

Quantum-resistant digital signatures schemes for low-power IoT

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Seminar Internet of Things, 2021

Motivation

Quantum Computing
Internet of Things

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- Quantum Computing
- Internet of Things

Quantum Resistant Signature Schemes

- Performance Metrics
- different types

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Structure

- Skeleton
- Width-Coverage
- Depth-Coverage
- Ressources
- Schedule

- ▶ sufficiently sized Quantum Computers (explained later) on the horizon
- ▶ They can break most of the cryptography in current use
 - ▶ RSA
 - ▶ ECDSA / ECDH
 - ▶ → Signal, WhatsApp, PGP, SSH, TLS/HTTPS, ...
- ▶ not everything equally effected
 - ▶ schemes in standardization to replace current cryptography
 - ▶ some are rather computationally intense
 - ▶ that is why i have a deeper look on which are feasible for IoT

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- ▶ Quantum Computers operate on Qubits instead of normal Bits
- ▶ Qubits are Quantum-Mechanical
 - ▶ using spin of an electrons
 - ▶ Entanglement and Superposition
- ▶ Algorithms can leverage those mechanics
 - ▶ up to exponential speed up in some cases
 - ▶ Shors algorithm completely breaks common asymmetric cryptography
 - ▶ can derive private key from public key
 - ▶ for everything based on Number-Theory (like RSA, ECDSA, ..)
 - ▶ Grovers algorithm poses threat against symmetric crypto and hash-functions
 - ▶ only quadratic speed-up
 - ▶ doubling length restores security (e.g. AES128 \mapsto AES256)

- ▶ Quantum Computers operate on Qubits instead of normal Bits




Figure: Model of a Qubit [?]

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


Figure: Grovers Algorithm [?]




Figure: Shors Algorithm[?]

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Many resource constrained devices

- ▶ Internet of Things
- ▶ Smart-devices that are actually pretty dumb
 - ▶ little memory (kilobytes to megabytes)
 - ▶ low computing power (slow clock, small cache, etc.)
 - ▶ limited energy resources (battery or solar operated)
- ▶ NIST classified into 3 classes:

Table: IETF IoT Classes

Class	RAM	Flash
C0	<< 10 KiB	<< 100 KiB
C1	10 KiB	100 KiB
C2	50 KiB	250 KiB

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What makes a signature scheme better than any other?

- ▶ length of:
 - ▶ signature
 - ▶ public key
 - ▶ private key
- ▶ time and space needed to:
 - ▶ generate keys (GEN)
 - ▶ sign a message (SIGN)
 - ▶ verify a message (VER)
- ▶ security against quantum computers and traditional attackers

Table: QR Security classes and their traditional counterparts as classified by the NIST

Class	security comparable to
1	AES-128
2	SHA256
3	AES-192
4	SHA384
5	AES-256

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- ▶ Super-singular isogeny based
 - ▶ SIKE
 - ▶ not well studied
- ▶ Multivariate polynomial based
 - ▶ Rainbow
 - ▶ not well studied
 - ▶ involves guessing work → not suited for low power devices
- ▶ Code based
 - ▶ McEliece
 - ▶ no finalist
- ▶ Hash based
 - ▶ SPHINCS+
 - ▶ big signatures (see next slide)
 - ▶ very well studied
- ▶ Lattice based
 - ▶ FALCON, Dilithium
 - ▶ most promising
 - ▶ most NIST finalists
 - ▶ most efficient
 - ▶ not as proofed as HBS

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- ▶ Introduction
- ▶ Internet of Things
- ▶ Quantum Resistant Security
 - ▶ Quantum Computing
 - ▶ QR Algorithms
 - ▶ Performance Metrics
 - ▶ Encryption
 - ▶ Signatures
- ▶ QR Signatures in IoT
 - ▶ Performance Metrics in IoT
 - ▶ Failed Signatures
 - ▶ WalnutDSA
 - ▶ qTESLA
 - ▶ FALCON
- ▶ Conclusion

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- ▶ Skimming multiple Quantum Resistant (QR) algorithms [?, ?] that focus on IoT [?, ?, ?, ?, ?]
- ▶ Deeper reserach about signature Schemes [?]
- ▶ and having a slightly more detailed look at two failed sschemes [?, ?, ?, ?]

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- ▶ having a deeper look at a NIST QR finalist with the most compact implementation:
FALCON [?, ?, ?]
- ▶ maybe having an outlook in the end on a Hardware-Accelerated QR chip
[?]

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- ▶ 7.5. : skim breadth coverage literature
- ▶ 15.5.: write until signatures (at least bullet point comments)
- ▶ 30.5.: finish breadth (at least bullet point comments)
- ▶ α : skim and bullet point Depth
- ▶ 30.6.: finish