



EDDI 9.19.19 meetup

Legal Notices

Anti-Trust Guidelines for the Encrypted DNS Deployment Initiative



As with other initiatives to implement protocols across the Internet, the Encrypted DNS Deployment Initiative (“EDDI”) seeks to ensure the smooth global deployment and reliable operation at scale of DNS encryption technology in an open and transparent way across the Internet. This effort necessarily involves global coordination across a wide range of technical actors, from protocol designers to software developers, network operators, DNS operators, content delivery networks, cloud providers, application providers, and many others. In order to advance the pro-competitive and pro-consumer objectives of EDDI, it is imperative that all participants in EDDI abide by the antitrust laws. While not exhaustive, the following guidelines are intended to aid in your compliance with the antitrust laws.

Participants in EDDI should consult with their own legal counsel on participation in the initiative and complying with all applicable laws.

1. Don’t discuss competitively sensitive information, such as pricing, competitive strategy, and future product roadmaps. EDDI participants should not discuss with each other pricing, competitive strategy, future product roadmaps or other similar information that could be considered competitively sensitive.
2. Don’t discuss with other participants in EDDI any joint action directed against another company, such as jointly refusing to deal with that other company.
3. Don’t discuss with other participants in EDDI your confidential dealings with business partners, suppliers or vendors.
4. Don’t discuss limiting competition or excluding competitors.
5. Don’t use exaggerated language. EDDI is a forum to share best practices, information on deployment and technical trials, lessons learned, and efforts to measure, test, and implement DNS encryption at scale across the Internet ecosystem. All communications in any form should be focused on those efforts. EDDI participants should avoid the use of exaggerated language. You should assume that communications made through EDDI are not confidential and will be shared outside of EDDI.

These guidelines are not intended to be exhaustive of the types of activities that are and are not appropriate for EDDI participants. If you have any questions about the application of these guidelines to particular facts and circumstances or questions regarding complying with the antitrust laws, please consult your own legal counsel.



Agenda

- Welcome & Introductions
- What EDDI isn't
- Workstream ideas
- How to work together
- EDDI Outreach
- Next Steps



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Workstreams

Brainstorming possible workstreams

Testing & Measurement

Would be nice to have a standard recommended dnssperf test configuration, so across different implementers there is an apples-to-apples benchmark tool - <https://www.dnssperf.com/>

This can also be used by independent measurement researcher & orgs

Resolver Discovery & Selection

Needs to handle one or more FORWARDERS between client and full resolver

If done right, will provide *DNS Traceroute* functionality, at last

Overlapping RFC-1918 scopes may result in forwarders and/or the final resolver not being directly accessible from the client

Forwarders and resolvers might not have public FQDNs and may not even have private FQDNs

Need some unique name in an available namespace that is guaranteed to not collide

Maybe base on IPv6 ULA or some other GUID name-generator

Canary Domains / Conflict Detection

Should only be local and should be relative to server's locally scoped name (if that is even possible)

E.g. canary-domain.forwarder-or-resolver-name.local (not literally, just semantically)



Workstreams

Brainstorming possible workstreams

Scaling / Architecture Discussions

Support for forwarding may be necessary to maintain parity with current scaling (e.g. ratios)

New DNS flag or EDNS flag or OPT to signal request to encrypt (including propagation of flag and encryption)

May require new kind of flag or OPT that is NOT hop-by-hop, but rather is propagated to from the originating client to the full resolver

See "Recursive-to-Authoritative" below as well

Security / Attack Resilience

Downgrade resistance is necessary

DNSSEC signing is very likely a requirement regardless of specific mechanism(s)

DANE TLSA records should probably be mandatory unless someone can provide counter-examples

DoT Positioning

Propose that DoH exclusive of DoT is not acceptable to the DNS community at large

Propose that resolver choices need to include DoT-only providers, and that DoH vs DoT needs to be exposed to users if a provider supports both

Propose DoT blocking be used as a proxy signal for network policy (substitute for canary domains)



Workstreams

Brainstorming possible workstreams

DNS Data Policies

Best practices concerning logging, use, disclosure, etc.

Opt-in vs opt-out

Generally, opt-out is a terrible idea, something that has been demonstrated repeatedly.

RPZ and Trust Anchor Issues

Trust anchor(s), provisioning/publishing of such, maybe via resolver-naming authoritative RRs? Self-signed or not?

Use trust anchors to auto-discover split-DNS environment (resolver type)?

Use trust anchors to auto-discover RPZ servers (or combined RPZ server-resolvers)?

Order trust anchors to prevent abuse or to scope functionality (no squatting, maybe private domains and/or RPZ only), including RPZ-first vs RPZ-second (no-cache vs cache)

Signing RPZ-specific responses?

Changes to RPZ architecture to allow mixing RPZ and non-RPZ resolvers?

Add structure to current unordered "nameserver" list in /etc/resolv.conf, similar to SRV semantic mechanisms?



Workstreams

Brainstorming possible workstreams

Recursive-to-Authoritative

Encryption generally is okay, but simply replacing Do53 with ADoT (for example) causes immediate scaling pain

"Poster child" of scaling: large recursive operator (google or cloudflare) to large authority operator (godaddy)

Site-to-site encryption mechanisms may scale better

Separate transport from DNS messages to facilitate scaling

Open question: is it desirable/necessary to facilitate anonymity of resolver operators, or would a mechanism that requires enrollment or coordination or identification be acceptable?

Things to document

DNS current uses and use cases so that proposals can be evaluated to score what works/what breaks

Capture any territorial compliance/legal requirements

Other Random Stuff

Develop short presentation that any participant can use to do a 5-minute lightning talk overview of EDDI at workshops/meetings/conferences



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Links

EDDI

<https://www.encrypted-dns.org/>

Archive

<http://lists.encrypted-dns.org/scripts/waENCDNS.exe?A0=ENCRYPTED-DNS>

GitHub

<https://github.com/Encrypted-DNS-Deployment-Initiative>