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Week 11b - Fairness

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Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in Decision Support Systems

Decision Support Systems

- After analyzing patterns or making predictions with machine learning algorithms (e.g. deep learning), we still need to make decisions
- This often involves some types of **resource allocation**
- Reasons:
 - Agents face resource constraints
 - Not enough budget to execute all possible actions
 - Not enough time to try all possible alternatives
 -

Our Scenario: The Sharing Economic

Sharing of Private Resources

When I buy a car, how often do I really use it?



The car is not used for over **90%** of the time

Sharing Economy (those with resources)

Sharing of Private Resources

High Cost + Idling Capacity + Critical Mass



Sharing Economy (those with skills)



Foldit – a game to crowdsource complex protein structures (*Nature* 466, 756–760, 2010).

Digitizing Books One Word at a Time



reCAPTCHA – digitalizing books via crowd-powered online security (*Science* 321, 1465–1468, 2008).

TIANCHI天池 HOME COMPETITIONS ~ LEARNING ~ DATA SETS REWARDS ~

Host contest | Log in Registration

Home > Competitions > Introduction



Status

Sponsors

Deadline of Season 1

Rewards

Teams

IJCAI SocInf'16 Contest-Brick-and-Mortar ... Completed



2016/06/01

\$16000


1122

US\$335 Billion
by 2025

Challenges in Decision-making

amazon mechanical turk
beta Artificial Intelligence
40% of the results are
deemed to be of **low quality**

Lack of Efficiency & Quality Control



Difficulties

1. Large-scale congestion game
2. Uncertainty & temporal variations in situational factors
3. Limited time for decision-making

Challenges in Decision-making

- Crowdsourcing systems need **efficiency** in order to attract crowdsourcer who pay for their services
- Crowdsourcing systems need to treat workers **fairly** in order to attract and retain a large pool of skilled workers to satisfy crowdsourcers' requests
- How to match tasks to workers to achieve these two (possibly conflicting) long-term goals?

Balancing Efficiency and Fairness

- Here:
 - We adopt the definition of “Fairness through Unawareness”
 - Develop a smart task allocation algorithm that balances efficiency and fairness considerations
 - Allow “human-over-the-loop” intervention through individual preference statements

Queueing System Modelling



Worker


- Reliability
- Productivity
- Availability

No. of tasks
accepted by w at
time t .


No. of tasks
completed by w
at time t .

$$q_w(t+1) = \max[0, q_w(t) + a_w(t) - c_w(t)]$$

Overall Decision-making Flow



Formulating Optimization Objective



Lyapunov functions: scalar functions that may be used to prove the stability of an equilibrium of an ordinary differential equations.

$$L(t) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{w=1}^N q_w^2(t)$$

What's Captured by Lyapunov Function

- Example:
 - Case 1: three workers having been allocated 5, 5 and 65 tasks, respectively.
 - Case 2: three workers having been allocated 25, 25 and 25 tasks, respectively.
 - $5 + 5 + 65 = 25 + 25 + 25 = 75$
 - No difference? Tasks in Case 2 is obviously more evenly distributed than in Case 1!

What's Captured by Lyapunov Function

- Example:
 - Case 1: three workers having been allocated 5, 5 and 65 tasks, respectively.
 - Case 2: three workers having been allocated 25, 25 and 25 tasks, respectively.
 - With the Lyapunov function, we have:
 - $\frac{1}{2}(5^2 + 5^2 + 65^2) = 2137.5$
 - $\frac{1}{2}(25^2 + 25^2 + 25^2) = 937.5$

Let $\mathbf{q}(t)$ be a vector of all workers' pending task queues during time slot t . Using the *Lyapunov drift*, $\Delta(\mathbf{q}(t))$, the variation in workers' workload can be expressed as:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta(\mathbf{q}(t)) &= \mathbb{E}\{L(t+1) - L(t) | \mathbf{q}(t)\} \\ &= \sum_{w=1}^N \left(\frac{1}{2} q_w^2(t+1) - \frac{1}{2} q_w^2(t) \right) \\ &\leq \sum_{w=1}^N \left(\underbrace{q_w(t)a_w(t)}_{\substack{\uparrow \\ \frac{1}{2}[(a_w^{\max})^2 + (c_w^{\max})^2]}} - q_w(t)c_w(t) + \frac{1}{2}[a_w^2(t) + c_w^2(t)] \right) \end{aligned}$$

Formulating Optimization Objective

- Let $U(t)$ be the expected overall utility (i.e., the sum of the expected task success rate) of a strategy which distributes tasks among a given set of N workers in a given way during time slot t . We have:

$$U(t) = \sum_{w=1}^N r_w(t) a_w(t)$$

 Worker w 's reputation
(i.e. probability of successfully completing a task)

Formulating Optimization Objective

Weightage

$$\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} (\sigma \mathbb{E}\{U(t) | \mathbf{q}(t)\} - \Delta(\mathbf{q}(t)))$$

Collective Utility

Unfairness

Maximize:


$$\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} \sum_{w=1}^N a_w(t) [\sigma_w(t) r_w(t) - q_w(t)]$$

Subject to:

$$r_w(t) \geq r_{\min}, \forall w, \forall t$$

$$a_w(t) \leq nc_w^{\max}, \forall w, \forall t$$

Suitability Ranking Index



- ❖ A simple greedy algorithm
 - ❖ greedy in the sense that decisions are made without considering future values of the relevant variables
- ❖ leads to a solution that has regret
 - ❖ compared to the *optimal solution*
- ❖ which increases with increasing σ
 - ❖ where $\sigma > 0$ is the average eagerness to work expressed by workers

Centralized Implementation

Require: New tasks in the crowdsourcing task at time slot t , $Q(t)$; the average deadline of the new requests, \bar{d} ; $\sigma_w(t)$, $q_w(t)$, c_w^{\max} and $r_w(t)$ values for all workers.

- 1: Compute $\Psi_w(t)$ for all w ;
- 2: Rank all w in descending order of $\Psi_w(t)$;
- 3: **for** each worker w **do**
- 4: **if** $\Psi_w(t) > 0$ **and** $r_w(t) \geq r_{\min}$ **then**
- 5: **if** $Q(t) < \bar{d}c_w^{\max} - q_w(t)$ **then**
- 6: $a_w(t) = Q(t)$;
- 7: **else**
- 8: $a_w(t) = \max[0, \lfloor \bar{d}c_w^{\max} - q_w(t) \rfloor]$;
- 9: **end if**
- 10: **else**
- 11: $a_w(t) = 0$;
- 12: **end if**
- 13: $Q(t) \leftarrow Q(t) - a_w(t)$;
- 14: **end for**
- 15: **return** $(a_1(t), a_2(t), \dots, a_N(t))$;

Distributed Implementation

Require: New tasks pending worker w 's acceptance at time slot t , $Q_w(t)$; the average deadline of the new requests for worker w , \bar{d}_w ; $\sigma_w(t)$, $q_w(t)$, c_w^{\max} and $r_w(t)$ values for worker w .


- 1: Compute $\Psi_w(t)$ for w ;
- 2: **if** $\Psi_w(t) > 0$ **then**
- 3: **if** $Q_w(t) < \bar{d}_w c_w^{\max} - q_w(t)$ **then**
- 4: $a_w(t) = Q_w(t)$;
- 5: **else**
- 6: $a_w(t) = \max[0, \lfloor c_w^{\max} \bar{d}_w - q_w(t) \rfloor]$;
- 7: **end if**
- 8: **else**
- 9: $a_w(t) = 0$;
- 10: **end if**
- 11: **if** $Q_w(t) - a_w(t) > 0$ **then**
- 12: Send the remaining $Q_w(t) - a_w(t)$ task requests to the crowdsourcers;
- 13: **end if**
- 14: **return** $a_w(t)$;

Further Reading

- Y. Zheng, H. Yu, L. Cui, C. Miao, C. Leung & Q. Yang, "SmartHS: An AI Platform for Improving Government Service Provision," in *Proceedings of the 30th AAAI Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence (IAAI-18)*, pp. 7704–7711, 2018.
- Yu, H., Miao, C., Chen, Y., Fauvel, S., Li, X. & Lesser, V. R. Algorithmic management for improving collective productivity in crowdsourcing. *Scientific Reports*, vol. 7, no. 12541, Nature Publishing Group (2017).
- Yu, H., Miao, C., Leung, C., Chen, Y., Fauvel, S., Lesser, V. R. & Yang, Q. Mitigating herding in hierarchical crowdsourcing networks. *Scientific Reports*, vol. 6, no. 4, Nature Publishing Group (2016).

A Walkthrough Example

Example



Example

- Suppose we have 5 workers, $w1$ to $w5$:

ID	Reputation	Eagerness to Work	Productivity (tasks per round)
w1	0.9	10	5
w2	0.8	15	8
w3	0.7	10	15
w4	0.4	20	20
w5	0.2	50	25

Round 1

- All workers start with 0 workload
- Compute their suitability ranking indices

$$\Psi_w(t) = \sigma_w(t)r_w(t) - q_w(t)$$

ID	Reputation	Eagerness to Work	Suitability Ranking Index
w1	0.9	10	9
w2	0.8	15	12
w3	0.7	10	7
w4	0.4	20	8
w5	0.2	50	10

Round 1

- Suppose we only want workers with reputation scores above 0.6 to work on our tasks:

ID	Reputation	Eagerness to Work	Suitability Ranking Index
w1	0.9	10	9
w2	0.8	15	12
w3	0.7	10	7
w4	0.4	20	8
w5	0.2	50	10

Round 1

- Rank the remaining workers in descending order of their suitability ranking indices:

ID	Reputation	Eagerness to Work	Suitability Ranking Index
w2	0.8	15	12
w1	0.9	10	9
w3	0.7	10	7

Round 1

- Rank the remaining workers in descending order of their suitability ranking indices.
- Suppose we have 20 new tasks, all with deadlines = 2 rounds:

ID	Suitability Ranking Index	Productivity (tasks per round)	New Tasks Assigned
w2	12	8	16
w1	9	5	4
w3	7	15	0

Round 2

- Suppose w2 completed 8 tasks during round 1, and w1 completed 4 tasks during round 1:

ID	Reputation	Eagerness to Work	Remaining Tasks	Suitability Ranking Index
w1	0.9	10	0	9
w2	0.8	15	8	4
w3	0.7	10	0	7
w4	0.4	20	0	8
w5	0.2	50	0	10

Round 2

- Suppose we only want workers with reputation scores above 0.6 to work on our tasks:

ID	Reputation	Eagerness to Work	Remaining Tasks	Suitability Ranking Index
w1	0.9	10	0	9
w2	0.8	15	8	4
w3	0.7	10	0	7
w4	0.4	20	0	8
w5	0.2	50	0	10

Round 2

- Rank the remaining workers in descending order of their suitability ranking indices.
- Suppose we have 10 new tasks, all with deadlines = 1 round:

ID	Suitability Ranking Index	Productivity (tasks per round)	New Tasks Assigned
w1	9	5	5
w3	7	15	5
w2	4	8	0

Measuring Fairness

Jain's Fairness Index

- Raj Jain's equation:

$$\mathcal{J}(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) = \frac{(\sum_{i=1}^n x_i)^2}{n \cdot \sum_{i=1}^n x_i^2}$$

- x_i denotes the amount of resources allocated to i .
- It is useful to evaluation fairness of resource allocation among recipients.
- The range of values for J is between 0 and 1. The larger the value, the fairer the allocation.

Example

- [Case 1]:
 - Consider workers a , b and c .
 - Their reputation scores (r) are 0.9, 0.5 and 0.2, respectively.
 - The values of the tasks (v) being allocated to them are 25, 12 and 20, respectively.
 - How fair is the allocation?
- Solution using Jain's Fairness Index:
 - In this case, we want to see if more reputable workers are allocated more valuable tasks
 - Thus, we set $x_i = \frac{v_i}{r_i}$
 - $$J = \frac{\left(\frac{25}{0.9} + \frac{12}{0.5} + \frac{20}{0.2}\right)^2}{3\left[\left(\frac{25}{0.9}\right)^2 + \left(\frac{12}{0.5}\right)^2 + \left(\frac{20}{0.2}\right)^2\right]} = \frac{23036.49}{34042.81} = 0.677$$

Example

- [Case 2]:
 - Consider workers a , b and c .
 - Their reputation scores (r) are 0.9, 0.5 and 0.2, respectively.
 - The values of the tasks (v) being allocated to them are 25, 20 and 12, respectively.
 - How fair is the allocation?
- Solution using Jain's Fairness Index:
 - In this case, we want to see if more reputable workers are allocated more valuable tasks
 - Thus, we set $x_i = \frac{v_i}{r_i}$
 - $$J = \frac{\left(\frac{25}{0.9} + \frac{20}{0.5} + \frac{12}{0.2}\right)^2}{3\left[\left(\frac{25}{0.9}\right)^2 + \left(\frac{20}{0.5}\right)^2 + \left(\frac{12}{0.2}\right)^2\right]} = \frac{16327.16}{17914.81} = 0.911 > 0.677$$
 - Thus, Case 2 is fairer than Case 1.

Example

- What about [Case 3]:
 - Consider workers a , b and c .
 - Their reputation scores (r) are 0.9, 0.5 and 0.2, respectively.
 - The values of the tasks (v) being allocated to them are 12, 20 and 25, respectively.
 - How fair is the allocation?
- Try it yourself



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