


PayFlow

smart contracts final audit report

January 2022





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1. Disclaimer

This is a limited report on our findings based on our analysis, in accordance with good industry practice at the date of this report, in relation to cybersecurity vulnerabilities and issues in the framework and algorithms based on smart contracts, the details of which are set out in this report. In order to get a full view of our analysis, it is crucial for you to read the full report. While we have done our best in conducting our analysis and producing this report, it is important to note that you should not rely on this report and cannot claim against us on the basis of what it says or doesn't say, or how we produced it, and it is important for you to conduct your own independent investigations before making any decisions. We go into more detail on this in the disclaimer below – please make sure to read it in full.

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2. Overview

HashEx was commissioned by the PayFlow team to perform an audit of their smart contract. The audit was conducted between 19/01/2022 and 20/01/2022.

The purpose of this audit was to achieve the following:

- Identify potential security issues with smart contracts,
- Formally check the logic behind given smart contracts.

Information in this report should be used for understanding the risk exposure of smart contracts, and as a guide to improving the security posture of smart contracts by remediating the issues that were identified.

The code is available at address <u>0xe3B42852a85d38b18076Ab2dd96B0F894CC0636c</u>.

2.1 Summary

| Project name | PayFlow |
|--------------|--|
| URL | https://bscscan.com/ address/0xe3b42852a85d38b18076ab2dd96b0f894cc0636c |
| Platform | Binance Smart Chain |
| Language | Solidity |

2.2 Contracts

SafeMath

| Name | Address |
|------|---------|
| | |

CodeWithJoe

0xe3b42852a85d38b18076ab2dd9 6b0f894cc0636c

3. Found issues



C77. SafeMath

| ID | Severity | Title | Status |
|--------|------------------------|------------------------|--------------|
| C77I83 | Low | Lack of error-messages | Acknowledged |
| C77I81 | Info | Code formatting issue | Acknowledged |

C76. CodeWithJoe

| ID | Severity | Title | Status |
|--------|--------------------------|-------------------------------|--------------|
| C76I82 | Medium | ERC20 approval race condition | Acknowledged |
| C76I80 | • Low | Unclear behaviour | Acknowledged |

4. Contracts

C77. SafeMath

Overview

Library to perform arithmetic operations protecting from over-/underflow issues.

Issues

C77183 Lack of error-messages

Low

Acknowledged

Error messages are missing in the require-statements of the library.

C77181 Code formatting issue

Info

Acknowledged

At L32 a few functions are implemented within the line, which makes it hard to read the logic of the functions.

C76. CodeWithJoe

Overview

Standard ERC20-Token.

Issues

C76l82 ERC20 approval race condition

Medium

Acknowledged

The token is not protected from the known ERC20 approval race condition attack.

The attack is possible because the approve method overwrites the current allowance

regardless of whether the spender already used it or not, so there is no way to increase or decrease allowance by a certain value atomically unless the token owner is a smart contract, rather than an account.

Recommendation

The risk of the attack could be mitigated by implementing functions <u>increaseAllowance</u> and decreaseAllowance.

C76180 Unclear behaviour

■ Low

Acknowledged

The view-function totalSupply() returns the result of the expression

```
_totalSupply - balances[address(0)];
```

There is no obvious need to calculate the result of **totalSupply** instead of returning a value of **_totalSupply**. In case such behavior is still needed, it should be explained in a comment.

5. Conclusion

The contract supports the ERC20 standard. High Severity issues are not found.

At the moment of the audit, most of the tokens (about 90%) are locked on a Vesting contract located at address 0x0C89C0407775dd89b12918B9c0aa42Bf96518820. While just \sim 0.33% of ones are in a liquidity pool at 0x0EbCD2E67027936f2A878DF1529bE65640d36ce3.

This audit includes recommendations on the code improving and preventing potential attacks.

Appendix A. Issues' severity classification

• **Critical.** Issues that may cause an unlimited loss of funds or entirely break the contract workflow. Malicious code (including malicious modification of libraries) is also treated as a critical severity issue. These issues must be fixed before deployments or fixed in already running projects as soon as possible.

- **High.** Issues that may lead to a limited loss of funds, break interaction with users, or other contracts under specific conditions. Also, issues in a smart contract, that allow a privileged account the ability to steal or block other users' funds.
- Medium. Issues that do not lead to a loss of funds directly, but break the contract logic.
 May lead to failures in contracts operation.
- **Low.** Issues that are of a non-optimal code character, for instance, gas optimization tips, unused variables, errors in messages.
- **Informational.** Issues that do not impact the contract operation. Usually, informational severity issues are related to code best practices, e.g. style guide.

Appendix B. List of examined issue types

- Business logic overview
- Functionality checks
- Following best practices
- Access control and authorization
- Reentrancy attacks
- Front-run attacks
- DoS with (unexpected) revert
- DoS with block gas limit
- Transaction-ordering dependence
- ERC/BEP and other standards violation
- Unchecked math
- Implicit visibility levels
- Excessive gas usage
- Timestamp dependence
- Forcibly sending ether to a contract
- Weak sources of randomness
- Shadowing state variables
- Usage of deprecated code

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