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Incident documentation/20190916-kubernetes-dns

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Summary

2 services (citoid, cxserver) in eqiad had partial failures. In the case of citoid, results were not augmented enough, in the case of cxserver, translations were not returned.

Impact

- Citoid was not augmenting results for citation with zotero data for 46 minutes.
- cxserver was not returning translations for usage in ContentTranslation in eqiad for 35 minutes.

Detection

Detection was by both by human as well as [Icinga](#).

Timeline

CoreDNS was enabled in codfw+eqiad today over the course of many hours (a process slowed down on purpose). Unfortunately [Calico](#) network policy rules were not correctly applied in eqiad (since the mid August migration to helmfile). The reason was the calico-policy-controller which does syncing between the Kubernetes NetworkPolicy objects and the Calico store, had configuration referencing the codfw datacenter.

The CoreDNS change required all pods to be restarted for the change to be applied, which was done in a slow rolling restart for loop. When it was understood that there is an issue, it was stopped, saving the other services.

- 13:43 Citoid partial outage begins. No alerts, it is evident however in Grafana dashboards
- Citoid was the service that suffered the most timewise, from 13:43 - 14:29

[https://grafana.wikimedia.org/d/NJkCVermz/citoid?](https://grafana.wikimedia.org/d/NJkCVermz/citoid?refresh=5m&panelId=15&fullscreen&orgId=1&from=1568641410756&to=1568644177940&var-dc=eqiad%20prometheus%2Fk8s&var-service=citoid)

[refresh=5m&panelId=15&fullscreen&orgId=1&from=1568641410756&to=1568644177940&var-dc=eqiad%20prometheus%2Fk8s&var-service=citoid](https://grafana.wikimedia.org/d/NJkCVermz/citoid?refresh=5m&panelId=15&fullscreen&orgId=1&from=1568641410756&to=1568644177940&var-dc=eqiad%20prometheus%2Fk8s&var-service=citoid)

- Cxserver was the other service that was hit, shortly after. Smaller time window, it did alert, although no SMS sent, as it was partial

[https://grafana.wikimedia.org/d/F7rttgqzm/cxserver?](https://grafana.wikimedia.org/d/F7rttgqzm/cxserver?refresh=1m&panelId=15&fullscreen&orgId=1&from=1568642277671&to=1568643894326&var-dc=eqiad%20prometheus%2Fk8s&var-service=cxserver)

[refresh=1m&panelId=15&fullscreen&orgId=1&from=1568642277671&to=1568643894326&var-dc=eqiad%20prometheus%2Fk8s&var-service=cxserver](https://grafana.wikimedia.org/d/F7rttgqzm/cxserver?refresh=1m&panelId=15&fullscreen&orgId=1&from=1568642277671&to=1568643894326&var-dc=eqiad%20prometheus%2Fk8s&var-service=cxserver)

- Helmfile deploys were also problematic in eqiad due to tiller failing DNS requests to the Kubernetes API, touched one deploy, namely the first deploy of [Wikifeeds](#) in eqiad, no alert (and none seems to be required).
- 14:29 full recovery

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The fix was merging the change mentioned below and applied using helmfile. Luckily enough, kube-system namespace was not touched yet by the breaking change, so there was no need to work around it.

All times in UTC.

Conclusions

What weaknesses did we learn about and how can we address them?

- Humans are the weakest link. The process went perfect in codfw and hence not everything was checked before applying it in eqiad.

What went well?

- Automated monitoring detected the incident when it reached cxserver
- It was root caused relatively quickly
- It only partially impacted editors, mildly inconveniencing them.

What went poorly?

- Citoid never logged anything, making the root cause finding a tad slower
- The CoreDNS internal kubernetes service wasn't adequately tested.

Where did we get lucky?

- The operator was looking into graphs from the beginning, spotted the issue and was able to react.


How many people were involved in the remediation?

- 1 SRE

Links to relevant documentation

New service so nothing yet.

Actionables

- Fix the calico configuration <https://gerrit.wikimedia.org/r/537121>.  **Done**
- Monitor coreDNS. <https://phabricator.wikimedia.org/T234545>
- Monitor zotero indirectly via citoid <https://phabricator.wikimedia.org/T234544>

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