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# Lesson 1

## 1.1 Problems in Cryptography

- Confidential communication

T0D0 1: Image of Alice, Bob, Eve in ske

**Kerckhoffs's principle:** No security by obscurity.

Security should only rely on the secrecy of the key. However sharing the key between two parties is a costly operation.

**Syntax:**

- $\mathcal{K}$  = Key Space
- $\mathcal{M}$  = Message Space
- $\mathcal{C}$  = Ciphertext Space
- $Enc : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{C}$
- $Dec : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{C} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$

**Correctness:**

$$\forall m \in \mathcal{M}, \forall k \in \mathcal{K} : Dec(k, Enc(k, m)) = m$$

**Definition 1.** Perfect Secrecy (SHANNON)

Let  $M$  be any distribution over  $\mathcal{M}$ .

Let  $K$  be uniform over  $\mathcal{K}$ .

We say that  $(Enc, Dec)$  is perfectly secret if  $\forall M, \forall m \in \mathcal{M}, \forall c \in \mathcal{C}$ .

$$Pr[M = m] = Pr[M = m | C = c]$$

Meaning that the ciphertext does not reveal anything about the message.  $\diamond$

**Theorem 1.** Let  $M, K, C$  as above. The following are equivalent:  $\diamond$

I  $Pr[M = m] = Pr[M = m | C = c]$

II  $M$  and  $C$  are INDEPENDENT

III  $\forall m, m' \in \mathcal{M}, \forall c \in \mathcal{C} \ Pr[Enc(k, m) = c] = Pr[Enc(k, m') = c]$

*Proof.* (I)  $\implies$  (II)

$$Pr[M = m \wedge C = c] = Pr[C = c]Pr[M = m|C = c] = Pr[C = c]Pr[M = m]$$

They are independent.

(II)  $\implies$  (III) Fix M, any  $m \in M, c \in C$

$$Pr[Enc(K, m) = c] = Pr[Enc(K, M) = c|M = m] = Pr[C = c|M = m] = Pr[C = c]$$

(III)  $\implies$  (I)

$$\begin{aligned} Pr[C = c] &= \sum_{m'} Pr[C = c \wedge M = m'] = \\ &= \sum_{m'} Pr[Enc(K, M) = c \wedge M = m'] = \\ &= \sum_{m'} Pr[Enc(K, M) = c|M = m']Pr[M = m'] = \\ &= \sum_{m'} Pr[Enc(K, m') = c]Pr[M = m'] = (\text{Using III}) \\ &= Pr[Enc(K, m) = c] \underbrace{\sum_{m'} Pr[M = m']}_{=1} = \\ &= Pr[Enc(K, m) = c] = Pr[Enc(K, M) = c|M = m] = \\ &= \underbrace{Pr[C = c|M = m]}_{\substack{\text{The proof ends here} \\ \text{but we want (I)}}} \implies Pr[M = m]Pr[C = c|M = m] \implies \\ &\implies Pr[M = m] = \frac{Pr[C = c]Pr[M = m|C = c]}{Pr[C = c|M = m]} \\ &\implies Pr[M = m] = Pr[M = m|C = c] \end{aligned}$$

□

## 1.2 One Time Pad (OTP)

$$\begin{aligned} K &= M = C = \{0, 1\}^l \\ K &\leftarrow \$\{0, 1\}^l \end{aligned}$$

- $Enc(k, m) = k \oplus m = c$
- $Dec(k, c) = k \oplus c = m$

**Theorem 2.** *OTP is perfectly secret*

◇

*Proof.* Fix any  $m, c \in \{0, 1\}^l$ :

$$\begin{aligned} Pr[Enc(k, m) = c] &= Pr[k \oplus m = c] = \\ &= Pr[k = c \oplus m] = 2^{-l} (\text{because } k \text{ is uniform}) \\ &= Pr[Enc(k, m') = c] \forall m' \end{aligned}$$

This satisfies (III)

□

**Problems:**


1.  $|k| = |m|$  (the key must have the same length of the message)
2. There must be one different key for each message (*One Time*).  
Otherwise:  
 $c_1 = k \oplus m_1; c_2 = k \oplus m_2 \implies c_1 \oplus c_2 = m_1 \oplus m_2$   
 Not independent! (OTP is malleable<sup>1</sup>)

**Theorem 3.** *In any perfectly secret SKE we must have  $|\mathcal{K}| \geq |\mathcal{M}|$*   $\diamond$

*Proof.* Take  $M$  to be uniform over  $\mathcal{M}$  and take  $c$  s.t.  $Pr[C = c] > 0$ .  
 Consider  $M' = \{Dec(K, c) : k \in K\}$  (decryption of  $c$  with every key) and  
 assume  $|\mathcal{K}| < |\mathcal{M}|$

$$\begin{aligned}
 &\implies |M'| \leq |K| \leq |\mathcal{M}| \\
 &\implies \exists m \in M \setminus M' \\
 &\text{Now } Pr[M = m] = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{M}|} \\
 &\quad \text{By assumption all the } c \text{ "creates" } M' \\
 &Pr\left[ \underbrace{M = m}_{m \text{ is not inside } M'} \mid \underbrace{C = c}_{\text{By assumption all the } c \text{ "creates" } M'} \right] = 0
 \end{aligned}$$

The above notion can be represented with the following picture:



Meaning that  $c$  is not an encryption of  $m$ !  $\square$

---

<sup>1</sup>An encryption algorithm is "malleable" if it is possible to transform a ciphertext into another ciphertext which decrypts to a related plaintext. That is, given an encryption  $c$  of a plaintext  $m$ , it is possible to generate another valid ciphertext  $c'$ , for a known  $Enc$ ,  $Dec$ , without necessarily knowing or learning  $m$ .

# Lesson 4

## 4.1 Negligible function

What is exactly a negligible function? Below here there is a possible interpretation of this notion:

“In real life, we can just consider adversaries with limited computational power; even if every non-perfectly secure authentication scheme can resist to unbounded computational power, the true unbounded computational power doesn’t exist at all. So, it’s reasonable to consider just bounded adversaries.

So consider a scheme  $\Pi$  where the only attack against it is brute-force attack. We consider  $\Pi$  to be secure if it cannot be broken by a brute-force attack in polynomial time.

The idea of **negligible probability** encompasses this exact notion. In  $\Pi$ , let’s say that we have a polynomial-bounded adversary. Brute force attack is not an option.

But instead of brute force, the adversary can try (a polynomial number of) random values and hope to guess the right one. In this case, we define security using negligible functions: The probability of success has to be smaller than the reciprocal of any polynomial function.

And this makes a lot of sense: if the success probability for an individual guess is a reciprocal of a polynomial function, then the adversary can try a polynomial amount of guesses and succeed with high probability. If the overall success rate is  $\frac{1}{poly(\lambda)}$  then we consider this attempt a feasible attack to the scheme, which makes the latter insecure.

So, we require that the success probability must be less than the reciprocal of every polynomial function. This way, even if the adversary tries  $poly(\lambda)$  guesses, it will not be significant since it will only have tried:  $\frac{poly(\lambda)}{superpoly(\lambda)}$ <sup>2</sup>

As  $\lambda$  grows, the denominator grows far faster than the numerator and the success probability will not be significant<sup>3</sup>.”

---

<sup>2</sup>If we design a function hard for  $superpoly(\lambda)$  possible attempts and the attacker completed  $poly(\lambda)$  attempts, he has just  $\mathcal{P}[\frac{poly(\lambda)}{superpoly(\lambda)}]$  of finding the key to break the scheme

<sup>3</sup>“What exactly is a negligible (and non-negligible) function?” — [Cryptography Stack Exchange](#)

**Definition**

Let  $\nu : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow [0, 1]$  be a function. Then it is deemed **negligible** iff:

$$\forall p(\lambda) \in \text{poly}(\lambda) \implies \nu(\lambda) \in o\left(\frac{1}{p(\lambda)}\right)$$

**Exercise 4.** Let  $p(\lambda), p'(\lambda) \in \text{poly}(\lambda)$  and  $\nu(\lambda), \nu'(\lambda) \in \text{negl}(\lambda)$ . Then prove the following:

1.  $p(\lambda) \cdot p'(\lambda) \in \text{poly}(\lambda)$
2.  $\nu(\lambda) + \nu'(\lambda) \in \text{negl}(\lambda)$

**Solution 1** (1.1). T0D0 2: Questa soluzione usa disuguaglianze deboli; per essere negligibile una funzione dev'essere strettamente minore di un polinomiale inverso. Da approfondire

We need to show that for any  $c \in \mathbb{N}$ , then there is  $n_0$  such that  $\forall n > n_0 \implies h(n) \leq n^{-c}$ .

So, consider an arbitrary  $c \in \mathbb{N}$ . Then, since  $c + 1 \in \mathbb{N}$ , and both  $f$  and  $g$  are negligible, there exists  $n_f$  and  $n_g$  such that:

$$\begin{aligned} \forall n \geq n_f &\implies f(n) \leq n^{-(c+1)} \\ \forall n \geq n_g &\implies g(n) \leq n^{-(c+1)} \end{aligned}$$

Fix  $n_0 = \max(n_f, n_g)$ . Then, since  $n \geq n_0 \geq 2$ ,  $\forall n \geq n_0$  we have:

$$\begin{aligned} h(n) &= f(n) + g(n) \\ &\leq n^{-(c+1)} + n^{-(c+1)} \\ &= 2n^{-(c+1)} \\ &\leq n^{-c} \end{aligned}$$

Thus we conclude  $h(n)$  is negligible.

## 4.2 One-Way Functions

A One-Way Function (OWF) is a function that is “easy to compute”, but “hard to invert”.

**Definition 2.** Let  $f : \{0, 1\}^{n(\lambda)} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{n(\lambda)}$  be a function. Then it is a OWF iff:

$$\forall \text{PPT } \mathcal{A} \exists \nu(\lambda) \in \text{negl}(\lambda) : \Pr [\text{GAME}_{f, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{OWF}}(\lambda) = 1] \leq \nu(\lambda) \quad (4.1)$$

◇

Do note that the game does not look for the equality  $x' = x$ , but rather for the equality of their images computed by  $f$ .




Figure 4.1: One-Way Function hardness

**Exercise 5.**

1. Show that there exists an inefficient adversary that wins  $\text{GAME}^{\text{OWF}}$  with probability 1
2. Show that there exists an efficient adversary that wins  $\text{GAME}^{\text{OWF}}$  with probability  $2^{-n}$

**One-Way puzzles**

A one-way function can be thought as a function which is very efficient in generating puzzles that are very hard to solve. Furthermore, the person generating the puzzle can efficiently verify the validity of a solution when one is given.

For a given couple  $(\mathcal{P}_{\text{GEN}}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{VER}})$  of a puzzle generator and a puzzle verifier, we have:




Figure 4.2: The puzzle game

So, we can say that one-way puzzle is a problem in NP, because the verifier enables efficient solution verification, but not in P because finding a solution from scratch is impractical by definition.

### 4.2.1 Impagliazzo's Worlds

Suppose to have Gauss, a genius child, and his professor. The professor gives to Gauss some mathematical problems, and Gauss wants to solve them all.

Imagine now that, if using one-way functions, the problem is  $f(x)$ , and its solution is  $x$ . According to Impagliazzo, we live in one of these possible worlds:

- *Algorithmica*:  $P = NP$ , meaning all efficiently verifiable problems are also efficiently solvable.



The professor can try as hard as possible to create a hard scheme, but he won't succeed because Gauss will always be able to efficiently break it using the verification procedure to compute the solution

- *Heuristica*: NP problems are hard to solve in the worst case but easy on average.

The professor, with some effort, can create a game difficult enough, but Gauss will solve it anyway; here there are some problems that the professor cannot find a solution to

- *Pessiland*: NP problems are hard on average but no one-way functions exist
- *Minicrypt*: One-way functions exist but public-key cryptography is impractical
- *Cryptomania*: Public-key cryptography is possible: two parties can exchange secret messages over open channels

### 4.3 Computational Indistinguishability

Distribution ensembles  $X = \{X_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}\}$  and  $Y = \{Y_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}\}$  are distribution sequences.

**Definition 3.**  $X$  and  $Y$  are **computationally indistinguishable** ( $X \approx_c Y$ ) if  $\forall$  PPT  $D, \exists \nu(\lambda) \in \text{negl}(\lambda)$  such that:

$$|\Pr[D(X_\lambda) = 1] - \Pr[D(Y_\lambda) = 1]| \leq \nu(\lambda)$$

◇

TOD0 3: AP181129-2344: There may be room for improvement, but I like how it's worded: it puts some unusual perspective into the cryptographic game, and it could be a good thing since it closely precedes our first reduction, and the whole hybrid argument mish-mash.

Suppose we have this mental game: a Distinguisher  $D$  receives the value  $z$ . This value has been chosen by me, the Challenger, among  $X_\lambda$  and  $Y_\lambda$ , and the Distinguisher has to *distinguish* which was the source of  $z$ . What does this formula mean?

This formula means that, fixed 1 as one of the sources, the *probability* that  $D$  says “1!” when I pick  $z$  from  $X_\lambda$  is **not so far** from the *probability* that  $D$  says “1!” when I pick  $z$  from  $Y_\lambda$ .

So, this means that, when this property is verified by two random variables, there isn't too much *difference* between the two variables in terms of exposed information (reachable by  $D$ ), otherwise the distance between the two probabilities should be much more than a *negligible* quantity.

What's the deep meaning of this formula? This is something to do.

**Lemma 1.**  $\forall$  PPT  $f, X \approx_c Y \implies f(x) \approx_c f(y)$

◇

*Proof.* We want to show that  $f(x) \approx_c f(y)$ . So, let's suppose this property is not true.

Assume  $\exists$  PPT  $f, A$  and some  $p'(\lambda) \in \text{poly}(\lambda)$  such that

$$|\Pr[D'(f(x)) = 1] - \Pr[D'(f(y)) = 1]| \geq \frac{1}{p'(\lambda)} \quad (4.2)$$

.




Figure 4.3: A distinguisher for  $f$

In the game depicted by figure 4.3, the adversary can make use of  $f$ , because it is PPT. Thus, if such a distinguisher exists, then it can be used to distinguish  $X$  from  $Y$ , as shown in figure 4.4. So, if  $A$  could efficiently distinguish between  $f(x)$  and  $f(y)$ , then  $D$  can efficiently distinguish between  $x$  and  $y$ . This contradicts the hypothesis  $X \approx_c Y$ , which in turn means  $f(X) \approx_c f(Y)$ .




Figure 4.4: Distinguisher reduction

□

## 4.4 Pseudorandom Generators

A deterministic function  $G : \{0,1\}^\lambda \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{\lambda+l(\lambda)}$  is called a PseudoRandom Generator, or PRG iff:

- $G$  runs in polynomial time
- $|G(s)| = \lambda + l(\lambda)$
- $G(U_\lambda) \approx_e U_{\lambda+l(\lambda)}$




Figure 4.5: The pseudorandom game

So, if we take  $s \leftarrow U_\lambda$ , the output of  $G$  will be indistinguishable from a random draw from  $U_\lambda$ .

# Lesson 5

## 5.1 Stretching a PRG

Consider this algorithm that uses  $G$  to construct  $G^l$ , as depicted in figure 5.6:

1. Let  $s_0 \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$
2.  $\forall i \in [l(\lambda)]$ , let  $G(s_{i-1}) = (s_i, b_i)$ , where  $b_i$  is the extra bit generated by  $G$
3. Compose  $(b_1, b_2, \dots, b_{l(\lambda)}, s_{l(\lambda)})$  and output the result; the outputted string will be  $\lambda + l(\lambda)$  bits long




Figure 5.6: Constructing  $G^{l(\lambda)}$  from  $G(\lambda)$

To prove that this construct is a valid PRG, we will make use of a known technique for proving many other results, which relies heavily on reductions, and is called **the hybrid argument**.

**Lemma 2. (Hybrid Argument)** Let  $X = \{X_n\}, Y = \{Y_n\}, Z = \{Z_n\} : X \approx_c Y \wedge Y \approx_c Z$ . Then  $X \approx_c Z$ .  $\diamond$

*Proof.*  $\forall$  PPT  $D$ , by using the triangle inequality:

$$\begin{aligned}
 & |\Pr[D(X_n) = 1] - \Pr[D(Z_n) = 1]| \\
 &= |(\Pr[D(X_n) = 1] - \Pr[D(Y_n) = 1]) + (\Pr[D(Y_n) = 1] - \Pr[D(Z_n) = 1])| \\
 &\leq |\Pr[D(X_n) = 1] - \Pr[D(Y_n) = 1]| + |\Pr[D(Y_n) = 1] - \Pr[D(Z_n) = 1]| \\
 &\leq \text{negl}(n) + \text{negl}(n) \\
 &= \text{negl}(n) \quad \square
 \end{aligned}$$

In essence, the hybrid argument proves that computational indistinguishability is transitive across a “hybrid” game, or by extension more than one. This property will be very useful in all future proofs.

**Theorem 6.** If there exists a PRG  $G(\lambda)$  with one bit stretch, then there exists a PRG  $G^{l(\lambda)}$  with polynomial stretch relative to its input length:

$$G : \{0, 1\}^\lambda \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\lambda+1} \implies \forall l(\lambda) \in \text{poly} \lambda \exists G^l : \{0, 1\}^\lambda \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\lambda+l(\lambda)} \quad \diamond$$

*Proof.* First off, do observe that, since both  $G$  and  $l$  are polynomial in  $\lambda$ , then  $G^{l(\lambda)}$ , which combines  $G$   $l$ -many times is polynomial in  $\lambda$  too. To prove that  $G^{l(\lambda)}$  is indeed a PRG, we will apply the hybrid argument. The hybrids are defined as:

- $H_\lambda^0 := G^{l(\lambda)}(U_\lambda)$ , which is the original construct
- $H_\lambda^i := \begin{cases} b_1, \dots, b_i \leftarrow \{0, 1\} \\ s_i \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\lambda+i} \\ (b_{i+1}, \dots, b_{l(\lambda)}, s_{l(\lambda)}) := G^{l(\lambda)-i}(s_i) \end{cases}$
- $H_\lambda^{l(\lambda)} := U_{\lambda+l}$

Focusing on two subsequent generic hybrids, as shown in figures 5.7 and 5.8, it can be observed that the only difference between the two resides in how  $b_{i+1}$  is generated: in  $H^i$  it comes from an instance of  $G$ , whereas in  $H^{i+1}$  is chosen at random.  $H_\lambda^0$  is the starting point where all bits are pseudorandom, which coincides with the  $G^{l(\lambda)}$ , and  $H_\lambda^{l(\lambda)}$  will generate a totally random string.




Figure 5.7:  $H_\lambda^i$




Figure 5.8:  $H_\lambda^{i+1}$

So let's fix a step  $i$  in the gradual substitution, and consider the following function  $f_i$ :

$$f_i(s_{i+1}, b_{i+1}) = (b_1, \dots, b_i, b_{i+1}, b_{i+2}, \dots, b_{l(\lambda)}, s_{l(\lambda)})$$

where the first  $i$  bits are chosen uniformly at random, and the remaining ones are obtained by subsequent applications of  $G$  ( $\forall j \in \{i+2, \dots, l(\lambda)\} \implies G(s_{j-1}) = (s_j, b_j)$ ). It can be observed that:

- $f_i(G(U_\lambda))$  has the same distribution of  $H_\lambda^i$
- $f_i(U_{\lambda+1})$  has the same distribution of  $H_\lambda^{i+1}$

Since by PRG definition  $G(U_\lambda) \approx_c U_{\lambda+1}$ , by lemma 1, we can deduce that  $f_i(G(U_\lambda)) \approx_c f_i(U_{\lambda+1})$ , which in turn, by how  $f$  is defined, implies  $H^i \approx_c H^{i+1}$ . This holds for an arbitrary choice of  $i$ , so by extension:

$$G^{l(\lambda)}(U_\lambda) = H_\lambda^0 \approx_c H_\lambda^1 \approx_c \dots \approx_c H_\lambda^{l(\lambda)} = U_{\lambda+l(\lambda)}$$

which proves that  $G^l$  is indeed a PRG.  $\square$

*Proof. (Contradiction):* This is an alternate proof that, instead of looking for a function  $f$  to model hybrid transitioning, aims for a contradiction.

Suppose  $G^l$  is not a PRG; then there must be a point in the hybrid chain  $H_\lambda^0 \approx_c \dots \approx_c H_\lambda^l$  where  $H_\lambda^i \not\approx_c H_\lambda^{i+1}$ . Thus there exists a distinguisher  $D'$  able to tell apart  $H_\lambda^i$  from  $H_\lambda^{i+1}$ , as shown in figure 5.9:

$$\exists i \in [0, l], \exists \text{PPT } D' : |\Pr[D'(H_\lambda^i) = 1] - \Pr[D'(H_\lambda^{i+1}) = 1]| \geq \frac{1}{\text{poly}(\lambda)}$$




Figure 5.9: Distinguisher for  $H_\lambda^i$  and  $H_\lambda^{i+1}$

If such a distinguisher exists, it can be also used to distinguish an output of  $G$  from a  $\lambda + 1$  uniform string by “crafting” a suitable bit sequence, which will distribute exactly as the hybrids in question, as shown in the reduction in figure 5.10. This contradicts the hypothesis of  $f$  being a PRG, which by definition is to be indistinguishable from a truly random distribution. Therefore,  $G^l$  is indeed a PRG.




Figure 5.10: Reducing to a distinguisher for  $G$ , where  $\beta = (b_1, \dots, b_{i-1})$  and  $\sigma = (b_{i+1}, \dots, b_{l(\lambda)}, s_{l(\lambda)})$

□

## 5.2 Hardcore predicate

We've seen how to reuse a PRG in order to obtain an arbitrary length of pseudorandom bits starting from a PRG with one bit stretch. How to construct a 1-bit PRG?

Consider a typical one-way function  $f$ , s.t.  $f(x) = y$ .

**Question 1.** Which bits of the input  $x$  are hard to compute given  $y = f(x)$ ?

Is it always true that, given  $f$ , the first bit of  $f(x)$  is hard to compute  $\forall x$ ?

**Example 1.** Given an OWF  $f$ , then  $f'(x) = x_0 || f(x)$  is a OWF.

**Definition 1.** A polynomial time function  $hc : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  is **hard core** for a given function  $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  if,  $\forall$  PPT  $A$ :

$$\Pr(A(f(x)) = hc(x) | x \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n) \in \text{negl}(\lambda)$$




Figure 5.11: The hardcore game,  $f$  and  $hc$  are known

There is also an alternative definition:

**Definition 2.** A polynomial time function  $hc : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  is hard-core for a function  $f$  iff:

$$(f(x), h(x)) \approx_c (f(x), b)$$

where  $x \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  and  $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ .




Figure 5.12: Another hardcore game,  $f$  and  $hc$  are known

Having made this definition, some observations are in order:

**Claim 1.** There is no *universal* hardcore predicate  $hc$ .

*Proof.* Suppose there exists such a predicate  $\mathfrak{H}\mathfrak{C}$ . Let  $f'(x) = \mathfrak{H}\mathfrak{C}(x) || f(x)$  for a given function  $f$ . Then  $\mathfrak{H}\mathfrak{C}$  cannot be a hardcore predicate of  $f'$ , because any image obtained by  $f$  reveals the predicate image itself. This contradicts the universality assumption.  $\square$

Nevertheless, it has been proven always possible to construct a hardcore predicate for a OWF, given another OWF:

**Theorem 7** (Goldreich-Levin, '99). *Let  $f$  be a OWF and consider  $g(x, r) = (f(x), r)$  for  $r \in \{0, 1\}^n$ . Then  $g$  is a OWF and:*

$$h(x, r) = \langle x, r \rangle = \sum_{i=1}^n x_i r_i \bmod 2 = \bigoplus_{i=1}^n x_i r_i$$

*is hard core for  $g$ .*  $\diamond$

*Proof.* T0D0 4: TO BE COMPLETED (...did we actually do this? è una bella menata dimostrare questo)

$\square$

**Exercise 8.** Prove that  $g$  is a OWF if  $f$  is a OWF (Hint: do a reduction).

### 5.3 One Way Permutation

$f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  is an OWF and

$$\forall x, |x| = |f(x)| \wedge x \neq x' \Rightarrow f(x) \neq f(x')$$

**Corollary 1.** If  $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  is a OWP, then for  $g(), h()$  as in the GL theorem,

$$G(s) = (g(s), h(s))$$

is a PRG.

*Proof.* By GL, if  $f$  is an OWP, so is  $g$ . This means that if we want to invert  $g$ , since  $g$  depends on  $f$  we have to invert a OWP.

Moreover  $h$  is hardcore for  $g$ . Hence

$$G(U_{2n}) \equiv (g(U_{2n}), h(U_{2n})) \equiv \underbrace{(f(U_n), U_n, h(U_{2n}))}_{\text{definition 1 of hard core pred.}} \approx_c (f(U_n), U_n, U_1) \equiv U_{2n+1}$$

$\square$

We are stretching just 1 bit, but we know we can stretch more than one.



# Lesson 6

## 6.1 Computationally secure encryption

**Question 2.** How to define the concept of **computationally secure encryption** ?

Find a task/scheme that is computationally hard for an attacker to break (supposing the attacker is  $\text{poly}\lambda$ , we want a scheme which requires an amount of time near ,as much as possible, to *superpoly*( $\lambda$ ) to be broken).

This scheme should have these properties:

- **one wayness** w.r.t. key (given  $c = \text{Enc}(k, m)$ , it should be hard to recover  $k$ )
- **one wayness** w.r.t. message (given  $c = \text{Enc}(k, m)$ , hard to obtain the message)
- **no information leakage** about the message

Consider the experiment depicted in figure 6.13 for the encryption scheme  $\Pi = (\text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ , where the adversary wins the game when the challenger outputs 1.




Figure 6.13:  $\text{GAME}_{\Pi, A}^{\text{IND}}(\lambda, b)$

**Definition 4.**  $\Pi$  is said to be computationally **one time secure** iff:

$$\text{GAME}_{\Pi, A}^{\text{IND}}(\lambda, 0) \approx_c \text{GAME}_{\Pi, A}^{\text{IND}}(\lambda, 1)^4$$

<sup>4</sup> $\text{GAME}_{\Pi, A}^{\text{IND}}$  refers to the indistinguishability of the messages sent by  $A$  during the game

or, alternatively  $\forall$  PPT  $A$ :

$$|\Pr[\text{GAME}_{\Pi,A}^{\text{IND}}(\lambda, 0) = 1] - \Pr[\text{GAME}_{\Pi,A}^{\text{IND}}(\lambda, 1) = 1]| \in \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

◇

This last definition is compliant with the three properties exposed beforehand. In particular, if a scheme is **one time secure**, then it has each one of these 3 properties:

#### T0D0 5: TO BE REVIEWED

- **compliance with point 1:** suppose point 1 is not valid, and  $k$  is not hard to discover for  $A$ . Then  $A$  is able to perfectly distinguish  $m$  and  $m_0$  every time, therefore the scheme cannot be one time secure;
- **compliance with point 2:** suppose point 2 is not valid, and then the encrypted message can be easily discovered by  $A$ . Then, as before,  $A$  can win every game with  $\Pr[1]$ , so the scheme couldn't be one time secure;
- **compliance with point 3:** suppose point 3 is not valid, and some information about  $m$  is leaked in  $c$ , for example the first bit of  $c$  is the same bit of  $m$ .  $A$  could forge  $m_0 = m$  such that they have the same bits but just the first is different. When  $A$  obtains  $c$ , he can look at the first bit and distinguish which was the message encrypted. Thus, the scheme wouldn't be one time secure.

What is not **two time secure**? Here is an apparently safe scheme,  $\Pi_{\oplus}$ , where  $G : \{0, 1\}^{\lambda} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^l$  is a PRG:

- $k \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\lambda} = \mathcal{K}$
- $\text{Enc}(k, m) = G(k) \oplus m, m \in \{0, 1\}^l$
- $\text{Dec}(k, c) = c \oplus G(k) = m$

To prove that  $\Pi_{\oplus}$  is not **two time secure**, assume an adversary  $A$  knows the pair  $(\bar{m}, \bar{c} = G(k) \oplus \bar{m})$ . Then, given any ciphertext  $c = G(k) \oplus m$ , where  $m$  is unknown,  $A$  can efficiently compute the following:

$$\bar{c} = G(k) \oplus \bar{m} = c \oplus m \oplus \bar{m} \Rightarrow c \oplus \bar{c} = m \oplus \bar{m}$$

and thus, by XORing the result with  $\bar{m}$ , obtain the entire unknown message<sup>5</sup>. Nevertheless, this scheme is still **one time secure**:

**Theorem 9.** *If  $G$  is a PRG, then  $\Pi_{\oplus}$  is computationally **one time secure** ◇*

*Proof.* We need to show that,  $\forall$  PPT  $A$ :

$$\text{GAME}_{\Pi_{\oplus},A}^{\text{IND}}(\lambda, 0) \approx_c \text{GAME}_{\Pi_{\oplus},A}^{\text{IND}}(\lambda, 1)$$

Consider the hybrid game in figure 6.14, where the original encryption routine is changed to use a random value instead of  $G(k)$ <sup>6</sup>. Compare with the




Figure 6.14:  $\text{HYB}_{\Pi_{\oplus}, A}(\lambda, b)$

original **one time secure** definition in figure 6.13 to observe that it perfectly matches.

**Lemma 3.**  $\text{HYB}_{\Pi_{\oplus}, A}(\lambda, 0) \equiv \text{HYB}_{\Pi_{\oplus}, A}(\lambda, 1)$   $\diamond$

*Proof.* This is true because distribution of  $c$  does not depend on  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ .

TODO 6: Eh?

$\square$

**Lemma 4.**  $\forall b \in \{0, 1\}, \text{HYB}_{\Pi_{\oplus}, A}(\lambda, b) \approx_c \text{GAME}_{\Pi_{\oplus}, A}^{\text{IND}}(\lambda, b)$   $\diamond$

*Proof.* The proof proceeds by reduction as depicted in figure 6.15, by assuming there exists a distinguisher  $D^{\text{IND}}$  for  $c = G(k) \oplus m_b$  and  $c = r \oplus m_b$ , and using it to break the PRG itself.




Figure 6.15: Reducing to breaking a PRG

<sup>5</sup>This example models a technique called “Chosen Plaintext Attack”, which will be discussed in depth later

<sup>6</sup>The observant student may recognize that this modification yields exactly the One-Time Pad encryption scheme discussed in lesson 1

Do observe that the adversary always encrypts  $m_0$ , but this game can be modified for  $m_1$  by switching  $b''$ 's assignments without loss of generality; the crucial point is to see if the distinguisher guesses which message the adversary has encrypted:

- if  $D^{\text{IND}}$  is wrong, then  $A$  can deduce with high probability that the value given by  $C^{\text{PRG}}$  is in fact truly random;
- if  $D^{\text{IND}}$  is right, then  $A$  has a sensibly greater probability of having received a pseudorandom value from  $C^{\text{PRG}}$ .

Either way, by the existence of  $D^{\text{IND}}$ ,  $A$  gains an edge in efficiently breaking a PRG, which is absurd.  $\square$

Finally, by the two above lemmas, the proof can be concluded by transitivity:

$$\text{GAME}_{\Pi_{\oplus}, A}^{\text{IND}}(\lambda, 0) \approx_c \text{HYB}_{\Pi_{\oplus}, A}(\lambda, 0) \equiv \text{HYB}_{\Pi_{\oplus}, A}(\lambda, 1) \approx_c \text{GAME}_{\Pi_{\oplus}, A}^{\text{IND}}(\lambda, 1)$$

$\square$

## 6.2 Pseudorandom functions


PRGs are practically used as a stepping stone for building *PseudoRandom Functions* (PRF), which in turn form the basis for most, if not all cryptographic schemes. Before introducing what a PRF formally is, a more intuitive definition of a *truly random function* is given.

**Definition 5.** A random function  $R : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^l$  is a function that, depending on what is known about its previous applications:

- if  $x$  is “fresh” (in formal terms,  $R$  has never been applied to  $x$  beforehand), then a value  $y$  is chosen UAR from  $R$ 's codomain, and it is permanently associated as the image of  $x$  in  $R^7$ ;
- if  $x$  is not fresh, then  $R(x)$  is directly returned instead.

$\diamond$

It should be noted that such functions occupy too much space, if we were to memorize it anywhere: supposing all the possible outputs of  $R$  have been generated and stored as an array in memory, its size in bits will be  $2^n l$ .



So we look for a kind of function which is “random”, but does not require to be memorized as a whole map, while still being efficiently computable. This is where pseudorandomness comes in: a function is deemed pseudorandom (a PRF) when it is (computationally) indistinguishable from a truly random one.

<sup>7</sup>this property is also called *lazy sampling*

Usually, PRFs come as function families  $F_k$ , where  $k$  is a key that identifies a single function inside the family itself<sup>8</sup>.

With this in mind, let  $\mathcal{F} = \{F_k : \{0,1\}^{n(\lambda)} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{l(\lambda)}\}_{k \in \{0,1\}^\lambda}$  be the *keyed* function family that defines a PRF. Consider the two games in figure 6.16, each one involving respectively  $\mathcal{F}$  and a random function  $R$ , where  $\mathcal{R} = \{R : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^l\}$ , also written as  $\mathcal{R}(\lambda, n, l)$  is the set of all random functions from  $n$ -bit strings to  $l$ -bit strings.




Figure 6.16:  $Real_{\mathcal{F},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$  vs  $Rand_{\mathcal{R},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$

$b' \in \{0,1\}$  is a convention and 1 is assigned to *Real* or *Rand*; so in this game the adversary **recognizes** which machine he is talking with.

**Definition 6.**  $F_k$  is a PRF iff:

$$Real_{\mathcal{F},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) \approx_c Rand_{\mathcal{R},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$$

◇

**Exercise 10.** Show that no PRG is secure against **unbounded attackers**.

**Exercise 11.** Show the same as above, but for any PRF instead.

---

<sup>8</sup>Those unfamiliar with the “currying” technique may see the key as an additional argument to pass to the “main” function  $F$

### 6.2.1 GGM-tree

In this section, it is described how to construct a PRF starting from a given PRG, using a technique devised from Goldreich, Goldwasser and Micali, called the GGM-tree.

**Construction 1.** Let  $G : \{0,1\}^\lambda \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{2\lambda}$  be a PRG such that it doubles the length of its input, and splits the images in halves, effectively returning string couples:

$$G(k) = (G_0(k), G_1(k))$$

Consider the GGM-tree depicted in figure 6.17, which describes how  $G$  will be used to craft a PRF. To lighten up the notation, a function composition  $G_a(G_b(G_c(k)))$  will be contracted to  $G_{abc}(k)$ . So let  $\mathcal{F} = \{F_k : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda\}$  be a family of functions such that:

$$F_k(r) = G_{r_n}(G_{r_{n-1}}(\dots G_{r_2}(G_{r_1}(k)) \dots))$$




Figure 6.17: The GGM-tree for  $G$

◇

An example, with a string value of 001 for  $r$  would evaluate as  $F_k(001) = G_0(G_0(G_1(k)))$ .

# Lesson 7

Recall the GGM-tree construct used to define a function family  $\mathcal{F} := \{F_k\}$  from a PRG  $G$ . From now on we will refer to this function family as  $F_k$ , implicitly stating that  $k$  represents a uniform probability distribution. Our wish is that  $F_k$  is indeed a PRF.

**Theorem 12.** *If  $G$  is a PRG, then  $F_k$  is a PRF.*  $\diamond$

*Proof.* Concerning  $F_k$ 's efficiency, one can observe that it involves computing  $G$  a polynomial number of times, and  $G$  itself is efficient, thus  $F_k$  is indeed easy to compute.

The rest of the proof, regarding  $F_k$ 's hardness, will proceed by induction over  $F_k$ 's domain length  $n$ , which indirectly defines its GGM-tree's height.

**Base case** ( $n = 1$ ):  $F_k$ 's domain is restricted to  $\{0, 1\}$ , meaning that its images will be respectively the two halves on a single iteration of  $G(k)$ , which are pseudorandom by  $G$ 's definition:

$$(F_k(0), F_k(1)) = (G_0(k), G_1(k)) \approx_c U_{2\lambda}$$

therefore, in this case,  $F_k$  is pseudorandom.

**Inductive step:** Let  $F'_k : \{0, 1\}^{n-1} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$  be a PRF. Define  $F_k(x, y)$  as  $G_x(F'_k(y))$ , where  $F_k : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$  and  $x \in \{0, 1\}$ . It must be proven that if  $F'_k$  is a PRF, then so is  $F_k$ . We will proceed by hybrid games, depicted in figures 7.18, 7.19 and 7.20:




Figure 7.18:  $\text{HYB}_{\mathcal{F}, A}^0(\lambda) = \text{GAME}_{\mathcal{F}, A}^{\text{PRF}}(\lambda)$

**Lemma 5.**  $\text{HYB}_{\mathcal{F}, A}^0(\lambda) \approx_c \text{HYB}_{\overline{R}, A}^1(\lambda)$   $\diamond$

*Proof.* Assume  $\exists$  PPT  $D$  that can distinguish  $F_k$  from  $H$ ; then an adversary  $A$  can use  $D$  as in figure 7.21 to break the induction hypothesis (i.e. can distinguish  $F'_k$  from  $\overline{R}$ ).  $\square$




Figure 7.19:  $\text{HYB}^1_{\mathcal{R},A}(\lambda)$




Figure 7.20:  $\text{HYB}^2_{\mathcal{R},A}(\lambda)$




Figure 7.21



Before tackling the reduction from the last two hybrids, it is best to introduce another lemma:

**T0D0 7:** This lemma isn't used at all, why is it here? It's actually used in a different proof for this theorem...

**Lemma 6.** *If  $G : \{0, 1\}^\lambda \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda}$  is a PRG, then for any  $t(\lambda) \in \text{poly}\lambda$ :*

$$(G(k_1), \dots, G(k_t)) \approx_c (U_{2\lambda}, \dots, U_{2\lambda}) \quad \forall k_i \leftarrow \$ U_\lambda$$

◇

*Proof.* Intuitively, this is true because, by PRG definition, any PPT adversary cannot efficiently tell pseudorandom outputs apart from truly random outputs. A formal proof involves the hybrid argument: assume that it exists a distinguisher  $D$  capable of distinguishing such tuples. Then, by doing a progressive hybridization of the starting tuple with the finishing one, the difference at each step  $i$  is how the  $i$ -th value distributes: either pseudorandomly in the preceding case, or randomly in the following case. This difference is indeed negligible because of pseudorandomness being indistinguishable from true randomness; the fact that the tuples' lengths is polynomial in  $\lambda$  makes them indistinguishable as a whole, which proves the lemma. □

Now for the final lemma:

**Lemma 7.**  $\text{HYB}_{\mathcal{R},A}^1(\lambda) \approx_c \text{HYB}_{\mathcal{R},A}^2(\lambda)$

◇

*Proof.* Consider the distinguishing game for  $H$  and  $R$  in figure 7.22. The random functions  $\bar{R}$  and  $R$  are entirely independant, and  $G$  transforms randomness in pseudorandomness, so this game boils down into distinguishing pseudorandom values from random ones, which is possible only with negligible probability.




Figure 7.22: The distinguishing game between  $H$  in  $\text{HYB}_{\Pi,A}^1$  and  $R$  in  $\text{HYB}_{\Pi,A}^2$

□

In the end the hybrids are proven to mutually indistinguishable, therefore the inductive step is correct, proving the theorem.  $\square$

## 7.1 CPA-security

Now it's time to define a stronger notion of security, which is widely used in cryptography for first assessments on cryptographic schemes. Let  $\Pi := (Enc, Dec)$  be a SKE scheme, and consider the game depicted in figure 7.23. Observe that this time, the adversary can “query” the challenger for the ciphertexts of any messages of his choice, with the only reasonable restriction that the query amount must be polynomially bound by  $\lambda$ . This kind of game/attack is called the *Chosen Plaintext Attack*, because of the adversary's capability of obtaining ciphertexts from messages. The usual victory conditions found in n-time security games, which are based on ciphertext distinguishability, apply.




Figure 7.23: The CPA-security game:  $\text{GAME}_{\Pi, A}^{\text{CPA}}(\lambda, b)$

**Definition 7.** A scheme is CPA-secure if  $\text{GAME}_{\Pi, A}^{\text{CPA}}(\lambda, 0) \approx_c \text{GAME}_{\Pi, A}^{\text{CPA}}(\lambda, 1)$   $\diamond$

Having given this definition of security, recall the  $\Pi_\oplus$  scheme defined in the previous lesson. It is easy to see that  $\Pi_\oplus$  is not CPA-secure for the same reasons that it is not computationally 2-time secure; however this example sheds some new light about a deeper problem:

**Observation 1.** No deterministic scheme can achieve CPA-security.  $\diamond$

This is true, because nothing prevents the adversary from asking the challenger to encrypt either  $m_0$  or  $m_1$ , or even both, before starting the actual

challenge; just as in the 2-time case for  $\Pi_{\oplus}$ , he will know the messages' ciphertexts in advance, so he will be able to tell which message the challenger has encrypted every time. The solution for obtaining a CPA-secure encryption scheme consists of returning different ciphertexts for the same message, even better if they look random. This can be achieved by using PRFs.

Consider the following SKE scheme  $\Pi_{\mathcal{F}}$ , with  $\mathcal{F} = \{F_k : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^l\}$  being a PRF:

- $Enc(k, m) = (c_1, c_2) = (r, F_k(r) \oplus m)$ , where  $k \leftarrow \mathfrak{s} \{0, 1\}^\lambda$  and  $r \leftarrow \mathfrak{s} \{0, 1\}^n$
- $Dec(k, (c_1, c_2)) = F_k(c_1) \oplus c_2$

Observe that the random value  $r$  is part of the ciphertext, making it long  $n + l$  bits; also more importantly, the adversary can and will always see  $r$ . The key  $k$  though, which gives a *flavour* to the PRF, is still secret.

**Theorem 13.** *If  $\mathcal{F}$  is a PRF, then  $\Pi_{\mathcal{F}}$  is CPA-secure.*  $\diamond$

*Proof.* We have to prove that  $\text{GAME}_{\Pi_{\mathcal{F}}, A}^{\text{CPA}}(\lambda, 0) \approx_c \text{GAME}_{\Pi_{\mathcal{F}}, A}^{\text{CPA}}(\lambda, 1)$ ; to this end, the hybrid argument will be used. Let the first hybrid  $\text{HYB}_{\Pi, A}^0$  be the original game, the second hybrid  $\text{HYB}_{\Pi, A}^1$  will have a different encryption routine:

- $r \leftarrow \mathfrak{s} \{0, 1\}^n$
- $R \leftarrow \mathfrak{R}(\lambda, n, l)$
- $c = (r, R(r) \oplus m)$ , where  $m$  is the plaintext to be encrypted

and then the last hybrid  $\text{HYB}_{\Pi, A}^2$  will simply output  $(r_1, r_2) \leftarrow \mathfrak{s} U_{n+l}$ .

**Lemma 8.**  $\forall b \in \{0, 1\} \implies \text{HYB}_{\Pi, A}^0(\lambda, b) \approx_c \text{HYB}_{\Pi, A}^1(\lambda, b)$ .  $\diamond$

*Proof.* As usual, the proof is by reduction: suppose there exists a distinguisher  $D$  capable of telling the two hybrids apart; then  $D$  can be used to break  $\mathcal{F}$ 's property of being a PRF. The way to use  $D$  is to make it play a CPA-like game, as shown in figure 7.24<sup>9</sup>, where the adversary attempting to break  $\mathcal{F}$  decides which message to encrypt between  $m_0$  and  $m_1$  beforehand, and checks whether  $D$  guesses which message has been encrypted. Either way, the adversary can get a sensible probability gain in guessing if the received values from the challenger were random, or generated by  $\mathcal{F}$ . Thus, assuming such  $D$  exists,  $A$  can efficiently break  $\mathcal{F}$ , which is absurd.  $\square$

---

<sup>9</sup>An observant student may notice a striking similarity with a previously exposed reduction in figure 6.15




Figure 7.24: Breaking a PRF, for fixed message choice of  $m_0$

**Lemma 9.**  $\forall b \in \{0, 1\} \implies \text{HYB}_{\Pi, A}^1(\lambda, b) \approx_c \text{HYB}_{\Pi, A}^2(\lambda, b).$   $\diamond$

*Proof.* Firstly, it can be safely assumed that any ciphertext  $(r_i, R(r_i) \oplus m_b)$  distributes equivalently with its own sub-value  $R(r_i)$ , because of  $R$ 's true randomness, and independency from  $m_b$ .

Having said that, the two hybrids apparently distribute uniformly, making them perfectly equivalent; however there is a caveat: if both games are run and one value  $\bar{r}$  is queried twice in both runs, then on the second query the adversary will receive the same image in  $\text{HYB}_{\Pi, A}^1$ , but almost certainly a different one in  $\text{HYB}_{\Pi, A}^2$ . This is because the first hybrid uses a function, which is deterministic by its nature, whereas the image in the second hybrid is picked completely randomly from the codomain. Nevertheless, this sneaky issue about "collisions" can be proven to happen with negligible probability.

Call REPEAT this collision event on  $\bar{r}$  between 2 consecutive games. Then:

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pr[\text{REPEAT}] &= \Pr[\exists i, j \in q \text{ such that } r_i = r_j] \\
&\leq \sum_{i \neq j} \Pr[r_i = r_j] \\
&= \text{Col}(U_n) \\
&= \sum_{i \neq j} \sum_{e \in \{0, 1\}^n} \Pr[r_1 = r_2 = e] \\
&= \sum_{i \neq j} \sum_{e \in \{0, 1\}^n} \Pr[r = e]^2 \\
&= \binom{q}{2} 2^n \frac{1}{2^{2n}} \\
&= \binom{q}{2} 2^{-n} \\
&\leq q^2 2^{-n} \in \text{negl}(\lambda)
\end{aligned}$$

which proves that the REPEAT influences negligibly on the two hybrids' equivalence. Thus  $\text{HYB}_{\Pi, A}^1(\lambda, b) \approx_c \text{HYB}_{\Pi, A}^2(\lambda, b)$ <sup>10</sup>.  $\square$

With the above lemmas, and observing that  $\text{HYB}_{\Pi, A}^2(\lambda, 0) \equiv \text{HYB}_{\Pi, A}^2(\lambda, 1)$ , we can reach the conclusion that  $\text{HYB}_{\Pi, A}^0(\lambda, 0) \approx_c \text{HYB}_{\Pi, A}^0(\lambda, 1)$ , which is what we wanted to demonstrate.  $\square$

---

<sup>10</sup>Do note that the hybrids lose their originally supposed perfect equivalence ( $\text{HYB}_{\Pi, A}^1(\lambda, b) \equiv \text{HYB}_{\Pi, A}^2(\lambda, b)$ ) because of the REPEAT event. The lemma, though, is still proven.

# Lesson 8

## 8.1 Domain extension

Up until now, encryption has been dealt with messages of fixed size around a polynomial function to  $\lambda$ . How to deal with messages with arbitrary size? Setting a maximum bound to message length seems impractical, both for waste reasons when messages are too short, and for practicality when messages eventually get too long. The solution takes the form of a “block-cipher”, where a message of a given size is split into equally-sized blocks, and then encrypted using a fixed-size encryption scheme. Various instances of this technique, called *modes*, have been devised.

### 8.1.1 Electronic Codebook mode

The operation of ECB-mode is straightforward: Given a message split into blocks  $(m_1, \dots, m_t)$ , apply the scheme’s encryption routine to each block, as shown in figure 8.25:

$$c_i = F_k(r) \oplus m_i \quad \forall i \in \{0, \dots, t\}$$

Decryption is trivially implemented by XOR-ing the ciphered blocks with  $F_k(r)$ .




Figure 8.25: ECB-mode block-cipher in action, using a PRF as the encryption routine

This approach has the advantage of being completely parallelizable, as each block can clearly be encrypted separately; however there is a dangerous flaw in being not CPA-secure, even when using a PRF-based encryption scheme. To understand why, observe that random nonces for ciphertext randomization are chosen per-message; this means the encryption of message blocks become deterministic in the message scope, enabling an adversary to attack the scheme

within a single plaintext. It is sufficient to choose an all-0 or all-1 message to realize that all its blocks would encrypt to the same ciphered block.

### 8.1.2 Cipher block chaining mode (CBC)

This mode serializes block encryption by using the preceding ciphered block in the formula:

$$c_i = P_k(r) \oplus m_i \quad \forall i \in \{0, \dots, t\}$$

This time, a *pseudorandom permutation*(PRP) is used instead of a PRF; they will be discussed later on. The diagram in figure 8.26 shows a general view of CBC-mode's operation. The decryption process is analogous but in a reversed fashion, by computing the preimage of a ciphered block and XOR-ing it with the preceding ciphered block:

$$m_i = P_k^{-1}(c_i) \oplus c_{i-1}$$




Figure 8.26: CBC-mode block-cipher in action, using a PRP as the encryption routine

### 8.1.3 Counter mode

This mode closely resembles ECB-mode but uses a “rolling” nonce instead of a static one, as shown in figure 8.27. At each successive block, the nonce is incremented by 1 and then used in a single block encryption. Since the nonce is in  $\{0, 1\}^n$ , the increment is done modulo  $2^n$  so that the value will wrap around to 0 if it ever overflows. Decryption is analogous.




Figure 8.27: Counter-mode block-cipher in action, using a PRF as the encryption routine

This apparently innocuous change to EBC is enough to ensure CPA-security, at the cost of perfect parallelization.

**Theorem 14.** Assume  $F_k$  is a PRF, then the counter-mode block cipher (CTR) is CPA-secure for variable length messages<sup>11</sup>.  $\diamond$

*Proof.* Figure 8.28 models a CPA attack to a counter-mode block-cipher. The proof will proceed by hybrid argument starting from this game, therefore the statement to verify will be  $\text{GAME}_{\text{CTR},A}^{\text{CPA}}(\lambda, 0) \approx_c \text{GAME}_{\text{CTR},A}^{\text{CPA}}(\lambda, 1)$ .




Figure 8.28: A chosen plaintext attack to counter-mode block-cipher

Define the two hybrid games from the original CPA game as follows:

- $\text{HYB}_{\text{CTR},A}^1(\lambda, b)$ : A random function  $R$  is chosen UAR from  $\mathcal{R}(\lambda, n, n)$  at the beginning of the game, and is used in place of  $F_k$  in all block encryptions;
- $\text{HYB}_{\text{CTR},A}^2(\lambda, b)$ : The challenger will pick random values from  $\{0, 1\}^n$  as ciphered blocks, disregarding any encryption routine.

**Lemma 10.**  $\text{GAME}_{\text{CTR},A}^{\text{CPA}}(\lambda, b) \approx_c \text{HYB}_{\text{CTR},A}^1(\lambda, b) \quad \forall b \in \{0, 1\}$   $\diamond$

*Proof.* The proof is left as exercise.

*Hint:* Since the original game and the first hybrid are very similar, we can use a distinguisher which plays the CPA-game; since this is a lemma, our goal in the reduction is to break the precondition contained in the theorem statement.  $\square$

**Lemma 11.**  $\text{HYB}_{\text{CTR},A}^1(\lambda, b) \approx_c \text{HYB}_{\text{CTR},A}^2(\lambda, b) \quad \forall b \in \{0, 1\}$   $\diamond$

<sup>11</sup> Variable length messages exactly means every message  $m = (m_1, \dots, m_t)$  is made of  $t$  blocks, and  $t$  can change from any message to a different one.



*Proof.* Since  $m_i$  doesn't affect the distribution of the result at all, for any  $i$ , if  $R(r^*)$  behaves like a true random extractor, then the two hybrids are indistinguishable in the general case ( $R(r+i) \oplus m_i \approx R(r+i)$ ). However, there is a sneaky issue: if in both games it happens that a given nonce  $r_i$  is used in both one query encryption and the challenge message encryption at any step, the subsequent encrypted blocks will be completely random in the second hybrid, whereas in the first hybrid the function's images, albeit random, become predictable, enabling a CPA.

Nevertheless, it can be proved that these "collisions" happen with negligible probability within  $\text{HYB}_{\text{CTR},A}^1$ . Let:

- $q$  = number of encryption queries in a game run
- $t_i$  = number of blocks for the  $i$ -th query
- $\tau$  = number of blocks for the challenge ciphertext
- OVERLAP event:  $\exists i, j, \iota : r_i + j = \rho + \iota$

The OVERLAP event exactly models our problematic scenario. Now it suffices to show that it occurs negligibly. For simplicity, assume the involved messages are of same length, that is  $t_i = \tau =: t$ . Denote with  $\text{OVERLAP}_i$  to be the event that the  $i$ -th query overlaps the challenge sequence as specified above.

Fix some  $\rho$ . One can see that  $\text{OVERLAP}_i$  happens if:

$$\rho - t + 1 \leq r_i \leq \rho + t - 1$$

which means that  $r_i$  should be chosen *at least* in a way that:

- the sequence  $\rho, \dots, \rho + t - 1$  comes before the sequence  $r_i, \dots, r_i + t - 1$ , and they overlap just for the last element  $\rho + t - 1 = r_i$  or
- the sequence  $r_i, \dots, r_i + t - 1$  comes before the sequence the sequence  $\rho, \dots, \rho + t - 1$ , and they overlap just for the last element  $r_i + t - 1 = \rho$ .

Then:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\text{OVERLAP}_i] &= \frac{(\rho + t - 1) - (\rho - t + 1) + 1}{2^n} \\ &= \frac{2t - 1}{2^n} \\ \Pr[\text{OVERLAP}] &\leq \sum_{i=1}^t \Pr[\text{OVERLAP}_i] \\ &\leq 2 \frac{t^2}{2^n} \in \text{negl}(\lambda) \end{aligned}$$

which proves that our collision scenario happens with negligible probability, thus the two hybrids are indistinguishable. □

Having proven the indistinguishability between the hybrids, the conclusion is reached:

$$\text{GAME}_{\text{CTR},A}^{\text{CPA}}(\lambda, 0) \approx_c \text{GAME}_{\text{CTR},A}^{\text{CPA}}(\lambda, 1)$$

□

# Lesson 9

## 9.1 Message Authentication Codes and unforgeability

After having explored the security concerns and challenges of the SKE realm, it is time to turn the attention to symmetric MAC schemes. Recall that a MAC scheme is a couple  $(Tag, Verify)$ , with the purpose of authenticating the message's source. In this chapter, the tagging function will be denoted as  $Tag_k$ , akin to a PRF.

The desirable property that a MAC scheme should hold is to prevent any attacker from generating a valid couple  $(m^*, \phi^*)$ , even after querying a tagging oracle polynomially many times<sup>12</sup>. The act of generating a valid couple from scratch is called *forging*, and the aforementioned property is defined as *unforgeability against chosen-message attacks* (or UFCMA, in short); its game diagram is shown in figure 9.29. Do note that  $m^*$  is stated to be outside the query set  $M$ , justifying the “freshness” of the forged couple<sup>13</sup>. In formal terms:

**Definition 8.** A MAC scheme  $\Pi$  is UFCMA-secure iff:

$$\forall \text{ PPT } A \implies \Pr[\text{GAME}_{\Pi, A}^{\text{UFCMA}}(\lambda) = 1] \in \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

◇




Figure 9.29:  $\text{GAME}_{\Pi, A}^{\text{UFCMA}}(\lambda)$

<sup>12</sup>Do note how this property resembles CPA-security in the encryption setting

<sup>13</sup>This cannot be said about the message tags; this security variant will be discussed later

Having defined a good notion of security in the MAC scheme domain, we turn our attention to a somewhat trivial scheme, and find out that it is indeed secure:

**Theorem 15.** *Let  $\Pi$  be a MAC scheme such that  $\text{Tag}_k = \text{Verify}_k = F_k$ , where  $F_k$  is a PRF. Then  $\Pi$  is UFCMA-secure.*  $\diamond$

*Proof.* The usual proof by randomic hybridization entails. The original game is identical to the UFCMA game, where the tagging function is the PRF, whereas the hybrid game will have it replaced with a truly random function, as shown in figure 9.30.




Figure 9.30:  $\text{HYB}^1_{\Pi,A}(\lambda)$

**Lemma 12.**  $\text{GAME}^{\text{UFCMA}}_{\Pi,A}(\lambda) \approx_c \text{HYB}^1_{\Pi,A}(\lambda)$   $\diamond$

*Proof.* By assuming there is a distinguisher  $\text{D}^{\text{UFCMA}}$  capable of disproving the lemma, it can be used to distinguish the PRF itself, as depicted by the reduction in figure 9.31  $\square$

**Lemma 13.**  $\forall \text{PPT } A \implies \Pr[\text{HYB}^1_{\Pi,A}(\lambda) = 1] \leq 2^{-l}$   $\diamond$

*Proof.* This is true because attacker has to predict the output  $R(m^*)$  on a fresh input  $m^*$  to win the game, which can happen at most with probability  $2^{-l}$ .  $\square$

Thus, the conclusion is that  $\Pi$  is UFCMA-secure.  $\square$




Figure 9.31: Distinguishing a PRF by using  $D^{\text{UFCMA}}$

## 9.2 Domain extension for MAC schemes

The previous scheme works on fixed length messages; as in the encryption domain, there are techniques for tagging variable length messages which are UFCMA-secure. However, before showing them, some other apparently secure modes are described here to give some possible insights on how to tackle the problem.

Assume the message  $m = (m_1, \dots, m_t) \in \{0, 1\}^{n \cdot t}$  for some  $t \geq 1$ . Given the tagging function  $\text{Tag}_k : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^l$ , an attempt to tag the whole message may be to:

- XOR all the message blocks, and then tag:  $\phi = \text{Tag}_k(\bigoplus_{i=1}^t m_i)$ . But then, given an authenticated message  $(m, \phi)$ , an adversary can always forge a valid couple  $(m', \phi)$ , where  $m'$  is the original message with two flipped bits in two distinct blocks at the same offset; the resulting XOR would be the same.
- define the tag to be a  $t$ -sequence of tags, one for each message block. However, an adversary can just flip the position of two arbitrary distinct message blocks and their relative tags, and would successfully forge a distinct authenticated message.
- attempt a variant of the above approach, by adding the block number to the block itself to avoid the previous forging. Again, this is not UFCMA-secure: the adversary may just make two queries on two distinct messages, obtain the two tag sequences, and then forge an authenticated message by choosing at each position  $i$  whether to pick the message-tag blocks from the first or second query.

### 9.2.1 Universal hash functions

A devised solution which has been proven to be secure relies on the following definition: a function family  $\mathcal{H}$  which can be used to “shrink” variable length messages and then composed with a PRF:

$$\mathcal{H} = \{h_s : \{0, 1\}^{n \cdot t} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n\}_{s \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda}$$

$$\text{Tag}_{k,s}(m) = F_k(h_s(m))$$

So what are the properties of the induced family  $\mathcal{F}(\mathcal{H}) = \{F_k(h_s(\cdot))\}$ ? The main problem are *collisions*, since for each  $m \in \{0, 1\}^{n \cdot t}$  it should be hard to find  $m' \neq m$  such that  $h_s(m) = h_s(m')$ . But collisions do exist for functions in  $\mathcal{F}(\mathcal{H})$ , because they map elements from  $\{0, 1\}^{n \cdot t}$  to  $\{0, 1\}^t$ , and since the codomain is smaller than the domain, the functions cannot be injective in any way.

To overcome this problem, we can consider two options:

- assume collisions are hard to find given  $s \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$  publicly, and we have a *collision resistant hashing*;
- let  $s$  be secret, and assume collisions are hard to find because it is hard to know how  $h_s$  works.

**Definition 9.** A function family  $\mathcal{H}$  is deemed  $\varepsilon$ -universal iff:

$$\forall x \neq x' \in \{0, 1\}^{n \cdot t} \implies \Pr_{s \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda} [h_s(x) = h_s(x')] \leq \varepsilon$$

◇

If  $\varepsilon = 2^{-n}$ , meaning the collision probability is minimized, then the family is also called *perfectly universal*; in the case where  $\varepsilon \in \text{negl}(\lambda)$  instead, it is defined as *almost universal* (AU).

**Lemma 14.** Show that any pairwise independent hash function is perfectly universal. ◇

*Proof.* The proof is left as exercise. (should I use *Col* for solving this? What is the difference and when I should use *Col* instead of one-shot-probability?) **ASK FOR SOLVING PROPERLY** (Thoughts: when I ask *what's the probability that, chosen 2 distinct x-es, their hashes are the same on a certain value?*, maybe I have to use one-shot, because one-shot refers to the prob. that the two inputs collide on a specific value, even if not specified.

Instead, if I consider *what's the prob. that, chosen 2 distinct x-es, their hashes are the same?*, maybe I have to calculate all the possible collisions, because I want to know if the 2 inputs can collide in general. ) □

**Theorem 16.** Assuming  $\mathcal{F}$  is a PRF with  $n$ -bit domain and  $\mathcal{H}$  is AU, then  $\mathcal{F}' = \mathcal{F}(\mathcal{H})$  is a PRF on  $(n \cdot t)$ -bit domain, for  $t \geq 1$ . ◇

*Proof.* This proof too will proceed by hybridizing the original game up to the ideal random one. Consider the three sequences depicted in figures 9.32, 9.33 and 9.34:




Figure 9.32:  $Real_{\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$




Figure 9.33:  $\mathcal{HYB}_{\mathcal{R}, \mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$




Figure 9.34:  $Rand_{\mathcal{R}', \mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$

**Lemma 15.**

$$Real_{\mathcal{F},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) \approx_c \mathcal{HYB}_{\mathcal{R},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$$

◇

*Proof.* The proof is left as exercise. □

**Lemma 16.**

$$\mathcal{HYB}_{\mathcal{R},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) \approx_c Rand_{\mathcal{R}',\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$$

◇

*Proof.* Again, collisions come into play there, but in a much sneakier way. Given two queries with arguments  $x_1, x_2$  returning the same image  $y$ , the random game can model two scenarios:

- the arguments are equal, but with negligible probability
- the arguments are distinct

while the hybrid can model three of them:

- the arguments are equal, again with negligible probability
- the arguments are distinct, *and so are their hashes*
- the arguments are distinct, *but not their hashes*

We want to show that the collision at hash level is negligible: as long as they don't happen, the random function  $\overline{R}$  is run over a sequence of distinct points, and behaves just as the random game's function  $R$  does. So let BAD be the event:

$$\exists i \neq j \in [q] : h_s(x_i) = h_s(x_j)$$

where  $q$  denotes the adversary's query count. It suffices to show that  $\Pr[\text{BAD}] \in \text{negl}(\lambda)$ .

Since we don't care what happens after a collision, we can alternatively consider a mental experiment where we answer all queries at random, and only at the end sample  $s \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$  and check for collisions: this does not change the value of  $\Pr(\text{BAD})$ . Now queries are independent of  $s$ , and this eases our proof:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\text{BAD}] &= \Pr_s[\exists x_i \neq x_j, h_s(x_i) = h_s(x_j)] \\ &\leq \sum_{i \neq j} \Pr_s[h_s(x_i) = h_s(x_j)] && h_s \text{ is AU by definition} \\ &\leq \binom{q}{2} \text{negl}(\lambda) \in \text{negl}(\lambda) \end{aligned}$$

By ruling out this event, the lemma is proven. □

So now we have  $Real \approx_c \mathcal{HYB} \approx_c Rand$  □

**Corollary 1.** Let  $\Pi = (\text{Tag}, \text{Verify})$  be a variable length message MAC scheme where, given a PRF  $F_k$  and an AU hash function family  $h_s$ , the tagging function is defined as  $F_k(h_s)$ . Then  $\Pi$  is UFCMA-secure. ◇

### 9.2.2 Hash function families from finite fields

A generic  $2^n$ -order finite field has very useful properties: adding two of its elements is equal to XOR-ing their binary representations, while multiplying them is done modulo  $2^n$ . It is possible to define a hash function family that makes good use of these properties, and is suitable for a UFCMA-secure MAC scheme.

**Construction 2.** Let  $\mathbb{F} = GF(2^n)$  be a *finite field* (or “Galois field”) of  $2^n$  elements, and let  $m = (m_1, \dots, m_t) \in \mathbb{F}^t$  and  $s = (s_1, \dots, s_t) \in \mathbb{F}^t$ . The desired hash function family will have this form:

$$h_s(m) = \sum_{i=1}^t s_i m_i = \langle s, m \rangle = q_m(s)$$

◇

**Lemma 17.** *The above function family  $h_s$  is almost universal.*

◇

*Proof.* In order for  $h_s$  to be almost universal, collisions must happen negligibly. Suppose we have a collision with two distinct messages  $m$  and  $m'$ :

$$\sum_{i=1}^t m_i s_i = \sum_{i=1}^t m'_i s_i$$

Let  $\delta_i = m_i - m'_i$  and assume, without loss of generality, that  $\delta \neq 0$ . Then, by using the previous equation, when a collision happens:

$$0 = \sum_{i=1}^t m_i s_i - \sum_{i=1}^t m'_i s_i = \sum_{i=1}^t \delta_i s_i$$

Since the messages are different from each other, there is at least some  $i$ -th block that contains some of the differences. Assume, without loss of generality, that some of the differences are contained in the first block ( $i = 1$ ); the sum can then be split between the first block itself  $\delta_1 s_1$  and the rest:

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{i=1}^t \delta_i s_i &= \delta_1 s_1 + \sum_{i=2}^t \delta_i s_i = 0 \\ \delta_1 s_1 &= - \sum_{i=2}^t \delta_i s_i \\ s_1 &= \frac{- \sum_{i=2}^t \delta_i s_i}{\delta_1} \end{aligned}$$

which means when a collision happens,  $s_1$  must be exactly equal to the sum of the other blocks, which is another element of  $\mathbb{F}$ . But since every seed is chosen at random among  $\mathbb{F}$ , the probability of picking the element  $s_1$  satisfying the above equation is just  $|\mathbb{F}|^{-1} = 2^{-n} \in \text{negl}(\lambda)$ . By repeating this reasoning for every difference-block, a sum of negligible probabilities is obtained, which is in turn negligible; therefore the hash function family  $h_s$  is almost universal.

□



**$\mathcal{H}$  with Galois fields elements and polynomials**

**Construction 3.** Take  $\mathbb{F} = GF(2^n)$ , a *Galois field* of  $2^n$  elements.

Let  $m = (m_1, \dots, m_t) \in \mathbb{F}^t$  and  $s \leftarrow \mathbb{F}$ . We state that

$$h_s(m) = \sum_{i=1}^t s^{i-1} m_i$$

◇

**Exercise 17.** Prove that this construction is **almost universal**.

(possible proof: to be almost universal, looking at the definition, collisions with  $m \neq m'$  must be negligible.

So consider a collision as above: it must be true that

$$\sum_{i=1}^t m_i s^{i-1} = \sum_{i=1}^t m'_i s^{i-1} \Leftrightarrow \sum_{i=1}^t m_i s^{i-1} - \sum_{i=1}^t m'_i s^{i-1} = 0 \Leftrightarrow q_{m-m'}(s) = 0$$

How can we make a polynomial equal to 0? We have to find the **roots** of the polynomial, which we know are at most the **grade** of the polynomial. So, the grade of this polynomial is  $t - 1$ , and the probability of picking a root from  $\mathbb{F}$  as seed of  $h_s(\cdot)$  is

$$\mathcal{P}[s = \text{root}] = \frac{t-1}{2^n} \in \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

)

# Lesson 10

## 10.1 Domain extension for PRF-based MAC schemes

### 10.1.1 Hash function families from PRFs

Another way to obtain domain extension for a MAC scheme, using the  $\mathcal{F}_k(h_s)$  approach, is to construct the hash function family from another PRF. We expect to have:

- $\Pr[h_s(m) = h_s(m'), s \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda, (m, m') \leftarrow A(1^\lambda)] \in \text{negl}(\lambda)$ ;
- We need two PRFs: one is  $F_k$ , and the other is  $F_s$

### 10.1.2 XOR-mode

Assume that we have this function

$$h_s(m) = F_s(m_1 || 1) \oplus \dots \oplus F_s(m_t || t)$$

so that the input to the PRF  $F_s(\cdot)$  is  $n + \log_2 t$  bytes long.

**Lemma 18.** *Above  $\mathcal{H}$  is computational AU if  $F_s$  is a PRF.*  $\diamond$

*Proof.* The proof is left as exercise.

(Hint: The pseudorandom functions can be defined as  $F_s = F'_k(0, \dots)$  and  $F_k = F'_k(1, \dots)$ ).

Possible proof: we have to show that

$$\mathcal{P}[h_s(m) = h_s(m')] \in \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

with  $m \neq m'$ . This means that

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr \left[ \left( \bigoplus_{i=1}^t F_s(m_i, i) \right) = \left( \bigoplus_{i=1}^t F_s(m'_i, i) \right) \right] \\ &= \Pr[\forall i \quad F_s(m_i, i) \oplus F_s(m'_i, i) = \bigoplus_{j=1, j \neq i}^t F_s(m_j, j) \oplus F_s(m'_j, j) = \alpha] \end{aligned}$$

for each  $i \in [1, t]$ . But  $\alpha$  is one unique random number chosen over  $2^n$  possible candidates, so the collision probability is negligible.  $\square$

### 10.1.3 CBC-mode MAC scheme

This is part of the standard, used in TLS. It's used with a PRF  $F_s$ , setting the starting vector as  $IV = 0^n = c_0$  and running this PRF as part of CBC. The last block obtained by the whole process is the message's signature:

$$h_s(m) = F_s(m_t \oplus F_s(m_{t-1} \oplus F_s(\dots F_s(m_2 \oplus F_s(m_1 \oplus IV)) \dots)))$$

**Lemma 19.** *CBC MAC defines completely an AU family.*  $\diamond$

*Proof.* (not proven)  $\square$

We can use this function to create an **encrypted CBC**, or **E-CBC**:

$$E - CBC_{K,S}(m) = F_k(h_s^{CBC}(m))$$

**Theorem 18.** *Actually if  $F_k$  is a PRF, CBC-MAC is already a MAC with domain  $n \cdot t$  for arbitrarily fixed  $t \in \mathbb{N}$ .*  $\diamond$

*Proof.* (not proven)  $\square$

### 10.1.4 XOR MAC

Instead of  $\mathcal{F}(\mathcal{H})$  now the  $Tag()$  function outputs  $\phi = (\eta, F_k(\eta) \oplus h_s(m))$  where  $\eta \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  is random and it's called *nonce*.

Authentication is done as:

$$(m, (\eta, F_k(\eta) \oplus h_s(m)))$$

When I want to verify a message and I get the couple  $(m, (\eta, v))$ , I just check that  $v = F_k(\eta) \oplus h_s(m)$ . It should be hard to find a value called  $a$  such that, given  $m \neq m'$ ,

$$h_s(m) \oplus a = h_s(m')$$

In fact, since an adversary who wants to break this scheme has to send a valid couple  $(m^*, \phi^*)$  after some queries, he could:

- ask for message  $m$  and store the tag  $(\eta, F_k(\eta) \oplus h_s(m))$
- try to find  $a = h_s(m) \oplus h_s(m')$  and modify the previous stored tag adding  $v \oplus a$ ,

so now he could send the authenticated message

$$(m', (\eta, F_k(\eta) \oplus h_s(m')))$$

which is a valid message.

T0D0 8: AXU property definition is missing

**Lemma 20.** *XOR mode gives computational AXU (Almost Xor Universal)*  $\diamond$

*Proof.* (not proven)  $\square$

**Theorem 19.** *If  $\mathcal{F}$  is a PRF and  $\mathcal{H}$  is computational AXU, then XOR-MAC is a MAC.*  $\diamond$

*Proof.* (not proven)  $\square$

## Summary

T0D0 9: not sure what to do with this bullet list...

With variable input length:

- AXU based XOR mode is secure;
- $\mathcal{F}(\mathcal{H})$  is insecure with polynomial construction  $h_s(m) = q_m(s)$ , but can be fixed;
- CBC-MAC is not secure, left as exercise;
- E-CBC is secure.

## 10.2 CCA-security

Going back to the encryption realm, a new definition of attack to a SKE scheme will be introduced. Now the adversary can query a decryption oracle, along with the CPA-related encryption oracle, for polynomially many queries. This attack is called the *Chosen Ciphertext Attack*<sup>14</sup>, and schemes that are proven to be CCA-secure are also defined as *non-malleable*, on the reasoning that an attacker cannot craft fresh valid ciphertexts from other valid ones.




Figure 10.35: The chosen ciphertext attack, on top of CPA

**Exercise 20.** Show that the scheme  $\Pi_{\mathcal{F}}$  defined in theorem 13, while CPA-secure, is not CCA-secure.

*Proof.* Let  $m_0$  and  $m_1$  be the messages the adversary sends to the challenger as the challenge plaintexts; on receiving the ciphertext  $c_b = (r, F_k(r \oplus m_b)) : b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ , the adversary crafts another ciphertext with an arbitrary value  $\alpha$ :

$$\hat{c}_b = (r, F_k(r) \oplus m_b \oplus \alpha)$$

<sup>14</sup>Different versions of the CCA notion exist. The one defined here is also called CCA2, or *adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack*

and queries the decryption oracle on it. The latter will decrypt the new ciphertext and return a plaintext, which can be easily manipulated by the adversary to reveal exactly which message was encrypted during the challenge:

$$\begin{aligned} Dec_k(\hat{c}_b) &= Dec_k(r, F_k(r) \oplus m_b \oplus \alpha) \\ &= F_k(r) \oplus F_k(r) \oplus m_b \oplus \alpha \\ &= m_b \oplus \alpha \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the adversary certainly wins after just one decryption query, proving the scheme's vulnerability to CCA attacks.  $\square$

### 10.3 Authenticated encryption

Instead of tackling the CCA-security problem upfront, it might be useful to consider a construction that achieves both secrecy and authentication: that is, a scheme that encrypts messages and authenticates their respective senders at the same time. In the encryption setting, such a scheme is defined as being CPA-secure with an additional AUTH property denoting the scheme's resistance to forgeries, much like its MAC cousins. The game shown in figure 10.36 models this AUTH property of a scheme  $\Pi = (Enc, Dec)$ , with an additional quirk to the decryption routine:

$$Dec : \mathcal{K} * \mathcal{C} \rightarrow M \cup \{\perp\}$$

where the  $\perp$  value is returned whenever the decryption algorithm is supplied an invalid or malformed ciphertext.




Figure 10.36:  $\text{GAME}_{\Pi, A}^{\text{AUTH}}(\lambda)$

**Theorem 21.** *Let  $\Pi$  be a SKE scheme. If it is CPA-secure, and has the AUTH property, then it is also CCA-secure.*  $\diamond$

*Proof.* The proof is left as an exercise.

*Hint:* consider the experiment where  $Dec(k, c)$ :

- if  $c$  not fresh ( i.e. output of previous encryption query  $m$ , output  $m$ )

- else output  $\perp$

The approach would be to reduce cca to cpa; given  $D^{cca}$ , we can build  $D^{cpa}$ .  $D^{cca}$  will ask decryption queries, but  $D^{cpa}$  can answer just with these two properties shown above, so it can reply just if he asked these  $(c, m)$  before to its challenger  $\mathcal{C}$ .

□

### 10.3.1 Combining SKE & MAC schemes

Let  $\Pi_1 = (Enc, Dec)$  be a SKE scheme, and  $\Pi_2 = (Tag, Verify)$  be a MAC scheme; there are 3 ways to combine them into an authenticated encryption scheme:

- *Encrypt-and-Tag*:
  1.  $c \leftarrow \$ Enc(k_1, m)$
  2.  $\phi \leftarrow \$ Tag(k_2, m)$
  3.  $c^* = (c, \phi)$
- *Tag-then-encrypt*:
  1.  $\phi \leftarrow \$ Tag(k_2, m)$
  2.  $c \leftarrow \$ Enc(k_1, (\phi, m))$
  3.  $c^* = c$
- *Encrypt-then-Tag*:
  1.  $c \leftarrow \$ Enc(k_1, m)$
  2.  $\phi \leftarrow \$ Tag(k_2, c)$
  3.  $c^* = (c, \phi)$

Of the three options, only the last one is proven to be CCA-secure for arbitrary scheme choices; the other approaches are not secure “a-priori”, with some couples proven to be secure by themselves. Notable examples are the *Transport Layer Security* (TLS) protocol, which employs the second strategy, and has been proven to be secure because of the chosen encryption scheme; *Secure SHell* (SSH) instead uses the first strategy.

**Theorem 22.** *If an authenticated encryption scheme  $\Pi$  is made by combining a CPA-secure SKE scheme  $\Pi_1$  with a strongly unforgeable MAC scheme  $\Pi_2$  in the Encrypt-then-tag method. Then  $\Pi$  is CPA-secure and auth-secure.* ◇

*Proof.* Assume that  $\Pi$  is not CPA-secure; then an adversary can use the resulting distinguisher  $D^{CPA}$  to direct a succesful CPA against  $\Pi_1$ , as shown in figure 10.37: the point is to run the two components of  $\Pi$  separately.

T0D0 10: Professor says that we have to show that  $Game^{cpa}(\lambda, 0) \approx_c Game^{cpa}(\lambda, 1)$ , but why??? Isn't this proof enough?

□




Figure 10.37



Proved for the cpa-security property, now we have to prove, in a similar way, that the auth property must be holded by  $\Pi$  if  $\Pi_2$  is an auth-secure scheme.

**Exercise 23.** Prove it!

Similar to the cpa-security proof.

# Lesson 11

## 11.1 Authenticated encryption (continued)

Having proven CPA-security of an authenticated encryption scheme in an *Encrypt-then-Tag* mode, it remains to prove that it has the AUTH property. Before this, a new unforgeability definition is needed:

**Definition 10.** Let  $\Pi = (\text{Tag}, \text{Verify})$  be a MAC scheme. Then  $\Pi$  is EUFCMA-secure iff it is UFCMA-secure, that is:

$$\Pr[\text{GAME}_{\Pi, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{UFCMA}}(\lambda) = 1] \in \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

with the additional restriction that the tag  $\phi^*$  of the forged message must be “fresh” itself.  $\diamond$

Note the small difference in security between UFCMA and EUFCMA.

**Theorem 24.** Let  $\Pi = (\text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \text{Tag}, \text{Verify})$  be an authenticated encryption scheme, composed by a SKE scheme  $\Pi_1$  and a MAC scheme  $\Pi_2$ . If  $\Pi_2$  is EUFCMA, then  $\Pi$  has the AUTH property.  $\diamond$

*Proof.* The proof is analogous to the previous proof regarding the scheme’s CPA security. Suppose that  $\Pi$  has not the AUTH property; then an adversary can use the distinguisher  $\mathcal{D}^{\text{AUTH}}$  to successfully forge authenticated messages with fresh signatures against  $\Pi_2$ , as depicted in figure 11.38.

From  $\mathcal{A}^{\text{auth}}$  perspective, all the couples  $(c_i, \phi_i)$  received are made with the following schema:

$$c_i \in \text{Enc}(k_1, m \in \mathcal{M}) \wedge \phi_i \leftarrow \$\text{Enc}(k_2, c_i)$$

Since  $\mathcal{A}^{\text{auth}}$  wins  $\text{Game}^{\text{auth}}$ , the challenge couple  $(c^*, \phi^*)$  which breaks  $\text{Game}^{\text{auth}}$  will be produced to be decrypted as

$$\text{Dec}(k, (c^*, \phi^*)) \rightarrow \text{Dec}(k_1, c^*) \in \mathcal{M} \wedge \text{Dec}(k_2, \phi^*) = c^*$$

But if this happens, then  $\mathcal{A}$  can use the same challenge couple of  $\mathcal{A}^{\text{auth}}$  to win  $\text{Game}^{\text{ufcma}}$ , which is impossible.

It could happen that, for  $c^* = c$  previously seen,  $\phi^*$  is a new fresh tag, never seen before. Just in this case the *auth* game would be valid because  $(c^*, \phi^*)$  would have never been seen before, but **not** the *eufcma* game, because  $c^*$  was previously sent to the challenger.  $\square$

Now we want an *ufcma* secure scheme able to resist against message-tag challenge couples where the tag is fresh but the message has been already requested to the challenger.




Figure 11.38: Breaking authenticity of  $\Pi_2$

## 11.2 Pseudorandom permutations

Pseudorandom permutations are like PRFs, but efficiently invertible. Consider the following family of functions:

$$\mathcal{F} = \{F_k : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n\}_{k \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda}$$




Figure 11.39:  $\text{Real}_{\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$




Figure 11.40:  $\text{Ideal}_{\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$

and the two games are indistinguishable

$$\text{Real}_{\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{A}}(\lambda) \approx_c \text{Ideal}_{\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$$

### 11.2.1 Feistel Network

Let  $F : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  and  $\psi_F$  the invertible function

$$\psi_F(\overbrace{x}^{\text{n bits}}, \overbrace{y}^{\text{n bits}}) = (y, x \oplus F(y)) = (x', y')$$

$$\psi_F^{-1}(\overbrace{x'}^{\text{n bits}}, \overbrace{y'}^{\text{n bits}}) = (F(x') \oplus y', x') = (x, y)$$

Is this function pseudorandom?

This is not pseudorandom, because the first  $n$  bits of the output of  $\psi_F$  are always equal to  $y$ , while in a PRF the probability that, given two different  $(x, y)$  and  $(x', y)$  in input, the first bits are equal is very low.

#### T0D0 11: FEISTEL IMAGE

The  $l - th$  level outputs something like

$$\psi_F[l](x, y) = \psi_{F_{k_l}}(\psi_{F_{k_{l-1}}}(\dots(\psi_{F_{k_1}}(x, y))\dots))$$

Two XORed rounds of this function don't create a PRP. In particular, imagine 2 queries  $(x, y)$  and  $(x', y)$  such that

$$\psi_{F, F'}(x, y) \oplus \psi_{F, F'}(x', y) = (x \oplus F(y) \oplus x' \oplus F(y), \dots)$$

Since for 2 random queries with the same  $y$ , the first member of the output is always equal to  $x \oplus x'$  with probability 1, this XORed rounds cannot constitute a PRP (which, instead, for 2 queries with the same second member outputs a first member equal to  $x \oplus x'$  with negligible probability).

**Lemma 21.** *For every **unbounded** distinguisher making  $q \in \text{poly}(\lambda)$  queries, the following are statistically close as long as  $y_1, \dots, y_q$  are **y-nique**, i.e.  $\forall i \neq j, y_i \neq y_j$*   $\diamond$

figures

# Lesson 15

## 15.1 Public key encryption recap

$\text{Game}_{\Pi, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{pke-cca}}$ :




Figure 15.41: CCA on a PKE scheme

(Reminder): Encryptions are made like this:  $\text{Enc}(k, m) = (r, F_k(r) \oplus m)$ ,  $r \simeq \text{Unif}(\{0, 1\}^\lambda)$ .

Every time an encryption is made, a fresh value  $r$  is picked UAR.

### 15.1.1 Trapdoor permutation

A TDP(TrapDoor Permutation) is a OWP family structured has these features:

- A key pair is chosen UAR by a key generator algorithm:  $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \mathcal{KGen}(1^\lambda)$
- There is a function family  $f_{pk} \subseteq (V_{pk} \rightarrow V_{pk})$  such that:
  - Computing  $f_{pk}$  is efficient
  - Sampling from the domain ( $x \leftarrow V_{pk}$ ) is efficient
- There is an efficient function  $g_{sk}$  that “inverts”  $f_{pk}$  ( $sk$  is the “trapdoor”):
 
$$g(sk, f(pk, x)) = x$$
- No efficient adversary is able to invert  $f_{pk}$  without knowing  $sk$

Note: Since  $pk$  is public, any adversary gets the capability of encrypting messages for free, without requiring an external challenger/oracle!

Therefore, if left deterministic, a TDP is not CPA-secure.

Here, in this scheme, we combine randomness and the notion of hardcore predicate  $\mathfrak{hc}$ :

- $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \mathcal{KGen}(1^\lambda)$
- $r \leftarrow \Xi_{pk}$
- $c := \text{Enc}(pk, m) = (f_{pk}(r), \mathfrak{hc}(r) \oplus m)$
- Correctness:  $\text{Dec}(sk, c) = \mathfrak{hc}(g_{sk}(c_1)) \oplus c_2$

Theorem: if  $(\mathcal{KGen}, f, g)$  is a TDP, and  $\mathfrak{hc}$  is hardcore for  $f$ , then the above scheme is CPA-secure.

Proof: (Exercise)

T0D0 12: Apparently, the reduction here is not easy at all. Some hints are needed to solve this exercise.

### 15.1.2 TDP examples

One example stems from the factoring problem: let’s look again at  $\mathbb{Z}_n^\times$ , where  $n = pq$ ,  $p, q \in \mathbb{P}$ ;

Theorem (Chinese remainder, or CRT): The following isomorphisms to  $\mathbb{Z}_n^\times$  are true:

- $\mathbb{Z}_n \simeq \mathbb{Z}_p \times \mathbb{Z}_q$
- $\mathbb{Z}_n^\times \simeq \mathbb{Z}_p^\times \times \mathbb{Z}_q^\times$

Note that the theorem is more general, and holds for any  $p, q$  that are co-prime.

How to use this theorem for constructing a PKE scheme:

Reminder (Euler's theorem):

REVIEW:  $\forall x \in \mathbb{Z}_n \implies x^{\varphi(n)} = x \pmod n$   
 maybe the correct one is  
 $\forall x \in \mathbb{Z}_n \implies x^{\varphi(n)} = 1 \pmod n$

Reminder:  $\forall p, q \in \mathbb{P} \implies \varphi(pq) = (p-1)(q-1)$

So let  $a$  be the public key such that  $\gcd(a, \varphi(n)) = 1$ , then  $\exists! b \in \mathbb{Z}_n : ab = 1 \pmod{\varphi(n)}$ ,  $b$  will be our private key.

Define encryption as  $f(a, m) = m^a \pmod n$ , and then decryption as  $g(b, c) = c^b \pmod n$ .

Observe that

$$g(b, f(a, m)) = (m^a)^b = m^{ab} = m^{k\varphi(n)+1} = (m^{\varphi(n)})^k m = m \pmod n$$

, because  $ab = 1 \pmod{\varphi(n)}$ .

So we conjecture that the above is a valid TDP-based PKE scheme. This is actually called the “RSA assumption”:




Figure 15.42: Depiction of the RSA assumption

Relation to the factoring problem:  $\text{RSA} \implies \text{FACT}$

Proof: Given  $p, q$ , an adversary can compute  $\varphi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)$ , and then find the inverse of the public key in  $\mathbb{Z}_{pq}^\times$ .

It hasn't been proven that  $\text{FACT} \implies \text{RSA}$

## 15.2 Textbook RSA

This is an insecure toy example of the more complex *RSA* (Rivest Shamir Adleman) algorithm. The key generation algorithm:  $\text{KGen} = \text{GenRSA}(1^\lambda)$  outputs  $P_k = (n, e)$  and  $S_k = d$ , then we have

$$\text{Enc}(P_k, m) = m^e \pmod n$$

$$\text{Dec}(S_k, c) = c^d \pmod n$$

Since the output of Enc is deterministic this is **not CPA secure!** However it can be used with HARD-CORE Predicate.  
Preprocess the message to add randomness:

$$\hat{m} = r || m \text{ where } r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^l$$

now Enc is not deterministic.

**Facts:**

1.  $l \in \text{super}(\log(\lambda))$  otherwise it is possible to bruteforce in PPT.

REVIEW:

2. If  $m \in \{0, 1\}$  then I can prove it CPA secure under RSA (just use standard TDP)

3. If  $m$  is "in the middle" ( $\{0, 1\} \leq m \leq \{0, 1\}^l$ ) RSA is believed to be secure and is standardized (PKCS#1,5)

REVIEW:

4. Still not CCA secure! counterexample?

### 15.2.1 Trapdoor Permutation from Factoring

Let's look at  $f(x) = x^2 \pmod{n}$  where  $f : \mathbb{Z}_n^* \rightarrow \mathbb{QR}_n(\subset \mathbb{Z}_n^*)$ , this is not a permutation in general.

Now let's consider the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) representation:

$$x = (x_p, x_q) \rightarrow x_p \equiv x \pmod{p}, x_q \equiv x \pmod{q}$$

$$f(x) = x^2 \pmod{p}; x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$$

Since  $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$  is cyclic I can always write:

$$\mathbb{Z}_p^* = \{g^0, g^1, g^2, \dots, g^{\frac{p-1}{2}-1}, g^{\frac{p-1}{2}}, \dots, g^{p-2}\}$$

$$\mathbb{QR}_p = \{g^0, g^2, g^4, \dots, \underbrace{g^{p-3}}_{g^{\frac{p-1}{2}-1} \text{ in } \mathbb{Z}_p^*}, \underbrace{g^0}_{g^{\frac{p-1}{2}} \text{ in } \mathbb{Z}_p^*}, \dots\}$$

$$|\mathbb{QR}_p| = \frac{p-1}{2}$$

Moreover, since  $(g^{\frac{p-1}{2}})^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$  and  $g^{\frac{p-1}{2}}$  cannot be 1 (since  $g^0 \neq g^{\frac{p-1}{2}} \neq g^{p-1}$ ) but must be one of the  $p-1$  elements of  $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$ , then  $g^{\frac{p-1}{2}} \equiv -1 \pmod{p}$ .



Now it's possible to show that  $f : \mathbb{QR}_p \rightarrow \mathbb{QR}_p$  is a permutation, and we are going to show a method to invert it, aka  $f^{-1}$ .

Assume  $p \equiv 3 \pmod{4}$  ( $[*]p = 4t + 3 \Rightarrow t = \frac{p-3}{4}$ ), then squaring  $Modp$  is a permutation because, given  $y = x^2 \pmod{p}$  if I compute:

$$\begin{aligned} (y^{t+1})^2 &= \underbrace{y^{2t+2}}_{[*] \ 2t+2 = \frac{p-3}{2} + 2 = \frac{p+1}{2} = \frac{p-1}{2} + 1} = (x^2)^{\frac{p-1}{2}+1} = 1x^2 = x^2 \\ &\implies x = \pm y^{t+1} \end{aligned}$$

But only 1 among the above  $\pm y^{t+1}$  is a square, in particular only the positive one.

Since we have that

$$p = k4 + 3 \Rightarrow \frac{p-1}{2} = \frac{4k+2}{2} = 2k+1$$

so  $\frac{p-1}{2}$  is odd.

Now, since we are considering just  $\mathbb{QR}_p = \{y \in \mathbb{Z}_p^* : \exists x \in \mathbb{Z}_p^* x^2 = y\}$  and we can write each  $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$  as  $g^z$  for a  $z \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ ,

$$y = x^2 \Leftrightarrow y = (g^z)^2 = g^{2z}$$

So,  $y = g^{z'} \in \mathbb{QR}_p \Leftrightarrow z'$  is even. If  $z'$  is odd, then  $y \notin \mathbb{QR}_p$ .

Since  $\frac{p-1}{2}$  is odd, then  $g^{\frac{p-1}{2}} \notin \mathbb{QR}_p$ , and since it is possible to generate all of the other numbers with odd exponents

$$g^{odd} = g^{\frac{p-1}{2} \pm even} = g^{\frac{p-1}{2}} g^{\pm even} \Rightarrow -1(g^{\pm even})$$

and  $g$  powered to odd exponents will have this form.

From that, it's possible to state the following

**Lemma 22.**  $\forall z, z \in \mathbb{QR}_p \implies -z \notin \mathbb{QR}_p$   $\diamond$

### 15.2.2 Rabin's Trapdoor permutation

Now we study a one way function built on previous deductions about number theory and modular arithmetic.

The *Rabin trapdoor permutation* is defined as

$$f(x) = x^2 \pmod{n}$$

where  $n = p * q$  for primes  $p, q \equiv 3 \pmod{4}$ .

We can observe that the image of this function is  $\mathbb{QR}_n$ , a subset of  $\mathbb{Z}_n^*$ .

For **Chinese remainder theorem** it is possible to state that  $f$  maps as follows

$$x = (x_p, x_q) \mapsto (x_p^2, x_q^2)$$

since each element of  $\mathbb{Z}_n$  has always two different forms, in  $\mathbb{Z}_p$  and in  $\mathbb{Z}_q$ .

So

$$y \in \mathbb{QR}_n \Leftrightarrow y_p \in \mathbb{QR}_p \wedge y_q \in \mathbb{QR}_q$$

As before, the image of  $f$  is exactly

$$\mathbb{QR}_n = \{y : \exists x : y = x^2 \bmod n\}$$

If we try to invert the function  $f$ , even without applying the previous inversion algorithm, we easily note that among the 4 possible values

$$f^{-1}(y) = \{(x_p, x_q), (-x_p, x_q), (x_p, -x_q), (-x_p, -x_q)\}$$

only 1 is a quadratic residue since we said, in the last lemma, that only one out of  $-x_k, x_k$  is a quadratic residue for  $k = q, p$ .

Therefore, we have that the Rabin's TDP is a permutation in  $\mathbb{QR}_n$ , and that the cardinality of  $\mathbb{QR}_n$  is  $\frac{|\mathbb{Z}_n^*|}{4}$ .

Furthermore, with the following claim we can state that the Rabin cryptosystem is OWF thanks to the hardness of factoring.

**Claim 1.** *Given  $x, z$  such that  $x^2 \bmod n \equiv z^2 \bmod n \equiv y \bmod n$ ,*

$$x \neq \pm z \Rightarrow \text{we can factor } n$$

◇

*Proof.* Since  $f^{-1}(y)$  has only one value out of four,  $x \neq \pm z$  and  $z \in \{(x_p, x_q), (-x_p, -x_q)\}$ , then  $x \in \{(x_p, -x_q), (-x_p, x_q)\}$  and

$$x + z \in \{(0, 2x_q), (2x_p, 0)\}$$

Now assume  $x + z = (2x_p, 0)$  without loss of generality, since the proof for the other case is the same.

We have that  $x + z \equiv 0 \bmod q$  and  $x + z \not\equiv 0 \bmod p$ .

But then  $\gcd(x + z, n) = q$ , and we obtain  $q$ . □

**Theorem 25.** *Squaring mod  $n$  (where  $n$  is a bloom integer<sup>15</sup>) is a **trapdoor permutation** under factoring.* ◇


Since we have already shown tha Rabin's function is a permutation since it is invertible, we have to show that Rabin's function is also OWF.

In other words

$$\text{Factoring is hard} \Rightarrow f(x) \text{ is OWF, aka inverting it is hard}$$

The following proof is by contraddiction.

*Proof.* Assume that exists an adversary PPT who, given  $y = x^2 \bmod n$ , can find a  $z \in \mathbb{Z}_n$  such that  $z^2 \bmod n = y$  but  $z \neq \pm x$ .



We can build the following reduction to show that  $\mathcal{A}$  chooses  $x$ :

Once obtained  $z \neq \pm x$  which  $z^2 = y$  we can use **Claim 1** (just summing  $x$  and  $z$  and analyzing the result) to factorize  $n$  in polytime.

But factorizing  $n$  in polytime is not possible. □

---

<sup>15</sup> a bloom integer  $n$  is  $n = p, q$  for  $p, q = 3 \pmod{4}$ , as the definition of Rabin's TDP

# Lesson 16

## 16.1 PKE schemes over DDH assumption

### 16.1.1 El Gamal scheme

Let's define a new  $\Pi = (\text{KGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ . Generate the needed (**public**) parameters  $(G, g, q) \leftarrow \text{GroupGen}(1^\lambda)^{16}$ .

The KeyGen algorithm is defined as follows:

- Pick  $x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$
- Output the key pair  $(pk, sk)$  as  $(g^x, x)$

The encryption routine  $\text{Enc}(pk, m)$  will:

- Pick  $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$
- Output  $c = (c_1, c_2) = (g^r, pk^r \cdot m)^{17}$

The decryption routine  $\text{Dec}(sk, c)$  will:

- Compute  $\hat{m} = c_1^{-sk} \cdot c_2$

Correctness of this scheme follows from some algebraic steps:

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{m} &= \text{Dec}(sk, \text{Enc}(pk, m)) \\ &= \text{Dec}(x, \text{Enc}(g^x, m)) \\ &= \text{Dec}(x, (g^r, (g^x)^r \cdot m)) \\ &= (g^r)^{-x} \cdot (g^x)^r \cdot m \\ &= m\end{aligned}$$

**Theorem 26.** *Assuming DDH, the El Gamal scheme is CPA-secure.*  $\diamond$


*Proof.* Consider the two following games  $H_0(\lambda, b)$  and  $H_1(\lambda, b)$  defined as follows. Observe that  $b$  can be fixed without loss of generality.

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
<sup>16</sup> $G$  could be any "valid" group such as  $\mathbb{QR}_p$  or an Elliptic Curve

<sup>17</sup>We need  $r$  because we want to re-randomize  $c$

$H_0(\lambda, b) :$



$H_1(\lambda, b) :$



**Note:** it is important to note that we can measure the advantage of  $\mathcal{A}$ , so fixed its output  $Adv_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = \left| \underbrace{Pr[\mathcal{A} \rightarrow 1 \mid b = 0]}_{\text{"}\mathcal{A} \text{ loses"}} - \underbrace{Pr[\mathcal{A} \rightarrow 1 \mid b = 1]}_{\text{"}\mathcal{A} \text{ wins"}} \right|$ . Since  $b$  is fixed the above formula will give a value  $\lambda$  *innegl*, generally the advantage of an adversary is:  $\frac{1}{2} + \lambda$  (random guessing + a negligible factor).

Proof technique:  $H_0(\lambda, 0) \approx_c H_0(\lambda, 1) \equiv H_1(\lambda, 0) \approx_c H_1(\lambda, 1)$

$$\implies H_0(\lambda, 0) \approx_c H_1(\lambda, 1)$$


**Lemma 23.**  $\forall b \in \{0, 1\}, H_0(\lambda, 0) \approx_c H_0(\lambda, 1)$

Fix  $b$ . (Reduction to DDH)

Assume  $\exists$  PPT  $D$  which is able to distinguish  $H_0(\lambda, b)$  and  $H_1(\lambda, b)$  with non negl. probability.  $\diamond$

*Proof.* Consider the following Game:

**Contradiction:**  $D$  should be able to compute  $\log_g$  to distinguish the message.  $\square$



**Lemma 24.**  $H_1(\lambda, 0) \equiv H_1(\lambda, 1)$   $\diamond$

*Proof.* This follows from the fact that:  $(g^x, (g^r, g^z m_0)) \equiv (g^x, (g^r, U_\lambda) \equiv (g^x, (g^r, g^z m_1)))$   $\square$

**Lemma 25.**  $H_1(\lambda, 1) \equiv H_0(\lambda, 1)$   $\diamond$

This is proved in the exact same way as **Lemma 20**. As a matter of fact it is the second part of the proof (where  $b$  is fixed to 1).  $\square$

### Properties of of El Gamal PKE scheme

Some useful observations can be made about this scheme:

- It is **homomorphic**: Given two ciphertexts  $(c_1, c_2)$  and  $(c'_1, c'_2)$ , then doing the product between them yields another valid ciphertext:

$$\begin{aligned} & (c_1 \cdot c'_1, c_2 \cdot c'_2) \\ &= (g^{r+r'}, h^{r+r'}(m \cdot m')) \end{aligned}$$

thus, decrypting  $c \cdot c'$ , gives  $m \cdot m'$ .

- It is **re-randomizable**: Given a ciphertext  $(c_1, c_2)$ , and  $r' \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ , then computing  $(g^{r'} \cdot c_1, h^{r'} \cdot c_2)$  results in a “fresh” encryption for the same message: the random value used at the encryption step will change from the original  $r$  to  $r + r'$

These properties of the El Gamal scheme can be desirable in some use cases, where a message must be kept secret to the second party. In fact, there are some PKE schemes which are designed to be **fully homomorphic**, i.e. they are homomorphic for any kind of function.

Consider the following use case: a client  $C$  has an object  $x$  and wants to apply a function  $f$  over it, but it lacks the computational power to execute it. There is another subject  $S$ , which is able to efficiently compute  $f$ , so the goal is to let it compute  $f(x)$  but the client wishes to keep  $x$  secret from him. This can be achieved using a FH-PKE scheme as follows:




Figure 16.43: Delegated secret computation

However one important consideration must be made: All these useful characteristics expose an inherent malleability of any fully homomorphic scheme: any attacker can manipulate ciphertexts efficiently, and with some predictable results. This compromises even CPA security of such schemes.

### 16.1.2 Cramer-Shoup PKE scheme

This scheme is based on the standard DDH assumption, and has the advantage of being CCA secure. A powerful tool, called **Designated Verifier Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge (DVNIZK)**, or alternatively **Hash-Proof System**, is used here.

#### Proof systems

Let  $L$  be a Turing-recognizable language in  $NP$ , and a predicate  $\mathcal{R} \in X \times Y \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$  such that:

$$L := \{y \in Y : \exists x \in X \mathcal{R}(x, y) = 1\}$$

where  $x$  is called a “witness” of  $y$ .

In our instance, let  $y = pq, x = (p, q)$

$\Pi = (\text{Setup}, \text{Prove}, \text{Verify})$

$(\omega, \tau) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ , where  $\omega$  is the **Common Reference String**, and  $\tau$  is the **trapdoor**.

Additional notes:

- $\omega$  is public ( $= pk$ )
- $\tau$  is part of the secret key

- $\tau = (x, y) : \mathcal{R}(x, y) = 1$
- There is presumably a common third-party, which samples from the setup and publishes  $\omega$ , while giving  $\tau$  to only B.




Figure 16.44: Overview of Cramer-Shoup operation

Proof system - purpose: a way to convince  $B$  that  $A$  knows something  
 Can compute the proof in two different ways, this is the core notion of  $ZK$   
 No  $\tau \implies ZK$

### Properties

- (*implicit, against malicious Bob*) **Zero-knowledge**: Proof for  $x$  can be simulated without knowing  $x$  itself
- (*stronger, against malicious ALice*) **Soundness**: It is hard to produce a valid proof for any  $y \notin L$
- *honest people* **Completeness**:  $\forall y \in L, \forall (\omega, \tau) \leftarrow \mathcal{S} \text{Setup}(1^\lambda) : \text{Prove}(\omega, x, y) = \text{Verify}(\tau, y)$

T0D0 13: to review and understand/better

### t-universality

**Definition 11.** Let  $\Pi$  be DV-NIKZ<sup>18</sup>.

We say it is *t-universal* if for any distinct

$$y_1, \dots, y_t \text{ s.t. } y_i \notin L (\forall i \in [t])$$

we have

$$(\omega, \text{Ver}(\tau, y_1), \dots, \text{Ver}(\tau, y_t)) = (\omega, v_1, \dots, v_t)$$

where  $(\omega, \tau) \leftarrow \mathcal{S} \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$  and  $v_1, \dots, v_t \leftarrow \mathcal{P}$  where  $\mathcal{P}$  should be the proofs' space.  $\diamond$

<sup>18</sup>Designated verifier non-interactive zero-knowledge



### Enriching DV-NIKZ

Can we enrich DV-NIKZ with labels  $l \in \{0, 1\}^*$ ?

Suppose to have the following:

$$L' = L \parallel \{0, 1\}^* = \{(y, l) : y \in L \wedge l \in \{0, 1\}^*\}$$

Then our scheme changes :  $Prove(\omega, (y, l), x) = \Pi; Ver(\tau, (y, l))$  and , for  $t$ -*universality* , now we can consider 2 distinct  $(y_i, l_i)$ .

### Membership Hard Language (MH)

**Definition 12.** Language  $L$  is **MH** if  $\exists \bar{L}$  such that:

1.  $L \cap \bar{L} = \emptyset$
2.  $\exists$  PPT  $Samp$  outputting  $y \leftarrow \$\mathcal{Y}$  together with  $x \in \bar{\mathcal{X}}$  such that

$$R(y, x) = 1$$

(it's possible to say that  $Samp(1^\lambda) \leftarrow \$\mathcal{Y}$ )

3.  $\exists$  PPT  $\bar{Samp}$  outputting  $y \leftarrow \$\bar{L}$
4.  $\{y : (y, x) \leftarrow \$Samp(1^\lambda)\} \approx_c \{y : y \leftarrow \$\bar{Samp}(1^\lambda)\}$

◇

# Lesson 17

## 17.1 Construction of a CCA-secure PKE

This section exposes a construction of a CCA-secure PKE scheme, using hash-proof systems, membership-hardness, and the  $n$ -universality property.

Let  $\Pi_1, \Pi_2$  be two distinct hash-proof systems for some NP language  $L$  and the range of  $Prove_2$  supports labels ( $L' = L || \{0, 1\}^\ell$ ).

Construct the CCA scheme as follows:  $\Pi := (\mathcal{KGen}, Enc, Dec)$

- $((\overbrace{(\omega_1, \omega_2)}^{pk}, \overbrace{(\tau_1, \tau_2)}^{sk})) \leftarrow \mathcal{KGen}(1^\lambda)$  ,  $(\omega_1, \tau_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{Setup}_1(1^\lambda), (\omega_2, \tau_2) \leftarrow \mathcal{Setup}_2(1^\lambda)$
- Encryption routine:  $Enc((\omega_1, \omega_2), m)$ 
  - $(y, x) \leftarrow \mathcal{Sample}_1(1^\lambda)$
  - $\pi_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{Prove}_1(\omega_1, y, x)$
  - $l := \pi_1 \cdot m$
  - $\pi_2 \leftarrow \mathcal{Prove}_2(\omega_2, (y, l), x)$
  - $c := (c_1, c_2) = ((y, l), \pi_2)$
- Decryption routine:  $Dec((\tau_1, \tau_2), (c_1, c_2))$ 
  - $\hat{\pi}_2 = \mathcal{Verify}_2(\tau_2, c_1)$
  - IF  $\hat{\pi}_2 \neq c_2$  THEN OUTPUT FALSE
  - Recall:  $c_1 = (y, l)$
  - $\hat{\pi}_1 = \mathcal{Verify}_1(\tau_1, y)$
  - OUTPUT  $l \cdot \hat{\pi}_1^{-1}$

Correctness (assume  $\hat{\pi}_i = \pi_i \forall i$ ):

$$\begin{aligned}
 \hat{m} &= Dec(sk, Enc(pk, m)) \\
 &= Dec((\tau_1, \tau_2), Enc((\omega_1, \omega_2), m)) \\
 &= Dec((\tau_1, \tau_2), ((y, l), \pi_2)) \\
 &= l \cdot \hat{\pi}_1^{-1} \\
 &= \pi_1 \cdot m \cdot \hat{\pi}_1^{-1} \\
 &= m
 \end{aligned}$$

Some additional notes (may be incorrect):

- The message space of the second prover is the range of the first prover.
- The message space of the first prover is a multiplicative group
- The message space of the second prover is a polylogarithmic language in  $(\lambda)$

**Theorem 27.** *Assuming  $\pi_1$  is 1-universal,  $\pi_2$  is 2-universal and  $L$  is Membership-hard, then the above scheme is CCA-secure.*  $\diamond$

*Proof.* Five different games will be defined, from  $\text{GAME}_{\Pi,A}^0$  up to  $\text{GAME}_{\Pi,A}^4$ ; the first game will be an analogous formalization of how the above PKE scheme works. It shall be proven that, for either fixed  $b$  in  $\{0,1\}$ :

$$\text{GAME}_{\Pi,A}^0(\lambda, b) = \text{GAME}_{\Pi,A}^1(\lambda, b) \approx_C \text{GAME}_{\Pi,A}^2(\lambda, b) \approx_S \text{GAME}_{\Pi,A}^3(\lambda, b) = \text{GAME}_{\Pi,A}^4(\lambda, b)$$

and finally that  $\text{GAME}_{\Pi,A}^4(\lambda, 0) = \text{GAME}_{\Pi,A}^4(\lambda, 1)$ , therefore concluding that  $\text{GAME}_{\Pi,A}^0(\lambda, 0) \approx_C \text{GAME}_{\Pi,A}^0(\lambda, 1)$ , and proving this scheme is CCA-secure.

T0D0 14: Non sono per niente sicuro riguardo all'origine di  $x$  ed  $y$ , né tantomeno dove sia definito il sampler per essi

The games are defined as follows:




Figure 17.45: Original CCA game

T0D0 15: Non è stato chiaro sull'origine di  $x$  ed  $y$ , inoltre mi manca da scrivere le query di decifratura

□

**Lemma 26.**

$$\forall b, G_0(\lambda, b) \equiv G_1(\lambda, b)$$

◇




Figure 17.46: Use verifiers




Figure 17.47: Sample statements outside the language




Figure 17.48: Modify decryption queries




Figure 17.49:  $\pi_1$  is chosen UAR

*Proof.* This follows by the correctness of  $\Pi_1$  and  $\Pi_2$

$$\Pi_1 = \tau_1 = \text{Ver}_1(\tau, y)$$

$$\Pi_2 = \tilde{\Pi}_2 = \text{Ver}_2(\tau, y)$$

with probability 1 over the choice of  $(\omega_1, \tau_1) \leftarrow \text{\$Setup}_1(1^\lambda)$

$$\Pi_1 \leftarrow \text{Prove}_1(\omega, y, x), (\omega_2, \tau_1) \leftarrow \text{\$Setup}_2(1^\lambda)$$

$$\Pi_2 \leftarrow \text{Prove}(\omega_2, (y, l), x) \forall y \in L, l \in \mathcal{P}_1$$

□

**Lemma 27.**

$$\forall b, G_1(\lambda, b) \approx_c G_2(\lambda, b)$$

◇

*Proof.* Straight forward reduction from membership hardness.

□

**Lemma 28.**

$$\forall b, G_2(\lambda, b) \approx_c G_3(\lambda, b)$$

◇

T0D0 16: I'm not completely sure the next proof is complete

*Proof.* Recall that the difference between  $G_2$  and  $G_3$  is that

$$(g^{(i)}, l^{(i)}, \Pi_2^{(i)}) \text{ such that } y^{(i)} \notin L$$

are answered  $\perp$  in  $G_3$ , instead in  $G_2$

$$\perp \text{ comes out as output} \Leftrightarrow \tilde{\Pi}_2^{(i)} = \text{Ver}(\tau, y^{(i)} \neq \Pi_2^{(i)})$$

It's possible to distinguish **two cases**, looking at  $c = (y, l, \Pi_2)$  :

1. if  $(y^{(i)}, l^{(i)}) = (y, l)$  and  $\tilde{\Pi}_2^{(i)} = \Pi_2^{(i)}$ , it outputs  $\perp$  if in the decryption scheme  $(\Pi_2^{(i)} \neq \tilde{\Pi}_2^{(i)})$  it outputs  $\perp$ .
2. <sup>19</sup> otherwise  $(y^{(i)}, l^{(i)}) \neq (y, l)$  if  $y^{(i)} \notin L$  we want that  $\Pi_2^{(i)}$  doesn't output exactly  $Ver_2(\tau, (y^{(i)}, l^{(i)}))$ , but it should output  $\perp$ .

**EVENT BAD:** If we look at the view of  $\mathcal{A}$ , the only information he knows is

$$(\omega_2, \tilde{\Pi}_2 = Ver_2(\tau_2, y))$$

for  $y \notin L$ .

The value

$$Ver_2(\tau_2, (y^{(i)}, x^{(i)}))$$

for  $y^{(i)} \in L$  and  $(y^{(i)}, l^{(i)}) \neq (y, l)$  is random.

So,

$$\mathcal{P}[BAD] = 2^{-|\mathcal{P}_2|}$$

□

**Lemma 29.**

$$\forall b, G_3(\lambda, b) \equiv G_4(\lambda, b)$$

◇

*Proof.* If we look at the view of  $\mathcal{A}$ , the only information known about  $\tau_1$  is  $\omega_1$ , since the decryption oracle only computes for  $y^{(i)} \in L$

$$Ver_1(\tau, y^{(i)}) = Prove_1(\omega_1, y^{(i)}, x^{(i)})$$

By 1-universality,  $\Pi = Ver_1(\tau, y)$  for any  $y \in L$  is random.

□

**Lemma 30.**

$$G_4(\lambda, 0) \equiv G_4(\lambda, 1)$$

◇

*Proof.* The challenge ciphertext is independent of  $b$ .

□

REVIEW: referencing something from another part of lesson 17

### 17.1.1 Instantiation of U-HPS (Universal Hash Proof System)

**MHL(Membership Hard Language) from DDH**

$\exists r$  using a DDH language such that  $L_{DDH} = \{(c_1, c_2), \exists r | c_1 = g_1^r, c_2 = g_2^r\}$

Given a group  $\mathcal{G}$  of order  $q$  with  $(g_1, g_2)$  as generators, we will have  $(g_1, g_2, c_1, c_2)$  but if we impose  $g_1 = g$  and  $g_2 = g^a$  then the previous construction becomes  $(g, g^a, c_1, c_2)$ . But for definition  $c_1 = g_1^{r_1}$  and  $c_2 = g_2^{r_2}$  then I can write  $(g, g^a, g^r, g^{ar})$ .

Now we can define our U-HPS  $\Pi := (\text{Setup}, \text{Prove}, \text{Verify})$

<sup>19</sup>when decryption oracle doesn't output the challenge

- *Setup*( $1^\lambda$ ): Pick  $x_1, x_2 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$  and define:  
 $\omega = h_1 = (g_1^{x_1}, g_2^{x_2})$ ,  $\tau = (x_1, x_2)$
- *Prove*( $\omega, \underbrace{(c_1, c_2)}_y, r$ ) output  $\Pi = \omega^2$
- *Verify*( $\tau, \underbrace{(c_1, c_2)}_y$ ) output  $\tilde{\Pi} = c_1^{x_1} c_2^{x_2}$

**Correctness:**  $\Pi = \omega^2 = (g_1^{x_1} g_2^{x_2})^r = g_1^{rx_1} g_2^{rx_2} = c_1^{x_1} c_2^{x_2} = \tilde{\Pi}$

**Theorem 28.** *Above construction defines a 1-universal DVNIZK for  $L_{DDH}$*   $\diamond$

*Proof.* We want to prove that if we take any  $(c_1, c_2) \notin L_{DDH}$  the distribution  $(\omega = h_1, \tilde{\Pi} = \text{Verify}(\tau, (c_1, c_2)))$  uniformly distributed.

Define a **MAP**  $\mu(\underbrace{x_1, x_2}_{\text{random}}) = (\omega, \Pi) = (g_1^{x_1}, g_2^{x_2}, c_1^{x_1}, c_2^{x_2})$  it suffices to prove that  $\mu$  is injective. This can easily be done with some constrains:

$$\mu'(x_1, x_2) = \log_{g_1}(\mu(x_1, x_2)) = (\log_{g_1}(\omega), \log_{g_1}(\Pi))$$

For  $r_1 \neq r_2$  then  $c_1 = g_1^{r_1}, c_2 = g_2^{r_2} = g^{\alpha r_2}$ . For  $\alpha = \log_{g_2} g_1$  then  $\Pi = c_1^{x_1} c_2^{x_2} = g_1^{r_1 x_1} g_2^{r_1 x_1 + \alpha r_2 x_2}$ .

$$\mu'(x_1, x_2) = \begin{pmatrix} z_1 \\ z_2 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & \alpha \\ r_1 & r_2 \alpha \end{pmatrix} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} x_1 \\ x_2 \end{pmatrix}$$

Since  $\text{Det} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & \alpha \\ r_1 & r_2 \alpha \end{pmatrix} = \alpha(r_2 - r_1) \neq 0$  the map is injective.

□

- *Setup*( $1^\lambda$ ):
  - Pick  $x_3, x_4, x_5, x_6 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$  and define:
    - \*  $\omega = (h_2, h_3, s) = (g_1^{x_3}, g_2^{x_4}, g_1^{x_5}, g_2^{x_6}, s)$  where  $s$  is a **seed** for a  $\text{CRH} \rightarrow \mathcal{H} = \{H_s\}$
- *Prove*( $\omega, (c_1, c_2, l), r$ )
  - Compute  $\beta = H_s(c_1, c_2, l) \in \mathbb{Z}_p$
  - Output  $\Pi = h_2^r h_3^{r\beta}$
- *Verify*( $\tau, (c_1, c_2, l)$ )
  - Compute  $\beta = H_s(c_1, c_2, l) \in \mathbb{Z}_q$
  - Output  $\tilde{\Pi} = c_1^{x_3 + \beta x_5} c_2^{x_4 + \beta x_6}$

**Correctness:**

$$\Pi = h_2^r h_3^{r\beta} = (g_1^{x_3} g_2^{x_4})^r (g_1^{x_5} g_2^{x_6})^{r\beta} = c_1^{x_3} c_2^{x_4} c_1^{\beta x_5} c_2^{\beta x_6} = c_1^{x_3 + \beta x_5} c_2^{x_4 + \beta x_6} = \tilde{\Pi}$$

**Theorem 29.** *The above construction define a 2-universal DVNIZK for  $L_{DDH}$*   $\diamond$

*Proof. Same goal and procedure as before*

- Take any  $(c_1, c_2) \notin L_{DDH}$

- Fix  $(c_1, c_2, l) \neq (c'_1, c'_2, l')$  s.t.  $(c_1, c_2), (c'_1, c'_2) \notin L_{DDH}$  which means:

$$\begin{aligned} & \bullet (c_1, c_2) = (g_1^{r_1} g_2^{r_2}) \\ & \bullet (c'_1, c'_2) = (g_1^{r'_1} g_2^{r'_2}) \end{aligned} \left\} r_1 \neq r_2 \text{ and } r'_1 \neq r'_2 \right.$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \bullet \beta = H_s(c_1, c_2, l) \\ & \bullet \beta' = H_s(c'_1, c'_2, l') \end{aligned}$$

- Let's define a MAP

$$\begin{aligned} \mu'(x_3, x_4, x_5, x_6) &= (\omega, \widetilde{\Pi} = Ver(\tau, (c_1, c_2, l)), \widetilde{\Pi}' = Ver(\tau, (c'_1, c'_2, l'))) = \\ &= (\underbrace{(h_2, h_3)}_{\omega}, c_1^{x_3+\beta x_5} c_2^{x_4+\beta x_6}, c'_1{}^{x_3+\beta' x_5} c'_2{}^{x_4+\beta' x_6} = \\ &= ((g_1^{x_3} g_2^{x_4}, g_1^{x_5} g_2^{x_6}), g_1^{r_1 x_3 + \beta r_1 x_5} g_2^{r_2 x_4 + \beta r_2 x_6}, g_1^{r'_1 x_3 + \beta' r'_1 x_5} g_2^{r'_2 x_4 + \beta' r'_2 x_6}) \end{aligned}$$

But I can rewrite  $g_2$  as  $g_2 = g_1^\alpha$  since they are generators. So:

$$\begin{aligned} & ((g_1^{x_3+\alpha x_4}, g_1^{x_5+\alpha x_6}), g_1^{r_1 x_3 + \beta r_1 x_5} g_1^{\alpha(r_2 x_4 + \beta r_2 x_6)}, g_1^{r'_1 x_3 + \beta' r'_1 x_5} g_1^{\alpha(r'_2 x_4 + \beta' r'_2 x_6)}) = \\ &= ((g_1^{x_3+\alpha x_4}, g_1^{x_5+\alpha x_6}), g_1^{r_1 x_3 + \alpha r_2 x_4 + \beta r_1 x_5 + \alpha \beta r_2 x_6}, g_1^{r'_1 x_3 + \alpha r'_2 x_4 + \beta' r'_1 x_5 + \alpha \beta' r'_2 x_6}) = \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{pmatrix} z_1 \\ z_2 \\ z_3 \\ z_4 \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & \alpha & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & \alpha \\ r_1 & \alpha r_2 & \beta r_1 & \alpha \beta r_2 \\ r'_1 & \alpha r'_2 & \beta' r'_1 & \alpha \beta' r'_2 \end{pmatrix} \cdot \begin{pmatrix} x_3 \\ x_4 \\ x_5 \\ x_6 \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\text{Since Det} \begin{pmatrix} \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \\ \cdot & \cdot & \cdot & \cdot \end{pmatrix} = \alpha^2(r_2 - r_1)(r'_2 - r'_1)(\beta - \beta') \neq 0$$

**IFF:**

$\overbrace{r_2 \neq r_1, r'_2 \neq r'_1}^{\text{for construction}}, \beta \neq \beta' \rightarrow$  this last condition is true because we picked  $H_s$  collision resistant.

Otherwise  $H_s$  computed on different elements  $((c_1, c_2, l)$  and  $(c'_1, c'_2, l')$ ) will have to output the same  $\beta(= \beta')$ .  $\square$



# Lesson 18

## Cramer-Shoup scheme construction

From the above two proof systems we can construct a PKE scheme, which is attributed to Cramer and Shoup:

T0D0 17: split definition from correctness

- $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \mathcal{KGen}$ , where:
  - $pk := (h_1, h_2, h_3) = (g_1^{x_1} g_2^{x_2}, g_1^{x_3} g_2^{x_4}, g_1^{x_5} g_2^{x_6})$
  - $sk := (x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5, x_6)$
- Encryption procedure:
  - $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$
  - $\beta = H_s(c_1, c_2, c_3) = (g_1^r, g_2^r, h_1^r m)$
  - $Enc(pk, m) = (c_1, c_2, c_3, (h_2 h_3^\beta)^r)$
- Decryption procedure:
  - Check that  $c_1^{x_3 + \beta x_5} c_2^{x_4 + \beta x_6} = c_4$ . If not, output FALSE.
  - Else, output  $\hat{m} = c_3 c_1^{-x_1} c_2^{-x_2}$

## 18.1 Digital signatures

In this section we explore the solutions to the problem of authentication with the use of an asymmetric key scheme. Some observations are in order:

- In a symmetric setting, a verifier routine could be banally implemented as recomputing the signature using the shared secret key and the message. Here, Bob cannot recompute  $\sigma$  as he's missing Alice's secret key (and for good reasons too...). Thus, the verifying routine must be defined otherwise




Figure 18.50: Asymmetric authentication

- In a vaguely similar manner to how an attacker could encrypt messages by itself in the asymmetric scenario, because the public key is known to everyone, any attacker can verify any signed messages, for free

Nevertheless, proving that a DS scheme is secure is largely defined in the same way as in the symmetric scenario, with the UF-CMA property:




Figure 18.51: Unforgeable digital signatures

### 18.1.1 Public Key Infrastructure

The problem now is that Alice has a public key, but she wants "the blue check" over it, so Bob is sure that public key comes only from the true Alice.

To obtain the blue check, Alice needs an universally-trusted third party, called *Certification Authority*, which will provide a special *signature* to Alice for proving her identity to Bob.

The scheme works as follows:

The CA message  $pk'$  is also called as  $cert_A$ , the signature of the CA for Alice.


Now, when Bob wants to check the validity of the Alice's public key:


How can Bob recognize a valid certificate from an expired/invalid one?

The infrastructure provides some servers which contain the lists of the currently valid certificates.

**Theorem 30.** *Signatures are in Minicrypt.* ◇

This is a counterintuitive result, not proven during the lesson, but very interesting because it implies that we can create valid signatures only with hash functions, without considering at all public key encryption.





In the next episodes:

- Digital Signatures from TDP\*
- Digital Signatures from ID Scheme\*
- Digital Signatures from CDH

Where \* appears, something called *Random Oracle Model* is used in the proof. Briefly, this model assumes the existence of an ideal hash function which behaves like a truly random function (outputs a random  $y$  as long as  $x$  was never queried, otherwise gives back the already taken  $y$ ).

# Lesson 19

**Theorem 31.** *The Waters' signature scheme is UFCMA* ◇

*Proof.* The trick is to “program the ‘u’s ” (Venturi)

T0D0 18: Sequence is incomplete/incorrect, have to study it more...




Figure 19.52: Reducing Waters' scheme to CDH

T0D0 19: The following explanation is roundabout, will rectify later

The following describes how the Waters' challenger constructs the  $u$  string. The main idea is, given  $k$  as the message length, to choose each single bit of  $u$  from 1 up to  $k$  such that:

$$\alpha(m) = g_2^{\beta(m)} g^{\gamma(m)}, \quad \beta(m) = x_0 + \sum_{i=1}^k m_i x_i, \quad \gamma(m) = y_0 + \sum_{i=1}^k m_i y_i$$

where  $x_0 \leftarrow \{-kl, \dots, 0\}$ ,  $x_{1-k} \leftarrow \{0, \dots, l\}$ ,  $y_{0-k} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$

In particular:  $l = 2q_s$ , where  $q_s$  is the number of sign queries made by the adversary.

Therefore, let  $u_i = g_2^{x_i} g^{y_i} \quad \forall i \in [0, k]$ . Then:

$$\alpha(m) = g_2^{x_0} g^{y_0} \prod_{i=1}^k (g_2^{x_i} g^{y_i})^{m_i} = g_2^{x_0 + \sum_{i=1}^k m_i x_i} g^{y_0 + \sum_{i=1}^k m_i y_i} = g_2^{\beta(m)} g^{\gamma(m)}$$

T0D0 20: Partizioni, doppi if.... qui non ci ho capito 'na mazza

**Step 1:**  $\sigma = (\sigma_1, \sigma_2) = (g_2^a \alpha(m)^{\bar{r}}, g^{\bar{r}})$ , for  $\bar{r} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q \quad \bar{r} = r - a\beta^{-1}$

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma_1 &= g_2^a \alpha(m)^{\bar{r}} \\ &= g_2^a \alpha(m)^{r - a\beta^{-1}} \\ &= g_2^a (g_2^{\beta(m)} g^{\gamma(m)})^{r - a\beta^{-1}} \\ &= g_2^a g_2^{\beta(m)r - a} g^{\gamma(m)r - \gamma(m)a\beta^{-1}} \\ &= g_2^{\beta(m)r} g^{\gamma(m)r} g^{-\gamma(m)\beta^{-1}} \end{aligned}$$

□

T0D0 21: Mi sono perso durante il rebase, quindi divido la parte di sotto da quella di sopra, e domando : chi viene prima??? Ai posteri l'ardua sentenza.

### 19.0.2 Waters Signature

This is a standard model for PKI which **does not need a Random Oracle**. (or at least I think so)

Let's define a **Bilinear Group** as  $(\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{G}_t, q, g, \hat{e}) \leftarrow \text{BilGen}(1^\lambda)$  where:

- $\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{G}_t$  are prime order groups (order  $q$ ).
- $g$  is a random generator of  $\mathcal{G}$ .
- $(\mathcal{G}, \cdot)$  is a multiplicative group and  $\mathcal{G}_t$  is called target group.
- $\hat{e}$  is a (bilinear) MAP:  $\mathcal{G} \times \mathcal{G} \rightarrow \mathcal{G}_t$  efficiently computable. Defined as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} &\rightarrow \text{Take a generator } g \text{ for } \mathcal{G} \text{ and an element } h \text{ in } \mathcal{G}. \\ &\forall g, h \in \mathcal{G}, a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_q \hat{e}(g^a, h^b) = \hat{e}(g, h)^{ab} = \hat{e}(g^{ab}, h) \\ &\text{and } \hat{e}(g, g) \neq 1 \text{ (Non degenerative)} \end{aligned}$$

Venturi said something here related to Weil pairing over an elliptic curve. I found [this](#). Interesting but not useful.

**Assumption:** CDH is HARD in  $\mathcal{G}$ .

**Observation:** DDH is EASY in  $\mathcal{G}$ !

*Proof.*  $(g, g^a, g^b, g^c) \approx_c (g, g^a, g^b, g^{ab}) \implies \hat{e}(g^a, g^b) \stackrel{?}{=} \hat{e}(g, g^c)$  now just move the exponents and I can transform the first element in  $\hat{e}(g, g^{ab})$  and check if it is equal to  $\hat{e}(g, g^c)$ .  $\square$

Now  $KGen(1^\lambda)$  will:

- Generate some params  $= (\mathcal{G}, \mathcal{G}_t, g, q, \hat{e}) \leftarrow BilGen(1^\lambda)$
- Pick  $a \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$  then  $g_1 = g^a$
- Pick  $g_2 = g^b$  and  $g_2, u_0, u_1, \dots, u_k \leftarrow \mathcal{G}$ .
- Then output:

- $P_k = (params, g_1, g_2, u_0, \dots, u_k)$
- $S_k = g_2^a = g^{ab}$

$Sign(S_k, m)$ :

- Divide the message  $m$  of length  $k$  in bits and not it as follows:  $m = (m[1], \dots, m[k])$
- Now define  $\alpha(m) = u_0 \prod_{i=1}^k u_i^{m[i]}$
- Pick  $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$  and output the signature  $\sigma = (\underbrace{g_2^a}_{S_k} \cdot \alpha(m)^r, g^r) = (\sigma_1, \sigma_2)$

$Vrf(P_k, m, (\sigma_1, \sigma_2))$

- Check  $\hat{e}(g, \sigma_1) = \hat{e}(\sigma_2, \alpha(m)) = \hat{e}(g_1, g_2)$

**Correctness:** "Just move the exponents"

I can separate the second part for bilinearity

$$\hat{e}(g, \sigma_1) = \hat{e}(g, g_2^a \cdot \alpha(m)^r) = \hat{e}(g, g_2^a) \cdot \hat{e}(g, \alpha(m)^r) = \hat{e}(\underbrace{g^a}_{g_1}, g_2) \cdot \hat{e}(\underbrace{g^r}_{\sigma_2}, \alpha(m)) = \hat{e}(g_1, g_2) \cdot \hat{e}(\sigma_2, \alpha(m))$$

We can say that we are moving the exponents from the "private domain" to the "public domain".