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Nankai-Baidu Joint Laboratory

Parallel and Distributed Software Technology Lab





➤ Fully Homomorphic Encryption without Bootstrapping

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➤ Efficient Fully Homomorphic Encryption from (Standard) LWE Zvika **B**rakerski Vinod **V**aikuntanathan





- Show that Somewhat HE can be based on LWE, using a new re-linearization technique.
- We introduce a new dimension-modulus reduction technique,
 which shortens the ciphertexts and reduces the decryption complexity





Re-linearization technique:
 does not require hardness assumptions on ideals.
 In contrast, all previous schemes relied on complexity assumptions related to ideals in various rings.





• Re-linearization technique:

To encrypt a bit $m \in \{0,1\}$

using secret key $s \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, a random vector $a \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, and a noise e.

$$c = (a, b = \langle a, s \rangle + 2e + m)$$

$$f_{a,b}(x) = b - \langle a, x \rangle \pmod{q} = b - \sum_{i=1}^{n} a[i] \cdot x[i]$$

decryption: $f_{a,b}(s)$, and then taking the result modulo 2.

Homomorphic multiplication:

$$f_{a,b}(x) \cdot f_{a',b'}(x) = \left(b - \sum a[i] \cdot x[i]\right) \cdot \left(b' - \sum_{\substack{i \in [i] \text{ all oral billy} \\ \text{Software Technology Lab}}} \right)$$



Re-linearization technique:

$$c=(a,\ b=\langle a,s\rangle+2e+m)$$
 $f_{a,b}(x)=b-\langle a,x\rangle \pmod q=b-\sum_{i=1}^n a[i]\cdot x[i]$ decryption: $f_{a,b}(s)$, and then taking the result modulo 2.

$$f_{a,b}(x) \cdot f_{a',b'}(x) = \left(b - \sum a[i] \cdot x[i]\right) \cdot \left(b' - \sum a'[i] \cdot x[i]\right)$$

$$= h_0 + \sum h_i \cdot x[i] + \sum h_{i,j} \cdot x[i]x[j]$$

$$m = s[i], s[i]s[j] \qquad b = \langle a, t \rangle + 2e + m$$

$$= h_0 + \sum h_i \cdot (b_i - \langle a_i, t \rangle) + \sum h_{i,j} \cdot (b_{i,j} - \langle a_{i,j} \rangle) + \sum h_i \cdot (b_{i,j} - \langle a_{i,j} \rangle)$$





• Dimension-modulus reduction technique:

$$(a, b = \langle a, s \rangle + 2e + m) >>> (a', b' = \langle a', t \rangle + 2e' + m)$$

s and t need not have the same dimension n.

 $m{t}$ have not only low dimension but also small modulus $m{p}$



• Dimension-modulus reduction technique:

$$(a, b = \langle a, s \rangle + 2e + m)$$
 >>> $(a', b' = \langle a', t \rangle + 2e' + m)$
intuition: Z_q >>> Z_p

(by simple scaling, up to a small error.)

$$s \to t$$
: $b_{i,\tau} = \langle b_{i,\tau}, t \rangle + e + \left[\frac{p}{q} \cdot 2^{\tau} \cdot s[i] \right]$





• Dimension-modulus reduction technique:

$$(a, b = \langle a, s \rangle + 2e + m) >>> (a', b' = \langle a', t \rangle + 2e' + m)$$

$$s \to t$$
: $b_{i,\tau} = \langle b_{i,\tau}, t \rangle + e + \left[\frac{p}{q} \cdot 2^{\tau} \cdot s[i] \right]$

we scale $2^{\tau} \cdot s[i]$ into an element in Z_p by multiplying by $\frac{p}{q}$ and rounding. (which incurs an additional error of magnitude at most .5)



Re-linearization: FV RLWE

Dimension-modulus reduction: BGV





- Fully Homomorphic Encryption without Bootstrapping
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- They use modulus switching in one shot to obtain a small ciphertext
- We will use it iteratively to keep the noise level essentially constant.

$$m = [\langle c', s \rangle]_p = [\langle c, s \rangle]_q \mod 2.$$

if s is short and p is sufficiently smaller than q, the noise in the ciphertext actually decreases.





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- We will use it iteratively to keep the noise level essentially constant.

$$m = [\langle c', s \rangle]_p = [\langle c, s \rangle]_q \mod 2.$$

a ladder of decreasing moduli

from
$$q_L((L+1) \cdot \mu \ bits)$$
 down to $q_0(\mu \ bits)$

FHE.Add FHE.Refresh

FHE.Mult FHE.Refresh





● 目前已有的两个实现方案

➤BGV方案: Helib (Linux)

Java BGV

