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This repository has been archived by the owner on Jan 15, 2019. It is now read-only.
Unfortunately icinga-core has the same problem with its installed permissions that nagios-core has, reported in NagiosEnterprises/nagioscore#424. The following executables are installed owned by the icinga user:
bin/icinga
bin/icingastats
bin/ido2db
bin/log2ido
and likewise with the config files -- at least the following are vulnerable:
etc/icinga.cfg
etc/ido2db.cfg-sample (yeah, it's a sample, but better safe than sorry)
The executables are exploitable because icinga can edit them and root will run them; the configs are vulnerable because icinga can edit them to give the daemons instructions and then insist that those daemons run as root.
The good news for you, potentially, is that maybe you don't care about maintaining compatibility with Nagios XI, and can set icinga.cfg to root:root.
My personal instinct would be to drop the INSTALL_OPTS all around, and then give the icinga user write permission only on those directories it needs. If somebody wants to manage the configs other than icinga.cfg with a dedicated, non-icinga group -- then he could do that either on his own or potentially with a new --with-config-group flag.
The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered:
orlitzky
changed the title
Root privilege escalation via insecure permissions
Root privilege escalation via insecure permissions (CVE-2017-16882)
Nov 19, 2017
Sorry for the delayed answer, it took me while to understand why and how to resolve this one. 1.x has a lower priority to me than 2.x these days.
It only affects source installations as far as I can see, packagers normally apply their own permissions.
The spec file e.g. defines INSTALL_OPTS='' and sets proper permissions to root,root and only allows for runtime directories. Debian does it in the same manner afaik.
I don't mind purging away INSTALL_OPTS anywhere suitable. Users who may depend on the permissions are not forced to upgrade anyways. 1.x is EOL and only collects security and minor patches.
I also guess 1.14.1 will be last one for the 1.x branch.
Hello,
Unfortunately icinga-core has the same problem with its installed permissions that nagios-core has, reported in NagiosEnterprises/nagioscore#424. The following executables are installed owned by the icinga user:
bin/icinga
bin/icingastats
bin/ido2db
bin/log2ido
and likewise with the config files -- at least the following are vulnerable:
etc/icinga.cfg
etc/ido2db.cfg-sample
(yeah, it's a sample, but better safe than sorry)The executables are exploitable because icinga can edit them and root will run them; the configs are vulnerable because icinga can edit them to give the daemons instructions and then insist that those daemons run as root.
The good news for you, potentially, is that maybe you don't care about maintaining compatibility with Nagios XI, and can set
icinga.cfg
toroot:root
.My personal instinct would be to drop the
INSTALL_OPTS
all around, and then give the icinga user write permission only on those directories it needs. If somebody wants to manage the configs other than icinga.cfg with a dedicated, non-icinga group -- then he could do that either on his own or potentially with a new--with-config-group
flag.The text was updated successfully, but these errors were encountered: