ELCANO GLOBAL PRESENCE REPORT

2022

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ELCANO GLOBAL PRESENCE REPORT 2022

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Executive Summary

Post-globalisation

Prior to the eruption of the pandemic, globalisation was already showing signs of fatigue. The sum of the index value of global presence for all 150 countries for which we calculate the Elcano Global Presence Index had reached its peak in 2015. New data for 2021 show a contraction in this aggregate value of 2.35% with respect the previous year –the largest annual drop for the entire time series–.

Of the three economic, military and soft dimensions, the latter is the most hit by this contraction (7% between 2020 and 2021), despite the fact that soft exchanges had been those showing a greater dynamism during the past two decades.

A stable ranking of global presence?

As in previous editions of the Elcano Global Presence Index, the top 20 ranking is fairly stable, with the same group of countries occupying similar positions for several years in a row and showing that, despite geopolitical and geo-economic changes depicted in previous editions of this report, the West and/or the North still account for a great deal of the aggregate global presence.

China gains an enormous volume of external projection and continues to narrow the global presence gap with the US. The index value of Chinese global presence is now 2.3 times lower than that of the US (2.9 times lower only one year before), the latter losing global presence over the past year.

Spain is the country that loses the greatest volume of global presence among all 150 countries, despite retaining its 13th position.

Global Europe?

We calculate the global presence index for the European Union (EU) as if it were a single country, allowing for the analysis of its global role, in comparison with the US and China.

The EU records a global presence index value of 3,377 points in 2021, higher than that of the US (3,241) and much higher than that of China (1,365). However, between 2020 and 2021, coinciding with the COVID-19 pandemic but also with the materialisation of Brexit, the EU's global presence decreases by 300 index value points, while US external projection falls by only 6 points and that of China increases by 62.

What does the Elcano Global Presence Index measure?	The index measures global presence. By global presence we understand the effective positioning, in absolute terms, of the different countries (in terms of products sold, tourists welcomed, victories in international sports competitions…).
Does the Elcano Global Presence Index measure power?	No. A country may have a strong international projection and a weak regional or global influence (or vice-versa). The relationship between presence and power depends on the foreign policy of each country or on the limiting factors of the exercise of influence depending, for instance, on the presence of another regional leader.
Does it reflect the effort of countries attempting to achieve greater internationalisation?	No. This Index measures the results of internationalisation, not its means. For example, a country may have deployed a significant number of troops abroad with a defence expenditure that is relatively smaller than that of another country with a smaller military presence.
Does it measure the openness of countries?	No. The Elcano Global Presence Index considers the external projection of the different countries and not so much the way in which they absorb the external action of other countries in their national territory. That is why the Index considers, for instance, the exports of manufactured goods but disregards the imports. It does not measure world interdependence, though it may help to analyse it.
Is it calculated with objective or subjective data?	Objective. Its purpose is not to ascertain how a country is perceived by certain elites or by public opinion as a whole. The Index is calculated to determine the effective external projection of the different countries, regardless of their reputation or image.
Does it measure merely the 'quantity' of a country's presence or also its nature?	Both. The Elcano Global Presence Index comprises three dimensions – economic, military and soft presence–, which in turn comprise variables of a different nature (ranging from energy to development cooperation, troops deployed or tourism). It is therefore useful in revealing not only how present countries are in the global order but also the nature of their presence.
How are the variables of the Elcano Global Presence Index selected?	First, presence is reflected in a single direction, which could be deemed its unidirectionality. Secondly, the results of presence are measured and not the means to achieve them. In addition, all the variables have an explicitly external component in the sense that they reflect cross-border presence. Presence is given in absolute and not relative terms; in other words, the indicators are not proportional to the demographic or economic size of the country. Likewise, as for any other index, the best explanatory capacity is sought with the fewest variables or indicators possible. Finally, hard data on presence are taken and not data based on judgments or opinions.

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And how are they combined in a synthetic index?	Weights assigned to variables and dimensions are based on experts' criteria. Surveys were conducted in 2012, 2015, 218 and 2021: questionnaires were sent to specialists in international relations and answers were combined to determine the weights of variables and dimensions.
What about missing cases? How are they estimated?	In these cases we have also referred to expert opinion. A total of 5,205 data items have been estimated from 86,447 observations. The number of estimations accounts for 6% of the base.
The Index has been calculated for what years?	For 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010-21. Since 2010 the calculation is performed annually.
Why those years?	To reveal the transformations in the world order since the end of the Cold War.
For what countries?	The Elcano Global Presence Index is calculated for 150 countries. These are selected, mainly, according to their size in terms of GDP.
Can the presence of different countries be combined to reveal the joint presence for a chosen group or region?	Not exactly. The presence of different countries can be combined, showing regional trends of global presence. Moreover, as new editions include an increasing number of countries, for some regions (ie, Latin America or East Asia) the number of countries selected for the Index is high enough to consider the aggregated index value as a fair reflection of the external projection of the whole region. However, it is important to note that, in these cases, the total index value records the relative presence of some countries in others of the same group or region (ie, the global presence index value of Latin America includes the relative presence of Argentina in Brazil). Thus, the adding together of global presences should not be considered a metric of a given region's external projection outside its boundaries.
Can the presence of European countries be combined and can it be assumed that that is the presence of the EU?	No, for the reason mentioned above. It must be borne in mind that the global presence of the member states is partly reflected in other member states of the Union. In order to apply the Index to the EU, intra-European presence has been deducted. The intra-European presence of the member states is precisely what the Elcano European Presence Index measures.

1. Post-globalisation

The Elcano Global Presence Index is now calculated for 150 countries, which account for 98.4% of the global economy and 98.5% of the world's population. Therefore, the aggregation of the index value of all countries included in it can give us a glimpse of the state of globalisation –its behaviour, volume, nature and evolution–. An increase, over time, of the aggregate global presence of all countries might indicate that globalisation is under way –since it would reflect that international exchanges are intensifying–. Conversely, a decrease of aggregate global presence would be a symptom of de-globalisation, and a decline of global exchanges. Also, since total global presence is composed of three dimensions –economic, military, soft–, which, in turn, are made of up to 16 variables –from energy to development cooperation–, observing globalisation through this lens also enables to track its changing nature –from harder to softer types of external relations, for instance–.

As already analysed [elsewhere](#), previously to the eruption of the pandemic, globalisation was already showing signs of fatigue. There were already doubts about the evolution of the globalisation process, given the possible exhaustion of the period of trade openness and the increase of protectionism, the growing concern about the ecological footprint and, in general terms, a strengthening of nation-state visions. According to data updated for this edition, global exchanges increased steadily during the 1990s and 2000s (at an average annual rate of over 2%) and rapidly in the early 2010s (at rates over 3%). However, in 2013 growth started to slow down and, after peaking in 2015, the aggregate value of global presence decreased in 2016 for the first time in this series' records. Data for the following years show that globalisation plateaued, with mild increases or declines until the eruption of the pandemic, that is reflected in this Index for 2021 data.

Globalisation began fundamentally as an economic process and continues to be so. It is the most relevant dimension, with an aggregate value of economic presence more than twice that of the soft or military dimensions (Graph 1.1). However, with different speeds of globalisation, also came a changing nature of this global trend. The main driver of globalisation during the 90s was the economic dimension (6% annual growth, on average, during that decade), with more modest increases of the soft dimension (2.5%) and a contraction of the military realm (-2.4%), following the collapse of the Soviet bloc. In the 2000s, the trend of the military dimension continued, though at a lower pace (-0.4% per year), the economic dimension substantially smoothed its rate of growth (to 2.8% annually) and the soft dimension took the lead in the globalisation process (increasing at an annual rate of 5.6% throughout this decade). The first half of the past decade, with a slower globalisation, saw an even slower growth of the economic dimension (less than 1.7% per year), a low but positive increase of the military dimension (1.7% per year) and, still, the lead of the soft dimension (5.4% per year). During the second half of the decade, and until the eruption of the COVID-19 pandemic, increases of economic exchanges dropped to less than 1% per year, those of military international relations

returned to negative values (-0.9% annually) and the expansion of the soft dimension smoothed out its trend of the previous years, dropping to an annual increase of 1.4%. In short, while economic exchanges led the globalisation process during the 90s, in the 2000s and 2010s the process was driven, to a greater extent, by the soft dimension, even during the years of stagnating globalisation in the second half of the past decade. Although the military dimension has expanded in some years, in general terms it has tended to lose ground in the globalisation process.

It has been argued that the pandemic accelerated global trends prior to the eruption of the global health crisis. With respect to the pace and nature of globalisation, tracked with the aggregated index value of global presence for the 150 countries included in this calculation, this is partly true. On the one hand, during the pandemic, there was a contraction of this aggregate value, that decreased by 2.35% in a single year (from 15,589 points in 2020 to 15,222 in 2021) –the largest annual drop for the entire time series–. There is, therefore, a continuation of the stagnation or contraction of global exchanges in previous years. However, on the other, the dimension most hit during the past year is the soft one, which is, precisely, the one that had been showing a greater dynamism during the past two decades. While there were hardly any variations in the economic dimension (at roughly 8,500 points in both 2020 and 2021), the military dimension contracted by 3% and the soft one by 7% (Graphs 1.1 and 1.2).

GRAPH 1.1
Global, economic, military and soft presence
(in index value 1990-2021)

Note: values for 1990 apply for the 1990-94 period, those of 1995 to 1995-99, those of 2000 to 2000-04 and those of 2005 to 2005-09.
Source: Elcano Royal Institute, Elcano Global Presence Index.

Indeed, maybe counterintuitively, the economic dimension did not contract during the pandemic, despite declines in the variables of energy, manufactures and services and due to increases in the two variables of primary goods and investments. Almost all types of export flows fell substantially: the energy indicator was hardly hit for two years in a row (-30.7% between 2020 and 2021),[1] so were services (-16.5%) –given the collapse of tourism and the contraction of the transport of goods– and, to a lesser extent, manufactures (-2.2%). Nevertheless, global exchanges of primary goods, including food and beverages, were resilient during the global health crisis and actually increased. In terms of the Elcano Global Presence Index this translates into a 5.6% growth with respect to the previous year, implying a change of trend and the highest increase since the end of the latest commodities' boom. Something similar happened with the investments variable, partially explained by the fact that it reflects foreign direct investment stocks, not flows. Therefore, even in the event of a contraction of international investments flows (which was actually the case during the pandemic), stocks remained resilient and even increased by 13% during the last year. In short, with the exception of services, the rest of the economic variables and the economic dimension as a whole behaved similarly to the pre-pandemic years, recording similar values (Table 1.1).

GRAPH 1.2
Economic, military and soft presence
(in index value 1990-2021)

Note: values for 1990 apply for the 1990-94 period, those of 1995 to 1995-99, those of 2000 to 2000-04 and those of 2005 to 2005-09.
Source: Elcano Royal Institute, Elcano Global Presence Index.

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[1] A trend that we expect to be reversed in the next edition of the Elcano Global Presence Index, given the behaviour of energy prices during the second half of 2021 and 2022.

Troops deployed overseas, in international conflicts or in foreign military bases, is the variable most hit in the military dimension (-5.8% between 2020 and 2021). It could be argued that this behaviour is consistent with the restrictions imposed to human mobility as a response to the propagation of the COVID-19 disease and reflects a similar behaviour as those of services in the economic dimension or tourism in the soft one. However, this variable has tended to decrease over the past five years and is associated with a lower participation of countries in international conflicts –eg, Afghanistan– until the invasion of Ukraine. Despite the enormous budgetary commitments made by NATO members in the past couple of years,[2] the variable of military equipment follows a similar trend, although with milder variations. This indicator decreased by 1.6% the past year, following a 1% decrease the previous one, given that military capacities require years (if not decades) to materialise after the financial commitments are adopted.[3] As a result, the military dimension is also on a sort of plateau since the mid-2010s, which is the net result of decreasing Western capacities and increasing Asian military equipment.

The soft dimension was the one most hit by the de-globalisation process in 2021. However, although this dimension contracted by 7% between 2020 and 2021, only five out of nine soft variables retrenched. Much to the contrary, although to different extents, there was an increase of global exchanges in the domains of technology (+0.4%), science (+11.6%), education (+0.3%) and development cooperation (+0.1%). As for technology, this performance implies a changing trend with respect to previous years, perhaps associated with the gigantic effort made in research for COVID-19 vaccines. This probably has derivatives in the variable of science that, however, records an upward trend in the time series as a whole. Although human mobility was seriously restricted, sudden lockdowns probably fixed part of the students' population in host countries, while colleges and universities made an effort to transit from physical to virtual courses. Lastly, despite initial pessimist forecasts, the bulk of the international community saw the pandemic as a global threat and another signal (such as the climate emergency) of the need to build common goods and renew financial efforts in development cooperation. The modest increase of 0.1% comes after two consecutive years of decreases in this soft variable.

Several soft variables record contractions between 2020 and 2021. Sports and information are both reduced by 1.2% and migrations by 1%. As for the latter, just as with investments, it must be taken into account that this indicator is on stocks, not flows, of international migrants. International cultural exchanges and world tourism went down by 27% and 65.9%, respectively. In the case of culture, this record is similar to that of the previous year. Much on the opposite, the performance of tourism breaks an upward trend for the whole time series; a fact that is explained with travel restrictions, lockdowns and the drastic contraction of household consumption. In absolute terms, the number of world tourists recorded in 2021 was below 1995 levels.

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[2] And documented here.

[3] In this respect, it should be noted that for the Elcano Global Presence Index we consider military equipment needed for the external deployment of troops, thus mainly naval gear.

TABLE 1.1
Global presence variations by variable
(in %)

Variable	2015-20 variation	2020-21 variation
Energy	-5.7	-30.7
Primary goods	-2.7	5.6
Manufactures	-0.5	-2.2
Services	1.9	-16.5
Investments	2.6	13.0
Troops	-1.8	-5.8
Military equipment	0.9	-1.6
Migrations	0.6	-1.0
Tourism	3.5	-65.9
Sports	-1.4	-1.2
Culture	-4.0	-27.0
Information	12.3	-1.2
Technology	2.1	0.4
Science	4.5	11.6
Education	4.0	0.3
Development cooperation	0.1	0.1

Source: Elcano Royal Institute, Elcano Global Presence Index.

2. A stable ranking of global presence?

As in previous editions of the Elcano Global Presence Index, the top 20 ranking is fairly stable, with the same group of countries occupying similar positions for several years in a row and showing that, despite geopolitical and geo-economic changes depicted in previous editions of this report, the West and/or the North still accounts for a great deal of the aggregate global presence analysed in the previous section. The emergence of the rest, which, in the case of global presence is limited to that of Asia, shows China holding the 2nd position, Japan the 4th, India the 11th, South Korea the 12th and Singapore the 17th. Regarding Europe and the West, it is interesting to note that, besides intuitive results such as the US topping the ranking and Germany, the UK and France occupying important positions, smaller countries (economically or demographically) such as Belgium, Ireland and Sweden are still in the top 20, while gigantic countries, such as India, still record external projections lower to those of Canada, the Netherlands and Italy (Graph 2.1).

	Index value
1. United States	3.241
2. China	1.365
3. Germany	860
4. Japan	853
5. United Kingdom	835
6. France	704
7. Russia	562
8. Canada	484
9. Netherlands	421
10. Italy	365
11. India	319
12. South Korea	311
13. Spain	272
14. Switzerland	260
15. Australia	248
16. Belgium	219
17. Singapore	207
18. Ireland	202
19. Turkey	172
20. Sweden	149

GRAPH 2.1
Ranking of global presence top 20
(in index value, 2021)

Source: Elcano Royal Institute, Elcano Global Presence Index.

With respect the previous year, the UK loses one position (to the 5th) after Brexit, swapping its place with Japan.

China gains an enormous volume of external projection and continues to narrow the global presence gap with the US. The index value of Chinese global presence is now 2.3 times lower than that of the US (2.9 times only one year before). Within Asia, Japan's growth is also noteworthy, while Korea, Singapore and especially India record losses of global presence in absolute terms.

Some European countries have seen increases of global presence over the past year but, in general terms, it would seem that the pandemic has had a greater impact in this region, just as occurred with the Great Recession. Particularly, Spain is the country that loses the greatest volume of global presence among all 150 countries, despite retaining its 13th position (Graph 2.2).

GRAPH 2.2
Global presence variations, top 20 countries (in index value, 2020-2021)

Source: Elcano Royal Institute, Elcano Global Presence Index.

Spain's global presence has decreased by 11% in only one year, due to huge retrenchments in its economic (-12%) and soft (-16%) dimensions. The economic dimension was particularly hit through the variables of energy (-37%) –fuel exports being an important component of Spain's sales overseas– and services (-41%) –a phenomenon strongly related to the drop in exports of goods and to lockdowns and limitations to human mobility, including tourism–. All variables of Spain's soft presence decrease in relation to the previous year, with the only exception of science, following the world trend outlined in the previous section. Major declines in this dimension are those of tourism (-57%) and culture (-17%) which are, precisely, two important channels of the country's external projection (Table 2.1).

TABLE 2.1
Spain's Elcano Global Presence Index

	2020 (index value)	2021 (index value)	Variation (%)
Global presence	307	272	-11
Economic dimension	435	382	-12
Energy	50	32	-37
Primary goods	149	158	6
Manufactures	405	382	-6
Services	546	323	-41
Investments	828	855	3
Military dimension	223	220	-1
Troops	101	95	-5
Military equipment	315	313	-1
Soft dimension	204	172	-16
Migrations	245	243	-1
Tourism	461	199	-57
Sports	109	102	-6
Culture	135	113	-17
Information	76	67	-11
Technology	152	137	-10
Science	300	343	14
Education	134	132	-1
Development cooperation	237	235	-1

Source: Elcano Royal Institute, Elcano Global Presence Index.

3. Global Europe?

For several editions now, we have been calculating the global presence of the EU as if it were a single country. This is done, roughly, by adding the external projection of all Member States (MS) –adapting the calculation to the evolving composition of the EU– and detracting the presence of each MS in others. This exercise allows for the analysis of the global role of the EU, particularly in comparison with the two world poles, the US and China. However, it also has obvious conceptual limitations, since political decisions affecting the global presence of the EU depend on all sovereign States (sometimes at different administrative levels) plus EU institutions and are therefore highly decentralised and even uncoordinated, unlike the situation in the US and, especially China, where the volume and nature of both countries' external projections depend more heavily on government strategy. All in all, we consider this simulation (or exercise of political fiction) to be useful for exploring the potential of a more integrated and/or coordinated EU in the global sphere.

GRAPH 3.1
Global presence
EU, US and China
(in index value, 1990-2021)

Note: values for 1990 apply for the 1990-94 period, those of 1995 to 1995-99, those of 2000 to 2000-04 and those of 2005 to 2005-09.
Source: Elcano Royal Institute, Elcano Global Presence Index.

The EU records a global presence index value of 3,377 points in 2021, higher than that of the US (3,241) and much higher than that of China (1,365), following the analysis of the US-China gap included in the previous section of this report. The EU's global presence has been higher than that of the US for the whole past decade and both external projections follow similar trends, with decreasing values since the mid or late 2010s, very much in line with the performance of the globalisation process depicted in the first section. Much to the contrary, China's global presence evolution shows a consistent upward trend, that accelerated in the mid-2000s (Graph 3.1). Nevertheless, the gap is still visible and, as mentioned above, despite its strong growth, China's global presence record today is less than half of that of the US in the 1990s.

Between 2020 and 2021, coinciding with the COVID-19 pandemic but also with the materialisation of Brexit, EU's global presence decreases by 300 index value points, while the US external projection falls by only 6 points and, perhaps surprisingly, China's increases by 62 (Graph 3.1).

That is, despite the fact that the health crisis originated in China and the harshness of the measures it implemented, the West appears to have been more hardly hit in global presence terms. In the case of the EU, its performance also responds to a re-composition effect, since data for 2020 reflect the global presence of the EU-28 while those for 2021 refer to the EU-27, without the UK. It should be noted that the EU could have increased its global presence despite the UK's exit. This is so because although, on the one hand, it loses a major global actor, on the other, the EU gains a partner for its external presence since the global projection of the other 27 MS in the UK is now recorded as part of the EU's global presence. According to global presence data, the net effect seems to be negative. The UK is a major military actor –an asset that the EU loses with Brexit– and this is a domain where the EU is not likely to project itself in the former member. It could have recorded significant increases of economic and soft presence that, nevertheless, did not materialise in a context of health and economic crisis. More specifically, the only variables that increase in the global presence records for the EU are information in the soft dimension and investments and primary goods in the economic domain. All in all, the global presence index of the EU in 2021 falls back to the levels of 2012 (Graph 3.1).

The Chinese increase in global presence between 2020 and 2021 is due to the economic dimension and, more precisely, to the performance of the variables of investments and of manufactures –despite the sudden stop in world production and trade in goods, the effect of which will become clearer in future editions of the index–. This contrasts with the behaviour of the US and the EU's economic dimension that, as we have already mentioned, do retrench, with declining values for all variables with the only exception of investments.

The EU's potential global leadership is grounded in its economic dimension, which is substantially higher than that of the US and more than double that of China. To a lesser extent, the EU is also a soft leader, a dimension where its record also surpasses those of the two global powers. In line with previous analyses on this issue, the EU's military projection is much more discrete and substantially lower than that of the US which is, by very far, the military leader. The anchor of Chinese external projection is economic, although the military and soft presences are also relevant (Graph 3.2).

GRAPH 3.2
Economic, military and soft presence
EU, US and China
(in index value, 2021)

Economic
2,155

Economic
1,581

Military
868

Soft
793

Soft
809

Military
413

Economic
846

Military
246

Soft
272

European Union   United States   China

Source: Elcano Royal Institute, Elcano Global Presence Index.

Economic

Military

Soft

GRAPH 3.3
US' economic, military and soft presence
(in index value, 1990-2021)

Source: Elcano Royal Institute, Elcano Global Presence Index.

GRAPH 3.4
China's economic, military and soft presence
(in index value, 1990-2021)

Source: Elcano Royal Institute, Elcano Global Presence Index.

GRAPH 3.5
EU's economic, military and soft presence
(in index value, 1990-2021)

Source: Elcano Royal Institute, Elcano Global Presence Index.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and over the past three decades, the US has tended to balance the nature of its external projection from a global presence heavily dependent on the military dimension to a greater role of the soft and, particularly, the economic dimension (Graph 3.3). As for China, the massive increase of its global presence is explained, to a great extent, by the performance of the economic dimension, although the Asian country also its increases military and soft forms of foreign action (Graph 3.4).

The EU's potential global leadership follows the performance of the economic dimension, which increases during the 2010s, and somehow resists in the past few years, despite Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic. However, there is a substantial drop of the military dimension that has been going on since the mid-2000s and that, as mentioned above, accelerates in the past couple of years mostly due to the UK's exit from the EU, given the importance of the navy and the type of equipment included in the Index. Brexit could also explain the sudden retrenchment of the soft dimension, reversing the trend of a continued increase since the beginning of the series, despite the fact that the effect could have been the opposite as the UK now becomes a major destination of the EU's (soft) external projection (Graph 3.5).

Given that both events materialised during the same years, it is not possible to differentiate the effects on the EU of Brexit and the pandemic. However, there is an obvious re-composition of the European space as a result of the UK's exit, the pandemic and other global and European trends. Such a re-composition is reflected in the Elcano European Presence Index, which calculates the external projection of MS in the EU space.

There are some changes in the ranking of MS according to the Elcano European Presence Index. With respect to 2020, Italy, Belgium, Austria, Finland and Lithuania gain one position each, and Bulgaria moves up three. Spain, Poland and Greece lose one position, and Croatia three. Despite retaining the 2nd position, the Netherlands lose over 62 points of European presence. In line with its performance in global presence, detailed in the previous section, the contraction of Spanish European presence amounts to nearly 55 points. Again, the impact of the pandemic on tourism is the main explanation, but unlike what has occurred with its global presence, Spain's European presence is also reduced due to the indicators of investment, information, culture and migration –most likely a direct cause of the UK's exit from the EU area–. Other important declines are those recorded by France (-18 points), Ireland (-14) and Greece (-12). As a result of these changes, not only is there a *sorpasso* in 2021, as Italy is now 4th in European presence, replacing the position held by Spain one year ago, but also, Belgium is now 5th in European presence, recording a projection in the European space 20 points higher than that of Spain, which is now 6th in this ranking (Table 3.1).

TABLE 3.1
Elcano European Presence Index
(in index value)

		2020	2021	2020-21 variation
1	Germany	676	672	-4,0
2	Netherlands	515	453	-62,1
3	France	399	381	-18,5
4	Italy	258	270	12,1
5	Belgium	240	239	-0,9
6	Spain	263	219	-44,9
7	Austria	133	131	-2,6
8	Poland	136	127	-9,2
9	Sweden	121	115	-5,6
10	Ireland	117	103	-14,1
11	Denmark	86	87	0,9
12	Czech Republic	85	84	-1,8
13	Hungary	65	64	-1,3
14	Portugal	57	51	-5,8
15	Finland	47	46	-1,4
16	Greece	57	45	-11,7
17	Romania	41	42	1,1
18	Slovakia	37	41	4,4
19	Bulgaria	24	26	2,5
20	Luxembourg	26	25	-1,0
21	Slovenia	24	24	0,1
22	Lithuania	20	23	2,8
23	Croatia	26	19	-6,7
24	Estonia	13	13	-0,3
25	Cyprus	13	12	-0,4
26	Latvia	11	10	-0,4
27	Malta	8	7	-1,3
28	UK	500	0	

Source: Elcano Royal Institute, Elcano Global Presence Index.

Methodological annex

Brief history of the project

The 2010 version of the Index, its first edition, published in 2011, ranks 54 countries according to their 2010 global presence.[4] That edition and, therefore, the design of the Index itself, was coordinated by Ignacio Molina and Iliana Olivié –both senior analysts at the Elcano Royal Institute– and was the result of nearly three years of methodological discussions. These discussions were conducted in the framework of a working group composed by the above-mentioned coordinators of the Index, Narciso Michavila and Antonio Vargas (from GAD3), Émêrson Correa (Olympus Consulting), several Elcano senior analysts and other staff members (Félix Arteaga, Carola García-Calvo, Carmen González, Jaime Otero, Juan Antonio Sánchez, and Federico Steinberg), and external experts (Alfredo Arahuetes –Pontificia University of Comillas–, Ángel Badillo –University of Salamanca, currently also senior analyst at the Elcano Royal Institute–, José Fernández Albertos –Spanish National Research Council, CSIC– and José Ignacio Torreblanca –ECFR Madrid–). We also received methodological suggestions from Philip Purnell (Thomson Reuters), Santiago de Mora-Figueroa, Marqués de Tamarón (Ambassador of Spain), Teresa G. del Valle Irala (University of the Basque Country), Ángel Vilariño (Complutense University of Madrid), Cristina Ortega, Cintia Castellano and Amaia Bernara (from the FECYT of the Ministry of Science and Innovation).

The 2011 edition of the Index included a re-designing of the military equipment variable. This change, led by Félix Arteaga, was based on previous methodological discussions with several experts on that field: Francisco Asensi (Ministry of Defence), Alberto de Blas (Ministry of Defence), Amador Enseñat (Ministry of Defence), Dagmar de Mora-Figueroa (NATO), Pablo Murga (Ministry of Defence), Diego Ruiz Palmer (NATO), Andrés Sanz (Ministry of Defence), Steven R. Sturn (NATO) and Federico Yaniz (Ministry of Defence).

The 2015 edition of the Index updated the weights of variables and dimensions by means of a new survey to experts in international relations (representing think tanks in all continents) conducted in mid-2015. This survey was repeated later in 2018 and 2021, and all the results were added to previous responses obtained in 2012. These combined results aimed at filling off particular time and geographical biases.

The 2018 edition also incorporated the conclusions of the statistical audit conducted by the Competence Centre on Composite Indicators and Scoreboards (COIN) of the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission. Individual indicators are now denominated first by countries' Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or population and later re-scaled by a scaling factor that takes into consideration the relative share of a country in global GDP or population.

Methodological reviews of the indicators are carried out periodically. In the 2015 edition, the information indicator was made more sophisticated by including, in addition to the Internet

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[4] Iliana Olivié & Ignacio Molina (2011), 'Elcano Global Presence Index¡, *Estudios Elcano* 2, Elcano Royal Institute.

band-width, explicit references to countries and their citizens in news of global news agencies (AP, AFP, Reuters, Xinhua, ITAR-TASS, EFE, ANSA and DPA). In the 2019 edition we widened the variables included in the sports indicator, incorporating the women's FIFA and football-club points to the men's FIFA and the Olympic medal table. In the 2020 edition we added trade in cultural goods to the culture indicator and intellectual property-royalties income to the technology indicator.

Graph A.1. Structure of Elcano Global Presence Index

For the design of both the Elcano European Presence Index, an initiative led by Manuel Gracia, and the calculation of the EU's global presence, several external experts were consulted anew:

Alfredo Arahuetes, Marisa Figueroa (ECFR Madrid), Narciso Michavila and José Molero (Complutense University of Madrid).

Moreover, the project and its methodology have been presented to and discussed with the Institute's Board of Trustees, the Executive Committee, the Media Committee, the Management Committee and, on several occasions, the Institute's Scientific Council (including its 2015 meeting and the 2015, 2018 and 2021 experts' survey). We have also received useful comments and suggestions over the years as a result of numerous meetings to present and discuss progress on the Index. At the national level, these discussions have taken place with members of the Spanish Parliament (2011), officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (2011) and of Economy (2011), analysts and officials from the Presidency of the Government (2011), experts from Accenture Spain (2013), members of the Central Bank of Spain (2014) and both professors and students at different universities (Saint-Louis University of Madrid in 2015, Rey Juan Carlos University in 2014 and 2015, Deusto University in 2016 and 2018, Salamanca University in 2015 and 2017, International University of Andalucía in 2017, and Coruña University in 2017). The Index has also been presented to the general public (once a year) and to foreign diplomats based in Madrid (twice in 2014) and discussed at the Matías Romero Institute in Mexico (2011), at the GIGA Institute in Hamburg (2011), at the Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Latvian Institute of International Affairs (2018), at the Joint Research Centre in Ispra (2017 and 2018), at the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) in Johannesburg (2018) and at the Elcano Royal Institute's Brussels office (2016 and 2018).

Throughout the life of the project, the final calculation of the Index has been made possible thanks to the generous aid provided in data-gathering by several people and institutions, as well as to those who have participated in the weighting survey, in the methodological support and in the statistical audit: Shaheen Afroze (BIIS, Bangladesh), Ángel Aguado (EFE, Spain), Hayden Allen (Accord, South Africa), Deniz Altayli (PASSIA, Palestina), Liliana Alvarado (Ethos, México), Marcos Álvarez Díaz (Joint Research Centre), Isabel Álvarez (ICEI-UCM, Spain), Alejandro Anaya (Center for Research and Teaching in Economics, Mexico), Barbara d'Ándrea (World Trade Organisation), Nisha Arunatilake (Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka), Raul Asensio (IEP, Perú), Bruno Ayllón (Complutense University of Madrid, Spain), D. Shyam Babu (Centre for Policy Research, India), Yaroslava Babych (ISET, Gerogia), Juan Battaleme (CARI, Argentina), Saradindu Bhaduri (CSSP, India), John Blaxland (ANU Strategic & Defence Studies Centre, Australia), Małgorzata Bonikowska (Center fo International Relations, Poland), Gordan Bosanac (Centar za mirovne studije, Croatia), Amelia Branczik (Crisis Group, Belgium), Eamonn Butler (Adam Smith Institute, UK), Carlos Augusto Chacón (ICP, Colombia), Chiao-Ling Chien (UNESCO), Alba Çela (Albanian Institute for International Studies), Alistair D.B. Cook (Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore), Juan Pablo Corlazzoli (CLAEH, Uruguay), José Miguel Cortés (Spanish Ministry of Economy), Marie Cross (Institute of International and European Affairs, Ireland), Helga Cuéllar Marchelli (Fusades, El Salvador), Jean-François Daguzan (Foundation for Strategic Research, France), Neelam Deo (Gateway House, India), Gonzalo Diéguez (CIPPEC, Argentina), Allan Gyngell (AIIA, Australia), Rafael Domínguez (University of Cantabria, Spain), Marcos Domínguez-Torreiro (Joint Research Centre), Stephanie Fenkart (IIP, Austria), Cinthya Fernández (Flacso, Costa Rica), Andreas Freytag (ECIPE, Belgium), Adam Frost (CGAI, Canada), Jorge Gómez Arismendi (Fundación para el Progreso, Chile), Christine Ma. Grace R. Salinas (Philippine Institute for Development

Studies), Alan Hao Yang (IIR, Taiwan), Jordan Harris (Pegasus Institute, USA), Indira Hirway (CFDA, India), Graham Hopwood (Institute for Public Policy Research, Namibia), Sunjoy Joshi (ORF, India), Charles Jebuni (Institute of Economic Affairs, Ghana), Katie Jost (GAD), Gape Kaboyakgosi (Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis), Cristóbal Kay (ISS, the Netherlands), Guillermo Kessler (Spanish Ministry of Economy), Munir Khasru (IPAG, Bangladesh), Changsu Kim (Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, Republic of Korea), Anna Koós (Centre for Strategic and Defence Studies, Hungary), Andrey Kortunov (Russian International Affairs Council, Russian Federation), Jan Kovar (Institute of International Relations, Czech Republic) Carlos Latorre (Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation), Tony Lawrence (ICDS, Estonia), Adam Lupel (IPI, USA), José María Lladós (Argentine Council for International Relations), Akaash Maharaj (Mosaic Institute, Canada), Sébastien Maillard (Jacques Delors Institute, France), Meruert Makhmutova (PPRC, Kazakhstan), Patrick Malope (BIDPA, Botswana), Raquel Marín (ICEI-UCM, Spain), Ognjen Markovic (CEDEM, Montenegro), Luis Martí (Spanish Ministry of Economy), Fernando Masi (CADEP, Paraguay), Pauline Massart (Security & Global Europe, Belgium), Salvador Maspoch (Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation), Fernando Mier (Spanish Ministry of Economy), Ramón Molina (Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation), Roman Mogilevskii (IPPA, University of Central Asia), Lumkile Mondi (Wits, South Africa), Manuel Moreno (Spanish delegation to the United Nations and other international organisations based in Geneva), Camino Mortera (Centre for European Reform, Belgium), Said Moufti (Royal Institute for Strategic Studies, Morocco), Dawn Nakagawa (Berggruen Institute, US), Moisés Naim (CEIP, US), José Miguel Nátera (CANACYT, Mexico), Franklin Oduro (Ghana Centre for Democratic Development), Anna Orlonek (demosEUROPA, Poland), Kwame Owino (IEA, Kenya), Eleni Panagiotarea (Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy, Greece), Plamen Pantev (Institute for Security and International Studies, Bulgaria), Roderick Parkes (Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Sweden), Raynier Pellón Azopardo (CIPI, Cuba), Rodrigo Perera (Borde Político, Mexico), Moisés Pérez (Spanish Ministry of Economy), Juan Pita (Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation), Henry Plater-Zyberk (Prague Security Studies Institute, Czech Republic), Anton du Plessis (Institute for Security Studies, South Africa), Rosario Pons (EFE), Arantxa Prieto (World Trade Organisation), Philip Purnell (Thomson Reuters), Martin Rapetti (CIPPEC, Argentina), Charles P. Ries (Rand, US), Martín Rivero (SEGIB), Robert Robinson (Universidad Pontificia de Comillas, Spain), Lorena Ruano (CIDE, Mexico), Antonio Ruiz Michel (CPTS, Bolivia), Ventura Rodríguez (Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation), Diego Rojas Toro (CEIUC, Chile), Eulalia Rubio (Jacques Delors Institute, France), Pep Ruiz (BBVA Research, Spain), Michaela Saisana (Joint Research Centre), Verónica Samper (Spanish Ministry of Economy), Manuel Sánchez (Spanish Ministry of Economy), Patrick Sandoval (Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation), Paul Saunders (Center For the National Interest, US), Olufemi Muibi Saibu (INCDS-UNILAG, Nigeria), Gabriele Schwarz (Spanish Ministry of Economy), James Sherr (International Centre for Defence and Security, Estonia), Andrés Serbin (CRIES, Argentina), Katarzyna Sidlo (Center for Social and Economic Research, Poland), Pedro Sosa (Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation), Moussa Soumahoro (IPSS, Ethiopia), Spanish Foundation for Science and Technology (FECYT), David J. Theroux, (The Independent Institute, US), José Tregón (Spanish Ministry of Economy), Márton Ugrósdy (IFAT, Hungary), Yan Vaslavsky (MGIMO-Moscow State Institute of International Relations, Russia), Sébastien Velley (Thomson Reuters), Antonio Villafranca (Italian Institute for International Political Studies), Marija Vuksanovic (Centre for

Democracy and Human Rights, Montenegro), Bibian Zamora (Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation), María Pilar Zaragüeta (EFE, Spain), Mario Abou Zeid (Carnegie Institute, Lebanon) and Ann Zimmerman (OECD).

Lastly, several collaborators and intern students have contributed both to data leverage and to analyses of the results of the Index (Datamérica Global, tweets, blogposts, or ARIs): Sergio Juan Alburquerque, Nacho Álvarez, Jorge Arias, Pablo Balsinde, José Ignacio Díaz, Mariola Gomariz, David Hernández, Lucía Mantecón, Ginés Martínez, Juliana Andrea Pizón, Marcos Ochoa, Carlos Raya, Davide Rognini, Celia Ruiz, Manuel Sainz, Néstor Santana and Karla Sulca.

Main elements of the Elcano Global Presence Index

This year's edition covers the global presence of a selection of 150 countries. The selection is done according to GDP and population World Bank data (table A.1). For this 2020 edition, 10 new countries have been added to the selection: Burundi, Haiti, Kyrgyzstan, Malawi, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Tajikistan and Togo.

Finally, in terms of country selection, bear in mind that by making calculations at time intervals that go back to 1990, the intention of the project is to show the two-bloc world, even if in decline. Thus, Russia's 1990 values refer to those of the Soviet Union, those of Germany to the German Federal Republic, those of the Czech Republic to Czechoslovakia, those of Serbia to Yugoslavia. Moreover, Eastern European countries that became independent after 1990 have no value assigned in that year. This is the case for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan as part of the Soviet Union, Slovakia as part of Czechoslovakia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, North Macedonia and Slovenia as part of Yugoslavia. Likewise, South Sudan since 2012, after its independence.

Table A.1. Countries listed in the Elcano Global Presence Index

Afghanistan	Denmark	Libya	Saudi Arabia
Albania	Dominican Republic	Lithuania	Senegal
Algeria	Ecuador	Luxembourg	Serbia
Angola	Egypt	Madagascar	Singapore
Argentina	El Salvador	Malawi	Slovakia
Armenia	Equatorial Guinea	Malaysia	Slovenia
Australia	Estonia	Mali	Somalia
Austria	Ethiopia	Malta	South Africa
Azerbaijan	Finland	Mauritania	South Korea
Bahamas	France	Mauritius	South Sudan
Bahrain	Gabon	Mexico	Spain
Bangladesh	Georgia	Moldova	Sri Lanka
Belarus	Germany	Mongolia	Sudan
Belgium	Ghana	Morocco	Sweden
Benin	Greece	Mozambique	Switzerland
Bolivia	Guatemala	Myanmar	Syria
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Guinea	Namibia	Tanzania
Botswana	Haiti	Nepal	Thailand
Brazil	Honduras	Netherlands	Tajikistan
Brunei	Hungary	New Zealand	Togo
Bulgaria	Iceland	Nicaragua	Trinidad and Tobago
Burkina Faso	India	Niger	Tunisia
Burundi	Indonesia	Nigeria	Turkey
Cameroon	Iran	North Macedonia	Turkmenistan
Cambodia	Iraq	Norway	Uganda
Canada	Ireland	Oman	Ukraine
Chad	Israel	Pakistan	United Arab Emirates
Chile	Italy	Panama	United Kingdom
China	Jamaica	Papua New Guinea	United States of America
Colombia	Japan	Paraguay	Uruguay
Congo, Rep.	Jordan	Peru	Uzbekistan
Congo DR	Kazakhstan	Philippines	Venezuela
Costa Rica	Kenya	Poland	Vietnam
Côte d'Ivoire	Kuwait	Portugal	Yemen
Croatia	Kyrgyzstan	Qatar	Zambia
Cuba	Laos	Romania	Zimbabwe
Cyprus	Latvia	Russia	
Czech Republic	Lebanon	Rwanda	

Table A.2. Variables, indicators, and sources of the Elcano Global Presence Index

Variable	Indicator	Source
Economic presence		
Energy	Flow of exports of energy products (oil, refined products and gas) (SITC 3)	UNCTAD
Primary goods	Flow of exports of primary goods (food, beverages, tobacco, agricultural commodities, non-ferrous metals, pearls, precious stones, and non-monetary gold), excluding oil (SITC 0 + 1 + 2 + 4 + 68 + 667+ 971)	
Manufactures	Flow of exports of manufactured goods (chemical products, machinery, transport equipment, other manufactured products) (SITC 5 to 8 minus 667 and 68)	
Services	Flow of exports of services in transport, construction, insurance, financial services, IT, the media, intellectual property, other business services, personal, cultural and leisure services, and public services	
Investments	Stock of foreign direct investment abroad	
Military presence		
Troops	Number of military personnel deployed in international missions and bases overseas	IISS
Military equipment	Weighted sum of aircraft carriers, big ships, destroyers, frigates, nuclear-powered submarines, amphibious ships, medium and heavy strategic aeroplanes, and air tankers	
Soft presence		
Migration	Estimated number of international immigrants in the country at mid-year	United Nations Population Division
Tourism	Thousands of arrivals of non-resident tourists at borders	United Nations World Tourism Organisation (UNWTO) – Statistics Database
Sports	Weighted sum of medals won at the summer Olympic Games, points in the FIFA world ranking and points of football clubs in the IFFHS	FIFA IFFHS and IOC
Culture	Exports of audiovisual services (cinematographic productions, radio and television programmes, and musical recordings) and cultural goods (antiques and works of art, books, jewellery, newspapers, photography, etc)	WTO and UN-Comtrade
Information	Number of mentions in news of main international press agencies (Associated Press, Reuters, AFP, DPA, ITARTASS, EFE, ANSA, Xinhua) and Internet bandwidth (Mbps)	Factiva International Telecommunication Union
Technology	External income for the use of intellectual property and number of foreign-oriented patents (inter-related patent applications filed in one or more foreign countries to protect the same invention)	IMF and World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO)
Science	Number of articles, notes, and reviews published in the fields of the arts and humanities, social sciences, and sciences	Clarivate Analytics via FECYT
Education	Number of foreign students in tertiary education on national territory	UNESCO and OECD
Development cooperation	Total gross flows of official development aid or comparable data	OECD and SEGIB
Scaling factors		
Economy	Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at current prices in US$	World Bank
Population	Number of inhabitants	World Bank

The variables, indicators and sources for this 2022 Elcano Global Presence Index are the same as for the previous edition. Several criteria guided the selection of the variables. First, presence

is reflected in a single direction, or what could be deemed its unidirectionality. Secondly, the results of presence are measured, and not the means or assets needed to achieve these results. In addition, all the variables have an explicitly external component, in the sense that they reflect cross-border presence. Presence is given in absolute and not relative terms; in other words, the indicators are not proportional to the demographic or economic size of the country. Likewise, as for any other index, the best explanatory capacity is sought with the fewest number of variables or indicators possible. Finally, hard data on presence are taken, and not data based on perceptions or opinions.[5]

In this 2022 edition, 5,205 cases have been estimated. Thus, the proportion of missing and estimated cases accounts for only 6% of a database of 86,447 observations. Again, estimations are based on experts' knowledge. All results are available at our website (www.globalpresence.realinstitutoelcano.org).

As for previous editions, the performance of the variables is assumed to be linear with the exception of the sports variable. As regards normalisation, the 'min-max' approach is applied; that is, global maximum and minimum values (across all countries and periods). It should be noted that when adding data for a new edition, a review of figures corresponding to previous years is also conducted, on the basis of data availability in each source. As a result, some records for the past few years have changed, thus modifying the maximum value that is referenced in the scaling. Moreover, the inclusion of new countries systematically affects the Index values for the variables that are built on the existing spatial sample, which is the case for sports and military equipment. Finally, it should be added that the pandemic has generated anomalous data for 2021 that may have influenced the modification of the maximum and minimum values. Therefore, new results may not match those of previous editions of the Index.

The inclusion of the EU in Elcano Global Presence Index

One of the features of 2012's edition was the composite calculation for the 27 EU member states. This was undertaken in order to try to quantify the global projection of the Union, as if it were a political and economic union with its own identity.

The foreign presence of the EU is measured starting in 2005 and considering that the varying composition of the Union should be reflected in the Index. Both the Union's global presence and the Union as the sphere of external projection calculated in the European Presence Index do change with every new enlargement or retrenchment. As a consequence, the Union's presence corresponds to that of the 25 members in 2005, 27 members from 2010 to 2012, 28 members from 2013 to 2020, and again 27 members since 2021 after the UK's exit.

To measure the EU's presence in the world we stick to the components of the Elcano Global Presence Index. For each of these components and for every member, the intra-European and extra-European flows must be differentiated, since a mere totalling of their results would be recording their projection in other member states (ie, consider the intra- and extra-European trade in German goods). This distinction between flows has been made feasible by using additional sources of data, especially Eurostat (Table A.4).

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[5] For more details on the debates and criteria that guided this selection, see Iliana Olivié & Ignacio Molina (2011), *op. cit*.

Since the 2012 edition we also calculate the presence of the individual member states within the Union itself: the Elcano European Presence Index.[6] To some extent, methodologically, this indicator is the flip-side of the Global Presence Index for the EU. In a similar way to the latter, it shows the cross-border presence of the member states, which in the case of the Elcano European Presence Index is limited to the European (and not global) space. It facilitates a comparative analysis of the current situation and recent evolution of the positioning of European countries within the Union. It can also provide relevant information on the position of the member states in the calculation of their European as well as their global presence.

The Elcano European Presence Index aims to be an Elcano Global Presence Index on a European scale, so the structure and methodology of the latter has been respected as far as possible, although some slight modifications have occasionally proved essential (Table A.4). Thus, in general terms, the calculation of European presence modifies the calculation of global presence by reducing the measures of presence on a global scale to the intra-European scale (for example, intra-European migration flows, exports to the rest of the EU or European foreign students). For that reason, three indicators compute a zero value, as they are not part of European's countries' projection inside the EU: troops, military equipment and development cooperation. Moreover, given the indivisibility of some variables, there was no possibility of distinguishing the extra from the intra-European component, so we stick to the values of global presence and re-scale them considering only the European countries. This is the case of sports, science and information (in its Internet component).

It almost always does so by using Eurostat data, just as for the calculation of the global presence of the EU. Obviously, the change in scale also reduces the scaling: the maximum value assigned to an indicator in the Elcano Global Presence Index is given, in the case of European presence, as the maximum value registered by a member state and for the intra-European presence series. Finally, just as in the index for the EU, the reference area for which European presence is measured is the Union as it has been composed in different moments of time, variations being the result of the enlargement process.

[6] Results of the Elcano European Presence Index are available at www.globalpresence.realinstitutoelcano.org.

Table A.3. Variables, indicators, and sources of the Elcano Global Presence Index calculated for the EU

Variable	Indicator	Source
Economic presence		
Energy	Extra-EU flows of exports of energy products (oil, refined products, and gas) (SITC 3)	Eurostat
Primary goods	Extra-EU flows of exports of primary goods (food, beverages, tobacco, agricultural commodities, non-ferrous metals, pearls, precious stones, and non-monetary gold), excluding oil (SITC 0 + 1 + 2 + 4 + 68 + 667+ 971)	
Manufactures	Extra-EU flows of exports of manufactured goods (chemical products, machinery, transport equipment, other manufactured products) (SITC 5 to 8 minus 667 and 68)	
Services	Extra-EU flows of exports of services in transport, construction, insurance, financial services, IT, the media, intellectual property, other business services, personal, cultural and leisure services, and public services	
Investments	Stock of foreign direct investment outside the EU	
Military presence		
Troops	Number of military personnel deployed in international missions and bases outside the EU	IISS
Military equipment	Weighted sum of aircraft carriers, big ships, destroyers, frigates, nuclear-powered submarines, amphibious ships, medium and heavy strategic aeroplanes, and air tankers	
Soft presence		
Migration	Estimated number of immigrants from outside the EU	Eurostat
Tourism	Thousands of arrivals of tourists from outside the EU	Eurostat
Sports	Weighted sum of medals won at the summer Olympic Games, points of male and female national teams in the FIFA world ranking and points of male football clubs in the IFFHS. Corrective variable: European audience at the World Cup Final and the opening ceremony of the Olympic Games	FIFA, IFFHS, ICO Kantar Media and Nielsen
Culture	Extra-EU exports of audiovisual services (cinematographic productions, radio and television programmes, and musical recordings) and cultural goods (antiques and works of art, books, jewellery, newspapers, photography, etc)	Eurostat
Information	Number of mentions in news of main international press agencies (Associated Press, Reuters, AFP, DPA, ITARTASS, EFE, ANSA, Xinhua) Internet bandwidth (Mbps)	Factiva and International Telecommunication Union
Technology	External income for the use of intellectual property and number of foreign-oriented patents (inter-related patent applications filed in one or more foreign countries to protect the same invention). Corrective variable: patents registered for each member state in other member States	Eurostat and World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO)
Science	Number of European articles, notes, and reviews published in the fields of the arts and humanities, social sciences, and sciences	Clarivate Analytics via FECYT
Education	Number of non-EU foreign students in tertiary education in the EU	Eurostat
Development cooperation	Total gross flows of official development aid for all member States	OECD
Scaling factors		
Economy	Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at current prices in US$	World Bank
Population	Number of inhabitants	World Bank

Table A.4. Variables, indicators, and sources of the Elcano European Presence Index

Variable	Indicator	Source
Economic presence		
Energy	Intra-EU flows of exports of energy products (oil, refined products and gas) (SITC 3)	
Primary goods	Intra-EU flows of exports of primary goods (food, beverages, tobacco, agricultural commodities, non-ferrous metals, pearls, precious stones, and non-monetary gold), excluding oil (SITC 0 + 1 + 2 + 4 + 68 + 667+ 971)	
Manufactures	Intra-EU flows of manufactured goods (chemical products, machinery, transport equipment, other manufactured products) (SITC 5 to 8 minus 667 and 68)	Eurostat
Services	Intra-EU flows of exports of services in transport, construction, insurance, financial services, IT, the media, intellectual property, other business services, personal, cultural and leisure services, and public services	
Investments	Stock of foreign direct investment in the EU	
Military presence		
Troops	Value zero for all countries and years	
Military equipment	Value zero for all countries and years	
Soft presence		
Migration	Estimated number of immigrants from within the EU	Eurostat
Tourism	Thousands of arrivals of tourists from within the EU	Eurostat
Sport	Weighted sum of medals won at the summer Olympic Games, points of male and female national teams in the FIFA world ranking and points of male football clubs in the IFFHS	FIFA, IFFHS and IOC
Culture	Intra-EU exports of audiovisual and related services (cinematographic productions, radio and television programmes, and musical recordings) and cultural goods (antiques and works of art, books, jewellery, newspapers, photography, etc)	Eurostat
Information	Number of mentions in news of main European press agencies (Associated Press, Reuters, AFP, DPA, and EFE) Internet bandwidth (Mbps)	Factiva and International Telecommunication Union
Technology	Number of patents registered at the European Patent Office (EPO)	Eurostat
Science	Number of articles published in the fields of the arts and humanities, social sciences and sciences	Clarivate Analytics via FECYT
Education	Number of EU foreign students in tertiary education	Eurostat
Development cooperation	Value 0 for all countries and years	
Scaling factors		
Economy	Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at current prices in US dollars	Eurostat
Population	Number of inhabitants	Eurostat

Statistical annex

TABLE B
Elcano Global Presence Index (index value)

Position	Country	2010	2015	2020	2021	Var 2020-21
1	United States	2,844.59	3,273.48	3,247.79	3,241.49	-6.30
2	China	678.40	1,019.19	1,302.99	1,364.95	61.96
3	Germany	890.74	857.33	863.56	860.24	-3.32
4	Japan	618.47	712.80	830.83	853.48	22.66
5	UK	893.52	886.26	850.11	835.28	-14.84
6	France	761.47	746.39	726.67	703.67	-23.00
7	Russia	474.90	664.12	581.40	562.08	-19.32
8	Canada	401.39	407.02	462.51	484.48	21.97
9	Netherlands	423.51	415.76	429.16	420.68	-8.47
10	Italy	437.46	398.54	388.23	365.34	-22.88
11	India	271.23	326.07	340.22	318.97	-21.26
12	South Korea	211.80	297.49	311.74	311.02	-0.72
13	Spain	363.49	296.24	306.95	272.27	-34.68
14	Switzerland	211.23	242.03	233.18	259.90	26.72
15	Australia	225.78	242.51	248.69	248.04	-0.65
16	Belgium	252.61	225.28	208.80	219.26	10.46
17	Singapore	147.10	208.01	213.00	206.88	-6.12
18	Ireland	127.52	124.91	174.74	202.18	27.44
19	Turkey	113.59	141.73	185.70	172.35	-13.35
20	Sweden	161.00	153.30	143.41	149.48	6.07
21	UAE	81.09	131.25	162.43	140.86	-21.57
22	Saudi Arabia	120.86	176.76	164.67	137.65	-27.01
23	Brazil	137.45	156.28	130.43	130.65	0.23
24	Indonesia	80.10	109.75	135.93	123.98	-11.94
25	Thailand	100.22	123.62	141.93	120.84	-21.09
26	Mexico	116.00	127.58	130.75	113.91	-16.85
27	Austria	122.23	123.75	119.19	112.05	-7.14
28	Denmark	104.96	107.04	107.49	110.00	2.51
29	Poland	84.65	87.16	101.40	102.93	1.53

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Elcano Global Presence Index (index value)

Position	Country	2010	2015	2020	2021	Var 2020-21
30	Malaysia	99.45	126.21	115.58	97.77	-17.81
31	South Africa	60.87	75.04	74.87	74.66	-0.20
32	Norway	101.97	89.91	82.41	73.53	-8.89
33	Israel	55.10	65.72	71.63	71.36	-0.26
34	Czechia	53.71	57.72	66.66	63.84	-2.82
35	Viet Nam	22.07	38.50	73.28	61.33	-11.95
36	Finland	66.20	57.74	59.57	60.06	0.49
37	Chile	41.54	57.30	51.52	57.26	5.74
38	Egypt	60.16	46.25	63.58	56.80	-6.78
39	Greece	73.86	66.32	63.82	51.74	-12.08
40	Hungary	47.42	54.06	55.36	49.36	-6.00
41	Philippines	24.18	33.37	52.06	48.47	-3.59
42	Pakistan	73.10	65.28	51.62	48.15	-3.47
43	Portugal	55.97	51.94	54.83	47.61	-7.22
44	Bangladesh	48.40	49.97	43.03	45.39	2.37
45	Iran	45.02	44.62	55.51	43.89	-11.62
46	Argentina	62.23	59.48	52.07	40.75	-11.32
47	Romania	33.57	39.18	43.16	39.88	-3.28
48	Ethiopia	19.17	62.36	56.95	36.77	-20.18
49	Ukraine	46.19	44.82	35.70	34.27	-1.43
50	Kuwait	36.58	46.15	36.05	33.11	-2.94
51	Qatar	19.51	43.95	35.08	32.21	-2.87
52	Colombia	22.74	36.95	38.87	31.65	-7.22
53	New Zealand	29.65	53.73	33.42	31.61	-1.81
54	Kenya	11.29	28.75	32.74	31.52	-1.22
55	Uganda	15.50	33.19	35.21	31.40	-3.82
56	Luxembourg	26.45	27.72	27.69	31.23	3.53
57	Morocco	29.10	38.43	40.43	29.57	-10.86
58	Algeria	30.58	31.02	34.81	28.64	-6.18
59	Slovakia	24.07	26.02	27.19	26.69	-0.49
60	Peru	33.97	34.25	28.75	25.97	-2.77
61	Nepal	18.33	22.45	24.35	23.98	-0.37
62	Kazakhstan	23.77	31.30	28.29	23.71	-4.58
63	Bulgaria	17.72	19.88	22.28	19.73	-2.55

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Elcano Global Presence Index (index value)

Position	Country	2010	2015	2020	2021	Var 2020-21
64	Myanmar	2.86	8.66	18.31	17.72	-0.59
65	Ghana	17.75	18.25	19.30	17.06	-2.24
66	Nigeria	48.76	20.63	22.30	16.95	-5.35
67	Iraq	15.90	26.28	25.49	16.76	-8.73
68	Oman	10.81	20.52	18.83	16.44	-2.40
69	Slovenia	16.62	14.95	16.46	15.61	-0.85
70	Rwanda	15.37	13.78	15.39	15.34	-0.05
71	Lithuania	10.49	13.70	15.99	15.16	-0.83
72	Belarus	14.99	17.25	16.34	14.94	-1.40
73	Bahrain	8.81	13.62	15.45	14.56	-0.89
74	Serbia	8.72	11.07	14.52	13.99	-0.52
75	Venezuela	37.55	33.95	19.35	13.70	-5.66
76	Croatia	17.00	15.37	18.23	13.30	-4.93
77	Burundi	0.63	13.23	13.12	13.21	0.09
78	Cyprus	12.29	10.84	12.34	12.54	0.20
79	Jordan	22.68	21.34	14.29	11.95	-2.34
80	Tanzania	5.28	14.01	13.98	11.31	-2.67
81	Azerbaijan	11.66	13.57	14.16	10.84	-3.33
82	Estonia	9.10	9.65	10.14	9.83	-0.31
83	Tunisia	14.37	11.75	11.86	9.26	-2.60
84	Uruguay	6.99	13.55	10.72	9.18	-1.54
85	Lebanon	13.99	15.11	14.28	9.16	-5.12
86	Côte d'Ivoire	6.99	7.03	7.80	8.98	1.19
87	Georgia	3.30	9.09	10.70	8.80	-1.89
88	Ecuador	9.71	11.63	9.88	8.52	-1.35
89	Senegal	9.60	12.73	10.54	8.46	-2.08
90	Sri Lanka	8.26	11.22	8.71	8.18	-0.53
91	Cuba	13.09	11.71	8.35	8.06	-0.29
92	Cambodia	3.05	4.16	10.09	7.95	-2.14
93	Angola	13.51	17.56	10.75	7.54	-3.21
94	Costa Rica	5.82	7.09	8.34	7.22	-1.12
95	Sudan	5.01	4.20	8.65	7.19	-1.45
96	Malta	4.92	5.73	6.99	7.18	0.19
97	Cameroon	4.23	8.75	7.45	7.01	-0.43

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Elcano Global Presence Index (index value)

Position	Country	2010	2015	2020	2021	Var 2020-21
98	Latvia	6.92	7.55	7.29	6.99	-0.30
99	Uzbekistan	6.34	5.64	9.56	6.90	-2.66
100	Panama	7.66	9.52	9.09	6.83	-2.26
101	Zambia	4.05	3.09	7.03	6.72	-0.31
102	Guatemala	5.16	5.88	5.00	6.59	1.59
103	Dominican R.	8.10	8.35	9.56	6.35	-3.21
104	Mongolia	3.05	5.99	6.08	6.06	-0.02
105	Libya	20.57	11.20	9.79	6.02	-3.77
106	Togo	5.44	7.81	5.56	5.59	0.03
107	Burkina Faso	3.07	9.62	9.76	5.25	-4.51
108	Niger	3.08	10.03	7.03	5.20	-1.83
109	Guinea	1.10	2.07	4.89	5.06	0.17
110	Bolivia	6.34	6.52	5.88	5.03	-0.86
111	Malawi	1.65	4.98	4.76	4.60	-0.16
112	Armenia	3.46	3.78	5.60	4.58	-1.01
113	Kyrgyzstan	3.23	2.65	3.31	4.32	1.01
114	Bosnia Herz.	3.00	3.31	4.90	4.19	-0.71
115	Iceland	5.00	5.03	4.99	3.83	-1.15
116	Gabon	3.39	5.12	4.01	3.83	-0.18
117	El Salvador	2.62	3.22	4.44	3.71	-0.73
118	Honduras	3.47	3.75	3.99	3.61	-0.38
119	Albania	4.11	3.19	4.92	3.54	-1.39
120	Benin	7.55	7.23	3.76	3.52	-0.24
121	Jamaica	4.09	4.08	4.39	3.31	-1.08
122	Congo, DR	3.71	8.45	4.57	3.15	-1.42
123	Paraguay	2.77	3.97	2.96	3.02	0.06
124	Afghanistan	3.19	3.16	2.00	3.01	1.01
125	N. Macedonia	2.81	3.49	3.05	2.92	-0.13
126	Mauritius	2.31	2.55	3.63	2.76	-0.87
127	Yemen	5.16	6.95	2.61	2.70	0.09
128	Syria	7.26	4.50	2.73	2.70	-0.04
129	Moldova, Rep.	1.68	2.02	2.65	2.64	-0.02
130	Botswana	2.63	3.12	2.66	2.27	-0.39
131	Congo, Rep.	3.12	6.93	2.59	2.23	-0.36

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Elcano Global Presence Index (index value)

Position	Country	2010	2015	2020	2021	Var 2020-21
132	Trinidad Tob.	4.38	4.52	2.81	2.21	-0.60
133	Chad	2.62	7.02	8.46	2.18	-6.28
134	Bahamas	2.43	2.70	3.39	2.13	-1.26
135	Zimbabwe	2.99	2.81	2.57	2.08	-0.48
136	Equ. Guinea	2.64	3.29	1.48	2.07	0.59
137	Nicaragua	1.54	3.39	2.13	1.94	-0.19
138	Namibia	2.10	2.24	2.19	1.88	-0.31
139	Mali	1.86	1.83	1.89	1.85	-0.04
140	Mozambique	1.87	2.14	2.31	1.82	-0.49
141	Papua NG	1.31	1.84	2.22	1.77	-0.44
142	Turkmenistan	1.88	4.07	2.24	1.75	-0.49
143	Lao PDR	1.10	1.75	2.70	1.74	-0.96
144	Brunei	2.36	3.00	1.97	1.69	-0.28
145	South Sudan	0.34	2.14	1.61	1.40	-0.21
146	Madagascar	1.04	1.27	1.51	1.12	-0.40
147	Tajikistan	1.43	1.00	1.32	1.08	-0.24
148	Mauritania	0.54	0.77	0.78	0.84	0.05
149	Haiti	1.52	0.95	0.78	0.71	-0.07
150	Somalia	0.37	0.46	0.42	0.42	-0.01

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