

Task 1:

Majority of the requests are HTTP GET requests, when shown from the addon. When logging into Alice's account, everything is simply a GET request since no action is being done. A GET request drabs data from a data source with just the internet. This request can be seen in the screenshot below, where the plugin shows that a GET request was sent out. "GET: HTTP/1.1 200 OK"




By making a blog post from Alice's profile, the server accepts the contents of the post as data. POST request methods requests that a web server accepts the data enclosed inside of the request. Therefore when making a blog post there is data that needs to be processed into the web page, requiring a HTTP POST, this request can be seen in the screenshot below. Where the plugin shows that a POST request was sent out. "POST: HTTP/1.1 200 OK"




Task 2:

From Boby's Profile, we add Samy as a friend while running the HTTP header Live. By doing this we see the request made by the website to add Samy as a friend. Samy is added by a friend with the "http://www.csrflabelgg.com/action/friends/add?friend=45". This is important information for the attack on alice.




We then go into Boby's edit profile page, then view the source code. When viewing source code, find the guid value for Boby's profile. This number is 43. So we change the request, "http://www.csrflabelgg.com/action/friends/add?friend=45", to have a 43 instead of a 45. So that a friend request can be sent to Boby through this request.




Then, edit Boby's bio description. Within this edit HTML, and add "". This link will add Boby as a friend if anyone is on his profile. This picture shows Alice viewing Boby's profile,


"Add Friend" is available since they are not friends.




However since Alice checked his profile, even if she doesn't press add friend, refreshing the page will show that she is now friends with Boby.




With this information, we can make a malicious link. From the attacker website. Put this link into a message targeted to Alice.



This page, similarly to how the bio attack worked, will cause Alice to add Boby as a friend.




When going back to the normal CSRF Lab Site, we can see that the attack was successful since Alice added Boby as a friend from only clicking the link.




Task 3: For this attack, we need to edit the given attack code. Each field will cause Alice to have her bio changed from visiting the attack site. Line 8 needs to contain Alice in value, so that her description can be changed in line 9. Line 9, has the value set to whatever the wanted description is. Finally line 11 needs to be changed with Alice's guid. Her guid can be found the same way we found Samy, and Boby's guid. Alice has a guid of 42. With this created we are able to attack Alice. Also the p.action link needs to be changed so that it will change Alice's bio. The correct link being "http://www.csrflabelgg.com/action/profile/edit."

```
getyou.html
                                       task3.html
<html>
<h1>This page forges an HTTP POST request.</h1>
<script type="text/javascript">
function forge post(){
runction forge_post()_
var fields;
fields = "<input type='hidden' name='name' value='Alice'>";
fields += "<input type='hidden' name='description' value='Boby is MY HERO'>";
fields += "<input type='hidden' name='accesslevel[description]'value='2'>";
fields += "<input type='hidden' name='guid' value='42'>";
var p = document.createElement("form");
p.action = "http://www.csrflabelgg.com/action/profile/edit";
p.innerHTML = fields;
p.method = "post";
document.body.appendChild(p);
// Submit the form
p.submit();
window.onload = function() { forge_post();}
</script>
</html>
```

We do the same messaging idea, to get Alice to open a link to the website which will attack her profile.



Alice having her bio changed after clicking the attack link.



• Question 1: The forged HTTP request needs Alice's user id (guid) to work properly. If Boby targets Alice specifically, before the attack, he can find ways to get Alice's user id. Boby does not know Alice's Elgg password, so he cannot log into Alice's account to get the information. Please describe how Boby can solve this problem.

Boby can use HTTP Header Live to get Alice's user id. By adding her as a friend, the request will show her id at the end of the request,

http://www.csrflabelgg.com/action/friends/add?friend=42. This allows him to target her profile with his attacking website specifically.


• Question 2: If Boby would like to launch the attack to anybody who visits his malicious web page. In this case, he does not know who is visiting the web page beforehand. Can he still launch the CSRF attack to modify the victim's Elgg profile? Please explain.

Boby would not be able to launch the attack on anyone except Alice since this attack is guid specific. So anyone other than Alice would not have the correct guid to be affected.

Task 4:

After turning on the countermeasure above, try the CSRF attack again, and describe your observation. Please point out the secret tokens in the HTTP request captured using Firefox's HTTP inspection tool. Please explain why the attacker cannot send these secret tokens in the CSRF attack; what prevents them from finding out the secret tokens from the web page?

The form is missing those two fields. So because those two fields are now emitted Boby is not added to the friend list. This is a result of the countermeasure. The countermeasure prevents actions being done to tokens that are not from the main website itself. So an attack website, that was changing the contents of the main website, can no longer change anything. Because of this, the secret tokens are also now safe, since they are only known to the server, and they're checked against any cookie request.



Turning on the countermeasure.



Going into the attack website, expecting Alice to now have Boby added as a friend. However, as explained previously, the attack failed.

