KQL Café – January 2024 | 3 Years

Your | hosts

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
<u>https://www.kustoking.com/</u>




Show | Agenda

Welcome
What is new/updates for KQL
Our guest: Ilana Waitser
Learning KQL
What did you do with KQL this month?

Thank you



What's New -Books




The Definitive Guide to KQL: Using Kusto Query Language for Operations, Defending, and Threat Hunting 1

https://www.amazon.com/Definitive-Guide-Kql-Operations-Defending/dp/0138293384

Publishing Date: March 31, 2024

What's New – Training



Notable Articles & Queries

KQL Security Sources - 2024 Update

<u> https://kqlquery.com/posts/kql-sources-2024-update/</u>

A Deep Dive into the KQL Union Operator

https://posts.bluraven.io/a-deep-dive-into-the-kgl-union-operator-9f16f0ed0a66

Extracting Nested Fields in Kusto

https://www.cloudsma.com/2024/01/extracting-nested-fields-in-kusto-2-0/

Harnessing threat intelligence using external data operator

https://www.michalos.net/2024/01/22/harnessing-threat-intelligence-using-externaldata-operator/



https://github.com/reprise99/Sentinel-Queries/blob/main/Azure%20Active%20Directory/Identity-PotentialAiTM.kql

Tip – Connect Kusto Explorer to Log Analytics Workspace

Query data in Azure Monitor using Azure Data Explorer

https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/data-explorer/query-monitor-data

- 2. In the Azure Data Explorer UI (https://dataexplorer.azure.com/clusters ☑), select Add Cluster.
- 3. In the **Add Cluster** window, add the URL of the Log Analytics (LA) or Application Insights (AI) cluster.
 - For Log Analytics (LA):

https://ade.loganalytics.io/subscriptions/<subscription-


id>/resourcegroups/<resource-group-


name>/providers/microsoft.operationalinsights/workspaces/<workspace-

name>



Tip – Connect Kusto Explorer to Log Analytics Workspace





Our Guest:



Ilana Waitser

Senior PM (Program & Product Manager) - Azure Monitor / Log Analytics

What is Sigma



Converting Sigma to KQL Online

https://sigconverter.io/

Sigma to KQL Backend

https://github.com/AttackIQ/pySigma-backend-microsoft365defender/

Thanks AttackIQ and Stephen Lincoln

```
from sigma.rule import SigmaRule
     from sigma.backends.microsoft365defender import Microsoft365DefenderBackend
     from sigma.pipelines.microsoft365defender import microsoft 365 defender pipeline
     # Define an example rule as a YAML str
     sigma rule = SigmaRule.from yaml("""
     ENTER SIGMA RULE HERE
     # Create backend, which automatically adds the pipeline
     m365def backend = Microsoft365DefenderBackend()
10
11
     # Or apply the pipeline manually
12
     pipeline = microsoft 365_defender_pipeline()
13
     pipeline.apply(sigma rule)
14
15
     # Convert the rule
16
     print(sigma_rule.title + " KQL Query: \n")
17
     print(m365def backend.convert rule(sigma rule)[0])
18
```


```
sigma rule = SigmaRule.from_yaml("""
   title: IcedID Malware Suspicious Single Digit DLL Execution Via Rundll32
    id: 2bd8e100-5b3b-4b6a-bbb5-b129d3ddddc5
   status: experimental
   description: Detects RunDLL32.exe executing a single digit DLL named "1.dll" with the export function "DllRegisterServer". This beh
   references:
        - https://thedfirreport.com/2023/05/22/icedid-macro-ends-in-nokoyawa-ransomware/
        - https://thedfirreport.com/2023/08/28/html-smuggling-leads-to-domain-wide-ransomware/
    author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
   date: 2023/08/31
    tags:
         attack.defense evasion
       - attack.t1218.011
        - detection.emerging threats
    logsource:
        category: process_creation
       product: windows
   detection:
        selection:
           Image|endswith: '\\rundll32.exe'
           CommandLine|endswith:
                - '\\1.dll, DllRegisterServer' # In case of full path exec
                - ' 1.dll, DllRegisterServer' # In case of direct exec
        condition: selection
    falsepositives:
        - Unknown
    level: high
```

```
sigma rule = SigmaRule.from yaml("""
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 19
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              category: process creation
              product: windows
          detection:
              selection:
                  Image|endswith: '\\rundll32.exe'
                  CommandLine endswith:
                       - '\\1.dll, DllRegisterServer' # In case of full path exec
                      - ' 1.dll, DllRegisterServer' # In case of direct exec
              condition: selection
          falsepositives:
              - Unknown
          level: high
          OUTPUT DEBUG CONSOLE TERMINAL PORTS
PROBLEMS
PS C:\Users\GianniCastaldi> & "C:/Program Files/Python311/python.exe" "c:/Users/GianniCastaldi/OneDrive - KustoKing/OneDrive - KustoWorks/General

    KQL Cafe/Sessions/2024/January 2024/sigma2kql.py"

IcedID Malware Suspicious Single Digit DLL Execution Via Rundll32 KQL Query:
DeviceProcessEvents
 where FolderPath endswith "\rundll32.exe" and (ProcessCommandLine endswith "\\1.dll, DllRegisterServer" or ProcessCommandLine endswith " 1.dll,
DllRegisterServer")
```

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint – Streamlined Connectivity Monitoring



https://github.com/alexverboon/Hunting-Queries-Detection-Rules/blob/main/Defender%20For%20Endpoint/MDE-ConnectivityType.md

Or just use www.kglsearch.com

Microsoft Defender XDR – Threat Protection Reporting

Microsoft announced that they will be retiring the Threat Protection report page - https://security.microsoft.com/mde-reports/threatProtection (accessed through Reports > Endpoints > Threat protection). Instead, they recommend the utilization of Advanced hunting queries and Alert queue filter in Defender XDR.

https://github.com/alexverboon/Hunting-Queries-Detection-Rules/blob/main/Defender%20365/MDXDR-ThreatProtectionReport.md

Detecting Defender 365 Forwarding Rules policy changes

1 CloudAppEvents 2 where ObjectName == "Set-H 3 mv-expand parse_json(Activ 4 where ActivityObjects.Name 5 extend Mode = tostring(Act 6 project TimeGenerated, Mod 7 City, CountryCode, IPAddress 8 Results Chart Add bookn	ityObjects) == 'AutoForwardingNivityObjects.Value) e, AccountId, Account , IPTags, Application	Mode'	bjectId, AccountDisplayName,ISP, Forwarding rules	
☐ TimeGenerated [UTC] ↑↓	Mode	Acco	Automatic forwarding rules	
> 1/28/2024, 1:46:44.000 PM	Automatic		Automatic - System-controlled	~
> 1/28/2024, 1:46:36.000 PM	On		Automatic - System-controlled	
> 1/28/2024, 12:28:48.000 PM	Automatic		Off - Forwarding is disabled	
> 1/28/2024, 12:28:32.000 PM	Off		On - Forwarding is enabled	
> 1/28/2024, 12:28:20.000 PM	On			
> 1/28/2024, 12:19:54.000 PM	Automatic		Application	

https://github.com/alexverboon/Hunting-Queries-Detection-Rules/blob/main/Defender%20For%20Office%20365/MDO-InboxForwarding.md

HTML smuggling detecting Socgolish

HTML smuggling detecting Socgolish

```
DeviceFileEvents
| where ActionType == "FileCreated"
| where FileName endswith ".js"
| where FileOriginUrl == "about:internet"
```

https://www.microsoft.com/enus/security/blog/2021/11/11/html-smuggling-surges-highlyevasive-loader-technique-increasingly-used-in-bankingmalware-targeted-attacks/

```
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("cscript","wscript.exe")
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains InitiatingProcessAccountName or
| InitiatingProcessCommandLine contains "temp"
| where not(RemoteIPType in ("Loopback","Private"))
```

Thanks for attending

