

A Tutorial of White-Box Cryptography

Chapter 1 Overview

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Introduction


Preliminaries of white-box cryptography

Conclusion


What is cryptology?

“Cryptology is about communication in the presence of adversaries or potential adversaries”

- R. Rivest



What is cryptography?




What we need for cryptography?


- ▶ Confidentiality: not just mean en/decryption, it imposes allow authorized people access privileged data
- ▶ Integrity: not just mean signature, it includes how to prove the originality and the tractability of the data
- ▶ Applicability: The cryptosystems must be practical

Kerckhoffs principle

- ▶ Do not rely on keeping an algorithm secret
- ▶ Publish an algorithm but keep the key secretly
- ▶ Have some mathematical foundation for the belief that it will be hard to extract the key



Different key types in cryptosystems



Threat model of secret key (1)

- ▶ There are three combinations in the mobile application threat model.
 - ▶ Benign host, Malicious client (APPs?)
 - ▶ Malicious host, Malicious client (Cloud service?)
 - ▶ Benign host, Benign client (VPN?)
- ▶ In most of mobile applications, hosts are assumed to be benign whilst client might be malicious or controlled by adversary.

Threat model of secret key (2)

- ▶ Black-box model: the adversary cannot intrude/alternate/observe the inside of the cryptosystem;
- ▶ Grey-box model: the adversary can **partially** intrude/alternate/observe the inside of the cryptosystem;
- ▶ White-box model: the adversary can **fully** intrude/alternate/observe the inside of the cryptosystem;

Applications of black/grey-model-secure products


- ▶ A typical example is the maturing of USB keys
- ▶ The various manufactories and vendors provide different solutions to make RSA/ECC onboard (which also deliberately design to resist grey-box attackers).
- ▶ Eventually it works like a secure black box (and still evolving)

USB Key型号	外形特征
捷德	
海泰	
飞天	
文鼎创	

Hardware-aided software security

In practice, many kinds of hardware are used to protect software security

- ▶ Environment validation: TPMs
- ▶ Authenticity: USB keys, TPMs
- ▶ Functionality: SE, Crypto ICs, Software USB doggles



Why we need white-box crypto?

- ▶ Although hardware-protected black/grey-box solutions are matured in the last decade, software solutions are still useful in many areas.
- ▶ To the best of my knowledge, the white-box crypto (which includes symmetric/asymmetric-key cryptosystems) is pivotal for the following practical issues.
 - ▶ Hardware protection is costly (**price**)
 - ▶ Hardware solution is incompatible (**interoperability**)
 - ▶ Extreme system security protection (**key obfuscation**)
 - ▶ Algorithm implementation flexibility and complexity (**Complex functionality requirements**)

“counter-examples” on the hardware interoperability



Threat in software solutions

Although software solutions enjoy the interoperability and flexibility, the security problems rise.

- ▶ emulation
- ▶ run step-by-step in a debugger
- ▶ disassemble/decompile

One usually refers to the above attacks as a *white-box* adversary.

Informal definitions of white-box crypto (1)

Informally I have the following concerns about white-box crypto:

- ▶ From the view of crypto key security, it implies
 - ▶ secret key protection: adversary cannot extract secret key from software (no matter whether running or not)
 - ▶ key distribution mechanism: only designated user/server can generate the white-box version secret key (quite close to public-key crypto, but not exactly the same)

Informal definitions of white-box crypto (2)

- ▶ From the view of software developer, it implies
 - ▶ cryptographic obfuscation: the algorithm is public, but only the secret key is obfuscated
 - ▶ code/space/time hardness: the time/memory/space complexities will increased (heavily)
 - ▶ Function abstraction: After white-box implementation, a function's inner functionality is no longer publicly verifiable

Differences between software obfuscation and white-box crypto

Software obfuscation and white-box crypto can operate together to achieve concrete security, while they have different purposes:


- ▶ Software obfuscation does not look for theoretically secure levels of white-box crypto, it should be feasible for practice
- ▶ White-box crypto must be secure either in theory or computational complexity
- ▶ Software obfuscation merely seeks to increase the reverse-engineering costs in a sufficiently discouraging manner for adversary

White-box crypto working range

- ▶ To resist adversary, a software should be secure against:
 - ▶ Static analysis: from binary code to extract information
 - ▶ Dynamic analysis: from memory to extract information
 - ▶ Code lift: change the execution order/function, which breaks the integrity of software
- ▶ For white-box crypto, we mainly focus on
 - ▶ functionality is executed as designed
 - ▶ key is not leaked

Basic security definitions for white-box crypto (1)


- ▶ In SAC 2002, the security notions have been informally described for white-box cryptography by Chow *et al.*. First the key recovery problem is informally defined by **the weak white-box security**



informal definition: (T, S) -incompressible implementation of E_K .
an adversary with full access to $WB(E_K)$ must be unable to derive
an **equivalent*** representation of E_K of size lower than S in time T . **

Basic security definitions for white-box crypto(2)

- For more general security, **the strong white-box security** has been defined by Chow et al.



- ▶ Software security is significant for protecting applications in practice
- ▶ Software obfuscation and white-box cryptography are different fruits on same tree
- ▶ Applications have various requirements on white-box crypto

Thanks for your attentions!

