

2019-03-14

Nankai-Baidu Joint Laboratory

Parallel and Distributed Software Technology Lab





Logistic Regression Model Training based on the Approximate Homomorphic Encryption

Andrey Kim¹, Yongsoo Song², Miran Kim², Keewoo Lee¹, and Jung Hee Cheon¹

- ¹ Seoul National University, Seoul, Republic of Korea
- ² University of California, San Diego, United States





Contents

- Abstract (iDASH)
- Related Work
- Paper Algorithm
- Paper Technique
- ☐ Recent Work





Abstract

- ➤ We apply the homomorphic encryption scheme of Cheon et al., and devise a new encoding method. In addition, we adapt Nesterov's accelerated gradient method.
- ➤ Our method shows a state-of-the-art performance (2017) of homomorphic encryption system in a real-world application.
- The submission based on this work was selected as the best solution of Track 3 at iDASH privacy and security competition 2017.



Abstract

> iDASH

- 2017年10月14日,百度安全实验室参加了第7届 iDASH Privacy & Security Workshop,并受邀进行演讲。该 Workshop 是由 UCSD 和 Indiana University 主办,百度、美国国家人类基因研究院(NHGRI)和 Human Longevity 公司赞助。该 Workshop 致力于解决医疗大数据人类基因组分析中的隐私保护问题,并同时举办 iDASH 竞赛,是医疗数据隐私领域的重要学术会议与赛事。学术界享有盛誉的 ACM SIGSAC 副主席 Xiao feng Wang 教授主持了该会议,来自美国国家卫生研究院(NIH)、微软、Intel、IBM以及来自十几个国家的研究员出席了该会议。
- 微软研究院的Dr. Kristin Lauter做了题为《Cryptographic Tools for Genomic Privacy: Ready for Standardization?》的演讲,总结了密码学工具在基因组分析隐私保护方向的研究,以及美国在标准化人类基因组分析的隐私保护的努力。Dr. Kristin 认为,基于同态运算的加密和基于 Intel SGX 的加密各有长处,配合使用可以达到保护隐私的效果。

Nankai-Baidu Joint Laboratory





Abstract

2017 Track 3: Homomorphic encryption (HME) based logistic regression model learning.

Track 3: Homomorphic encryption (HME) based logistic regression model learning

Jung Hee Cheon (Seoul National University), Andrey Kim (Seoul National University), Miran Kim (UCSD), Keewoo Lee (Seoul National University), and Yongsoo Song (Seoul National University)

➤ 2018 Track 2: Secure Parallel Genome Wide Association Studies using Homomorphic Encryption.

Track 2: Secure Parallel Genome Wide Association Studies using Homomorphic Encryption

Miran Kim(UTHealth), Baiyu Li(UCSD), Daniele Micciancio(UCSD), Yongsoo Song(UCSD)

Marcelo Blatt(Duality Technologies), Alexander "Sasha" Gusev(Dana Farber Cancer Institute), Yuriy

Polyakov(Duality Technologies), Kurt Rohloff(Duality Technologies), Vinod Vaikuntanathan(Duality Technologies)





Related Work

- Naehrig et al. and Bos et al. both papers assume that the logistic model has already been trained and is publicly available.
- Aono et al. they shift the computations that are challenging to perform homomorphically to trusted data sources and a trusted client.
- ➤ Xie et al. construct PrivLogit which performs logistic regression in a privacy-preserving but distributed manner.
- Kim et al.

Secure logistic regression based on homomorphic encryption.

Joint Laboratory





Related Work

2017 iDASH Track 3

- ➤ Doing Real Work with FHE: The Case of Logistic Regression.

 Jack L.H. Crawford, Craig Gentry, Shai Halevi, Daniel Platt, and Victor Shoup.

 不像Logistics Regression,使用了复杂的比较操作,可能实用性不强
- ➤ Logistic regression over encrypted data from fully homomorphic encryption.

 Hao Chen, Ran Gilad-Bachrach, Kyoohyung Han, Zhicong Huang, Amir Jalali, Kim Laine, and Kristin Lauter. 参考了首尔国立大学密码实验室的方案
- Logistic Regression Model Training based on the Approximate Homomorphic Encryption.

 Andrey Kim, Yongsoo Song, Miran Kim, Keewoo Lee, and Jung Hee Cheon.
- Privacy-Preserving Logistic Regression Training.
 Charlotte Bonte, and Frederik Vercauteren. 近期工作

Nankai-Baidu
Joint Laboratory
Parallel and Distributed
Software Technology Lab



Logistic Regression

Gradient Descent

- ➤ 初始化权重向量W
- \triangleright for i = 1 : MAX_ITER do
- \succ % compute the gradient g
- \triangleright $\mathbf{W} = \mathbf{W} \boldsymbol{\alpha} \cdot \boldsymbol{g}$

Nesterov's accelerated gradient method

Starting with a random initial $\mathbf{v}_0 = \boldsymbol{\beta}_0$, the updated equations for Nesterov's Accelerated GD are as follows:

$$\begin{cases} \boldsymbol{\beta}^{(t+1)} &= \mathbf{v}^{(t)} - \alpha_t \cdot \nabla J(\mathbf{v}^{(t)}), \\ \mathbf{v}^{(t+1)} &= (1 - \gamma_t) \cdot \boldsymbol{\beta}^{(t+1)} + \gamma_t \cdot \boldsymbol{\beta}^{(t)}, \end{cases}$$

Baidu Pratory Joint Leberology ibuted app Lab

where $0 < \gamma_t < 1$ is a moving average smoothing parameter.



Logistic Regression

Gradient Descent

- ➤ 初始化权重向量W
- \triangleright for i = 1 : MAX_ITER do
- \succ % compute the gradient g
- \triangleright $\mathbf{W} = \mathbf{W} \boldsymbol{\alpha} \cdot \boldsymbol{g}$

Nesterov's accelerated gradient method

Starting with a random initial $\mathbf{v}_0 = \boldsymbol{\beta}_0$, the updated equations for Nesterov's Accelerated GD are as follows:

$$\boldsymbol{\beta}^{(t+1)} = \mathbf{v}^{(t)} - \alpha_t \cdot \nabla J(\mathbf{v}^{(t)}),$$

$$\begin{cases} \mathbf{v}^{(t+1)} = (1 - \gamma_t) \cdot \boldsymbol{\beta}^{(t+1)} + \gamma_t \cdot \boldsymbol{\beta}^{(t)}, \end{cases}$$
(1)

where $0 < \gamma_t < 1$ is a moving average smoothing parameter.





Logistic Regression

Gradient Descent

- ➤ 初始化权重向量W
- \triangleright for i = 1 : MAX_ITER do
- \triangleright % compute the gradient g 初始化数据至区间[-1,+1] 使得 Sigmoid函数的输入值较小
- \triangleright $W = W \alpha \cdot g$

Nesterov's accelerated gradient method

Starting with a random initial $\mathbf{v}_0 = \boldsymbol{\beta}_0$, the updated equations for Nesterov's Accelerated GD are as follows: $\boldsymbol{\beta}^{(t+1)} = \mathbf{v}^{(t)} - \boldsymbol{\gamma}_t \cdot \nabla I(\mathbf{v}^{(t)})$

$$\boldsymbol{\beta}^{(t+1)} = \mathbf{v}^{(t)} - \alpha_t \cdot \nabla J(\mathbf{v}^{(t)}),$$

$$\begin{cases} \mathbf{v}^{(t+1)} = (1 - \gamma_t) \cdot \boldsymbol{\beta}^{(t+1)} + \gamma_t \cdot \boldsymbol{\beta}^{(t)}, \end{cases}$$
(1)

where $0 < \gamma_t < 1$ is a moving average smoothing parameter.






Gradient Descent

- ➤ 初始化权重向量W
- \triangleright for i = 1 : MAX_ITER do
- \triangleright % compute the gradient g
- \triangleright $\mathbf{W} = \mathbf{W} \boldsymbol{\alpha} \cdot \boldsymbol{g}$
- ✓应该必须初始化数据

需要使用多项式拟合Sigmoid函数

 $Sigmoid(yW^TX)$ 使得 yW^TX 落在很小的区间内

 $\{0.5 + 1.20096/8 \times x - 0.81562/8^3 \times x^3\};$








Gradient Descent

- ➤ 初始化权重向量W
- \rightarrow for i = 1 : MAX_ITER do
- \succ % compute the gradient g
- \triangleright $W = W \alpha \cdot g$
- ✓应该必须初始化数据 需要使用多项式拟合Sigmoid函数 Least Squares Approximation

 ${0.5 + 1.20096/8 \times x - 0.81562/8^3 \times x^3}$

初始化数据至区间[-1,+1] 使得 Sigmoid函数的输入值较小







Gradient Descent


- ➤ 初始化权重向量W
- \succ for i = 1 : MAX_ITER do

初始化数据至区间[-1,+1] 使得 Sigmoid函数的输入值较小 % compute the gradient g

 $\mathbf{W} = \mathbf{W} - \boldsymbol{\alpha} \cdot \boldsymbol{\xi}$ Fig. 2. Graphs of sigmoid function and Taylor polynomials

✓应该必须初始 需要使用多项式拟合 Least Squares Approx

 $\{0.5 + 1.20096/8 \times x - 0\}$






Fig. 3. Graphs of sigmoid function and least





Homomorphic Encryption Scheme: HEAAN

他们自己设计的同态加密库

同态加密的计算时间大 密文由系数为大整数的超长维数的向量构成

在应用到实际中, 编码问题也会严重影响计算量

- The main idea is to treat an encryption noise as part of error occurring during approximate computations.
- > We still have a problem that the bit size of message increases exponentially with the depth of a circuit without rounding.

We suggest a new technique - called *rescaling* - that manipulates the message of ciphertext.





Homomorphic Encryption Scheme: HEAAN

- rescaling Technically it seems similar to the modulus-switching method suggested by Brakerski and Vaikuntanatan.
- For an encryption c of m such that $(c, sk) = m + e \pmod{q}$, the rescaling procedure outputs a ciphertext $\lfloor p^{-1} \cdot c \rfloor$ $\pmod{q/p}$, which is a valid encryption of m/p with noise about e/p. It reduces the size of ciphertext modulus and consequently removes the error located in the LSBs of messages, similar to the rouding step of fixed/floating-point arithmetic, while almost preserving the precision of plaintexts.
- \triangleright For a plaintext modulus t and a ciphertext modulus q
- \triangleright BGV $\langle c, sk \rangle = m + te$ (mod q)
- \triangleright BFV $\langle c, sk \rangle = qI + (q/t)m + e \pmod{q}$
- \triangleright HEAAN $\langle c, sk \rangle = m + e \pmod{q}$





Homomorphic Encryption Scheme: HEAAN

- rescaling Technically it seems similar to the modulus-switching method suggested by Brakerski and Vaikuntanatan.
- For an encryption c of m such that $(c, sk) = m + e \pmod{q}$, the rescaling procedure outputs a ciphertext $\lfloor p^{-1} \cdot c \rfloor$ ($mod \ q/p$), which is a valid encryption of m/p with noise about e/p. It reduces the size of ciphertext modulus and consequently removes the error located in the LSBs of messages, similar to the rouding step of fixed/floating-point arithmetic, while almost preserving the precision of plaintexts.
- ► double a; double b; $\stackrel{Encode}{\Longrightarrow}$ int A = 1000a; int B = 1000b $A \times B = 1000000ab \stackrel{Rescaling}{\Longrightarrow} 1000ab \stackrel{Decode}{\Longrightarrow} ab$
- ➤ 否则,应该无法使用代替Sigmoid函数的近似多项式 (因为多项式输出结果会超出[0,1])





Track 2: team evaluation (overall results)

Team	Submission	Schemes	End to End Performance		Evaluation result (F1- Score) at different cutoffs								
			Running time (mins)	Peak Memory (M)	0.01		0.001		0.0001		0.00001		
					Gold	Semi	Gold	Semi	Gold	Semi	Gold	Semi	
A*FHE	A*FHE -1 +	HEAAN	922.48	3,777	0.977	0.999	0.986	0.999	0.985	0.999	0.966	0.998	
	A*FHE -2		1,632.97	4,093	0.882	0.905	0.863	0.877	0.827	0.843	0.792	0.826	
Chimera	Version 1 +	TFHE & HEAAN (Chimera)	201.73	10,375	0.979	0.993	0.987	0.991	0.988	0.989	0.982	0.974	
	Version 2		215.95	15,166	0.339	0.35	0.305	0.309	0.271	0.276	0.239	0.253	
Delft Blue	Delft Blue	HEAAN	1,844.82	10,814	0.965	0.969	0.956	0.944	0.951	0.935	0.884	0.849	
UC San Diego	Logistic Regr +	HEAAN	1.66	14,901	0.983	0.993	0.993	0.987	0.991	0.989	0.995	0.967	
	Linear Regr		0.42	3,387	0.982	0.989	0.980	0.971	0.982	0.968	0.925	0.89	
Duality Inc	Logistic Regr +	CKKS (Aka HEAAN), pkg: PALISADE	3.8	10,230	0.982	0.993	0.991	0.993	0.993	0.991	0.990	0.973	
	Chi2 test		0.09	1,512	0.968	0.983	0.981	0.985	0.980	0.985	0.939	0.962	
Seoul National University	SNU-1	HEAAN	52.49	15,204	0.975	0.984	0.976	0.973	0.975	0.969	0.932	0.905	
	SNU-2		52.37	15,177	0.976	0.988	0.979	0.975	0.974	0.969	0.939	0.909	
IBM	IBM-Complex	CKKS (Aka	23.35	8,651	0.913	0.911	0.169	0.188	0.067	0.077	0.053	0.06	
	IBM- Real	HEAAN), pkg: HEIIb	52.65	15,613	0.542	0.526	0.279	0.28	0.241	0.255	0.218	0.229	

+ no statistical significance in terms of discrimination, see following tables



ai-Baidu ooratory





Track 2: team evaluation (overall results)

Team	Submission	Schemes	End to End Performance		Evaluation result (F1- Score) at different cutoffs								
			Running time (mins)	Peak Memory (M)	0.01		0.001		0.0001		0.00001		
					Gold	Semi	Gold	Semi	Gold	Semi	Gold	Semi	
	A*FHE -1 +	HEAAN	922.48	3,777	0.977	0.999	0.986	0.999	0.985	0.999	0.966	0.998	
A*FHE	A*FHE -2		1,632.97	4,093	0.882	0.905	0.863	0.877	0.827	0.843	0.792	0.826	
	Version 1 +	TFHE & HEAAN	201.73	10,375	0.979	0.993	0.987	0.991	0.988	0.989	0.982	0.974	
Chimera	Version 2	(Chimera)	215.95	15,166	0.339	0.35	0.305	0.309	0.271	0.276	0.239	0.253	
Delft Blue	Delft Blue	HEAAN	1,844.82	10,814	0.965	0.969	0.956	0.944	0.951	0.935	0.884	0.849	
UC San	Logistic Regr +	HEAAN	1.66	14,901	0.983	0.993	0.993	0.987	0.991	0.989	0.995	0.967	
Diego	Linear Regr		0.42	3,387	0.982	0.989	0.980	0.971	0.982	0.968	0.925	0.89	
	Logistic Regr +	CKKS (Aka HEAAN	3.8	10,230	0.982	0.993	0.991	0.993	0.993	0.991	0.990	0.973	
Duality Inc	Chi2 test	pkg: PALISADE	0.09	1,512	0.968	0.983	0.981	0.985	0.980	0.985	0.939	0.962	
Seoul National University	SNU-1	HEAAN	52.49	15,204	0.975	0.984	0.976	0.973	0.975	0.969	0.932	0.905	
	SNU-2		52.37	15,177	0.976	0.988	0.979	0.975	0.974	0.969	0.939	0.909	
	IBM-Complex	CKKS (Aka HEAAN	23.35	8,651	0.913	0.911	0.169	0.188	0.067	0.077	0.053	0.06	
IBM	IBM- Real	pkg: HEIIb	52.65	15,613	0.542	0.526	0.279	0.28	0.241	0.255	0.218	0.229	

+ no statistical significance in terms of discrimination, see following tables



oratory





A New Encoding Method

HEAAN支持的操作

计算时间: 密文×密文 >> 明文×密文

Rotate: $[a, b, \cdots, z] \gg [b, \cdots, z, a]$

SIMD: 密文1 = [a, b, ···, z]

密文2 = [A, B, ···, Z] 模运算

密文1 +密文 $2 = [a + A, b + B, \cdots, z + Z]$

密文 $1 \times$ 密文 $2 = [a \times A, b \times B, \cdots, z \times Z]$

$$Z = \begin{bmatrix} z_{10} & z_{11} & \cdots & z_{1f} \\ z_{20} & z_{21} & \cdots & z_{1f} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ z_{n0} & z_{n1} & \cdots & z_{nf} \end{bmatrix}$$



$$Z \mapsto \mathbf{w} = (z_{10}, \dots, z_{1f}, z_{20}, \dots, z_{2f}, \dots, z_{n0}, \dots, z_{nf})$$

A more efficient encoding method to encrypt a matrix

A training dataset consists of n samples $z_i \in \mathbb{R}^{f+1}$

Nankai-Baidu Joint Laboratory



Parallel and Distributed Software Technology Lab





A New Encoding Method

$$\mathsf{ct}_z = \mathsf{Enc} \begin{bmatrix} z_{10} \ z_{11} \cdots z_{1f} \\ z_{20} \ z_{21} \cdots z_{1f} \\ \vdots \ \vdots \ \ddots \ \vdots \\ z_{n0} \ z_{n1} \cdots z_{nf} \end{bmatrix}, \qquad \mathsf{ct}_{\beta}^{(0)} = \mathsf{Enc} \begin{bmatrix} \beta_0^{(0)} \ \beta_1^{(0)} \cdots \beta_f^{(0)} \\ \beta_0^{(0)} \ \beta_1^{(0)} \cdots \beta_f^{(0)} \\ \vdots \ \vdots \ \ddots \ \vdots \\ \beta_0^{(0)} \ \beta_1^{(0)} \cdots \beta_f^{(0)} \end{bmatrix}$$

 $\mathbf{z}_{i}^{T}\boldsymbol{\beta}^{(t)} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{z}_{i0}, \mathbf{z}_{i1}, \cdots, \mathbf{z}_{if} \end{bmatrix} \cdot \begin{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{\beta}_{i0}, \boldsymbol{\beta}_{i1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{\beta}_{if} \end{bmatrix}^{T}$

Nankai-Baidu Joint Laboratory

Parallel and Distributed Software Technology Lab






A New Encoding Method

SIMD 密文1 = [a, b, ···, z] 密文2 = [A, B, ···, Z] 模运算 密文1 × 密文2 = [a × A, b × B, ···, z × Z] $ct_z \times ct_R^{(0)} = ct_1$ (SIMD Multiply and Rescale it)

$$\mathsf{ct}_1 = \mathsf{Enc} \begin{bmatrix} z_{10} \cdot \beta_0^{(t)} & z_{11} \cdot \beta_1^{(t)} & \cdots & z_{1f} \cdot \beta_f^{(t)} \\ z_{20} \cdot \beta_0^{(t)} & z_{21} \cdot \beta_1^{(t)} & \cdots & z_{1f} \cdot \beta_f^{(t)} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ z_{n0} \cdot \beta_0^{(t)} & z_{n1} \cdot \beta_1^{(t)} & \cdots & z_{nf} \cdot \beta_f^{(t)} \end{bmatrix}$$

Nankai-Baidu Joint Laboratory









A New Encoding Method

SIMD 密文1 = [a, b, ···, z] 密文2 = [A, B, ···, Z] 模运算 密文1 × 密文2 = [a × A, b × B, ···, z × Z]

$$ct_1 \leftarrow Add(ct_1, Rotate(ct_1; 2^j)) \quad for j = 0, 1, ..., log(f+1) - 1$$

$$\mathsf{ct}_1 = \mathsf{Enc} \begin{bmatrix} z_{10} \cdot \beta_0^{(t)} & z_{11} \cdot \beta_1^{(t)} & \cdots & z_{1f} \cdot \beta_f^{(t)} \\ z_{20} \cdot \beta_0^{(t)} & z_{21} \cdot \beta_1^{(t)} & \cdots & z_{1f} \cdot \beta_f^{(t)} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ z_{n0} \cdot \beta_0^{(t)} & z_{n1} \cdot \beta_1^{(t)} & \cdots & z_{nf} \cdot \beta_f^{(t)} \end{bmatrix}$$

Nankai-Baidu Joint Laboratory



 $\mathbf{z}_{i}^{T}\boldsymbol{\beta}^{(t)} = \left[\mathbf{z}_{i0}, \mathbf{z}_{i1}, \cdots, \mathbf{z}_{if}\right] \cdot \left[\boldsymbol{\beta}_{i0}, \boldsymbol{\beta}_{i1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{\beta}_{if}\right]^{T}$

Parallel and Distributed Software Technology Lab



A New Encoding Method

```
SIMD 密文1 = [a, b, ···, z] 密文2 = [A, B, ···, Z] 模运算 密文1 × 密文2 = [a × A, b × B, ···, z × Z] ct_1 \leftarrow Add\left(ct_1, Rotate(ct_1; 2^j)\right) \quad for j = 0, 1, ..., log(f+1) - 1
```

$$\mathsf{ct}_2 = \mathsf{Enc} egin{bmatrix} \mathbf{z}_1^T oldsymbol{eta}^{(t)} & \star & \cdots & \star \ \mathbf{z}_2^T oldsymbol{eta}^{(t)} & \star & \cdots & \star \ dots & dots & dots & dots \ \mathbf{z}_n^T oldsymbol{eta}^{(t)} & \star & \cdots & \star \end{bmatrix}$$

Nankai-Baidu Joint Laboratory

 $\mathbf{z}_{i}^{T}\boldsymbol{\beta}^{(t)} = \left[\mathbf{z}_{i0}, \mathbf{z}_{i1}, \cdots, \mathbf{z}_{if}\right] \cdot \left[\boldsymbol{\beta}_{i0}, \boldsymbol{\beta}_{i1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{\beta}_{if}\right]^{T}$

Parallel and Distributed Software Technology Lab



A New Encoding Method

This step performs a constant multiplication in order to annihilate the garbage values.

$$C = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 1 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$C = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 1 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \end{bmatrix} \quad \mathsf{ct}_3 = \mathsf{Enc} \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{z}_1^T \boldsymbol{\beta}^{(t)} & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\ \mathbf{z}_2^T \boldsymbol{\beta}^{(t)} & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \mathbf{z}_n^T \boldsymbol{\beta}^{(t)} & 0 & \cdots & 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\mathbf{z}_{i}^{T}\boldsymbol{\beta}^{(t)} = \left[\mathbf{z}_{i0}, \mathbf{z}_{i1}, \cdots, \mathbf{z}_{if}\right] \cdot \left[\boldsymbol{\beta}_{i0}, \boldsymbol{\beta}_{i1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{\beta}_{if}\right]^{T}$$



A New Encoding Method

```
SIMD 密文1 = [a, b, ···, z] 密文2 = [A, B, ···, Z] 模运算 密文1 × 密文2 = [a × A, b × B, ···, z × Z] ct_3 \leftarrow Add\left(ct_3, Rotate(ct_3; -2^j)\right) for j = 0, 1, ..., log(f+1) - 1
```

$$\mathsf{ct}_4 = \mathsf{Enc} \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{z}_1^T \boldsymbol{\beta}^{(t)} & \mathbf{z}_1^T \boldsymbol{\beta}^{(t)} & \cdots & \mathbf{z}_1^T \boldsymbol{\beta}^{(t)} \\ \mathbf{z}_2^T \boldsymbol{\beta}^{(t)} & \mathbf{z}_2^T \boldsymbol{\beta}^{(t)} & \cdots & \mathbf{z}_2^T \boldsymbol{\beta}^{(t)} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \mathbf{z}_n^T \boldsymbol{\beta}^{(t)} & \mathbf{z}_n^T \boldsymbol{\beta}^{(t)} & \cdots & \mathbf{z}_n^T \boldsymbol{\beta}^{(t)} \end{bmatrix}$$

Nankai-Baidu Joint Laboratory







Fixed Hessian Method

- ➤ 初始化权重向量W
- \triangleright for i = 1 : MAX_ITER do
- \succ % compute the gradient g and the Hessian matrix H
- $> W = W H^{-1} \cdot g$

Böhning et al. $\overline{H} = -\frac{1}{4}X^TX$





Fixed Hessian Method

- ➤ 初始化权重向量W
- \rightarrow for i = 1 : MAX_ITER do
- \succ % compute the gradient g and the Hessian matrix H
- \triangleright $W = W H^{-1} \cdot g$

Bonte et al. B = diag()

Gerschgorin's circle theorem





Gerschgorin's circle theorem

2 Gershgorin's Theorem

Theorem 2.1 (Gershgorin's Theorem Round 1)

Every eigenvalue of matrix A_{nn} satisfies:

$$|\lambda - A_{ii}| \le \sum_{j \ne i} |A_{ij}| \quad i \in \{1, 2, ..., n\}$$



$$|\lambda - 10| \le |-1| + |0| + |1|$$

 $|\lambda - 10| \le |0.2| + |1| + |-1|$
>>
 $|\lambda - 10| \le 2$
 $|\lambda - 10| \le 2.2$
>>
 $D(10, 2)$
>>
 $8 \le \lambda \le 12$

Example [edit]

Use the Gershgorin circle theorem to estimate the eigenvalues of:

$$A = egin{bmatrix} 10 & -1 & 0 & 1 \ 0.2 & 8 & 0.2 & 0.2 \ 1 & 1 & 2 & 1 \ -1 & -1 & -1 & -11 \end{bmatrix}.$$

Starting with row one, we take the element on the diagonal, a_{ij} as the center for the disc. and apply the formula:

$$\sum_{j
eq i} |a_{ij}| = R_i$$

to obtain the following four discs:

$$D(10,2), D(8,0.6), D(2,3), \text{ and } D(-11,3).$$

Note that we can improve the accuracy of the last two discs by applying the formula to th D(2,1.2) and D(-11,2.2).

The eigenvalues are 9.8218, 8.1478, 1.8995, -10.86