

ONIONNS:
TOR-POWERED DISTRIBUTED DNS
FOR TOR HIDDEN SERVICES

by

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PUBLIC ABSTRACT

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The Tor network is a second-generation onion routing system that aims to provide anonymity, privacy, and Internet censorship resistance to its users. In recent years it has grown significantly in response to revelations of national and global electronic surveillance, and remains one of the most popular anonymity networks in use today. Tor is also known for its support of anonymous websites within its network. The domain names for these services are tied to distributed public key infrastructure but suffer from usability challenges due to their randomly-generated addresses. In response to this difficulty, in this work we introduce OnionNS, a novel and decentralized Tor-powered DNS that provides unique user-selected domain names to Tor hidden services.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Onion Routing

As the prevalence of the Internet and other communication has grown, so too has the development and usage of privacy-enhancing systems. These are tools and protocols that provide privacy by obfuscating the link between a user's identification or location and their communications. Privacy is not achieved in traditional Internet connections because SSL/TLS encryption cannot hide IP and TCP headers, which must be exposed to allow routing between two parties; eavesdroppers can easily break user privacy by monitoring these headers. A closely related property is anonymity – a part of privacy where user activities cannot be tracked and their communications are indistinguishable from others. Tools that provide these systems hold a user's identity in confidence, and privacy and anonymity are often provided together. Following a general distrust of unsecured Internet communications and in light of the 2013-current revelations by Edward Snowden of Internet surveillance by the Five Eyes, users have increasingly turned to these tools for their own protection. Privacy-enhancing and anonymity tools may also be used by the military, researchers working in sensitive topics, journalists, law enforcement running tip lines, activists and whistleblowers, or individuals in countries with Internet censorship. These users may turn to proxies or VPNs, but these tools often track their users for liability reasons and thus rarely provide anonymity. Furthermore, they can easily break confidence to destroy user privacy. More complex tools are needed for a stronger guarantee of privacy and anonymity.

Today, most anonymity tools descent from mixnets, a concept invented by David Chaum in 1981. [1] In a mixnet, user messages are transmitted to one or more mixes, who each partially decrypt, scramble, delay, and retransmit the messages to other mixes or

to the final destination. This enhances privacy by heavily obscuring the correlation between the origin, destination, and contents of the messages. Mixnets have inspired the development of many varied mixnet-like protocols and have generated significant literature within the field of network security. [2] [3]

Mixnet descendants can generally be classified into two distinct categories: high-latency and low-latency systems. High-latency networks typically delay traffic packets and are notable for their greater resistance to global adversaries who monitor communication entering and exiting the network. However, high-latency networks, due to their slow speed, are typically not suitable for common Internet activities such as web browsing, instant messaging, or the prompt transmission of email. Low-latency networks, by contrast, do not delay packets and are thus more suited for these activities, but they are more vulnerable to timing attacks from global adversaries. [4] In this work, we detail and introduce new functionality within low-latency protocols.

Onion routing is a technique for enhancing privacy of TCP-based communication across a network and is the most popular low-latency descendant of mixnets in use today. It was first designed by the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory in 1997 for military usage [5] [6] but has since seen widespread usage. In onion routing with public key infrastructure (PKI), a user selects a set network nodes, typically called *onion routers* and together a *circuit*, and encrypts the message with the public key of each router. Each encryption layer contains the next destination for the message – the last layer contains the message’s final destination. As the *cell* containing the message travels through the network, each of these onion routers in turn decrypt their encryption layer like an onion, exposing their share of the routing information. The final recipient receives the message from the last router, but is never exposed to the message’s source. [3] The sender therefore has privacy because the recipient does not know the sender’s location, and the sender has anonymity if no identifiable or distinguishing information is included in their message.

The first generation of onion routing used circuits fixed to a length of five, assumed a static network topology, and most notably, introduced the ability to mate two circuits at a




Figure 1.1: An example cell and message encryption in an onion routing scheme. Each router “peals” off its respective layer of encryption; the final router exposes the final destination.

common node or server. This last capability enabled broader anonymity where the circuit users were anonymous to each other and to the common server, a capability that was adopted and refined by later generation onion routers. Second generation introduced variable-length circuits, multiplexing of all user traffic over circuits, exit policies for the final router, and assumed a dynamic network by routing updates throughout the network. A client, Alice, in second-generation onion routers also distributed symmetric keys through the cell layers. If routers remember the destinations for each message they received, the recipient Bob can send his reply backwards through the circuit and each router re-encrypts the reply with their symmetric key. Alice unwraps all the layers, exposing the Bob’s reply. The transition from public-key cryptography to symmetric-key encryption significantly reduced the CPU load on onion routers and enabled them to transfer more packets in the same amount of time. However, while influential, first and second generation onion routing networks have fallen out of use in favor of third-generation systems. [3]

1.2 Tor

Tor is a third-generation onion routing system. It was invented in 2002 by Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson, and Paul Syverson of the Free Haven Project and the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory [4] and is the most popular onion router in use today. Tor inherited many of the concepts pioneered by earlier onion routers and implemented several key changes: [3] [4]

- **Perfect forward secrecy:** Rather than distributing keys via onion layers, Tor clients negotiate a TLS Diffie-Hellman-Merkle ephemeral key exchange with each of the routers in turn, extending the circuit one node at a time. These keys are then purged when the circuit is torn down; this achieves perfect forward secrecy, a property that ensures that the symmetric encryption keys will not be revealed if long-term public keys are later compromised.
- **Circuit isolation:** Second-generation onion routers mixed cells from different circuits in realtime, but later research could not justify this as an effective defence against an active adversary. [3] Tor abandoned this in favor of isolating circuits from each other inside the network. Tor circuits are used for up to 10 minutes or whenever the user chooses to rotate to a fresh circuit.
- **Three-hop circuits:** Previous onion routers used long circuits to provide heavy traffic mixing. Tor removed mixing and fell back to using short circuits of minimal length. With three relays involved in each circuit, the first node (the *guard*) is exposed to the user's IP address. The middle router passes onion cells between the guard and the final router (the *exit*) and its encryption layer exposes it to neither the user's IP nor its traffic. The exit processes user traffic, but is unaware of the origin of the requests. While the choice of middle and exits can be routers can be safely random, the guard nodes must be chosen once and then consistently used to avoid a large cumulative chance of leaking the user's IP to an attacker. This is of particular importance for circuits from hidden services. [7] [8]
- **Standardized to SOCKS proxy:** Tor simplified the multiplexing pipeline by transitioning from application-level proxies (HTTP, FTP, email, etc) to a TCP-level SOCKS proxy, which multiplexed user traffic and DNS requests through the onion circuit regardless of any higher protocol. The disadvantage to this approach is that Tor's client software has less capability to cache data and strip identifiable information out of a protocol. The countermeasure was the Tor Browser, a fork of Mozilla's open-source

Firefox with a focus on security and privacy. To reduce the risks of users breaking their privacy through Javascript, it ships with the NoScript extension which blocks all web scripts not explicitly whitelisted. The browser also forces all web traffic, including DNS requests, through the Tor SOCKS proxy, provides a Windows-Firefox user agent regardless of the native platform, and includes many additional security and privacy enhancements not included in native Firefox. The browser also utilizes the EFF’s HTTPS Everywhere extension to re-write HTTP web requests into HTTPS whenever possible; when this happens the Tor cell contains an additional inner encryption layer.

- **Directory servers:** Tor introduced a set of trusted directory servers to distribute network information and the public keys of onion routers. Onion routers mirror the digitally signed network information from the directories, distributing the load. This simplified approach is more flexible and scales faster than the previous flooding approach, but relies on the trust of central directory authorities. Tor ensures that each directory is independently maintained in multiple locations and jurisdictions, reducing the likelihood of an attacker compromising all of them. [3] We describe the contents and format of the network information published by the directories in section 1.2.3.
- **Dynamic rendezvous with hidden services:** In previous onion routers, circuits mated at a fixed common node and did not use perfect forward secrecy. Tor uses a distributed hashtable to record the location of the introduction node for a given hidden service. Following the initial handshake, the hidden service and the client then meet at a different onion router chosen by the client. This approach significantly increased the reliability of hidden services and distributed the communication load across multiple rendezvous points. [4] We provide additional details on the hidden service protocol in section 1.2.4 and our motivation for addition hidden service infrastructure in section 1.3.

As of March 2015, Tor has 2.3 million daily users that together generate 65 Gbit/s of traffic. Tor’s network consists of nine authority nodes and 6,600 onion routers in 83 coun-

tries. [9] In a 2012 Top Secret presentation leaked by Edward Snowden, Tor was recognized by the U.S. National Security Agency as the "the king of high secure, low latency Internet anonymity". [10] [11] In 2014, BusinessWeek claimed that Tor was "perhaps the most effective means of defeating the online surveillance efforts of intelligence agencies around the world." [12]

1.2.1 Design

Tor's design focuses on being easily deployable, flexible, and well-understood. Tor also places emphasis on usability in order to attract more users; more user activity translates to an increased difficulty of isolating and breaking the privacy of any single individual. Tor however does not manipulate any application-level protocols nor does it make any attempt to defend against global attackers. Instead, its threat model assumes that the capabilities of adversaries are limited to observing fractions of Tor traffic, that they can actively delay, delete, or manipulate traffic, that they may attempt to digitally fingerprint packets, that they may run onion routers themselves, and that they may compromise a fraction of other existing routers. Together, most of the assumptions may be broadly classified as traffic analysis attacks. Tor's final focus is defending against these types of attacks. [4]

1.2.2 Circuit Construction

TAPm [13] NTap, [14] NTor, on the other hand, uses the more efficient elliptic curve group Curve25519: [15]

Todo: the following paragraph is not a complete description of Tor's crypto. I don't describe the NTor routing protocol.

The client first establishes a TLS connection with the first relay, R_1 , using the relay's public key. The client then performs an ECDHE key exchange to negotiate K_1 which is then used to generate two symmetric session keys: a forward key $K_{1,F}$ and a backwards key $K_{1,B}$. $K_{1,F}$ is used to encrypt all communication from the client to R_1 and $K_{1,B}$ is used for all replies from R_1 to the client. These keys are used conjunction with the symmetric cipher suite negotiated during the TLS handshake, thus forming an encrypted tunnel with




Figure 1.2: Anatomy of the construction of a Tor circuit.

How Tor Works




Figure 1.3: A circuit through the Tor network.

perfect forward secrecy. Once this one-hop circuit has been created, the client then sends R_1 the RELAY_EXTEND command, the address of R_2 , and the client’s half of the Diffie-Hellman-Merkle protocol using $K_{1,F}$. R_1 performs a TLS handshake with R_2 and uses R_2 ’s public key to send this half of the handshake to R_2 , who replies with his second half of the handshake and a hash of K_2 . R_1 then forwards this to the client under $R_{1,B}$ with the RELAY_EXTENDED command to notify the client. The client generates $K_{1,F}$ and $K_{1,B}$ from K_2 , and repeats the process for R_3 , [16] as shown in Figure 3. The TCP/IP connections remain open, so the returned information travels back up the circuit to the end user.

At the application layer, this data is packed and padded into equally-sized Tor *cells*, transmission units of 512 bytes. Tor further obfuscates user traffic by changing the circuit path every ten minutes, [17] as shown in Figure 4. A new circuit can also be requested manually by the user.

If this happens, end-to-end encryption is complete and an outsider near the user would be faced with up to four layers of TLS encryption: $K_{1,F}(K_{2,F}(K_{3,F}(K_{server}(\text{client request}))))$ and likewise $K_{1,B}(K_{2,B}(K_{3,B}(K_{server}(\text{server reply}))))$ for the returning traffic, making traffic analysis very difficult.

1.2.3 Consensus Documents




Figure 1.4: A Tor circuit is changed periodically, creating a new user identity.

These nodes in the circuit are commonly referred to as *guard node*, *middle relay*, and the *exit node*, respectively. Only the first node is exposed to the origin of TCP traffic into Tor, and only the exit node can see the destination of traffic out of Tor. The middle router, which passes encrypted traffic between the two, is unaware of either.

The Tor network is maintained by nine authority nodes, who each vote on the status of nodes and together hourly publish a digitally signed consensus document containing IPs, ports, public keys, latest status, and capabilities of all nodes in the network. The document is then redistributed by other Tor nodes to clients, enabling access to the network. The document also allows clients to authenticate Tor nodes when constructing circuits, as well as allowing Tor nodes to authenticate one another. Since all parties have prior knowledge of the public keys of the authority nodes, the consensus document cannot be forged or modified without disrupting the digital signature. [18]

1.2.4 Hidden Services

Must use the same guard node. [7] [8]

Although Tor's primary and most popular use is for secure access to the traditional Internet, since 2004 Tor also supports anonymous services, such as websites, marketplaces, or chatrooms. These are a part of the Dark Web and cannot be normally accessed outside the context of Tor. In contrast to Tor-anonymized web requests where the client is anonymous

but the server is known, Tor hidden services provide bidirectional anonymity where both parties remain anonymous and never directly communicate with one another. This allows for a greater range of communication capabilities. [19]

Tor hidden services are known only by their public RSA key. Tor does not contain a DNS system for its websites; instead the domain names of hidden services are an 80-bit truncated SHA-1 hash of its public key, postpended by the .onion top-level domain (TLD). Once the hidden service is contacted and its public key obtained, this key can be checked against the requested domain to verify the authenticity of the service server. This process is analogous to SSL certificates in the clearnet, however Tor's authenticity check leaks no identifiable information about the anonymous server. If a client obtains the hash domain name of the hidden service through a backchannel and enters it into the Tor Browser, the hidden service lookup begins.

Preceding any client communication, the hidden server, Bob, first builds Tor circuits to several random relays and enables them to act as *introduction points* by giving them its public key, B_K . The server then uploads its public key and the fingerprint identity of these nodes to a distributed hashtable inside the Tor network, signing the result. When a client, Alice, requests contact with Bob, Alice's Tor software queries this hashtable, obtains B_K and Bob's introduction points, and builds a Tor circuit to one of them, ip_1 . Simultaneously, the client also builds a circuit to another relay, rp , which she enables as a rendezvous point by telling it a one-time secret, sec .




Figure 1.5: Alice uses the encrypted cookie to tell Bob to switch to rp .




Figure 1.6: Bidirectional communication between Alice and the hidden service.

She then sends to ip_1 a cookie encrypted with B_K , containing rp and sec . Bob decrypts this message, builds a circuit to rp , and tells it sec , enabling Alice and Bob to communicate. Their communication travels through six Tor nodes: three established by Alice and three by Bob, so both parties remain anonymous. From there traditional HTTP, FTP, SSH, or other protocols can be multiplexed over this new channel.

1.3 Motivation

The usability of hidden services is severely challenged by their non-intuitive 16-character base58-encoded domain names. To choose several prominent examples, `3g2upl4pq6kufc4m.onion` is the address for the DuckDuckGo hidden service, `33y6fjyhs3phzfjj.onion` is the Guardian's SecureDrop service for anonymous document submission, and `blockchainbdgpzk.onion` is the anonymized edition of `blockchain.info`. It is rarely clear what service a hidden server is providing by its domain name alone without relying on third-party directories for the correlation, directories which must be updated and reliably maintained constantly. These must be then distributed through backchannels such as `/r/onions`, `the-hidden-wiki.com`, or through a hidden service that is known in advance. It is a frequent topic of conversation inside Tor communities. It is clear that this problem limits the usability and popularity of Tor hidden services. Although there have been some workarounds that are partially successful, the issue remains unresolved. It is for these reasons that I propose OnionNS as a full solution.

CHAPTER 2

PROBLEM STATEMENT

2.1 Assumptions and Threat Model

The design of OnionNS is based on several main assumptions and threat vectors:

- Not all Tor nodes can be trusted. It is already well-known in the Tor community that some Tor nodes are run by malicious operators, curious researchers, experimenting developers, or government organizations. Nodes can be wiretapped, become semi-honest, or behave in an abnormal fashion. However, the majority of Tor nodes are honest and trustworthy: a reasonable assumption considering that Tor's large userbase must make this assumption when using Tor for anonymity or privacy-enhancement purposes.
- For an M -sized set chosen randomly from Tor nodes that have the stable and fast flags, $\lceil \frac{M}{2} \rceil$ or more of them are at least semi-honest. This assumption is very similar to the assumption made when Tor clients create circuits: that all three nodes in a circuit are honest and less than all of them are semi-honest. Relays with stable and fast flags have more consensus weight are thus more likely to be chosen relative to other nodes during circuit construction.
- The amount of dishonest Tor nodes does not increase in response to the inclusion of OnionNS into Tor infrastructure. Specifically, that if an attacker Eve can predict the next set of *quorum* nodes (section 5.5.3) that Eve does not have enough time to make those nodes dishonest. This is a reasonable assumption because regular Tor traffic is far more valuable to an attacker than DNS data is, so penetration of the Tor network

would have occurred already if Eve meant to introduce disruption. OnionNS data structures are almost all public anyway.

- Adversaries have access to some of Tor inter-node traffic and to portions of general Internet communication. However, attackers do not have not have a global view of Internet traffic; namely they cannot always correlate connections into the Tor network with connections out of the Tor network. This assumption is also made by the Tor community and developers. No attempt is made to defend against a global attacker from either Tor or OnionNS.
- Adversaries are not breaking properly-implemented Tor circuits and their modern components, namely TLS 1.2, the AES cipher, ECDHE key exchange, and the SHA2 series of digests, and that they maintain no backdoors in the Botan and OpenSSL implementations of these algorithms.

2.2 Design Principles

Tor's high security environment is challenging to the inclusion of additional capabilities, even to systems that are backwards compatible to existing infrastructure. Anonymity, privacy, and general security are of paramount importance. We enumerate a short list of requirements for any secure DNS system designed for safe use by Tor clients. We later show how existing works do not meet these requirements and how we overcome these challenges with OnionNS.

1. The registrations must be anonymous; it should be infeasible to identify the registrant from the registration.
2. Lookups must be anonymous or at least privacy-enhanced; it should not be trivial to determine both a client's identity and the hidden service that the client is requesting.
3. Registrations must be publicly confirmable; all parties must be able to verify that the registration came from the desired hidden service and that the registration is not a forgery.

4. Registrations must be securely unique, or have an extremely high chance of being securely unique such as when this property relies on the collision-free property of cryptographic hash functions.
5. It must be distributed. The Tor community will adamantly reject any centralized solution for Tor hidden services for security reasons, as centralized control makes correlations easy, violating our first two requirements.
6. It must remain simple to use. Usability is key as most Tor users are not security experts. Tor hides non-essential details like routing information behind the scenes, so additional software should follow suite.
7. It must remain backwards compatible; the existing Tor infrastructure must still remain functional.
8. It should not be feasible to maliciously modify or falsify registrations in the database or in transit through insider attacks.

Several additional objectives, although they are not requirements, revolve around performance: it should be assumed that it is impractical for clients to download the entirety or large portions of the DNS database in order to verify any of the requirements, a DNS system should take a reasonable amount of time to resolve domain name queries, and that the system should not introduce any significant load on client computers.

CHAPTER 3

CHALLENGES

3.1 Zooko's Triangle

One of the largest challenges is inherent to the difficulty of designing a distributed system that maintains a correlation database of human-meaningful names in a one-to-one fashion. The problem is summarized in Zooko's Triangle, an influential conjecture proposed by Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn in late 2001. The conjecture states that in a persistent naming system, only two out of the three following properties can be established: [20]

- Human meaningfulness: the names have a quality of meaningfulness and memorability to the users.
- Securely unique: for any name, duplicates do not exist.
- Distributed: the naming system lacks a central authority or database for allocating and distributing names.




Figure 3.1: Zooko's Triangle.

Tor hidden service .onion domains, PGP keys, and Bitcoin addresses are secure and decentralized but are not human-meaningful; they use the large key-space and the collision-free properties of secure digest algorithms to ensure uniqueness, so no centralized database is needed to provide this property. Tradition domain names on the Clearnet are memorable and provably collision-free, but use a hierarchical structure and central authorities under the jurisdiction of ICANN. Finally, human names and nicknames are meaningful and distributed, but not securely collision-free. [21]

3.2 Synchronization

CHAPTER 4

EXISTING WORKS

Several workarounds exist that attempt to alleviate the issue, with one used in practice, but none are fully successful. Other DNS systems already exist, including some that are distributed, but they are either not applicable, or their design makes it extremely challenging to integration into the Tor environment. Two primary problems occur when attempting to use existing DNS systems: being able to prove the correlation of ownership between the DNS name and the hidden service, and the leakage of information that may compromise the anonymity of the hidden service or its operator. As hidden services are only known by their public key and introduction points, it is not easy to use only the hidden service descriptor to prove ownership, and there are privacy and security issues with requiring any more information. Due to these problems, no existing works have been yet integrated into the Tor environment, and the one workaround that is used in practice remains only partially successful.

4.1 Encoding Schemes

In an attempt to address the readability and the memorability of hidden service domain names, two changes to the encoding of domain names have been proposed, with one used in practice.

Shallot, originally created by an anonymous developer sometime between 2004 and 2010, is an application which uses OpenSSL to generate many RSA hidden service keys in an attempt to find one that has a desirable hash, such as one that begins with a meaningful noun. [22] By brute-forcing the domain key-space, Shallot will eventually find a domain that is meaningful and partially memorable to the hidden service operator. Shallot was used by Blockchain.info (blockchainbdgpzk.onion), by Facebook (facebookcorewwi.onion), and by

many other hidden services in an attempt to make their domain name appear less random. However, Shallot only partially successful because the size of the domain key-space is too large to be fully brute-forced in any reasonable length of time. For example, on a 1.5 GHz processor, Shallot is expected to take approximately 25 days to find a key whose hash contains 8 custom letters out of the 16 total. [22] Tor Proposal 224 makes this solution even worse as it suggests 32-byte domain names which embed an entire ECDSA hidden service key in base32. [23] Although prefixing the domain name with a meaningful word helps identify a hidden service at a glance, it does nothing to alleviate the logistic problems of entering a hidden service domain name, including the remaining random characters, manually into the Tor Browser.

A different encoding scheme was proposed in 2011 by Simon Nicolussi, who suggested that encoding the key hash as a series of words, using a dictionary known in advance by all parties. The list of words would then represent the domain name, rather than base58. While this scheme would improve the memorability of hidden services, the words cannot all be chosen by the hidden service operator, and brute-forcing with Shallot would again only be partially successful due to the large key-space. Therefore this solution could be used to generate some words that relate to the hidden service in a meaningful way, but this scheme is only a partial solution. [19]

These schemes do not change the underlying hidden service protocol, they just attempt to increase the readability of the domain names in Tor Browser. Compared against our original requirements, they meet the anonymity for registration and lookups due to Tor circuits, the confirmability because the domain is the hash of the public key, the uniqueness of domain names due to the collision-free property of SHA-1, the distributed requirement by way of the distributed hashtable stored throughout the Tor network, and resistance to malicious modifications because of the strong association between domain names and the hidden service key. However, it fails to meet the simplicity requirement because although hidden service domain names are entered in the traditional manner into the Tor Browser, the domain names are not entirely human-meaningful nor memorable. The domain names con-

tinue to suffer from usability problems, only partially alleviated by these encoding schemes. These workarounds do not introduce any new DNS systems or change the existing Tor hidden service protocol in any way that allows for customized domain names, but these partial solutions are worthy of mention nevertheless.

4.2 Clearnet DNS

The Internet Domain Name Service (DNS) was originally designed in 1983 as a hierarchical naming system to link domain names to Internet Protocol (IP) addresses and translate one to the other. IP addresses specify the location of a computer or device on a network and domain names identify that resource. Domain names therefore operate as an abstraction layer, allowing servers to be moved to a different IP address without loss of functionality. The names consist of a top-level domain (TLD) that is prefixed by a sequence of labels, delimited by dots. The labels divide the DNS system into zones of responsibility, where each label can be unique within that zone, but not necessarily across different zones. Each label can consist of up to 63 characters and the domain names can be up to 253 characters in total length. In contrast to IP addresses, domain names are human-meaningful and easily memorized, so DNS is a crucial component to the usability of the Internet.

The Clearnet DNS system suffers from several significant shortcomings that make it inappropriate for use by Tor hidden services. First, responses to DNS queries are not authenticated by digital signatures, so spoofing by a MITM attack is possible. Secondly, queries and responses are not encrypted, so it is easy for anyone wiretapping port 53 to correlate end-users to their activities, even if the communication to those websites is protected by TLS/HTTPS. Third, it suffers from DNS cache poisoning, in which an attacker pretends to be an authoritative server and sends incorrect or malicious records to local DNS resolvers. Finally, owning a TLD specifically for Tor hidden services (such as .tor) is prohibitively expensive. While DNS looks traditionally go through the Tor circuit and are resolved by Tor exit nodes, the shortcomings of the Clearnet DNS system make it unsuitable for our purposes.

The traditional Clearnet DNS system meets only a few of our requirements; registrations require a significant amount of identifiable and geographic information and thus are far from anonymous, lookups occur without encryption or signatures and are therefore neither anonymous nor privacy-enhanced, registrations are by default not publically confirmable but can be made so through use of an expensive SSL certificate from a central authority, the system is zone-based but is managed by centralized organizations and is therefore only partially distributed, and while it is very simple to use, extremely popular, and backwards compatible with TCP/IP, a Tor-specific TLD does not exist and falsifications of registrations is possible in a number of different ways. For its many security issues we therefore dismiss it as a possible solution.

4.3 Namecoin

Namecoin (NMC) is a decentralized peer-to-peer information registration and transfer system, developed by Vincent Durham in early 2011. It was the first fork of Bitcoin and as such inherits most of Bitcoin's design and capabilities. Like Bitcoin, a digital cryptocurrency created by pseudonymous developer Satoshi Nakamoto in 2008, Namecoin holds name records and transactions in a public ledger known as a blockchain. Users may hold Namecoins, and may prove ownership and authorize transactions with their private secp256k1 ECDSA key. Each transaction is a transfer of ownership of a certain amount of NMC from one public key to another, and as all transactions are recorded into the blockchain by the Namecoin network, all Namecoins can be traced backwards to the point of origin. Purchasing a name-value pair, such as a domain name, consumes 0.01 Namecoins, thus adding value and some expense to names in the system. Durham added two rules to Namecoin not present in Bitcoin: names in the blockchain expire after 36,000 blocks (about every 250 days) unless renewed by the owner and no two unexpired names can be identical. Namecoin domain names use the .bit TLD, which is not in use by ICANN.

The blockchain data structure is Nakamoto's novel answer to the problem of ensuring agreement of critical data across all involved parties. This prevents the double-spending of Bitcoins, or in Namecoin's case the prevention of duplicate names. Starting from an




Figure 4.1: Three traditional Namecoin transactions.

initial genesis block, all blocks of data link to one another by referencing the hash of a previous block. Blocks are generated and appended to the chain at a relatively fixed rate by a process known as mining. The mining process is the solving of a proof-of-work (PoW) problem in a scheme similar to Adam Back’s Hashcash: find a nonce that when passed through two rounds of SHA256 (SHA256²) produces a value less than or equal to a target T . This requires a party to perform on average $\frac{1}{Pr[H \leq T]} = \frac{2^{256}}{T}$ amount of computations, but it is easy to verify afterwards that $\text{SHA256}^2(\text{msg}||n) \leq T$. Once the PoW is complete, the block (containing the back-reference hash, a list of transactions, and the PoW variables) is broadcasting to rest of the network, thus forming an append-only chain whose validity everyone can confirm. As each block is generated, the miner receives fresh Namecoins, thus introducing newly-minted Namecoins into the system at a fixed rate. Blocks cannot be modified retrospectively without requiring regeneration of the PoW of that block and all subsequent blocks, so the PoW locks blocks in the chain together. Nodes in the Namecoin network collectively agree to use the blockchain with the highest accumulation of computational effort, so an adversary seeking to modify the structure would need to recompute the proof-of-work for all previous blocks as well as out-perform the network, which is currently considered infeasible. [24]

Each block in the blockchain consists of a header and a payload. The header contains a hash of the previous block’s header, the root hash of the Merkle tree built from the




Figure 4.2: A sample blockchain.

transactions in this block, a timestamp, a target T , and a nonce. The block payload consists of a list of transactions. The root node of the Merkle tree ensures the integrity of the transaction vector: verifying that a given transaction is contained in the tree takes $\log(n)$ hashes, and a Merkle tree can be built $n * \log(n)$ time, ensuring that all transactions are accounted for. The hash of the previous block in the header ensures that blocks are ordered chronologically, and the Merkle root hash ensures that the transactions contained in each block are ordered chronologically as well. The target T changes every 2016 blocks in response to the speed at which the proof-of-work is solved such that Bitcoin miners take two weeks to generate 2016 blocks, or one block every 10 minutes. The change in target ensures that the difficulty of the proof-of-work remains relatively constant as processing capabilities increase according to Moore's Law. In the event that multiple nodes solve the proof-of-work and generate a new block simultaneously, the forked block becomes orphaned, the transactions recycled, and the network converges to follow the blockchain with the longest path from the genesis node, thus the one with the most amount of PoW behind it. [24]

Namecoin is particularly noteworthy in that it was the first system to prove Zooko's Triangle false in a practical sense. The blockchain public ledger is held by every node in the distributed network, and human-meaningful names can be owned and placed inside it. The rules of the Namecoin network tell all participants to ensure that there are no name duplicates, and anyone holding the blockchain can verify this property. Names cannot be inserted retroactively due to the PoW, so these properties are ensured. Thus, Namecoin achieves all three properties in Zooko's Triangle. Namecoin is the most commonly-used alternative DNS system and is noted for its security and censorship resistance. In 2014,

Namecoin was recognized by ICANN as the most well-known example of a PKI and DNS system with an emphasis of distributed control and privacy, a growing trend in light of the revelations about the US National Security Agency (NSA) by Edward Snowden. [25]

While Namecoin is perhaps the most well-known secure distributed DNS system, it too is not applicable to Tor's environment. One of the main problems is one of practicality: it is unreasonable to require all Tor users to be able to download the entire Namecoin blockchain, which currently stands at 2.05 GB as of January 2015, [26] in order to know DNS records and verify the uniqueness of names. While this burden could be shifted to Tor nodes, Tor clients must then be able to trust the nodes to return an accurate record or even the correct block that contained that record. If the client queried the Namecoin network for DNS information through a Tor circuit, they would have no way of verifying the accuracy of the information without holding a complete blockchain to verify it. Secondly, the hidden service operator would have to prove that he owned both the ECDSA private key attached to the Namecoin record and the private RSA key attached to his hidden service in a manner that is both publicaly confirmable and didn't compromise his identity or location. These problems make Namecoin difficult to integrate securely into Tor. While we recognize Namecoin for its novelty and OnionNS shares some similarities with Namecoin, Namecoin itself is not a viable solution here.

Namecoin meets only some of our initial requirements; anonymity during registration can be met when the hidden service operator uses a Tor circuit, anonymity or privacy-enhancement during lookup can be met when the Tor client uses a Tor circuit for the query, public confirmability of the name to the hidden service is not easily met, domain name uniqueness is met by the Namecoin network but not easily proven without access to the entire blockchain, the distributed property is met by the nature of the network, simplicity is not fully met by Namecoin and further software would have be developed to accomplish this objective for Tor integration, backwards compatibility is unknown but could theoretically be met by certain designs, and resistance to malicious modifications or falsifications is met by the network but again not easily proven without access to the entire blockchain.

CHAPTER 5

SOLUTION

5.1 Overview

We propose Onion Name Service, or OnioNS for short. The system translates .tor domain names to .onion hidden service addresses using syntax adapted from the Clearnet DNS. In this chapter, first we describe the construction and contents of a distributed append-only ledger called a “page-chain”, a data structure that holds DNS records and functionally resembles Namecoin’s blockchain. Secondly, we describe how this page-chain can be used by the Tor network to power a publicly-verifiable distributed DNS system on top of existing Tor hidden service infrastructure. At a high level, OnioNS’ master page-chain is maintained by a randomly-selected rotating set of high-capacity Tor nodes. Other Tor nodes may mirror the page-chain, distributing the load and responsibilities across the network. The system supports a variety of command and control operations including Create, Domain Query, Onion Query, Modify, Move, Renew, and Delete.

5.2 Cryptographic Primitives

OnioNS makes use of cryptographic hash algorithms, digital signatures, proof-of-work, and a pseudorandom number generator. We now describe our choices of fundamental cryptographic algorithms.

- Hash function - We choose SHA-384 for most applications for its greater resistance to preimage, collision, and pseudo-collision attacks over SHA-256, which is itself significantly stronger than Tor’s default hidden service hash algorithm, SHA-1. SHA-384 is included in the National Security Agency’s Suite B Cryptography for protecting up to Top Secret information.

- Digital signatures - Our default method is EMSA-PSS, (EMSA4) a probabilistic signature scheme defined by PKCS1 v2.1 and republished in 2003's RFC 3447, using a Tor node's 1024-bit RSA key with the SHA-384 digest. For signatures inside our proof-of-work scheme, we rely on EMSA-PKCS1-v1.5, (EMSA3) defined by 1998's RFC 2315. In contrast to EMSA-PSS, its deterministic nature prevents hidden service operators from bypassing the proof-of-work and brute-forcing the signature to validate the record.
- Proof-of-work - We select scrypt, a password-based key derivation function which is notable for its large memory and CPU requirements during its operation. The scrypt function provides significantly greater resistance to custom hardware attacks and massively parallel computation primarily due to its memory requirements. This limits attackers to the same software implementation and asymptotic cost as legitimate users. [27] We choose scrypt because of these advantages over other key derivation functions such as SHA-256 or PBKDF2.
- Pseudorandom number generation - In applications that require pseudorandom numbers from a known seed, we use the Mersenne Twister generator. In all instances the Mersenne Twister is initialized from the output of a hash algorithm, negating the generator's weakness of producing substandard random output from certain types of initial seeds.

We use the JSON format to encode records and databases of records. JSON is significantly more compact than XML, but retains readability. Its support of basic primitive types is highly applicable to our needs. Additionally, we consider the JSON format safer than byte-level encoding.

5.3 Data Structures

OnionNS uses five main data structures: records, snapshots, pages, AVL trees, and a hashtable bitset. Here we describe these structures and how an individual machine can use them. The design assumes that the machine has access to Tor's consensus documents and

can verify them; here we use the consensus documents as both a source of network and cryptographic information and as an agreed-upon time-based one-time password. In other words, the machine holding these structures can be assumed to be a Tor client.

5.3.1 Record




Figure 5.1: A sample domain name: a sequence of labels separated by delimiters. Here we use the .tor TLD and resolve the “www” third-level domain the same as the second-level domain by default.

A record is a simple data structure that represents a single DNS operation. Every record contains a public signing key, is self-signed, and contains a full list of domain names claimed by the issuer. Anyone may claim any second-level domain name that is not currently in use. There are five different types of records, each representing a corresponding control operation: Create, Modify, Move, Renew, and Delete.

As a distributed system has no central authorities from which one can purchase domain names, it is necessary to implement a system that introduces a cost of ownership. This fulfils three main purposes:

1. Significantly reduces the threat of record flooding.
2. Introduces a cost of investment that encourages the use of domain names and the availability of their servers.
3. Increases the difficulty of domain squatting, a denial-of-service where one claims one or more second-level domains for the purpose of making them unavailable to others. This attack is particularly difficult to resolve as records do not contain any personally-identifying information.

We introduce a proof-of-work system based on scrypt into all records. Proof-of-work schemes are noteworthy for their asymmetry: they require the issuer to find an answer to a computational problem that is feasible but moderately hard, but once found the solution is easily verified by any recipient. Proof-of-work is used in Hashcash, Namecoin, and in other cryptocurrencies.

Create

A Create record consists of nine components: *type*, *nameList*, *contact*, *timestamp*, *consensusHash*, *nonce*, *pow*, *recordSig*, and *pubHSKey*. Fields that are optional are blank unless specified, and all fields are encoded in base64, except for *nameList* and *timestamp*, which are encoded in standard UTF-8. These are defined in Table 5.3.1.

Field	Required?	Description
type	Yes	A textual label containing the type of record. In this case, <i>type</i> is set to “Create”.
nameList	Yes	An array list of up to 24 domain names and their destinations. which can be domains with either the .tor or .onion TLDs. Domain names can be up to 16 levels deep and each name can be up to 32 characters long, though the full domain name cannot exceed 128 characters in length. This field must also contain second-level domain names, which must match any subdomains (names at level < 2) claimed by the issuer. In this way, records can be referenced by their unique master second-level domain names and issuers cannot claim ownership of domain names that they do not own.

contact	No	The final 16, 24, or 32 characters in the issuer's PGP key fingerprint, if he has a key chooses to disclose it. If the fingerprint is listed, clients may query a public keyserver for this fingerprint, obtain the PGP public key, and contact the owner over encrypted email.
timestamp	Yes	The UNIX timestamp of when the issuer created the registration and began the proof-of-work to validate it. This timestamp cannot be more than 48 hours old nor in the future relative to the recipient's clock.
consensusHash	Yes	The SHA-384 hash of a consensus document published at 00:00 GMT no more than 48 hours before the record was received by the recipient.
nonce	Yes	Four bytes that serve as a source of randomness for the proof-of-work.
pow	Yes	16 bytes that store the result of the proof-of-work.
recordSig	Yes	The digital signature of all preceding fields, signed using the issuer's private key.
pubHSKey	Yes	The issuer's public key in PKCS.1 DER encoding. When the SHA-1 hash of the decoded key is converted to base58 and truncated to 16 characters the resulting hidden service address must match at least one <i>nameList</i> destination.

Table 5.1: A Create record, which contains fields common to all records. Every record is self-signed and must have verifiable proof-of-work before it is considered valid.

Issuers must complete the proof-of-work before transmitting the record to the recipient. Let the variable *central* consist of all fields except *recordSig* and *pow*. The issuer must then find a *nonce* such that the SHA-384 of *central*, *pow*, and *recordSig* is $\leq 2^{\text{difficulty} * \text{count}}$, where *difficulty* specifies the order of magnitude of the work that must be done and *count* is the number of second-level domain names claimed. For each *nonce*, *pow* and *recordSig* must be regenerated. When the proof-of-work is complete, the valid and complete record is represented in JSON format and is ready for transmission.

Modify

A Modify record allows an owner to update his registration with updated information. The Modify record has identical fields to Create, but *type* is set to “Modify”. The owner corrects the fields, updates *timestamp* and *consensusHash*, revalidates the proof-of-work, and transmits the record. Modify records have a difficulty of $\frac{\text{difficulty}_{\text{Create}}}{4}$. Modify records can be used to add and remove domain names but cannot be used to claim additional second-level domains.

Move

A Move record is used to transfer one or more second-level domain names and all associated subdomains from one owner to another. Move records have all the fields of a Create record, have their *type* is set to “Move”, and contain two additional fields: *target*, a list of domain-destination pairs, and *destPubKey*, the public key of the new owner. Domain names and their destinations contained in *target* cannot be modified; they must match the latest Create, Renew, or Modify record that defined them. Move records also have a difficulty of $\frac{\text{difficulty}_{\text{Create}}}{4}$.

Renew

Second-level domain names (and their associated domain names) expire every *L* days because (as explained below) the page-chain has a maximum length of *L* pages. Renew records must be reissued periodically at least every *L* days to ensure continued ownership

of domain names. Renew records are identical to Create records, except that *type* is set to “Renew”. No modifications to existing domain names can be made in Renew records, and the domain names contained within must already exist in the page-chain. Similar to the Modify and Move records, Renew records have a difficulty of $\frac{\text{difficulty}_{\text{Create}}}{4}$.

Delete

If a owner’s private key is compromised or if they wish to relinquish ownership rights over all of their domain names, they can issue a Delete record. Aside from their *type* field set to “Delete”, Delete records are identical in form to Create records but have the opposite effect: all second-level domains contained within the record are purged from local caches and made available for others to claim. There is no difficulty associated with Delete records, so they can be issued instantly.

5.3.2 Snapshot

A *snapshot* is JSON-encoded textual database designed as a short-term and volatile cache. When two or more machines are maintaining a common page-chain, snapshots are used as a buffer that is flushed to the other parties every Δs minutes. Individually, they are flushed to a local page every Δs minutes. Snapshots contain four fields: *originTime*, *recentRecords*, *fingerprint*, and *snapshotSig*.

originTime

Unix time when the snapshot was first created. This must be less than Δs minutes ago and not in the future relative to a recipient’s clock.

recentRecords

A array list of records in reverse chronological order by receive time.

fingerprint

The hash of the public key of the machine maintaining this snapshot.

snapshotSig

The digital signature of the preceding fields, signed using the machine's private key.

5.3.3 Page

A *page* is long-term JSON-encoded textual database used for archival of records. Each page contains a link to a previous page, forming an append-only public ledger known as a page-chain. In section 5.4 we describe how an individual machine can maintain its own page-chain and in section 5.5 we detail how nodes in the Tor network can maintain a common page-chain. In any fully-connected network where all participants know everyone's public keys, the page-chain becomes publicly confirmable and can be used for distributed DNS.

Each page contains five fields, *prevHash*, *recordList*, *consensusDocHash*, *fingerprint*, and *pageSig*.

prevHash

The SHA-384 hash of *prevHash*, *recordList*, and *consensusDocHash* of a previous page.

recordList

An array list of records, sorted in a deterministic manner.

consensusDocHash

The SHA-384 of *cd*.

fingerprint

The hash of the public key of the machine maintaining this page.

pageSig

The digital signature of the preceding fields, signed using the machine's private key.

5.3.4 AVL Tree

A self-balancing binary AVL tree is used as a local cache of existing records. Its nodes hold references to the location of records in a local copy of the page-chain and it is sorted by alphabetical comparison of second-level domain names. As a page-chain is a linear data

structure that requires a $\mathcal{O}(n)$ scan to find a record, the $\mathcal{O}(n \log n)$ generation of an AVL tree cache allows lookups of second-level domain names to occur in $\mathcal{O}(\log n)$ time.

5.3.5 Hashtable Bitset

A hashtable bitset is a special and highly compact adaptation of a traditional hashtable. Unlike its AVL tree counterpart, its purpose to prove the non-existence of a record. As an extension of an ordinary hashtable, the hashtable bitset maps keys to buckets, but here we are interested in only tracking the existence of keys and have no need to store the keys themselves. Therefore each bucket in the structure is represented as a bit, creating a compact bitset of $\mathcal{O}(n)$ size. The hashtable bitset records a “1” if a second-level domain name exists, and a “0” if not. In the event of a hash collision, all second-level domains that map to that bucket should be added to an array list. Once the bitset is fully constructed, the array is sorted alphabetically and the resulted converted into the leaves of a Merkle tree.

Let Alice and a trusted authority Faythe maintain a common page-chain, and let Alice be a resolver for a third-party Bob. In the event that Bob asks Alice to resolve a domain name to a hidden service and Alice claims that the domain name does not exist, Bob must be able to verify the non-existence of that record. Demonstrating non-existence is a challenge often overlooked in DNS: even if existing records can be authenticated by Bob, Alice may still lie and claim a false negative on the existence of a domain name. Bob may choose to query Faythe to confirm non-existence, but this introduces additional load onto Faythe. Bob cannot easily determine the accuracy of Alice’s claim without downloading all of the records and confirming for himself, but this is impractical in most environments.

The hashtable bitset efficiently resolves this issue. Faythe periodically generates a timestamped hashtable bitset for all existing domain names, digitally signs it, and publishes the result to Alice. As described in section 5.4.3, Alice then includes this bitset along with any non-existence responses sent back to Bob. Since Bob knows and trusts Faythe, he can verify Alice’s claim by verifying the authenticity of the bitset and confirming that the domain he requested does not appear in the hashtable or in the Merkle tree in $\mathcal{O}(1)$ time

on average. The hashtable also serves as an optimization to Alice: she can check the bitset for Bob’s request in $\mathcal{O}(1)$ time, bypassing the $\mathcal{O}(\log n)$ lookup if the second-level domain name does not exist.

Note that a Bloom filter with k hash functions could be used instead of a compact hashtable, but a Bloom filter would require sending up to k sections of buckets to the client. Therefore, we use a simple hashtable scheme, which is effectively a Bloom filter with $k = 1$.

5.3.6 Trie

A trie, also known as a digital tree, is used for efficiently resolving Onion Queries (section 5.4.4). Each node in the trie corresponds to a base58 digit of the .onion hidden service address. These addresses are currently defined at 16 characters, so the trie has a maximum depth of 16 and up to 58 branches per node.

5.4 Algorithms

5.4.1 Initialization

This following description assumes that Alice is maintaining a local page-chain in synchronization with a Faythe, a trusted second party. The functionality described here is extended to distributed environments in 5.5 – Application Within Tor.

Alice creates an initial OnionNS database by the following procedure. Let i be the current day, and let Δi be the lifetime in days of a individual page.

1. Download a copy of the consensus document cd published at at 00:00 GMT on day $\lfloor \frac{i}{\Delta i} \rfloor$.
2. Create an empty AVL tree, an initial hashtable bitset, an empty trie, a blank snapshot, and an empty page.
3. Sets the snapshot’s *originTime* field to the current Unix time, *recentRecords* to an empty array, and *fingerprint* to the hash of her public key.

4. Digitally sign $originTime + recentRecords + fingerprint$ and save the signature in $snapshotSig$.
5. Set the page's $prevHash$ field to zeros, $recordList$ to an empty array, $fingerprint$ to the hash of her public key, and $consensusDocHash$ to the SHA-384 of cd .
6. Digitally sign $prevHash + recordList + consensusDocHash + fingerprint$ and save the signature in $pageSig$.

5.4.2 Page-chain Maintenance

Alice then listens for new records from herself or from third-parties. Let p_i be Alice's current page and s_x the current snapshot.

For each received record, Alice

1. Rejects the record if the fields are invalid, the signature does not validate, or the proof-of-work cannot be confirmed.
2. Checks for the second-level domain name in s_x , p_i , the hashtable bitset, and then the AVL tree.
3. If Alice received a Create record, rejects the record if the domain was found.
4. If a Modify, Move, Renew or Delete record was received, rejects the record if the domain was not found.
5. Adds the record into s_x 's $recentRecords$ and regenerates $snapshotSig$.

Every Δs minutes, Alice

1. Generates a new snapshot, s_{x+1} .
2. Sets its $originTime$ to the current time, creates $snapshotSig$, and sets s_{x+1} to be the currently active snapshot for collecting new records.
3. Sends s_x to Faythe and accepts Faythe's snapshot if one is offered.

4. Merge all records in $recentRecords$ from s_x and Faythe's snapshot into the $recordList$ field of p_i .
5. Regenerates $pageSig$.
6. Increments x .

Every Δi days, Alice

1. Creates a new page p_{i+1} and sets its $prevHash$ to $\text{SHA-384}(prevHash + recordList + consensusDocHash)$ from p_i .
2. Sets p_{i+1} 's $consensusDocHash$ to the SHA-384 of the consensus document at 00:00 GMT.
3. Deletes page p_{i-L} if it exists.
4. Regenerates her local AVL tree and hashtable bitset from records in the page-chain using the pages in reverse chronological order. The leaves of the AVL tree at each second-level domain name point to the latest record containing that domain. Deletion records mark that domain as available and invalidate any Create, Modify, Move, or Renew that contain that domain earlier in the page-chain.
5. Regenerates the trie with the .onion addresses in the page-chain such that each leaf in the trie is mapped to the record that immediately resolves it.
6. Asks Faythe for an updated signature on her hashtable bitset, which should verify against Alice's bitset.
7. Increments i .

5.4.3 Domain Query

Alice can optionally act as a resolver for other parties. Let Bob be a client and Faythe a third-party trusted by both Alice and Bob. Assume that Bob does not trust Alice, Bob has Faythe's public key, and that Bob has obtained a copy of the Tor consensus document

published on day $\lfloor \frac{i}{\Delta i} \rfloor$ at 00:00 GMT. Faythe has divided her bitset into Q sections, digitally signed each section, digitally signed the root hash of the Merkle tree, and send the signatures to Alice.

Bob enters “sub.example.tor” into his Tor Browser. As this TLD is not used by the Clearnet DNS, his client software directs the request to Alice. Bob must recursively resolve the .tor domain name into a .onion address and it is more efficient if Alice returns back to Bob all the necessary information that he needs to perform this resolution. Along with the domain name, Bob also sends to Alice one of the two verification levels, each providing progressively more verification that the record Bob receives is authentic, unique, and trustworthy. The default verification level is 0 for performance reasons.

At verification level 0, Alice first checks the hashtable bitset to confirm that the record exists. If it does, Alice then queries the AVL tree to find the latest record that contains the requested domain name. Alice resolves the requested domain and repeats this lookup up to eight times if the resulting destination uses the .tor TLD. Once a .onion TLD destination is encountered, Alice returns to Bob all records containing the intermediate and final destinations. If a lookup fails, Alice returns to Bob records containing any intermediary destinations, and the Faythe-signed section of the bitset. If the hash maps to a “1” bucket, Alice also returns the Faythe-signed root of the Merkle collision tree, the leaves of the branch containing neighbouring second-level domain names that alphabetically span the failed domain, and all other hashes at the top level of the branch in the Merkle tree.

Bob receives from Alice the data structures containing the domain name resolutions. Bob confirms the resolution path and confirms the validity, signature, and proof-of-work of each record in turn. Finally, Bob looks up the .onion hidden service in the traditional manner. If the resolution was unsuccessful, Bob also verifies the signed section of the bitset. If the domain maps to a “0”, Bob’s client software returns that the DNS lookup failed, otherwise Bob confirms that no such second-level domain name exists in the Merkle tree branch returned by Alice. Since the leaves of the branch alphabetically span the requested domain and would otherwise contain it if it existed, Bob knows that it does not

exist. Finally, Bob hashes the leaves to reconstructs the branch, and constructs the rest of the tree by combining the root of that branch with the other hashes returned by Alice at that level, and verifies the root hash against Faythe’s signature. If this validates, Bob’s software also informs the Tor Browser that DNS lookup failed. The resolution can also fail if the service has not published a recent hidden service descriptor to Tor’s distributed hash table. End-to-end verification (relative to the authenticity of the hidden service itself) is complete when *pubHSKey* can be successfully used to encrypt the hidden service cookie and the service proves that it can decrypt *sec* as part of the hidden service protocol.

At verification level 1, in addition to returning all record and supplementary data structures in level 0, Alice also returns the page that contained each record and the *pageSig* field from Faythe’s page. Since Alice and Faythe are maintaining a common page-chain, both Alice and Faythe will be signing the same data. Bob verifies the authenticity of the page against both Alice and Faythe’s public keys and proceeds with his steps in level 0.

5.4.4 Onion Query

Bob may also issue a reverse-hostname lookup to Alice to find second-level domains that directly resolve to a given .onion hidden service address. This request is an Onion Query. Unlike on the Clearnet (under RFCs 1033 and 1912) not every .onion name has a corresponding domain name, so these queries may also fail. When Bob sends a Onion Query to Alice, Alice finds in her trie the record that contains a second-level .tor domain name that immediately maps to that .onion, and returns the domain name. Bob can optionally perform additional verification by issuing a Level 1 Domain Query on that domain name which should resolve to the original requested .onion hidden service address, a forward-confirmed reverse DNS lookup.

5.4.5 Synchronization

Rather than continue to query Alice, Bob may wish to become his own resolver. Bob may also become a resolver for others that trust Faythe. The procedure to clone Alice’s databases is simple:

1. Bob downloads Alice’s $\min(i, L)$ most recent pages in her page-chain.
2. Bob obtains the consensus documents published every Δi days between days $i - \min(i, L)$ and i at 00:00 GMT. Bob may download these from Alice, but Bob may also download them from any other source. These documents may be compressed beforehand: very high compression ratios can be achieved under 7zip.
3. Bob verifies the authenticity of the consensus documents and then verifies the signatures on each page in the page-chain.
4. Bob constructs his own AVL tree, hashtable bitset, and trie and confirms that Faythe’s signatures on her bitset and Merkle collision tree root match his copy. If so, there has been no corruption and Bob has an authentic copy of the database.

Once the synchronization is complete, Bob can confirm the integrity, authenticity, and uniqueness of domain names.

5.5 Application to Tor

When used inside a fully connected network such as Tor, individual nodes continue to hold their own page-chains and if they share snapshots with each other the network will, under ideal conditions, maintain a common page-chain and general database. This is possible if the Faythe character is represented by the whole or part of the rest of the network. Specifically, rather than flush s_x every Δs minutes to a single trusted source and check their *pageSigs*, the communication happens with many authorities. In this situation, distributed DNS can be achieved.

OnionNS is a distributed system and may have many participants; any machine with sufficient storage and bandwidth capacity — including those outside the Tor network — can obtain a full copy of all DNS information from OnionNS nodes. Inside the Tor network, these participants can be classified into three sets: *mirrors*, quorum node *candidates*, and *quorum* nodes. The last set is of particular importance because *quorum* nodes are the only participants to actively power OnionNS.




Figure 5.2: There are three sets of participants in the OnionNS network: *mirrors*, quorum node *candidates*, and *quorum* members. The set of *quorum* nodes is chosen from the pool of up-to-date *mirrors* who are reliable nodes within the Tor network.

5.5.1 Mirrors

Mirrors are Tor nodes that have performed a full synchronization (section 5.4.5) against the network and hold a complete copy of all OnionNS data structures. This may optionally respond to passive queries from clients, but do not have power to modify any data structures. *Mirrors* are the largest and simplest set of participants.

5.5.2 Quorum Node Candidates

Quorum node *candidates* are *mirrors* inside the Tor network that desire and qualify to become *quorum* nodes. The first requirement is that they must be an up-to-date and complete *mirror*, and secondly that they must have sufficient CPU and bandwidth capabilities to handle the influx of new records and the work involved with propagating these records to other *mirrors*. These two requirements are essential and of equal importance for ensuring that *quorum* node can accept new information and function correctly.

To meet the first requirement, Tor nodes must demonstrate their readiness to accept new records. The naïve solution is to have Tor nodes and clients simply ask the node if it was ready, and if so, to provide proof that it's up-to-date. However, this solution quickly runs into the problem of scaling; Tor has ≈ 7000 nodes and $\approx 2,250,000$ daily users [9]: it is infeasible for any single node to handle queries from all of them. The more practical solution is to publish information to the authority nodes that will be distributed to all parties in the

consensus document. Following a full synchronization, a *mirror* publishes this information in the following manner:

1. Let $tree$ be its local AVL Tree, described in section 5.3.4.
2. Encode SHA-384($tree$) in Base64 and truncate to 8 bytes.
3. Append the result to the Contact field in the relay descriptor sent to the authority nodes.

While ideally this information could be placed in a special field set aside for this purpose, to ease integration with existing Tor infrastructure and third-party websites that parse the consensus document (such as Globe or Atlas) we use the Contact field, a user-defined optional entry that Tor relay operators typically use to list methods of contact such as email addresses and PGP keys. OnionNS would not be the first system to embed special information in the Contact field; onion-tip.com identifies Bitcoin addresses in the field and then sends shares of donations to that address proportional to the relay's consensus weight.

One weakness with this approach is that because this hash is published in the 00:00 GMT descriptor, an adversary could very easily forge the hash for the 01:00 GMT descriptor and onward and thus broadcast the correct hash without ever performing a synchronization. One possible solution is to combine this hash publication with a Time-based One-time Password Algorithm (TOTP) at a 1 hour time interval. Although this would not thwart collusion or the publishing of the hash elsewhere, it would make the attack non-trivial.

Of all sets of relays that publish the same hash, if *mirror* m_i publishes a hash that is in the largest set, m_i meets the first qualification to become a quorum node *candidate*. Relays must take care to refresh this hash whenever a new *quorum* is chosen. Assuming complete honesty across all *mirrors* in the Tor network, they will all publish the same hash and complete the first requirement.

The second criteria requires Tor nodes to prove that has sufficient capabilities to handle the increase in communication and processing. Fortunately, Tor's infrastructure already provides a mechanism that can be utilized to prove reliability and capacity; Tor nodes

fulfil the second requirement if they have the *fast*, *stable*, *running*, and *valid* flags. These demonstrate that they have the ability to handle large amounts of traffic, have maintained a history of long uptime, are currently online, and have a correct configuration, respectively. As of February 2015, out of the 7000 nodes participating in the Tor network, 5400 of these node have these flags and complete the second requirement.

Both of these requirements can be determined in $\mathcal{O}(n)$ time by anyone holding a recent or archived copy of the consensus document.

5.5.3 Quorum




Figure 5.3: An example *page-chain* across four *quorums*. Each *page* contains a references to a previous *page*, forming an distributed scrolling data structure. *Quorum 1* is semi-honest and maintains its uptime, and thus has identical *pages*. *Quorum 2*'s largest cluster is likewise in agreement, but there are three nodes which are acting maliciously together and have changed their *pages*. Node 5 in *quorum 3* references an old page in attempt to bypass *quorum 2*'s records, and nodes 6-7 are colluding with nodes 5-7 from *quorum 2*. Finally, *quorum 3* has two nodes that acted honestly but did not record new records, so their *page-chains* differ from the others. However, across all four days the largest clusters are honest nodes and thus integrity remains in the *page-chain*.

Selection

Quorum are randomly chosen from the set of quorum node *candidates*. The *quorum* perform the main duties of the system, namely receiving, broadcasting, and recording DNS records from hidden service operators. The *quorum* can be derived from the pool of *candidates* by performing by the following procedure, where i is the current day:

1. Obtain a remote or local archived copy of the most recent consensus document, cd , published at 00:00 GMT on day $\lfloor \frac{i}{\Delta i} \rfloor$.
2. Extract the authorities' digital signatures, their signatures, and verify cd against $PK_{authorities}$.
3. Construct a numerical list, ql of quorum node *candidates* from cd .
4. Initialize the Mersenne Twister PRNG with $\text{SHA-384}(cd)$.
5. Use the seeded PRNG to randomly scramble ql .
6. Let the first M nodes, numbered $1..M$, define the *quorum*.

In this manner, all parties — in particular Tor nodes and clients — agree on the members of the *quorum* and can derive them in $\mathcal{O}(n)$ time. As the pages and the *quorum* both change every Δi days, *quorum* nodes have an effective lifetime of Δi days before they are replaced by a new *quorum*.

5.5.4 Broadcast

Operation records, such as Create, Modify, Move, Renew, and Delete must anonymously transmitted through a Tor circuit to the *quorum* by a hidden service operator. First, the operator uses a Tor circuit to fetch from a *mirror* the consensus document on day $\lfloor \frac{i}{\Delta i} \rfloor$ at 00:00 GMT, which he then uses to derive the current *quorum*. Secondly, he asks the *mirror* for the digitally signed hash of the *page* used by each *quorum* node. Third, he randomly selects two *quorum* nodes from the largest cluster of matching *pages* and sends his record to one of them. For security purposes, the operator should use the same entry

node for this transmission that their hidden service uses for its communication. Fourth, he constructs a circuit to the second node and polls the node 15 minutes later to determine if it has knowledge of the record. If it does, he can be reasonable sure that the record has been properly transmitted and recorded. If the record is not known the next day, the operator should repeat this procedure to ensure that the record is recorded in the *page*-chain.

This process is illustrated in figure 5.4.




Figure 5.4: The hidden service operator uses his existing circuit (green) to inform *quorum* node Q_4 of the new record. Q_4 then distributes it via *snapshots* to all other *quorum* nodes. Each records it in their own *page* for long-term storage. The operator also confirms from a randomly-chosen *quorum* node Q_5 that the record has been received.

5.6 Examples and Structural Induction

In this section we provide examples of how a page-chain can be maintained with minimal participants, and then expand our example to include a larger network.

```

0  {
1      "prevHash": 0,
2      "recordList": [] ,
3      "consensusDocHash": "uU0nuZNNPgilLILX2n2r+sSE7+N6U4DukIj3rOLVzek=" ,
4      "fingerprint": "2FC06226AE152FBAB7620BB107CDEF0E70876A7B" ,
5      "pageSig": "KSaOfzrXIZclHFcYxI+3jBwLs943wxVv3npI5ccY/
kBEpyXRSopzjoFs746n0tJqUpdY4Kbe6DBwERaN7ELmSSK9Pu6q8QeKzNAh+
QOnKl0fKBN7fqowjkQ3ktFkR0Vuox9WrrbNTMa4+
up0Np52hlbKA3zSRz4fbR9NVlh6uuQ="
6 }

```

Figure 5.5: A sample empty *page*, encoded in JSON and base64.

```

0  {
1      "originTime": 1426507551,
2      "recentRecords": [] ,
3      "fingerprint": "2FC06226AE152FBAB7620BB107CDEF0E70876A7B" ,
4      "snapshotSig": "KSaOfzrXIZclHFcYxI+3jBwLs943wxVv3npI5ccY/
kBEpyXRSopzjoFs746n0tJqUpdY4Kbe6DBwERaN7ELmSSK9Pu6q8QeKzNAh+
QOnKl0fKBN7fqowjkQ3ktFkR0Vuox9WrrbNTMa4+
up0Np52hlbKA3zSRz4fbR9NVlh6uuQ="
5 }

```

Figure 5.6: A sample empty *snapshot*, encoded in JSON and base64.

5.6.1 Base Case

In the most trivial case of a client Alice, a server Carol, and a hidden service Bob. Alice and Bob both trust Carol, who maintains her own local page-chain. Bob wishes to obtain “example.tor” which Alice will then use to anonymously communicate over the hidden service protocol with Bob. All parties are Tor clients and are capable of fetching current and past consensus documents.

At the beginning of day₀, Carol creates an initial and empty page, snapshot, AVL tree, hashtable bitset, and trie. Her blank page and snapshots are shown in Figure 5.5 and 5.6, respectively.

Bob creates a Create record in which she claims “example.tor” as pointing to her hidden

```

0  {
1      "names": {
2          "example.tor": "exampleruyw6wgve.onion"
3      }
4      "contact": "AD97364FC20BEC80",
5      "timestamp": 1424045024,
6      "consensusHash": "uU0nuZNNPgillLILX2n2r+sSE7+N6U4DukIj3rOLvzek=",
7      "nonce": "AAABw==",
8      "pow": "4I4dzaBwi4AIZW8s2m0hQQ==",
9      "recordSig": "KSaOfzrXIZclHFcYxI+3jBwLs943wxVv3npI5ccY/
kBEpyXRSpzjoFs746n0tJqUpdY4Kbe6DBwERaN7ElmSSK9Pu6q8QeKzNAh+
QOnKl0fKBN7fqowjkQ3ktFkR0Vuox9WrrbNTMa4+
up0Np52hlbKA3zSRz4fbR9NVlh6uuQ=",
10     "pubHSKey": "MIGhMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GPADCBiwKBgQDE7CP/
kgwtJhTTc4JpuPkvA7Ln9wgc+
fgTKgkyUp1zusxgUAn1c1MGx4YhO42KPB7dyZOf3pcRk94XsYFY1ULkF2+
tf9KdNe7GFzJyMFCQENnUcVXbcwLH4vAeiGK7R/nScbCbyc9LT+
VE1fbKchTL1QzLVBLqJTvhR+9YPi8x+QIFAdZ8BJs="
11 }

```

Figure 5.7: Sample registration record from a hidden service, encoded in JSON and base64.

service address, `exampleruyw6wgve.onion`. Bob then spends computational time and RAM finding a *nonce* such that SHA-384 of *central*, *pow*, and *recordSig* is $\leq 2^{\text{difficulty} * \text{count}}$, where *central* consist of all fields in the Create record except *recordSig* and *pow*, and *count* is the number of second-level domains claimed, in this case one. When the proof-of-work is complete, Bob builds a Tor circuit to Carol and sends her the Create record shown in Figure 5.7. This process is illustrated in Figure 5.8.

Once received, Carol validates the record by checking the fields, the signature, and the proof-of-work. Carol accept the record if it passes. Carol has no previous knowledge of “example.tor” so there are no conflicts. Carol then adds the Create record into her current snapshot as shown in Figure 5.10.

Then at the next Δs snapshot change, generates a fresh snapshot and merges the snapshot’s contents into the page.

When Carol switches to a fresh page she will update her AVL tree, hashtable bitset,




Figure 5.8: The hidden service Bob anonymously sends a record to a trusted server Carol, who adds it to her page-chain. Alice later anonymously queries Carol for Bob’s domain name, and Carol returns Bob’s record.

and trie. At that point, Alice can query Carol for “example.com” and Carol will return Bob’s record.

5.6.2 Trusted Party Faythe

Now let there be an additional party Faythe, a machine known to and trusted by Alice, Bob, and Carol. Assume that Alice does not trust Carol and that Faythe maintains a common page-chain by sharing snapshots and signatures with one another.

Now when Alice asks Carol for “example.tor” at verification level 1, Carol also provides to Alice Faythe’s digital signature on the page, as explained in section 5.4.3.

5.6.3 Two Trusted Parties

to do...

```

0  {
1      "originTime": 1426507551,
2      "recentRecords": [
3          "names": {
4              "example.tor": "exampleruyw6wgve.onion"
5          }
6          "contact": "AD97364FC20BEC80",
7          "timestamp": 1424045024,
8          "consensusHash": "uU0nuZNNPgilLlX2n2r+sSE7+N6U4DukIj3rOLvzek=",
9          "nonce": "AAAAABw==",
10         "pow": "4I4dzaBwi4AIZW8s2m0hQQ==",
11         "recordSig": "KSaOfzrXIZclHFcYxI+3jBwLs943wxVv3npI5ccY/
kBEpyXRSpzjoFs746n0tJqUpdY4Kbe6DBwERaN7ElmSSK9Pu6q8QeKzNAh+
QOnKl0fKBN7fqowjkQ3ktFkR0Vuox9WrrbNTMa4+
up0Np52hlbKA3zSRz4fbR9NVlh6uuQ=",
12         "pubHSKey": "MIIGhMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GPADCBiwKBgQDE7CP/
kgwtJhTTc4JpuPkvA7Ln9wgc+
fgTKgkyUp1zusxgUAn1c1MGx4YhO42KPB7dyZOf3pcRk94XsYFY1ULkF2+
tf9KdNe7GFzJyMFCQENnUcVXbcwLH4vAeiGK7R/nScbCbyc9LT+
VE1fbKchTL1QzLVBLqJTxhR+9YPi8x+QIFAdZ8BJs="
13     }],
14     "fingerprint": "2FC06226AE152FBAB7620BB107CDEF0E70876A7B",
15     "snapshotSig": "KSaOfzrXIZclHFcYxI+3jBwLs943wxVv3npI5ccY/
kBEpyXRSpzjoFs746n0tJqUpdY4Kbe6DBwERaN7ElmSSK9Pu6q8QeKzNAh+
QOnKl0fKBN7fqowjkQ3ktFkR0Vuox9WrrbNTMa4+
up0Np52hlbKA3zSRz4fbR9NVlh6uuQ="
16 }

```

Figure 5.9: A sample Create record has been merged into an initially-blank snapshot.

5.6.4 N Trusted Parties

to do...

```

0  {
1      "prevHash": 0,
2      "recordList": [
3          "names": {
4              "example.tor": "exampleruyw6wgve.onion"
5          }
6          "contact": "AD97364FC20BEC80",
7          "timestamp": 1424045024,
8          "consensusHash": "uU0nuZNNPgilLlX2n2r+sSE7+N6U4DukIj3rOLvzek=",
9          "nonce": "AAAAABw==",
10         "pow": "4I4dzaBwi4AIZW8s2m0hQQ==",
11         "recordSig": "KSaOfzrXIZclHFcYxI+3jBwLs943wxVv3npI5ccY/
kBEpyXRSopzjoFs746n0tJqUpdY4Kbe6DBwERaN7ELmSSK9Pu6q8QeKzNAh+
QOnKl0fKBN7fqowjkQ3ktFkR0Vuox9WrrbNTMa4+
up0Np52hlbKA3zSRz4fbR9NVlh6uuQ=",
12         "pubHSKey": "MIGHMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GPADCBiwKBgQDE7CP/
kgwtJhTTc4JpuPkVA7Ln9wgc+
fgTKgkyUp1zusxgUAn1c1MGx4YhO42KPB7dyZOf3pcRk94XsYFY1ULkF2+
tf9KdNe7GFzJyMFCQENnUcVXbcwLH4vAeiGK7R/nScbCbyc9LT+
VE1fbKchTL1QzLVBLqJTxhR+9YPi8x+QIFAdZ8BJs="
13     ],
14     "consensusDocHash": "uU0nuZNNPgilLlX2n2r+sSE7+N6U4DukIj3rOLvzek=",
15     "fingerprint": "2FC06226AE152FBAB7620BB107CDEF0E70876A7B",
16     "pageSig": "KSaOfzrXIZclHFcYxI+3jBwLs943wxVv3npI5ccY/
kBEpyXRSopzjoFs746n0tJqUpdY4Kbe6DBwERaN7ELmSSK9Pu6q8QeKzNAh+
QOnKl0fKBN7fqowjkQ3ktFkR0Vuox9WrrbNTMa4+
up0Np52hlbKA3zSRz4fbR9NVlh6uuQ="
17 }

```

Figure 5.10: A snapshot containing a single Create record has merged into Carol's page.

CHAPTER 6

ANALYSIS

We have designed OnionNS to meet our original design goals. Assuming that Tor circuits are a sufficient method of masking one’s identity and location, hidden service operators can perform operations on their records anonymously. Likewise, a Tor circuit is also used when a client lookups a .tor domain name, just as Tor-protected DNS lookups are performed when browsing the Clearnet through the Tor Browser. OnionNS records are self-signed and include the hidden service’s public key, so anyone — particularly the client — can confirm the authenticity (relative to the authenticity of the public key) and integrity of any record. This does not entirely prevent Sybil attacks, but this is a very hard problem to address in a distributed environment without the confirmation from a central authority. However, the proof-of-work component makes record spoofing a costly endeavour, but it is not impossible to a well-resourced attacker with sufficient access to high-end general-purpose hardware.

Without complete access to a local copy of the database a party cannot know whether a second-level domain is in fact unique, but by using an existing level of trust with a known network they can be reasonably sure that it meets the unique edge of Zooko’s Triangle. Anyone holding a copy of the consensus document can generate the set of *quorum* node and verify their signatures. As the *quorum* is a set of nodes that work together and the *quorum* is chosen randomly from reliable nodes in the Tor network, OnionNS is a distributed system. Tor clients also have the ability to perform a full synchronization and confirming uniqueness for themselves, thus verifying that Zooko’s Triangle is complete. Hidden service .onion addresses will continue to have an extremely high chance of being securely unique as long the key-space is sufficiently large to avoid hash collisions.

Just as traditional Clearnet DNS lookups occur behind-the-scenes, OnionNS Domain Queries require no user assistance. Client-side software should filter TLDs to determine

which DNS system to use. We introduce no changes to Tor’s hidden service protocol and also note that the existence of a DNS system introduces forward-compatibility: developers can replace hash functions and PKI in the hidden service protocol without disrupting its users, so long as records are transferred and OnionNS is updated to support the new public keys. We therefore believe that we have met all of our original design requirements.

6.1 Security

6.1.1 Quorum-level Attacks

The quorum nodes hold the greatest amount of responsibility and control over OnionNS out of all participating nodes in the Tor network, therefore ensuring their security and limiting their attack capabilities is of primary importance.

Malicious Quorum Generation

If an attacker, Eve, controls some Tor nodes (who may be assumed to be colluding with one another), the attacker may desire to include their nodes in the quorum for malicious manipulation, passive observation, or for other purposes. Alternatively, Eve may wish to exclude certain legitimate nodes from inclusion in the quorum. In order to carry out either of these attacks, Eve must have the list of qualified Tor nodes scrambled in such a way that the output is pleasing to Eve. Specifically, the scrambled list must contain at least some of Eve’s malicious nodes for the first attack, or exclude the legitimate target nodes for the second attack. We initialize Mersenne Twister with a 384-bit seed, thus Eve can find k seeds that generates a desirable scrambled list in 2^{192} operations on average, or 2^{384} operations in the worst case. The chance of any of those seeds being selected, and thus Eve successfully carrying out the attack, is thus $\frac{2^{384}}{k}$.

Eve may attempt to manipulate the consensus document in such a way that the SHA-384 hash is one of these k seeds. Eve may instruct her Tor nodes to upload a custom status report to the authority nodes in an attempt to maliciously manipulate the contents of the consensus document, but SHA-384’s strong preimage resistance and the unknown state and

number of Tor nodes outside Eve’s control makes this attack infeasible. As of the time of this writing, the best preimage break of SHA-512 is only partial (57 out of 80 rounds in 2^{511} time [28]) so the time to break preimage resistance of full SHA-384 is still 2^{384} operations. This also implies that Eve cannot determine in advance the next consensus document, so the new quorum cannot be predicted. If Eve has compromised at least some of the Tor authority nodes she has significantly more power in manipulating the consensus document for her own purposes, but this attack vector can also break the Tor network as a whole and is thus outside the scope of our analysis. Therefore, the computation required to maliciously generate the quorum puts this attack vector outside the reach of computationally-bound adversaries.

OnionNS and the Tor network as a whole are both susceptible to Sybil attacks, though these attacks are made significantly more challenging by the slow building of trust in the Tor network. Eve may attempt to introduce large numbers of nodes under her control in an attempt to increase her chances of at least one of the becoming members of the *quorum*. Sybil attacks are not unknown to Tor; in December 2014 the black hat hacking group LizardSquad launched 3000 nodes in the Google Cloud in an attempt to intercept the majority of Tor traffic. However, as Tor authority nodes grant consensus weight to new Tor nodes very slowly, despite controlling a third of all Tor nodes, these 3,000 nodes moved 0.2743 percent of Tor traffic before they were banned from the Tor network. The Stable and Fast flags are also granted after weeks of uptime and a history of reliability. As nodes must have these flags to be qualified as a *quorum candidate*, these large-scale Sybil attacks are financially demanding and time-consuming for Eve.

6.1.2 Non-existence Forgery

As we have stated earlier, falsely claiming a negative on the existence of a record is a problem overlooked in other domain name systems. One of the primary challenges with this approach is that the space of possible names so vast that attempting to enumerate and digitally sign all names that are not taken is highly impractical. Without a solution, this weakness can degenerate into a denial-of-service attack if the DNS resolver is malicious

towards the client. Our counter-measure is the highly compact hashtable bitset with a Merkle tree for collisions. We set the size of the hashtable such that the number of collisions is statistically very small, allowing an efficient lookup in $\mathcal{O}(1)$ time on average with minimal data transferred to the client.

6.1.3 Name Squatting and Record Flooding

An attacker, Eve, may attempt a denial-of-service attack by obtaining a set of names for the sole purpose of denying them to others. Eve may also wish to create many name requests and flood the *quorum* with a large quantity of records. Both of these attacks are made computationally difficult and time-consuming for Eve because of the proof-of-work. If Eve has access to large computational resources or to custom hardware she may be able to process the PoW more efficiently than legitimate users, and this can be a concern.

The proof-of-work scheme is carefully designed to limit Eve to the same capabilities as legitimate users, thus significantly deterring this attack. The use of scrypt makes custom hardware and massively-parallel computation expensive, and the digital signature in every record forces the hidden service operator to resign the fields for every iteration in the proof-of-work. While the scheme would not entirely prevent the operator from outsourcing the computation to a cloud service or to a secondary offline resource, the other machine would need the hidden service private key to regenerate *recordSig*, which the operator can't reveal without compromising his security. However, the secondary resource could perform the scrypt computations in batch without generating *recordSig*, but it would always perform more than the necessary amount of computation because it would could not generate the SHA-384 hash and thus know when to stop. Furthermore, offloading the computation would still incur a cost to the hidden service operator, who would have to pay another party for the consumed computational resources. Thus the scheme always requires some cost when claiming a domain name.

6.2 Performance

bandwidth, CPU, RAM, latency for clients to be determined...

6.2.1 Load

demand on participating nodes to be determined...

Unlike Namecoin, OnionNS' *page*-chain is of L days in maximal length. This serves two purposes:

1. Causes domain names to expire, which reduced the threat of name squatting.
2. Prevents the data structure from growing to an unmanageable size.

6.3 Reliability

Tor nodes have no reliability guarantee and may disappear from the network momentarily or permanently at any time. Old *quorums* may disappear from the network without consequence of data loss, as their data is cloned by current *mirrors*. So long as the *quorum* nodes remain up for the Δi days that they are active, the system will suffer no loss of functionality. Nodes that become temporarily unavailable will have out-of-sync *pages* and will have to fetch recent records from other *quorum* nodes in the time of their absence.

CHAPTER 7

RESULTS

7.1 Implementation

implementation...

We use the BSD-licensed Botan library and C++11 for the hash and digest algorithms in our reference implementation, while the Mersenne Twister is implemented in C++'s Standard Template Library.

Our reference implementation uses the libjsoncpp header-only library for encoding and decoding purposes. The library is also available as the libjsoncpp-dev package in the Debian, Ubuntu, and Linux Mint repositories.

7.2 Discussion

discussions...

7.2.1 Guarantees

Guarantees...

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

OnionNS is a distributed DNS system inside the Tor network. The system maps human-meaningful .tor domain names to traditional Tor .onion addresses. It exists on top of current Tor hidden service infrastructure and increases usability of hidden services by abstracting away the base58-encoded hidden service addresses. OnionNS is powered by a randomly chosen set of Tor nodes, whose work can be verified by any party with a copy of Tor's consensus document. Records are self-signed and can be publicly verified. If accepted by the Tor community, OnionNS will be a valuable abstraction layer that will significantly improve the usability and popularity of Tor hidden services.

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