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lightningd/cryptomsg: routines to encrypt on the wire.
After the handshake, it's a simple matter of AEAD and key rotation. Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
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#include <assert.h> | ||
#include <ccan/build_assert/build_assert.h> | ||
#include <ccan/crypto/hkdf_sha256/hkdf_sha256.h> | ||
#include <ccan/crypto/sha256/sha256.h> | ||
#include <ccan/endian/endian.h> | ||
#include <ccan/mem/mem.h> | ||
#include <ccan/short_types/short_types.h> | ||
#include <lightningd/cryptomsg.h> | ||
#include <sodium/crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305.h> | ||
#include <status.h> | ||
#include <utils.h> | ||
#include <wire/wire_io.h> | ||
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struct crypto_state { | ||
/* Received and sent nonces. */ | ||
u64 rn, sn; | ||
/* Sending and receiving keys. */ | ||
struct sha256 sk, rk; | ||
/* Chaining key for re-keying */ | ||
struct sha256 s_ck, r_ck; | ||
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/* Peer who owns us: peer->crypto_state == this */ | ||
struct peer *peer; | ||
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/* Output and input buffers. */ | ||
u8 *out, *in; | ||
struct io_plan *(*next_in)(struct io_conn *, struct peer *, u8 *); | ||
struct io_plan *(*next_out)(struct io_conn *, struct peer *); | ||
}; | ||
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static void hkdf_two_keys(struct sha256 *out1, struct sha256 *out2, | ||
const struct sha256 *in1, | ||
const struct sha256 *in2) | ||
{ | ||
/* BOLT #8: | ||
* | ||
* * `HKDF(salt,ikm)`: a function is defined in [5](#reference-5), | ||
* evaluated with a zero-length `info` field. | ||
* * All invocations of the `HKDF` implicitly return `64-bytes` | ||
* of cryptographic randomness using the extract-and-expand | ||
* component of the `HKDF`. | ||
*/ | ||
struct sha256 okm[2]; | ||
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BUILD_ASSERT(sizeof(okm) == 64); | ||
hkdf_sha256(okm, sizeof(okm), in1, sizeof(*in1), in2, sizeof(*in2), | ||
NULL, 0); | ||
*out1 = okm[0]; | ||
*out2 = okm[1]; | ||
} | ||
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static void maybe_rotate_key(u64 *n, struct sha256 *k, struct sha256 *ck) | ||
{ | ||
struct sha256 new_k, new_ck; | ||
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/* BOLT #8: | ||
* | ||
* A key is to be rotated after a party sends of decrypts | ||
* `1000` messages with it. This can be properly accounted | ||
* for by rotating the key once the nonce dedicated to it | ||
* exceeds `1000`. | ||
*/ | ||
if (*n != 1000) | ||
return; | ||
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/* BOLT #8: | ||
* | ||
* Key rotation for a key `k` is performed according to the following: | ||
* | ||
* * Let `ck` be the chaining key obtained at the end of `Act Three`. | ||
* * `ck', k' = HKDF(ck, k)` | ||
* * Reset the nonce for the key to `n = 0`. | ||
* * `k = k'` | ||
* * `ck = ck'` | ||
*/ | ||
hkdf_two_keys(&new_ck, &new_k, ck, k); | ||
status_trace("# 0x%s, 0x%s = HKDF(0x%s, 0x%s)", | ||
tal_hexstr(trc, &new_ck, sizeof(new_ck)), | ||
tal_hexstr(trc, &new_k, sizeof(new_k)), | ||
tal_hexstr(trc, ck, sizeof(*ck)), | ||
tal_hexstr(trc, k, sizeof(*k))); | ||
*ck = new_ck; | ||
*k = new_k; | ||
*n = 0; | ||
} | ||
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static void le64_nonce(unsigned char *npub, u64 nonce) | ||
{ | ||
/* BOLT #8: | ||
* | ||
* ...with nonce `n` encoded as 32 zero bits followed by a | ||
* *little-endian* 64-bit value (this follows the Noise Protocol | ||
* convention, rather than our normal endian). | ||
*/ | ||
le64 le_nonce = cpu_to_le64(nonce); | ||
const size_t zerolen = crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_ietf_NPUBBYTES - sizeof(le_nonce); | ||
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BUILD_ASSERT(crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_ietf_NPUBBYTES >= sizeof(le_nonce)); | ||
/* First part is 0, followed by nonce. */ | ||
memset(npub, 0, zerolen); | ||
memcpy(npub + zerolen, &le_nonce, sizeof(le_nonce)); | ||
} | ||
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static struct io_plan *peer_decrypt_body(struct io_conn *conn, | ||
struct crypto_state *cs) | ||
{ | ||
unsigned char npub[crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_ietf_NPUBBYTES]; | ||
unsigned long long mlen; | ||
u8 *decrypted = tal_arr(cs->in, u8, tal_count(cs->in) - 16), *in; | ||
struct io_plan *plan; | ||
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le64_nonce(npub, cs->rn++); | ||
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/* BOLT #8: | ||
* | ||
* * Decrypt `c` using `ChaCha20-Poly1305`, `rn`, and `rk` to | ||
* obtain decrypted plaintext packet `p`. | ||
* | ||
* * The nonce `rn` MUST be incremented after this step. | ||
*/ | ||
if (crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_ietf_decrypt(decrypted, | ||
&mlen, NULL, | ||
memcheck(cs->in, | ||
tal_count(cs->in)), | ||
tal_count(cs->in), | ||
NULL, 0, | ||
npub, cs->rk.u.u8) != 0) { | ||
/* FIXME: Report error! */ | ||
return io_close(conn); | ||
} | ||
assert(mlen == tal_count(decrypted)); | ||
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maybe_rotate_key(&cs->rn, &cs->rk, &cs->r_ck); | ||
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/* Steal cs->in: we free it after, and decrypted too unless | ||
* they steal but be careful not to touch anything after | ||
* next_in (could free itself) */ | ||
in = tal_steal(NULL, cs->in); | ||
cs->in = NULL; | ||
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plan = cs->next_in(conn, cs->peer, decrypted); | ||
tal_free(in); | ||
return plan; | ||
} | ||
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static struct io_plan *peer_decrypt_header(struct io_conn *conn, | ||
struct crypto_state *cs) | ||
{ | ||
unsigned char npub[crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_ietf_NPUBBYTES]; | ||
unsigned long long mlen; | ||
be16 len; | ||
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le64_nonce(npub, cs->rn++); | ||
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/* BOLT #8: | ||
* | ||
* * Let the encrypted length prefix be known as `lc` | ||
* | ||
* * Decrypt `lc` using `ChaCha20-Poy1305`, `rn`, and `rk` to | ||
* obtain size of the encrypted packet `l`. | ||
* * A zero-length byte slice is to be passed as the AD | ||
* (associated data). | ||
* * The nonce `rn` MUST be incremented after this step. | ||
*/ | ||
if (crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_ietf_decrypt((unsigned char *)&len, | ||
&mlen, NULL, | ||
memcheck(cs->in, | ||
tal_count(cs->in)), | ||
tal_count(cs->in), | ||
NULL, 0, | ||
npub, cs->rk.u.u8) != 0) { | ||
/* FIXME: Report error! */ | ||
return io_close(conn); | ||
} | ||
assert(mlen == sizeof(len)); | ||
tal_free(cs->in); | ||
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/* BOLT #8: | ||
* | ||
* * Read _exactly_ `l+16` bytes from the network buffer, let | ||
* the bytes be known as `c`. | ||
*/ | ||
cs->in = tal_arr(cs, u8, (u32)be16_to_cpu(len) + 16); | ||
return io_read(conn, cs->in, tal_count(cs->in), peer_decrypt_body, cs); | ||
} | ||
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struct io_plan *peer_read_message(struct io_conn *conn, | ||
struct crypto_state *cs, | ||
struct io_plan *(*next)(struct io_conn *, | ||
struct peer *, | ||
u8 *msg)) | ||
{ | ||
assert(!cs->in); | ||
/* BOLT #8: | ||
* | ||
* ### Decrypting Messages | ||
* | ||
* In order to decrypt the _next_ message in the network | ||
* stream, the following is done: | ||
* | ||
* * Read _exactly_ `18-bytes` from the network buffer. | ||
*/ | ||
cs->in = tal_arr(cs, u8, 18); | ||
cs->next_in = next; | ||
return io_read(conn, cs->in, 18, peer_decrypt_header, cs); | ||
} | ||
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static struct io_plan *peer_write_done(struct io_conn *conn, | ||
struct crypto_state *cs) | ||
{ | ||
cs->out = tal_free(cs->out); | ||
return cs->next_out(conn, cs->peer); | ||
} | ||
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struct io_plan *peer_write_message(struct io_conn *conn, | ||
struct crypto_state *cs, | ||
const u8 *msg, | ||
struct io_plan *(*next)(struct io_conn *, | ||
struct peer *)) | ||
{ | ||
unsigned char npub[crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_ietf_NPUBBYTES]; | ||
unsigned long long clen, mlen = tal_count(msg); | ||
be16 l; | ||
int ret; | ||
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assert(!cs->out); | ||
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cs->out = tal_arr(cs, u8, sizeof(l) + 16 + mlen + 16); | ||
cs->next_out = next; | ||
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/* BOLT #8: | ||
* | ||
* In order to encrypt a lightning message (`m`), given a | ||
* sending key (`sk`), and a nonce (`sn`), the following is done: | ||
* | ||
* | ||
* * let `l = len(m)`, | ||
* where `len` obtains the length in bytes of the lightning message. | ||
* | ||
* * Serialize `l` into `2-bytes` encoded as a big-endian integer. | ||
*/ | ||
l = cpu_to_be16(mlen); | ||
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/* BOLT #8: | ||
* | ||
* * Encrypt `l` using `ChaChaPoly-1305`, `sn`, and `sk` to obtain `lc` | ||
* (`18-bytes`) | ||
* * The nonce `sn` is encoded as a 96-bit big-endian number. | ||
* * The nonce `sn` MUST be incremented after this step. | ||
* * A zero-length byte slice is to be passed as the AD | ||
*/ | ||
le64_nonce(npub, cs->sn++); | ||
ret = crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_ietf_encrypt(cs->out, &clen, | ||
(unsigned char *) | ||
memcheck(&l, sizeof(l)), | ||
sizeof(l), | ||
NULL, 0, | ||
NULL, npub, | ||
cs->sk.u.u8); | ||
assert(ret == 0); | ||
assert(clen == sizeof(l) + 16); | ||
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/* BOLT #8: | ||
* | ||
* * Finally encrypt the message itself (`m`) using the same | ||
* procedure used to encrypt the length prefix. Let | ||
* encrypted ciphertext be known as `c`. | ||
* | ||
* * The nonce `sn` MUST be incremented after this step. | ||
*/ | ||
le64_nonce(npub, cs->sn++); | ||
ret = crypto_aead_chacha20poly1305_ietf_encrypt(cs->out + clen, &clen, | ||
memcheck(msg, mlen), | ||
mlen, | ||
NULL, 0, | ||
NULL, npub, | ||
cs->sk.u.u8); | ||
assert(ret == 0); | ||
assert(clen == mlen + 16); | ||
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maybe_rotate_key(&cs->sn, &cs->sk, &cs->s_ck); | ||
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/* BOLT #8: | ||
* * Send `lc || c` over the network buffer. | ||
*/ | ||
return io_write(conn, cs->out, tal_count(cs->out), peer_write_done, cs); | ||
} | ||
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struct crypto_state *crypto_state(struct peer *peer, | ||
const struct sha256 *sk, | ||
const struct sha256 *rk, | ||
const struct sha256 *rck, | ||
const struct sha256 *sck, | ||
u64 rn, u64 sn) | ||
{ | ||
struct crypto_state *cs = tal(peer, struct crypto_state); | ||
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cs->rn = rn; | ||
cs->sn = sn; | ||
cs->sk = *sk; | ||
cs->rk = *rk; | ||
cs->s_ck = *sck; | ||
cs->r_ck = *rck; | ||
cs->peer = peer; | ||
cs->out = cs->in = NULL; | ||
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return cs; | ||
} |
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Original file line number | Diff line number | Diff line change |
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#ifndef LIGHTNING_LIGHTNINGD_CRYPTOMSG_H | ||
#define LIGHTNING_LIGHTNINGD_CRYPTOMSG_H | ||
#include "config.h" | ||
#include <ccan/short_types/short_types.h> | ||
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struct io_conn; | ||
struct peer; | ||
struct sha256; | ||
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/* Initializes peer->crypto_state */ | ||
struct crypto_state *crypto_state(struct peer *peer, | ||
const struct sha256 *sk, | ||
const struct sha256 *rk, | ||
const struct sha256 *rck, | ||
const struct sha256 *sck, | ||
u64 rn, u64 sn); | ||
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/* Get decrypted message */ | ||
struct io_plan *peer_read_message(struct io_conn *conn, | ||
struct crypto_state *cs, | ||
struct io_plan *(*next)(struct io_conn *, | ||
struct peer *, | ||
u8 *msg)); | ||
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/* Sends and frees message */ | ||
struct io_plan *peer_write_message(struct io_conn *conn, | ||
struct crypto_state *cs, | ||
const u8 *msg, | ||
struct io_plan *(*next)(struct io_conn *, | ||
struct peer *)); | ||
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#endif /* LIGHTNING_LIGHTNINGD_CRYPTOMSG_H */ |