


BurpToken

smart contracts final audit report

October 2021





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1. Disclaimer

This is a limited report on our findings based on our analysis, in accordance with good industry practice at the date of this report, in relation to cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in the framework and algorithms based on smart contracts, the details of which are set out in this report. In order to get a full view of our analysis, it is crucial for you to read the full report. While we have done our best in conducting our analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report and cannot claim against us on the basis of what it says or doesn't say, or how we produced it, and it is important for you to conduct your own independent investigations before making any decisions. We go into more detail on this in the disclaimer below - please make sure to read it in full.

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2. Overview

HashEx was commissioned by the CoinBurp team to perform an audit of changes in their smart contracts since the last audit in July 2021 [1]. The audit was conducted between September 21 and October 26, 2021.

The code located in the GitHub repository @coinburp/coinburp-contracts was audited after commit <u>1e0901</u>.

The purpose of this audit was to achieve the following:

- Identify potential security issues with smart contracts.
- Formally check the logic behind given smart contracts.

Information in this report should be used to understand the risk exposure of smart contracts, and as a guide to improving the security posture of smart contracts by remediating the issues that were identified.


2.1 Summary

Project name	BurpToken
URL	https://burptoken.com
Platform	Ethereum
Language	Solidity

2.2 Contracts

Name	Address
RaffleAdminAccessControl	https://github.com/coinburp/coinburp-contracts/ blob/1e09012c9dbd4dc77f9b2b837df7de2d2a5a87e3/contracts/ AccessControl/RaffleAdminAccessControl.sol
RarityRegisterAdminAcces sControl	<pre>https://github.com/coinburp/coinburp-contracts/ blob/1e09012c9dbd4dc77f9b2b837df7de2d2a5a87e3/contracts/ AccessControl/RarityRegisterAdminAccessControl.sol</pre>
Raffle	https://github.com/coinburp/coinburp-contracts/ blob/1e09012c9dbd4dc77f9b2b837df7de2d2a5a87e3/contracts/Raffle/ Raffle.sol
RaffleAccessControl	https://github.com/coinburp/coinburp-contracts/ blob/1e09012c9dbd4dc77f9b2b837df7de2d2a5a87e3/contracts/Raffle/ RaffleAccessControl.sol
ERC1155PrizeWrapper	https://github.com/coinburp/coinburp-contracts/blob/1e09012c9dbd4dc77f9b2b837df7de2d2a5a87e3/contracts/Raffle/ERC1155PrizeWrapper.sol
NFTRarityRegister	https://github.com/coinburp/coinburp-contracts/ blob/1e09012c9dbd4dc77f9b2b837df7de2d2a5a87e3/contracts/ NFTRarityRegister/NFTRarityRegister.sol

3. Found issues



C24. RaffleAdminAccessControl

ID	Severity	Title	Status
C24I53	Medium	onlyManager excessive requirements	
C24I54	Low	Constructor parameters	
C24lb3	Low	Duplicating functions	Ø Acknowledged

$C25.\ Rarity Register Admin Access Control$

ID	Severity	Title	Status
C25I55	Medium	onlyManager excessive requirements	
C25I56	• Low	Constructor parameters	
C25lb2	Low	Duplicating functions	Acknowledged

C27. Raffle

ID	Severity	Title	Status
C27lea	High	claimPrize() re-entrancy	Acknowledged
C27I57	Low	RaffleTicket address	
C27I58	Low	AccessControl setup is doubled	
C27leb	Info	Locked tokens	

C47. RaffleAccessControl

ID	Severity	Title	Status
C47la8	Medium	onlyMinter excessive requirements	

4. Contracts

C24. RaffleAdminAccessControl

Overview

AccessControl contract based on OpenZeppelin contract [2].

Issues

C24I53 onlyManager excessive requirements





The onlyManager() modifier is used in the addRaffleManager(), removeRaffleManager(), addPrizeManager() and removePrizeManager() functions in addition to the requirements from AccessControl's grantRole() and revokeRole() functions. Thus, these functions need to be called by the DEFAUL_ADMIN_ROLE bearer who also has to grant the manager role to himself.

Recommendation

Setup proper AccessControl model with role's admin. Don't forget that 0x00 DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE is its own admin.

Update

The issue was fixed. The onlyManager() modifier was replaced with onlyAdmin().

C24I54 Constructor parameters





The raffleOwner input parameter of the constructor is required to be non-zero but never used nor even stored.

The _managerOf input parameter of the constructor is used only for events and couldn't be changed.

Update

The issue was fixed. raffleOwner became a default admin.

C24lb3 Duplicating functions

LowAcknowledged

Public functions isRaffleManager(), isPrizeManager(), addRaffleManager(), addPrizeManager(), renounceRaffleManager(), renouncePrizeManager(), removeRaffleManager() and removePrizeManager() don't implement additional functionality over standard functions from AccessControl contract, except for emitting custom events. But these events aren't reliable as the same results of granting or revoking roles can be achieved by calling grantRole(), revokeRole() and hasRole() public functions.

C25. RarityRegisterAdminAccessControl

Overview

AccessControl contract based on OpenZeppelin contract [2].

Issues

C25I55 onlyManager excessive requirements

Medium

Resolved

The onlyManager() modifier is used in addRaffleManager(), removeRaffleManager(), addPrizeManager() and removePrizeManager() functions in addition to the requirements from AccessControl's grantRole() and revokeRole() functions. Thus these functions need to be called by the DEFAUL_ADMIN_ROLE bearer who also has to grant the manager role to himself.

Recommendation

Setup proper AccessControl model with the role's admin. Don't forget that 0x00 DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE is its own admin.

Update

The issue was fixed. onlyManager() modifier was replaced with onlyAdmin(). RARITY_REGISTER_MANAGER_ROLE was removed.

C25l56 Constructor parameters

The owner input parameter of the constructor is required to be non-zero but never used nor even stored.

The _managerOf input parameter of the constructor is set to address(this), used only for events and couldn't be changed.

Update

The issue was fixed. The owner became a default admin.

C25lb2 Duplicating functions

Public functions isRarityManager(), addRarityManager(), renounceRarityManager() and removeRarityManager() don't implement additional functionality over standard functions from AccessControl contract except for emitting custom events. But these events aren't reliable as the same results of granting or revoking roles can be achieved by calling grantRole(), revokeRole() and hasRole() public functions.

Resolved

Acknowledged

Low

Low

C27. Raffle

Overview

Lottery contract randomized by Chainlink VRF.

Issues

C27lea claimPrize() re-entrancy



Winner of single raffle with ERC1155 prize can claim all the prize tokens with the same tokenId in different transactions or with single call to <code>claimPrize()</code> with re-entrancy from ERC1155 <code>safeTransferFrom()</code>. The <code>safeTransferFrom()</code> function invokes <code>onERC1155BatchReceived()</code> hook which can be used for reentrancy attack.

Recommendation

Add ReentrancyGuard and check the status of raffleInfo[raffleIndex].prizes[prizeIndex].claimed before claiming in the claimPrize

Update

As the Raffle contract is already deployed, an ERC1155PrizeWrapper.sol contract was created to wrap ERC1155 prizes to ERC721 tokens and use them as prizes.

C27I57 RaffleTicket address



RaffleTicket address should be named in mixedCase to conform with Solidity naming conventions. It should also be declared immutable as it's set only in the constructor.

Update

The issue was fixed. Variable was modified according recommendations.

C27I58 AccessControl setup is doubled



Resolved

_setupRole() initializes twice: in RaffleAdminAccessControl and then in Raffle constructor.

Update

The issue was fixed. Initialization in the Raffle contract was removed.

C27leb Locked tokens



Acknowledged

onERC721Received(), onERC1155BatchReceived(), onERC1155Received() and
supportsInterface() functions of Raffle contract could lead to locked third-party ERC721 and
ERC1155 tokens.

C47. RaffleAccessControl

Overview

AccessControl contract based on OpenZeppelin contract [2].

Issues

C47la8 onlyMinter excessive requirements

Medium

Resolved

The onlyMinter() modifier is used in addMinter() function in <u>L54</u> in addition to the requirements from AccessControl's grantRole(). Thus that function needs to be called by the DEFAUL_ADMIN_ROLE bearer who also has to grant the manager role to himself.

Recommendation

Setup proper AccessControl model with role's admin. Don't forget that 0x00 DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE is its own admin.

Update

The onlyMinter() modifier was changed to onlyAdmin() which checks the same conditions and grantRole() and can be omitted for gas savings.

C62. ERC1155PrizeWrapper

Overview

A token wrapper contract for making ERC1155 tokens compatible with ERC721 Raffle.

Issues

No issues were found.

C26. NFTRarityRegister

Overview

Contract for NFT registration.

5. Conclusion

One high severity issue was found regarding reentrancy in Raffle with ERC1155 tokens in some cases. A wrapper contract was implemented to wrap ERC1155 to ERC721 tokens to use in the Raffle. The contracts are highly dependent on the owner's account. Users using the project have to trust the owner and that the owner's account is properly secured.

Audit includes recommendations on the code improving and preventing potential attacks.

Appendix A. Issues' severity classification

• **Critical.** Issues that may cause an unlimited loss of funds or entirely break the contract workflow. Malicious code (including malicious modification of libraries) is also treated as a critical severity issue. These issues must be fixed before deployments or fixed in already running projects as soon as possible.

- **High.** Issues that may lead to a limited loss of funds, break interaction with users, or other contracts under specific conditions. Also, issues in a smart contract, that allow a privileged account the ability to steal or block other users' funds.
- Medium. Issues that do not lead to a loss of funds directly, but break the contract logic.
 May lead to failures in contracts operation.
- **Low.** Issues that are of a non-optimal code character, for instance, gas optimization tips, unused variables, errors in messages.
- **Informational.** Issues that do not impact the contract operation. Usually, informational severity issues are related to code best practices, e.g. style guide.

Appendix B. List of examined issue types

- Business logic overview
- Functionality checks
- Following best practices
- Access control and authorization
- Reentrancy attacks
- Front-run attacks
- DoS with (unexpected) revert
- DoS with block gas limit
- Transaction-ordering dependence
- ERC/BEP and other standards violation
- Unchecked math
- Implicit visibility levels
- Excessive gas usage
- Timestamp dependence
- Forcibly sending ether to a contract
- Weak sources of randomness
- Shadowing state variables
- Usage of deprecated code

8. References

- 1. CoinBurp audit by HashEx
- 2. AccessControl by OpenZeppelin

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