ETHNIC DIVERSITY, SEGREGATION, AND INEQUALITY: A Structural Model of Ethnic Prejudice in Bosnia and Croatia

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Widespread ethnic prejudice is an incomplete explanation for the development of war in the former Yugoslavia. However, high levels of prejudice in ethnic enclaves played an important role in increasing ethnic tensions and facilitating the outbreak of war. The purpose of this article is to explain county differences in average levels of ethnic prejudice in Bosnia and Croatia prior to the wars of national separation. We focus on structural characteristics of counties, such as ethnic diversity, economic conditions, and ethnic segregation and inequality, to explain county differences in average levels of prejudice. We also consider the possibility that compositional differences among counties (e.g., differences in average levels of education) explain county differences in ethnic prejudice. We combine survey data and county-level census data collected immediately prior to the wars of national separation and use hierarchical linear modeling techniques to analyze these data. Results suggest that ethnic diversity and ethnic occupational segregation decrease ethnic prejudice while ethnic economic inequality increases ethnic prejudice. Thus, structural characteristics account for some of the county differences in average levels of prejudice. County compositional differences, however, explain a majority of the county variation in ethnic prejudice. These results provide important clues to the origins of pockets of intense ethnic prejudice within diverse societies.

Recent decades have seen a resurgence of ethnic prejudice and ethnic conflict throughout the world. Scholars have estimated that between eleven million and twenty million people have died as a result of ethnic conflict since 1945 (Topor 1992; Williams 1994). Events in Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, and Rwanda have demonstrated the devastating power of ethnic prejudice and ethnic conflict. Above and beyond the death and destruction suffered by individuals, these conflicts have damaged the societies themselves. Through genocide, mass rape, intimidation, and population transfer,

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whole societies have been gravely injured—a process labeled "sociocide" by Keith Doubt (2000).

A great deal of scholarly effort has been dedicated to uncovering the sources of prejudice and intolerance around the world (Allport 1954; Blalock 1967; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Hodson, Sekulić, and Massey 1994; Karpov 1999a; 1999b; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Kunovich and Hodson 1999; Massey, Hodson, and Sekulić 1999; Quillian 1995; 1996; Sniderman, Peri, Figueiredo, and Piazza 2000; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982; Sullivan, Shamir, Walsh, and Roberts 1985). Scholars have based these analyses on an assumed link between prejudice, discrimination, and conflict. In recent years, there has been an effort to test this assumption. Examining the consequences of intolerance in the United States, James L. Gibson (1989, p. 30) suggests that, although intolerance among individuals does not directly influence public policy, the level of intolerance in society "delimits the range of acceptable policy alternatives." In addition, Gibson (1992) demonstrates that intolerance within the community, friendship networks, and the family affects the perceived freedom of individuals—that is, intolerance fosters "cultural conformity" that constrains individual behavior. Existing research, then, suggests that prejudice can provide a basis for leaders to exploit ethnonationalist policies and can also create an environment that threatens the basic human rights of individuals and groups.

Research in the former Yugoslavia demonstrates that *widespread* prejudice is a weak explanation for the development of war (Calhoun 1997; Cohen 1995; Denitch 1994; Hodson et al. 1994; Massey et al. 1999; Silber and Little 1996; Woodward 1995). However, high levels of ethnic prejudice in ethnic enclaves played an important role in the civil wars of former Yugoslavia. These ethnic enclaves—places of residence with a high concentration of similarly identified individuals and families—were centers of ethnic prejudice and were disposed to the politics of identity (Anderson 1991; Denitch 1994; Gilliland 1995). With the decentralization of political power following Tito's death and trends toward democratization within republics, political leaders on all sides mobilized ethnic enclaves for political gain. Once small-scale conflicts began to develop in these ethnic enclaves, fear spread rapidly, and the mobilization of individuals in more "tolerant" regions became possible. Thus, regional differences in ethnic prejudice provided a foundation for the emergence and spread of ethnic conflict.

The purpose of the current analysis is to explain county differences in average levels of ethnic prejudice in Bosnia and Croatia. We combine county-level census data and individual-level survey data to examine structural sources of ethnic prejudice. Our theoretical approach is informed by structural theories of racial and ethnic prejudice, ethnic political mobilization, and ethnic conflict, such as group-threat theory (Quillian 1995; 1996), realistic group conflict theory (Bobo 1983; 1988; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Bobo and Kluegel 1993), ethnic competition theory (Barth 1969; Hannan 1979; Jenkins and Kposowa 1990; Kposowa and Jenkins 1993; Nagel and Olzak 1982; Nielsen 1980; 1985; Olzak 1992; Olzak and Nagel 1986; Ragin 1979), and ethnic segregation theory (Hechter 1975; Medrano 1994). At the county level, we focus on the effects of ethnic diversity, economic conditions, and ethnic segregation and inequality on ethnic prejudice. We also consider the possibility that county compositional differences explain county disparities in the level of ethnic prejudice (e.g., differences in the average level of education across counties can account for county differences in the levels of prejudice). Thus, we also

examine the effects of individual-level variables, such as education, occupation, personal economic hardship, sex, age, family diversity, and religiosity, on ethnic prejudice.

We use hierarchical linear modeling techniques to analyze the multilevel data. Hierarchical linear modeling allows us to model the sources of prejudice that exist at the county and individual levels and to specify at which level the effects occur. Moreover, hierarchical linear modeling allows us to partition the variance of ethnic prejudice into within and between-county components and to determine how much between-county variance in ethnic prejudice is due to county differences in average levels of both individual-level variables (county compositional effects) and county-level structural variables. Finally, hierarchical linear modeling allows us to control for the possibility of correlated errors and unequal error variances that are often associated with multilevel data.

This article makes several important contributions to the literature on racial and ethnic prejudice as well as to a better understanding of recent events in Bosnia and Croatia. First, we examine structural sources of prejudice in Bosnia and Croatia just prior to the outbreak of war. During the height of in-group/out-group polarization and mobilization, we might not expect structural conditions, such as ethnic diversity or ethnic economic inequality, to play much of a role in shaping people's attitudes. Thus, these settings provide a stringent test of structural theories of prejudice. Second, we expand upon the usual structural variables (e.g., the size of competing groups and general economic conditions) by considering the effects of ethnic occupational and residential segregation and ethnic economic inequality on prejudice. Group-threat theorists have not yet considered the effects of segregation and inequality on ethnic prejudice. These variables, however, have played an important role in explaining ethnic political mobilization and ethnic conflict (Hechter 1975; Medrano 1994; Olzak 1992). Third, we examine structural sources of ethnic prejudice at the detailed county level. County-level data are appropriate because structural conditions, such as ethnic diversity and ethnic occupational segregation, are most likely to be experienced in the daily lives of individuals as they are manifest at the local county level.

STRUCTURAL SOURCES OF ETHNIC PREJUDICE

A vast literature has developed that explores U.S. regional differences in the levels of racial prejudice (Blalock 1956; 1957; Firebaugh and Davis 1988; Fossett and Kiecolt 1989; Giles 1977; Lieberson 1980; Middleton 1976; Pettigrew 1957; Quillian 1996; Smith 1981; Wilson 1986). In this literature, scholars demonstrate that racial prejudice—including both traditional prejudice and opposition to government policies designed to decrease inequality—is more frequent in the South (Quillian 1996).[1] Scholars posit that structural conditions—levels of direct competition and threat in particular—influence people's attitudes toward out-groups and partially explain these regional differences in prejudice. For example, the percentage of blacks and average income per capita in the region of residence have positive effects on racial prejudice and partially explain the North-South gap in prejudice (Quillian 1996). Structural theories of prejudice have also shown promise in explaining country differences in ethnic prejudice and prejudice toward immigrants in Western Europe (Quillian 1995). In the sections that follow, we review several prominent structural approaches that may help us to better understand county differences in ethnic prejudice in Bosnia and Croatia.

Structure and Ethnic Prejudice: Theoretical Foundations

Early in the development of the study of racial and ethnic relations, theorists recognized the importance of context in shaping people's racial and ethnic attitudes. Prominent in this early work was a focus on objective threats from direct competition and on factors that increased competition among groups.

Blumer (1958), perhaps the most cited scholar in this area, argued that prejudice is a defensive reaction to threats to a group's social position. Blumer (1958, p. 5) stated, "Race prejudice is a protective device. It functions, however shortsightedly, to preserve the integrity and the position of the dominant group." Another classic work in this area is *The Nature of Prejudice* by Gordon Allport (1954). Although Allport focused on individual-level causes of prejudice—or "the immediate level of causation" (p. 217)—he recognized the importance of historical, sociocultural, and situational factors in creating a context within which prejudice can develop. For example, Allport (1954, p. 221) argues that prejudice would be more common where the following structural conditions prevail:

> Where the social structure is marked by heterogeneity; where vertical mobility is permitted; where rapid social change is in progress; where there are ignorance and barriers to communication; where the size of a minority group is large or increasing; where direct competition and realistic threats exist; where exploitation sustains important interests in the community; where customs regulating aggression are favorable to bigotry; where traditional justifications for ethnocentrism are available; where neither assimilation nor cultural pluralism is favored.

Regarding the size of competing groups, Hawley (1944, p. 670) argued:

> It is common knowledge . . . that the representatives of alien groups living among a native population experience few, if any, restrictions so long as their numbers are small. . . . When, however, the size of an alien or subordinate group begins to increase relative to the native or dominant group and to loom progressively larger as a competitive force, tensions develop, restrictions accumulate, and the minority is more and more suppressed.

Similarly, Blalock (1967) developed a power framework to describe minority group relations and mobilization. He argued that relative group power is a function of resources, organization, and the size of competing groups and affects relations between majority and minority groups.

In sum, early work in racial and ethnic relations acknowledged the important role of structural conditions in the development of prejudice. These scholars provided the foundation for the development of contemporary structural theories of racial and ethnic prejudice, ethnic political mobilization, and ethnic conflict.

Group-Threat Theory

In the United States, overt racial prejudice is more frequent in the South (Firebaugh and Davis 1988; Quillian 1996). Much of the research that seeks to explain the North-South gap in prejudice focuses on structural conditions in the region of residence. The dominant approach has recently been coined "group-threat theory" (Quillian 1995). From this perspective, which is based on the early work of Blumer (1958) and Blalock (1967),

"prejudice is . . . a response to feelings that certain prerogatives believed to belong to the dominant racial group are under threat by members of the subordinate group" (Quillian 1996, p. 820). One possible source of the threat is the relative size of the subordinate group. A second possible source of threat is the state of the economy: "The idea is that the dominant group perceives their own group to be more threatened by minority presence when economic circumstances are worse" (Quillian 1996, p. 821). Thus, scholars argue that the size of the minority population and the overall state of the economy provide a foundation for the development of prejudice.

This general approach has been used to examine regional and temporal variation in racial prejudice in the United States (Quillian 1996) and country differences in ethnic prejudice and prejudice toward immigrants in Western Europe (Quillian 1995). There is support for group-threat theory in both contexts. In the United States, the percentage of blacks and the inverse of per capita income, both measures of group threat, affect racial attitudes and explain some of the North-South gap in racial prejudice. In Western Europe, the percentage of immigrants, the inverse of GDP per capita, and the interaction between the two lead to ethnic prejudice and prejudice toward immigrants. These structural variables explain much of the country differences in the level of prejudice. Thus, group-threat theory has received support from research in both the United States and Western Europe.

Structural Theories of Support for Racial Policies, Ethnic Mobilization, and Ethnic Conflict

Other structural theories play a prominent role in explaining support for racial policies designed to decrease segregation and inequality, ethnic political mobilization, and ethnic conflict. These include realistic group conflict theory (Bobo 1988; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Bobo and Kluegel 1993), ethnic competition theory (Barth 1969; Hannan 1979; Jenkins and Kposowa 1990; Kposowa and Jenkins 1993; Nagel and Olzak 1982; Nielsen 1980; 1985; Olzak 1992; Olzak and Nagel 1986; Ragin 1979), and ethnic segregation theory (Hechter 1975; Medrano 1994). Similar to the theories of prejudice outlined above, they emphasize group threat and competition. In addition, they consider the effects of segregation and inequality on ethnic prejudice, ethnic political mobilization, and ethnic conflict.

Realistic Group Conflict Theory

The realistic group conflict approach is very similar to group-threat theory. Realistic group conflict theory was originally developed to address the growing disparity between people's support for racial equality and integration in the United States and their opposition to specific policies designed to decrease inequality and segregation (Bobo 1988). It stands in contrast to psychological approaches by focusing on objective group threats and their relation to support for policies such as affirmative action and racial busing. More specifically, realistic group conflict theorists argue that patterns of social inequality lead to competing objective interests between groups (Bobo 1988; Jackman and Jackman 1983). Inequality and differences in objective interests, then, lead to perceptions of incompatible group interests, a sense of fraternal deprivation, and perceived threat, all of which affect attitudes toward racial policies (Bobo 1988; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Bobo and Kluegel 1993).

Ethnic Competition Theory

Scholars developed ethnic competition theory to explain contemporary ethnic political mobilization and ethnic conflict. The theory is a reaction to the failure of modernization theory, which predicted that ethnic distinctions would disappear with industrialization. Ethnic competition theorists argue that modernization promotes competition along ethnic lines and that increased competition leads to ethnic political mobilization and conflict (Barth 1969; Hannan 1979; Jenkins and Kposowa 1990; Kposowa and Jenkins 1993; Ragin 1979; Nagel and Olzak 1982; Nielsen 1980; 1985; Olzak 1992; Olzak and Nagel 1986). Specifically, modernization, through processes of industrialization, urbanization, improved communication and transportation technologies, and rationalization of social institutions, breaks down structural barriers to competition along ethnic lines. Thus, ethnic competition is a function of occupational and residential desegregation, increased migration, increased contact, and economic downturns.

Ethnic Segregation Theory

Ethnic segregation theory is also a reaction to the failure of modernization theory. Ethnic segregation theorists argue that modernization promotes ethnic segregation and inequality that, in turn, lead to ethnic solidarity, ethnic political mobilization, and ethnic conflict. Specifically, modernization and industrialization promote uneven development, often between core and peripheral regions (Hechter 1975). An associated outcome of industrialization is the cultural division of labor in which people are assigned to specific types of occupations or other social roles on the basis of observable cultural traits (Hechter 1978). Ethnic grievances are formed when uneven development and cultural divisions of labor coincide with ethnic divisions. Segregation theorists argue that "ethnic political mobilization occurs when members of one ethnic group perceive that their life chances are fewer than those of other ethnic groups" (Medrano 1994, p. 875). Thus, ethnic segregation and ethnic inequality increase ethnic solidarity, mobilization, and conflict (Belanger and Pinnard 1991; Medrano 1994). Ethnic competition theory and ethnic segregation theory are opposed when it comes to the effects of segregation and economic inequality on ethnic political mobilization and ethnic conflict (Medrano 1994; Nielsen 1980). Ethnic competition theorists argue that declines in segregation and inequality promote mobilization and conflict, while segregation theorists argue that segregation and inequality promote mobilization and conflict.

In sum, many contemporary theories of ethnic and racial prejudice, ethnic political mobilization, and ethnic conflict emphasize structural conditions that provide a context within which attitudes and behavior toward out-groups develop. We use these theories of prejudice, mobilization, and conflict to develop a structural model of ethnic prejudice in Bosnia and Croatia.

County Composition and Ethnic Prejudice

A second approach to explaining regional differences in ethnic prejudice is to focus on the composition of the specific regions (Hyman and Sheatsley 1956; Middleton 1976; Quillian 1996). For example, scholars studying the North-South gap in U.S. racial

prejudice have focused on differences in average levels of education. Since education decreases prejudice, prejudice should be lower in regions that have more educated populations.[2] For compositional effects to exist, the average level of individual variables must differ across the regions and these variables must have sizable effects on the dependent variable.

Lincoln Quillian (1996) examines whether education and other individual-level variables, such as sex, employment status, happiness, family income, type of residence (e.g., urban, suburban), and residential contact with other racial groups, explain regional differences in the level of prejudice in the United States. The results suggest that regional compositional differences do not explain much of the North-South gap in prejudice. Differences in education account for some of the variation; however, other individual-level variables do not. Quillian (1995) also examines whether compositional differences account for between-country variance in ethnic and anti-immigrant prejudice in Western Europe. Results indicate that compositional differences account for very little of the between-country variance in ethnic and anti-immigrant prejudice in Western Europe.

ETHNIC PREJUDICE IN BOSNIA AND CROATIA: MAJOR HYPOTHESES

We focus on the following county-level structural characteristics to explain county differences in average levels of ethnic prejudice in Bosnia and Croatia: ethnic diversity, economic conditions, and ethnic segregation and inequality. We also explore the possibility that county compositional differences explain county variation in average levels of prejudice.

County Composition

Hypothesis 1: Compositional differences among counties explain a significant part of the county differences in average levels of prejudice.

While we focus on structural conditions to explain county differences in average levels of ethnic prejudice, it is equally possible that compositional differences across counties (e.g., average levels of education) also explain county disparities in ethnic prejudice (Fossett and Kiecolt 1989; Middleton 1976; Quillian 1995; 1996). At the individual level, we focus on stratification position (e.g., education, occupation, and personal economic hardship). Other control variables include sex, age, minority status, family diversity, frequency reading the newspaper, membership in the Communist Party, support for democratic change, and religiosity. Hierarchical linear modeling techniques allow us to partition the variance of ethnic prejudice into within-county and between-county components. By controlling for these individual-level variables, we will be able to assess how much of the between-county variance in ethnic prejudice is due to county compositional differences.

Regarding the stratification position variables (education, occupation, and personal economic hardship), we expect that education has a curvilinear effect on ethnic prejudice—a negative effect at low to moderate levels of education and a positive effect at high levels of education—because many political, religious, and cultural elites used nationalism to mobilize ethnic constituencies for their own gain during the dissolution

of Yugoslavia (Denitch 1994; Partos 1997; Ramet 1996). Vesna Pešić (1994, p. 133) argues, "Manipulating this kind of ethnocentric nationalism has been seen as the quickest and most effective method of gaining political power and maintaining control of the population." The politics of ethnicity infiltrated all aspects of Yugoslav society including politics, religion, art, literature, music, and the media (Jelavich 1983; Partos 1997; Ramet 1996). Thus, we expect elites to be more prejudiced toward ethnic out-groups because of their role in strengthening intra-ethnic ties and promoting ethnic prejudice. Individuals who are unemployed, those not in the labor force (e.g., retirees and homemakers), those working in blue-collar jobs, and those with personal economic hardship are expected to be more prejudiced because they are more vulnerable to direct competition with other ethnic groups (Bobo and Hutchings 1996).

As for the control variables, men and the aged are typically more intolerant than women and the young. Research has shown that local and regional minorities and individuals with greater ethnic diversity in their family of origin or destination are generally less intolerant (Hodson et al. 1994; Massey et al. 1999). We expect frequently reading the newspaper to decrease ethnic prejudice. We expect members of the Communist Party to be less intolerant because of the party's support for Yugoslavism and federalism. Support for democratic change is often shown to decrease intolerance (Sullivan, Marcus, Feldman, and Piereson 1981; Sullivan et al. 1982). In the current analysis, however, we expect that support for democratic change will increase intolerance because republic-level politicians have used democratic ideas to justify nationalism during the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The relationship between religiosity and intolerance is complex. Religious affiliation, commitment, and participation have only weak indirect effects on intolerance in Poland (Karpov 1999b). The effect of religiosity (attendance and the intensity of beliefs) on intolerance is largely spurious in Croatia (Kunovich and Hodson 1999). Nevertheless, religiosity is an important control variable because political and religious elites manipulated religious symbols to propagate nationalism throughout the region.

Ethnic Diversity

Hypothesis 2: Ethnic diversity in the county of residence affects ethnic prejudice.

There are several perspectives on the relationship between ethnic diversity and ethnic tensions. According to "ethnic plurality theory" (Jenkins and Kposowa 1990; Kposowa and Jenkins 1993), ethnic diversity increases ethnic tensions because of the number of competing groups and greater cultural heterogeneity. On the other hand, the "ethnic dominance thesis" (Jenkins and Kposowa 1990; Kposowa and Jenkins 1993) suggests that diversity decreases ethnic tensions because "ethnic plurality should create a more dispersed power system" (Kposowa and Jenkins 1993, p. 131).

In this article, we focus on ethnic diversity rather than the size of competing groups (e.g., the percentage minority). This decision is based on the fact that there are numerous groups competing for resources in Bosnia and Croatia (e.g., national groups from Yugoslavia, such as Croatians, Serbians, Bosnian Muslim, and Albanians, as well as national groups from other countries, such as Czechs and Slovaks). Percentage minority implies a focus on the relationship between two groups—this is overly simplistic and does not represent well the situation in Bosnia and Croatia.

Economic Conditions

Hypothesis 3: Levels of economic hardship and unemployment in the county of residence increase ethnic prejudice.

High levels of economic hardship and unemployment in the county of residence should increase ethnic prejudice for the ethnic majority and ethnic minorities because competition is greater when economic conditions are worse. With difficult economic conditions, members of the dominant group fear the loss of social status, and members of subordinate groups fear falling further behind.

Ethnic Segregation and Inequality

Hypothesis 4: Ethnic residential segregation in the county of residence affects ethnic prejudice.

The various structural approaches outlined above are divided on the relationship between residential segregation and prejudice. Hawley (1944) and Allport (1954) suggested that residential segregation increases ethnic prejudice. For Hawley, this occurs because segregation heightens the visibility of minority groups and facilitates stereotyping. For Allport, residential segregation limits chances for interpersonal contact. Although ethnic competition theory and ethnic segregation theory focus on economic competition—particularly competition for scarce jobs—the basic ideas may also apply to residential segregation. From the ethnic segregation perspective, residential segregation may increase grievances based on perceptions of blocked life chances, thus promoting ethnic prejudice. On the other hand, ethnic competition theory suggests that residential segregation decreases prejudice because segregation limits intergroup competition.

Hypothesis 5: Ethnic occupational segregation in the county of residence affects ethnic prejudice.

Once again, the structural theories of prejudice, mobilization, and conflict are divided on the relationship between occupational segregation and prejudice. Ethnic competition theorists argue that direct competition over scarce resources in the same niche—especially competition over jobs—increases ethnic political mobilization and conflict (Olzak 1992). Therefore, ethnic occupational segregation should decrease prejudice for majority and minority groups. However, ethnic segregation theorists argue that segregation in low-status jobs leads to ethnic grievances, solidarity, mobilization, and conflict. Thus, ethnic segregation theory suggests that ethnic occupational segregation increases prejudice for minority groups.

Hypothesis 6: Ethnic economic inequality in the county of residence increases ethnic prejudice.

Ethnic segregation theorists argue that "ethnic political mobilization occurs when members of one ethnic group perceive that their life chances are fewer than those of other ethnic groups" (Medrano 1994, p. 875). Thus, inequality tends to increase ethnic solidarity, mobilization, and conflict (Belanger and Pinard 1991; Hechter 1975; Medrano 1994). We expect ethnic economic inequality to increase ethnic prejudice among subordinate

groups because they perceive their life chances to be limited. On the other hand, we expect the dominant group to be more prejudiced in counties with high levels of ethnic inequality partially as a "mask for privilege" (Allport 1954, p. 233)—that is, prejudice is justified based on the lower status of the subordinate group.

DATA AND METHODS

Individual-level Data

In 1989 and 1990 the Consortium of Social Research Institutes of Yugoslavia used a stratified, multistage cluster sampling design to interview approximately 13,400 individuals from Yugoslavia's eight republics. In each republic, within selected counties, districts and then factories and/or streets were randomly selected. Individuals were sampled from these units and interviewed in their homes or at work. The complete sample is composed of 13,422 adults and is distributed across the republics in accord with their populations. The age, education, and occupation distributions of the sample closely approximate those reported in the 1991 Yugoslav census. The sex distribution, however, is moderately skewed. We weight the data to achieve a sex distribution consistent with that reported in the Yugoslav census.[3] The questionnaire asked over three hundred items, resulting in a wealth of data. We use data from Bosnia and Croatia (N = 4,572) in the current analysis. We use these data to create individual-level variables measuring ethnic prejudice, stratification position, and control variables, as well as several county-level variables measuring local economic conditions, occupational segregation, and ethnic economic inequality.

Individual-level Variables

Ethnic Prejudice

Six items have face validity as indicators of ethnic prejudice. Respondents were asked how important nationality is for picking a marriage partner, as well as the extent to which they agree that nationally mixed marriages must be more unstable than others, that every nation should have its own state, that people can feel completely safe only when the majority belong to their nation, that among nations it is possible to create cooperation but not full trust, and that, without leaders, every nation is like a man without a head. Bivariate correlations and exploratory factor analysis using principal axis extraction indicate that five of these items are highly intercorrelated. The sixth question (the importance of leaders for nations) has the weakest intercorrelations and factor loading. This item has, therefore, been removed. The resulting five-item index (Cronbach's alpha = .658) measures the degree to which an individual is prejudiced toward other ethnic groups. (See Appendix 1 for the details of scale construction, Appendix 2 for the descriptive statistics for all variables, and Appendix 3 for bivariate correlations.)

Stratification Position

We include three variables as indicators of stratification position: education, occupation, and personal economic hardship. Education is measured by years of schooling. Political,

religious, and cultural elites played an important role in the mobilization of ethnic constituencies in the former Yugoslavia. We include a quadratic term, education squared, in the models to better capture the relationship between education and prejudice. Occupation is measured by a set of dummy variables. The unemployed, blue-collar workers, and other people not in the labor force (e.g., homemakers, retirees) are each dichotomous variables. Individuals with white-collar jobs are the reference group. A direct measure of income is unavailable in the survey data. Accordingly, we create an index of personal economic hardship that is composed of three questions: difficulty paying for groceries, for housing, and for clothing (yes or no for each). We averaged and then standardized these three items, which yielded an unweighted index.

Control Variables

Other individual-level variables include sex, age, minority status, family diversity, frequency reading the newspaper, membership in the Communist Party, support for democratic change, and religiosity. Male, county-level ethnic minority, ethnically mixed marriage, ethnically mixed heritage, and membership in the Communist Party are dummy variables. Men, minorities, those married to an individual of a different ethnicity, those whose parents have different ethnic backgrounds, and Communist Party members (as of the time of the survey) are coded as "1." Age is measured in years. Frequency reading the newspaper is measured by one item with the following response categories: never, monthly, weekly, and daily. Support for democratic change is a weighted scale (Cronbach's alpha = .541) based on seven items measuring support for private property, market economics, multiparty political systems, and an independent judicial system (Appendix 1). This variable is designed to capture support for the political and economic changes taking place. Religiosity (Cronbach's alpha = .872) is also a weighted scale and consists of five items including the frequency of church attendance, respondent's overall level of religious orthodoxy, and the degree to which the respondent believes in God, life after death, and that God created people (Appendix 1).[4]

County-level Data

The 1991 Yugoslav census, completed several months before the country's dissolution, contains detailed information on the size of ethnic group populations in the various counties and districts of Bosnia and Croatia. We use these data to create the following county-level variables: the ethnic index of qualitative variation (a measure of ethnic diversity in the county) and the dissimilarity index (a measure of ethnic residential segregation).

County-level Variables

Ethnic Diversity

We use the index of qualitative variation (IQV) to measure the level of ethnic diversity in each county. The IQV is a measure of variability for nominal variables and is defined as the ratio of observed differences to possible differences. More formally,

$$IQV = \frac{\Sigma f_i f_j}{\frac{K(K-1)}{2}(N/K)^2} \quad (1)$$

where f_i is the frequency of category i, f_j is the frequency of category j, K is the number of categories in the distribution, and N is the total number of cases in the distribution. The IQV can range from 0 to 1, with 0 indicating no diversity (i.e., the county is composed entirely of one ethnic group) and 1 indicating total diversity (i.e., the county is composed of a completely even mix of ethnic groups). We calculated the index of qualitative variation separately for each county using the census data. There are a total of five possible ethnic categories in the census data: Bosnian Muslim, Croatian, Serbian, Yugoslavian, and other.

Economic Conditions

We use the survey data to create two county-level variables that capture local economic conditions. We measure economic hardship in the county with the county mean personal economic hardship. Three items in the survey data are indicators of economic hardship: difficulty paying for groceries, housing, and clothing. Economic hardship is simply personal economic hardship aggregated to the county level. We also measure unemployment with the percentage of people in the county who are currently unemployed. We use the survey data to estimate county economic hardship and unemployment because detailed economic information is not available at the county level in the Yugoslav census.

Ethnic Segregation and Inequality

We measure ethnic residential segregation with the index of dissimilarity (Δ). The index of dissimilarity is defined as the proportion of individuals who would have to move to another district to achieve an even ethnic distribution across all districts within a county. More formally,

$$\Delta = 1/2\Sigma|a_i - b_i|, \quad (2)$$

where a_i is the proportion of the county majority living in district i, b_i is the proportion of county minorities living in district i, and the absolute value of the difference between the proportion of county majority and minorities in each district is summed across all districts in a county. The dissimilarity index is a direct measure of residential segregation in the county of residence. High scores suggest that the majority and minorities are segregated in different districts within the same county. Low scores, by contrast, suggest that the majority and minorities are integrated within districts in the county. Scholars of racial and ethnic prejudice have focused on the relative size of competing groups rather than on the distribution of groups within and across geographic regions. We seek to answer the question: Does residential segregation (i.e., the concentration or dispersion of competing ethnic groups) affect ethnic prejudice? The ethnic residential segregation variable is based on the census data.

We also measure ethnic occupational segregation with the index of dissimilarity (Δ). The index of dissimilarity is defined as the percentage of individuals who would have to

change jobs (e.g., from a blue-collar to a white-collar job) to achieve an even ethnic distribution across occupations within a county. More formally,

$$\Delta = 1/2\Sigma|a_i - b_i|, \tag{3}$$

where a_i is the percentage of the county majority working in occupation i, b_i is the percentage of the county minorities working in occupation i, and the absolute value of the difference between the percentage of majority and minorities in each occupation is summed across all occupations in a county. High scores on the index suggest that either the county majority or minorities are segregated in particular types of jobs. The index of dissimilarity is a nonhierarchical measure of occupational segregation—that is, it does not indicate which ethnic group is segregated in which occupation. Detailed occupation data are not available in the Yugoslav census by county. Therefore, we estimate the index of dissimilarity based on the survey data.

We measure ethnic economic inequality with the absolute value of the difference between the county ethnic minorities and the county ethnic majority in their levels of economic hardship. Three items in the survey data are indicators of economic hardship: difficulty paying for groceries, housing, and clothing. To construct the ethnic economic inequality index, we calculate the mean level of personal economic hardship in each county separately for the minorities and majority. Next, we subtract the mean level of economic hardship for the minorities from the majority and take the absolute value. High scores indicate that there is ethnic economic inequality in the county. The ethnic economic inequality index is a nonhierarchical measure of economic inequality—that is, it does not indicate which ethnic group is worse off economically. The ethnic economic inequality variable is based on the survey data.

METHODS

Hierarchical data structures exist when one unit of analysis is nested within another unit of analysis. In the current analysis, individuals are nested within counties. Ordinary least squares regression is inappropriate for hierarchical data structures because of the possibility of correlated errors and unequal error variances. We use hierarchical linear modeling techniques (HLM 4.0 for Windows) to control for the possibility of correlated errors and unequal error variances. In the discussion that follows, "level-1" refers to the individual-level survey data and "level-2" refers to the county-level data (for a more detailed review of hierarchical linear modeling techniques, see Bryk and Raudenbush 1992; DiPrete and Forristal 1994; Goldstein 1995; Guo and Zhao 2000; and Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, and Congdon 2000).

Through the course of this analysis, we estimate several hierarchical linear models. First is the one-way ANOVA with random effects (also known as the fully unconditional model). The one-way ANOVA with random effects is formally defined as:

$$Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + u_{0j} + r_{ij}; \tag{4}$$

where Y_{ij} is the ethnic prejudice score for person i in county j, γ_{00} is the mean level of ethnic prejudice across all counties, u_{0j} is the random coefficient associated with county j (the county-level residual), and r_{ij} is the individual-level residual. The fully uncondi-

tional model provides an estimate of the within and between-county variance in ethnic prejudice.

After examining the amount of within and between-county variance in ethnic prejudice, we constructed several level-1 models (known as one-way ANCOVA with random effects models). The one-way ANCOVA with random effects model, with one level-1 independent variable (for the following example, education), is formally defined as:

$$Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10}(X_{ij} - \overline{X}_{..}) + u_{0j} + r_{ij}; \quad (5)$$

where Y_{ij} is the ethnic prejudice score for person i in county j, γ_{00} is the mean level of ethnic prejudice across all counties, γ_{10} is the average effect of education on ethnic prejudice across all counties, $(X_{ij} - \overline{X}_{..})$ is the grand mean centered education score for person i in county j, u_{0j} is the random coefficient associated with county j (the county-level residual after controlling for education), and r_{ij} is the individual-level residual (after controlling for education). This model allows us to determine how much between-county variation in ethnic prejudice the individual-level variables explain (county compositional effects).

The final hierarchical linear model that we estimate is an extension of the one-way ANCOVA with random effects model and is referred to as an "intercepts as outcomes" model. Using this HLM submodel, we model the between-county variance in ethnic prejudice—that is, we include county-level variables to explain county-level differences in prejudice. The intercepts as outcomes model, with one level-1 variable (e.g., education) and one level-2 variable (e.g., ethnic economic inequality), is formally defined as:

$$Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}W_j + \gamma_{10}(X_{ij} - \overline{X}_{..}) + u_{0j} + r_{ij}; \quad (6)$$

where Y_{ij} is the ethnic prejudice score for person i in county j, γ_{00} is the mean level of ethnic prejudice across all counties, γ_{01} is the effect of ethnic economic inequality on ethnic prejudice, W_j is the level of ethnic economic inequality in county j, γ_{10} is the average effect of education on ethnic prejudice across all counties, $(X_{ij} - \overline{X}_{..})$ is the grand mean centered education score for person i in county j, u_{0j} is the random coefficient associated with county j (the county-level residual after controlling for education and ethnic economic inequality), and r_{ij} is the individual-level residual (after controlling for education and ethnic economic inequality).

RESULTS

County Variation in Ethnic Prejudice

Does the average level of ethnic prejudice vary across counties? To answer this question, we estimate a one-way ANOVA with random effects model. This hierarchical linear model divides the variance of ethnic prejudice into between and within-county components and allows us to estimate the percentage of variance in ethnic prejudice that can be attributed to individual- and county-level variables.

The between-county variance (tau) in ethnic prejudice is .143. The within-county variance (sigma squared) in ethnic prejudice is .891. The intraclass correlation is .138.[5] Thus, about 14 percent of the variance in ethnic prejudice is between counties and 86 percent of the variance is within counties. With a chi-square statistic of 623.5 and 33 degrees of freedom, the between-county variance in ethnic prejudice is significant at the

.001 level. In sum, results suggest that there are significant differences across counties in the level of ethnic prejudice.

County Compositional Effects: Individual-level Sources of Ethnic Prejudice

Do stratification position (education, occupation, and personal economic hardship) and other individual-level variables affect ethnic prejudice? Do compositional differences across counties explain some of the county differences in the level of ethnic prejudice? To answer these questions, we estimate several one-way ANCOVA with random effects models in which we include only individual-level predictors of ethnic prejudice.

We begin by regressing ethnic prejudice on the stratification position variables—education, occupation, and personal economic hardship. Results suggest that stratification position plays an important role in the development of ethnic prejudice (Table 1, model 1). As expected, education has a curvilinear effect on ethnic prejudice. Controlling for the effects of occupation and personal economic hardship, education decreases ethnic prejudice at a decreasing rate until about fifteen years of education, at which point education increases ethnic prejudice at an increasing rate. The point of inflection—fifteen years of education—is interesting because only about 11 percent of the sample has more than fifteen years of education, so clearly, these are elites. Results also suggest that unemployed and blue-collar workers are more prejudiced than white-collar workers. On average, the unemployed score .177 standardized units higher and blue-collar workers score .261 standardized units higher on the ethnic prejudice scale than white-collar workers. Finally, personal economic hardship does not affect ethnic prejudice. Stratification position explains 3.7 percent of the within-county variance in ethnic prejudice and 8.6 percent of the between-county variance in ethnic prejudice. Thus, differences in the levels of education and occupation across counties account for some of the county differences in the level of ethnic prejudice.

Next, we regress ethnic prejudice on stratification position and the control variables (except for religiosity). Results suggest that women, county-level minorities, and individuals with ethnically mixed marriages and heritage are less prejudiced. Women score, on average, .139 standardized units lower on the ethnic prejudice scale than men. On average, county-level ethnic minorities score .336 standardized units lower on the prejudice scale than county-level majorities. Individuals with a spouse from a different ethnic group or with parents from different ethnic groups score .242 and .137 standardized units lower on the ethnic prejudice scale, respectively, than those lacking such family diversity. Age has a positive effect on ethnic prejudice. A one-year increase in age increases prejudice by .002 standardized units. Frequently reading the newspaper and membership in the Communist Party decrease prejudice; support for democratic change increases prejudice. A one-unit increase in the frequency of reading the newspaper decreases prejudice by .062 standardized units. Communist Party members score .269 standardized units lower on the prejudice scale than nonmembers. Finally, a one-unit increase in support for democratic change increases prejudice by .027 standardized units. Together, stratification position and the controls variables (excluding religiosity) explain 10.1 percent of the within-county variance in prejudice and 30.3 percent of the between-county variance in prejudice.

We control for religiosity in the final individual-level model. Religiosity has the single strongest effect on ethnic prejudice. A one standard deviation unit increase in religiosity

TABLE 1. ETHNIC PREJUDICE REGRESSED ON STRATIFICATION POSITION AND INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL CONTROL VARIABLES: HLM ONE-WAY ANCOVA WITH RANDOM EFFECTS MODELS FOR BOSNIA AND CROATIA, 1989 (4,572 INDIVIDUALS; 34 COUNTIES)[a]

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
Variables	Gamma Coefficient	Standard Error	Gamma Coefficient	Standard Error	Gamma Coefficient	Standard Error
Intercept	−.098	.070	.138**	.066	.045	.053
Stratification Position						
Education	−.090*	.012	−.054*	.013	−.020†	.012
Education squared	.003*	.001	.002*	.001	.001*	.001
Occupation[b]						
Unemployed (1 = yes)	.177*	.059	.127*	.061	.085†	.058
Not in the labor force (1 = yes)	.056	.050	−.056	.058	−.012	.055
Blue-collar (1 = yes)	.261*	.040	.119*	.042	.043	.040
Personal economic hardship	−.016	.014	−.011	.014	−.014	.013
Control Variables						
Male (1 = yes)			.139*	.029	.163*	.028
Age			.002*	.001	.001	.001
Ethnic minority in county (1 = yes)			−.336*	.031	−.192*	.030
Mixed marriage (1 = yes)			−.242*	.044	−.181*	.042
Mixed heritage (1 = yes)			−.137*	.053	−.116*	.050
Frequency reading newspaper			−.062*	.016	−.031*	.015
Communist Party member (1 = yes)			−.269*	.039	−.054†	.038
Support for democratic change			.027*	.015	.022†	.014
Religiosity					.361*	.016
% within-county variance explained	3.7		10.1		18.8	
% between-county variance explained	8.6		30.3		63.8	

Chi-square Table

Parameter	Variance[c]	χ^2 (d.f.)	Variance	χ^2 (d.f.)	Variance	χ^2 (d.f.)
Intercept	.131*	580.791 (33)	.100*	475.955 (33)	.052*	290.776 (33)
Level-1	.859		.801		.724	

[a] Education, education squared, personal economic hardship, age, frequency reading the newspaper, support for democratic change, and religiosity have been centered around their grand means. The residual parameter variance for all level-1 coefficients has been set to zero.
[b] The reference category for occupation is white-collar.
[c] The variance estimates from the fully unconditional model are as follows: intercept (.143) and level-1 (.891).
* $p < .05$ (one-tailed t-test); † $p < .10$ (one-tailed t-test); ** $p < .05$ (two-tailed t-test).

increases ethnic prejudice by .361 standardized units. Together, all of the individual-level variables explain 18.8 percent of the within-county variance in ethnic prejudice and 63.8 percent of the between county variance in prejudice. These results suggest that the majority of county variation in ethnic prejudice is due to county compositional differences. Thus, there is considerable support for the first hypothesis, that county compositional differences account for county differences in the level of prejudice. Nevertheless, a significant amount of between-county variation in ethnic prejudice remains to be explained.

Ethnic Diversity, Economic Conditions, and Ethnic Segregation and Inequality: County-level Sources of Ethnic Prejudice

Do structural characteristics in the county of residence affect ethnic prejudice? We estimate several intercepts as outcomes models to answer this question. In the first intercepts as outcomes model, we include all six county-level variables as well as the individual-level stratification position and control variables. In the second model, we remove nonsignificant county-level variables. Results suggest that three county-level variables significantly affect ethnic prejudice. In support of the second hypothesis, ethnic diversity in the county of residence affects ethnic prejudice. More specifically, ethnic diversity has a negative effect on prejudice. A one-unit increase in ethnic diversity decreases the average level of prejudice by .393 standardized units (.393 standardized units is the difference between two counties—one with no ethnic diversity and the other with complete ethnic diversity). This finding lends support to the ethnic dominance thesis, which suggests that ethnic diversity decreases ethnic tensions.

In addition, in support of the fifth hypothesis, ethnic occupational segregation affects ethnic prejudice. Ethnic occupational segregation has a weak negative effect on prejudice ($p < .10$), lending support to ethnic competition theory. In Bosnia and Croatia, occupational segregation appears to shield different ethnic groups from direct competition in the labor market and, thus, reduces levels of prejudice. A one-unit increase in ethnic occupational segregation decreases the average level of ethnic prejudice by .006 standardized units.

Finally, in support of the sixth hypothesis, ethnic economic inequality increases ethnic prejudice. A one-unit increase in ethnic economic inequality increases the average level of prejudice by 1.422 standardized units. This finding lends support to ethnic segregation theory, which suggests that inequality breeds resentment among subordinate ethnic groups as well as a sense of privilege among the dominant ethnic group.

After controlling for all individual-level variables and for the three significant county-level variables, we are able to explain 18.8 percent of the within-county variance in ethnic prejudice and 83.1 percent of the between-county variance. Thus, structural characteristics of counties explain about 19 percent of the between-county variance in ethnic prejudice (that is, 83.1 minus 63.8 = 19.3 percent).

DISCUSSION

Structural conditions in the county of residence influence people's attitudes toward ethnic out-groups in Bosnia and Croatia. In particular, ethnic diversity in the county of residence decreases ethnic prejudice. How can we explain the negative relationship between ethnic diversity and ethnic prejudice in Bosnia and Croatia? The ethnic dominance thesis (Jenkins and Kposowa 1990; Kposowa and Jenkins 1993) suggests that eth-

TABLE 2. ETHNIC PREJUDICE REGRESSED ON COUNTY-LEVEL THREAT, SEGREGATION, AND INEQUALITY VARIABLES, CONTROLLING FOR INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL VARIABLES: HLM INTERCEPTS AS OUTCOMES MODELS FOR BOSNIA AND CROATIA, 1989 (4,572 INDIVIDUALS; 34 COUNTIES).[a]

Variables	Model 1 Gamma coefficient	Model 1 Standard error	Model 2 Gamma coefficient	Model 2 Standard error
Intercept	.051	.045	.048	.044
County-level variables				
Ethnic diversity	−.393**	.168	−.387**	.139
Economic hardship	.125	.493		
Percent unemployed	.002	.009		
Ethnic residential segregation	.148	.164		
Ethnic occupational segregation	−.006††	.003	−.006††	.003
Ethnic economic inequality	1.422**	.401	1.464**	.384
Individual-level variables				
Stratification Position				
Education	−.020†	.012	−.021*	.012
Education squared	.001*	.001	.001*	.001
Occupation[b]				
Unemployed (1 = yes)	.086†	.058	.087†	.058
Not in the labor force (1 = yes)	−.014	.055	−.015	.055
Blue-collar (1 = yes)	.040	.040	.039	.040
Personal economic hardship	−.014	.013	−.014	.013
Control Variables				
Male (1 = yes)	.165*	.028	.167*	.028
Age	.001	.001	.001	.001
Ethnic minority in county (1 = yes)	−.188*	.030	−.187*	.030
Mixed marriage (1 = yes)	−.179*	.042	−.180*	.042
Mixed heritage (1 = yes)	−.115*	.050	−.116*	.050
Frequency reading newspaper	−.031*	.015	−.032*	.015
Communist Party member (1 = yes)	−.057†	.038	−.055†	.038
Support for democratic change	.023†	.014	.022†	.014
Religiosity	.358*	.016	.359*	.016
% within-county variance explained	18.8		18.8	
% between-county variance explained	81.4		83.1	

Chi-square Table

Parameter	Variance[c]	χ^2 (d.f.)	Variance	χ^2 (d.f.)
Intercept	.027*	136.952 (27)	.024*	140.948 (30)
Level-1	.724		.724	

[a] Education, education squared, personal economic hardship, age, frequency reading the newspaper, support for democratic change, and religiosity have been centered around their grand means. The residual parameter variance for all level-1 coefficients has been set to zero. All level-2 predictors have been centered around their grand means.

[b] The reference category for occupation is white-collar.

[c] The variance estimates from the fully unconditional model are as follows: intercept (.143) and level-1 (.891).

* $p < .05$ (one-tailed t-test); † $p < .10$ (one-tailed t-test); ** $p < .05$ (two-tailed t-test); †† $p < .10$ (two-tailed t-test).

nic diversity decreases ethnic tensions because of a dispersion of power among competing groups. Certainly, this is one possibility. We must not, however, overlook the powerful ideology of Yugoslavism.

After World War II, political leaders in Yugoslavia sought to rebuild the federal Yugoslav state, which was devastated by genocide and interethnic fighting during the war. Leaders used the ideology of Yugoslavism (a shared South Slav ethnic identity) in the attempt to bind together national groups with different cultural traditions. Their efforts were somewhat successful—the percentage of people who self-identified as "Yugoslav" gradually increased in 1961–1981. This trend was especially pronounced in diverse republics, such as Bosnia, Vojvodina, and Croatia. In fact, heterogeneity in the republic or province of residence encouraged individuals to self-identify as Yugoslav (Breuilly 1982; Djilas 1991; Sekulić, Massey, and Hodson 1994). We argue that the ideology of Yugoslavism, which was particularly strong in heterogeneous regions in the former Yugoslavia, provided a context within which individuals internalized dominant group norms and values of ethnic *tolerance* rather than perceptions of group threat, fear, and prejudice.

Many scholars have acknowledged the important role of socialization and dominant social norms in shaping people's ethnic and racial attitudes (Allport 1954; Middleton 1976; Quillian 1996). For example, Russell Middleton (1976, pp. 98–99) states, "If . . . prejudice is in large part a matter of socialization to a regional complex of prejudiced beliefs and norms, an individual's attitudes will tend to reflect the prevailing views in the area in which he lives." Similarly, Quillian (1996, p. 827) argues that a likely source of regional disparity in prejudice in the United States is the history of slavery and race relations—these influenced racial attitudes through "Southern acculturation and through conformity to regional norms about race." In other words, individuals internalize dominant social norms and values. In the cases of Bosnia and Croatia, individuals in ethnically diverse counties internalized tolerance.

A second structural characteristic, ethnic economic inequality, also played an important role in generating prejudiced attitudes in Bosnia and Croatia. Our results suggest that ethnic inequality in the county of residence increases ethnic prejudice. Following from ethnic segregation theory, we suggest that subordinate economic groups are prejudiced in counties with higher levels of ethnic economic inequality because they perceive their life chances as more limited than the dominant group's. Conversely, the dominant group is prejudiced in counties with high levels of ethnic inequality as a "mask for privilege" (Allport 1954, p. 233)—that is, prejudice is justified based on the lower status of subordinate groups.

A final structural source of ethnic prejudice in Bosnia and Croatia is ethnic occupational segregation. Scholars are divided on the effects of occupational segregation on prejudice and other ethnic outcomes. Allport (1954) and ethnic segregation theorists, such as Michael Hechter (1975) and Juan Diez Medrano (1994), suggest that occupational segregation increases prejudice. For Allport, interpersonal relationships that develop in the workplace decrease prejudice. Ethnic segregation theorists argue that concentration in low-status jobs increases prejudice because of blocked chances for upward mobility (Medrano 1994). By contrast, ethnic competition theory suggests that direct competition for scarce jobs increases prejudice. Thus, occupational integration should increase prejudice, and segregation should be associated with greater tolerance. Our results lend some support to ethnic competition theory. Ethnic occupational segregation in the county of residence decreased ethnic prejudice in Bosnia and Croatia.

Thus, counties with greater ethnic occupational segregation tended to have lower average levels of prejudice.

Taken together, ethnic diversity, ethnic economic inequality, and ethnic occupational segregation explain some of the county differences in the level of ethnic prejudice. Surprisingly, county compositional differences explained a majority of the county differences in prejudice. Similar research in the United States and Western Europe suggests that only a small percentage of the regional and country differences in prejudice are due to compositional differences (Quillian 1995; 1996). In Bosnia and Croatia, 63.8 percent of the between-county variance in prejudice is due to compositional differences. Some of this variation is due to differences in average levels of education, different rates of unemployment and employment in blue-collar occupations, and differences in average levels of the control variables. However, almost 34 percent of the between-county variation is due to differences in the average level of religiosity across counties. Previous research in the former Yugoslavia demonstrates that competition among groups polarized individuals along religious lines and increased intolerance (Kunovich and Hodson 1999). Religiosity is, thus, a carrier for group identity and intolerance. This interpretation is supported in the current analysis—counties with high levels of church attendance and intense religious beliefs tended to have high levels of ethnic prejudice.

Many scholars have argued that education decreases prejudice. Results from the current article, however, indicate that education has a nonlinear effect on ethnic prejudice in Bosnia and Croatia. Political, religious, and cultural elites used ethnicity to increase in-group solidarity and to mobilize ethnic constituencies for personal gain. The curvilinear effect of education suggests that educated elites are more ethnically prejudiced in Bosnia and Croatia—the relationship between education and prejudice turns positive after about fifteen years of education. Clearly, it is unwise to assume that education always plays a role in decreasing prejudice.

While many of the structural variables identified by theories of ethnic prejudice, ethnic political mobilization, and ethnic conflict explain county differences in prejudice, a few do not. Most surprising is the non-effect of ethnic residential segregation on prejudice. In Bosnia and Croatia, just prior to the outbreak of war, the overall level of ethnic diversity in the county affected the level of prejudice—prejudice was lower in diverse counties. Surprisingly, the dispersion or concentration of ethnic groups within the county did not affect prejudice. Imagine two counties with the same ethnic composition—for example, five ethnic groups, each comprising 20 percent of the county population. Further, imagine that, in the first county, each ethnic group is perfectly segregated in its own area and, in the second county, each ethnic group is perfectly dispersed throughout the county. Our results suggest that there is no difference in the average level of prejudice between these two ideal-type counties.

CONCLUSIONS

There has been much debate in the field of racial and ethnic relations about the roles played by structure and personality in generating prejudiced attitudes. Our analysis focuses on structural conditions in the county of residence and demonstrates that ethnic diversity, ethnic occupational segregation, and ethnic economic inequality provide a context for the development of prejudiced attitudes. Ethnic diversity and ethnic occupational segregation decrease ethnic prejudice; ethnic economic inequality increases ethnic prejudice. These structural characteristics explain some of the county differences in the level of ethnic prejudice. However, a majority of the county variation in ethnic prej-

udice is due to county compositional differences. Surprisingly, economic conditions, including economic hardship and unemployment, and ethnic residential segregation did not appear to play prominent roles in generating ethnic prejudice in Bosnia and Croatia just prior to the wars of national separation.

By identifying larger patterns in the development of ethnic prejudice, social scientists may be able to suggest appropriate strategies to build a constructive dialogue among hostile groups while supporting minority rights. Future analyses of ethnic prejudice would benefit from a greater comparative focus—examining prejudice in countries that vary in the degree of ethnic diversity, ethnic economic inequality, and ethnic occupational segregation and that have different historical legacies with respect to the treatment of ethnic minorities and related ideologies.

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APPENDIX 1. SCALE CONSTRUCTION

Items	Factor Loadings
Ethnic Prejudice Factor Analysis for Bosnia and Croatia, 1989 (N = 4,572)[a]	
Nationality is important for picking a marriage partner.	.556
Nationally mixed marriages are unstable.	.576
Every nation should have its own state.	.483
Men can only feel safe when the majority belong to their nation.	.688
Among nations it is possible to create cooperation but not trust.	.386
N	4,572
Eigenvalue	2.165
% variance	43.301
Cronbach's alpha	.658
Support for Democratic Change Factor Analysis for Bosnia and Croatia, 1989 (N = 4,572)[a]	
Freedom of speech does not lead to the disorganization of society.[b]	.335
Social progress is based on private property.	.279
The judicial system should not serve the interests of the state.[b]	.336
The state must not have control over the economy.[b]	.689
Firm independence stimulates growth.	.534
Private agriculture means more food.	.135
A multiparty system is best.	.354
N	4,572
Eigenvalue	1.938
% variance	27.680
Cronbach's alpha	.541
Religiosity Factor Analysis for Bosnia and Croatia, 1989 (N = 4,572)[a]	
Frequency of church attendance	.684
Religious orthodoxy	.839
Believe in God	.888
Believe in life after death	.724
Believe God created people	.880
N	4,572
Eigenvalue	3.586
% variance	71.727
Cronbach's alpha	.872

[a] Results are based on principal axis extraction.
[b] These variables are re-coded such that high levels of each reflect support for democratic change.

APPENDIX 2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR BOSNIA AND CROATIA, 1989 (4,572 INDIVIDUALS; 34 COUNTIES)

Variables	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum	Data Source
County-level variables						
Ethnic diversity	34	.565	.230	.049	.898	Census
Economic hardship	34	.524	.092	.003	.461	Survey
Percent unemployed	34	8.315	4.710	.060	18.480	Survey
Ethnic residential segregation	34	.447	.211	.092	.797	Census
Ethnic occupational segregation	34	12.822	10.858	.000	52.679	Survey
Ethnic economic inequality	34	.092	.091	.003	.461	Survey
Individual-level variables						
Ethnic prejudice	4,572	.000	1.000	−1.014	3.099	Survey
Stratification position						
Years of education	4,572	10.226	4.038	0	22	Survey
Education squared	4,572	120.870	77.868	0	484	Survey
Occupation						
Unemployed (1 = yes)	4,572	.073	.261	0	1	Survey
Not in the labor force (1 = yes)	4,572	.140	.347	0	1	Survey
Blue-collar (1 = yes)	4,572	.515	.500	0	1	Survey
White-collar (1 = yes)	4,572	.272	.445	0	1	Survey
Personal economic hardship	4,572	.000	1.000	−1.238	1.126	Survey
Control variables						
Male (1 = yes)	4,572	.477	.500	0	1	Survey
Age	4,572	41.323	14.400	15	89	Survey
Ethnic minority in county (1 = yes)	4,572	.363	.481	0	1	Survey
Mixed marriage (1 = yes)	4,572	.114	.317	0	1	Survey
Mixed heritage (1 = yes)	4,572	.074	.262	0	1	Survey
Frequency reading newspaper	4,572	3.321	.981	1	4	Survey
Communist Party member (1 = yes)	4,572	.173	.378	0	1	Survey
Support for democratic change	4,572	.000	1.000	−2.415	1.841	Survey
Religiosity	4,572	.000	1.000	−1.255	1.871	Survey

APPENDIX 3. BIVARIATE CORRELATIONS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Correlations among Individual-level Variables for Bosnia and Croatia, 1989 (N = 4,572)																
(1) Ethnic prejudice	1.000															
(2) Education	−.175*	1.000														
(3) Education squared	−.151*	.955*	1.000													
(4) Unemployed	−.029*	.103*	.084*	1.000												
(5) Not in labor force	−.012	−.168*	−.146*	−.113*	1.000											
(6) Blue-collar	.141*	−.390*	−.442*	−.290*	−.416*	1.000										
(7) White-collar	−.133*	.509*	.561*	−.172*	−.246*	−.629*	1.000									
(8) Pers econ hardship	.008	−.125*	−.139*	.004	−.003	.060*	−.068*	1.000								
(9) Male	.086*	−.079*	−.070*	−.087*	−.024	.237*	−.196*	−.042*	1.000							
(10) Age	.086*	−.393*	−.294*	−.330*	.597*	−.091*	−.170*	.008	.145*	1.000						
(11) County minority	−.254*	.060*	.060*	.082*	−.007	−.084*	.052*	.008	−.031*	−.037*	1.000					
(12) Mixed marriage	−.167*	.115*	.103*	−.036*	.025	−.070*	.081*	.021	−.021	.021	.257*	1.000				
(13) Mixed heritage	−.086*	.121*	.132*	.098*	.009	−.134*	.086*	−.008	−.072*	−.043*	.136*	.140*	1.000			
(14) Newspaper	−.147*	.445*	.384*	.022	−.007	−.192*	.208*	−.103*	.009	−.161*	.025	.071*	.062*	1.000		
(15) Communist Party	−.192*	.269*	.280*	−.081*	−.029*	−.218*	.315*	−.059*	.061*	−.018	.164*	.128*	.049*	.179*	1.000	
(16) Democracy	.022	.286*	.316*	.010	−.015	−.181*	.209*	−.088*	.049*	−.018	−.041*	.032*	.069*	.164*	.045*	1.000
(17) Religiosity	.462*	−.375*	−.343*	−.046*	−.007	.253*	−.253*	.064*	.007	.147*	−.295*	−.187*	−.098*	−.277*	−.369*	−.050*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Correlations among County-level Variables for Bosnia and Croatia, 1989 (N = 34)						
(1) County mean ethnic prejudice	1.000					
(2) Ethnic diversity	−.661*	1.000				
(3) Economic hardship	.108	.003	1.000			
(4) Percent unemployed	−.217	.448*	−.099	1.000		
(5) Ethnic residential segregation	.318	−.116	.080	.118	1.000	
(6) Ethnic occupational segregation	.020	−.053	−.280	.180	.261	1.000
(7) Ethnic economic inequality	.509*	−.271	−.101	−.087	.189	.270

* $p < .05$ (two-tailed t-test).

NOTES

1. Prejudice is typically defined as "an antipathy based on a faulty and inflexible generalization" (Allport 1954, p. 9). Prejudice has both overt and subtle forms. Scholars generally acknowledge that overt racial prejudice is higher in the southern United States. Despite its more subtle nature, prejudice is still widespread in the North (Feagin 1991; Feagin and Vera 1995; Hacker 1995; Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, and Krysan 1997).

2. There is considerable debate on the nature of the relationship between education and prejudice. The "education-as-liberator view" (Jackman and Muha 1984) suggests that education decreases both the abstract principle of prejudice and applied prejudice (Converse 1964; Greeley and Sheatsley 1974; Prothro and Grigg 1960; Stouffer 1955). Briefly, scholars from this perspective argue that education leads to psychological changes in the individual and imparts status such that the individual becomes less prejudiced. An alternative approach, the "education-as-superficial commitment view" (Jackman and Muha 1984), suggests that education creates only a superficial level of support for tolerance (Jacob 1957; Jackman 1978; Merelman 1980) or that any relationship between education and tolerance is the result of measurement bias based on acquiescence to socially accepted attitudes (Jackman 1973; Jackman and Senter 1980; Peabody 1961).

3. The reader should use caution in drawing conclusions because of the use of cluster sampling. With cluster sampling, the assumption of simple random sampling is compromised.

4. Because religious differences coincide with ethnic differences in the former Yugoslavia, we examine religiosity in terms of attendance and the intensity of one's beliefs, rather than other differences to avoid confounding religiosity with ethnic identity.

5. That is, $\rho = \tau / (\tau + \sigma^2)$, where the intraclass correlation (ρ) is the proportion of between-county variance in ethnic prejudice, tau (τ) is the between-county variance in ethnic prejudice, and sigma squared (σ^2) is the within-county variance in ethnic prejudice.

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