre events in the DRC—one about contempt. The story creates the impression that Americans so underestimate African states that they imagine a government can be overthrown by a small group of outsiders with nothing but fatigues, guns, and a can-do attitude. It’s consistent with former President Trump’s vulgar characterization of African countries, with press coverage that uses images from one part of the continent to accompany a story about a completely different country, and with analyses that consistently overlook the agency of Africans themselves in explaining major political developments. A small, misguided group with a sprinkling of American passports have boosted the efforts of America’s adversaries in Africa.</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog/puzzling-attempted-coup-drc</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/blog/puzzling-attempted-coup-drc</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2024 16:00:13 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>The President’s Inbox Recap: America’s New Cold Wars</title>
<description><figure>
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/slide_3_2/public/image/2024/05/Xi%20and%20Putin%20Gala%20Photo.JPG.webp" alt="Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping attend the gala event celebrating 75th anniversary of China-Russia relations in Beijing, China, on May 16, 2024." class="article-header-blog__image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
<figcaption class="article-header-blog__caption">
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping attend the gala event celebrating 75th anniversary of China-Russia relations in Beijing, China, on May 16, 2024.
<span class="article-header-blog__credit">Alexander Ryumin/Pool via REUTERS</span> </figcaption>
</figure><br><p>The latest episode o<em>f </em><a href="https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/americas-new-cold-wars-david-sanger" title="The President’s Inbox" target="_blank"><em>The President’s Inbox</em></a><em> </em>is live! This week, Jim sat down with <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/by/david-e-sanger" title="David E. Sanger" target="_blank">David E. Sanger</a>, White House and National Security Correspondent for the <em>New York Times</em>. David recently published <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/710053/new-cold-wars-by-david-e-sanger-with-mary-k-brooks/" title="New Cold Wars: China’s Rise, Russia’s Invasion, and America’s Struggle to Defend the West" target="_blank"><em>New Cold Wars: China’s Rise, Russia’s Invasion, and America’s Struggle to Defend the West</em></a>. They discussed the United States’ return to great power competition.</p>
<div class="media-episode-card">
<div class="episode-card__podcast-title">
<section class="series-tag"><a href="https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/presidents-inbox" class="series-tag__link"> The President’s Inbox</a> </section></div>
<h1 class="episode-card__title">
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/americas-new-cold-wars-david-sanger" data-vars-event-label=" America’s New Cold Wars, With David Sanger"> America’s New Cold Wars, With David Sanger</a>
</h1>
<div class="episode-card__summary">
<p></p><p>David Sanger, the White House and national security correspondent for the<em> New York Times</em>, sits down with James M. Lindsay to discuss how the post-Cold War ended and why the new era of geopolitical rivalry began.</p>
</div>
<div class="audio-podcast">
<div id="player-container-node-audio-252435" class="audio-player-wrapper" data-id="-node-audio-252435">
<div id="play-btn-node-audio-252435" class="audio-player-wrapper__btn audio-player-wrapper__play">
<span class="play-btn">
</span>
<span class="pause-btn">
</span>
</div>
<div class="audio-player-wrapper__controls">
<div id="seekObjContainer-node-audio-252435" class="seekObjContainer">
<div id="seekHover-node-audio-252435" class="seekHover"></div>
<input type="range" id="seek-slider-node-audio-252435" max="100" value="0"></div>
</div>
<div class="audio-player-wrapper__time">
<small id="current-time-node-audio-252435" class="time">0:00</small>
<small id="duration-node-audio-252435" class="time">0:00</small>
</div>
<div class="audio-player-wrapper__mute"></div>
<div class="audio-player-wrapper__speed" data-speed="1">x</div>
<div class="audio-player" id="audio-player-container-node-audio-252435">
<audio id="player-node-audio-252435" src="https://cfr-org-prod-media-files.s3.amazonaws.com/audio-files/240521_TPI_MASTER.mp3" preload="”metadata”"></audio></div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="episode-card__date">
May 20, 2024 — 38:18 min </div>
</div>
<p>Here are four highlights from their conversation:</p>
<p><em>1.) The post-Cold War era is over. </em>The United States no longer enjoys its unipolar moment. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and through the 2000s, the United States and the West made a series of misjudgments about where Russia and China were headed. They assumed that Russia and China would want to become more integrated into the U.S.-led world order. David acknowledged that Russian President Vladimir Putin stated explicitly in 2007 that he would do the contrary, while China’s ambitions were unclear initially. David said, “this was a failure of imagining a world in which these powers wanted to return to a past era of greatness and weren’t going to sit still for a unipolar world, run out of Washington under Washington values.”</p><p><em>2.) The new era of great power competition is distinct from the old Cold War. </em>The old Cold War was largely a military competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Today, the United States is engaged in a great power competition that is more complex. The United States is engaged in competition with China and Russia—both of whom have nuclear arsenals. The United States is dealing with, as David put it, “a Russia that has learned with great effectiveness, how to be an agent of disturbance or at least disruption, and a China whose rise, although it has recently run into considerable economic headwinds, has created a range of new problems for us.” At the same time, the United States and its allies and partners—including NATO members, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia—and the “Axis of Resistance”—which is made up of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran—are squaring off. The United States and the Soviet Union, however, were never as interconnected as the United States, China, and Russia are today. He added, “in the new Cold Wars, we are still reliant on the Chinese for chips, other technology. They are reliant on us, and yet none of that has prevented us from descending into what I think is a new era of containment.”</p>
<p><em>3.) The Russia-Ukraine war is a “laboratory” for the United States and its partners against the backdrop of great power competition. </em>The United States is learning what does and doesn’t work in direct conflict with major powers. For example, the United States now realizes that its expensive satellite systems are “sitting ducks.” In the run-up to the war in Ukraine, Russia successfully took out the European Viasat satellite network through a cyberattack on the ground-based modems. Now, the United States is looking to move to a system like Elon Musk’s Starlink—which consists of small satellite constellations. That’s just one example of expensive, modern technology mismatching warfare realities.</p>
<p><em>4.) There is more reason for optimism on the U.S.-China relationship than the U.S.-Russia relationship. </em>David put it this way, “oddly enough, I'm slightly more optimistic, at least in the short term on China than I am on Russia. At least we have conversations underway with them. That's really only in the past year and is driven less by the brilliance of our diplomacy, I think, than by the fact that the Chinese economy has been through a significant downturn that's going to be really hard for them to reverse.” At the same time, when Putin threatened to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, China stated its opposition to the use of nuclear weapons in the conflict. China and the United States have some opportunities for collaboration. David added, “I don’t have any illusions that that’s going to be a broad effort, and I fear the two countries [Russia and China] may grow closer, not further apart, but it is an opportunity for the US.”</p>
<p>If you’re looking to read more of David’s work, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/23/us/politics/ukraine-new-american-technology.html" title="check out" target="_blank">check out</a> this adaptation from his book for the <em>New York Times</em> about the lessons learned from the war in Ukraine.</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog/presidents-inbox-recap-americas-new-cold-wars</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/blog/presidents-inbox-recap-americas-new-cold-wars</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2024 14:42:21 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Advanced Manufacturing to be a Focus of China’s July Party Plenum</title>
<description><figure>
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/slide_3_2/public/image/2024/05/2017-10-22T230936Z_41608130_RC13548D61B0_RTRMADP_3_CHINA-BATTERIES-RECYCLING.JPG.webp" alt="A worker inspects batteries for electric vehicles being manufactured at a factory in Dongguan, China. " class="article-header-blog__image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
<figcaption class="article-header-blog__caption">
A worker inspects batteries for electric vehicles being manufactured at a factory in Dongguan, China.
<span class="article-header-blog__credit">Bobby Yip/Reuters</span> </figcaption>
</figure><br><p>China’s long-delayed third Party plenum on economic reform will be held in July. Official commentary suggests that the Party communique which will be issued at this meeting will double-down on the importance of manufacturing as a tool to address China’s pressing domestic economic problems, potentially increasing trade tensions with a range of foreign countries.</p>
<p>On April 30, Chinese authorities&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="0" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.rfa.org%2Fenglish%2Fnews%2Fchina%2Fdelayed-third-plenary-economy-meeting-05022024142612.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503185984%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=6rGd5%2FLSHj1bM81wUd7kavWE%2BfArnHSjbHJl9xnwSRY%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWA21353390-5ead-5dcb-2b03-23d199791392" originalsrc="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/delayed-third-plenary-economy-meeting-05022024142612.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="H0nZtRfp6EVbYT+KTpVqEheb+uLHle+cIEiV0g+4+TJW3Qu25XU/yzbCa1G2aRH/CCZXeUISHDF/gjIEXXg6zrryaT7ofgaXLsCq4t+Ik6Cb4/KAwl81rSRLR+Eb2phf9yd3N/9uq7lw3S0AkysnTIbFN+sOlSXsSMVT6MjV/hw=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/delayed-third-plenary-economy-meeting-05022024142612.html. Click or tap if you trust this link.">announced</a>&nbsp;that the third Party plenum of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee would meet in July. Official commentary&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="1" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.chinadaily.com.cn%2Fa%2F202405%2F01%2FWS66323e19a31082fc043c5050.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503199426%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=2n3UuGo%2FRAWMbRlRHWq%2BEQJSihCvwU%2FgSSy2AXeD2PE%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWA117497f5-e87c-bc4e-01dd-f20665dc9b5e" originalsrc="https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202405/01/WS66323e19a31082fc043c5050.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="bqQQxTFiPd7eWyoW8nBUP4fkYbr+Lnn8xYI19CYTxCJmPQ0cE4NwUv9TvRZM6N7F+C46cUR8Mw1johhx4G2Aca9bsgndQMVxL7ANckuufHWRiWeNv8elRRoWYA824p1Ilt4+VGxxWLXaknoI7+ubjDILGgOZJLlPYVseD4HI/nw=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202405/01/WS66323e19a31082fc043c5050.html. Click or tap if you trust this link.">indicates</a>&nbsp;that economic issues will be the core of the plenum, including a focus on integrated economic plans for the Yangtze Delta region. But specific attention will also be devoted to fostering “new quality productive forces”—a new Party slogan set out by Xi Jinping—with state commentary stating:</p><p><em>“The imperative was stressed... to develop new quality productive forces according to local conditions. The layout of China's strength in strategic science and technology should be improved, emerging industries cultivated and strengthened, the development of industries for the future arranged in advance, and the transformation and upgrading of traditional industries empowered by advanced technologies.”</em></p>
<p>As Chinese authorities&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="2" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Flosangeles.china-consulate.gov.cn%2Feng%2Flghd%2F202404%2Ft20240418_11283727.htm&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503205764%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=IbEShh6%2BllqjRF%2BKcOmhi%2FU7fTx1f9JCGSLpKwYrcBk%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAe743989e-a804-99d8-d203-643dc5ac1cc7" originalsrc="http://losangeles.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/lghd/202404/t20240418_11283727.htm" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="nJFMkJ+NoiMgW4rhQv8Zy1Lr3elJYsunHe4BDryx6OO0YVHvk0kbWP02pfLAsbN1ydtFaaLLI+D2xacSVY5nZse/MXybDN3lKtTtVciINnLLI1oJjosVuWnQLf9+vqKBw/nTo448yRRn+8p/5q4ZAnoGVQEE+nbAkYpuy9tqg0g=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: http://losangeles.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/lghd/202404/t20240418_11283727.htm. Click or tap if you trust this link.">note</a>, “new quality productive forces” includes three specific industries: electric vehicles, lithium-ion batteries, and photovoltaic products, which have registered dramatic export growth, in addition to other fields in biomedicine, artificial intelligence, and the digital economy. In recent years, Beijing has&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="3" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2024%2F05%2F14%2Fbusiness%2Fchina-exports-manufacturing.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503211048%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=1ahyI9wpkevRlu2E672ErhfP7nh3mz%2Fwp4Q4dT76QSc%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAd915b52c-0ef4-2399-4607-1ea63c3f5b6b" originalsrc="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/14/business/china-exports-manufacturing.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="L2sZOeL0lFunPptcQBH8iAhtpk88vF6tbo59ysGysLK+IoJ4HxdgExVjCZ/qZ6o01CYHuZ3WrgTsj9CqTmStycTBTwhf+dMUsXEuw49i+afnKwi/uOCVTlwcjKEcEbF6/gKe+TnSzRXlDzhzF6kuCmKwHA/MVKY/pJPB0BG8OpI=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/14/business/china-exports-manufacturing.html. Click or tap if you trust this link.">identified and promoted</a>&nbsp;key advanced manufacturing industries—including electric vehicles and batteries—as part of China’s industrial strategy. Goals include reducing reliance on foreign technologies and creating new sources of export-driven growth.&nbsp;</p>
<p>For Beijing, such emphasis on manufacturing represents an economic development strategy aimed at responding to serious domestic challenges. China currently faces both continuing high&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="4" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.wsj.com%2Fworld%2Fchina%2Fchinas-youth-unemployment-eased-in-april-a029344f&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503216081%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=eNQrISw%2BXNg3i%2FwuJav7ExYbcv2lBfCg4MzHyblG7p4%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAbd6af401-ab3c-7845-7ea4-53d89f61f617" originalsrc="https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-youth-unemployment-eased-in-april-a029344f" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="AQ4/iQp/hYQGxLkXSn7qmCrCJ/cZPlJ+TV1/fUPl5xi4LmH5GuJJY97e/YzHRaDV7MuK+PCZTCHRcdjAGmcXnkvGUJvpbYYSHjcj+YJoViFXMJd+4ypOZ98eTfbC22clyxh9qg1vg2Dbiab/raJBmkpD+TjrkS5zidNmKWfKPGQ=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-youth-unemployment-eased-in-april-a029344f. Click or tap if you trust this link.">youth unemployment</a>, as well as construction and real estate sectors that are mired in deep distress after the implosion of China’s property bubble, and which constituted a quarter of China’s GDP prior to the pandemic. Recent years have&nbsp;<a data-auth="NotApplicable" data-linkindex="5" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/amid-mounting-youth-unemployment-woes-beijing-looks-towards-vocational-education" id="OWA4f9afd72-27e1-a17f-5c3b-a22fc9dadb5d" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" title="seen">seen</a>&nbsp;Chinese authorities make a concerted effort to raise the status of vocational education programs and steer youth in the direction of skilled manufacturing labor, precisely because of the employment difficulties facing four-year college graduates.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Indeed, recent statements by Xi himself give further support to the likelihood that the July plenum will feature a doubling-down on manufacturing. A front-page&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="6" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fpaper.people.com.cn%2Frmrb%2Fhtml%2F2024-05%2F01%2Fnw.D110000renmrb_20240501_4-01.htm&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503220962%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=LvIQKiUxzrnTL5IJ16VqXtLA2b8mEyKv3lZTT4xqvYk%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWA3964bf46-e856-5cc7-ecc1-e1db928cee93" originalsrc="http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2024-05/01/nw.D110000renmrb_20240501_4-01.htm" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="U+VGUCUN0VJYCDQ2m86YaO3xVtQLf4AFom+BRwX1d9GyfZpjKes/TTI9qMLzcuMXNjvU+HCgSepVli75jPbZ3LIWCwAAZbLulu9txfWvvq83eCkMtoYWI36ftt+PqSliQSPrKlM0wk/5b1NnvWK2u5IeHP12JeLpC0cyv1/ltJI=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2024-05/01/nw.D110000renmrb_20240501_4-01.htm. Click or tap if you trust this link.">article</a>&nbsp;in the Party’s flagship paper accompanying the announcement of the July plenum carried extensive quotations from Xi himself extolling Chinese “craftsmanship” (<em>gongjiang</em>) in numerous fields of advanced manufacturing.</p>
<p>Naturally, any policy moves by Beijing to boost its own export-oriented advanced manufacturing industries run the risk of heightening tensions between China and its trading partners. Fears of Chinese market domination in specific industries led the Biden administration to&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="7" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fapnews.com%2Farticle%2Fbiden-china-tariffs-electric-vehicles-evs-solar-2024ba735c47e04a50898a88425c5e2c&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503225850%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=Lf8uTpZ6O1wJNj%2FSMr8ybHVGEuHjxOTwdJI49t%2BjhmY%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAbf0d4b26-e45d-be24-0f02-464361a12e73" originalsrc="https://apnews.com/article/biden-china-tariffs-electric-vehicles-evs-solar-2024ba735c47e04a50898a88425c5e2c" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="Zial7EJt9mURBt5T7sLNyoDKz3K/3tbjbkvn3tpiLyw16SD1VUaE4xhpY7xPsNzt05pHcsZEOjV3lzvQ09lZ5gjWonBZNBUQKbZdL96lTfPnncvNW3KYIP1mNu9l18reYgYx8EeZGPdwyI/KjsFZU1d3Nd9Aw9+8Kx8cwxUjyMc=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://apnews.com/article/biden-china-tariffs-electric-vehicles-evs-solar-2024ba735c47e04a50898a88425c5e2c. Click or tap if you trust this link.">announce</a>&nbsp;high tariffs on a range of such products last week. In fall 2023, European authorities&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="8" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Frhg.com%2Fresearch%2Faint-no-duty-high-enough%2F&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503230731%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=lyUNGLKjjpnh19ABAO7T6svYM8im%2F1%2Bhg%2BdAw4NUZ1I%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAe6e23327-f57b-65e1-1139-73e7492b7bc3" originalsrc="https://rhg.com/research/aint-no-duty-high-enough/" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="JaDVZAQwTw9fRxuxCWHj8WGhl3dc+jVzZfhMwuGIEkGneAbeDvT4IVpdE7XXcwVyjK8MtOFpBmFteUpAFXZ5EsTvExteNVVizaOmbqPwyBZY+e0plVrdArCFjCjJRKphNkxFyxk3V+dCyvyso5tC5M6sydgpqUCWvii5uiExGdA=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://rhg.com/research/aint-no-duty-high-enough/. Click or tap if you trust this link.">launched</a>&nbsp;an anti-subsidy investigation into China’s electric vehicle industry, and are currently considering imposing countervailing duties.&nbsp;</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog/advanced-manufacturing-be-focus-chinas-july-party-plenum</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/blog/advanced-manufacturing-be-focus-chinas-july-party-plenum</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 22 May 2024 20:43:23 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>European Tech Law Faces Test to Address Interference, Threats, and Disinformation in 2024 Elections</title>
<description><figure>
<div class="article-header__image-picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/full_width_xl/public/image/2024/05/EUvote.jpg.webp" alt="Pin badges encouraging people to vote in June's European Parliament elections are placed at the Malta office information stand during a conference at the European Parliament, in Rabat, Malta May 22, 2024." class="article-header__image-img" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="article-header__image-caption">
Pin badges encouraging people to vote in June's European Parliament elections are placed at the Malta office information stand during a conference at the European Parliament, in Rabat, Malta May 22, 2024.
<span class="author">REUTERS/Darrin Zammit Lupi</span>
</figcaption>
</figure><br><p>The European Union (EU) began implementing the Digital Services Act (DSA) this year, just in time to combat online disinformation and other electoral interference in the dozens of elections taking place in Europe’s twenty-seven member countries and the European Parliament elections taking place June 6 through June 9. To prepare, the EU conducted a stress test of the DSA mechanisms to address elections targeted by false and manipulated information, incitement, and attempts to suppress voices. The DSA has also <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/30/business/meta-european-union-disinformation-investigation.html" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="opened investigations">opened investigations</a> against Meta, TikTok, and X out of concern they are not doing enough to prevent these scenarios.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The DSA is a landmark piece of legislation not only because it is the most comprehensive regulatory effort to address digital threats to date and impacts the 740 million people living in the EU; its implementation will also inform other countries’ efforts to provide a secure and safe internet space. Even without additional legislation, the European law may induce the largest technology companies to voluntarily apply the same standards globally, as was the case with the EU’s Global Digital Privacy Regulation, which caused many platforms to routinely seek user permission for data collection and retention.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p><p>Tech companies’ responses to the DSA during the EU elections will be watched closely in the United States, where disinformation and electoral interference could roil the already contentious November elections. Despite years of debate, no U.S. guardrails have been implemented. Concerns over government censorship and free speech have stalled dozens of legislative proposals to require tech companies to address various threats in the digital space and risks arising from powerful new artificial intelligence (AI). The free speech argument overlooks the speech of those who are being doxed, threatened, attacked, and driven out of the public arena by vicious online actors—including women, who are far and away <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/most-online-hate-targets-women-says-eu-report-2023-11-29/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="the most frequent targets of these attacks">the most frequent targets of these attacks</a>. Legislative action has also been impeded by concerns that overly burdensome regulation will inhibit tech companies amid a worldwide race to gain competitive edge through generative artificial intelligence and other innovations.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The DSA is a useful model constructed around three principles: due diligence requirements for tech companies, mandated transparency via public reporting of their compliance with those requirements, and the threat of hefty fines to ensure compliance and accountability. The size of the EU market is large enough that, as with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), some tech companies may be incentivized to comply with the law’s provisions even without sanctions. The DSA’s strictest provisions apply to the world’s largest online platforms and search engines (those with more than 45 million users). These companies are required to routinely assess activity on their platforms and services for “<a href="https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-vlops" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="systemic risks">systemic risks</a>” involving elections, illegal content, human rights, gender-based violence, protection of minors, and public health and safety.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Companies have delivered initial assessments, which are publicly available, as well as information about the actions they have taken to comply. The EU website hosts a massive and growing online archive of hundreds of thousands of content moderation decisions made by the companies. In early enforcement actions, the EU has requested that Meta and other companies take down false ads and sought more information about their safety practices. For example, the EU queried X about its decision to cut its <a href="https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-requests-information-x-decreasing-content-moderation-resources-under-digital-services" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="content moderation team">content moderation team</a> by 20 percent since last October. Reduced content moderation on one of the world’s largest platforms is obviously a great concern given the number of elections and aggressive disinformation and interference campaigns by Russia and its proxies as it seeks to boost the fortunes of rising rightwing populists, Euroskeptic parties, and pro-Russian and anti-Ukraine candidates, as recently <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/04/17/slovakia-president-pellegrini-russia-election-interference-disinformation/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="occurred in Slovakia">occurred in Slovakia</a> and other Central and Eastern European countries.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>Thus far, the DSA has not yet levied fines, but the threat alone of stiff penalties of up to 6 percent of gross revenues has led most companies to provide the required information. This treasure trove of information about how these tech companies are policing their own platforms is itself valuable; it enables governments and researchers to understand the effectiveness of measures being employed by trust and safety divisions of companies, some of which embrace the goal of a safe internet. The EU law explicitly seeks to guard free speech as well as innovation by companies, but the experience of implementation will inform lingering concerns about free speech, direct government decision-making, and censorship of content, including whether an authoritarian government could exercise control over their populations through digital policing and firewalls. Those concerns color the current negotiations at the United Nations over a Global Digital Compact, which is to be announced as part of the Summit of the Future in September.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The essence of the DSA is not to make content decisions directly but to set standards for due diligence and require companies to demonstrate that they are monitoring and mitigating risks via their own codes of conduct. Voluntary standards may vary, but the sharpest debates revolve around defining what constitutes illegal content. The EU has taken additional measures to harmonize laws regarding what is illegal content across the EU member states, which has been a difficult and contentious matter. The United Kingdom (UK) went through a similar multiyear debate over concerns about curtailing free speech before passing its Online Safety Act late last year. The UK law adopted some features in the DSA, including the due diligence reporting requirement and fines of up to ten percent of gross revenue. It defines the scope of risks more narrowly than the DSA, although the UK law does criminalize “extreme” pornography and may criminalize the creation of deepfake porn. Enforcement of the UK law awaits finalization of codes of conduct by year’s end. The EU also has moved to harmonize what constitutes illegal content as the laws of the twenty-seven member states currently vary greatly in defining what is illegal. Germany’s Network Enforcement Act, which was passed in 2018, is one of the world’s stiffest hate speech laws, which aims to stem rising neo-Nazi hate speech. The far-right Alternative fur Deutschland party has <a href="https://www.vox.com/world-politics/2024/3/12/24080074/germany-afd-far-right" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="surged in state elections">surged in state elections</a> and exceeded the popularity of the leading Social Democrats in national polls.&nbsp;</p><p>The process of making the internet safer is iterative; several countries have revised their laws based on the experience of implementing them as well as evolving circumstances. For example, Germany amended its law in 2021 to stiffen its requirement that companies take down “clearly illegal” content within twenty-four hours. Australia has revised its online safety law twice since its initial passage in 2015, to require faster takedown of material deemed illegal and to greatly expand the law’s original focus on stopping child sexual abuse and exploitation and terrorist material. Speed of response is a critical factor in countering mis- and disinformation. Delayed action by tech companies has allowed viral propagation of material to proceed unhindered—as occurred in early January when deepfake porn of pop star Taylor Swift spread to 47 million viewers shortly after it was uploaded from the notorious 4chan message board.&nbsp;</p>
<p>That highly publicized episode drew attention to the disproportionate targeting of women and girls by internet violence, especially women in public life like politicians, journalists, and human rights activists, and minorities. The chilling effect on political participation has also been documented. The UK parliament rushed to act on deepfake porn after a number of women candidates were targeted this spring. Growing attention to the magnitude of the effects on women spurred the Biden administration to form a fourteen-country global partnership for action on online harassment and abuse. And last month, the EU concluded years-long negotiations to issue a directive on online gender-based violence and threats, including nonconsensual sharing of intimate images, deepfake porn, and other forms of attack. Member states are required to pass laws to implement the directive within two years.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The 2024 elections will serve as an initial test case for the DSA’s ability to rein in this wide variety of election interference, threats, and disinformation. Given the nascent regulatory architecture and companies’ varied compliance records, it is certain that further scrutiny and modification will be needed. Big tech will be required to provide public after-action reviews of the effectiveness of their measures to label AI-generated content, moderate discourse, identify foreign interference, and meet other guidelines for each country’s elections. These much-needed first steps will help light the way for others.&nbsp;</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/article/european-tech-law-faces-test-address-interference-threats-and-disinformation-2024-elections</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/article/european-tech-law-faces-test-address-interference-threats-and-disinformation-2024-elections</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 22 May 2024 15:54:31 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>On "Outside Agitators" and Gaza Protests</title>
<description><p>Below is a chart showing the numbers of people arrested during Gaza encampments and protests on a number of U.S. campuses.</p>
<p>Data was collected from <em>The New York Times </em>article titled <a href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2Finteractive%2F2024%2Fus%2Fpro-palestinian-college-protests-encampments.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7CEAbrams%40cfr.org%7C79b6f0937c2346ef2f5308dc79a4262b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638518993125924955%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=c1vMu1qHcMFcAe4V9go9nFMUVVZ8eQSGkzA5KFljrXA%3D&amp;reserved=0" title="“Where Protesters on U.S. Campuses Have Been Arrested or Detained,”" target="_blank">“Where Protesters on U.S. Campuses Have Been Arrested or Detained,”</a> and supplemented with additional numbers from local journalists, university papers and statements, and national news agencies. The arrest numbers are <em>not </em>an exhaustive list of total arrests related to Gaza encampments and protests. Rather, it is a sample from a group of institutions where there are reports on the affiliation status of those arrested.</p><p>So these numbers should be considered suggestive, not final or absolutely reliable. And what they suggest is that the protests were indeed seized upon by people unaffiliated with the universities and colleges in question, but determined to disrupt campus life in the service of their political goals. Only half of those "protesting" were students or faculty members.&nbsp;</p>
<p>This suggests other questions. Who were the 50.43% who were unaffiliated? Who financed their activities? Did the affiliated and unaffiliated act in the same ways, or was one group or the other more involved in violence, building takeovers, and extremist rhetoric as opposed to peaceful protest?&nbsp;</p>
<p>The involvement of such a percentage of persons unaffiliated with the universities presents special problems for administrators, because internal discipline such as suspension or expulsion will of course not be available when it comes to the unaffiliated. That may leave no alternative except arrests to bring the activities to an end. In real life, we've very often seen administrators threaten suspensions or expulsions and then back off, or even impose such penalties and then remove them as part of the price of getting protesters to disband. Faculty who violate university rules present a similar but even harder problem because they often have more protections, such as tenure.&nbsp;</p>
<p>My impression, now as the academic year is ending, is that punishment is extremely rare. Most charges have been or likely will be dropped, except perhaps in cases where "protesters" assaulted police. Academic penalties such as suspension appear to be disappearing as well. This sends a clear message: violations of the rules will be forgiven no matter how severe the violation if violators stick to their guns and threaten further disturbances. It is an invitation for more trouble, and quite an education for the vast majority of students who naively assumed rules were <em>not </em>made to be broken.&nbsp;</p>
<figure id="image-82254" class="image-embed embedded_large"><div class="image-embed__picture">
<img width="520" height="332" alt="A list of universities with the number of arrests and affiliation status of those arrested." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" class="lazyload" data-src="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/Arrests%20at%20University%20Gaza%20Encampments%20and%20Protests_2.jpg.webp" src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/Arrests%20at%20University%20Gaza%20Encampments%20and%20Protests_2.jpg.webp" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption"><div class="image-embed__caption-text">
<span class="image-embed__source"></span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption></figure></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog/outside-agitators-and-gaza-protests</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/blog/outside-agitators-and-gaza-protests</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 21 May 2024 19:45:22 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Cyber Week in Review: May 16, 2024</title>
<description><figure>
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/slide_3_2/public/image/2024/05/2023-09-13T183146Z_1763002145_RC2U73AQX2WE_RTRMADP_3_USA-AI-CONGRESS-SCHUMER.JPG.webp" alt="U.S. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) addresses a press conference during a break in a bipartisan Artificial Intelligence (AI) Insight Forum for all U.S. senators at the U.S. Capitol on September 13, 2023." class="article-header-blog__image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
<figcaption class="article-header-blog__caption">
U.S. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) addresses a press conference during a break in a bipartisan Artificial Intelligence (AI) Insight Forum for all U.S. senators at the U.S. Capitol on September 13, 2023.
<span class="article-header-blog__credit">Julia Nikhinson/Reuters</span> </figcaption>
</figure><br><p><b style="font-weight:700">Senate AI working group releases AI Policy Roadmap</b></p>
<p>A bipartisan group of senators, which consists of Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY), and Sens. Todd Young (R-IN), Martin Heinrich (D-NM), and Mike Rounds (R-S.D.), released a “<a href="https://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000018f-79a9-d62d-ab9f-f9af975d0000" title="roadmap" target="_blank">roadmap </a>for artificial intelligence policy in the U.S. Senate” this week, and identifies areas or uses of AI that are well-suited for regulation, including boosting funding for AI innovation, developing standards for AI fairness, addressing AI’s implications for national security, and addressing AI’s effects on the workforce, among other concerns. The roadmap also calls for Congress to appropriate nearly $32 billion to encourage non-military AI innovation over the coming year. Although the report offers a <a href="https://www.akingump.com/en/insights/alerts/senate-gang-of-four-releases-long-anticipated-ai-whitepaper" title="variety of recommendations" target="_blank">variety of recommendations</a> for how Congress could leverage processes like appropriations, existing acts and funding like the CHIPS and Science Act, and research and development funding mechanisms to meet the goals of the roadmap, the senators have not clarified exactly what action Congress should take or when it would do so. The roadmap reflects the topics of AI Insight Forums that Majority Leader Schumer convened throughout the fall, which brought together business executives, legislators, and a small group of civil society advocates to discuss regulating artificial intelligence in the United States. While <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2024/05/15/congress-ai-road-map-regulation-schumer/" title="tech industry groups generally supported the report" target="_blank">tech industry groups generally supported the report</a> as a step in the right direction, academics and civil society advocates <a href="https://www.fastcompany.com/91126098/chuck-schumer-ai-roadmap-panned" title="derided" target="_blank">derided</a> it for lacking specificity and substance.&nbsp;</p><p><b style="font-weight:700">U.S., Japan, and partners unveil agreement for cross-border data flows</b></p>
<p>The United States, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom have <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Technology/Japan-U.S.-and-others-to-ease-cross-border-personal-data-transfers" title="created" target="_blank">created </a>a new framework to enable the sharing of personal data across their respective borders. The new framework aims to balance the need to encourage online commerce between countries with the data security needs and regulations of each country. The existing mechanism for data sharing, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Cross-Border Privacy Rules, will be phased out in favor of a new system. The new agreement will allow non-APEC countries to participate in data-sharing initiatives, with the United Kingdom being the first such country to join, and will standardize a process for certifying companies from participating countries. Once those companies have been certified by a relevant data protection authority, they will be able to share data more easily among the participating countries. The agreement, which is still being finalized, is likely to be rolled out in the coming months, and the participating countries hope it will expand beyond the additional participating APEC countries, Australia, Canada, Mexico, the Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan.</p>
<p><b style="font-weight:700">Frank McCourt announces a planned bid for TikTok</b></p>
<p>In the wake of congressional and executive action aimed at forcing the divestiture of social media platform TikTok, American billionaire Frank McCourt <a href="https://www.projectliberty.io/news/frank-mccourt-organizing-a-people-s-bid-to-acquire-tiktok" title="announced" target="_blank">announced</a> that he is readying a bid for the U.S. version of the social media app TikTok. McCourt is organizing the bid through Project Liberty, an initiative hehe has founded to reimagine the economic models that currently power Big Tech and to bring forward novel solutions aimed at putting individuals in charge of their own data and digital engagement. experience. that could shape and change the status quo of the web, bring forward novel solutions at every level, and put people back in control of their digital lives. McCourt said that buying TikTok would create value by providing “individuals and creators on [TikTok] the value and control they deserve regarding who has access to their data and how it is used.” ByteDance, the parent company of TikTok, will likely be forced to sell the app after Congress included a provision in an annual defense spending bill that requires ByteDance to either sell TikTok in six months or see the app banned. The ban is currently <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/14/business/media/tiktok-creators-sue-ban.html" title="facing challenges" target="_blank">facing challenges</a> in the U.S. court system, as a group of TikTok creators has filed a lawsuit alleging that the ban violates their First Amendment right to fere speech.</p>
<p><b style="font-weight:700">Biden administration increases tariffs on Chinese technology imports</b></p><p>The Biden administration <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/972cabfb-f587-4cb3-ab21-ec3380b049da" title="announced" target="_blank">announced </a>additional tariffs on nearly $18 billion worth of Chinese goods, i stating the move was necessary to protect certain sectors of the U.S. economy. Chinese-made electric vehicles will see some of the largest increases, with the Biden administration quadrupling tariffs from 25 percent of a car’s value to 100 percent in the coming year. Currently <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/electric-shock-interpreting-chinas-electric-vehicle-export-boom" title="only 2 percent" target="_blank">only 2 percent</a> of all U.S. imports of electric vehicles come from China, but Chinese EVs have proliferated rapidly in other markets, with Chinese automakers accounting for <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-ev-strategy-going-small-cheap-pay-big-dividends-asia-russell-2024-04-23/" title="60 percent" target="_blank">60 percent</a> of all EV sales worldwide in 2023. China’s foreign ministry issued a statement saying Beijing “opposes unilateral tariff increases that violate World Trade Organization rules and will take all necessary measures to safeguard its legitimate rights and interests”. The Biden administration isn’t alone in investigating the potential growth of Chinese electric vehicles, as the European Commission has also begun <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/8e4a9eb4-cd88-4625-a21b-6378d24c6dad" title="investigating" target="_blank">investigating </a>EV imports to the EU, and may impose tariffs in the coming months.</p>
<p><b style="font-weight:700">FBI seizes major online cybercrime marketplace</b></p>
<p>The FBI and a number of international law enforcement partners announced that they had seized the servers used to host BreachForums, a prominent cybercrime website. The seizure, which the FBI conducted in partnership with law enforcement in the U.K., New Zealand, Australia, Switzerland, Ukraine and Iceland, involved seizing BreachForum’s Telegram channel as well. The agencies appeared to be searching for the administrators of the site, known by the aliases Baphomet and ShinyHunters, with the FBI issuing a request for tips on the administrators’ real identities. The FBI and Department of Justice have seized a number of major cybercrime forums over the past two years, including BreachForums’ predecessor, RaidForums. BreachForums offered a variety of criminal items for sale through its services, such as stolen devices, hacking tools, and illegal contraband.</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog/cyber-week-review-may-16-2024</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/blog/cyber-week-review-may-16-2024</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 17 May 2024 14:25:53 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Power and Financial Interdependence</title>
<description><p>So long as China runs a large trade surplus, Chinese residents (either the government or Chinese firms typically) will need to accumulate financial claims on the rest of the world. Conversely, so long as the United States runs a large trade deficit, the rest of the world will accumulate, in aggregate, claims on the United States. China need not directly finance the U.S. (though it did for a time), but Chinese offshore asset accumulation is necessarily a part of any global equilibrium that sustains U.S. deficits in a world still marked by <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/new-geopolitics-global-finance" title="large Chinese surpluses and large U.S. deficits" target="_blank">large Chinese surpluses and large U.S. deficits</a>.</p>
<p>Trade imbalances thus imply financial interdependence and linkage of one form or another.&nbsp; In today’s world, the risk that such interdependence can be “weaponized” is a very real.</p><p>In my new paper for the <a href="https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/power-and-financial-interdependence" title="Institut Français des Relations Internationales&nbsp;(Ifri)" target="_blank">Institut Français des Relations Internationales&nbsp;(Ifri)</a>, specifically for their new initiative on Geoeconomics and Geofinance, I explore the history of the Sino-American financial relationship – and in particular, try to highlight how perceptions of which country truly holds the leverage within the financially unbalanced relationship have evolved over time.</p>
<p>Two incidents are, I think, especially important.</p>
<p>One is the runup in China’s holdings of Agencies and (less visibly) other forms of credit to U.S. financial institutions in years prior to the global financial crisis. Prior to the global financial crisis, reserve growth (by China and others) was massive, both absolutely and relative to Treasury issuance. This squeezed big sovereign investors (and private investors) into close substitutes for Treasuries. Synthetic AAA didn’t work out well, but it was a real part of global finance for a while.</p>
<p>China’s exposure to the Agency market and other less visible exposures to the U.S. banking system (the China Investment Corporation’s investment in the Reserve Primary money market fund for example) taught China of the dangers of excessive exposure to the U.S. well before the current wave of sanctions against sovereign risk. China had more exposure to Agencies than Treasuries in the summer of 2008 – which wasn’t a comfortable position for China.</p>
<p>It also gave China a bit of leverage over the U.S., at least at the time. This leverage was not directly exercised, but the perception at the top of the U.S. Treasury that China’s actions could determine the success or failure of attempts to stabilize financial markets (notably the Agency market) clearly had an impact on U.S. policymakers. At a minimum, it raised the priority that the U.S. attached to its financial dialogue with China. At a maximum, it put pressure on the U.S. to respect China’s core financial interests, which included assuring the safety and liquidity of its holdings of Agencies. Then again, the need to support the Agency market was wildly overdetermined; the U.S. banking system was far more exposed than China.</p><p>At the end of the day, the fact that the U.S. stabilized the Agency market even as China reduced its exposure quite rapidly (whether by roll-off or outright sales) illustrated that the Fed, far more than China, has the decisive vote when it came to U.S. financial stability. The U.S. has learned, I think, that the Fed can buy more than China can sell.</p>
<p>The second episode is China’s decision after the global financial crisis to reduce its exposure to Treasury bonds – at least its visible holdings of Treasury bonds. China’s flight out of the Agencies was initially a slight back into Treasuries (and supply of Treasuries expanded rapidly after the crisis, making this an easy choice). Visible holdings of Treasuries soared from $500 billion in mid-2008 to $1.3 trillion by mid-2010, and from 2010 on China was a significant user of Euroclear’s custodial service.</p>
<figure id="image-82126" class="image-embed embedded_large"><div class="image-embed__picture">
<img width="520" height="378" alt="China: U.S. Holdings vs. Estimated Dollar Reserves" loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" class="lazyload" data-src="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/JGB%20Chart%20New.png.webp" src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/JGB%20Chart%20New.png.webp" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption"><div class="image-embed__caption-text">
<span class="image-embed__source"></span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption></figure><p>China found this risky – partially because of the domestic “optics” of having so much of Chinese savings in a country that, even then, was viewed as a less than ideal custodian of China’s wealth. China thus has been looking for alternatives to Treasuries for far longer than most contemporary accounts recognize.* The G7’s immobilization of Russia’s risk crystallized the risks of holding large reserve balances in strategic adversaries in the public eye. But China had been thinking about those risks for many years.</p>
<p>China’s response to risks of a concentrated exposure to the Treasury market was partially to continue diversifying the currency composition of its foreign reserves. This process started in 2005, likely ended around 2012 and ended up costing China a bit of interest income. China accumulated large euro reserve balances just when the ECB decided to adopt negative rates.</p>
<p>But a big part of China’s strategy was to diversify the way it holds dollars – making more use of offshore custodians (Belgium’s Euroclear most obviously) and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/fe81e06c-010d-4ddd-ad85-406412ec1bb9" title="private fund managers" target="_blank">private fund managers</a>, but also inching back into Agencies and no doubt other forms of dollar exposure that offer both less visibility and a small yield pickup over Treasuries. For example, Chinese institutions are believed to be active suppliers of dollars in the cross-currency swap market.</p>
<p>Most importantly, China decided to stop holding all its foreign assets as “liquid” foreign exchange reserves. A big part of China’s strategy is what China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) calls the “diversified use” of its reserves. <a href="http://www.safe.gov.cn/en/file/file/20211217/1bdd3ed85dba4d269655b5ce7159893b.pdf?n=Annual%20Report%20of%20the%20State%20Administration%20of%20Foreign%20Exchange%20(2020)" title="SAFE’s 2020 annual report" target="_blank">SAFE’s 2020 annual report</a>, which provides a 10-year progress report on this diversification, remains essential.</p>
<p>Diversified use of reserves effectively meant using foreign exchange not to add to SAFE’s formal foreign exchange reserves, but rather to use China’s foreign exchange to directly fund China’s strategic goals (through what SAFE calls the co-financing platform). SAFE handed foreign exchange over to the Silk Road Fund and its close kin, it provided close to $100 billion in equity capital to the China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export-Import Bank of China (Exim), and no doubt more financing via entrusted loans, and it helped fund the offshore activity of “small, medium, and large” financial instruments. I still think <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/how-hide-your-foreign-exchange-reserves-users-guide" t... |
http://localhost:1200/cfr/timelines - Success ✔️<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0">
<channel>
<title>Timelines</title>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/timelines</link>
<atom:link href="http://localhost:1200/cfr/timelines" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"></atom:link>
<description>Timelines - Made with love by RSSHub(https://github.com/DIYgod/RSSHub)</description>
<generator>RSSHub</generator>
<webMaster>i@diygod.me (DIYgod)</webMaster>
<language>en</language>
<lastBuildDate>Fri, 24 May 2024 08:26:41 GMT</lastBuildDate>
<ttl>5</ttl>
<item>
<title>Far-Right Terrorism in the United States</title>
<description><br>
<h1>1865</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Formation of the Ku Klux Klan</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77403" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1865_KKK.jpg.webp" width="520" height="550" alt="Illustration showing members of the White League and the Ku Klux Klan clasping hands over a suffering African American family." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
An editorial illustration by Thomas Nast in an 1874 publication of Harper’s Weekly shows members of the White League and the Ku Klux Klan clasping hands over a suffering African American family.
<span class="image-embed__source">Library of Congress</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>The Civil War between the pro-slavery South and anti-slavery North ends, and disgruntled veterans of the South’s defeated Confederate Army form the first iteration of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) in Pulaski, Tennessee. Nathan Bedford Forrest, a former Confederate general, becomes the Klan’s first grand wizard, its national leader. The KKK’s declared goal is “to maintain the supremacy of the White Race in the Republic.” The first Klan was active from 1865 until 1871 and played a major role in the South’s postwar Reconstruction era, fighting to oppress the previously enslaved African American populace and engaging in acts of violence against them.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1963</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>September 15, 1963</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Bombing of Sixteenth Street Baptist Church</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77407" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1963_Birmingham.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="The family of Carol Robertson mourn at her graveside during funeral services. " loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
The family of Carol Robertson, a fourteen-year-old African American girl killed in the bombing of Sixteenth Street Baptist Church, mourn at her graveside during funeral services.
<span class="image-embed__source">Horace Court/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>The church bombing in Birmingham, Alabama, is coordinated by the local chapter of the KKK, which by now is in its third iteration and popular across the South. The bombing of the predominately Black congregation kills four young girls, becoming one of the defining racist attacks of the civil rights era. Between 1947 and 1965, the KKK is linked to upward of fifty dynamite explosions targeting African Americans in Birmingham, Alabama—earning the city the grim nickname “Bombingham.”</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1968</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>April 4, 1968</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Assassination of Martin Luther King</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77408" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1968_AssassinationMLK.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Reverend Martin Luther King Jr.’s body is viewed by his wife, Coretta Scott King, and their four young children look at King in his coffin at his funeral in Atlanta." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Reverend Martin Luther King Jr.’s body is viewed by his wife, Coretta Scott King, and their four young children at King’s funeral in Atlanta.
<span class="image-embed__source">AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>James Earl Ray, a fugitive with multiple past convictions, shoots and kills Reverend Martin Luther King Jr., a leader of the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s, at a motel in Memphis, Tennessee. Ray was a supporter of racial segregation and a white supremacist. King’s death is mourned by millions of Americans and considered a low point in the civil rights movement.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1978</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Publishing of ‘The Turner Diaries’</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77409" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1978_TurnerDiaries.jpg.webp" width="520" height="780" alt="A copy of ‘The Turner Diaries,’ a racist, dystopian novel, sits on a library shelf in Marlinton, West Virginia." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
A copy of “The Turner Diaries,” a racist, dystopian novel, sits on a library shelf in Marlinton, West Virginia.
<span class="image-embed__source">Jeff Gentner/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>William Luther Pierce, a former college physics professor and a prominent neo-Nazi, publishes <em>The Turner Diaries</em> under the pseudonym Andrew Macdonald. The dystopian novel tells the story of a violent overthrow of the federal government, which leads to a nuclear conflict and race war. Notably, the book’s hero, Earl Turner, detonates a bomb at the FBI’s headquarters in Washington, DC. The book is advertised with the slogan, “What will you do when they come to take your guns?” The novel comes to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/12/books/turner-diaries-white-supremacists.html">resonate with far-right groups</a> in the decades ahead.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1978</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Formation of the Aryan Nations </h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77410" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1978_AryanNations.jpg.webp" width="520" height="728" alt="Reverend Richard Butler poses in his church at the headquarters of the Aryan Nations neo-nazi organization, in northern Idaho." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Reverend Richard Butler poses in his church at the headquarters of the Aryan Nations neo-nazi organization, in northern Idaho.
<span class="image-embed__source">Bettmann/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Notorious neo-Nazi Pastor Richard Butler forms the Aryan Nations in Idaho. A small but committed group, its followers subscribe to the so-called <a href="https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounder/christian-identity">Christian Identity doctrine</a>, believing they are God’s true “chosen people,” a designation usually that refers to Jews. They believe a racial war is imminent between Aryan (white) people and Jews and nonwhites, one that they must prepare for and win. Through its annual World Congresses, the Aryan Nations inspires the creation of the terrorist group called the Order.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1984</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">End of The Order </h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77423" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1984_Order.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="FBI agents sift through the ruins of the house where Robert J. Matthews, founder of the neo-Nazi group the Order, died in a fire after a standoff with federal agents." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
FBI agents sift through the ruins of the house where Robert J. Matthews, founder of the neo-Nazi group The Order, died in a fire amid a standoff with federal agents.
<span class="image-embed__source">Tim Klass/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Federal law enforcement officials <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/17/us/fbi-spying-white-supremacists-declassified/index.html">track Robert Mathews</a>, leader of The Order, to a small house on the state of Washington’s Whidbey Island. Mathews, wanted on murder and robbery charges, refuses to surrender, and a gunfight and standoff ensue, during which he’s killed in a fire. With his death, Mathews becomes a martyr for the far right.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1988</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Fort Smith Sedition Trial</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77411" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1988_SeditionTrial.jpg.webp" width="520" height="668" alt="Louis Ray Beam Jr. carries his wife, Sheila, who had fainted, away from the federal courthouse in Fort Smith, Arkansas. after he and twelve other white supremacists are acquitted on sedition charges." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Louis Ray Beam Jr. carries his wife, Sheila, who had fainted, away from the federal courthouse in Fort Smith, Arkansas, after he and twelve other white supremacists are acquitted on sedition charges.
<span class="image-embed__source">Danny Johnson/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Federal prosecutors bring fourteen white supremacists to trial at Fort Smith, Arkansas. They stand accused of plots against the U.S. government (seditious conspiracy) and other violent crimes. An all-white jury <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/04/08/13-white-supremacists-acquitted-in-arkansas-murder-and-sedition-trial/21c30cbe-c120-40ac-8fec-33420d1b0d2e/">acquits all of them</a>. Afterward, defendant Louis Beam, a former KKK leader and later the “ambassador-at-large” for the Aryan Nations, focuses on building a base of support for a white supremacist revolution against the “Zionist-Occupied Government.” To this end, Beam founds a publication called the Seditionist, which promotes his concept of “leaderless resistance.” This revolution strategy argues that guerrilla warfare should be pursued through individual or small cells, not hierarchical organizations.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1992</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>August 1992</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Standoff at Ruby Ridge</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77412" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1992_RubyRidge.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Federal agents draw their weapons on five neo-Nazis a few miles from the Ruby Ridge site in Idaho where Randy Weaver is engaged in a standoff with authorities." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Federal agents draw their weapons on five neo-Nazis a few miles from the Ruby Ridge site in Idaho, where Randy Weaver is engaged in a standoff with authorities.
<span class="image-embed__source">Mason March/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>A large contingent of federal agents descend on a small home in Idaho to arrest Aryan Nations member Randy Weaver on unresolved firearms charges. After Weaver refuses to surrender, the ensuing eleven-day standoff and siege results in the shootout deaths of Weaver’s son, wife, and dog, as well as a federal officer. Weaver ends up surrendering, but his family become <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/05/13/1098735768/weaver-and-the-ruby-ridge-standoff-contributed-to-the-evolution-of-the-radical-r">martyrs for the movement</a>, and the standoff captures the attention of far-right Americans nationwide.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1993</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>February 1993</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Waco Siege</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77413" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1993_Waco.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Smoke billows from the Branch Davidians’ compound as it burns to the ground outside of Waco, Texas, during a raid by federal agents." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
The Branch Davidians’ compound burns to the ground outside of Waco, Texas, during a raid by federal agents.
<span class="image-embed__source">Greg Smith/Corbis/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Federal agents besiege Mount Carmel Center, a compound near Waco, Texas, where residents are suspected of illegally selling machine guns and stockpiling weapons. The compound is home to the Branch Davidians, a religious cult led by David Koresh. When agents try to serve a search warrant, a gunfight breaks out, leaving ten people dead, including four federal officers. A nearly two-month standoff ensues, which ends when federal agents launch an assault on the compound. During the raid, a fire starts, and the compound burns to the ground, killing seventy-six Branch Davidians, including David Koresh and many women and children. Ruby Ridge and Waco both fuel anti-government conspiracy theories by alleging that a predatory government seeks to infringe on individual liberties.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1995</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>April 19, 1995</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Oklahoma City Bombing</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>An anti-government extremist and military veteran named Timothy McVeigh detonates a truck bomb at the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, killing 168 people and injuring hundreds more. The act is directly tied to the government crackdowns at Ruby Ridge and Waco, with McVeigh launching his attack on the second anniversary of the Waco siege. The Oklahoma City bombing is the deadliest domestic terrorist attack in modern U.S. history and leads to a sweeping government crackdown on armed militias, with federal law enforcement agencies significantly raising their efforts to infiltrate anti-government extremist groups. The militia movement therefore suffers a substantial blow in the late 1990s. McVeigh is executed for his crimes in 2001, while a co-conspirator, Terry Nichols, is still serving out a life sentence in prison as of 2024.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2008</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Election of Barack Obama</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77414" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2008_ObamaElection.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Members of the Tea Party hold a sign reading &quot;Obama Where's Your Papers&quot; during a protest." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Members of the Tea Party movement protest outside of San Francisco’s Fairmont Hotel ahead of a fundraiser attended by President Barack Obama in 2010.
<span class="image-embed__source">Justin Sullivan/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>A resurgence of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE49L7D0/">racism</a> and anti-government extremism surfaces with the November election of Barack Obama, the country’s first African American president. Some political opponents and conspiracy theorists allege that Obama is Muslim and foreign-born, falsehoods that they hoped would undermine his presidency and disqualify him from office.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2011</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>July 2011</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">American-Inspired Attacks in Norway</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77415" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2011_Norway.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="A young man is comforted as he mourns the deaths of those killed by Anders Breivik in a mass shooting and bombing in Norway." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
A young man is comforted as he mourns the deaths of those killed by Anders Breivik in a mass shooting and bombing in Norway.
<span class="image-embed__source">Wolfgang Rattay/Reuters</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Anders Breivik, a far-right extremist seeking to emulate Timothy McVeigh, kills seventy-seven people in twin attacks in Oslo, Norway. He murders eight with a truck bomb in the capital’s government quarter, and then drives to a nearby island—home to the summer camp of the youth wing of the country’s Labour Party—where he indiscriminately guns down sixty-nine more victims. Breivik wrote a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE76N14J/">long manifesto</a> accompanying his attack, calling his targets “cultural Marxists” who he felt were orchestrating the cultural and demographic replacement of Norwegians who shared his European heritage.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2015</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>June 2015</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Charleston AME Church Shooting</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77416" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2015_Charleston.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="People line up to attend Sunday services following a mass shooting at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina. " loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
People line up to attend Sunday services following a mass shooting at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina.
<span class="image-embed__source">Joe Raedle/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>White supremacist Dylann Roof opens fire at the “Mother” Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church in Charleston, South Carolina, killing nine African American worshippers. The church is known for hosting civil rights icons over the decades, including Martin Luther King Jr. During the attack, Roof tells victims, “I have to do it. You rape our women, and you’re taking over our country. And you have to go.”</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2016</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Election of Donald Trump</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77417" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2016_TrumpElection.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump speaks at a campaign rally in Rochester, New York." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump speaks at a campaign rally in Rochester, New York.
<span class="image-embed__source">Brett Carlsen/Getty Images </span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Donald Trump is elected president of the United States running as a Republican. Trump’s campaign had featured some far-right themes on immigration and race, and made proposals including a Muslim ban, a possible Muslim registry, and a border wall to keep out “rapist” and “criminal” Mexicans. To many Americans, his election victory proves that far-right rhetoric and policies that for decades had been associated only with extremists could resonate with wider swathes of the electorate, enough to actually win the White House.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2017</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>August 2017</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Charlottesville Car-Ramming</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77418" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2017_Charlottesville.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="White nationalists, holding tiki torches, march on the grounds of the University of Virginia ahead of the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia. " loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
White nationalists march on the grounds of the University of Virginia ahead of the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia.
<span class="image-embed__source">Stephanie Keith/Reuters</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>On August 11, a “Unite the Right” rally against the removal of a statue of Confederate commander Robert E. Lee in Charlottesville, Virginia, begins with a torchlight procession at the University of Virginia amid chants that “Jews will not replace us.” The following day, the protests turn more violent when James Alex Fields Jr., a twenty-year-old neo-Nazi who had traveled from Ohio for the rally, rams his car into a crowd of counter-demonstrators, injuring twenty-eight and killing one. In the wake of the incident, President Trump refused to condemn the rally, stating that there were “very fine people on both sides.” This statement, coupled with the president’s widely criticized handling of the crisis, provides a significant fillip for Americans on the far right, who <a href="https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/443666-richard-spencer-charlottesville-wouldnt-have-occurred-without/">see Trump as an ally in the White House.</a></p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2018</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Tree of Life Synagogue Shooting</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77419" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2018_TreeLife.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="A Jewish man prays at a makeshift memorial of flowers and handwritten notes outside the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
A Jewish man prays at a makeshift memorial of flowers and handwritten notes outside the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh.
<span class="image-embed__source">Cathal McNoughton/Reuters</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Robert Bowers, a forty-six-year-old local man, guns down eleven Jewish worshippers, most of them elderly, at the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Bowers presaged his attack with antisemitic and anti-immigrant posts on the social-networking site Gab, writing, “HIAS [Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society] likes to bring invaders in that kill our people. I can’t sit by and watch my people get slaughtered. Screw your optics, I’m going in.” Bowers was aggrieved about alleged migrant “caravans” coming from Central America, which he believed were being orchestrated by Jewish nonprofit organizations such as HIAS Bowers is sentenced to death in 2023 for the attack, and he remains on death row.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2019</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Christchurch Shootings</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77420" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2019_Christchurch.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="People walk under police tape as they leave after prayers at Linwood Islamic Center in Christchurch, New Zealand." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
People leave after prayers at the site of Brenton Tarrant’s rampage at the Linwood Islamic Centre in Christchurch, New Zealand.
<span class="image-embed__source">Edgar Su/Reuters </span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>During a twenty-minute rampage in Christchurch, New Zealand, gunman Brenton Tarrant murders fifty-one worshippers in two mosques. Seeking to inspire emulation of this violence, Tarrant livestreams most of the carnage on the internet, where it is viewed more than a million times—thus redefining far-right terrorism in the twenty-first century. Tarrant had been active in an eclectic and radical online space that trafficked in extremist ideologies about race, immigration, and environmental degradation. Mimicking Breivik, Tarrant explained his views in a seventy-four-page manifesto. His attack is inspired by U.S. conspiracy theories (including over guns), and in turn inspires follow-on attacks in the United States.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2020</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">COVID-19, Racial Justice, and the ‘Big Lie’</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77421" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2020_Covid.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Armed civilian men stand on the steps of the Michigan State Capitol in Lansing, taking part in a protest against Gov. Gretchen Whitmer's expanded stay-at-home order during the Covid-19 pandemic." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Armed civilian men stand on the steps of the Michigan State Capitol in Lansing, taking part in a protest against Governor Gretchen Whitmer’s expanded stay-at-home order during the COVID-19 pandemic.
<span class="image-embed__source">Jeff Kowalsky/AFP/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>The COVID-19 pandemic and ensuing government “lockdowns” in many jurisdictions provide renewed impetus to extremists across the far-right spectrum, offering perceived proof for many of their conspiracy theories and leading to spikes in online radicalization. Nationwide racial justice protests, catalyzed by the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/photos-how-george-floyds-death-sparked-protests-worldwide">killing of George Floyd</a>, also reenergize far right Americans, some of whom gather in armed counterprotests to “defend” police and businesses from rioting and looting. In the most notable flash of violence, Air Force Sergeant and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/right-wing-extremists-looming-threat-us-election">“boogaloo” adherent</a> Steven Carrillo perpetrates twin attacks in May and June 2020 that kill a federal officer and sheriff’s deputy in California. Both before and after his November 2022 election loss to Joe Biden, President Trump repeatedly airs unfounded concerns over mail-in ballot voting and repeats the falsehood that the election was “stolen.”</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2021</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Riots at the U.S. Capitol Building</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77422" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2021_Jan6Insurrection.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Trump supporters erect gallows amid protests and riots in front of the U.S. Capitol building, where many clash with police and damage government property." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Trump supporters erect gallows amid protests and riots in front of the U.S. Capitol building, where many clash with police and damage government property.
<span class="image-embed__source">Shay Horse/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>On January 6, 2021, a mob storms the U.S. Capitol, driven by Trump-fueled conspiracy theories about the 2020 presidential election. It the first such attack on the institution since British invaders set fire to the Capitol in 1814. Participants erect a gallows outside the building, imagery evoking “The Day of the Rope” from <em>The Turner Diaries</em>, which presaged a nationwide revolt. In the aftermath, federal prosecutors secure <a href="https://apnews.com/article/enrique-tarrio-capitol-riot-seditious-conspiracy-sentencing-da60222b3e1e54902db2bbbb219dc3fb">seditious conspiracy convictions</a> against several planners of the assault, succeeding where their 1988 counterparts had failed in proving that the defendants intended to violently overthrow the U.S. government.</p>
</div>
</div>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/timeline/far-right-terrorism-united-states</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/timeline/far-right-terrorism-united-states</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 03 Jan 2024 21:04:02 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>The U.S.–South Korea Alliance</title>
<description><br>
<h1>1950</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>June 25, 1950</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">The Korean War Begins With North Korea’s Invasion </h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76281" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_1950_KoreanWar_0.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="American troops withdrawing from Yongsan in Korea." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
American troops withdraw from Yongsan in Korea.
<span class="image-embed__source">Keystone/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>After independence from Japanese colonialism post–World War II, early Cold War tensions lead to the occupation of the Korean Peninsula by Soviet forces in the North and U.S. forces in the South. North Korea, backed by China and the Soviet Union, attempts to reunify the peninsula under communist rule by invading South Korea. The UN Security Council <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1950">denounces the attack</a> as a breach of peace and adopts binding resolutions, which call for an immediate cessation of hostilities and—for the first time—authorize the formation of the UN Command to provide assistance to South Korea. Under the command, sixteen countries, led by the United States, provide troop support to South Korea.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1953</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>July 27, 1953</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">The United Nations, China, and North Korea Sign the Armistice Agreement</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76284" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/12/TL_1953_Armistice2.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Maj. Gen. Blackshear M. Bryan exchanges credentials with Communist Lt. Gen. Lee Sang Cho at the opening session of the Military Armistice Commission at the Panmunjom Conference House on July 27, 1953." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
U.S. Maj. Gen. Blackshear M. Bryan exchanges credentials with Korean Communist Lt. Gen. Lee Sang Cho at the Military Armistice Commission in the Inter-Korean Peace House, situated on the south side of demilitarized zone.
<span class="image-embed__source">AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>The agreement divides the Korean Peninsula along the thirty-eighth parallel and establishes the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) as a buffer between North and South Korea. South Korean President Syngman Rhee opts not to sign the agreement, but he accepts the armistice on the condition that the United States and South Korea sign a mutual defense treaty. Because the Armistice Agreement serves as a cease-fire to the Korean War and the two Koreas did not sign a formal peace treaty, they technically remain in a state of war.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1953</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>October 1, 1953</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">The United States and South Korea Sign the Mutual Defense Treaty </h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76287" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_1953_MutualDefense.jpg.webp" width="520" height="409" alt="South Korean President Rhee Syngman leafs through the mutual defense treaty between the United States and Republic of Korea on January 29, 1954." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
South Korean President Rhee Syngman leafs through the mutual defense treaty between the United States and Republic of Korea on January 29, 1954.
<span class="image-embed__source">George Sweers/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>The U.S.-South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty ensures U.S. defense&nbsp;of&nbsp;South Korea against external aggression and commits to a U.S. military presence in South Korea. The treaty lays the foundation for a robust security alliance between the two countries.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1961</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>May 16, 1961</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">General Park Chung-hee Launches a Military Coup</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76288" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_1961_Coup.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="South Korean President Park Chung-hee stands on a podium next to U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson in Washington, DC." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
South Korean President Park Chung-hee stands on a podium next to U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson in Washington, DC, on May 17, 1965.
<span class="image-embed__source">Universal History Archive/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Amid domestic economic and political turmoil, the military overthrows the government, seizes power, and imposes martial law. Under pressure from the United States, South Korea holds a presidential election in 1963, in which Park is elected as president. Park implements an export-oriented economic modernization plan that transforms South Korea from one of the most impoverished countries in the world to a country with unprecedented economic growth, known as the so-called “<a href="https://www.oecd.org/country/korea/thematic-focus/sustaining-the-miracle-on-the-han-river-103653fa/">Miracle on the Han River</a>.” South Korea’s enhanced economic stature begins to alleviate the asymmetry of the U.S.-South Korea relationship.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1975</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">The United States Discovers South Korea’s Covert Nuclear Weapons Program </h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>President Park initiates the development of an independent nuclear weapons program, following concerns about the United States reducing its security commitment and withdrawing troops from South Korea under the Nixon Doctrine established by U.S. President Richard Nixon. The United States later pressures Park to cancel a nuclear plant agreement with France, offering U.S. nuclear assistance and personnel for peaceful purposes instead. South Korea’s nuclear ambitions cease when Park signs the <a href="https://disarmament.unoda.org/wmd/nuclear/npt/">Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty</a> (NPT).</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1980</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>May 18, 1980</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Pro-democracy Activists Lead the Gwangju Democratization Movement</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76289" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_1980_GwangjuProtest.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Armed South Korean soldiers capture rioters in Gwangju, South Korea." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Armed South Korean soldiers capture rioters in Gwangju, South Korea, on May 27, 1980.
<span class="image-embed__source">Sadayuki Mikami/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>After General Chun Doo-hwan seizes power through a military coup in December 1979,&nbsp;South Korean civilians, led by students and activists, <a href="https://archives.kdemo.or.kr/display/en/1980.html">organize pro-democracy protests</a> demanding an end to military rule. The South Korean government responds by imposing martial law and using violence to suppress activists in the city of Gwangju. The movement marks a turning point in South Korea’s struggle for democracy, inspiring people to resist the military dictatorship across the country and eventually leading to the country’s democratization. U.S.-South Korea relations are hobbled by perceptions within South Korea that the United States sided with the dictatorship rather than support the democratic movement.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1991</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>September 27, 1991</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">The United States Withdraws Tactical Nuclear Weapons</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>U.S. President George H. W. Bush announces his decision to remove all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea. The next year, the two Koreas sign the <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/KR%20KP_920120_JointDeclarationDenuclearizationKoreanPeninsula.pdf">Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization&nbsp;of the Korean Peninsula</a> [PDF]. Under this agreement, the two countries commit not to test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2002</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>June 13, 2002</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Anti-American Protests Arise in South Korea</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76290" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_2002_AntiUSProtests.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="A protester shouts anti-American slogans while holding a poster of the two students accidentally killed by U.S. officers in Seoul." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
A protester shouts anti-American slogans while holding a poster of the two students accidentally killed by U.S. officers in Seoul, South Korea, on December 3, 2002.
<span class="image-embed__source">Lee Jae-Won/Reuters</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Two off-duty U.S. servicemen accidentally kill two South Korean middle-school girls while driving a U.S. military vehicle. The incident and the subsequent acquittal of the soldiers by a U.S. military court trigger anti-American protests across South Korea. Primarily directed at the U.S. military presence in South Korea, the protests reflect a desire for a more equal relationship with the United States.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2003</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>January 10, 2003</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">North Korea Withdraws From the NPT</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76291" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_2003_NPTWithdrawl.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="A crowd of millions of North Koreans gathers to hear political leaders announce the decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in Pyongyang." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Millions of North Koreans gather to hear political leaders announce the decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in Pyongyang, North Korea.
<span class="image-embed__source">Xinhua/AFP/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>North Korea announces its intention to withdraw from the NPT, stating concerns regarding&nbsp;“hostile” U.S. policies toward the country. Pyongyang criticizes the binding obligations stipulated in the safeguard accord under Article 3 of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regulations. Three years later, North Korea <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/north-korea-nuclear-weapons-missile-tests-military-capabilities">successfully tests its first nuclear weapon</a>, changing security dynamics on the Korean Peninsula.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2003</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>August 27, 2003</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Six-Party Talks Aim to Negotiate North Korea’s Denuclearization</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76292" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_2003_6PartyTalks.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="The heads of each of the six country delegations join hands before talks about North Korea’s nuclear crisis in Beijing." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
The heads of each of the six country delegations join hands before talks about North Korea’s nuclear crisis in Beijing.
<span class="image-embed__source">Ng Han Guan/AFP/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Representatives from China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States convene in Beijing to negotiate <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/north-korean-nuclear-negotiations">North Korea’s denuclearization</a> following revelations that North Korea had covertly pursued a uranium enrichment program. The United States insists on complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID), while North Korea seeks diplomatic normalization with the United States and security assurances. Despite multiple rounds of talks, the countries fail to reach a consensus, leading to North Korea’s withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks in April 2009 after the UN Security Council condemns its long-range missile launch.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2012</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>March 15, 2012</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">The Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement Enters Into Force</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76293" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_2012_KORUS.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="South Korean conservative activists raise a banner reading “let’s occupy the world market and become an economic power,”." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
South Korean conservative activists raise a banner reading “let’s occupy the world market and become an economic power,” at a rally supporting the South Korea-U.S. free trade agreement in Seoul, South Korea.
<span class="image-embed__source">Jung Yeon-Je/AFP/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>After six years of negotiations, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak and U.S. President Barack Obama sign the trade treaty, which is then ratified by the South Korean National Assembly. The agreement promotes economic cooperation and access to commercial markets for both countries. The <a href="https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta">Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement</a> (KORUS FTA) is the largest bilateral free trade agreement the United States has signed. The trade agreement paves the way for an economic partnership alongside the military alliance between the two countries.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2016</h1>
<div class=... |
http://localhost:1200/cfr/books-reports - Success ✔️<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0">
<channel>
<title>Books & Reports</title>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/books-reports</link>
<atom:link href="http://localhost:1200/cfr/books-reports" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"></atom:link>
<description>Books & Reports - Made with love by RSSHub(https://github.com/DIYgod/RSSHub)</description>
<generator>RSSHub</generator>
<webMaster>i@diygod.me (DIYgod)</webMaster>
<language>en</language>
<lastBuildDate>Fri, 24 May 2024 08:26:43 GMT</lastBuildDate>
<ttl>5</ttl>
<item>
<title>Preventing U.S. Election Violence in 2024</title>
<description><figure>
<div class="article-header__image-picture">
<picture>
<source srcset="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_16x9_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 1x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_2x_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 2x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_3x_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 3x" media="all and (min-width: 1280px)" type="image/webp" width="1800" height="1014">
<source srcset="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_m_480px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 1x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_m_2x_480px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 2x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_m_3x_480px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 3x" media="all and (max-width: 1279px) and (min-width: 1024px)" type="image/webp" width="1440" height="810">
<source srcset="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_16x9_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 1x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_2x_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 2x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_3x_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 3x" media="all and (max-width: 1023px) and (min-width: 750px)" type="image/webp" width="1800" height="1014">
<source srcset="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_s_260px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 1x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_s_2x_260px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 2x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_s_3x_260px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 3x" media="all and (max-width: 749px)" type="image/webp" width="780" height="438">
<source srcset="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_16x9_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 1x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_2x_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 2x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_3x_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 3x" media="all and (min-width: 1280px)" type="image/webp" width="1800" height="1014">
<source srcset="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_m_480px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 1x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_m_2x_480px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 2x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_m_3x_480px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 3x" media="all and (max-width: 1279px) and (min-width: 1024px)" type="image/webp" width="1440" height="810">
<source srcset="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_16x9_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 1x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_2x_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 2x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_3x_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 3x" media="all and (max-width: 1023px) and (min-width: 750px)" type="image/webp" width="1800" height="1014">
<source srcset="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_s_260px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 1x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_s_2x_260px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 2x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_s_3x_260px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 3x" media="all and (max-width: 749px)" type="image/webp" width="780" height="438">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_16x9_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp" width="600" height="338" alt="" loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</picture>
</div>
<figcaption class="article-header__image-caption">
Supporters of former U.S. President Donald Trump riot in front of the U.S. Capitol Building in Washington, DC, on January 6, 2021.
<span class="author">Leah Millis/Reuters</span>
</figcaption>
</figure><br><h2>Introduction</h2>
<p>There is a serious risk of extremist violence around the 2024 U.S. presidential election. Many of the same sources of instability and grievances that precipitated the January 6, 2021, assault on the U.S. Capitol (along with other challenges to the outcome of the last election) remain present today. And, while the risk of far-right election-related violence is greater, the possibility of far-left extremist violence cannot be dismissed. Such violence threatens individual lives and the domestic political stability of the country.</p>
<p>It could also undermine the United States’ international standing and foreign policy goals, in a year where at least eighty elections will take place around the world. U.S.-based election violence has already <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/america-exporter-far-right-violent-extremism-brazil-and-beyond" title="inspired&nbsp;one similar incident" target="_blank">inspired&nbsp;one similar incident</a>, in Brazil in January 2023, and further disruption could affect the rules-based international order in ways detrimental to U.S. interests as it embarks on a new generation in strategic competition. The United States would also benefit from serving as the standard-setter on several associated issues, such as disinformation on social media and the rise of generative artificial intelligence (AI) and its impact on elections.</p><p>Lessening the risk of such a contingency is therefore an urgent national security imperative. Political leaders and other participants in the political and civic process need to implement a range of measures to prevent and manage violent election-related extremism.</p>
<h2>The Contingency</h2>
<p>Several plausible scenarios could develop between now and Inauguration Day. The scenarios can be broken down into events that occur before the election, during early voting in October and on election day in November, and in the weeks after the election, possibly lingering into the new administration. Each scenario poses different challenges to different constituencies and could be inspired or driven by differing accelerants.</p>
<p><b><em>Pre-election</em></b></p>
<p>The first and most urgent scenario involves assassination threats against campaigning candidates and other public officials<a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-slow-burn-threatening-our-democracy" title=". According to Seamus Hughes and Pete Simi" target="_blank">. According to Seamus Hughes and Pete Simi</a> of the University of Nebraska-Omaha, “over the past 10 years, more than 500 individuals have been arrested for threatening public officials. And the trendline is shooting up.” In recent years, for example, the lives of Vice President Mike Pence, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, and New York Republican gubernatorial candidate Lee Zeldin were all threatened. Nikki Haley, the Republican runner-up, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/nikki-haley-secret-service-2ae5b277396702248af73f89da92b4b9" title="requested Secret Service protection" target="_blank">requested Secret Service protection</a> during her campaign, indicating that violent threats have already surfaced in this cycle as well. The United States has been spared a high-profile assassination for more than a half-century. However, lack of success should not be taken to suggest lack of intent. Precisely this point was underscored on June 14, 2017, when a far-left extremist opened fire at a baseball practice of congressional Republicans, gravely wounding House Majority Whip Steve Scalise before being killed by the congressman’s Capitol Police detail.</p>
<p>Second, large party and voter gatherings, such as the Republican National Convention in Milwaukee in July and the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in August, as well as primary elections and caucuses, could pose attractive targets. The conventions will boast the largest collections of party members and leaders throughout the entire election cycle and could therefore attract individuals or groups with a vendetta. News headquarters will also be potential targets given extremist rhetoric depicting the media the “enemy of the people.”</p>
<p>Third, dates associated with the former president’s legal troubles could also trigger violent extremists. Trump’s legal challenges have thrust the 2024 election into unprecedented territory, with the possibility of a presidential candidate running for office from the courtroom, and possibly jail. The public process and potential legal outcomes could accelerate and spur violent attacks.</p><p><em><b>Election</b></em></p>
<p>Once voting begins, the first and most likely scenario is violence and intimidation at polling places and against election workers, or against drive-by or drop-off balloting sites and their collection points. This could include armed militia groups “observing” the election for fraud but, in reality, intimidating voters. In 2020, for example, Oath Keepers gathered at polling places to, in Oath Keepers founder Stewart Rhodes’s <a href="https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-10-10/what-happens-if-armed-right-wing-groups-polls" title="words" target="_blank">words</a>, “protect people who are voting.” Such gatherings could intimidate voters and disrupt Election Day by <a href="https://www.chicagotribune.com/2023/11/24/munster-incident-puts-focus-on-voter-intimidation-cases-that-can-dampen-turnout-poll-worker-participation/" title="dampening turnout" target="_blank">dampening turnout</a>. This scenario could be driven both by any candidate calls to arms as well as by grassroots voices sensitive to local issues, vulnerabilities, and voting preferences, and to individual poll workers expressing or acting upon their personal political views. Such violence provides less of a model for partners and adversaries in the international space, given that the November election will occur after most other 2024 elections have occurred.</p>
<p>Once voting is completed, threats could turn against those counting the ballots. During the 2020 election, some of the more vitriolic threats were delivered against election officials in swing states. The sequencing of vote counting can play a part, such as when early, mail, and absentee ballots, which tend to lean Democratic, are counted last, leading to “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/oct/31/red-mirage-trump-election-scenario-victory" title="red mirages" target="_blank">red mirages</a>” in which Republican candidates take early leads that fade in the final legal vote tally. In 2020, for example, federal agents&nbsp;<a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/2-men-detained-after-police-learn-possible-threat-philadelphia-vote-n1246774" title="arrested two QAnon supporters" target="_blank">arrested two QAnon supporters</a> from Virginia who showed up with firearms at a convention center in Philadelphia where votes were still being counted three days after Election Day. Political calls to “stop the count” or “stop the steal” can make a violent response more likely.</p>
<div id="pullquote-80929--2" class="pullquote embedded_small">
<figure class="pullquote__container"><blockquote class="pullquote__quote">
<span class="pullquote__quote-content">Once voting is completed, threats could turn against those counting the ballots.</span>
</blockquote>
</figure></div>
<p><em><b>Post-election</b></em></p>
<p>In the post-election era, depending on election results, attacks against government buildings and/or law enforcement officials will likely be the preferred means as violent extremists aim to take the fight directly to those they deem responsible for malfeasance. This scenario was seen at COVID protests in April 2020, sprawling anti-fascist rioting that summer, at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, and the attack against the FBI in Cincinnati. Here, the main accelerant will be political rhetoric interpreted by violently inclined individuals as calls for violence. Perhaps the most significant lesson of January 6 is that even seemingly innocuous moments can provide the impetus for extremist gatherings given the right combination of messaging and momentum. Any number of constitutional milestones—when electors vote in their home states; the January 6, 2025, counting of electoral votes; or Inauguration Day itself—could thus provide the spark, particularly among far-right violent extremists. Far-left violence responding to a disappointing election result will likely be more sporadic and disorganized. Militant anarchists, in particular, could be active, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/protesters-bring-shouts-skirmishes-and-shutdowns-to-inauguration-celebration/2017/01/20/00ea4c72-df11-11e6-acdf-14da832ae861_story.html" title="as seen on inauguration day in 2017" target="_blank">as seen on inauguration day in 2017</a>. Still, the bond between far-left anarchists and the political system is <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/us/live-updates-antifa-riots-1-21-2021" title="not as strong" target="_blank">not as strong</a> as on the right, making it unlikely that extremists respond to any call for violence from politicians.</p>
<p>Should multiple, organized extremist elements take up arms in defense of their candidates or other interests, sustained violence between political factions across broad geographic spaces remains possible. This level of violence has not yet been reached during the current escalation in domestic terrorism, except at a small scale on American streets in clashes between the Proud Boys and anti-fascists. Should those skirmishes escalate, they would pose a serious threat to law and order. The gravest fear, full-scale and total civil war, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/16/opinions/us-brink-of-civil-war-hoffman-ware/index.html" title="remains unlikely" target="_blank">remains unlikely</a>, in large part due to the lack of safe havens or sanctuaries for extremists in the United States. Political divides today run along urban-rural delineations, not northern-southern, which will likely stunt any budding civil war in its infancy.</p>
<h2>Warning Indicators</h2>
<p>The most urgent warning sign of impending violence will be the words of the candidates themselves. Political figures are certain to use divisive and perhaps even <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/09/05/polarization-democracy-and-political-violence-in-united-states-what-research-says-pub-90457?utm_source=carnegieemail&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_campaign=announcement&amp;mkt_tok=ODEzLVhZVS00MjIAAAGOBdngCOU2E0PgTOYMht0Jscfwq-kVZ7BNGEm9S0g9a-6RljRaHw9QWuQJjFo-HOqyY1k8e_LWTFj9poxUJ9iHe4ZzUlTWqS5XnzxluU0" title="existential political rhetoric" target="_blank">existential political rhetoric</a> during the campaign, warning of an urgent threat to the rank-and-file of either political party and to the country as a whole. Politicians deploy such rhetoric to frighten their base into voting, but such action also increases the odds of individuals turning to violent solutions if their candidate loses or appears to be in arrears. Existential rhetoric from within the political system or from candidates or parties can translate into implicit and explicit calls for violence, including against members of one’s own party, another important warning indicator. Even regular political rhetoric could be taken as calls to violence, particularly given that Americans are increasingly divided. Polls show that almost a quarter of Americans (33 percent of Republicans and 13 percent of Democrats) believe that “American patriots may have to resort to violence in order to save the country.”</p>
<div id="pullquote-80930--2" class="pullquote embedded_small">
<figure class="pullquote__container"><blockquote class="pullquote__quote">
<span class="pullquote__quote-content">The most urgent warning sign of impending violence will be the words of the candidates themselves.</span>
</blockquote>
</figure></div>
<p>Casting doubt over election results before voting commences heightens the possibility of violent extremism. “Pre-bunking” of fair election outcomes sows doubts in the minds of voters who then see eventual electoral defeats as confirmation of fraud rather than a rejection of one’s political platform, unlocking inherent confirmation biases. Politicians on both the left and right have been responsible for such rhetoric, the right issuing warnings of stolen dating back to the 2016 race, and the left often expressing concern over alleged voter suppression in predominantly Black southern communities.</p>
<p>The risk of more organized and widespread violence could be heralded by armed paramilitary mobilization, including on social media. January 6 was preceded by an onslaught of threats and public organizing, which was largely ignored by law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Extremist infiltrations of law enforcement agencies (<a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/01/03/could-january-6th-happen-again-526167" title="including the Capitol Police" target="_blank">including the Capitol Police</a>) and the military, coupled with the radicalization of active duty service members, also bears monitoring as both would considerably undermine any mitigative countermeasures arrayed against violent actors.</p>
<p>Finally, national security professionals should be vigilant in tracking foreign interference, whether covert (and therefore likely hidden from public view until after the election) or overt, including foreign leaders casting doubt on election results before voting commences. Adversaries such as China, Iran, and Russia will eagerly exploit any opportunity to weaken the United States and will likely issue widespread disinformation to cause disunity, as in 2016 and 2020. Social media remains a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/defending-year-democracy" title="defining battlefield in twenty-first-century elections" target="_blank">defining battlefield in twenty-first-century elections</a>, and the situation has only grown more fraught with the development of powerful tools such as generative AI, which, for instance, was used to attempt to <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/boston/video/new-hampshire-federal-officials-open-criminal-probe-after-fake-joe-biden-robocalls/" title="dampen the Biden vote" target="_blank">dampen the Biden vote</a> during the New Hampshire primary. The social media platform X poses a particular new challenge. Owner Elon Musk has reduced content moderation and allowed disinformation on the platform, creating an opening for manipulation by domestic and foreign actors alike, as well as AI-generated content.</p>
<h2>Implications for U.S. Interests</h2>
<p>The assassination of a politician or election official could seriously undermine U.S. democratic institutions and traditions. More broadly, the rejection of election results could undermine civil society and further polarize the nation, while the mere threat of violence at polling places could dissuade voters from making their voices heard, further <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-slow-burn-threatening-our-democracy" title="weakening American democracy" target="_blank">weakening American democracy</a>. Threats issued against poll workers undermine American democratic traditions; volunteers seeking to participate in the civic process do not anticipate being targeted for their service, and such threats could deter their participation.</p>
<p>But perhaps equally damaging, American political violence, particularly concentrated around election cycles, poses grave threats to the rules-based international order. U.S. electoral turmoil could provide a model for further seditious organizing in allied states. Such contagion has already been seen in Brazil, and could undermine election integrity in a year with upwards of eighty elections worldwide. Domestic violent extremism also undermines U.S. credibility on international human rights and its international security credentials. On January 7, 2021, for instance, a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry claimed that American support for pro-democratic protests in Hong Kong was now a sign of hypocrisy: “On the issue of human rights, democracy, and freedom, double standard should be discarded. I hope the relevant countries can think about this and learn real lessons from it.” An author linked to al-Qaeda, meanwhile, wrote that <a href="https://twitter.com/colebunzel/status/1382747626521563140" title="January 6 had made amends" target="_blank">January 6 had made amends</a> for mistakes made on 9/11: “I realized the wisdom of God almighty in not guiding the fourth plane to its target, for their destroying the citadel of their democracy by their own hands ... is more damaging to them &amp; more soothing to the hearts of the believers.”</p>
<div id="pullquote-80927--2" class="pullquote embedded_small">
<figure class="pullquote__container"><blockquote class="pullquote__quote">
<span class="pullquote__quote-content">U.S. electoral turmoil could provide a model for further seditious organizing in allied states</span>
</blockquote>
</figure></div>
<p>U.S. electoral turmoil could also offer a “window of opportunity” for state and nonstate adversaries to act—whether through direct terrorism launched at the United States or U.S. interests, or other hybrid measures intended to undermine U.S. security and standing. Hamas’s attack on Israel at a time of <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2023/10/israel-democracy-judicial-reform-netanyahu-hamas-attacks/675713/" title="profound internal turmoil" target="_blank">profound internal turmoil</a> in that country is an example of such opportunism. Russia also launched its invasion of Ukraine at a time of perceived Western weakness and division.</p>
<h2><b>Preventive Options</b></h2>
<p>In the same way that law enforcement officials deconstruct the motives, means, and opportunities behind criminal behavior to design more effective preventive measures, so too can election administrators assess policy options to lessen the risk of domestic political violence around the 2024 election.</p>
<p>The leading reason for the rise in domestic terrorism in recent years is a heightened motive or intent toward acts of violence. <b><em>Reducing motive</em></b>, therefore, is both paramount to prevention and a daunting challenge. In the build-up to the election, mainstream politicians on both sides of the aisle can use their platforms to speak out against division and publicly praise the integrity of U.S. democracy. Although federal politicians have been reluctant to be outspoken against divisive politics (perhaps warily watching the examples of Republicans Liz Cheney and Adam Kinzinger, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/loyal-trump-republican-party-moves-censure-us-reps-cheney-kinzinger-2022-02-04/" title="who no longer serve in Congress" target="_blank">who no longer serve in Congress</a> after sitting on the January 6 committee), state and local officials have been far more committed to upholding democratic norms in their constituencies. Many maintain the trust of a large swathe of the American people and can call for peace and calm. One example of this commitment is Republican Utah Governor (and Chair of the National Governors Association) Spencer Cox’s Disagree Better initiative, which aims “to model how to disagree better, setting an example and creating the permission structure and template for other public officials at every level to follow.” Such measures, critically, do not touch on political or ideological differences, but instead emphasize shared interests such as civil disagreement and trust and faith in democracy.</p>
<p>The Joe Biden administration has several options to lower the country’s temperature and promote a peaceful and orderly election process. For instance, President Biden could task agencies such as the Department of Education or Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to issue nonpartisan educational tools that teach the American public about the electoral process and its resilience to manipulation. Such positive pre-bunking could prevent electoral conspiracy theories from taking root as widely as they did in 2020. The Biden administration could also push states to reverse their vote-counting timelines to count the usually Democratic early, mail, and absentee ballots ahead of the typically Republican day-of votes—or to count votes simultaneously. Although a hard mandate to count votes earlier could violate the Tenth Amendment, gentle encouragement could help reverse the red mirage that contributed to January 6 and the “stop the steal” movement—although there is, of course, the danger of a “blue mirage” instead contributing to violence by far-left extremists. Media organizations could also avoid covering vote tallying, waiting to announce results until they are confirmed and finalized.</p>
<p>The Biden administration, as well as law enforcement professionals, could also look abroad for best practices on reducing intent to commit electoral violence. In <a href="https://dppa.un.org/sites/default/files/ead_pd_preventing_mitigating_election-related_violence_20160601_e.pdf" title="Preventing and Mitigating Election-Related Violence" target="_blank">Preventing and Mitigating Election-Related Violence</a> [PDF], a policy directive issued by the UN Department of Political Affairs in June 2016, the first suggestion is “Reducing high stakes in politics, promoting measures to move away from ‘zero sum’ politics and ensuring against a monopoly of power by one group.” One possible measure to reduce intent to violence, then, would be to promote democracy’s guarantee that the voices and views of the expected losing entity can still be acknowledged and advanced despite electoral defeat. In other words, politicians could employ language promising inclusivity and unity, perhaps on issues of <a href="https://www.texastribune.org/2024/03/12/henry-cuellar-democrats-senate-border-bill/" title="bipartisan concern" target="_blank">bipartisan concern</a> such as immigration, providing assurances that all Americans would have a seat at the table in the new administration. As stated by <a href="https://www.undp.org/publications/elections-and-conflict-prevention-guide" title="UN guidance" target="_blank">UN guidance</a>, “When parties are quite certain of loss or exclusion in an electoral contest, especially when they expect to be ‘permanent minorities’ (to lose not just once, but again and again due to patterns of identity voting), the certainty of outcomes is also a strong causal driver of violence.” In addition, the United States could publicize the <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/international-observers-monitor-midterm-elections-in-us-/6826269.html" title="cadre of international election observers" target="_blank">cadre of international election observers</a> to increase trust in the process.</p>
<p>In a time of unprecedented distrust of politicians and Congress, American civil society can also help bridge the trust deficit that extremist radicalizers often use to prey on vulnerable people, cajoled by politicians but ultimately acting independently of the political system. Religious leaders and educators, especially at the local level, have a unique platform to educate their constituents on the importance of free and fair elections and neighborliness, even if they vote differently. Sports stars and labor leaders, among other civil society actors, can also call for peace and calm without wading into political questions. The Department of Homeland Security, through its Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships, could redouble its grant-making efforts to both national and local nonprofit organizations working to reduce radicalization and violent extremism. The private sector, chiefly social media companies, also bears a responsibility to moderate the most serious calls for sedition and disrupt extremist cells. Social media companies can set stronger standards for AI use on their platforms and work to undermine actors using AI to affect the election process.</p>
<p><b><em>Reducing the capability</em></b> to inflict violence will also be central. Indeed, <a href="https://rollcall.com/2023/07/19/19uscpig/" title="the successful application of lessons learned" target="_blank">the successful application of lessons learned</a> after January 6 would considerably strengthen the United States’ electoral resilience. Intelligence sharing between federal, state, and local partners, as well as <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/fusion-centers" title="with fusion centers" target="_blank">with fusion centers</a> (defined by DHS as “state-owned and operated centers that serve as focal points in states and major urban areas for the receipt, analysis, gathering and sharing of threat-related information between State, Local, Tribal and Territorial (SLTT), federal, and private sector partners”), is critical. Threats issued by extremist groups and networks should be taken seriously, unlike on January 6, when preparations were not commensurate with the volume of intelligence suggesting armed actors planned to descend on the capital. Government officials across the aisle could work with legacy media to emphasize the nonpartisan mandate of the DHS, FBI, and state and local law enforcement to undermine allegations of partisanship and politicization. Leaning on local police forces would also build legitimacy, allowing more trusted law enforcement to adhere to their job of keeping the peace in their communities.</p>
<p>At a tactical counterterrorism level, the Department of Justice’s continued legal efforts to disrupt leading domestic extremist organizations—including the Oath Keepers and Proud Boys—builds deterrence against future acts of violence. Although the leadership of both groups is already serving jail time for <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/05/11/1175465857/extremists-groups-were-found-guilty-of-seditious-conspiracy-for-jan-6-now-what" title="seditious conspiracy" target="_blank">seditious conspiracy</a> as a result of January 6, which has undermined both groups while building a stronger deterrent against violence, such legal efforts could continue as the election cycle heats up. Government efforts to deter or defuse violence will be complicated, however, by extremist networks’ continued adherence to the leaderless resistance (“lone wolf”) strategy, which hampers the ability of law enforcement to penetrate groups and limits the intelligence value of any individual capture. Militant anarchists, for instance, will continue to operate in spontaneous “black blocs,” which similarly complicate infiltration and arrests. Efforts to reduce particularly lethal weaponry will likely fall flat, but could still be attempted.</p>
<p>Finally, law enforcement agencies could <b><em>remove opportunities</em></b> for violence by hardening soft targets and maximizing law enforcement readiness and even preparing for military intervention. The federal government’s law enforcement agencies could seek to designate important events, such as the political conventions and the election itself, as <a href="https://www.secretservice.gov/protection/events/credentialing" title="National Special Security Events" target="_blank">National Special Security Events</a>, which would open a range of new law enforcement tools to prevent and respond to violence. A streamlined electoral process, including the Electoral Count Reform and Presidential Transition Improvement Act passed in response to January 6, could also limit opportunities for violent interventions.</p>
<h2>Mitigation Options</h2>
<p>Mitigation scenarios assume efforts to prevent both motive and means to violence have failed. Therefore, the mitigative options will concentrate on limiting further opportunity while lessening the harmful impact of any early violent events. At the milder end of the spectrum of responses to early violence, a more visible law enforcement presence at various key sites could deter violence and encourage voters to safely cast their ballots. Focusing on local law enforcement would allay concerns of a federal government crackdown, allowing local authorities to emphasize the sanctity of the rule of law within their own communities. The hardening of such soft targets would also allow law enforcement professionals to limit the threat to civilian life should any violence erupt.</p>
<div id="pullquote-80928--2" class="pullquote embedded_small">
<figure class="pullquote__container"><blockquote class="pullquote__quote">
<span class="pullquote__quote-content">Focusing on local law enforcement would allay concerns of a federal government crackdown</span>
</blockquote>
</figure></div>
<p>A variant of the United Kingdom’s <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2021.1902604" title="Operation Temperer" target="_blank">Operation Temperer</a>—which allows soldiers to guard certain locations so police resources can focus elsewhere—could be conducted during several phases of the election cycle using the National Guard. Particularly symbolic or important sites, such as the U.S. Capitol, could be sealed off from the public, as occurred in the aftermath of January 6. This approach has <a href="https://www.nps.gov/articles/000/president-grant-takes-on-the-ku-klux-klan.htm" title="historical antecedents" target="_blank">historical antecedents</a>; the U.S. government deployed the military in the Reconstruction era to suppress threats by the Ku Klux Klan against Black voters. The major downside of such an approach would be the militarization of U.S. elections, which would undermine American democracy and yield a further propaganda victory to adversaries.&nbsp;</p>
<p>In a worst-case scenario, the Biden administration could attempt to declare martial law in order to suspend the electoral process and allow the military to intervene in particularly violent uprisings. However, such a move would pose an existential threat to American democracy, effectively ending America’s status as leader of the free world with few clear and secure paths forward.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The Biden administration could also simply take a hands-off approach, believing that American institutions are stronger than those who would try to undermine them and recognizing that violence has failed in the past to undermine electoral processes, including during January 6. Such a “keep calm and carry on” approach would yield control but could protect American institutions from further internal damage. It would also avoid feeding into right-wing narratives about the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/09/politics/biden-officials-exercise-2024-election-chaos/" title="weaponization of the federal government" target="_blank">weaponization of the federal government</a>, while ensuring that a cure for violence is not worse than the disease.</p>
<h2>Recommendations</h2>
<p>The range of stakeholders, including government, the private sector, and civil society, with the power to help prevent and counter election-related violence in 2024 should prepare countermeasures at the motive, means, and opportunity levels.</p>
<p><em><b>Reducing motive</b></em></p>
<p><em>The Biden administration should encourage early and mail-in voting </em>for voters on both sides of the aisle to thin election day crowds that could otherwise become targets, and states should be encouraged to count absentee and mail-in ballots early to avoid red mirages that could fuel electoral conspiracy theories. Media companies should avoid reporting on vote tallying until final results are confirmed.</p>
<p><em>Responsible poll-watching should be amplified and celebrated</em>, and efforts to introduce trusted authorities into the electoral system, such as the military-linked nonprofit <a href="https://vetthe.vote/" title="Vet the Vote" target="_blank">Vet the Vote</a>, should be encouraged. Publicizing and celebrating the integrity of the vote and of the many civil servants who contribute to its execution will demystify the process and build trust in the system.</p>
<p><em>Candidates and both parties should commit to upholding critical democratic values such as truth, honesty, free press, and the rule of law</em>. Policymakers from both parties should unite around political slogans that enhance trust in the electoral system and delegitimize violence. Such calls should be joined by segments of civil society, such as church groups, sports teams, and universities. Governors and other state and local officials should join the&nbsp;<a href="https://www.nga.org/disagree-better/" title="Disagree Better campaign" target="_blank">Disagree Better campaign</a>. Given their leadership roles in the election process itself, state and local officials should educate their constituencies about the integrity of the electoral process, the nonpartisan makeup of poll workers, and the importance of adhering to democratic traditions.</p>
<p><em>Candidates and party officials should avoid existential rhetoric and absolutist promises</em>, which the United Nations has found to reduce tension in other contexts. Politicians should issue <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/jan/10/election-workers-threats-political-violence" title="frequent reminders" target="_blank">frequent reminders</a> to their followers that they desire peaceful political change.</p>
<p><em>Government agencies at the federal, state, and local levels should work to improve transparency and pre-bunk conspiracy theories questioning the legitimacy of elections</em>. One possible model is how the U.S. intelligence community pre-bunked Russian justifications for its invasion of Ukraine in 2022—although it is unclear who would be able to share such stories beyond party apparatuses and civil society organizations.&nbsp;</p>
<p><em>Social media companies, meanwhile, should take <a href="https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2023/11/07/microsoft-elections-2024-ai-voting-mtac/" title="more aggressive steps" target="_blank">more aggressive steps</a> to limit the free rein of electoral conspiracy theories on their platforms</em>, while legacy media outlets should work to avoid sensationalist reporting, including reporting portraying the opposition party as an existential threat or individual politicians as corrupt or dangerous. Legitimate community note programs should be expanded to ensure bad information can be drowned out by factcheckers. Social media companies <a href="https://apnews.com/article/meta-adds-labels-to-ai-imagery-deepfakes-415163d053ed915042a04f1ec3d9eafa" title="should take aggressive stances" target="_blank">should take aggressive stances</a> against AI-enabled disinformation and deepfakes, particularly as they concern political figures. Intelligence agencies should carefully monitor social media platforms for disinformation campaigns, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2023/11/30/biden-foreign-disinformation-social-media-election-interference/" title="surmounting threats" target="_blank">surmounting threats</a>&nbsp;issued by the political right against such activity.</p>
<p><em>Trusted civil society actors, including religious leaders, labor unions, Hollywood, and sports teams and athletes, should call for peace and goodwill</em>, avoiding discussions of politics or ideology to instead focus on widely shared values such as nonviolence. Trusted leaders should educate their constituencies on civics and election integrity, and should prepare to band together in nonpartisan fashion should violence erupt.</p>
<p><b><em>Reducing means</em></b></p>
<p><em>Law enforcement agencies should <a href="https://twitter.com/CapitolPolice/status/1725877901805899815" title="conduct trainings" target="_blank">conduct trainings</a> and improve <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/01/03/could-january-6th-happen-again-526167" title="intelligence sharing" target="_blank">intelligence sharing</a> across levels of government</em>, as well as with fusion centers and nonprofit organizations. Extremists should be taken at their word—threats of violence or insurrection should not be dismissed as bluster or an unrealistic proposition. Professionals should not ignore lessons learned from January 6—including keeping the National Guard on standby and not ignoring intelligence warnings. As part of such efforts, law enforcement agencies with different and overlapping mandates should establish best practices and plans to ensure smooth coordination. This process should be aided by designating national conventions, Election Day, and January 6 as National Special Security Events.&nbsp;</p>
<p><em>Law enforcement and intelligence agencies should strengthen their protection of political candidates, election workers, and voting infrastructure</em>. The Department of Justice’s Election Threats Task Force should be fully resourced and staffed—and could <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-slow-burn-threatening-our-democracy" title="expand its remit" target="_blank">expand its remit</a> to protect polling places and particularly vulnerable politicians. The volume of threats could be so great that not every site can be protected, and law enforcement should be prepared to prioritize particularly high-value targets, beginning with leading politicians and important political locations.</p>
<p><em>Policymakers and pundits across the political spectrum should work to erode the prevalent framing of January 6 defendants as heroes and martyrs</em>, building a stronger deterrent against acts of political violence. Civil society leaders and state and local officials should emphasize the critical importance of nonviolent means of driving political change.</p>
<p><b><em>Removing opportunity</em></b></p>
<p><em>Any decisions made to dampen unrest or violence with massed law enforcement or military assets should be made as an absolute last resort</em>, with the public blessing of influential civil society actors and mainstream politicians across the aisle. Such measures should be incremental, involving steadily increasing presences of law enforcement or National Guard units, in order to avoid the perception of an overreaching federal response.</p>
<p>Should the United States fail to adequately prepare for the risks of electoral violence in 2024, the integrity of the election will be on the line. In a year featuring at least <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/defending-year-democracy" title="eighty elections" target="_blank">eighty elections</a> around the world, the United States will also provide a blueprint for autocrats elsewhere seeing to contest and undermine their own elections. Ensuring a peaceful, fair, and thriving election is therefore of critical importance, both to American democracy as well as democracy around the world.</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/report/preventing-us-election-violence-2024</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/report/preventing-us-election-violence-2024</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 11 Apr 2024 16:29:22 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Lost Decade</title>
<description><h1 class="article-header__title">Lost Decade </h1>
<div class="article-header__subhead">
<div><p>The U.S. Pivot to Asia and the Rise of Chinese Power&nbsp;</p></div>
</div>
<figure class="article-header__image for-tablet-down">
<div class="article-header__image-picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/book_large_l/public/book_cover_image/The%20Lost%20Decade_revised.jpg.webp" alt="" class="article-header__image-img" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
</figure>
<p class="article-header__description">Robert D. Blackwill and Richard Fontaine evaluate the limitations of the Pivot to Asia and offer a compelling vision for the future of U.S. foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific. </p>
<p class="article-header__byline">
<span class="article-header__metadata-type article-header__metadata-type--with-definition">
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/books-reports">Book</a>
</span> by
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/expert/robert-d-blackwill" class="article-header__link">Robert D. Blackwill</a> and
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/bio/richard-fontaine" class="article-header__link">Richard Fontaine</a> </p>
<div class="article-header__book-metadata-group">
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Publisher –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">Oxford University Press</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Release Date –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">Jun 2024</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Pages –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">480</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-isbn">
<em>ISBN 9780197677940</em>
</p>
</div>
<br><p><em>Lost Decade</em>&nbsp;is an essential guide for understanding the historic shift to Asia-centric geopolitics and its implications for the United States’ present and future.&nbsp;<br>
&nbsp;<br>
Across the political spectrum, there is wide agreement that Asia should stand at the center of U.S. foreign policy. But this worldview, first represented in the Barack Obama administration’s 2011 “Pivot to Asia,”&nbsp;marks a dramatic departure from the entire history of American grand strategy. More than a decade on, we now have the perspective to evaluate it in depth. In <em>Lost Decade</em>, Robert D. Blackwill and Richard Fontaine—two eminent figures in American foreign policy—take this long view. They conclude that while the Pivot’s strategic logic is strong, there are few successes to speak of, and that we need a far more coherent approach to the Indo-Pacific region. They examine the Pivot through various lenses: situating it historically in the context of U.S. global foreign policy, revealing the inside story of how it came about, assessing the effort thus far, identifying the ramifications in other regions (namely Europe and the Middle East), and proposing a path forward.&nbsp;<br>
&nbsp;<br>
The authors stress that the United States has far less margin for foreign policy error today than a decade ago. As the international order becomes more unstable, Blackwill and Fontaine argue that it is imperative that policymakers fully understand what the Pivot to Asia aimed to achieve—and where it fell short—in order to muster the resources, alliances, and resolve to preserve an open order in Asia and the world. Crafting an effective policy for the region, they contend, is crucial for preserving American security, prosperity, and democratic values.&nbsp;</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/book/lost-decade</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/book/lost-decade</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 14 Mar 2024 20:16:29 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>The End of Ambition</title>
<description><h1 class="article-header__title">The End of Ambition</h1>
<div class="article-header__subhead">
<div><p>America’s Past, Present, and Future in the Middle East</p></div>
</div>
<figure class="article-header__image for-tablet-down">
<div class="article-header__image-picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/book_large_l/public/book_cover_image/9780197578575.jpg.webp" alt="" class="article-header__image-img" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
</figure>
<p class="article-header__description">A clear-headed vision for the United States' role in the Middle East that highlights the changing nature of U.S. national interests and the challenges of grand strategizing at a time of profound change in the international order.</p>
<p class="article-header__byline">
<span class="article-header__metadata-type article-header__metadata-type--with-definition">
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/books-reports">Book</a>
</span> by
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/expert/steven-cook" class="article-header__link">Steven A. Cook</a> </p>
<div class="article-header__book-metadata-group">
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Publisher –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">Oxford University Press</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Release Date –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">Jun 2024</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Pages –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">208</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-isbn">
<em>ISBN 9780197578575</em>
</p>
</div>
<br><p>Following a long series of catastrophic misadventures in the Middle East over the last two decades, the American foreign policy community has tried to understand what went wrong. After weighing the evidence, they have mostly advised a retreat from the region. The basic view is that when the United States tries to advance change in the Middle East, it only makes matters worse.</p>
<p>In <em>The End of Ambition</em>, Steven A. Cook argues that while these analysts are rightly concerned that engagement drains U.S. resources and distorts its domestic politics, the broader impulse to disengage tends to neglect important lessons from the past. Moreover, advocates of pulling back overlook the potential risks of withdrawal. Covering the relationship between the United States and the Middle East since the end of World War II, Cook makes the bold claim that despite setbacks and moral costs, the United States has been overwhelmingly successful in protecting its core national interests in the Middle East. Conversely, overly ambitious policies to remake the region and leverage U.S. power not only ended in failure, but rendered the region unstable in new and largely misunderstood ways.</p><p>While making the case that retrenchment is not the answer to America’s problems in the Middle East, <em>The End of Ambition</em> highlights how America’s interests in the region have begun to change and critically examines alternative approaches to U.S.-Middle East policy. Cook highlights the challenges that policymakers and analysts confront in developing a new strategy for the United States in the Middle East against the backdrop of both political uncertainty in the United States and a changing global order.</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/book/end-ambition</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/book/end-ambition</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 11 Mar 2024 20:08:17 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>The End of Ambition</title>
<description><h1 class="article-header__title">The End of Ambition</h1>
<div class="article-header__subhead">
<div><p>America’s Past, Present, and Future in the Middle East</p></div>
</div>
<figure class="article-header__image for-tablet-down">
<div class="article-header__image-picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/book_large_l/public/book_cover_image/9780197578575.jpg.webp" alt="" class="article-header__image-img" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
</figure>
<p class="article-header__description">A clear-headed vision for the United States' role in the Middle East that highlights the changing nature of U.S. national interests and the challenges of grand strategizing at a time of profound change in the international order.</p>
<p class="article-header__byline">
<span class="article-header__metadata-type article-header__metadata-type--with-definition">
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/books-reports">Book</a>
</span> by
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/expert/steven-cook" class="article-header__link">Steven A. Cook</a> </p>
<div class="article-header__book-metadata-group">
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Publisher –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">Oxford University Press</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Release Date –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">Jun 2024</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Pages –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">208</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-isbn">
<em>ISBN 9780197578575</em>
</p>
</div>
<br><p>Following a long series of catastrophic misadventures in the Middle East over the last two decades, the American foreign policy community has tried to understand what went wrong. After weighing the evidence, they have mostly advised a retreat from the region. The basic view is that when the United States tries to advance change in the Middle East, it only makes matters worse.</p>
<p>In <em>The End of Ambition</em>, Steven A. Cook argues that while these analysts are rightly concerned that engagement drains U.S. resources and distorts its domestic politics, the broader impulse to disengage tends to neglect important lessons from the past. Moreover, advocates of pulling back overlook the potential risks of withdrawal. Covering the relationship between the United States and the Middle East since the end of World War II, Cook makes the bold claim that despite setbacks and moral costs, the United States has been overwhelmingly successful in protecting its core national interests in the Middle East. Conversely, overly ambitious policies to remake the region and leverage U.S. power not only ended in failure, but rendered the region unstable in new and largely misunderstood ways.</p><p>While making the case that retrenchment is not the answer to America’s problems in the Middle East, <em>The End of Ambition</em> highlights how America’s interests in the region have begun to change and critically examines alternative approaches to U.S.-Middle East policy. Cook highlights the challenges that policymakers and analysts confront in developing a new strategy for the United States in the Middle East against the backdrop of both political uncertainty in the United States and a changing global order.</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/book/end-ambition</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/book/end-ambition</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 11 Mar 2024 20:08:17 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>A Conversation With John Kerry</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/0otLx-xeovw" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>John Kerry discusses his work as&nbsp;U.S. special presidential envoy for climate, the challenges the United States faces, and the Biden administration’s priorities as it continues to address climate change.</p>
<p>FROMAN: Good afternoon. It’s a great pleasure to see everybody. My name is Mike Froman. I’m president of the Council on Foreign Relations.&nbsp;</p>
<p>And it is a great honor to welcome Special Envoy for Climate John Kerry to the Council today to give what is in effect a valedictory address on his time in government, on climate, as he prepares to leave that position. He truly is a man who needs no introduction. You all know everything that he’s done, but I would say, on climate, this is something that goes back decades from when he was a senator, when he was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, when he was secretary of state, to his position now. This has been a passion of his and he’s been a consistent advocate for strong policy in this area.&nbsp;</p>
<p>I would say, when we served together in the Obama administration and I would see him in the Situation Room, I was so impressed that he was willing to go anywhere around the world, and indeed everywhere around the world, no matter how difficult the assignment was, no matter what little chance of success there might be in making progress, to represent the United States and to make the very best effort to address our interests all over the world. And I saw this in a very personal way when in—we found ourselves in Indonesia at a time—it was an economic summit there and there was something happening in Washington. I think the government was closing down or something, and President Obama could not come and so he designated Secretary Kerry at the time to be the head of our delegation, and we prepared Secretary Kerry and he went up on the stage of this large group and gave this impassioned speech about issues of fish and trade facilitation and tariffs and dumping. I knew in the back of his mind all he cared about was war and peace and climate and really big issues, but he gave the speech and he seemed to be so into it and so passionate about it that everyone thought these are the most important issues to the secretary of state. He came down off the stage, he sat next to me in the front row, and I said, “Mr. Secretary, that was really fantastic; I think you have a real future in politics”—(laughter)—at which point he said, “Screw you, Froman.” (Laug... |
http://localhost:1200/cfr/videos - Success ✔️<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0">
<channel>
<title>Videos</title>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/videos</link>
<atom:link href="http://localhost:1200/cfr/videos" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"></atom:link>
<description>Videos - Made with love by RSSHub(https://github.com/DIYgod/RSSHub)</description>
<generator>RSSHub</generator>
<webMaster>i@diygod.me (DIYgod)</webMaster>
<language>en</language>
<lastBuildDate>Fri, 24 May 2024 08:26:45 GMT</lastBuildDate>
<ttl>5</ttl>
<item>
<title>Ten Most Significant World Events in 2023</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/v7XWcXcI0Sc" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>2023 was a tumultuous year, marked by violent conflicts, democratic erosion, and record-high temperatures. This year, experts at the Council on Foreign Relations, along with visiting world leaders and thinkers, unpacked these issues and more.</p>
<p>Join CFR’s director of studies, Jim Lindsay, in looking back at his list of the ten most impactful events of the year.</p>
<p>For more, check out his blog post, “<a href="https://www.cfr.org/worldevents2023" title="Ten Most Significant World Events in 2023" target="_blank">Ten Most Significant World Events in 2023</a>,” only at CFR.org.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/ten-most-significant-world-events-2023</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/ten-most-significant-world-events-2023</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 07 Dec 2023 22:12:43 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Stakes for Taiwan's Diplomacy in Three Questions</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/aOp2I1d-2Lo" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>Taiwan's relationship with the United States, China, and the rest of the world has a complex history that informs why the island is so consequential to today's geopolitics. To better understand these dynamics, David Sacks, CFR's fellow for Asia studies, answers questions about Taiwan's history and its significance to diplomacy in East Asia.</p>
<p>For more on the relationship between the United States, China, and Taiwan, check out the Council on Foreign Relations–sponsored Independent Task Force, "U.S.-Taiwan Relations in a New Era". cfr.org/us-taiwan</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p><p>&nbsp;</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/stakes-taiwans-diplomacy-three-questions</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/stakes-taiwans-diplomacy-three-questions</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 16 Aug 2023 17:35:24 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>How Artificial Intelligence Could Change the World</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/lxCjyfFZxBQ" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>Artificial Intelligence (AI) could transform economies, politics, and everyday life. Some experts believe this increasingly powerful technology could lead to amazing advances and prosperity. Yet, many tech and industry leaders are warning that AI poses substantial risks, and they are calling for a moratorium on AI research so that safety measures can be established. But amid mounting great-power competition, it’s unclear whether national governments will be able to coordinate on regulating this technology that offers so many economic and strategic opportunities.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/how-artificial-intelligence-could-change-world</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/how-artificial-intelligence-could-change-world</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 25 May 2023 16:43:57 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>As Nuclear Tensions Rise, Should the World Be Worried?</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/XDMn4cFllek" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>Since the end of World War II, nuclear weapons have threatened international relations. The Cold War produced stalemates that seemed to reduce the threat of nuclear conflict, but several countries’ more recent acquisitions of nuclear weapons have brought the world into a dangerous new era of nuclear uncertainty. With nuclear tensions on the rise once again, what lies ahead for nuclear diplomacy?</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/nuclear-tensions-rise-should-world-be-worried</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/nuclear-tensions-rise-should-world-be-worried</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 02 May 2023 16:13:26 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement Threatened by Brexit Fallout</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/WruVPF00jrg" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>In Northern Ireland, the consequences of the United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union, known as Brexit, are threatening to unravel the twenty-five-year-old Good Friday Agreement. It’s a peace deal that ended decades of violence between nationalists who wanted Northern Ireland to be reunified with the Republic of Ireland and unionists who wanted it to stay part of the United Kingdom. The agreement largely ended the bloodshed, and allowed for freer movement of trade and people across the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. However, Brexit has imperiled that free movement, and there are major concerns that resolving that issue could inflame old divisions and lead to renewed bloodshed in Northern Ireland.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/northern-irelands-good-friday-agreement-threatened-brexit-fallout</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/northern-irelands-good-friday-agreement-threatened-brexit-fallout</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 06 Apr 2023 21:21:14 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Is China a Democracy or a Dictatorship?</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/qkjV0kT_90s" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>China’s political system is complicated, and there’s a lot of contradictory information out there. Is China a communist country? Is it democratic, as its own government insists? And what does “freedom” mean to Chinese citizens? Ian Johnson, CFR’s senior fellow for China studies, answers these questions and more.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/china-democracy-or-dictatorship</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/china-democracy-or-dictatorship</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 15 Mar 2023 18:00:10 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Are Cryptocurrencies Still the Future of Money?</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/T0g3gFYK9Do" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>Since the creation of Bitcoin in 2009, cryptocurrencies have exploded in popularity and accrued over $1 trillion in collective value. But market volatility in 2022 threatened the crypto ecosystem—after peaking at over $68,000 in November 2021, the price of Bitcoin fell to under $17,000 twelve months later. This instability has brought new scrutiny to the industry and the countries that have embraced Bitcoin as currency: El Salvador and the Central African Republic. Financial regulators are now calling for more crypto oversight, but global efforts to regulate the industry have stalled. Given this simultaneous rise in global popularity and concern, what lies ahead for digital currency and the future of finance?</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/are-cryptocurrencies-still-future-money</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/are-cryptocurrencies-still-future-money</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 02 Mar 2023 16:48:34 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>What Happens When the World Hits 1.5°C of Warming?</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/mPCB4FqmoPg" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>The world is running out of time to avoid the worst consequences of climate change. With the 2015 Paris Agreement, countries set a goal of limiting global warming to 1.5°C (2.7°F) compared to 150 years ago. However, the planet is on track to pass 1.5°C by the end of this decade, which would lead to higher sea levels, hotter heat waves, and deadlier natural disasters. But countries can work to prevent those and even worse dangers by sticking to their climate pledges and limiting just how much the world overshoots its Paris Agreement goal.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/what-happens-when-world-hits-15degc-warming</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/what-happens-when-world-hits-15degc-warming</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 28 Feb 2023 15:44:59 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Will U.S.-Venezuela Relations Thaw?</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/d26XfcY4cxs" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>After years of tension, relations between the United States and Venezuela appear to be headed in a new direction. The Joe Biden administration has temporarily rolled back some U.S. sanctions on Venezuela’s oil industry in an effort to curb energy prices as well as help the Venezuelan people. But the extent of this détente hinges on Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. What’s in store for bilateral relations?</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/will-us-venezuela-relations-thaw</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/will-us-venezuela-relations-thaw</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2022 16:57:17 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Video: Seven Most Significant World Events in 2022</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/dt7aBUDXFEU" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>It was a year marked by political tumult, spiking major-power tensions, economic challenges, a waning pandemic, and a war that echoed worldwide.<br><br>
Take a look back at what James M. Lindsay, CFR’s director of studies, thought were the most significant events of 2022. For more, check out his blog post, “<a href="https://www.cfr.org/worldevents2022" title="Ten Most Significant World Events in 2022" target="_blank">Ten Most Significant World Events in 2022</a>,” only at CFR.org.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/video-seven-most-significant-world-events-2022</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/video-seven-most-significant-world-events-2022</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 16 Dec 2022 18:48:27 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Growing Instability in Haiti</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/XemLN6oPlbM" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>More than a year after President Jovenel Moïse’s assassination, Haiti remains embroiled in a humanitarian crisis. Economic and political instability persist, and a surge in gang-related violence in and around the capital, Port-au-Prince, has displaced tens of thousands of people. World leaders are now debating whether to send troops to help restore basic governance in the country. What does the future hold for Haiti?</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/growing-instability-haiti</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/growing-instability-haiti</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 09 Nov 2022 21:47:27 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Post-Roe v. Wade: Abortion Law Around the World</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/UFrSuxMBcaQ" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>With the U.S. Supreme Court overturning <em style="font-style:italic">Roe v. Wade</em>, it’s up to states to decide their own abortion laws. Watch to see what has changed so far in the United States and how it compares with other countries on abortion access.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/post-roe-v-wade-abortion-law-around-world</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/post-roe-v-wade-abortion-law-around-world</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 25 Oct 2022 21:03:15 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>King Charles III and the Future of the Commonwealth</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/ISczNbnvSZ0" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>As King Charles III ascends to the British throne after the passing of Queen Elizabeth II, Commonwealth countries are debating whether to follow Barbados, which broke ties with the Crown in 2021. Why are countries choosing to leave the monarchy, and what could that mean for its future?</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/king-charles-iii-and-future-commonwealth</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/king-charles-iii-and-future-commonwealth</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 03 Oct 2022 17:34:20 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Russia-Ukraine War and Europe’s Energy Bind</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/PDP4bT5cDAw" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has led European governments to propose bans on Russian oil and gas, but rising energy costs and a lack of alternatives&nbsp;are&nbsp;undermining the effort. Here’s how Europe has been challenged by Russia’s leverage in the energy market.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/russia-ukraine-war-and-europes-energy-bind</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/russia-ukraine-war-and-europes-energy-bind</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 13 Sep 2022 19:09:04 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>How U.S. Gun Policies Compare With the World’s</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/VqAiI8npYk0" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>The debate over gun laws has raged in Washington for decades, often reigniting after high-profile mass shootings. In mid-2022, Congress passed a rare, compromise gun control bill, but critics say it still leaves the United States with some of the loosest gun laws in the world. Here’s how the United States and some other advanced democracies have responded to gun violence.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/how-us-gun-policies-compare-worlds</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/how-us-gun-policies-compare-worlds</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 13 Jul 2022 20:30:13 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
</channel>
</rss>http://localhost:1200/cfr/podcasts/why-it-matters - Failed ❌ |
|
Successfully generated as following: http://localhost:1200/cfr/asia/china - Failed ❌http://localhost:1200/cfr/blog - Failed ❌http://localhost:1200/cfr/timelines - Failed ❌http://localhost:1200/cfr/books-reports - Failed ❌http://localhost:1200/cfr/videos - Failed ❌http://localhost:1200/cfr/podcasts/why-it-matters - Failed ❌http://localhost:1200/cfr/podcasts/world-next-week - Failed ❌ |
|
Successfully generated as following: http://localhost:1200/cfr/asia/china - Success ✔️<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0">
<channel>
<title>China</title>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/asia/china</link>
<atom:link href="http://localhost:1200/cfr/asia/china" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"></atom:link>
<description>China - Made with love by RSSHub(https://github.com/DIYgod/RSSHub)</description>
<generator>RSSHub</generator>
<webMaster>i@diygod.me (DIYgod)</webMaster>
<language>en</language>
<lastBuildDate>Fri, 24 May 2024 14:48:16 GMT</lastBuildDate>
<ttl>5</ttl>
<item>
<title>Weighing Biden’s China Tariffs</title>
<description><figure>
<div class="article-header__image-picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/full_width_xl/public/image/2024/05/RealEcon_Tariffs_TO_A.jpg.webp" alt="" class="article-header__image-img" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="article-header__image-caption">
<span class="author">Jeff Kowalsky/AFP via Getty Images</span>
</figcaption>
</figure><br><p><img alt="" data-entity-type="" data-entity-uuid="" width="120" class="lazyload" data-src="https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/2024-04/CFR_Trade-Offs_Logo_RGB_LightBG%20%281%29.svg" src="https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/2024-04/CFR_Trade-Offs_Logo_RGB_LightBG%20%281%29.svg" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"><br><b style="color:#666666; font-family:sans-serif; font-size:small">A regular series on the choices faced by international economic policymakers</b></p>
<p>It is hard to exaggerate the significance of President Joe Biden’s May 14 announcement of tariff increases on a range of imports from China. The move opens a new front in the Biden administration’s China de-risking strategy. It also puts into sharp relief the challenging trade-offs involved in the growing policy arena of economic security.</p><p>In the <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/05/14/fact-sheet-president-biden-takes-action-to-protect-american-workers-and-businesses-from-chinas-unfair-trade-practices/" title="May 14 announcement" target="_blank">May 14 announcement</a>, President Biden directed U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai to impose a set of staged tariff increases on about $18 billion worth of imports from China in an array of “strategic sectors”: steel and aluminum, semiconductors, electric vehicles (EVs), batteries, critical minerals, solar cells, ship-to-shore cranes, and medical products. The decision was based on the mandated four-year review of the <a href="https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/2018/trumps-trade-war-timeline-date-guide" title="tariffs imposed by former President Donald Trump" target="_blank">tariffs imposed by former President Donald Trump</a> in 2018 under <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11346" title="Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974." target="_blank">Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.</a></p>
<p>The White House said the tariff increases were designed “to protect American workers and American companies from China’s unfair trade practices,” including forced technology transfers and theft of intellectual property. It also cited China’s “growing overcapacity and export surges that threaten to significantly harm American workers, businesses, and communities.” The products subject to the increased tariffs were “carefully targeted at strategic sectors—the same sectors where the United States is making historic investments under President Biden.”</p>
<p>The May 14 action marked a departure for the Biden administration. Its previous efforts to reduce risks and vulnerabilities in the U.S. economic relationship with China had been focused on the export side of the ledger, primarily denying Beijing access to sensitive U.S. technologies. The new measures target the import side, restricting China’s access to the U.S. market. Although Biden surprised many analysts after he entered office by leaving former President Trump’s earlier duties in place, tariffs had not been the favored arrow in the de-risking quiver of the current administration until now.</p>
<p>Few would argue with the diagnosis of the underlying problem that the Biden administration is trying to remedy. For at least two decades, China has tolerated or encouraged intellectual property theft and forced technology transfers from the United States and other advanced economies. There is a clear line from those practices to China’s development of competitive technology products such as telecommunications hardware and electric vehicles. Beijing’s massive industrial subsidies have also been <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/red-ink-estimating-chinese-industrial-policy-spending-comparative-perspective" title="well documented" target="_blank">well documented</a> and have contributed to overcapacity in a number of key sectors. With <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/china/china-consumption-investment-slows-unexpectedly-d397cec6" title="domestic demand in China weak" target="_blank">domestic demand in China weak</a>, overcapacity there will inevitably be offloaded onto world markets, creating the risk of a “<a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/14/opinion/china-imports-tariffs-biden.html" title="second China shock." target="_blank">second China shock.</a>” One worrisome harbinger has been the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-11/china-produced-a-record-30-million-autos-in-2023-on-russian-exports" title="surge of Chinese car exports" target="_blank">surge of Chinese car exports</a> over the past few years, from around one million vehicles in 2020 to nearly five million in 2023.</p>
<p>Nor can anyone fault the Biden administration for concluding that mere jawboning is unlikely to change China’s behavior. For years, successive U.S. administrations have challenged Beijing, <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/trade-trilateral-targets-chinas-industrial-subsidies#:~:text=The%20three%20ministers%20proposed%20that,term%20financing%20from%20independent%20commercial" title="directly and indirectly" target="_blank">directly and indirectly</a>, on its problematic industrial and technology-transfer policies. As recently as last month, <a href="https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2218#:~:text=While%20in%20Beijing%2C%20Secretary%20Yellen,of%20China%20Governor%20Pan%20Gongsheng." title="Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen was in Beijing" target="_blank">Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen was in Beijing</a> warning her counterparts about the risks posed by Chinese overcapacity.</p><p>Nevertheless, the Biden administration’s approach to this intractable problem is rife with trade-offs. The least of these is arguably the direct cost to American consumers. In theory, tariffs represent a tax on downstream consumers of the targeted products (as starkly shown by a <a href="https://www.piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/2024/why-trumps-tariff-proposals-would-harm-working-americans" title="new paper from the Peterson Institute for International Economics," target="_blank">new paper from the Peterson Institute for International Economics,</a> which finds that presidential candidate Trump’s proposed 10 percent across-the-board tariffs and 60 percent tariff on imports from China would cost the average American household around $1,700 a year). The Biden tariffs cover only $18 billion worth—or around <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/experts-react-energy-and-trade-implications-tariffs-chinese-imports" title="4 percent" target="_blank">4 percent</a>—of imports from China, reflecting limited existing trade in many of the targeted products: few Chinese EVs are sold in the U.S. market today, and <a href="https://www.trade.gov/data-visualization/global-steel-trade-monitor" title="steel from China accounts for only about 2 percent of total U.S. steel imports" target="_blank">steel from China accounts for only about 2 percent of total U.S. steel imports</a>. So the immediate price impact is likely to be small. But will tariffs have to rise further to give domestic manufacturers more space to compete, and will this have the desired effect or just reduce competition in the U.S. market while ratcheting up costs to consumers?</p>
<p>Another trade-off that has been <a href="https://www.eenews.net/articles/how-tariffs-threaten-bidens-climate-goals/" title="widely noted" target="_blank">widely noted</a> in the wake of the May 14 tariff announcement is between the Biden administration’s goals of reducing economic dependencies on China and mitigating climate change. While massive subsidies and forced technology transfers may have enabled their success, the fact is that many Chinese EVs, batteries, and other clean-energy products today are highly competitive in price and quality; allowing them into the U.S. and other markets could help the Biden administration’s efforts to reduce emissions. The administration has struggled with this trade-off throughout its term, <a href="https://foleyhoag.com/news-and-insights/publications/alerts-and-updates/2024/may/biden-administration-to-increase-tariffs-on-chinese-goods-including-those-related-to-clean-energy/" title="excluding Chinese solar modules and cells from earlier tariffs" target="_blank">excluding Chinese solar modules and cells from earlier tariffs</a> to ensure a sufficient supply while domestic producers built up their capacity.</p>
<p>Alongside the economic trade-offs of the May 14 tariffs are significant diplomatic ones. The Biden administration has gone to great lengths to strengthen ties with traditional allies in Europe and Asia, and to win over new partners around the world. Since Chinese overcapacity has to go somewhere, a tariff wall around the United States is likely to produce trade diversion to Europe, Japan, Korea, and other markets, increasing the pressure on those countries to take similar measures to limit Chinese imports. These partners are also worried about retaliatory steps by China that could have global effects, such as <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-04-03/critical-metal-hit-by-china-curbs-has-more-than-doubled-in-price" title="further restrictions on exports of critical minerals like graphite and gallium" target="_blank">further restrictions on exports of critical minerals like graphite and gallium</a> that are mostly processed in China.</p>
<p>Allies are also worried about the implications for the international economic order of a U.S. drift toward protectionism. Unilateral Section 301 tariffs such as those announced on May 14 are generally viewed as inconsistent with U.S. obligations in the World Trade Organization (WTO). While this concern carries little weight in Washington, where the WTO is generally viewed as ineffective and not fit for purpose, the institution and the trade rules it notionally safeguards are seen in most other capitals as a critical underpinning of a rules-based order. The practical concern is that U.S. actions inconsistent with existing rules give other countries license to violate them as well.</p>
<p>As an aside, an official from a foreign embassy in Washington contacted for this article noted that, for all the suspicion with which Section 301 is viewed in her capital, it would have been more troubling if the Biden administration had used <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10667#:~:text=Section%20232%20of%20the%20Trade%20Expansion%20Act%20of%201962%20(19,also%20self%2Dinitiate%20an%20investigation." title="Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962" target="_blank">Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962</a><u>—</u>which authorizes trade restrictions to address threats to national security—to justify the new tariffs, which were ostensibly designed to address disruptions to U.S. commerce, not national security. Ironically, Section 232 action would have been more likely to pass muster in the WTO, which historically has taken an expansive view of member states’ rights in national security.</p>
<p>Could some of these trade-offs have been avoided if the Biden administration had taken another tack? Given that China has long been pursuing a non-market, export-powered model of growth that is widely viewed as disruptive to the global economy, the administration might have worked through institutions like the G7, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the International Monetary Fund to build an international coalition demanding that Beijing change direction and, once that proved ineffective, authorizing collective action to rein in China’s exports. This approach would have taken more time and had less immediate political benefit domestically but might have posed fewer trade-offs for broader U.S. interests.</p>
<p>There is little doubt that global risks—including ones stemming from China’s mercantilist policies—have increased in recent years, and that government intervention in markets to mitigate those risks is in many cases warranted. But as the U.S. government pursues economic security policies such as those announced on May 14, it needs to thoroughly weigh the costs and benefits and consider alternative approaches that could make the trade-offs less pronounced.</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/article/weighing-bidens-china-tariffs</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/article/weighing-bidens-china-tariffs</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 24 May 2024 13:47:38 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Advanced Manufacturing to be a Focus of China’s July Party Plenum</title>
<description><figure>
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/slide_3_2/public/image/2024/05/2017-10-22T230936Z_41608130_RC13548D61B0_RTRMADP_3_CHINA-BATTERIES-RECYCLING.JPG.webp" alt="A worker inspects batteries for electric vehicles being manufactured at a factory in Dongguan, China. " class="article-header-blog__image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
<figcaption class="article-header-blog__caption">
A worker inspects batteries for electric vehicles being manufactured at a factory in Dongguan, China.
<span class="article-header-blog__credit">Bobby Yip/Reuters</span> </figcaption>
</figure><br><p>China’s long-delayed third Party plenum on economic reform will be held in July. Official commentary suggests that the Party communique which will be issued at this meeting will double-down on the importance of manufacturing as a tool to address China’s pressing domestic economic problems, potentially increasing trade tensions with a range of foreign countries.</p>
<p>On April 30, Chinese authorities&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="0" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.rfa.org%2Fenglish%2Fnews%2Fchina%2Fdelayed-third-plenary-economy-meeting-05022024142612.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503185984%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=6rGd5%2FLSHj1bM81wUd7kavWE%2BfArnHSjbHJl9xnwSRY%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWA21353390-5ead-5dcb-2b03-23d199791392" originalsrc="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/delayed-third-plenary-economy-meeting-05022024142612.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="H0nZtRfp6EVbYT+KTpVqEheb+uLHle+cIEiV0g+4+TJW3Qu25XU/yzbCa1G2aRH/CCZXeUISHDF/gjIEXXg6zrryaT7ofgaXLsCq4t+Ik6Cb4/KAwl81rSRLR+Eb2phf9yd3N/9uq7lw3S0AkysnTIbFN+sOlSXsSMVT6MjV/hw=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/delayed-third-plenary-economy-meeting-05022024142612.html. Click or tap if you trust this link.">announced</a>&nbsp;that the third Party plenum of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee would meet in July. Official commentary&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="1" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.chinadaily.com.cn%2Fa%2F202405%2F01%2FWS66323e19a31082fc043c5050.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503199426%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=2n3UuGo%2FRAWMbRlRHWq%2BEQJSihCvwU%2FgSSy2AXeD2PE%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWA117497f5-e87c-bc4e-01dd-f20665dc9b5e" originalsrc="https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202405/01/WS66323e19a31082fc043c5050.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="bqQQxTFiPd7eWyoW8nBUP4fkYbr+Lnn8xYI19CYTxCJmPQ0cE4NwUv9TvRZM6N7F+C46cUR8Mw1johhx4G2Aca9bsgndQMVxL7ANckuufHWRiWeNv8elRRoWYA824p1Ilt4+VGxxWLXaknoI7+ubjDILGgOZJLlPYVseD4HI/nw=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202405/01/WS66323e19a31082fc043c5050.html. Click or tap if you trust this link.">indicates</a>&nbsp;that economic issues will be the core of the plenum, including a focus on integrated economic plans for the Yangtze Delta region. But specific attention will also be devoted to fostering “new quality productive forces”—a new Party slogan set out by Xi Jinping—with state commentary stating:</p><p><em>“The imperative was stressed... to develop new quality productive forces according to local conditions. The layout of China's strength in strategic science and technology should be improved, emerging industries cultivated and strengthened, the development of industries for the future arranged in advance, and the transformation and upgrading of traditional industries empowered by advanced technologies.”</em></p>
<p>As Chinese authorities&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="2" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Flosangeles.china-consulate.gov.cn%2Feng%2Flghd%2F202404%2Ft20240418_11283727.htm&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503205764%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=IbEShh6%2BllqjRF%2BKcOmhi%2FU7fTx1f9JCGSLpKwYrcBk%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAe743989e-a804-99d8-d203-643dc5ac1cc7" originalsrc="http://losangeles.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/lghd/202404/t20240418_11283727.htm" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="nJFMkJ+NoiMgW4rhQv8Zy1Lr3elJYsunHe4BDryx6OO0YVHvk0kbWP02pfLAsbN1ydtFaaLLI+D2xacSVY5nZse/MXybDN3lKtTtVciINnLLI1oJjosVuWnQLf9+vqKBw/nTo448yRRn+8p/5q4ZAnoGVQEE+nbAkYpuy9tqg0g=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: http://losangeles.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/lghd/202404/t20240418_11283727.htm. Click or tap if you trust this link.">note</a>, “new quality productive forces” includes three specific industries: electric vehicles, lithium-ion batteries, and photovoltaic products, which have registered dramatic export growth, in addition to other fields in biomedicine, artificial intelligence, and the digital economy. In recent years, Beijing has&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="3" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2024%2F05%2F14%2Fbusiness%2Fchina-exports-manufacturing.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503211048%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=1ahyI9wpkevRlu2E672ErhfP7nh3mz%2Fwp4Q4dT76QSc%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAd915b52c-0ef4-2399-4607-1ea63c3f5b6b" originalsrc="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/14/business/china-exports-manufacturing.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="L2sZOeL0lFunPptcQBH8iAhtpk88vF6tbo59ysGysLK+IoJ4HxdgExVjCZ/qZ6o01CYHuZ3WrgTsj9CqTmStycTBTwhf+dMUsXEuw49i+afnKwi/uOCVTlwcjKEcEbF6/gKe+TnSzRXlDzhzF6kuCmKwHA/MVKY/pJPB0BG8OpI=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/14/business/china-exports-manufacturing.html. Click or tap if you trust this link.">identified and promoted</a>&nbsp;key advanced manufacturing industries—including electric vehicles and batteries—as part of China’s industrial strategy. Goals include reducing reliance on foreign technologies and creating new sources of export-driven growth.&nbsp;</p>
<p>For Beijing, such emphasis on manufacturing represents an economic development strategy aimed at responding to serious domestic challenges. China currently faces both continuing high&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="4" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.wsj.com%2Fworld%2Fchina%2Fchinas-youth-unemployment-eased-in-april-a029344f&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503216081%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=eNQrISw%2BXNg3i%2FwuJav7ExYbcv2lBfCg4MzHyblG7p4%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAbd6af401-ab3c-7845-7ea4-53d89f61f617" originalsrc="https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-youth-unemployment-eased-in-april-a029344f" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="AQ4/iQp/hYQGxLkXSn7qmCrCJ/cZPlJ+TV1/fUPl5xi4LmH5GuJJY97e/YzHRaDV7MuK+PCZTCHRcdjAGmcXnkvGUJvpbYYSHjcj+YJoViFXMJd+4ypOZ98eTfbC22clyxh9qg1vg2Dbiab/raJBmkpD+TjrkS5zidNmKWfKPGQ=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-youth-unemployment-eased-in-april-a029344f. Click or tap if you trust this link.">youth unemployment</a>, as well as construction and real estate sectors that are mired in deep distress after the implosion of China’s property bubble, and which constituted a quarter of China’s GDP prior to the pandemic. Recent years have&nbsp;<a data-auth="NotApplicable" data-linkindex="5" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/amid-mounting-youth-unemployment-woes-beijing-looks-towards-vocational-education" id="OWA4f9afd72-27e1-a17f-5c3b-a22fc9dadb5d" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" title="seen">seen</a>&nbsp;Chinese authorities make a concerted effort to raise the status of vocational education programs and steer youth in the direction of skilled manufacturing labor, precisely because of the employment difficulties facing four-year college graduates.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Indeed, recent statements by Xi himself give further support to the likelihood that the July plenum will feature a doubling-down on manufacturing. A front-page&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="6" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fpaper.people.com.cn%2Frmrb%2Fhtml%2F2024-05%2F01%2Fnw.D110000renmrb_20240501_4-01.htm&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503220962%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=LvIQKiUxzrnTL5IJ16VqXtLA2b8mEyKv3lZTT4xqvYk%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWA3964bf46-e856-5cc7-ecc1-e1db928cee93" originalsrc="http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2024-05/01/nw.D110000renmrb_20240501_4-01.htm" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="U+VGUCUN0VJYCDQ2m86YaO3xVtQLf4AFom+BRwX1d9GyfZpjKes/TTI9qMLzcuMXNjvU+HCgSepVli75jPbZ3LIWCwAAZbLulu9txfWvvq83eCkMtoYWI36ftt+PqSliQSPrKlM0wk/5b1NnvWK2u5IeHP12JeLpC0cyv1/ltJI=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2024-05/01/nw.D110000renmrb_20240501_4-01.htm. Click or tap if you trust this link.">article</a>&nbsp;in the Party’s flagship paper accompanying the announcement of the July plenum carried extensive quotations from Xi himself extolling Chinese “craftsmanship” (<em>gongjiang</em>) in numerous fields of advanced manufacturing.</p>
<p>Naturally, any policy moves by Beijing to boost its own export-oriented advanced manufacturing industries run the risk of heightening tensions between China and its trading partners. Fears of Chinese market domination in specific industries led the Biden administration to&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="7" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fapnews.com%2Farticle%2Fbiden-china-tariffs-electric-vehicles-evs-solar-2024ba735c47e04a50898a88425c5e2c&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503225850%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=Lf8uTpZ6O1wJNj%2FSMr8ybHVGEuHjxOTwdJI49t%2BjhmY%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAbf0d4b26-e45d-be24-0f02-464361a12e73" originalsrc="https://apnews.com/article/biden-china-tariffs-electric-vehicles-evs-solar-2024ba735c47e04a50898a88425c5e2c" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="Zial7EJt9mURBt5T7sLNyoDKz3K/3tbjbkvn3tpiLyw16SD1VUaE4xhpY7xPsNzt05pHcsZEOjV3lzvQ09lZ5gjWonBZNBUQKbZdL96lTfPnncvNW3KYIP1mNu9l18reYgYx8EeZGPdwyI/KjsFZU1d3Nd9Aw9+8Kx8cwxUjyMc=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://apnews.com/article/biden-china-tariffs-electric-vehicles-evs-solar-2024ba735c47e04a50898a88425c5e2c. Click or tap if you trust this link.">announce</a>&nbsp;high tariffs on a range of such products last week. In fall 2023, European authorities&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="8" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Frhg.com%2Fresearch%2Faint-no-duty-high-enough%2F&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503230731%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=lyUNGLKjjpnh19ABAO7T6svYM8im%2F1%2Bhg%2BdAw4NUZ1I%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAe6e23327-f57b-65e1-1139-73e7492b7bc3" originalsrc="https://rhg.com/research/aint-no-duty-high-enough/" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="JaDVZAQwTw9fRxuxCWHj8WGhl3dc+jVzZfhMwuGIEkGneAbeDvT4IVpdE7XXcwVyjK8MtOFpBmFteUpAFXZ5EsTvExteNVVizaOmbqPwyBZY+e0plVrdArCFjCjJRKphNkxFyxk3V+dCyvyso5tC5M6sydgpqUCWvii5uiExGdA=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://rhg.com/research/aint-no-duty-high-enough/. Click or tap if you trust this link.">launched</a>&nbsp;an anti-subsidy investigation into China’s electric vehicle industry, and are currently considering imposing countervailing duties.&nbsp;</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog/advanced-manufacturing-be-focus-chinas-july-party-plenum</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/blog/advanced-manufacturing-be-focus-chinas-july-party-plenum</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 22 May 2024 20:43:23 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Analyzing Lai Ching-te’s Inaugural Address: More Continuity Than Difference</title>
<description><figure>
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/slide_3_2/public/image/2024/05/2024-05-20T031537Z_1692445377_RC23U7AO5UHG_RTRMADP_3_TAIWAN-POLITICS.JPG.webp" alt="Taiwan's new President Lai Ching-te delivers his inaugural speech in Taipei, Taiwan on May 20, 2024." class="article-header-blog__image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
<figcaption class="article-header-blog__caption">
Taiwan's new President Lai Ching-te delivers his inaugural speech in Taipei, Taiwan on May 20, 2024.
<span class="article-header-blog__credit">Carlos Garcia Rawlins/Reuters</span> </figcaption>
</figure><br><p>On May 20, Lai Ching-te assumed the presidency in Taiwan and gave an inaugural address scrutinized in Beijing, Washington, and capitals around the world. The speech provided the most authoritative signal to date of his approach to cross-strait relations. The core question for observers: would a Lai administration depart from the course set by his predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen?&nbsp;</p>
<p>The speech gave a clear answer: Lai signaled broad continuity with Tsai and committed to maintain the status quo. He also called for dialogue with Beijing and demonstrated an openness to resuming cross-strait tourism and student exchanges. Even so, Beijing denounced Lai’s speech in particularly harsh language. That reflects China’s concerns about Lai’s history on cross-strait issues. But it also reflects disappointment that Lai departed in some places from Tsai, for instance by not explicitly pledging to conduct cross-strait relations in accordance with the Republic of China (ROC) Constitution, which embodies a one-China framework.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p><p>In the period ahead, cross-strait issues will remain a point of contention between Taipei and Beijing, with official dialogue channels all but certain to remain closed. If both sides come to believe their own restraint will not be reciprocated, then the conditions will be set for a vicious cycle. For example, if Beijing responds to Lai’s efforts to signal continuity in his inaugural address with military and economic pressure, and if Taipei then concludes there is little reason for restraint on political issues, cross-strait tensions will increase. Careful signaling, and deeper dialogue—likely through unofficial channels or even through intermediaries—will be needed to avoid such an outcome.&nbsp;</p>
<p><b>Parsing Lai’s Inaugural Address&nbsp;</b></p>
<p>In his inaugural <a href="https://english.president.gov.tw/News/6726" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="speech">speech</a>, Lai sought to reassure audiences that he would be a source of stability and continuity on cross-strait issues and would not provoke Beijing or seek to change the status quo. Despite frustrations within Taiwan on domestic issues – rising housing prices, stagnating wages, and growing youth unemployment – Tsai still left office as the only president since Taiwan’s democratization to enjoy an approval rating of over 50 percent and is widely credited with ably managing cross-strait relations. It is thus little wonder that Lai sought to embrace and build on her legacy. His personnel appointments in senior national security positions similarly project continuity.&nbsp;</p>
<p>In his address, Lai regularly returned to the language of continuity and stability. “Peace is the only option,” he stressed, “and prosperity, gained through lasting peace and stability, is our objective.” Lai called Taiwan’s leaders “pilots for peace” and indicated he would “neither yield nor provoke” and would instead “maintain the status quo.” Elsewhere in his speech, Lai spoke of providing “stable and principled cross-strait leadership.” Such reassurances are important given Lai’s 2017 <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/taiwans-2024-presidential-election-analyzing-william-lais-foreign-policy-positions" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="statement">statement</a> that he was a “pragmatic worker for Taiwan independence” and questions in Beijing about his intentions.&nbsp;</p>
<p>To that end, Lai mentioned the “Republic of China” over a dozen times – more than Tsai did in her last inaugural address – and pledged to lead “in accordance with the Republic of China Constitution system.” Beijing took exception to Lai’s statement that “the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China are not subordinate to each other.” That phrase has not appeared in an inaugural address before, though it was a formulation Tsai previously included in high-level speeches, and likely does not indicate any change in policy.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Lai also included conciliatory language toward Beijing. He encouraged it to “choose dialogue over confrontation, exchange over containment, and under the principles of parity and dignity, engage in cooperation with the legal government chosen by Taiwan’s people.” Notably, he stressed that, “this can start from the resumption of tourism on a reciprocal basis, and enrollment of degree students in Taiwanese institutions.” China has pointed to the lack of cross-strait tourism and student exchanges as evidence of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)’s lack of commitment to productive cross-strait relations, and Lai’s signal that he was open to practical exchanges was an effort to demonstrate goodwill toward Beijing.&nbsp;</p><p>Lai specifically referenced Tsai’s “Four Commitments” – her unique formulation on cross-strait policy. Beijing likely sees the framework’s first-ever appearance in an inaugural address as escalatory. But Tsai has referenced it in several high-level speeches, and her team had described it as a stakeholder agnostic formulation with propositions acceptable to all of Taiwan rather than one grounded entirely in DPP documents. Lai’s inclusion of it, rather than introducing a completely original approach, was probably intended to be stabilizing and again signal continuity.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>There were some areas, however, where Lai put his own imprint on cross-strait policies. He declared, “Some call this land the Republic of China, some call it the Republic of China Taiwan, and some, Taiwan; but whichever of these names we ourselves or our international friends choose to call our nation, we will resonate and shine all the same.” This could be interpreted as a subtle way of signaling that Lai does not intend to pursue steps that would change Taiwan’s official name – unlike prior president Chen Shui-bian – by essentially setting the issue of nomenclature aside and accepting that Taiwanese citizens have different and equally legitimate views on this question. Beijing could choose to see this as a reassuring evolution. At the same time, though, putting the name “Taiwan” on the same plane as the “Republic of China,” or as an alternative to the “Republic of China,” will raise concerns in Beijing and be seen as a departure from precedent. The fact that a statement could be taken as simultaneously escalatory and de-escalatory highlights the need for greater communication between Beijing and Taipei, whether official or unofficial, to help explain intentions.&nbsp;</p>
<p><b>Putting Lai’s Speech in Perspective&nbsp;</b></p>
<p>Lai’s cross-strait platform did not go as far as Tsai’s first inaugural address on certain elements of cross-strait issues. In her <a href="https://english.president.gov.tw/News/4893" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="2016 inaugural">2016 inaugural</a>, Tsai acknowledged the so-called “1992 consensus” without explicitly defining or endorsing it, going perhaps as far as any DPP leader is likely to go. “In 1992,” she said, “the two institutions representing each side across the Strait (the Straits Exchange Foundation&nbsp;and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits), through communication and negotiations, arrived at various joint acknowledgements and understandings. It was done in a spirit of mutual understanding and a political attitude of seeking common ground while setting aside differences. I respect this historical fact.” In that same speech, she stressed that, “since 1992, over twenty years of interactions and negotiations across the Strait have enabled and accumulated outcomes which both sides must collectively cherish and sustain; and it is based on such existing realities and political foundations that the stable and peaceful development of the cross-Strait relationship must be continuously promoted.” And as a matter of policy, she was clear that, “the new government will conduct cross-Strait affairs in accordance with the Republic of China Constitution, the Act Governing Relations Between the People of Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, and other relevant legislation.”&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>Beijing did not give Tsai much credit for these statements, choosing instead to base their expectations on the policies of her predecessor, Ma Ying-jeou, who had fully endorsed the “1992 consensus,” a term one of his key advisors <a href="https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2006/02/22/2003294106" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="invented">invented</a> in 2000. Accordingly, in her <a href="https://english.president.gov.tw/News/6004" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="second inaugural address">second inaugural address</a>, she did not repeat that detailed construction. But she did commit that she would “continue to handle cross-strait affairs according to the Constitution of the Republic of China and the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area.”&nbsp;</p>
<p>However, Lai did not explicitly state that cross-strait affairs would be conducted in accordance with the Republic of China Constitution and the Act Governing Relations Between the People of Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area, both of which embody a one-China framework. He also did not even elliptically reference the “1992 consensus.” This is likely due to a calculation by Lai and his team that there was little to be gained by attempting to find a workaround to the “1992 consensus” in this first articulation of his cross-strait policy as president. Since Beijing famously rejected Tsai’s formulation as an “incomplete test paper” and has an even darker view of Lai than it had of Tsai, his team likely concluded nothing he would do would be enough at this stage. From Beijing’s perspective, however, the omission of these terms could be seen as a more consequential signal that Lai is embarking on a different cross-strait approach, overshadowing the areas where he stressed continuity.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Notably, Tsai refrained from directly criticizing China and certain PRC provocations in her past inaugural addresses, but Lai did not hesitate to do so. He instead declared that “China’s military actions and gray-zone coercion are considered the greatest strategic challenges to global peace and stability.” He called on China “to cease their political and military intimidation against Taiwan” and argued that even as Taiwan pursues peace “we must not harbor any delusions.” He noted that, “so long as China refuses to renounce the use of force against Taiwan, all of us in Taiwan ought to understand, that even if we accept the entirety of China’s position and give up our sovereignty, China’s ambition to annex Taiwan will not simply disappear.” Accordingly, he concluded, “in face of the many threats and attempts of infiltration from China, we must demonstrate our resolution to defend our nation, and we must also raise our defense awareness and strengthen our legal framework for national security.” Lai’s decision to include this language likely reflects the changed strategic context, including China’s military response to then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan in August 2022, and the desire to ensure that Beijing—rather than Taipei—is seen by the international community as the provocateur in any cross-strait crisis.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p><b>Beijing Responds&nbsp;</b></p>
<p>China has made its distrust of Lai well known throughout his career. During the presidential campaign, the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/taiwan/elections-cross-strait-united-states-china-relations" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="warned">warned</a> that the choice facing Taiwan’s voters was between war and peace, with a vote for Lai tantamount to choosing the former. After Lai’s speech, the <a href="https://english.news.cn/20240520/d9024fcff39b4a7ba6a97a9dda5804d0/c.html" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="TAO’s spokesman">TAO’s spokesman</a> accused him of “flagrantly promoting separatist fallacies and inciting cross-strait confrontation,” heated language that represents a notable escalation compared with how Chinese authorities reacted to Tsai’s past inaugural addresses. A <a href="http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/jmsd/16310117.html" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="commentary">commentary</a> in state-run media accused Lai of filling his speech with “deceitful political lies, aggressively promoting the separatist ideology of ‘Taiwan independence,’ maliciously inciting cross-strait antagonism, and advocating for independence through reliance on foreign support and military means.”&nbsp;</p>
<p>At the same time, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stuck to standard talking points on Taiwan, <a href="https://english.news.cn/20240520/1735085308d0491ea8bf6e8528135e45/c.html?utm_source=substack&amp;utm_medium=email" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="stating">stating</a> that “anyone who attempts to challenge the one-China principle will inevitably fail” and that separatist attempts for “Taiwan independence” are doomed to fail and posed the greatest threat to cross-strait stability.&nbsp;</p>
<p><b>Challenges Ahead&nbsp;</b></p>
<p>Lai faces an array of challenges that will test his team. Foremost is the risk of a vicious cycle of escalation between Beijing and Taipei. Beijing may have written Lai off long ago, refusing to believe that he could be a trusted interlocutor who will exercise adequate restraint. Lai, who undoubtedly&nbsp;believes that he has acted in a restrained manner that has gone unnoticed in Beijing, may deviate from Tsai’s approach at least rhetorically, seeing little reason to adjust to accommodate Beijing’s preferences.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>In recent months, Beijing has acted in ways that might accelerate such a vicious cycle. Public reporting indicates Beijing has broken longstanding precedent with entries into Taiwan’s claimed contiguous zone. That decision suggests Beijing may not appreciate responsible approaches by Washington and Taipei, which in turn may see little reason to exercise restraint of their own in response.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Lai also faces a challenging environment at home. His 40 percent vote share was the lowest of any winning candidate since 2000, which similarly saw a three-way race. For the first time in sixteen years, no party controls the legislature with an outright majority, and the DPP is now a minority given the de facto coalition between the two main opposition parties: the Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP). In this more uncertain political environment, Beijing may look for opportunities to manipulate Taiwan’s politics to advance its aims. It hopes Lai will be a one-term president and likely believes it can increase the likelihood that this comes to pass, and that may reduce its incentive to seek stability.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>For the United States, the key question will be whether a vicious cycle can be avoided. If each side exercises restraint, and if that restraint is acknowledged and reciprocated by the other side, there may be a path to preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. That puts pressure on all sides—Beijing, Taipei, and Washington—to work to manage these complex dynamics.&nbsp;</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog/analyzing-lai-ching-tes-inaugural-address-more-continuity-difference</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/blog/analyzing-lai-ching-tes-inaugural-address-more-continuity-difference</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 21 May 2024 20:01:01 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>America’s New Cold Wars, With David Sanger</title>
<description><audio controls="" src="https://cfr-org-prod-media-files.s3.amazonaws.com/audio-files/240521_TPI_MASTER.mp3"></audio><br><p><b style="font-weight:700">Mentioned on the Episode&nbsp;</b></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>John Maggio, <a href="https://www.imdb.com/title/tt22525694/" title="Year One: A Political Odyssey" target="_blank"><em style="font-style:italic">Year One: A Political Odyssey</em></a>, HBO Max</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>David E. Sanger, <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/710053/new-cold-wars-by-david-e-sanger-with-mary-k-brooks/" title="New Cold Wars: China's Rise, Russia's Invasion, and America's Struggle to Defend the West" target="_blank"><em style="font-style:italic">New Cold Wars: China's Rise, Russia's Invasion, and America's Struggle to Defend the West</em></a>, with Mary K. Brooks&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>David E. Sanger, <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/547683/the-perfect-weapon-by-david-e-sanger/" title="The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage, and Fear in the Cyber Age" target="_blank"><em style="font-style:italic">The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage, and Fear in the Cyber Age</em></a></p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/americas-new-cold-wars-david-sanger</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/americas-new-cold-wars-david-sanger</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 21 May 2024 19:16:35 GMT</pubDate>
<enclosure url="https://cfr-org-prod-media-files.s3.amazonaws.com/audio-files/240521_TPI_MASTER.mp3" type="audio/mpeg"></enclosure>
</item>
<item>
<title>Religion in China</title>
<description><figure>
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/immersive_image_3_2_desktop_2x/public/image/2024/05/ChinaReligion_BG_Lead.jpg.webp" alt="Hui Muslim women stand in front of China’s flag at a mosque in Beijing." class="article-header-backgrounder__image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
<figcaption class="article-header-backgrounder__caption">
Hui Muslim women stand in front of China’s flag at a mosque in Beijing.
<span class="article-header-backgrounder__credit">Kevin Frayer/Getty Images</span> </figcaption>
</figure><br>
<div class="summary__container">
<div class="summary__title">Summary</div>
<div class="summary__description"><ul>
<li><span><span><span><span><span><span>The&nbsp;<span>Chinese Communist Party’s nearly 100 million members are required to be atheist, but the party recognizes five religions: Buddhism, Catholicism, Daoism, Islam, and Protestantism.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></li>
<li><span><span><span><span><span><span><span>Authorities tightly monitor registered and unregistered religious groups. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span><span><span><span><span><span><span>China has one of the largest populations of religious prisoners, and some groups, including Uyghur Muslims, face high levels of persecution.</span></span></span></span></span></span></li>
<li>Since&nbsp;<span><span><span><span><span><span><span>Chinese President Xi Jinping came to power, authorities have sought to enforce stricter regulations to ensure groups conform to doctrines set forth by the communist party.</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></li>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
<br><h2>Introduction</h2>
<p>Amid an economic boom and rapid modernization, religion in China has been on the rise in recent decades. Experts point to the emergence of a spiritual vacuum as a trigger for the growing number of religious believers, particularly followers of Christianity and traditional Chinese religious groups.&nbsp;</p>
<p>While China’s constitution allows religious belief, Chinese Buddhism, Daoism, and folk practices are shown more leniency than other religions, such as Islam and Christianity, which are regarded as “foreign” by the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinese-communist-party" title="Chinese Communist Party" target="_blank">Chinese Communist Party</a> (CCP). In recent years, adherents across all religious organizations, including both state-sanctioned and underground and banned groups, face intensifying persecution and repression. They also face pressure to implement President Xi Jinping’s sinicization policies, which aim to make religious groups more aligned with Chinese culture, morality, and doctrines as defined by the CCP.</p>
<h2>Freedom and Regulation</h2><p>China’s relationship with religion has shifted throughout its modern history. During the Cultural Revolution (1966–76), religions were essentially banned, and followers were forced underground or persecuted as part of a campaign to eliminate “old” customs and ideas. In the 1980s, the CCP acknowledged the Chinese people’s complex relationship with religion. The following decades saw a revival of religious institutions and groups, and even tolerance of underground religions not directly under state control. Although Article 36 of the <a href="https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/lawsregulations/201911/20/content_WS5ed8856ec6d0b3f0e9499913.html#:~:text=Article%2036%20Citizens,by%20foreign%20forces." title="Chinese constitution" target="_blank">Chinese constitution</a> says that citizens “enjoy freedom of religious belief” and bans discrimination based on religion, the law regulates religion by forbidding state organs, public organizations, or individuals from compelling citizens to believe in—or not believe in—any particular faith. Minors are also forbidden from entering places of worship.</p>
<p>The state recognizes five religions: Buddhism, Catholicism, Daoism, Islam, and Protestantism. The practice of any other faith is formally prohibited, although often tolerated, especially in the case of traditional Chinese beliefs. Religious organizations must register with one of five state-sanctioned patriotic religious associations, which are supervised by the United Front Work Department, a branch of the Communist Party.</p>
<p>The government’s tally of registered religious believers is around two hundred million, or less than 10 percent of the population, according to several sources, including the UN Human Rights Council’s 2024 <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/CNIndex.aspx" title="Universal Periodic Review" target="_blank">Universal Periodic Review</a>. However, the number of Chinese adults who practice religion or hold religious belief is <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2023/08/30/measuring-religion-in-china/" title="likely much higher" target="_blank">likely much higher</a> because many believers do not follow organized religion and are said to practice traditional folk religion. These practitioners, along with members of underground house churches and banned religious groups, account for many of the country’s unregistered believers.</p>
<a id="1bcaf1d5-ec8e-4829-92af-c4167af28ab0"></a>
<div class="datawrapper-graph-embed"><div class="dw-responsive-embed-iframe"><iframe title="Religious Affiliation in China" aria-label="Bar Chart" id="datawrapper-chart-9Zk6T" src="https://datawrapper.dwcdn.net/9Zk6T/6/" scrolling="no" frameborder="0" style="width: 0; min-width: 100% !important; border: none;" height="333" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe></div></div>
<p>Chinese public security officials monitor both registered and unregistered religious groups to prevent activities that “<a href="http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content_1372964.htm" title="disrupt public order" target="_blank">disrupt public order</a>, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the State,” as stipulated by the Chinese constitution. In practice, however, monitoring and crackdowns often target peaceful activities that are protected under international law, say human rights watchdogs.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The State Council, the government’s administrative authority, <a href="http://english.gov.cn/policies/latest_releases/2017/09/07/content_281475842719170.htm" title="passed regulations on religious affairs" target="_blank">passed regulations on religious affairs</a> in 2018 to allow state-registered religious organizations to possess property, publish literature, train and approve clergy, and collect donations. But the revised rules also included restrictions on religious schooling and the times and locations of religious celebrations, as well as monitoring of online religious activity and reporting <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-religion/china-tightens-regulation-of-religion-to-block-extremism-idUSKCN1BI1IH" title="donations that exceed 100,000 yuan" target="_blank">donations that exceed 100,000 yuan</a> (around $15,900).&nbsp;</p><p>Under Xi, the CCP has pushed to sinicize religion, or shape all religions to conform to the doctrines of the Communist Party and the customs of the majority Han Chinese population. New regulations that went into effect in early 2020 require religious groups to accept and <a href="https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/measures-for-the-administration-of-religious-groups/" title="spread CCP ideology" target="_blank">spread CCP ideology</a> and values. Faith organizations must now get approval from the government’s religious affairs office before conducting any activities. The next year, the CCP banned unregistered domestic religious groups from <a href="https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-report-on-international-religious-freedom/china/" title="sharing religious content online" target="_blank">sharing religious content online</a> and prohibited overseas organizations from operating online religious services in China without a permit, particularly targeting Christianity-related content on the messaging service WeChat.&nbsp;</p>
<p>In September 2023, stricter laws required religious sites and activities to support <a href="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/religion-controls-08032023122520.html" title="sinicization policies" target="_blank">sinicization policies</a>, which&nbsp; included prohibiting religious activity if it could “endanger national security, disrupt social order [or] damage national interests.” Meanwhile, in Hong Kong, where religious groups are not required to register with the government, religious figures have faced tighter scrutiny and have <a href="https://static1.squarespace.com/static/58ecfa82e3df284d3a13dd41/t/6549b051117ad12c7c40c783/1699328088263/Sell+Out+My+Soul_final.pdf" title="increased self-censorship" target="_blank">increased self-censorship</a> [PDF] under the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/hong-kong-freedoms-democracy-protests-china-crackdown" title="2020 national security law" target="_blank">2020 national security law</a>. The former Catholic Bishop of Hong Kong, Cardinal Joseph Zen Ze-kiun, was arrested on suspicion of “collusion with foreign forces” in 2021. He was later found guilty and was issued a fine. Since 2022, the Catholic church in Hong Kong has halted its annual commemorative masses to mark the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre.</p>
<figure id="image-82067" class="image-embed embedded_small"><div class="image-embed__picture">
<img width="520" height="347" alt="Cardinal Joseph Zen attends a mass for the Chinese Catholic church in Hong Kong." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" class="lazyload" data-src="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/China_Christianity_BG.jpg.webp" src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/China_Christianity_BG.jpg.webp" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption"><div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Cardinal Joseph Zen Ze-kiun attends a mass for the Chinese Catholic church in Hong Kong.
<span class="image-embed__source">Tyrone Siu/Reuters</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption></figure><p>In addition, China is home to one of the largest populations of religious prisoners, likely numbering from several thousand to <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/441219-CHINA-2022-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FREEDOM-REPORT.pdf" title="as high as tens of thousands" target="_blank">as high as tens of thousands</a> [PDF]; while in custody, some are tortured or killed, rights groups say. Instances of arbitrary detentions and violence carried out with impunity have led the U.S. State Department to designate China as a country of particular concern&nbsp;over religious freedom annually since 1999.</p>
<h2>Atheism and the CCP</h2>
<p>The CCP is officially atheist. The party prohibits its roughly ninety-eight million party members from holding religious beliefs, and it requires the expulsion of party members who belong to religious organizations. Officials have said that party membership and religious beliefs are incompatible, and they discourage families of CCP members from publicly participating in religious ceremonies. Although these regulations are not always strictly enforced, the party periodically takes steps to draw a clearer line on religion.&nbsp;</p>
<h2><b>Chinese Buddhism and Folk Religions</b></h2>
<p>China has the world’s largest Buddhist population—an estimate of 4 percent to 33 percent of the country’s population (42 million to 362 million people) depending on how religious practices are measured, according to the U.S.-based <a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2023/08/30/buddhism/#how-many-buddhists-are-there-in-china" title="Pew Research Center" target="_blank">Pew Research Center</a>. Though Buddhism originated in India, it has a long history and tradition in China and today is the country’s largest institutionalized religion. Chinese folk religions, in contrast, have no rigid organizational structure, blend practices from Buddhism and Daoism, and are manifest in the worship of ancestors, spirits, or other local deities. According to CFR Senior Fellow Ian Johnson, author of <a href="http://www.ian-johnson.com/books/the-souls-of-china" title="The Souls of China: The Return of Religion After Mao" target="_blank"><em style="font-style:italic">The Souls of China: The Return of Religion After Mao</em></a>, “hundreds, if not thousands, of folk religious temples are unregistered,” but are tolerated.</p>
<p>Since China’s opening and reform in the 1980s, the party has been tolerant of, and tacitly approved, the rise in Buddhist and Daoist practice. Under former Chinese leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, the government “<a href="http://www.academia.edu/2262613/Buddhist_revival_under_state_watch" title="passively supported" target="_blank">passively supported</a>” the growth of Buddhism because it believed doing so helped bolster the image of China’s peaceful rise, supported the CCP’s goal of creating a “harmonious society,” and could help to improve relations with Taiwan, according to the University of Ottawa’s André Laliberté. Today, Buddhism, Daoism, and folk religions are <a href="https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/china-reversing-its-crackdown-some-religions-not-all" title="treated more leniently ... |
http://localhost:1200/cfr/blog - Success ✔️<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0">
<channel>
<title>Blogs</title>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog</link>
<atom:link href="http://localhost:1200/cfr/blog" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"></atom:link>
<description>Blogs - Made with love by RSSHub(https://github.com/DIYgod/RSSHub)</description>
<generator>RSSHub</generator>
<webMaster>i@diygod.me (DIYgod)</webMaster>
<language>en</language>
<lastBuildDate>Fri, 24 May 2024 14:48:17 GMT</lastBuildDate>
<ttl>5</ttl>
<item>
<title>A Puzzling Attempted Coup in the DRC</title>
<description><figure>
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/slide_3_2/public/image/2024/05/DRC%20Coup%20052324.jpg.webp" alt="The Congolese Republican Guard and police block a road around the scene of an attempted coup d'etat in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo on May 19, 2024." class="article-header-blog__image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
<figcaption class="article-header-blog__caption">
The Congolese Republican Guard and police block a road around the scene of an attempted coup d'etat in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo on May 19, 2024.
<span class="article-header-blog__credit">Arsene Mpiana/AFP via Getty Images</span> </figcaption>
</figure><br><p>The news <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/democratic-republic-congo-army-says-it-stopped-attempted-coup-2024-05-19/" title="reports" target="_blank">reports</a> of this past weekend’s failed coup attempt in Kinshasa read like a Mad Lib—a father-son duo from <u>Utah</u> and a <u>cannabis entrepreneur</u> from <u>Maryland</u> were part of a small band <u>livestreaming</u> an attempt to overthrow the government of the <u>Democratic Republic of Congo</u>. In the conspiratorial hothouse of Congolese politics, the bizarre incident, which culminated in deadly consequences for several people including Christian Malanga, leader of the would-be putchists, has raised numerous as yet unanswered questions. Who convinced Malanga that this effort would succeed? How did the amateurish group manage to access the presidential palace? Whose agenda was advanced by this spectacle?</p>
<p>It remains to be seen how the failed coup d’état will influence politics in the DRC, but one clear loser would seem to be the United States. Certainly, the incident made U.S. Ambassador to the DRC Lucy Tamlyn’s job more difficult. As social media accounts buzzed with accusations of CIA involvement, she <a href="https://x.com/USAmbDRC" title="registered" target="_blank">registered</a> “shock and concern” while pledging to cooperate with the Congolese government in investigating the incident. Cooler heads recognized that the failed takeover hardly bore the hallmarks of a professional intelligence organization, but the notion of armed Americans meddling in Congolese politics <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/10/24/congo-lumumba-cia-amends/" title="echoes" target="_blank">echoes</a> the real and sordid history of U.S. policies during the Cold War. As the United States aims to find a constructive way forward with the DRC on a range of issues from critical mineral deals to forest conservation and conflict resolution, developments that stir up historic resentments benefit only those who wish to see the United States on the back foot.</p><p>Yet another unhelpful narrative is buttressed by the bizarre events in the DRC—one about contempt. The story creates the impression that Americans so underestimate African states that they imagine a government can be overthrown by a small group of outsiders with nothing but fatigues, guns, and a can-do attitude. It’s consistent with former President Trump’s vulgar characterization of African countries, with press coverage that uses images from one part of the continent to accompany a story about a completely different country, and with analyses that consistently overlook the agency of Africans themselves in explaining major political developments. A small, misguided group with a sprinkling of American passports have boosted the efforts of America’s adversaries in Africa.</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog/puzzling-attempted-coup-drc</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/blog/puzzling-attempted-coup-drc</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2024 16:00:13 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>The President’s Inbox Recap: America’s New Cold Wars</title>
<description><figure>
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/slide_3_2/public/image/2024/05/Xi%20and%20Putin%20Gala%20Photo.JPG.webp" alt="Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping attend the gala event celebrating 75th anniversary of China-Russia relations in Beijing, China, on May 16, 2024." class="article-header-blog__image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
<figcaption class="article-header-blog__caption">
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping attend the gala event celebrating 75th anniversary of China-Russia relations in Beijing, China, on May 16, 2024.
<span class="article-header-blog__credit">Alexander Ryumin/Pool via REUTERS</span> </figcaption>
</figure><br><p>The latest episode o<em>f </em><a href="https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/americas-new-cold-wars-david-sanger" title="The President’s Inbox" target="_blank"><em>The President’s Inbox</em></a><em> </em>is live! This week, Jim sat down with <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/by/david-e-sanger" title="David E. Sanger" target="_blank">David E. Sanger</a>, White House and National Security Correspondent for the <em>New York Times</em>. David recently published <a href="https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/710053/new-cold-wars-by-david-e-sanger-with-mary-k-brooks/" title="New Cold Wars: China’s Rise, Russia’s Invasion, and America’s Struggle to Defend the West" target="_blank"><em>New Cold Wars: China’s Rise, Russia’s Invasion, and America’s Struggle to Defend the West</em></a>. They discussed the United States’ return to great power competition.</p>
<div class="media-episode-card">
<div class="episode-card__podcast-title">
<section class="series-tag"><a href="https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/presidents-inbox" class="series-tag__link"> The President’s Inbox</a> </section></div>
<h1 class="episode-card__title">
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/americas-new-cold-wars-david-sanger" data-vars-event-label=" America’s New Cold Wars, With David Sanger"> America’s New Cold Wars, With David Sanger</a>
</h1>
<div class="episode-card__summary">
<p></p><p>David Sanger, the White House and national security correspondent for the<em> New York Times</em>, sits down with James M. Lindsay to discuss how the post-Cold War ended and why the new era of geopolitical rivalry began.</p>
</div>
<div class="audio-podcast">
<div id="player-container-node-audio-252435" class="audio-player-wrapper" data-id="-node-audio-252435">
<div id="play-btn-node-audio-252435" class="audio-player-wrapper__btn audio-player-wrapper__play">
<span class="play-btn">
</span>
<span class="pause-btn">
</span>
</div>
<div class="audio-player-wrapper__controls">
<div id="seekObjContainer-node-audio-252435" class="seekObjContainer">
<div id="seekHover-node-audio-252435" class="seekHover"></div>
<input type="range" id="seek-slider-node-audio-252435" max="100" value="0"></div>
</div>
<div class="audio-player-wrapper__time">
<small id="current-time-node-audio-252435" class="time">0:00</small>
<small id="duration-node-audio-252435" class="time">0:00</small>
</div>
<div class="audio-player-wrapper__mute"></div>
<div class="audio-player-wrapper__speed" data-speed="1">x</div>
<div class="audio-player" id="audio-player-container-node-audio-252435">
<audio id="player-node-audio-252435" src="https://cfr-org-prod-media-files.s3.amazonaws.com/audio-files/240521_TPI_MASTER.mp3" preload="”metadata”"></audio></div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="episode-card__date">
May 20, 2024 — 38:18 min </div>
</div>
<p>Here are four highlights from their conversation:</p>
<p><em>1.) The post-Cold War era is over. </em>The United States no longer enjoys its unipolar moment. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and through the 2000s, the United States and the West made a series of misjudgments about where Russia and China were headed. They assumed that Russia and China would want to become more integrated into the U.S.-led world order. David acknowledged that Russian President Vladimir Putin stated explicitly in 2007 that he would do the contrary, while China’s ambitions were unclear initially. David said, “this was a failure of imagining a world in which these powers wanted to return to a past era of greatness and weren’t going to sit still for a unipolar world, run out of Washington under Washington values.”</p><p><em>2.) The new era of great power competition is distinct from the old Cold War. </em>The old Cold War was largely a military competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. Today, the United States is engaged in a great power competition that is more complex. The United States is engaged in competition with China and Russia—both of whom have nuclear arsenals. The United States is dealing with, as David put it, “a Russia that has learned with great effectiveness, how to be an agent of disturbance or at least disruption, and a China whose rise, although it has recently run into considerable economic headwinds, has created a range of new problems for us.” At the same time, the United States and its allies and partners—including NATO members, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia—and the “Axis of Resistance”—which is made up of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran—are squaring off. The United States and the Soviet Union, however, were never as interconnected as the United States, China, and Russia are today. He added, “in the new Cold Wars, we are still reliant on the Chinese for chips, other technology. They are reliant on us, and yet none of that has prevented us from descending into what I think is a new era of containment.”</p>
<p><em>3.) The Russia-Ukraine war is a “laboratory” for the United States and its partners against the backdrop of great power competition. </em>The United States is learning what does and doesn’t work in direct conflict with major powers. For example, the United States now realizes that its expensive satellite systems are “sitting ducks.” In the run-up to the war in Ukraine, Russia successfully took out the European Viasat satellite network through a cyberattack on the ground-based modems. Now, the United States is looking to move to a system like Elon Musk’s Starlink—which consists of small satellite constellations. That’s just one example of expensive, modern technology mismatching warfare realities.</p>
<p><em>4.) There is more reason for optimism on the U.S.-China relationship than the U.S.-Russia relationship. </em>David put it this way, “oddly enough, I'm slightly more optimistic, at least in the short term on China than I am on Russia. At least we have conversations underway with them. That's really only in the past year and is driven less by the brilliance of our diplomacy, I think, than by the fact that the Chinese economy has been through a significant downturn that's going to be really hard for them to reverse.” At the same time, when Putin threatened to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, China stated its opposition to the use of nuclear weapons in the conflict. China and the United States have some opportunities for collaboration. David added, “I don’t have any illusions that that’s going to be a broad effort, and I fear the two countries [Russia and China] may grow closer, not further apart, but it is an opportunity for the US.”</p>
<p>If you’re looking to read more of David’s work, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/23/us/politics/ukraine-new-american-technology.html" title="check out" target="_blank">check out</a> this adaptation from his book for the <em>New York Times</em> about the lessons learned from the war in Ukraine.</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog/presidents-inbox-recap-americas-new-cold-wars</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/blog/presidents-inbox-recap-americas-new-cold-wars</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 23 May 2024 14:42:21 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Advanced Manufacturing to be a Focus of China’s July Party Plenum</title>
<description><figure>
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/slide_3_2/public/image/2024/05/2017-10-22T230936Z_41608130_RC13548D61B0_RTRMADP_3_CHINA-BATTERIES-RECYCLING.JPG.webp" alt="A worker inspects batteries for electric vehicles being manufactured at a factory in Dongguan, China. " class="article-header-blog__image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
<figcaption class="article-header-blog__caption">
A worker inspects batteries for electric vehicles being manufactured at a factory in Dongguan, China.
<span class="article-header-blog__credit">Bobby Yip/Reuters</span> </figcaption>
</figure><br><p>China’s long-delayed third Party plenum on economic reform will be held in July. Official commentary suggests that the Party communique which will be issued at this meeting will double-down on the importance of manufacturing as a tool to address China’s pressing domestic economic problems, potentially increasing trade tensions with a range of foreign countries.</p>
<p>On April 30, Chinese authorities&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="0" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.rfa.org%2Fenglish%2Fnews%2Fchina%2Fdelayed-third-plenary-economy-meeting-05022024142612.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503185984%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=6rGd5%2FLSHj1bM81wUd7kavWE%2BfArnHSjbHJl9xnwSRY%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWA21353390-5ead-5dcb-2b03-23d199791392" originalsrc="https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/delayed-third-plenary-economy-meeting-05022024142612.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="H0nZtRfp6EVbYT+KTpVqEheb+uLHle+cIEiV0g+4+TJW3Qu25XU/yzbCa1G2aRH/CCZXeUISHDF/gjIEXXg6zrryaT7ofgaXLsCq4t+Ik6Cb4/KAwl81rSRLR+Eb2phf9yd3N/9uq7lw3S0AkysnTIbFN+sOlSXsSMVT6MjV/hw=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/delayed-third-plenary-economy-meeting-05022024142612.html. Click or tap if you trust this link.">announced</a>&nbsp;that the third Party plenum of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee would meet in July. Official commentary&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="1" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.chinadaily.com.cn%2Fa%2F202405%2F01%2FWS66323e19a31082fc043c5050.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503199426%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=2n3UuGo%2FRAWMbRlRHWq%2BEQJSihCvwU%2FgSSy2AXeD2PE%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWA117497f5-e87c-bc4e-01dd-f20665dc9b5e" originalsrc="https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202405/01/WS66323e19a31082fc043c5050.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="bqQQxTFiPd7eWyoW8nBUP4fkYbr+Lnn8xYI19CYTxCJmPQ0cE4NwUv9TvRZM6N7F+C46cUR8Mw1johhx4G2Aca9bsgndQMVxL7ANckuufHWRiWeNv8elRRoWYA824p1Ilt4+VGxxWLXaknoI7+ubjDILGgOZJLlPYVseD4HI/nw=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202405/01/WS66323e19a31082fc043c5050.html. Click or tap if you trust this link.">indicates</a>&nbsp;that economic issues will be the core of the plenum, including a focus on integrated economic plans for the Yangtze Delta region. But specific attention will also be devoted to fostering “new quality productive forces”—a new Party slogan set out by Xi Jinping—with state commentary stating:</p><p><em>“The imperative was stressed... to develop new quality productive forces according to local conditions. The layout of China's strength in strategic science and technology should be improved, emerging industries cultivated and strengthened, the development of industries for the future arranged in advance, and the transformation and upgrading of traditional industries empowered by advanced technologies.”</em></p>
<p>As Chinese authorities&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="2" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Flosangeles.china-consulate.gov.cn%2Feng%2Flghd%2F202404%2Ft20240418_11283727.htm&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503205764%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=IbEShh6%2BllqjRF%2BKcOmhi%2FU7fTx1f9JCGSLpKwYrcBk%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAe743989e-a804-99d8-d203-643dc5ac1cc7" originalsrc="http://losangeles.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/lghd/202404/t20240418_11283727.htm" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="nJFMkJ+NoiMgW4rhQv8Zy1Lr3elJYsunHe4BDryx6OO0YVHvk0kbWP02pfLAsbN1ydtFaaLLI+D2xacSVY5nZse/MXybDN3lKtTtVciINnLLI1oJjosVuWnQLf9+vqKBw/nTo448yRRn+8p/5q4ZAnoGVQEE+nbAkYpuy9tqg0g=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: http://losangeles.china-consulate.gov.cn/eng/lghd/202404/t20240418_11283727.htm. Click or tap if you trust this link.">note</a>, “new quality productive forces” includes three specific industries: electric vehicles, lithium-ion batteries, and photovoltaic products, which have registered dramatic export growth, in addition to other fields in biomedicine, artificial intelligence, and the digital economy. In recent years, Beijing has&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="3" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2F2024%2F05%2F14%2Fbusiness%2Fchina-exports-manufacturing.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503211048%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=1ahyI9wpkevRlu2E672ErhfP7nh3mz%2Fwp4Q4dT76QSc%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAd915b52c-0ef4-2399-4607-1ea63c3f5b6b" originalsrc="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/14/business/china-exports-manufacturing.html" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="L2sZOeL0lFunPptcQBH8iAhtpk88vF6tbo59ysGysLK+IoJ4HxdgExVjCZ/qZ6o01CYHuZ3WrgTsj9CqTmStycTBTwhf+dMUsXEuw49i+afnKwi/uOCVTlwcjKEcEbF6/gKe+TnSzRXlDzhzF6kuCmKwHA/MVKY/pJPB0BG8OpI=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/14/business/china-exports-manufacturing.html. Click or tap if you trust this link.">identified and promoted</a>&nbsp;key advanced manufacturing industries—including electric vehicles and batteries—as part of China’s industrial strategy. Goals include reducing reliance on foreign technologies and creating new sources of export-driven growth.&nbsp;</p>
<p>For Beijing, such emphasis on manufacturing represents an economic development strategy aimed at responding to serious domestic challenges. China currently faces both continuing high&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="4" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.wsj.com%2Fworld%2Fchina%2Fchinas-youth-unemployment-eased-in-april-a029344f&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503216081%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=eNQrISw%2BXNg3i%2FwuJav7ExYbcv2lBfCg4MzHyblG7p4%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAbd6af401-ab3c-7845-7ea4-53d89f61f617" originalsrc="https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-youth-unemployment-eased-in-april-a029344f" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="AQ4/iQp/hYQGxLkXSn7qmCrCJ/cZPlJ+TV1/fUPl5xi4LmH5GuJJY97e/YzHRaDV7MuK+PCZTCHRcdjAGmcXnkvGUJvpbYYSHjcj+YJoViFXMJd+4ypOZ98eTfbC22clyxh9qg1vg2Dbiab/raJBmkpD+TjrkS5zidNmKWfKPGQ=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://www.wsj.com/world/china/chinas-youth-unemployment-eased-in-april-a029344f. Click or tap if you trust this link.">youth unemployment</a>, as well as construction and real estate sectors that are mired in deep distress after the implosion of China’s property bubble, and which constituted a quarter of China’s GDP prior to the pandemic. Recent years have&nbsp;<a data-auth="NotApplicable" data-linkindex="5" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/amid-mounting-youth-unemployment-woes-beijing-looks-towards-vocational-education" id="OWA4f9afd72-27e1-a17f-5c3b-a22fc9dadb5d" rel="noopener noreferrer" target="_blank" title="seen">seen</a>&nbsp;Chinese authorities make a concerted effort to raise the status of vocational education programs and steer youth in the direction of skilled manufacturing labor, precisely because of the employment difficulties facing four-year college graduates.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Indeed, recent statements by Xi himself give further support to the likelihood that the July plenum will feature a doubling-down on manufacturing. A front-page&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="6" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fpaper.people.com.cn%2Frmrb%2Fhtml%2F2024-05%2F01%2Fnw.D110000renmrb_20240501_4-01.htm&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503220962%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=LvIQKiUxzrnTL5IJ16VqXtLA2b8mEyKv3lZTT4xqvYk%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWA3964bf46-e856-5cc7-ecc1-e1db928cee93" originalsrc="http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2024-05/01/nw.D110000renmrb_20240501_4-01.htm" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="U+VGUCUN0VJYCDQ2m86YaO3xVtQLf4AFom+BRwX1d9GyfZpjKes/TTI9qMLzcuMXNjvU+HCgSepVli75jPbZ3LIWCwAAZbLulu9txfWvvq83eCkMtoYWI36ftt+PqSliQSPrKlM0wk/5b1NnvWK2u5IeHP12JeLpC0cyv1/ltJI=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2024-05/01/nw.D110000renmrb_20240501_4-01.htm. Click or tap if you trust this link.">article</a>&nbsp;in the Party’s flagship paper accompanying the announcement of the July plenum carried extensive quotations from Xi himself extolling Chinese “craftsmanship” (<em>gongjiang</em>) in numerous fields of advanced manufacturing.</p>
<p>Naturally, any policy moves by Beijing to boost its own export-oriented advanced manufacturing industries run the risk of heightening tensions between China and its trading partners. Fears of Chinese market domination in specific industries led the Biden administration to&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="7" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fapnews.com%2Farticle%2Fbiden-china-tariffs-electric-vehicles-evs-solar-2024ba735c47e04a50898a88425c5e2c&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503225850%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=Lf8uTpZ6O1wJNj%2FSMr8ybHVGEuHjxOTwdJI49t%2BjhmY%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAbf0d4b26-e45d-be24-0f02-464361a12e73" originalsrc="https://apnews.com/article/biden-china-tariffs-electric-vehicles-evs-solar-2024ba735c47e04a50898a88425c5e2c" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="Zial7EJt9mURBt5T7sLNyoDKz3K/3tbjbkvn3tpiLyw16SD1VUaE4xhpY7xPsNzt05pHcsZEOjV3lzvQ09lZ5gjWonBZNBUQKbZdL96lTfPnncvNW3KYIP1mNu9l18reYgYx8EeZGPdwyI/KjsFZU1d3Nd9Aw9+8Kx8cwxUjyMc=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://apnews.com/article/biden-china-tariffs-electric-vehicles-evs-solar-2024ba735c47e04a50898a88425c5e2c. Click or tap if you trust this link.">announce</a>&nbsp;high tariffs on a range of such products last week. In fall 2023, European authorities&nbsp;<a data-auth="Verified" data-linkindex="8" data-loopstyle="linkonly" data-ogsc="rgb(5, 99, 193)" href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Frhg.com%2Fresearch%2Faint-no-duty-high-enough%2F&amp;data=05%7C02%7Cshuang%40cfr.org%7C39eb2f06693340e7069c08dc7a9bbb9b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638520056503230731%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=lyUNGLKjjpnh19ABAO7T6svYM8im%2F1%2Bhg%2BdAw4NUZ1I%3D&amp;reserved=0" id="OWAe6e23327-f57b-65e1-1139-73e7492b7bc3" originalsrc="https://rhg.com/research/aint-no-duty-high-enough/" rel="noopener noreferrer" shash="JaDVZAQwTw9fRxuxCWHj8WGhl3dc+jVzZfhMwuGIEkGneAbeDvT4IVpdE7XXcwVyjK8MtOFpBmFteUpAFXZ5EsTvExteNVVizaOmbqPwyBZY+e0plVrdArCFjCjJRKphNkxFyxk3V+dCyvyso5tC5M6sydgpqUCWvii5uiExGdA=" target="_blank" title="Original URL: https://rhg.com/research/aint-no-duty-high-enough/. Click or tap if you trust this link.">launched</a>&nbsp;an anti-subsidy investigation into China’s electric vehicle industry, and are currently considering imposing countervailing duties.&nbsp;</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog/advanced-manufacturing-be-focus-chinas-july-party-plenum</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/blog/advanced-manufacturing-be-focus-chinas-july-party-plenum</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 22 May 2024 20:43:23 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>European Tech Law Faces Test to Address Interference, Threats, and Disinformation in 2024 Elections</title>
<description><figure>
<div class="article-header__image-picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/full_width_xl/public/image/2024/05/EUvote.jpg.webp" alt="Pin badges encouraging people to vote in June's European Parliament elections are placed at the Malta office information stand during a conference at the European Parliament, in Rabat, Malta May 22, 2024." class="article-header__image-img" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="article-header__image-caption">
Pin badges encouraging people to vote in June's European Parliament elections are placed at the Malta office information stand during a conference at the European Parliament, in Rabat, Malta May 22, 2024.
<span class="author">REUTERS/Darrin Zammit Lupi</span>
</figcaption>
</figure><br><p>The European Union (EU) began implementing the Digital Services Act (DSA) this year, just in time to combat online disinformation and other electoral interference in the dozens of elections taking place in Europe’s twenty-seven member countries and the European Parliament elections taking place June 6 through June 9. To prepare, the EU conducted a stress test of the DSA mechanisms to address elections targeted by false and manipulated information, incitement, and attempts to suppress voices. The DSA has also <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/30/business/meta-european-union-disinformation-investigation.html" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="opened investigations">opened investigations</a> against Meta, TikTok, and X out of concern they are not doing enough to prevent these scenarios.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The DSA is a landmark piece of legislation not only because it is the most comprehensive regulatory effort to address digital threats to date and impacts the 740 million people living in the EU; its implementation will also inform other countries’ efforts to provide a secure and safe internet space. Even without additional legislation, the European law may induce the largest technology companies to voluntarily apply the same standards globally, as was the case with the EU’s Global Digital Privacy Regulation, which caused many platforms to routinely seek user permission for data collection and retention.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p><p>Tech companies’ responses to the DSA during the EU elections will be watched closely in the United States, where disinformation and electoral interference could roil the already contentious November elections. Despite years of debate, no U.S. guardrails have been implemented. Concerns over government censorship and free speech have stalled dozens of legislative proposals to require tech companies to address various threats in the digital space and risks arising from powerful new artificial intelligence (AI). The free speech argument overlooks the speech of those who are being doxed, threatened, attacked, and driven out of the public arena by vicious online actors—including women, who are far and away <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/most-online-hate-targets-women-says-eu-report-2023-11-29/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="the most frequent targets of these attacks">the most frequent targets of these attacks</a>. Legislative action has also been impeded by concerns that overly burdensome regulation will inhibit tech companies amid a worldwide race to gain competitive edge through generative artificial intelligence and other innovations.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The DSA is a useful model constructed around three principles: due diligence requirements for tech companies, mandated transparency via public reporting of their compliance with those requirements, and the threat of hefty fines to ensure compliance and accountability. The size of the EU market is large enough that, as with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), some tech companies may be incentivized to comply with the law’s provisions even without sanctions. The DSA’s strictest provisions apply to the world’s largest online platforms and search engines (those with more than 45 million users). These companies are required to routinely assess activity on their platforms and services for “<a href="https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/dsa-vlops" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="systemic risks">systemic risks</a>” involving elections, illegal content, human rights, gender-based violence, protection of minors, and public health and safety.&nbsp;</p>
<p>Companies have delivered initial assessments, which are publicly available, as well as information about the actions they have taken to comply. The EU website hosts a massive and growing online archive of hundreds of thousands of content moderation decisions made by the companies. In early enforcement actions, the EU has requested that Meta and other companies take down false ads and sought more information about their safety practices. For example, the EU queried X about its decision to cut its <a href="https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/commission-requests-information-x-decreasing-content-moderation-resources-under-digital-services" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="content moderation team">content moderation team</a> by 20 percent since last October. Reduced content moderation on one of the world’s largest platforms is obviously a great concern given the number of elections and aggressive disinformation and interference campaigns by Russia and its proxies as it seeks to boost the fortunes of rising rightwing populists, Euroskeptic parties, and pro-Russian and anti-Ukraine candidates, as recently <a href="https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/04/17/slovakia-president-pellegrini-russia-election-interference-disinformation/" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="occurred in Slovakia">occurred in Slovakia</a> and other Central and Eastern European countries.&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p>Thus far, the DSA has not yet levied fines, but the threat alone of stiff penalties of up to 6 percent of gross revenues has led most companies to provide the required information. This treasure trove of information about how these tech companies are policing their own platforms is itself valuable; it enables governments and researchers to understand the effectiveness of measures being employed by trust and safety divisions of companies, some of which embrace the goal of a safe internet. The EU law explicitly seeks to guard free speech as well as innovation by companies, but the experience of implementation will inform lingering concerns about free speech, direct government decision-making, and censorship of content, including whether an authoritarian government could exercise control over their populations through digital policing and firewalls. Those concerns color the current negotiations at the United Nations over a Global Digital Compact, which is to be announced as part of the Summit of the Future in September.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The essence of the DSA is not to make content decisions directly but to set standards for due diligence and require companies to demonstrate that they are monitoring and mitigating risks via their own codes of conduct. Voluntary standards may vary, but the sharpest debates revolve around defining what constitutes illegal content. The EU has taken additional measures to harmonize laws regarding what is illegal content across the EU member states, which has been a difficult and contentious matter. The United Kingdom (UK) went through a similar multiyear debate over concerns about curtailing free speech before passing its Online Safety Act late last year. The UK law adopted some features in the DSA, including the due diligence reporting requirement and fines of up to ten percent of gross revenue. It defines the scope of risks more narrowly than the DSA, although the UK law does criminalize “extreme” pornography and may criminalize the creation of deepfake porn. Enforcement of the UK law awaits finalization of codes of conduct by year’s end. The EU also has moved to harmonize what constitutes illegal content as the laws of the twenty-seven member states currently vary greatly in defining what is illegal. Germany’s Network Enforcement Act, which was passed in 2018, is one of the world’s stiffest hate speech laws, which aims to stem rising neo-Nazi hate speech. The far-right Alternative fur Deutschland party has <a href="https://www.vox.com/world-politics/2024/3/12/24080074/germany-afd-far-right" rel="noreferrer noopener" target="_blank" title="surged in state elections">surged in state elections</a> and exceeded the popularity of the leading Social Democrats in national polls.&nbsp;</p><p>The process of making the internet safer is iterative; several countries have revised their laws based on the experience of implementing them as well as evolving circumstances. For example, Germany amended its law in 2021 to stiffen its requirement that companies take down “clearly illegal” content within twenty-four hours. Australia has revised its online safety law twice since its initial passage in 2015, to require faster takedown of material deemed illegal and to greatly expand the law’s original focus on stopping child sexual abuse and exploitation and terrorist material. Speed of response is a critical factor in countering mis- and disinformation. Delayed action by tech companies has allowed viral propagation of material to proceed unhindered—as occurred in early January when deepfake porn of pop star Taylor Swift spread to 47 million viewers shortly after it was uploaded from the notorious 4chan message board.&nbsp;</p>
<p>That highly publicized episode drew attention to the disproportionate targeting of women and girls by internet violence, especially women in public life like politicians, journalists, and human rights activists, and minorities. The chilling effect on political participation has also been documented. The UK parliament rushed to act on deepfake porn after a number of women candidates were targeted this spring. Growing attention to the magnitude of the effects on women spurred the Biden administration to form a fourteen-country global partnership for action on online harassment and abuse. And last month, the EU concluded years-long negotiations to issue a directive on online gender-based violence and threats, including nonconsensual sharing of intimate images, deepfake porn, and other forms of attack. Member states are required to pass laws to implement the directive within two years.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The 2024 elections will serve as an initial test case for the DSA’s ability to rein in this wide variety of election interference, threats, and disinformation. Given the nascent regulatory architecture and companies’ varied compliance records, it is certain that further scrutiny and modification will be needed. Big tech will be required to provide public after-action reviews of the effectiveness of their measures to label AI-generated content, moderate discourse, identify foreign interference, and meet other guidelines for each country’s elections. These much-needed first steps will help light the way for others.&nbsp;</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/article/european-tech-law-faces-test-address-interference-threats-and-disinformation-2024-elections</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/article/european-tech-law-faces-test-address-interference-threats-and-disinformation-2024-elections</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 22 May 2024 15:54:31 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>On "Outside Agitators" and Gaza Protests</title>
<description><p>Below is a chart showing the numbers of people arrested during Gaza encampments and protests on a number of U.S. campuses.</p>
<p>Data was collected from <em>The New York Times </em>article titled <a href="https://nam10.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.nytimes.com%2Finteractive%2F2024%2Fus%2Fpro-palestinian-college-protests-encampments.html&amp;data=05%7C02%7CEAbrams%40cfr.org%7C79b6f0937c2346ef2f5308dc79a4262b%7C146cc3db32f24b3c815625bcc3553464%7C0%7C0%7C638518993125924955%7CUnknown%7CTWFpbGZsb3d8eyJWIjoiMC4wLjAwMDAiLCJQIjoiV2luMzIiLCJBTiI6Ik1haWwiLCJXVCI6Mn0%3D%7C0%7C%7C%7C&amp;sdata=c1vMu1qHcMFcAe4V9go9nFMUVVZ8eQSGkzA5KFljrXA%3D&amp;reserved=0" title="“Where Protesters on U.S. Campuses Have Been Arrested or Detained,”" target="_blank">“Where Protesters on U.S. Campuses Have Been Arrested or Detained,”</a> and supplemented with additional numbers from local journalists, university papers and statements, and national news agencies. The arrest numbers are <em>not </em>an exhaustive list of total arrests related to Gaza encampments and protests. Rather, it is a sample from a group of institutions where there are reports on the affiliation status of those arrested.</p><p>So these numbers should be considered suggestive, not final or absolutely reliable. And what they suggest is that the protests were indeed seized upon by people unaffiliated with the universities and colleges in question, but determined to disrupt campus life in the service of their political goals. Only half of those "protesting" were students or faculty members.&nbsp;</p>
<p>This suggests other questions. Who were the 50.43% who were unaffiliated? Who financed their activities? Did the affiliated and unaffiliated act in the same ways, or was one group or the other more involved in violence, building takeovers, and extremist rhetoric as opposed to peaceful protest?&nbsp;</p>
<p>The involvement of such a percentage of persons unaffiliated with the universities presents special problems for administrators, because internal discipline such as suspension or expulsion will of course not be available when it comes to the unaffiliated. That may leave no alternative except arrests to bring the activities to an end. In real life, we've very often seen administrators threaten suspensions or expulsions and then back off, or even impose such penalties and then remove them as part of the price of getting protesters to disband. Faculty who violate university rules present a similar but even harder problem because they often have more protections, such as tenure.&nbsp;</p>
<p>My impression, now as the academic year is ending, is that punishment is extremely rare. Most charges have been or likely will be dropped, except perhaps in cases where "protesters" assaulted police. Academic penalties such as suspension appear to be disappearing as well. This sends a clear message: violations of the rules will be forgiven no matter how severe the violation if violators stick to their guns and threaten further disturbances. It is an invitation for more trouble, and quite an education for the vast majority of students who naively assumed rules were <em>not </em>made to be broken.&nbsp;</p>
<figure id="image-82254" class="image-embed embedded_large"><div class="image-embed__picture">
<img width="520" height="332" alt="A list of universities with the number of arrests and affiliation status of those arrested." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" class="lazyload" data-src="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/Arrests%20at%20University%20Gaza%20Encampments%20and%20Protests_2.jpg.webp" src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/Arrests%20at%20University%20Gaza%20Encampments%20and%20Protests_2.jpg.webp" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption"><div class="image-embed__caption-text">
<span class="image-embed__source"></span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption></figure></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog/outside-agitators-and-gaza-protests</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/blog/outside-agitators-and-gaza-protests</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 21 May 2024 19:45:22 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Cyber Week in Review: May 16, 2024</title>
<description><figure>
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/slide_3_2/public/image/2024/05/2023-09-13T183146Z_1763002145_RC2U73AQX2WE_RTRMADP_3_USA-AI-CONGRESS-SCHUMER.JPG.webp" alt="U.S. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) addresses a press conference during a break in a bipartisan Artificial Intelligence (AI) Insight Forum for all U.S. senators at the U.S. Capitol on September 13, 2023." class="article-header-blog__image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
<figcaption class="article-header-blog__caption">
U.S. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) addresses a press conference during a break in a bipartisan Artificial Intelligence (AI) Insight Forum for all U.S. senators at the U.S. Capitol on September 13, 2023.
<span class="article-header-blog__credit">Julia Nikhinson/Reuters</span> </figcaption>
</figure><br><p><b style="font-weight:700">Senate AI working group releases AI Policy Roadmap</b></p>
<p>A bipartisan group of senators, which consists of Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY), and Sens. Todd Young (R-IN), Martin Heinrich (D-NM), and Mike Rounds (R-S.D.), released a “<a href="https://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000018f-79a9-d62d-ab9f-f9af975d0000" title="roadmap" target="_blank">roadmap </a>for artificial intelligence policy in the U.S. Senate” this week, and identifies areas or uses of AI that are well-suited for regulation, including boosting funding for AI innovation, developing standards for AI fairness, addressing AI’s implications for national security, and addressing AI’s effects on the workforce, among other concerns. The roadmap also calls for Congress to appropriate nearly $32 billion to encourage non-military AI innovation over the coming year. Although the report offers a <a href="https://www.akingump.com/en/insights/alerts/senate-gang-of-four-releases-long-anticipated-ai-whitepaper" title="variety of recommendations" target="_blank">variety of recommendations</a> for how Congress could leverage processes like appropriations, existing acts and funding like the CHIPS and Science Act, and research and development funding mechanisms to meet the goals of the roadmap, the senators have not clarified exactly what action Congress should take or when it would do so. The roadmap reflects the topics of AI Insight Forums that Majority Leader Schumer convened throughout the fall, which brought together business executives, legislators, and a small group of civil society advocates to discuss regulating artificial intelligence in the United States. While <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2024/05/15/congress-ai-road-map-regulation-schumer/" title="tech industry groups generally supported the report" target="_blank">tech industry groups generally supported the report</a> as a step in the right direction, academics and civil society advocates <a href="https://www.fastcompany.com/91126098/chuck-schumer-ai-roadmap-panned" title="derided" target="_blank">derided</a> it for lacking specificity and substance.&nbsp;</p><p><b style="font-weight:700">U.S., Japan, and partners unveil agreement for cross-border data flows</b></p>
<p>The United States, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom have <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Technology/Japan-U.S.-and-others-to-ease-cross-border-personal-data-transfers" title="created" target="_blank">created </a>a new framework to enable the sharing of personal data across their respective borders. The new framework aims to balance the need to encourage online commerce between countries with the data security needs and regulations of each country. The existing mechanism for data sharing, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Cross-Border Privacy Rules, will be phased out in favor of a new system. The new agreement will allow non-APEC countries to participate in data-sharing initiatives, with the United Kingdom being the first such country to join, and will standardize a process for certifying companies from participating countries. Once those companies have been certified by a relevant data protection authority, they will be able to share data more easily among the participating countries. The agreement, which is still being finalized, is likely to be rolled out in the coming months, and the participating countries hope it will expand beyond the additional participating APEC countries, Australia, Canada, Mexico, the Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan.</p>
<p><b style="font-weight:700">Frank McCourt announces a planned bid for TikTok</b></p>
<p>In the wake of congressional and executive action aimed at forcing the divestiture of social media platform TikTok, American billionaire Frank McCourt <a href="https://www.projectliberty.io/news/frank-mccourt-organizing-a-people-s-bid-to-acquire-tiktok" title="announced" target="_blank">announced</a> that he is readying a bid for the U.S. version of the social media app TikTok. McCourt is organizing the bid through Project Liberty, an initiative hehe has founded to reimagine the economic models that currently power Big Tech and to bring forward novel solutions aimed at putting individuals in charge of their own data and digital engagement. experience. that could shape and change the status quo of the web, bring forward novel solutions at every level, and put people back in control of their digital lives. McCourt said that buying TikTok would create value by providing “individuals and creators on [TikTok] the value and control they deserve regarding who has access to their data and how it is used.” ByteDance, the parent company of TikTok, will likely be forced to sell the app after Congress included a provision in an annual defense spending bill that requires ByteDance to either sell TikTok in six months or see the app banned. The ban is currently <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/14/business/media/tiktok-creators-sue-ban.html" title="facing challenges" target="_blank">facing challenges</a> in the U.S. court system, as a group of TikTok creators has filed a lawsuit alleging that the ban violates their First Amendment right to fere speech.</p>
<p><b style="font-weight:700">Biden administration increases tariffs on Chinese technology imports</b></p><p>The Biden administration <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/972cabfb-f587-4cb3-ab21-ec3380b049da" title="announced" target="_blank">announced </a>additional tariffs on nearly $18 billion worth of Chinese goods, i stating the move was necessary to protect certain sectors of the U.S. economy. Chinese-made electric vehicles will see some of the largest increases, with the Biden administration quadrupling tariffs from 25 percent of a car’s value to 100 percent in the coming year. Currently <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/electric-shock-interpreting-chinas-electric-vehicle-export-boom" title="only 2 percent" target="_blank">only 2 percent</a> of all U.S. imports of electric vehicles come from China, but Chinese EVs have proliferated rapidly in other markets, with Chinese automakers accounting for <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-ev-strategy-going-small-cheap-pay-big-dividends-asia-russell-2024-04-23/" title="60 percent" target="_blank">60 percent</a> of all EV sales worldwide in 2023. China’s foreign ministry issued a statement saying Beijing “opposes unilateral tariff increases that violate World Trade Organization rules and will take all necessary measures to safeguard its legitimate rights and interests”. The Biden administration isn’t alone in investigating the potential growth of Chinese electric vehicles, as the European Commission has also begun <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/8e4a9eb4-cd88-4625-a21b-6378d24c6dad" title="investigating" target="_blank">investigating </a>EV imports to the EU, and may impose tariffs in the coming months.</p>
<p><b style="font-weight:700">FBI seizes major online cybercrime marketplace</b></p>
<p>The FBI and a number of international law enforcement partners announced that they had seized the servers used to host BreachForums, a prominent cybercrime website. The seizure, which the FBI conducted in partnership with law enforcement in the U.K., New Zealand, Australia, Switzerland, Ukraine and Iceland, involved seizing BreachForum’s Telegram channel as well. The agencies appeared to be searching for the administrators of the site, known by the aliases Baphomet and ShinyHunters, with the FBI issuing a request for tips on the administrators’ real identities. The FBI and Department of Justice have seized a number of major cybercrime forums over the past two years, including BreachForums’ predecessor, RaidForums. BreachForums offered a variety of criminal items for sale through its services, such as stolen devices, hacking tools, and illegal contraband.</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/blog/cyber-week-review-may-16-2024</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/blog/cyber-week-review-may-16-2024</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 17 May 2024 14:25:53 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Power and Financial Interdependence</title>
<description><p>So long as China runs a large trade surplus, Chinese residents (either the government or Chinese firms typically) will need to accumulate financial claims on the rest of the world. Conversely, so long as the United States runs a large trade deficit, the rest of the world will accumulate, in aggregate, claims on the United States. China need not directly finance the U.S. (though it did for a time), but Chinese offshore asset accumulation is necessarily a part of any global equilibrium that sustains U.S. deficits in a world still marked by <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/new-geopolitics-global-finance" title="large Chinese surpluses and large U.S. deficits" target="_blank">large Chinese surpluses and large U.S. deficits</a>.</p>
<p>Trade imbalances thus imply financial interdependence and linkage of one form or another.&nbsp; In today’s world, the risk that such interdependence can be “weaponized” is a very real.</p><p>In my new paper for the <a href="https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/notes-de-lifri/power-and-financial-interdependence" title="Institut Français des Relations Internationales&nbsp;(Ifri)" target="_blank">Institut Français des Relations Internationales&nbsp;(Ifri)</a>, specifically for their new initiative on Geoeconomics and Geofinance, I explore the history of the Sino-American financial relationship – and in particular, try to highlight how perceptions of which country truly holds the leverage within the financially unbalanced relationship have evolved over time.</p>
<p>Two incidents are, I think, especially important.</p>
<p>One is the runup in China’s holdings of Agencies and (less visibly) other forms of credit to U.S. financial institutions in years prior to the global financial crisis. Prior to the global financial crisis, reserve growth (by China and others) was massive, both absolutely and relative to Treasury issuance. This squeezed big sovereign investors (and private investors) into close substitutes for Treasuries. Synthetic AAA didn’t work out well, but it was a real part of global finance for a while.</p>
<p>China’s exposure to the Agency market and other less visible exposures to the U.S. banking system (the China Investment Corporation’s investment in the Reserve Primary money market fund for example) taught China of the dangers of excessive exposure to the U.S. well before the current wave of sanctions against sovereign risk. China had more exposure to Agencies than Treasuries in the summer of 2008 – which wasn’t a comfortable position for China.</p>
<p>It also gave China a bit of leverage over the U.S., at least at the time. This leverage was not directly exercised, but the perception at the top of the U.S. Treasury that China’s actions could determine the success or failure of attempts to stabilize financial markets (notably the Agency market) clearly had an impact on U.S. policymakers. At a minimum, it raised the priority that the U.S. attached to its financial dialogue with China. At a maximum, it put pressure on the U.S. to respect China’s core financial interests, which included assuring the safety and liquidity of its holdings of Agencies. Then again, the need to support the Agency market was wildly overdetermined; the U.S. banking system was far more exposed than China.</p><p>At the end of the day, the fact that the U.S. stabilized the Agency market even as China reduced its exposure quite rapidly (whether by roll-off or outright sales) illustrated that the Fed, far more than China, has the decisive vote when it came to U.S. financial stability. The U.S. has learned, I think, that the Fed can buy more than China can sell.</p>
<p>The second episode is China’s decision after the global financial crisis to reduce its exposure to Treasury bonds – at least its visible holdings of Treasury bonds. China’s flight out of the Agencies was initially a slight back into Treasuries (and supply of Treasuries expanded rapidly after the crisis, making this an easy choice). Visible holdings of Treasuries soared from $500 billion in mid-2008 to $1.3 trillion by mid-2010, and from 2010 on China was a significant user of Euroclear’s custodial service.</p>
<figure id="image-82126" class="image-embed embedded_large"><div class="image-embed__picture">
<img width="520" height="378" alt="China: U.S. Holdings vs. Estimated Dollar Reserves" loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" class="lazyload" data-src="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/JGB%20Chart%20New.png.webp" src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/05/JGB%20Chart%20New.png.webp" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption"><div class="image-embed__caption-text">
<span class="image-embed__source"></span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption></figure><p>China found this risky – partially because of the domestic “optics” of having so much of Chinese savings in a country that, even then, was viewed as a less than ideal custodian of China’s wealth. China thus has been looking for alternatives to Treasuries for far longer than most contemporary accounts recognize.* The G7’s immobilization of Russia’s risk crystallized the risks of holding large reserve balances in strategic adversaries in the public eye. But China had been thinking about those risks for many years.</p>
<p>China’s response to risks of a concentrated exposure to the Treasury market was partially to continue diversifying the currency composition of its foreign reserves. This process started in 2005, likely ended around 2012 and ended up costing China a bit of interest income. China accumulated large euro reserve balances just when the ECB decided to adopt negative rates.</p>
<p>But a big part of China’s strategy was to diversify the way it holds dollars – making more use of offshore custodians (Belgium’s Euroclear most obviously) and <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/fe81e06c-010d-4ddd-ad85-406412ec1bb9" title="private fund managers" target="_blank">private fund managers</a>, but also inching back into Agencies and no doubt other forms of dollar exposure that offer both less visibility and a small yield pickup over Treasuries. For example, Chinese institutions are believed to be active suppliers of dollars in the cross-currency swap market.</p>
<p>Most importantly, China decided to stop holding all its foreign assets as “liquid” foreign exchange reserves. A big part of China’s strategy is what China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) calls the “diversified use” of its reserves. <a href="http://www.safe.gov.cn/en/file/file/20211217/1bdd3ed85dba4d269655b5ce7159893b.pdf?n=Annual%20Report%20of%20the%20State%20Administration%20of%20Foreign%20Exchange%20(2020)" title="SAFE’s 2020 annual report" target="_blank">SAFE’s 2020 annual report</a>, which provides a 10-year progress report on this diversification, remains essential.</p>
<p>Diversified use of reserves effectively meant using foreign exchange not to add to SAFE’s formal foreign exchange reserves, but rather to use China’s foreign exchange to directly fund China’s strategic goals (through what SAFE calls the co-financing platform). SAFE handed foreign exchange over to the Silk Road Fund and its close kin, it provided close to $100 billion in equity capital to the China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export-Import Bank of China (Exim), and no doubt more financing via entrusted loans, and it helped fund the offshore activity of “small, medium, and large” financial instruments. I still think <a href="https://www.cfr.org/blog/how-hide-your-foreign-exchange-reserves-users-guide" t... |
http://localhost:1200/cfr/timelines - Success ✔️<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0">
<channel>
<title>Timelines</title>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/timelines</link>
<atom:link href="http://localhost:1200/cfr/timelines" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"></atom:link>
<description>Timelines - Made with love by RSSHub(https://github.com/DIYgod/RSSHub)</description>
<generator>RSSHub</generator>
<webMaster>i@diygod.me (DIYgod)</webMaster>
<language>en</language>
<lastBuildDate>Fri, 24 May 2024 14:48:21 GMT</lastBuildDate>
<ttl>5</ttl>
<item>
<title>Far-Right Terrorism in the United States</title>
<description><br>
<h1>1865</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Formation of the Ku Klux Klan</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77403" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1865_KKK.jpg.webp" width="520" height="550" alt="Illustration showing members of the White League and the Ku Klux Klan clasping hands over a suffering African American family." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
An editorial illustration by Thomas Nast in an 1874 publication of Harper’s Weekly shows members of the White League and the Ku Klux Klan clasping hands over a suffering African American family.
<span class="image-embed__source">Library of Congress</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>The Civil War between the pro-slavery South and anti-slavery North ends, and disgruntled veterans of the South’s defeated Confederate Army form the first iteration of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) in Pulaski, Tennessee. Nathan Bedford Forrest, a former Confederate general, becomes the Klan’s first grand wizard, its national leader. The KKK’s declared goal is “to maintain the supremacy of the White Race in the Republic.” The first Klan was active from 1865 until 1871 and played a major role in the South’s postwar Reconstruction era, fighting to oppress the previously enslaved African American populace and engaging in acts of violence against them.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1963</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>September 15, 1963</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Bombing of Sixteenth Street Baptist Church</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77407" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1963_Birmingham.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="The family of Carol Robertson mourn at her graveside during funeral services. " loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
The family of Carol Robertson, a fourteen-year-old African American girl killed in the bombing of Sixteenth Street Baptist Church, mourn at her graveside during funeral services.
<span class="image-embed__source">Horace Court/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>The church bombing in Birmingham, Alabama, is coordinated by the local chapter of the KKK, which by now is in its third iteration and popular across the South. The bombing of the predominately Black congregation kills four young girls, becoming one of the defining racist attacks of the civil rights era. Between 1947 and 1965, the KKK is linked to upward of fifty dynamite explosions targeting African Americans in Birmingham, Alabama—earning the city the grim nickname “Bombingham.”</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1968</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>April 4, 1968</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Assassination of Martin Luther King</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77408" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1968_AssassinationMLK.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Reverend Martin Luther King Jr.’s body is viewed by his wife, Coretta Scott King, and their four young children look at King in his coffin at his funeral in Atlanta." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Reverend Martin Luther King Jr.’s body is viewed by his wife, Coretta Scott King, and their four young children at King’s funeral in Atlanta.
<span class="image-embed__source">AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>James Earl Ray, a fugitive with multiple past convictions, shoots and kills Reverend Martin Luther King Jr., a leader of the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s, at a motel in Memphis, Tennessee. Ray was a supporter of racial segregation and a white supremacist. King’s death is mourned by millions of Americans and considered a low point in the civil rights movement.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1978</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Publishing of ‘The Turner Diaries’</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77409" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1978_TurnerDiaries.jpg.webp" width="520" height="780" alt="A copy of ‘The Turner Diaries,’ a racist, dystopian novel, sits on a library shelf in Marlinton, West Virginia." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
A copy of “The Turner Diaries,” a racist, dystopian novel, sits on a library shelf in Marlinton, West Virginia.
<span class="image-embed__source">Jeff Gentner/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>William Luther Pierce, a former college physics professor and a prominent neo-Nazi, publishes <em>The Turner Diaries</em> under the pseudonym Andrew Macdonald. The dystopian novel tells the story of a violent overthrow of the federal government, which leads to a nuclear conflict and race war. Notably, the book’s hero, Earl Turner, detonates a bomb at the FBI’s headquarters in Washington, DC. The book is advertised with the slogan, “What will you do when they come to take your guns?” The novel comes to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/12/books/turner-diaries-white-supremacists.html">resonate with far-right groups</a> in the decades ahead.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1978</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Formation of the Aryan Nations </h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77410" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1978_AryanNations.jpg.webp" width="520" height="728" alt="Reverend Richard Butler poses in his church at the headquarters of the Aryan Nations neo-nazi organization, in northern Idaho." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Reverend Richard Butler poses in his church at the headquarters of the Aryan Nations neo-nazi organization, in northern Idaho.
<span class="image-embed__source">Bettmann/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Notorious neo-Nazi Pastor Richard Butler forms the Aryan Nations in Idaho. A small but committed group, its followers subscribe to the so-called <a href="https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounder/christian-identity">Christian Identity doctrine</a>, believing they are God’s true “chosen people,” a designation usually that refers to Jews. They believe a racial war is imminent between Aryan (white) people and Jews and nonwhites, one that they must prepare for and win. Through its annual World Congresses, the Aryan Nations inspires the creation of the terrorist group called the Order.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1984</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">End of The Order </h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77423" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1984_Order.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="FBI agents sift through the ruins of the house where Robert J. Matthews, founder of the neo-Nazi group the Order, died in a fire after a standoff with federal agents." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
FBI agents sift through the ruins of the house where Robert J. Matthews, founder of the neo-Nazi group The Order, died in a fire amid a standoff with federal agents.
<span class="image-embed__source">Tim Klass/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Federal law enforcement officials <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/17/us/fbi-spying-white-supremacists-declassified/index.html">track Robert Mathews</a>, leader of The Order, to a small house on the state of Washington’s Whidbey Island. Mathews, wanted on murder and robbery charges, refuses to surrender, and a gunfight and standoff ensue, during which he’s killed in a fire. With his death, Mathews becomes a martyr for the far right.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1988</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Fort Smith Sedition Trial</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77411" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1988_SeditionTrial.jpg.webp" width="520" height="668" alt="Louis Ray Beam Jr. carries his wife, Sheila, who had fainted, away from the federal courthouse in Fort Smith, Arkansas. after he and twelve other white supremacists are acquitted on sedition charges." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Louis Ray Beam Jr. carries his wife, Sheila, who had fainted, away from the federal courthouse in Fort Smith, Arkansas, after he and twelve other white supremacists are acquitted on sedition charges.
<span class="image-embed__source">Danny Johnson/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Federal prosecutors bring fourteen white supremacists to trial at Fort Smith, Arkansas. They stand accused of plots against the U.S. government (seditious conspiracy) and other violent crimes. An all-white jury <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/04/08/13-white-supremacists-acquitted-in-arkansas-murder-and-sedition-trial/21c30cbe-c120-40ac-8fec-33420d1b0d2e/">acquits all of them</a>. Afterward, defendant Louis Beam, a former KKK leader and later the “ambassador-at-large” for the Aryan Nations, focuses on building a base of support for a white supremacist revolution against the “Zionist-Occupied Government.” To this end, Beam founds a publication called the Seditionist, which promotes his concept of “leaderless resistance.” This revolution strategy argues that guerrilla warfare should be pursued through individual or small cells, not hierarchical organizations.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1992</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>August 1992</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Standoff at Ruby Ridge</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77412" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1992_RubyRidge.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Federal agents draw their weapons on five neo-Nazis a few miles from the Ruby Ridge site in Idaho where Randy Weaver is engaged in a standoff with authorities." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Federal agents draw their weapons on five neo-Nazis a few miles from the Ruby Ridge site in Idaho, where Randy Weaver is engaged in a standoff with authorities.
<span class="image-embed__source">Mason March/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>A large contingent of federal agents descend on a small home in Idaho to arrest Aryan Nations member Randy Weaver on unresolved firearms charges. After Weaver refuses to surrender, the ensuing eleven-day standoff and siege results in the shootout deaths of Weaver’s son, wife, and dog, as well as a federal officer. Weaver ends up surrendering, but his family become <a href="https://www.npr.org/2022/05/13/1098735768/weaver-and-the-ruby-ridge-standoff-contributed-to-the-evolution-of-the-radical-r">martyrs for the movement</a>, and the standoff captures the attention of far-right Americans nationwide.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1993</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>February 1993</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Waco Siege</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77413" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_1993_Waco.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Smoke billows from the Branch Davidians’ compound as it burns to the ground outside of Waco, Texas, during a raid by federal agents." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
The Branch Davidians’ compound burns to the ground outside of Waco, Texas, during a raid by federal agents.
<span class="image-embed__source">Greg Smith/Corbis/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Federal agents besiege Mount Carmel Center, a compound near Waco, Texas, where residents are suspected of illegally selling machine guns and stockpiling weapons. The compound is home to the Branch Davidians, a religious cult led by David Koresh. When agents try to serve a search warrant, a gunfight breaks out, leaving ten people dead, including four federal officers. A nearly two-month standoff ensues, which ends when federal agents launch an assault on the compound. During the raid, a fire starts, and the compound burns to the ground, killing seventy-six Branch Davidians, including David Koresh and many women and children. Ruby Ridge and Waco both fuel anti-government conspiracy theories by alleging that a predatory government seeks to infringe on individual liberties.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1995</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>April 19, 1995</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Oklahoma City Bombing</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>An anti-government extremist and military veteran named Timothy McVeigh detonates a truck bomb at the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, killing 168 people and injuring hundreds more. The act is directly tied to the government crackdowns at Ruby Ridge and Waco, with McVeigh launching his attack on the second anniversary of the Waco siege. The Oklahoma City bombing is the deadliest domestic terrorist attack in modern U.S. history and leads to a sweeping government crackdown on armed militias, with federal law enforcement agencies significantly raising their efforts to infiltrate anti-government extremist groups. The militia movement therefore suffers a substantial blow in the late 1990s. McVeigh is executed for his crimes in 2001, while a co-conspirator, Terry Nichols, is still serving out a life sentence in prison as of 2024.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2008</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Election of Barack Obama</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77414" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2008_ObamaElection.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Members of the Tea Party hold a sign reading &quot;Obama Where's Your Papers&quot; during a protest." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Members of the Tea Party movement protest outside of San Francisco’s Fairmont Hotel ahead of a fundraiser attended by President Barack Obama in 2010.
<span class="image-embed__source">Justin Sullivan/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>A resurgence of <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE49L7D0/">racism</a> and anti-government extremism surfaces with the November election of Barack Obama, the country’s first African American president. Some political opponents and conspiracy theorists allege that Obama is Muslim and foreign-born, falsehoods that they hoped would undermine his presidency and disqualify him from office.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2011</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>July 2011</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">American-Inspired Attacks in Norway</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77415" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2011_Norway.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="A young man is comforted as he mourns the deaths of those killed by Anders Breivik in a mass shooting and bombing in Norway." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
A young man is comforted as he mourns the deaths of those killed by Anders Breivik in a mass shooting and bombing in Norway.
<span class="image-embed__source">Wolfgang Rattay/Reuters</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Anders Breivik, a far-right extremist seeking to emulate Timothy McVeigh, kills seventy-seven people in twin attacks in Oslo, Norway. He murders eight with a truck bomb in the capital’s government quarter, and then drives to a nearby island—home to the summer camp of the youth wing of the country’s Labour Party—where he indiscriminately guns down sixty-nine more victims. Breivik wrote a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE76N14J/">long manifesto</a> accompanying his attack, calling his targets “cultural Marxists” who he felt were orchestrating the cultural and demographic replacement of Norwegians who shared his European heritage.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2015</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>June 2015</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Charleston AME Church Shooting</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77416" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2015_Charleston.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="People line up to attend Sunday services following a mass shooting at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina. " loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
People line up to attend Sunday services following a mass shooting at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina.
<span class="image-embed__source">Joe Raedle/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>White supremacist Dylann Roof opens fire at the “Mother” Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church in Charleston, South Carolina, killing nine African American worshippers. The church is known for hosting civil rights icons over the decades, including Martin Luther King Jr. During the attack, Roof tells victims, “I have to do it. You rape our women, and you’re taking over our country. And you have to go.”</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2016</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Election of Donald Trump</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77417" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2016_TrumpElection.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump speaks at a campaign rally in Rochester, New York." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump speaks at a campaign rally in Rochester, New York.
<span class="image-embed__source">Brett Carlsen/Getty Images </span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Donald Trump is elected president of the United States running as a Republican. Trump’s campaign had featured some far-right themes on immigration and race, and made proposals including a Muslim ban, a possible Muslim registry, and a border wall to keep out “rapist” and “criminal” Mexicans. To many Americans, his election victory proves that far-right rhetoric and policies that for decades had been associated only with extremists could resonate with wider swathes of the electorate, enough to actually win the White House.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2017</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>August 2017</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Charlottesville Car-Ramming</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77418" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2017_Charlottesville.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="White nationalists, holding tiki torches, march on the grounds of the University of Virginia ahead of the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia. " loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
White nationalists march on the grounds of the University of Virginia ahead of the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, Virginia.
<span class="image-embed__source">Stephanie Keith/Reuters</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>On August 11, a “Unite the Right” rally against the removal of a statue of Confederate commander Robert E. Lee in Charlottesville, Virginia, begins with a torchlight procession at the University of Virginia amid chants that “Jews will not replace us.” The following day, the protests turn more violent when James Alex Fields Jr., a twenty-year-old neo-Nazi who had traveled from Ohio for the rally, rams his car into a crowd of counter-demonstrators, injuring twenty-eight and killing one. In the wake of the incident, President Trump refused to condemn the rally, stating that there were “very fine people on both sides.” This statement, coupled with the president’s widely criticized handling of the crisis, provides a significant fillip for Americans on the far right, who <a href="https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/443666-richard-spencer-charlottesville-wouldnt-have-occurred-without/">see Trump as an ally in the White House.</a></p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2018</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Tree of Life Synagogue Shooting</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77419" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2018_TreeLife.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="A Jewish man prays at a makeshift memorial of flowers and handwritten notes outside the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
A Jewish man prays at a makeshift memorial of flowers and handwritten notes outside the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh.
<span class="image-embed__source">Cathal McNoughton/Reuters</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Robert Bowers, a forty-six-year-old local man, guns down eleven Jewish worshippers, most of them elderly, at the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Bowers presaged his attack with antisemitic and anti-immigrant posts on the social-networking site Gab, writing, “HIAS [Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society] likes to bring invaders in that kill our people. I can’t sit by and watch my people get slaughtered. Screw your optics, I’m going in.” Bowers was aggrieved about alleged migrant “caravans” coming from Central America, which he believed were being orchestrated by Jewish nonprofit organizations such as HIAS Bowers is sentenced to death in 2023 for the attack, and he remains on death row.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2019</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Christchurch Shootings</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77420" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2019_Christchurch.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="People walk under police tape as they leave after prayers at Linwood Islamic Center in Christchurch, New Zealand." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
People leave after prayers at the site of Brenton Tarrant’s rampage at the Linwood Islamic Centre in Christchurch, New Zealand.
<span class="image-embed__source">Edgar Su/Reuters </span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>During a twenty-minute rampage in Christchurch, New Zealand, gunman Brenton Tarrant murders fifty-one worshippers in two mosques. Seeking to inspire emulation of this violence, Tarrant livestreams most of the carnage on the internet, where it is viewed more than a million times—thus redefining far-right terrorism in the twenty-first century. Tarrant had been active in an eclectic and radical online space that trafficked in extremist ideologies about race, immigration, and environmental degradation. Mimicking Breivik, Tarrant explained his views in a seventy-four-page manifesto. His attack is inspired by U.S. conspiracy theories (including over guns), and in turn inspires follow-on attacks in the United States.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2020</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">COVID-19, Racial Justice, and the ‘Big Lie’</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77421" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2020_Covid.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Armed civilian men stand on the steps of the Michigan State Capitol in Lansing, taking part in a protest against Gov. Gretchen Whitmer's expanded stay-at-home order during the Covid-19 pandemic." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Armed civilian men stand on the steps of the Michigan State Capitol in Lansing, taking part in a protest against Governor Gretchen Whitmer’s expanded stay-at-home order during the COVID-19 pandemic.
<span class="image-embed__source">Jeff Kowalsky/AFP/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>The COVID-19 pandemic and ensuing government “lockdowns” in many jurisdictions provide renewed impetus to extremists across the far-right spectrum, offering perceived proof for many of their conspiracy theories and leading to spikes in online radicalization. Nationwide racial justice protests, catalyzed by the <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/photos-how-george-floyds-death-sparked-protests-worldwide">killing of George Floyd</a>, also reenergize far right Americans, some of whom gather in armed counterprotests to “defend” police and businesses from rioting and looting. In the most notable flash of violence, Air Force Sergeant and <a href="https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/right-wing-extremists-looming-threat-us-election">“boogaloo” adherent</a> Steven Carrillo perpetrates twin attacks in May and June 2020 that kill a federal officer and sheriff’s deputy in California. Both before and after his November 2022 election loss to Joe Biden, President Trump repeatedly airs unfounded concerns over mail-in ballot voting and repeats the falsehood that the election was “stolen.”</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2021</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Riots at the U.S. Capitol Building</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-77422" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2024/01/TL_2021_Jan6Insurrection.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Trump supporters erect gallows amid protests and riots in front of the U.S. Capitol building, where many clash with police and damage government property." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Trump supporters erect gallows amid protests and riots in front of the U.S. Capitol building, where many clash with police and damage government property.
<span class="image-embed__source">Shay Horse/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>On January 6, 2021, a mob storms the U.S. Capitol, driven by Trump-fueled conspiracy theories about the 2020 presidential election. It the first such attack on the institution since British invaders set fire to the Capitol in 1814. Participants erect a gallows outside the building, imagery evoking “The Day of the Rope” from <em>The Turner Diaries</em>, which presaged a nationwide revolt. In the aftermath, federal prosecutors secure <a href="https://apnews.com/article/enrique-tarrio-capitol-riot-seditious-conspiracy-sentencing-da60222b3e1e54902db2bbbb219dc3fb">seditious conspiracy convictions</a> against several planners of the assault, succeeding where their 1988 counterparts had failed in proving that the defendants intended to violently overthrow the U.S. government.</p>
</div>
</div>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/timeline/far-right-terrorism-united-states</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/timeline/far-right-terrorism-united-states</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 03 Jan 2024 21:04:02 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>The U.S.–South Korea Alliance</title>
<description><br>
<h1>1950</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>June 25, 1950</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">The Korean War Begins With North Korea’s Invasion </h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76281" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_1950_KoreanWar_0.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="American troops withdrawing from Yongsan in Korea." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
American troops withdraw from Yongsan in Korea.
<span class="image-embed__source">Keystone/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>After independence from Japanese colonialism post–World War II, early Cold War tensions lead to the occupation of the Korean Peninsula by Soviet forces in the North and U.S. forces in the South. North Korea, backed by China and the Soviet Union, attempts to reunify the peninsula under communist rule by invading South Korea. The UN Security Council <a href="https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-adopted-security-council-1950">denounces the attack</a> as a breach of peace and adopts binding resolutions, which call for an immediate cessation of hostilities and—for the first time—authorize the formation of the UN Command to provide assistance to South Korea. Under the command, sixteen countries, led by the United States, provide troop support to South Korea.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1953</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>July 27, 1953</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">The United Nations, China, and North Korea Sign the Armistice Agreement</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76284" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/12/TL_1953_Armistice2.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Maj. Gen. Blackshear M. Bryan exchanges credentials with Communist Lt. Gen. Lee Sang Cho at the opening session of the Military Armistice Commission at the Panmunjom Conference House on July 27, 1953." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
U.S. Maj. Gen. Blackshear M. Bryan exchanges credentials with Korean Communist Lt. Gen. Lee Sang Cho at the Military Armistice Commission in the Inter-Korean Peace House, situated on the south side of demilitarized zone.
<span class="image-embed__source">AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>The agreement divides the Korean Peninsula along the thirty-eighth parallel and establishes the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) as a buffer between North and South Korea. South Korean President Syngman Rhee opts not to sign the agreement, but he accepts the armistice on the condition that the United States and South Korea sign a mutual defense treaty. Because the Armistice Agreement serves as a cease-fire to the Korean War and the two Koreas did not sign a formal peace treaty, they technically remain in a state of war.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1953</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>October 1, 1953</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">The United States and South Korea Sign the Mutual Defense Treaty </h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76287" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_1953_MutualDefense.jpg.webp" width="520" height="409" alt="South Korean President Rhee Syngman leafs through the mutual defense treaty between the United States and Republic of Korea on January 29, 1954." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
South Korean President Rhee Syngman leafs through the mutual defense treaty between the United States and Republic of Korea on January 29, 1954.
<span class="image-embed__source">George Sweers/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>The U.S.-South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty ensures U.S. defense&nbsp;of&nbsp;South Korea against external aggression and commits to a U.S. military presence in South Korea. The treaty lays the foundation for a robust security alliance between the two countries.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1961</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>May 16, 1961</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">General Park Chung-hee Launches a Military Coup</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76288" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_1961_Coup.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="South Korean President Park Chung-hee stands on a podium next to U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson in Washington, DC." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
South Korean President Park Chung-hee stands on a podium next to U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson in Washington, DC, on May 17, 1965.
<span class="image-embed__source">Universal History Archive/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Amid domestic economic and political turmoil, the military overthrows the government, seizes power, and imposes martial law. Under pressure from the United States, South Korea holds a presidential election in 1963, in which Park is elected as president. Park implements an export-oriented economic modernization plan that transforms South Korea from one of the most impoverished countries in the world to a country with unprecedented economic growth, known as the so-called “<a href="https://www.oecd.org/country/korea/thematic-focus/sustaining-the-miracle-on-the-han-river-103653fa/">Miracle on the Han River</a>.” South Korea’s enhanced economic stature begins to alleviate the asymmetry of the U.S.-South Korea relationship.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1975</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">The United States Discovers South Korea’s Covert Nuclear Weapons Program </h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>President Park initiates the development of an independent nuclear weapons program, following concerns about the United States reducing its security commitment and withdrawing troops from South Korea under the Nixon Doctrine established by U.S. President Richard Nixon. The United States later pressures Park to cancel a nuclear plant agreement with France, offering U.S. nuclear assistance and personnel for peaceful purposes instead. South Korea’s nuclear ambitions cease when Park signs the <a href="https://disarmament.unoda.org/wmd/nuclear/npt/">Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty</a> (NPT).</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1980</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>May 18, 1980</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Pro-democracy Activists Lead the Gwangju Democratization Movement</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76289" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_1980_GwangjuProtest.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="Armed South Korean soldiers capture rioters in Gwangju, South Korea." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Armed South Korean soldiers capture rioters in Gwangju, South Korea, on May 27, 1980.
<span class="image-embed__source">Sadayuki Mikami/AP Photo</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>After General Chun Doo-hwan seizes power through a military coup in December 1979,&nbsp;South Korean civilians, led by students and activists, <a href="https://archives.kdemo.or.kr/display/en/1980.html">organize pro-democracy protests</a> demanding an end to military rule. The South Korean government responds by imposing martial law and using violence to suppress activists in the city of Gwangju. The movement marks a turning point in South Korea’s struggle for democracy, inspiring people to resist the military dictatorship across the country and eventually leading to the country’s democratization. U.S.-South Korea relations are hobbled by perceptions within South Korea that the United States sided with the dictatorship rather than support the democratic movement.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>1991</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>September 27, 1991</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">The United States Withdraws Tactical Nuclear Weapons</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>U.S. President George H. W. Bush announces his decision to remove all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea. The next year, the two Koreas sign the <a href="https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/KR%20KP_920120_JointDeclarationDenuclearizationKoreanPeninsula.pdf">Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization&nbsp;of the Korean Peninsula</a> [PDF]. Under this agreement, the two countries commit not to test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2002</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>June 13, 2002</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Anti-American Protests Arise in South Korea</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76290" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_2002_AntiUSProtests.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="A protester shouts anti-American slogans while holding a poster of the two students accidentally killed by U.S. officers in Seoul." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
A protester shouts anti-American slogans while holding a poster of the two students accidentally killed by U.S. officers in Seoul, South Korea, on December 3, 2002.
<span class="image-embed__source">Lee Jae-Won/Reuters</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Two off-duty U.S. servicemen accidentally kill two South Korean middle-school girls while driving a U.S. military vehicle. The incident and the subsequent acquittal of the soldiers by a U.S. military court trigger anti-American protests across South Korea. Primarily directed at the U.S. military presence in South Korea, the protests reflect a desire for a more equal relationship with the United States.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2003</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>January 10, 2003</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">North Korea Withdraws From the NPT</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76291" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_2003_NPTWithdrawl.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="A crowd of millions of North Koreans gathers to hear political leaders announce the decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in Pyongyang." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
Millions of North Koreans gather to hear political leaders announce the decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in Pyongyang, North Korea.
<span class="image-embed__source">Xinhua/AFP/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>North Korea announces its intention to withdraw from the NPT, stating concerns regarding&nbsp;“hostile” U.S. policies toward the country. Pyongyang criticizes the binding obligations stipulated in the safeguard accord under Article 3 of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regulations. Three years later, North Korea <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/north-korea-nuclear-weapons-missile-tests-military-capabilities">successfully tests its first nuclear weapon</a>, changing security dynamics on the Korean Peninsula.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2003</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>August 27, 2003</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">Six-Party Talks Aim to Negotiate North Korea’s Denuclearization</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76292" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_2003_6PartyTalks.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="The heads of each of the six country delegations join hands before talks about North Korea’s nuclear crisis in Beijing." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
The heads of each of the six country delegations join hands before talks about North Korea’s nuclear crisis in Beijing.
<span class="image-embed__source">Ng Han Guan/AFP/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>Representatives from China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States convene in Beijing to negotiate <a href="https://www.cfr.org/timeline/north-korean-nuclear-negotiations">North Korea’s denuclearization</a> following revelations that North Korea had covertly pursued a uranium enrichment program. The United States insists on complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID), while North Korea seeks diplomatic normalization with the United States and security assurances. Despite multiple rounds of talks, the countries fail to reach a consensus, leading to North Korea’s withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks in April 2009 after the UN Security Council condemns its long-range missile launch.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2012</h1>
<div class="timeline-slide__front">
<h2>March 15, 2012</h2>
<h2 class="timeline-slide__title">The Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement Enters Into Force</h2>
<div class="timeline-slide__media">
<figure id="image-76293" class="image-embed timeline_redesign_entry">
<div class="image-embed__picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/large_s/public/image/2023/11/TL_2012_KORUS.jpg.webp" width="520" height="347" alt="South Korean conservative activists raise a banner reading “let’s occupy the world market and become an economic power,”." loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
<figcaption class="image-embed__caption">
<div class="image-embed__caption-text">
South Korean conservative activists raise a banner reading “let’s occupy the world market and become an economic power,” at a rally supporting the South Korea-U.S. free trade agreement in Seoul, South Korea.
<span class="image-embed__source">Jung Yeon-Je/AFP/Getty Images</span>
<div class="image-embed__share-gradient"></div>
</div>
</figcaption>
</figure>
</div>
<div class="timeline-slide__description"><p>After six years of negotiations, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak and U.S. President Barack Obama sign the trade treaty, which is then ratified by the South Korean National Assembly. The agreement promotes economic cooperation and access to commercial markets for both countries. The <a href="https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/korus-fta">Korea-United States Free Trade Agreement</a> (KORUS FTA) is the largest bilateral free trade agreement the United States has signed. The trade agreement paves the way for an economic partnership alongside the military alliance between the two countries.</p>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<h1>2016</h1>
<div class=... |
http://localhost:1200/cfr/books-reports - Success ✔️<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0">
<channel>
<title>Books & Reports</title>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/books-reports</link>
<atom:link href="http://localhost:1200/cfr/books-reports" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"></atom:link>
<description>Books & Reports - Made with love by RSSHub(https://github.com/DIYgod/RSSHub)</description>
<generator>RSSHub</generator>
<webMaster>i@diygod.me (DIYgod)</webMaster>
<language>en</language>
<lastBuildDate>Fri, 24 May 2024 14:48:25 GMT</lastBuildDate>
<ttl>5</ttl>
<item>
<title>Preventing U.S. Election Violence in 2024</title>
<description><figure>
<div class="article-header__image-picture">
<picture>
<source srcset="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_16x9_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 1x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_2x_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 2x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_3x_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 3x" media="all and (min-width: 1280px)" type="image/webp" width="1800" height="1014">
<source srcset="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_m_480px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 1x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_m_2x_480px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 2x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_m_3x_480px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 3x" media="all and (max-width: 1279px) and (min-width: 1024px)" type="image/webp" width="1440" height="810">
<source srcset="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_16x9_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 1x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_2x_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 2x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_3x_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 3x" media="all and (max-width: 1023px) and (min-width: 750px)" type="image/webp" width="1800" height="1014">
<source srcset="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_s_260px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 1x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_s_2x_260px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 2x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_s_3x_260px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 3x" media="all and (max-width: 749px)" type="image/webp" width="780" height="438">
<source srcset="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_16x9_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 1x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_2x_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 2x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_3x_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 3x" media="all and (min-width: 1280px)" type="image/webp" width="1800" height="1014">
<source srcset="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_m_480px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 1x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_m_2x_480px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 2x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_m_3x_480px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 3x" media="all and (max-width: 1279px) and (min-width: 1024px)" type="image/webp" width="1440" height="810">
<source srcset="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_16x9_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 1x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_2x_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 2x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_3x_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 3x" media="all and (max-width: 1023px) and (min-width: 750px)" type="image/webp" width="1800" height="1014">
<source srcset="//cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_s_260px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 1x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_s_2x_260px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 2x, //cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_s_3x_260px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp 3x" media="all and (max-width: 749px)" type="image/webp" width="780" height="438">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/article_header_l_16x9_600px/public/image/2024/04/CPM.jpg.webp" width="600" height="338" alt="" loading="lazy" typeof="foaf:Image" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</picture>
</div>
<figcaption class="article-header__image-caption">
Supporters of former U.S. President Donald Trump riot in front of the U.S. Capitol Building in Washington, DC, on January 6, 2021.
<span class="author">Leah Millis/Reuters</span>
</figcaption>
</figure><br><h2>Introduction</h2>
<p>There is a serious risk of extremist violence around the 2024 U.S. presidential election. Many of the same sources of instability and grievances that precipitated the January 6, 2021, assault on the U.S. Capitol (along with other challenges to the outcome of the last election) remain present today. And, while the risk of far-right election-related violence is greater, the possibility of far-left extremist violence cannot be dismissed. Such violence threatens individual lives and the domestic political stability of the country.</p>
<p>It could also undermine the United States’ international standing and foreign policy goals, in a year where at least eighty elections will take place around the world. U.S.-based election violence has already <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/america-exporter-far-right-violent-extremism-brazil-and-beyond" title="inspired&nbsp;one similar incident" target="_blank">inspired&nbsp;one similar incident</a>, in Brazil in January 2023, and further disruption could affect the rules-based international order in ways detrimental to U.S. interests as it embarks on a new generation in strategic competition. The United States would also benefit from serving as the standard-setter on several associated issues, such as disinformation on social media and the rise of generative artificial intelligence (AI) and its impact on elections.</p><p>Lessening the risk of such a contingency is therefore an urgent national security imperative. Political leaders and other participants in the political and civic process need to implement a range of measures to prevent and manage violent election-related extremism.</p>
<h2>The Contingency</h2>
<p>Several plausible scenarios could develop between now and Inauguration Day. The scenarios can be broken down into events that occur before the election, during early voting in October and on election day in November, and in the weeks after the election, possibly lingering into the new administration. Each scenario poses different challenges to different constituencies and could be inspired or driven by differing accelerants.</p>
<p><b><em>Pre-election</em></b></p>
<p>The first and most urgent scenario involves assassination threats against campaigning candidates and other public officials<a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-slow-burn-threatening-our-democracy" title=". According to Seamus Hughes and Pete Simi" target="_blank">. According to Seamus Hughes and Pete Simi</a> of the University of Nebraska-Omaha, “over the past 10 years, more than 500 individuals have been arrested for threatening public officials. And the trendline is shooting up.” In recent years, for example, the lives of Vice President Mike Pence, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, and New York Republican gubernatorial candidate Lee Zeldin were all threatened. Nikki Haley, the Republican runner-up, <a href="https://apnews.com/article/nikki-haley-secret-service-2ae5b277396702248af73f89da92b4b9" title="requested Secret Service protection" target="_blank">requested Secret Service protection</a> during her campaign, indicating that violent threats have already surfaced in this cycle as well. The United States has been spared a high-profile assassination for more than a half-century. However, lack of success should not be taken to suggest lack of intent. Precisely this point was underscored on June 14, 2017, when a far-left extremist opened fire at a baseball practice of congressional Republicans, gravely wounding House Majority Whip Steve Scalise before being killed by the congressman’s Capitol Police detail.</p>
<p>Second, large party and voter gatherings, such as the Republican National Convention in Milwaukee in July and the Democratic National Convention in Chicago in August, as well as primary elections and caucuses, could pose attractive targets. The conventions will boast the largest collections of party members and leaders throughout the entire election cycle and could therefore attract individuals or groups with a vendetta. News headquarters will also be potential targets given extremist rhetoric depicting the media the “enemy of the people.”</p>
<p>Third, dates associated with the former president’s legal troubles could also trigger violent extremists. Trump’s legal challenges have thrust the 2024 election into unprecedented territory, with the possibility of a presidential candidate running for office from the courtroom, and possibly jail. The public process and potential legal outcomes could accelerate and spur violent attacks.</p><p><em><b>Election</b></em></p>
<p>Once voting begins, the first and most likely scenario is violence and intimidation at polling places and against election workers, or against drive-by or drop-off balloting sites and their collection points. This could include armed militia groups “observing” the election for fraud but, in reality, intimidating voters. In 2020, for example, Oath Keepers gathered at polling places to, in Oath Keepers founder Stewart Rhodes’s <a href="https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-10-10/what-happens-if-armed-right-wing-groups-polls" title="words" target="_blank">words</a>, “protect people who are voting.” Such gatherings could intimidate voters and disrupt Election Day by <a href="https://www.chicagotribune.com/2023/11/24/munster-incident-puts-focus-on-voter-intimidation-cases-that-can-dampen-turnout-poll-worker-participation/" title="dampening turnout" target="_blank">dampening turnout</a>. This scenario could be driven both by any candidate calls to arms as well as by grassroots voices sensitive to local issues, vulnerabilities, and voting preferences, and to individual poll workers expressing or acting upon their personal political views. Such violence provides less of a model for partners and adversaries in the international space, given that the November election will occur after most other 2024 elections have occurred.</p>
<p>Once voting is completed, threats could turn against those counting the ballots. During the 2020 election, some of the more vitriolic threats were delivered against election officials in swing states. The sequencing of vote counting can play a part, such as when early, mail, and absentee ballots, which tend to lean Democratic, are counted last, leading to “<a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/oct/31/red-mirage-trump-election-scenario-victory" title="red mirages" target="_blank">red mirages</a>” in which Republican candidates take early leads that fade in the final legal vote tally. In 2020, for example, federal agents&nbsp;<a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/2-men-detained-after-police-learn-possible-threat-philadelphia-vote-n1246774" title="arrested two QAnon supporters" target="_blank">arrested two QAnon supporters</a> from Virginia who showed up with firearms at a convention center in Philadelphia where votes were still being counted three days after Election Day. Political calls to “stop the count” or “stop the steal” can make a violent response more likely.</p>
<div id="pullquote-80929--2" class="pullquote embedded_small">
<figure class="pullquote__container"><blockquote class="pullquote__quote">
<span class="pullquote__quote-content">Once voting is completed, threats could turn against those counting the ballots.</span>
</blockquote>
</figure></div>
<p><em><b>Post-election</b></em></p>
<p>In the post-election era, depending on election results, attacks against government buildings and/or law enforcement officials will likely be the preferred means as violent extremists aim to take the fight directly to those they deem responsible for malfeasance. This scenario was seen at COVID protests in April 2020, sprawling anti-fascist rioting that summer, at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, and the attack against the FBI in Cincinnati. Here, the main accelerant will be political rhetoric interpreted by violently inclined individuals as calls for violence. Perhaps the most significant lesson of January 6 is that even seemingly innocuous moments can provide the impetus for extremist gatherings given the right combination of messaging and momentum. Any number of constitutional milestones—when electors vote in their home states; the January 6, 2025, counting of electoral votes; or Inauguration Day itself—could thus provide the spark, particularly among far-right violent extremists. Far-left violence responding to a disappointing election result will likely be more sporadic and disorganized. Militant anarchists, in particular, could be active, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/protesters-bring-shouts-skirmishes-and-shutdowns-to-inauguration-celebration/2017/01/20/00ea4c72-df11-11e6-acdf-14da832ae861_story.html" title="as seen on inauguration day in 2017" target="_blank">as seen on inauguration day in 2017</a>. Still, the bond between far-left anarchists and the political system is <a href="https://www.foxnews.com/us/live-updates-antifa-riots-1-21-2021" title="not as strong" target="_blank">not as strong</a> as on the right, making it unlikely that extremists respond to any call for violence from politicians.</p>
<p>Should multiple, organized extremist elements take up arms in defense of their candidates or other interests, sustained violence between political factions across broad geographic spaces remains possible. This level of violence has not yet been reached during the current escalation in domestic terrorism, except at a small scale on American streets in clashes between the Proud Boys and anti-fascists. Should those skirmishes escalate, they would pose a serious threat to law and order. The gravest fear, full-scale and total civil war, <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/16/opinions/us-brink-of-civil-war-hoffman-ware/index.html" title="remains unlikely" target="_blank">remains unlikely</a>, in large part due to the lack of safe havens or sanctuaries for extremists in the United States. Political divides today run along urban-rural delineations, not northern-southern, which will likely stunt any budding civil war in its infancy.</p>
<h2>Warning Indicators</h2>
<p>The most urgent warning sign of impending violence will be the words of the candidates themselves. Political figures are certain to use divisive and perhaps even <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/09/05/polarization-democracy-and-political-violence-in-united-states-what-research-says-pub-90457?utm_source=carnegieemail&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_campaign=announcement&amp;mkt_tok=ODEzLVhZVS00MjIAAAGOBdngCOU2E0PgTOYMht0Jscfwq-kVZ7BNGEm9S0g9a-6RljRaHw9QWuQJjFo-HOqyY1k8e_LWTFj9poxUJ9iHe4ZzUlTWqS5XnzxluU0" title="existential political rhetoric" target="_blank">existential political rhetoric</a> during the campaign, warning of an urgent threat to the rank-and-file of either political party and to the country as a whole. Politicians deploy such rhetoric to frighten their base into voting, but such action also increases the odds of individuals turning to violent solutions if their candidate loses or appears to be in arrears. Existential rhetoric from within the political system or from candidates or parties can translate into implicit and explicit calls for violence, including against members of one’s own party, another important warning indicator. Even regular political rhetoric could be taken as calls to violence, particularly given that Americans are increasingly divided. Polls show that almost a quarter of Americans (33 percent of Republicans and 13 percent of Democrats) believe that “American patriots may have to resort to violence in order to save the country.”</p>
<div id="pullquote-80930--2" class="pullquote embedded_small">
<figure class="pullquote__container"><blockquote class="pullquote__quote">
<span class="pullquote__quote-content">The most urgent warning sign of impending violence will be the words of the candidates themselves.</span>
</blockquote>
</figure></div>
<p>Casting doubt over election results before voting commences heightens the possibility of violent extremism. “Pre-bunking” of fair election outcomes sows doubts in the minds of voters who then see eventual electoral defeats as confirmation of fraud rather than a rejection of one’s political platform, unlocking inherent confirmation biases. Politicians on both the left and right have been responsible for such rhetoric, the right issuing warnings of stolen dating back to the 2016 race, and the left often expressing concern over alleged voter suppression in predominantly Black southern communities.</p>
<p>The risk of more organized and widespread violence could be heralded by armed paramilitary mobilization, including on social media. January 6 was preceded by an onslaught of threats and public organizing, which was largely ignored by law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Extremist infiltrations of law enforcement agencies (<a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/01/03/could-january-6th-happen-again-526167" title="including the Capitol Police" target="_blank">including the Capitol Police</a>) and the military, coupled with the radicalization of active duty service members, also bears monitoring as both would considerably undermine any mitigative countermeasures arrayed against violent actors.</p>
<p>Finally, national security professionals should be vigilant in tracking foreign interference, whether covert (and therefore likely hidden from public view until after the election) or overt, including foreign leaders casting doubt on election results before voting commences. Adversaries such as China, Iran, and Russia will eagerly exploit any opportunity to weaken the United States and will likely issue widespread disinformation to cause disunity, as in 2016 and 2020. Social media remains a <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/defending-year-democracy" title="defining battlefield in twenty-first-century elections" target="_blank">defining battlefield in twenty-first-century elections</a>, and the situation has only grown more fraught with the development of powerful tools such as generative AI, which, for instance, was used to attempt to <a href="https://www.cbsnews.com/boston/video/new-hampshire-federal-officials-open-criminal-probe-after-fake-joe-biden-robocalls/" title="dampen the Biden vote" target="_blank">dampen the Biden vote</a> during the New Hampshire primary. The social media platform X poses a particular new challenge. Owner Elon Musk has reduced content moderation and allowed disinformation on the platform, creating an opening for manipulation by domestic and foreign actors alike, as well as AI-generated content.</p>
<h2>Implications for U.S. Interests</h2>
<p>The assassination of a politician or election official could seriously undermine U.S. democratic institutions and traditions. More broadly, the rejection of election results could undermine civil society and further polarize the nation, while the mere threat of violence at polling places could dissuade voters from making their voices heard, further <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-slow-burn-threatening-our-democracy" title="weakening American democracy" target="_blank">weakening American democracy</a>. Threats issued against poll workers undermine American democratic traditions; volunteers seeking to participate in the civic process do not anticipate being targeted for their service, and such threats could deter their participation.</p>
<p>But perhaps equally damaging, American political violence, particularly concentrated around election cycles, poses grave threats to the rules-based international order. U.S. electoral turmoil could provide a model for further seditious organizing in allied states. Such contagion has already been seen in Brazil, and could undermine election integrity in a year with upwards of eighty elections worldwide. Domestic violent extremism also undermines U.S. credibility on international human rights and its international security credentials. On January 7, 2021, for instance, a spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry claimed that American support for pro-democratic protests in Hong Kong was now a sign of hypocrisy: “On the issue of human rights, democracy, and freedom, double standard should be discarded. I hope the relevant countries can think about this and learn real lessons from it.” An author linked to al-Qaeda, meanwhile, wrote that <a href="https://twitter.com/colebunzel/status/1382747626521563140" title="January 6 had made amends" target="_blank">January 6 had made amends</a> for mistakes made on 9/11: “I realized the wisdom of God almighty in not guiding the fourth plane to its target, for their destroying the citadel of their democracy by their own hands ... is more damaging to them &amp; more soothing to the hearts of the believers.”</p>
<div id="pullquote-80927--2" class="pullquote embedded_small">
<figure class="pullquote__container"><blockquote class="pullquote__quote">
<span class="pullquote__quote-content">U.S. electoral turmoil could provide a model for further seditious organizing in allied states</span>
</blockquote>
</figure></div>
<p>U.S. electoral turmoil could also offer a “window of opportunity” for state and nonstate adversaries to act—whether through direct terrorism launched at the United States or U.S. interests, or other hybrid measures intended to undermine U.S. security and standing. Hamas’s attack on Israel at a time of <a href="https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2023/10/israel-democracy-judicial-reform-netanyahu-hamas-attacks/675713/" title="profound internal turmoil" target="_blank">profound internal turmoil</a> in that country is an example of such opportunism. Russia also launched its invasion of Ukraine at a time of perceived Western weakness and division.</p>
<h2><b>Preventive Options</b></h2>
<p>In the same way that law enforcement officials deconstruct the motives, means, and opportunities behind criminal behavior to design more effective preventive measures, so too can election administrators assess policy options to lessen the risk of domestic political violence around the 2024 election.</p>
<p>The leading reason for the rise in domestic terrorism in recent years is a heightened motive or intent toward acts of violence. <b><em>Reducing motive</em></b>, therefore, is both paramount to prevention and a daunting challenge. In the build-up to the election, mainstream politicians on both sides of the aisle can use their platforms to speak out against division and publicly praise the integrity of U.S. democracy. Although federal politicians have been reluctant to be outspoken against divisive politics (perhaps warily watching the examples of Republicans Liz Cheney and Adam Kinzinger, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/loyal-trump-republican-party-moves-censure-us-reps-cheney-kinzinger-2022-02-04/" title="who no longer serve in Congress" target="_blank">who no longer serve in Congress</a> after sitting on the January 6 committee), state and local officials have been far more committed to upholding democratic norms in their constituencies. Many maintain the trust of a large swathe of the American people and can call for peace and calm. One example of this commitment is Republican Utah Governor (and Chair of the National Governors Association) Spencer Cox’s Disagree Better initiative, which aims “to model how to disagree better, setting an example and creating the permission structure and template for other public officials at every level to follow.” Such measures, critically, do not touch on political or ideological differences, but instead emphasize shared interests such as civil disagreement and trust and faith in democracy.</p>
<p>The Joe Biden administration has several options to lower the country’s temperature and promote a peaceful and orderly election process. For instance, President Biden could task agencies such as the Department of Education or Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to issue nonpartisan educational tools that teach the American public about the electoral process and its resilience to manipulation. Such positive pre-bunking could prevent electoral conspiracy theories from taking root as widely as they did in 2020. The Biden administration could also push states to reverse their vote-counting timelines to count the usually Democratic early, mail, and absentee ballots ahead of the typically Republican day-of votes—or to count votes simultaneously. Although a hard mandate to count votes earlier could violate the Tenth Amendment, gentle encouragement could help reverse the red mirage that contributed to January 6 and the “stop the steal” movement—although there is, of course, the danger of a “blue mirage” instead contributing to violence by far-left extremists. Media organizations could also avoid covering vote tallying, waiting to announce results until they are confirmed and finalized.</p>
<p>The Biden administration, as well as law enforcement professionals, could also look abroad for best practices on reducing intent to commit electoral violence. In <a href="https://dppa.un.org/sites/default/files/ead_pd_preventing_mitigating_election-related_violence_20160601_e.pdf" title="Preventing and Mitigating Election-Related Violence" target="_blank">Preventing and Mitigating Election-Related Violence</a> [PDF], a policy directive issued by the UN Department of Political Affairs in June 2016, the first suggestion is “Reducing high stakes in politics, promoting measures to move away from ‘zero sum’ politics and ensuring against a monopoly of power by one group.” One possible measure to reduce intent to violence, then, would be to promote democracy’s guarantee that the voices and views of the expected losing entity can still be acknowledged and advanced despite electoral defeat. In other words, politicians could employ language promising inclusivity and unity, perhaps on issues of <a href="https://www.texastribune.org/2024/03/12/henry-cuellar-democrats-senate-border-bill/" title="bipartisan concern" target="_blank">bipartisan concern</a> such as immigration, providing assurances that all Americans would have a seat at the table in the new administration. As stated by <a href="https://www.undp.org/publications/elections-and-conflict-prevention-guide" title="UN guidance" target="_blank">UN guidance</a>, “When parties are quite certain of loss or exclusion in an electoral contest, especially when they expect to be ‘permanent minorities’ (to lose not just once, but again and again due to patterns of identity voting), the certainty of outcomes is also a strong causal driver of violence.” In addition, the United States could publicize the <a href="https://www.voanews.com/a/international-observers-monitor-midterm-elections-in-us-/6826269.html" title="cadre of international election observers" target="_blank">cadre of international election observers</a> to increase trust in the process.</p>
<p>In a time of unprecedented distrust of politicians and Congress, American civil society can also help bridge the trust deficit that extremist radicalizers often use to prey on vulnerable people, cajoled by politicians but ultimately acting independently of the political system. Religious leaders and educators, especially at the local level, have a unique platform to educate their constituents on the importance of free and fair elections and neighborliness, even if they vote differently. Sports stars and labor leaders, among other civil society actors, can also call for peace and calm without wading into political questions. The Department of Homeland Security, through its Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships, could redouble its grant-making efforts to both national and local nonprofit organizations working to reduce radicalization and violent extremism. The private sector, chiefly social media companies, also bears a responsibility to moderate the most serious calls for sedition and disrupt extremist cells. Social media companies can set stronger standards for AI use on their platforms and work to undermine actors using AI to affect the election process.</p>
<p><b><em>Reducing the capability</em></b> to inflict violence will also be central. Indeed, <a href="https://rollcall.com/2023/07/19/19uscpig/" title="the successful application of lessons learned" target="_blank">the successful application of lessons learned</a> after January 6 would considerably strengthen the United States’ electoral resilience. Intelligence sharing between federal, state, and local partners, as well as <a href="https://www.dhs.gov/fusion-centers" title="with fusion centers" target="_blank">with fusion centers</a> (defined by DHS as “state-owned and operated centers that serve as focal points in states and major urban areas for the receipt, analysis, gathering and sharing of threat-related information between State, Local, Tribal and Territorial (SLTT), federal, and private sector partners”), is critical. Threats issued by extremist groups and networks should be taken seriously, unlike on January 6, when preparations were not commensurate with the volume of intelligence suggesting armed actors planned to descend on the capital. Government officials across the aisle could work with legacy media to emphasize the nonpartisan mandate of the DHS, FBI, and state and local law enforcement to undermine allegations of partisanship and politicization. Leaning on local police forces would also build legitimacy, allowing more trusted law enforcement to adhere to their job of keeping the peace in their communities.</p>
<p>At a tactical counterterrorism level, the Department of Justice’s continued legal efforts to disrupt leading domestic extremist organizations—including the Oath Keepers and Proud Boys—builds deterrence against future acts of violence. Although the leadership of both groups is already serving jail time for <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/05/11/1175465857/extremists-groups-were-found-guilty-of-seditious-conspiracy-for-jan-6-now-what" title="seditious conspiracy" target="_blank">seditious conspiracy</a> as a result of January 6, which has undermined both groups while building a stronger deterrent against violence, such legal efforts could continue as the election cycle heats up. Government efforts to deter or defuse violence will be complicated, however, by extremist networks’ continued adherence to the leaderless resistance (“lone wolf”) strategy, which hampers the ability of law enforcement to penetrate groups and limits the intelligence value of any individual capture. Militant anarchists, for instance, will continue to operate in spontaneous “black blocs,” which similarly complicate infiltration and arrests. Efforts to reduce particularly lethal weaponry will likely fall flat, but could still be attempted.</p>
<p>Finally, law enforcement agencies could <b><em>remove opportunities</em></b> for violence by hardening soft targets and maximizing law enforcement readiness and even preparing for military intervention. The federal government’s law enforcement agencies could seek to designate important events, such as the political conventions and the election itself, as <a href="https://www.secretservice.gov/protection/events/credentialing" title="National Special Security Events" target="_blank">National Special Security Events</a>, which would open a range of new law enforcement tools to prevent and respond to violence. A streamlined electoral process, including the Electoral Count Reform and Presidential Transition Improvement Act passed in response to January 6, could also limit opportunities for violent interventions.</p>
<h2>Mitigation Options</h2>
<p>Mitigation scenarios assume efforts to prevent both motive and means to violence have failed. Therefore, the mitigative options will concentrate on limiting further opportunity while lessening the harmful impact of any early violent events. At the milder end of the spectrum of responses to early violence, a more visible law enforcement presence at various key sites could deter violence and encourage voters to safely cast their ballots. Focusing on local law enforcement would allay concerns of a federal government crackdown, allowing local authorities to emphasize the sanctity of the rule of law within their own communities. The hardening of such soft targets would also allow law enforcement professionals to limit the threat to civilian life should any violence erupt.</p>
<div id="pullquote-80928--2" class="pullquote embedded_small">
<figure class="pullquote__container"><blockquote class="pullquote__quote">
<span class="pullquote__quote-content">Focusing on local law enforcement would allay concerns of a federal government crackdown</span>
</blockquote>
</figure></div>
<p>A variant of the United Kingdom’s <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2021.1902604" title="Operation Temperer" target="_blank">Operation Temperer</a>—which allows soldiers to guard certain locations so police resources can focus elsewhere—could be conducted during several phases of the election cycle using the National Guard. Particularly symbolic or important sites, such as the U.S. Capitol, could be sealed off from the public, as occurred in the aftermath of January 6. This approach has <a href="https://www.nps.gov/articles/000/president-grant-takes-on-the-ku-klux-klan.htm" title="historical antecedents" target="_blank">historical antecedents</a>; the U.S. government deployed the military in the Reconstruction era to suppress threats by the Ku Klux Klan against Black voters. The major downside of such an approach would be the militarization of U.S. elections, which would undermine American democracy and yield a further propaganda victory to adversaries.&nbsp;</p>
<p>In a worst-case scenario, the Biden administration could attempt to declare martial law in order to suspend the electoral process and allow the military to intervene in particularly violent uprisings. However, such a move would pose an existential threat to American democracy, effectively ending America’s status as leader of the free world with few clear and secure paths forward.&nbsp;</p>
<p>The Biden administration could also simply take a hands-off approach, believing that American institutions are stronger than those who would try to undermine them and recognizing that violence has failed in the past to undermine electoral processes, including during January 6. Such a “keep calm and carry on” approach would yield control but could protect American institutions from further internal damage. It would also avoid feeding into right-wing narratives about the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/09/politics/biden-officials-exercise-2024-election-chaos/" title="weaponization of the federal government" target="_blank">weaponization of the federal government</a>, while ensuring that a cure for violence is not worse than the disease.</p>
<h2>Recommendations</h2>
<p>The range of stakeholders, including government, the private sector, and civil society, with the power to help prevent and counter election-related violence in 2024 should prepare countermeasures at the motive, means, and opportunity levels.</p>
<p><em><b>Reducing motive</b></em></p>
<p><em>The Biden administration should encourage early and mail-in voting </em>for voters on both sides of the aisle to thin election day crowds that could otherwise become targets, and states should be encouraged to count absentee and mail-in ballots early to avoid red mirages that could fuel electoral conspiracy theories. Media companies should avoid reporting on vote tallying until final results are confirmed.</p>
<p><em>Responsible poll-watching should be amplified and celebrated</em>, and efforts to introduce trusted authorities into the electoral system, such as the military-linked nonprofit <a href="https://vetthe.vote/" title="Vet the Vote" target="_blank">Vet the Vote</a>, should be encouraged. Publicizing and celebrating the integrity of the vote and of the many civil servants who contribute to its execution will demystify the process and build trust in the system.</p>
<p><em>Candidates and both parties should commit to upholding critical democratic values such as truth, honesty, free press, and the rule of law</em>. Policymakers from both parties should unite around political slogans that enhance trust in the electoral system and delegitimize violence. Such calls should be joined by segments of civil society, such as church groups, sports teams, and universities. Governors and other state and local officials should join the&nbsp;<a href="https://www.nga.org/disagree-better/" title="Disagree Better campaign" target="_blank">Disagree Better campaign</a>. Given their leadership roles in the election process itself, state and local officials should educate their constituencies about the integrity of the electoral process, the nonpartisan makeup of poll workers, and the importance of adhering to democratic traditions.</p>
<p><em>Candidates and party officials should avoid existential rhetoric and absolutist promises</em>, which the United Nations has found to reduce tension in other contexts. Politicians should issue <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/jan/10/election-workers-threats-political-violence" title="frequent reminders" target="_blank">frequent reminders</a> to their followers that they desire peaceful political change.</p>
<p><em>Government agencies at the federal, state, and local levels should work to improve transparency and pre-bunk conspiracy theories questioning the legitimacy of elections</em>. One possible model is how the U.S. intelligence community pre-bunked Russian justifications for its invasion of Ukraine in 2022—although it is unclear who would be able to share such stories beyond party apparatuses and civil society organizations.&nbsp;</p>
<p><em>Social media companies, meanwhile, should take <a href="https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2023/11/07/microsoft-elections-2024-ai-voting-mtac/" title="more aggressive steps" target="_blank">more aggressive steps</a> to limit the free rein of electoral conspiracy theories on their platforms</em>, while legacy media outlets should work to avoid sensationalist reporting, including reporting portraying the opposition party as an existential threat or individual politicians as corrupt or dangerous. Legitimate community note programs should be expanded to ensure bad information can be drowned out by factcheckers. Social media companies <a href="https://apnews.com/article/meta-adds-labels-to-ai-imagery-deepfakes-415163d053ed915042a04f1ec3d9eafa" title="should take aggressive stances" target="_blank">should take aggressive stances</a> against AI-enabled disinformation and deepfakes, particularly as they concern political figures. Intelligence agencies should carefully monitor social media platforms for disinformation campaigns, <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2023/11/30/biden-foreign-disinformation-social-media-election-interference/" title="surmounting threats" target="_blank">surmounting threats</a>&nbsp;issued by the political right against such activity.</p>
<p><em>Trusted civil society actors, including religious leaders, labor unions, Hollywood, and sports teams and athletes, should call for peace and goodwill</em>, avoiding discussions of politics or ideology to instead focus on widely shared values such as nonviolence. Trusted leaders should educate their constituencies on civics and election integrity, and should prepare to band together in nonpartisan fashion should violence erupt.</p>
<p><b><em>Reducing means</em></b></p>
<p><em>Law enforcement agencies should <a href="https://twitter.com/CapitolPolice/status/1725877901805899815" title="conduct trainings" target="_blank">conduct trainings</a> and improve <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2022/01/03/could-january-6th-happen-again-526167" title="intelligence sharing" target="_blank">intelligence sharing</a> across levels of government</em>, as well as with fusion centers and nonprofit organizations. Extremists should be taken at their word—threats of violence or insurrection should not be dismissed as bluster or an unrealistic proposition. Professionals should not ignore lessons learned from January 6—including keeping the National Guard on standby and not ignoring intelligence warnings. As part of such efforts, law enforcement agencies with different and overlapping mandates should establish best practices and plans to ensure smooth coordination. This process should be aided by designating national conventions, Election Day, and January 6 as National Special Security Events.&nbsp;</p>
<p><em>Law enforcement and intelligence agencies should strengthen their protection of political candidates, election workers, and voting infrastructure</em>. The Department of Justice’s Election Threats Task Force should be fully resourced and staffed—and could <a href="https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the-slow-burn-threatening-our-democracy" title="expand its remit" target="_blank">expand its remit</a> to protect polling places and particularly vulnerable politicians. The volume of threats could be so great that not every site can be protected, and law enforcement should be prepared to prioritize particularly high-value targets, beginning with leading politicians and important political locations.</p>
<p><em>Policymakers and pundits across the political spectrum should work to erode the prevalent framing of January 6 defendants as heroes and martyrs</em>, building a stronger deterrent against acts of political violence. Civil society leaders and state and local officials should emphasize the critical importance of nonviolent means of driving political change.</p>
<p><b><em>Removing opportunity</em></b></p>
<p><em>Any decisions made to dampen unrest or violence with massed law enforcement or military assets should be made as an absolute last resort</em>, with the public blessing of influential civil society actors and mainstream politicians across the aisle. Such measures should be incremental, involving steadily increasing presences of law enforcement or National Guard units, in order to avoid the perception of an overreaching federal response.</p>
<p>Should the United States fail to adequately prepare for the risks of electoral violence in 2024, the integrity of the election will be on the line. In a year featuring at least <a href="https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/defending-year-democracy" title="eighty elections" target="_blank">eighty elections</a> around the world, the United States will also provide a blueprint for autocrats elsewhere seeing to contest and undermine their own elections. Ensuring a peaceful, fair, and thriving election is therefore of critical importance, both to American democracy as well as democracy around the world.</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/report/preventing-us-election-violence-2024</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/report/preventing-us-election-violence-2024</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 11 Apr 2024 16:29:22 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Lost Decade</title>
<description><h1 class="article-header__title">Lost Decade </h1>
<div class="article-header__subhead">
<div><p>The U.S. Pivot to Asia and the Rise of Chinese Power&nbsp;</p></div>
</div>
<figure class="article-header__image for-tablet-down">
<div class="article-header__image-picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/book_large_l/public/book_cover_image/The%20Lost%20Decade_revised.jpg.webp" alt="" class="article-header__image-img" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
</figure>
<p class="article-header__description">Robert D. Blackwill and Richard Fontaine evaluate the limitations of the Pivot to Asia and offer a compelling vision for the future of U.S. foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific. </p>
<p class="article-header__byline">
<span class="article-header__metadata-type article-header__metadata-type--with-definition">
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/books-reports">Book</a>
</span> by
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/expert/robert-d-blackwill" class="article-header__link">Robert D. Blackwill</a> and
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/bio/richard-fontaine" class="article-header__link">Richard Fontaine</a> </p>
<div class="article-header__book-metadata-group">
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Publisher –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">Oxford University Press</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Release Date –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">Jun 2024</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Pages –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">480</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-isbn">
<em>ISBN 9780197677940</em>
</p>
</div>
<br><p><em>Lost Decade</em>&nbsp;is an essential guide for understanding the historic shift to Asia-centric geopolitics and its implications for the United States’ present and future.&nbsp;<br>
&nbsp;<br>
Across the political spectrum, there is wide agreement that Asia should stand at the center of U.S. foreign policy. But this worldview, first represented in the Barack Obama administration’s 2011 “Pivot to Asia,”&nbsp;marks a dramatic departure from the entire history of American grand strategy. More than a decade on, we now have the perspective to evaluate it in depth. In <em>Lost Decade</em>, Robert D. Blackwill and Richard Fontaine—two eminent figures in American foreign policy—take this long view. They conclude that while the Pivot’s strategic logic is strong, there are few successes to speak of, and that we need a far more coherent approach to the Indo-Pacific region. They examine the Pivot through various lenses: situating it historically in the context of U.S. global foreign policy, revealing the inside story of how it came about, assessing the effort thus far, identifying the ramifications in other regions (namely Europe and the Middle East), and proposing a path forward.&nbsp;<br>
&nbsp;<br>
The authors stress that the United States has far less margin for foreign policy error today than a decade ago. As the international order becomes more unstable, Blackwill and Fontaine argue that it is imperative that policymakers fully understand what the Pivot to Asia aimed to achieve—and where it fell short—in order to muster the resources, alliances, and resolve to preserve an open order in Asia and the world. Crafting an effective policy for the region, they contend, is crucial for preserving American security, prosperity, and democratic values.&nbsp;</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/book/lost-decade</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/book/lost-decade</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 14 Mar 2024 20:16:29 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>The End of Ambition</title>
<description><h1 class="article-header__title">The End of Ambition</h1>
<div class="article-header__subhead">
<div><p>America’s Past, Present, and Future in the Middle East</p></div>
</div>
<figure class="article-header__image for-tablet-down">
<div class="article-header__image-picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/book_large_l/public/book_cover_image/9780197578575.jpg.webp" alt="" class="article-header__image-img" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
</figure>
<p class="article-header__description">A clear-headed vision for the United States' role in the Middle East that highlights the changing nature of U.S. national interests and the challenges of grand strategizing at a time of profound change in the international order.</p>
<p class="article-header__byline">
<span class="article-header__metadata-type article-header__metadata-type--with-definition">
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/books-reports">Book</a>
</span> by
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/expert/steven-cook" class="article-header__link">Steven A. Cook</a> </p>
<div class="article-header__book-metadata-group">
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Publisher –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">Oxford University Press</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Release Date –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">Jun 2024</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Pages –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">208</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-isbn">
<em>ISBN 9780197578575</em>
</p>
</div>
<br><p>Following a long series of catastrophic misadventures in the Middle East over the last two decades, the American foreign policy community has tried to understand what went wrong. After weighing the evidence, they have mostly advised a retreat from the region. The basic view is that when the United States tries to advance change in the Middle East, it only makes matters worse.</p>
<p>In <em>The End of Ambition</em>, Steven A. Cook argues that while these analysts are rightly concerned that engagement drains U.S. resources and distorts its domestic politics, the broader impulse to disengage tends to neglect important lessons from the past. Moreover, advocates of pulling back overlook the potential risks of withdrawal. Covering the relationship between the United States and the Middle East since the end of World War II, Cook makes the bold claim that despite setbacks and moral costs, the United States has been overwhelmingly successful in protecting its core national interests in the Middle East. Conversely, overly ambitious policies to remake the region and leverage U.S. power not only ended in failure, but rendered the region unstable in new and largely misunderstood ways.</p><p>While making the case that retrenchment is not the answer to America’s problems in the Middle East, <em>The End of Ambition</em> highlights how America’s interests in the region have begun to change and critically examines alternative approaches to U.S.-Middle East policy. Cook highlights the challenges that policymakers and analysts confront in developing a new strategy for the United States in the Middle East against the backdrop of both political uncertainty in the United States and a changing global order.</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/book/end-ambition</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/book/end-ambition</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 11 Mar 2024 20:08:17 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>The End of Ambition</title>
<description><h1 class="article-header__title">The End of Ambition</h1>
<div class="article-header__subhead">
<div><p>America’s Past, Present, and Future in the Middle East</p></div>
</div>
<figure class="article-header__image for-tablet-down">
<div class="article-header__image-picture">
<img src="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/styles/book_large_l/public/book_cover_image/9780197578575.jpg.webp" alt="" class="article-header__image-img" referrerpolicy="no-referrer">
</div>
</figure>
<p class="article-header__description">A clear-headed vision for the United States' role in the Middle East that highlights the changing nature of U.S. national interests and the challenges of grand strategizing at a time of profound change in the international order.</p>
<p class="article-header__byline">
<span class="article-header__metadata-type article-header__metadata-type--with-definition">
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/books-reports">Book</a>
</span> by
<a href="https://www.cfr.org/expert/steven-cook" class="article-header__link">Steven A. Cook</a> </p>
<div class="article-header__book-metadata-group">
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Publisher –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">Oxford University Press</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Release Date –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">Jun 2024</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-metadata">
<em class="article-header__book-metadata-title">Pages –</em>
<span class="article-header__book-metadata-serif">208</span>
</p>
<p class="article-header__book-isbn">
<em>ISBN 9780197578575</em>
</p>
</div>
<br><p>Following a long series of catastrophic misadventures in the Middle East over the last two decades, the American foreign policy community has tried to understand what went wrong. After weighing the evidence, they have mostly advised a retreat from the region. The basic view is that when the United States tries to advance change in the Middle East, it only makes matters worse.</p>
<p>In <em>The End of Ambition</em>, Steven A. Cook argues that while these analysts are rightly concerned that engagement drains U.S. resources and distorts its domestic politics, the broader impulse to disengage tends to neglect important lessons from the past. Moreover, advocates of pulling back overlook the potential risks of withdrawal. Covering the relationship between the United States and the Middle East since the end of World War II, Cook makes the bold claim that despite setbacks and moral costs, the United States has been overwhelmingly successful in protecting its core national interests in the Middle East. Conversely, overly ambitious policies to remake the region and leverage U.S. power not only ended in failure, but rendered the region unstable in new and largely misunderstood ways.</p><p>While making the case that retrenchment is not the answer to America’s problems in the Middle East, <em>The End of Ambition</em> highlights how America’s interests in the region have begun to change and critically examines alternative approaches to U.S.-Middle East policy. Cook highlights the challenges that policymakers and analysts confront in developing a new strategy for the United States in the Middle East against the backdrop of both political uncertainty in the United States and a changing global order.</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/book/end-ambition</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/book/end-ambition</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 11 Mar 2024 20:08:17 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>A Conversation With John Kerry</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/0otLx-xeovw" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>John Kerry discusses his work as&nbsp;U.S. special presidential envoy for climate, the challenges the United States faces, and the Biden administration’s priorities as it continues to address climate change.</p>
<p>FROMAN: Good afternoon. It’s a great pleasure to see everybody. My name is Mike Froman. I’m president of the Council on Foreign Relations.&nbsp;</p>
<p>And it is a great honor to welcome Special Envoy for Climate John Kerry to the Council today to give what is in effect a valedictory address on his time in government, on climate, as he prepares to leave that position. He truly is a man who needs no introduction. You all know everything that he’s done, but I would say, on climate, this is something that goes back decades from when he was a senator, when he was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, when he was secretary of state, to his position now. This has been a passion of his and he’s been a consistent advocate for strong policy in this area.&nbsp;</p>
<p>I would say, when we served together in the Obama administration and I would see him in the Situation Room, I was so impressed that he was willing to go anywhere around the world, and indeed everywhere around the world, no matter how difficult the assignment was, no matter what little chance of success there might be in making progress, to represent the United States and to make the very best effort to address our interests all over the world. And I saw this in a very personal way when in—we found ourselves in Indonesia at a time—it was an economic summit there and there was something happening in Washington. I think the government was closing down or something, and President Obama could not come and so he designated Secretary Kerry at the time to be the head of our delegation, and we prepared Secretary Kerry and he went up on the stage of this large group and gave this impassioned speech about issues of fish and trade facilitation and tariffs and dumping. I knew in the back of his mind all he cared about was war and peace and climate and really big issues, but he gave the speech and he seemed to be so into it and so passionate about it that everyone thought these are the most important issues to the secretary of state. He came down off the stage, he sat next to me in the front row, and I said, “Mr. Secretary, that was really fantastic; I think you have a real future in politics”—(laughter)—at which point he said, “Screw you, Froman.” (Laug... |
http://localhost:1200/cfr/videos - Success ✔️<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" version="2.0">
<channel>
<title>Videos</title>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/videos</link>
<atom:link href="http://localhost:1200/cfr/videos" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"></atom:link>
<description>Videos - Made with love by RSSHub(https://github.com/DIYgod/RSSHub)</description>
<generator>RSSHub</generator>
<webMaster>i@diygod.me (DIYgod)</webMaster>
<language>en</language>
<lastBuildDate>Fri, 24 May 2024 14:48:27 GMT</lastBuildDate>
<ttl>5</ttl>
<item>
<title>Ten Most Significant World Events in 2023</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/v7XWcXcI0Sc" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>2023 was a tumultuous year, marked by violent conflicts, democratic erosion, and record-high temperatures. This year, experts at the Council on Foreign Relations, along with visiting world leaders and thinkers, unpacked these issues and more.</p>
<p>Join CFR’s director of studies, Jim Lindsay, in looking back at his list of the ten most impactful events of the year.</p>
<p>For more, check out his blog post, “<a href="https://www.cfr.org/worldevents2023" title="Ten Most Significant World Events in 2023" target="_blank">Ten Most Significant World Events in 2023</a>,” only at CFR.org.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/ten-most-significant-world-events-2023</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/ten-most-significant-world-events-2023</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 07 Dec 2023 22:12:43 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Stakes for Taiwan's Diplomacy in Three Questions</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/aOp2I1d-2Lo" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>Taiwan's relationship with the United States, China, and the rest of the world has a complex history that informs why the island is so consequential to today's geopolitics. To better understand these dynamics, David Sacks, CFR's fellow for Asia studies, answers questions about Taiwan's history and its significance to diplomacy in East Asia.</p>
<p>For more on the relationship between the United States, China, and Taiwan, check out the Council on Foreign Relations–sponsored Independent Task Force, "U.S.-Taiwan Relations in a New Era". cfr.org/us-taiwan</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p><p>&nbsp;</p></description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/stakes-taiwans-diplomacy-three-questions</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/stakes-taiwans-diplomacy-three-questions</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 16 Aug 2023 17:35:24 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>How Artificial Intelligence Could Change the World</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/lxCjyfFZxBQ" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>Artificial Intelligence (AI) could transform economies, politics, and everyday life. Some experts believe this increasingly powerful technology could lead to amazing advances and prosperity. Yet, many tech and industry leaders are warning that AI poses substantial risks, and they are calling for a moratorium on AI research so that safety measures can be established. But amid mounting great-power competition, it’s unclear whether national governments will be able to coordinate on regulating this technology that offers so many economic and strategic opportunities.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/how-artificial-intelligence-could-change-world</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/how-artificial-intelligence-could-change-world</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 25 May 2023 16:43:57 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>As Nuclear Tensions Rise, Should the World Be Worried?</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/XDMn4cFllek" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>Since the end of World War II, nuclear weapons have threatened international relations. The Cold War produced stalemates that seemed to reduce the threat of nuclear conflict, but several countries’ more recent acquisitions of nuclear weapons have brought the world into a dangerous new era of nuclear uncertainty. With nuclear tensions on the rise once again, what lies ahead for nuclear diplomacy?</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/nuclear-tensions-rise-should-world-be-worried</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/nuclear-tensions-rise-should-world-be-worried</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 02 May 2023 16:13:26 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement Threatened by Brexit Fallout</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/WruVPF00jrg" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>In Northern Ireland, the consequences of the United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union, known as Brexit, are threatening to unravel the twenty-five-year-old Good Friday Agreement. It’s a peace deal that ended decades of violence between nationalists who wanted Northern Ireland to be reunified with the Republic of Ireland and unionists who wanted it to stay part of the United Kingdom. The agreement largely ended the bloodshed, and allowed for freer movement of trade and people across the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. However, Brexit has imperiled that free movement, and there are major concerns that resolving that issue could inflame old divisions and lead to renewed bloodshed in Northern Ireland.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/northern-irelands-good-friday-agreement-threatened-brexit-fallout</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/northern-irelands-good-friday-agreement-threatened-brexit-fallout</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 06 Apr 2023 21:21:14 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Is China a Democracy or a Dictatorship?</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/qkjV0kT_90s" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>China’s political system is complicated, and there’s a lot of contradictory information out there. Is China a communist country? Is it democratic, as its own government insists? And what does “freedom” mean to Chinese citizens? Ian Johnson, CFR’s senior fellow for China studies, answers these questions and more.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/china-democracy-or-dictatorship</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/china-democracy-or-dictatorship</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 15 Mar 2023 18:00:10 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Are Cryptocurrencies Still the Future of Money?</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/T0g3gFYK9Do" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>Since the creation of Bitcoin in 2009, cryptocurrencies have exploded in popularity and accrued over $1 trillion in collective value. But market volatility in 2022 threatened the crypto ecosystem—after peaking at over $68,000 in November 2021, the price of Bitcoin fell to under $17,000 twelve months later. This instability has brought new scrutiny to the industry and the countries that have embraced Bitcoin as currency: El Salvador and the Central African Republic. Financial regulators are now calling for more crypto oversight, but global efforts to regulate the industry have stalled. Given this simultaneous rise in global popularity and concern, what lies ahead for digital currency and the future of finance?</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/are-cryptocurrencies-still-future-money</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/are-cryptocurrencies-still-future-money</guid>
<pubDate>Thu, 02 Mar 2023 16:48:34 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>What Happens When the World Hits 1.5°C of Warming?</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/mPCB4FqmoPg" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>The world is running out of time to avoid the worst consequences of climate change. With the 2015 Paris Agreement, countries set a goal of limiting global warming to 1.5°C (2.7°F) compared to 150 years ago. However, the planet is on track to pass 1.5°C by the end of this decade, which would lead to higher sea levels, hotter heat waves, and deadlier natural disasters. But countries can work to prevent those and even worse dangers by sticking to their climate pledges and limiting just how much the world overshoots its Paris Agreement goal.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/what-happens-when-world-hits-15degc-warming</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/what-happens-when-world-hits-15degc-warming</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 28 Feb 2023 15:44:59 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Will U.S.-Venezuela Relations Thaw?</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/d26XfcY4cxs" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>After years of tension, relations between the United States and Venezuela appear to be headed in a new direction. The Joe Biden administration has temporarily rolled back some U.S. sanctions on Venezuela’s oil industry in an effort to curb energy prices as well as help the Venezuelan people. But the extent of this détente hinges on Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. What’s in store for bilateral relations?</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/will-us-venezuela-relations-thaw</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/will-us-venezuela-relations-thaw</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 23 Dec 2022 16:57:17 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Video: Seven Most Significant World Events in 2022</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/dt7aBUDXFEU" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>It was a year marked by political tumult, spiking major-power tensions, economic challenges, a waning pandemic, and a war that echoed worldwide.<br><br>
Take a look back at what James M. Lindsay, CFR’s director of studies, thought were the most significant events of 2022. For more, check out his blog post, “<a href="https://www.cfr.org/worldevents2022" title="Ten Most Significant World Events in 2022" target="_blank">Ten Most Significant World Events in 2022</a>,” only at CFR.org.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/video-seven-most-significant-world-events-2022</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/video-seven-most-significant-world-events-2022</guid>
<pubDate>Fri, 16 Dec 2022 18:48:27 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Growing Instability in Haiti</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/XemLN6oPlbM" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>More than a year after President Jovenel Moïse’s assassination, Haiti remains embroiled in a humanitarian crisis. Economic and political instability persist, and a surge in gang-related violence in and around the capital, Port-au-Prince, has displaced tens of thousands of people. World leaders are now debating whether to send troops to help restore basic governance in the country. What does the future hold for Haiti?</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/growing-instability-haiti</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/growing-instability-haiti</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 09 Nov 2022 21:47:27 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>Post-Roe v. Wade: Abortion Law Around the World</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/UFrSuxMBcaQ" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>With the U.S. Supreme Court overturning <em style="font-style:italic">Roe v. Wade</em>, it’s up to states to decide their own abortion laws. Watch to see what has changed so far in the United States and how it compares with other countries on abortion access.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/post-roe-v-wade-abortion-law-around-world</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/post-roe-v-wade-abortion-law-around-world</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 25 Oct 2022 21:03:15 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>King Charles III and the Future of the Commonwealth</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/ISczNbnvSZ0" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>As King Charles III ascends to the British throne after the passing of Queen Elizabeth II, Commonwealth countries are debating whether to follow Barbados, which broke ties with the Crown in 2021. Why are countries choosing to leave the monarchy, and what could that mean for its future?</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/king-charles-iii-and-future-commonwealth</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/king-charles-iii-and-future-commonwealth</guid>
<pubDate>Mon, 03 Oct 2022 17:34:20 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>The Russia-Ukraine War and Europe’s Energy Bind</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/PDP4bT5cDAw" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has led European governments to propose bans on Russian oil and gas, but rising energy costs and a lack of alternatives&nbsp;are&nbsp;undermining the effort. Here’s how Europe has been challenged by Russia’s leverage in the energy market.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/russia-ukraine-war-and-europes-energy-bind</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/russia-ukraine-war-and-europes-energy-bind</guid>
<pubDate>Tue, 13 Sep 2022 19:09:04 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
<title>How U.S. Gun Policies Compare With the World’s</title>
<description><iframe src="https://www.youtube-nocookie.com/embed/VqAiI8npYk0" width="640" height="360" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen="" referrerpolicy="no-referrer"></iframe><br><p>The debate over gun laws has raged in Washington for decades, often reigniting after high-profile mass shootings. In mid-2022, Congress passed a rare, compromise gun control bill, but critics say it still leaves the United States with some of the loosest gun laws in the world. Here’s how the United States and some other advanced democracies have responded to gun violence.</p>
</description>
<link>https://www.cfr.org/video/how-us-gun-policies-compare-worlds</link>
<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.cfr.org/video/how-us-gun-policies-compare-worlds</guid>
<pubDate>Wed, 13 Jul 2022 20:30:13 GMT</pubDate>
</item>
</channel>
</rss>... |
|
route test for |
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.
Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.
Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.
Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.
You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.
Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.
This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.
Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.
Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.
Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.
Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Involved Issue / 该 PR 相关 Issue
Close #15542
Example for the Proposed Route(s) / 路由地址示例
New RSS Route Checklist / 新 RSS 路由检查表
PuppeteerNote / 说明