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Q

Toolforge webservices are in the final stages of migrating to the toolforge.org domain.

Please help us clean up older documentation referring to tools.wmflabs.org!

Incident documentation/20190613-wdqs

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Summary

From June 13 ~15:10UTC to ~15:50 UTC the public WDQS endpoint in eqiad was overloaded by a bot to the point where it was not serving user queries. There is no reason to think that this bot was malicious. To mitigate this, the python-requests user agent is temporarily banned from accessing WDQS, consistent with our user agent policy ...

Impact

The WDQS public endpoint in eqiad was unavailable from ~15:25 to ~15:45 UTC ₽.

The python-requests user agent is still being banned, we are waiting to implement a more gentle solution before removing this ban.

The internal WDQS endpoint was not impacted.

Detection

Problem was detected by the Icinga LVS probe.

Timeline

All times in UTC.

- 15:10: load starts to increase on the public wdgs egiad cluster
- 15:31: Icinga LVS alert for wdqs.svc.eqiad.wmnet

Conclusions

- identifying and throttling bots is a hard problem
- we need to take more drastic action to protect the stability of the service (aggressively throttle generic user agents)

What went well?

- problem was detected automatically in a timely manner
- good collaboration and clear communication between

What went poorly?

- while we do have logic to throttle abusive bots, this throttling was not sufficient to protect the service
- we are still banning python-requests as a user agent, which affects a number of bots

Where did we get lucky?

• This happened during SRE offsite, when most SRE are in the same timezone. Luckily this wasn't when all of them were sleeping!

Actionables

- We know that our throttling of bot is far from perfect (this is a hard problem). Some idea are already being discussed on phab:T219477
- ban logs are too verbose on disk (mitigated by https://gerrit.wikimedia.org/r/c/operations/puppet/+/516837 [])
- our user agent policy discourages the use of generic user agents, we should start to be more agressive in throttling generic UA or ban requests with no UA (https://gerrit.wikimedia.org/r/c/wikidata/query/rdf/+/516834 2)
- our own clients should follow our policy, for example our icinga checks should have a meaningful UA (https://gerrit.wikimedia.org/r/c/operations/puppet/+/517032@)
- remove the ban on the python-requests UA once we have a more gently throttling solution in place

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