


# Youniq Labs Public Distribution

smart contracts final audit report

June 2023





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## 1. Disclaimer

This is a limited report on our findings based on our analysis, in accordance with good industry practice at the date of this report, in relation to cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in the framework and algorithms based on smart contracts, the details of which are set out in this report. In order to get a full view of our analysis, it is crucial for you to read the full report. While we have done our best in conducting our analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report and cannot claim against us on the basis of what it says or doesn't say, or how we produced it, and it is important for you to conduct your own independent investigations before making any decisions. We go into more detail on this in the disclaimer below – please make sure to read it in full.

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## 2. Overview

HashEx was commissioned by the Youniq Labs team to perform an audit of their smart contract. The audit was conducted between 10/06/2023 and 16/06/2023.

The purpose of this audit was to achieve the following:

- Identify potential security issues with smart contracts
- Formally check the logic behind given smart contracts.

Information in this report should be used for understanding the risk exposure of smart contracts, and as a guide to improving the security posture of smart contracts by remediating the issues that were identified.

The code is available at <a href="https://github.com/techbandorg/youniq-labs-contracts">https://github.com/techbandorg/youniq-labs-contracts</a> GitHub repository and was audited after the commit <a href="mailto:6a2e1cc">6a2e1cc</a>. The scope of the audit includes PublicDistribution and UnkwnBonesGenesis contracts with their dependencies.

**Update.** A recheck was done after the commit <u>0ecd262</u>.


# 2.1 Summary

Project name	Youniq Labs Public Distribution
URL	https://youniqlabs.io
Platform	Ethereum
Language	Solidity

# 2.2 Contracts

Name	Address
UnkwnBonesGenesis	
PublicDistribution	
Whitelist	

# 3. Found issues



## Cac. UnkwnBonesGenesis

ID	Severity	Title	Status
Caclc4	Low	Gas optimizations	

## Cad. PublicDistribution

ID	Severity	Title	Status
Cadlc6	Low	Gas optimizations	⊗ Resolved
Cadlc5	<ul><li>Info</li></ul>	Typos	⊗ Resolved

## 4. Contracts

## Cac. UnkwnBonesGenesis

#### Overview

The Token smart contract is an <u>ERC721</u> token implementation that includes the <u>ERC2981</u> royalty standard, <u>ERC721Enumerable</u> and <u>ERC721URIStorage</u>, and <u>access control</u> features from OpenZeppelin. The token has a maximum supply which is set in the constructor.

## Centralization risks

- The owner can set a URI of the token to a wrong value.
- Accounts with a MINTER role can mint new tokens until the number of the tokens reaches the maximum total supply.
- The owner can change the recipient and the amount of ERC2981 royalties.

#### Issues

## Caclc4 Gas optimizations

- Low
- Resolved

- maxTotalSupply variable can be declared immutable
- multiple storage reads in the updateBaseURI() function: baseURI
- for() loop increment could be alter inside unchecked{} scope in the batchSafeMintWithUri(), batchSafeMint(), updateUriBatch(), and userTokens() functions
- custom errors with error messages doesn't reduce the deployed bytecode, and therefore should be avoided as custom errors may be interpreted incorrectly by user's software using revert(errorString) is recommended

## Cad. PublicDistribution

#### Overview

An NFT token sale contract where users can buy NFT token at a given price. Only whitelisted users are allowed to use contract until specific timestamp. After the sale is ended the owner of the contract distributes purchased tokens.

#### Centralization risk

- The owner may not distribute purchased tokens after the sale.

#### Issues

#### Cadlc6 Gas optimizations

- Low⊘ Resolved
- excessive storage data: **distributionInfo.distributionDuration** is derivable from the **distributionInfo.start** and **distributionInfo.end** timestamps and vice versa
- multiple storage reads in the mint() function: mintIndex
- multiple storage reads in the withdrawEthToOwner() function: owner()
- multiple storage reads in the updateDistributionStartTime() function:
   distributionInfo.distributionDuration
- multiple storage reads in the availableForClaim() function: distributionInfo.totalDistributionQuantity and distributionInfo.distributedQuantity
- unnecessary read from storage in the \_buy() function: userBalance[user]
- for() loop increment could be alter inside unchecked{} scope in the mint() and \_mint()
  functions
- unchecked math could be used for excessETH calculations in the \_buy() function

- unnecessary calculations ethAmount -= excessETH in the \_buy() function
- custom errors with error messages doesn't reduce the deployed bytecode, and therefore should be avoided as custom errors may be interpreted incorrectly by user's software using revert(errorString) is recommended
- start and end, distributionDuration fields in DistributionInfo struct may be declared as uint64 to fit into one storage slot. totalDistributionQuantity, distributedQuantity, quantityPerWallet also may use smaller types depending on the anticipated scale of the quantities being handled, thus optimizing the storage and gas costs

#### Cadlc5 Typos

Info



Typos reduce the code's readability. Typos in 'addresss', 'availavble', 'onwer', 'the function claim...' instead of 'the function claims...'.

#### Cae. Whitelist

#### Overview

A simple owner-governed contract implementing a whitelist of privileged accounts. No issues were found.

# 5. Conclusion

2 low severity issues were found during the audit. 2 low issues were resolved in the update.

The reviewed contracts are highly dependent on the owner's account. See the centralization risks chapters for each contract. Users using the project have to trust the owner and that the owner's account is properly secured.

# Appendix A. Issues' severity classification

- **Critical.** Issues that may cause an unlimited loss of funds or entirely break the contract workflow. Malicious code (including malicious modification of libraries) is also treated as a critical severity issue. These issues must be fixed before deployments or fixed in already running projects as soon as possible.
- **High.** Issues that may lead to a limited loss of funds, break interaction with users, or other contracts under specific conditions. Also, issues in a smart contract, that allow a privileged account the ability to steal or block other users' funds.
- Medium. Issues that do not lead to a loss of funds directly, but break the contract logic.
   May lead to failures in contracts operation.
- **Low.** Issues that are of a non-optimal code character, for instance, gas optimization tips, unused variables, errors in messages.
- **Informational.** Issues that do not impact the contract operation. Usually, informational severity issues are related to code best practices, e.g. style guide.

# Appendix B. List of examined issue types

- Business logic overview
- Functionality checks
- Following best practices
- Access control and authorization
- Reentrancy attacks
- Front-run attacks
- DoS with (unexpected) revert
- DoS with block gas limit
- Transaction-ordering dependence
- ERC/BEP and other standards violation
- Unchecked math
- Implicit visibility levels
- Excessive gas usage
- Timestamp dependence
- Forcibly sending ether to a contract
- Weak sources of randomness
- Shadowing state variables
- Usage of deprecated code

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