

团队合作与通信

(Teamwork & Agent Communication)

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Outline

- Understanding teamwork
- Teamwork theories
- Practical teamwork model (STEAM)
- Agent communication

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 - Agent communication

Why Teams?

- *Teamwork* as a basis for organizing groups
 - Not castes, ^{种姓制度} master-slave, or contract relationships
- *Robust* organizations
 - Responsibility to substitute (cover for one another)
 - Mutual assistance when run into difficulties
 - Teammates ensure key information is communicated to peers
- Still capable of structure (not necessarily a *flat* organization)
 - Teams of teams
 - Different roles require different responsibilities
 - Variations in capabilities and limitations

Understanding Teamwork: Motivators

Coming together is beginning --

Keeping together is progress --

Working together is success

- *Teamwork* is the ability to work together towards a common vision
- The ability to direct individual accomplishment toward organizational objectives
- It is the fuel that allows common people to attain uncommon results

Understanding Teamwork 共同目标

- Not just a union of simultaneous 协调动作 coordinated actions
- Different from contracting
- Ordinary traffic × 成员不知道在 team 中
- Driving in a convoy (车队)
 - Two friends A & B together drive in a convoy ✓
 - Person B's car is secretly following A's car ×
- Pass play (传球) in Soccer ✓
- Table tennis doubles (双打) ✓
- Contracting with a software company × 不是团队成员
- Marathon ×
- Orchestra 乐队演奏 performance ✓

Understanding Teamwork

- Not just a union of simultaneous coordinated actions
- Different from contracting
 - Ordinary traffic
 - Driving in a convoy
 - *Two friends A & B together drive in a convoy*
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 - Orchestra performance

What is Teamwork?

Cooperative effort by members of a team to achieve a common goal

➤ Common goal, teammate cooperate, help each other, *team spirit?*

Research questions:

- Build *robust* teams with *flexible coordination* in *complex* domains
- Team *formation*
- Teamwork *monitoring*, diagnosis, analysis, explanation
- Collaborative *negotiation*
- *Adjustable* autonomy in teams 自适应
- Team plan *recognition*
- *Learning* in teamwork ...

How to Build Effective Agent Teams?

领域级别

Given *multiple agents* with domain-level skills & team goals

- Appropriate teamwork/coordination to achieve team goals?
 - *When/with whom/what to communicate? Take up others' tasks?*

Difficulties:

- Members' dynamically obtain differing, incomplete information
- Communication time-consuming, costly, risky
- Members unexpectedly fail in fulfilling tasks
- Uncertainty about what other team members know

Outline



- Understanding teamwork
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- Practical teamwork model (STEAM)
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Teamwork Theories

- Theory: *Fundamentally* understand teamwork
 - Is there one underlying model for working in teams?
e.g. is the teamwork in Soccer the same as in other domains? *领域知识*
 - Are there some fundamentally different types of teamwork?
- Practical benefits: *Specification* for teamwork applications
 - Build reusable teamwork code *建立复用的 team code*
 - Teamwork libraries: High-level team-oriented programs
 - Build robust applications *高级别 面向团队编程*

Ad Hoc Team Coordination in Real World

- A real-world multi-agent implementation



临时的

Problems with Ad Hoc Team Coordination

- For 2-3 agents, carefully *controlled* coordination may work
 - Individual agents provide individual goals and plans
 - Based on fixed, domain-specific coordination plans
 - *No framework* to anticipate failures; numerous ad hoc plans
- Inflexibility, unexpected failures, lack of reuse
- For *bigger* teams and *complex* scenarios, ad hoc coordination can cause serious *problems*:
 - Commander returned to home base alone, leaving others in battlefield
 - Company waited indefinitely for message, after the scout crashed
 - Flight leader got order first and started mission alone, others not ready
 - Scout never returned, while others got into infinite loop ...
- **Need the support of teamwork theories**

Different BDI Theories of Teamwork

Explicitly based on commitments, beliefs, desires, intentions:

- *Joint Intentions* [Cohen & Levesque 90]
 - *SharedPlans* [Grosz & Kraus 96]
 - *Planned team activity* [Sonenberg et al 92]
 - *We-intentions* [Searle 90]
-
- Basis for effective team building
 - But did not cover *team formation, negotiation, learning,*
....

Focus on Joint Intentions Theory

Commitment is central to *teamwork*:

- *Team* commitment rather than *individual* commitment

Next we shall

- Go through the main theory *step by step*
- Help understand why the theory is the *way* it is
- Also help understand some of the *issues* in teams

Recall: Commitments Fundamental to Agents

Agents plan because they are *resource bounded* (Recall Bratman)

- Agents must form and **commit** to plans
Commit == hold on to a plan, don't drop it easily
- Commitments constrain reasoning:
 - Frame problems for an agent (*what to reason about*)
Agent needs to determine how to fulfill commitments
 - Provide filter of admissibility (*what not to reason about*)
Agent filters out options incompatible with commitments
- *Intention* is kind of *committed* plan (e.g. my next trip)

Formalizing Commitments in Modal Logic

■ Notation (Cohen & Levesque 1990):

- Bel (x P): Agent x has P as a belief
- Goal (x P): Agent x has P as a goal
- (Eventually P): Somewhere in the future P becomes True
- (Until P Q)/(Q Until P): Q is True until P True
- (Always P): (NOT (Eventually NOT(P)))
- (Never P): (Always (NOT(P)))
- AND, OR, NOT: Logic connectives

Recall: Individual Commitments

Focus on achievement goals:

- If P is a *commitment*, then don't drop P as a goal easily
 - (Goal x (Eventually P)) UNTIL
 - P Achieved: (Bel x P) OR
 - P Unachievable: (Bel x (Never P)) OR
 - P Irrelevant (Q is possibly the *reason* for P): (Bel x NOT(Q))

Commitments as persistent goals (*PGOAL*, 持续的目标):

- (PGOAL x P Q) is defined as:
 - (Bel x NOT(P)) AND (Goal x (Eventually P)) AND
 - (UNTIL ((Bel x P) OR
 - (Bel x (Never P)) OR
 - (Bel x NOT(Q)))
 - (Goal x (Eventually P)))

Formalizing Team Commitments: Attempt #1

Attempt #1: Sum of individual commitments

- Team: $T=\{x, y\}$ (Two individuals)
- Team task: searching for a lost object: SFLO
- $P=(\text{Done } T \text{ SFLO})$; $Q=\text{High-level cause for } P$

Team commitment:

$(\text{PGOAL } x \text{ } X's\text{-part}(P) \text{ } Q) \text{ AND } (\text{PGOAL } y \text{ } Y's\text{-part}(P) \text{ } Q)$

Problem:

- X and Y do *not even know* they are a team
- Just *individual* simultaneous effort

Defining Mutual Beliefs (共同的信念)

■ Mutual Beliefs (MB T P)

(MB x y P):

- (Bel x P)
- (Bel y P)
- (Bel x (Bel y P))
- (Bel y (Bel x P))
- (Bel x (Bel y (Bel x P)))
- (Bel y (Bel x (Bel y P)))
-

- Infinite levels of nesting in principle
- Practical systems find compromises
- Remains an active area of research

Formalizing Team Commitments: Attempt #2

Attempt #2: Add MB to individual commitments

- Team: $T=\{x, y\}$ (Two individuals)
- Team task: searching for a lost object: SFLO
- $P=(\text{Done } T \text{ SFLO})$; $Q=\text{High-level cause for } P$

Team joint commitment:

(**Joint-PGOAL** $T \ P \ Q$
 (**MB** $T \ (\text{PGOAL } x \ X\text{'s-part}(P) \ Q) \ \text{AND}$
 ($\text{PGOAL } y \ Y\text{'s-part}(P) \ Q$)))

Problem:

- One team member can *drop* P and leave, e.g. if $(\text{Bel } x \ P)$
- *Glue* to hold team together is missing

We-Intentions (Searle 90)

- *Collective* intentional behavior is a *primitive* phenomenon
- *Cannot* be analyzed in terms of *individual* intentions
 - Puppies playing in a lawn, practicing pass play ...
 - No single individual acting alone or accomplishing results alone
- “We” are doing actions “*together*”: collective intention
- Since collective intention is *irreducible*, how to formalize it ?

Formalizing Team Commitments: Attempt #3

Attempt #3: Team as a single agent

- Team: $T=\{x, y\}$ (Two individuals)
- Team task: searching for a lost object: SFLO
- $P=(\text{Done } T \text{ SFLO})$; $Q=\text{High-level cause for } P$

Team joint commitment:

(Joint-PGOAL $T \ P \ Q$

(**MB** $T \ \text{NOT}(P)$) AND (**MG** $T \ (\text{Eventually } P)$) AND

(UNTIL [(**MB** $T \ P$) OR

(**MB** $T \ (\text{Never } P)$) OR

(**MB** $T \ \text{NOT}(Q)$)]

(**MG** $T \ (\text{Eventually } P)$)))

- **Mutual Goal** ($\text{MG } T \ P$) is: (**MB** $T \ ((\text{Goal } x \ P) \text{ and } (\text{Goal } y \ P))$)

Problems in Attempt #3: Too Strong

Team is not an individual and hence attempt fails!

- As time goes by, individuals may *diverge* in their beliefs (though initially beliefs were synchronized)
- E.g. after some passage of time, x *privately* comes to believe that P is impossible, but y does not believe so yet

This divergence in private beliefs is not allowed.

Example: *Violate* our current definition of JPG

- Suppose (Bel x (Never P)), then x *drops* (Goal x (Eventually P))
 - Otherwise, beliefs and goals are inconsistent
- So (MG T (Eventually P)) is *false*, but *UNTIL* condition is *false*
(As there is no mutual belief formed yet, this MG is supposed to persist until there is a certain mutual belief)

Formalizing Team Commitments: JPG

■ Joint Persistent Goal (JPG, 联合持续的目标)

Team joint commitment:

(JPG T P Q

(MB T NOT(P)) AND (MG T (Eventually P)) AND

(UNTIL [(MB T P) OR

(MB T (Never P)) OR

(MB T NOT(Q))]

(WMG T (Eventually P) Q)))

- Team *mutually* believes the goal P is not achieved
- Team has the *mutual goal* to achieve P
- Until Team *mutually* believes P *achieved, unachievable or irrelevant*:
 - Team has P as a *Weak Mutual Goal* (WMG, 弱的共同目标)

Formalizing Team Commitments: JPG

- Joint Persistent Goal (JPG, 联合持续的目标)

Team joint commitment:

$$\begin{aligned} &(\text{JPG } T \ P \ Q \\ &\quad (\text{MB } T \ \text{NOT}(P)) \ \text{AND} \ (\text{MG } T \ (\text{Eventually } P)) \ \text{AND} \\ &\quad (\text{UNTIL } [(\text{MB } T \ P) \ \text{OR} \\ &\quad \quad (\text{MB } T \ (\text{Never } P)) \ \text{OR} \\ &\quad \quad (\text{MB } T \ \text{NOT}(Q))]) \\ &\quad (\text{WMG } T \ (\text{Eventually } P) \ Q))) \end{aligned}$$

- Weak Mutual Goal (WMG $T \ P \ Q$) is defined as:

$$(\text{MB } T \ (\text{WG } x \ T \ P \ Q) \ \text{and} \ (\text{WG } y \ T \ P \ Q))$$

- Team *mutually* believes that each member has P as a *Weak Goal*

Formalizing Team Commitments: WG

■ Joint Persistent Goal (JPG, 联合持续的目标)

Team joint commitment:

(JPG T P Q

(MB T NOT(P)) AND (MG T (Eventually P)) AND

(UNTIL [(MB T P) OR

(MB T (Never P)) OR

(MB T NOT(Q))]

(MB T (WG x T (Eventually P) Q) and (WG y T (Eventually P) Q))))

- Team *mutually* believes the goal P is not achieved
- Team has the *mutual goal* to achieve P
- Until Team *mutually* believes P *achieved, unachievable or irrelevant*:
 - Team *mutually* believes that each member has P as a *Weak Goal*

Weak Goals (WG, 弱的目标)

- UNTIL clause only contains weak goal:

(WG x T (Eventually P) Q) is defined as:

$[(\text{Bel} \times \text{NOT}(P)) \text{ AND } (\text{Goal} \times (\text{Eventually } P))]$

OR

$[(\text{Bel} \times P) \text{ AND } (\text{Goal} \times (\text{Eventually } (\text{MB } T \ P))))]$

OR

$[(\text{Bel} \times (\text{Never } P)) \text{ AND } (\text{Goal} \times (\text{Eventually } (\text{MB } T \ (\text{Never } P))))]$

OR

$[(\text{Bel} \times \text{NOT}(Q)) \text{ AND } (\text{Goal} \times (\text{Eventually } (\text{MB } T \ \text{NOT}(Q))))]$

Example: Divergence of Private Beliefs

Divergence of private beliefs is okay now.

Example: Initially team has JPG, but now (Bel x (Never P))

- If (Bel x (Never P)), then x *drops* (Goal x (Eventually P))
- We enter the *UNTIL* clause, but with a change:

(UNTIL [(MB T P) OR
 (MB T (Never P)) OR
 (MB T NOT(Q))]
(MB T [(Bel x (Never P)) AND (Goal x (Eventually (MB T (Never P))))])
 AND (WG y T (Eventually P) Q)))

- So x must commit to attain MB of (Never P) (e.g. communicate y)
- Cannot simply drop P and walk away, must inform others

JPG Exercise

- Suppose T consists of one individual x, then we have

$$(JPG\ x\ x\ P\ Q) = (PGOAL\ x\ P\ Q)$$

- Note that

$$(MB\ x\ x\ P) \Rightarrow (Bel\ x\ P)$$

$$(MB\ x\ x\ Never(P)) \Rightarrow (Bel\ x\ Never(P))$$

$$(MB\ x\ x\ NOT(P)) \Rightarrow (Bel\ x\ NOT(P)) \Rightarrow NOT(Bel\ x\ P)$$

$$(MG\ x\ x\ (Eventually\ P)) \Rightarrow (Goal\ x\ (Eventually\ P))$$

$$(WMG\ x\ x\ P\ Q) \Rightarrow (WG\ x\ x\ P\ Q)$$

JPG and WG: Implications

- Joint Persistent Goal (*JPG*) as team *joint commitment*
 - Team members must hold this mental attitude
 - bind the team together
- *Weak mutual goal*: team's *MB* of each member's *weak goal*
 - Team members will attempt to achieve *P*
 - If *x* privately believes *P* is *achieved*, *unachievable* or *irrelevant*
 - Commit to make *P* mutually believed
- Implications:
 - *Jointly commit* to a team goal and work together *persistently*
 - Also accommodate to the *divergence* of individual beliefs, but keep teammates *informed*
 - Lead to communication in teamwork

Joint Intentions

- Joint commitment basis of *joint intention*:
 - Joint commitment to a joint activity while mutually believing that agents are about to do the joint action
 - Must deliberately do it (jointly)

Definition 5 $(JI\ x\ y\ a\ q) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (JPG\ x\ y\ (DONE\ x\ y\ [UNTIL\ (DONE\ x\ y\ a)\ (MB\ x\ y\ (DOING\ x\ y\ a))]?;a)\ q)$ P

- $W?;a \rightarrow$ Action a with W holding initially
- $(Done\ T\ a) \rightarrow$ Similar to P

SharedPlans (Grosz & Kraus 96)

- No joint mental attitude, instead “*intend-that*” for helpful behavior
- *SharedPlan* of a group GR requires that:
 - Mutual belief that each member intends that GR achieves *joint goal*
 - Mutual belief (agreement) of the *joint recipe*
 - For each step in the *recipe*:
 - Some individual/subteam forms *SharedPlan* for that step
 - Other members *intend that* individual/subteam perform the step
- *SharedPlans* may be *partial* (e.g., recipe not fully elaborated and can be developed *incrementally*)

Example: SharedPlan

- “Intend-that” is defined via several axioms
- E.g. *Axiom A7 in SharedPlan*:
 - Group GR has a *sharedplan* S1
 - G1 is a member of GR, G2 is a member of GR
 - G1 can perform A1
 - G1 intends that for G2 to bring about some action A2 in service of S1
 - G1 believes that G1’s performing A1 and then G2’s performing A2 will be cheaper (lower cost) than G1 not performing A1 and G2 performing A2
- Then G1 will consider performing A1

Exercise: Quick Questions



- In Cohen & Levesque's joint intentions theory, is joint commitments a primitive concept? Yes/No NO
最基本的概念
- If No, then what are the primitive concepts from which joint intentions theory is built?
- Does Joint Intentions theory cover all of teamwork? Yes/No NO
- What are some key problems in the joint intentions theory?
失败, 团队扩展, 团队生成

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Avoiding Ad Hoc Team Coordination

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 - Individual agents provide individual goals and plans
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 - Commander returned to home base alone, leaving others in battlefield
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 - Flight leader got order first and started mission alone, others not ready
 - Scout never returned, while others got into infinite loop ...
- **Need the support of teamwork models**

Explicit General Teamwork Models

- Provide agents with *explicit, general model* of teamwork:
 - Outline team members' commitments, responsibilities
 - General team coordination algorithms

Advantages:

- *Robustness* in the presence of unanticipated events
 - Agents themselves plan responses to teamwork contingencies
- *Reuse/transfer* to other applications:
 - Why build coordination from scratch each time?

Teamwork models:

- GRATE* [Jennings 95]
- COLLAGEN [Rich & Sindner 97]
- STEAM [Tambe 97], Java TEAMCORE [Scerri *et al* 03] ...

Relationships to Teamwork Theories

Based on teamwork theories: *Joint Intentions*, *SharedPlans*

■ Joint Intentions

- Agents behave responsibly towards teammates
- Once jointly committed to a team goal, inform teammates if it privately believes team goal terminated

■ SharedPlans

- Evolving hierarchy of commitments; not just one goal
- “Intend-that” to fulfill unfulfilled tasks
- Individuals may volunteer or request others to take up tasks

➤ *Joint Intentions* provide commitments; *SharedPlans* are suited in complex tasks

STEAM: A Practical Teamwork Model

STEAM (Tambe 97): A Shell for Teamwork

Key points:

- *Operationalize* teamwork theories in agent architectures
 - Modal-logic specifications operationalized in tractable algorithm
- Apply and reuse teamwork model in *real-world* domains
 - Empirically illustrate cross-domain general teamwork principles
- Agents automatically *coordinate* team communication/retasking
 - Enable team-oriented programming
- Address some major issues:
 - Communication costs, uncertainty; Team member failure, ...


M. Tambe. Reactive Towards Flexible Teamwork. *Journal of AI Research*, 1997.

STEAM: Plans and Constraints

Explicitly using situated/reactive team plans:

- Hierarchically expand into individual/subteam plans
 - Each plan has preconditions, body, termination conditions
- Coordinate constraints among plans (e.g. Follow→Lead)

Hierarchical situated plans:




Recall: Situated/Reactive Plans（情境规划）

- Practical implementations may use *situated plans*
- Situated/Reactive plans consist of
 - *Preconditions*: matched with agents' beliefs to activate plan
 - *Termination conditions*: to terminate plan when matched
 - *Plan body*: to execute when plan is activated
- Example: Plan *Attend-agents-conference*
 - *Precondition*: Call for participation posted
 - *Body*: Register, fly to site, attend sessions, fly back...
 - *Termination condition*: Agents conference attended
- Basis of several different types of agent architectures
 - PRS, SOAR, IRMA, InteRRaP, JACKTM ...

Recall: PRS-Type BDI Architecture

- Integrate BDI model, planning and reactive techniques



Hierarchical Situated Plans

■ Evacuation (Rescue) domain



Team plan:

Fly-flight-plan

Precondition: Flight plan

Termination: Reach destination

See enemy

Plan body: (Null)

Subteam plan:

Fly-route

Fly-to-waypoint

Precondition: Next waypoint

Termination: Reach waypoint

Plan body: Search for lead helo

Individual plan:

Fly-lead



Follow-leader

Precondition: See lead helo

Termination: Reach waypoint


Plan body: Heading/speed matches lead

STEAM: Organization Hierarchy

Specifying hierarchical organization structure

- Organization hierarchy of team, subteam and individual with different roles

Organization hierarchy for agents:




STEAM: Role Assignments

Using situated team plans for role assignments

- Assign roles in the organization hierarchy to multi-agent team plans

Role assignments in evacuation plan:



STEAM: Team-Oriented Programs

STEAM realizes team-oriented programming with

- Reactive team plan hierarchy
- Organization hierarchy of roles for individuals and teams
- Assignments of roles to plans in the team hierarchy
- Finally,
Assignments of agents to roles specified in the organization hierarchy

Team-Oriented Program Interface

Reactive Plan Hierarchy

- Team Plan
 - Evacuate [Big Team]
 - Obtain orders
 - Determine number of helos [Obtain orders]
 - Determine routes [Plan route]
 - Prepare to execute mission
 - Check route safety [Obtain orders]
 - Execute mission [Big Team]
 - Fly flight plan
 - Travelling overwatch
 - Fly control routes
 - Landing zone maneuvers [Flight team]
 - Escort operations [Escort]
 - Transport operations [Transport]
 - Wait at point [Flight team]
 - Formation landing [Transport]

Organization Hierarchy

- Organization
 - Big Team
 - Obtain orders [RPlan]
 - Obtain safety info
 - Plan route
 - Flight team
 - Escort
 - Helo 1 [wolf101]
 - Helo 2 [wolf102]
 - Transport
 - Helo 1
 - Helo 2 [knight11]
 - Helo 3


Domain-level Agents

- Available Agents
 - RPlan
 - teamquickset
 - wolf101
 - wolf102
 - wolf103
 - wolf104
 - wolf105
 - knight10
 - knight11
 - knight12
 - knight13
 - knight14
 - knight15
 - knight16
 - knight17
 - knight18

STEAM: Team Members at Run-Time

At run-time, each agent maintains a copy of team-oriented program

- Beliefs: Team beliefs, subteam beliefs, individual beliefs
 - No Shared memory
- Individual plans modify individual beliefs, but not team beliefs



STEAM: Team Plan Execution

- All team plans are executed by *forming* and *terminating* joint commitments:
 - Request-confirm exchanges so all team members *select & commit*
 - Establish MB for *achieved/unachievable/irrelevant (AUI)* to terminate
 - Forming and terminating team plans: All *communication* in STEAM

Example: Team of company jointly commit to “*execute mission*” plan

- If commander privately believes *mission achieved* ...
 - Commander must establish mutual belief in termination condition
 - It communicates *mission achieved*, so no one is left behind
- Hierarchy of jointly committed team plans & subteam plans
- Team is coherent when executing and terminating team plans

Hierarchical Situated Plans

■ Evacuation (Rescue) domain



Team plan:

Fly-flight-plan

Precondition: Flight plan

Termination: Reach destination

See enemy

Plan body: (Null)

Subteam plan:

Fly-route

Fly-to-waypoint

Precondition: Next waypoint

Termination: Reach waypoint

Plan body: Search for lead helo

Individual plan:

Fly-lead



Follow-leader

Precondition: See lead helo

Termination: Reach waypoint

Plan body: Heading/speed matches lead

STEAM: Monitor and Repair

Addresses unanticipated team member/subteam failures:

- Monitoring and replanning capabilities

- Explicit constraints of individual/subteam roles and team goal

- AND*: All roles must be fulfilled

- OR*: At least one role must be fulfilled

- Role-dependency* \rightarrow : Role R1 is dependent on R2

- Constraints may be combined, e.g. (A OR B) AND (B \rightarrow C)

Scouting failure example:

- *Wait-for-battle-position-scouted* is the team plan

- *AND-combination*: Scout and Non-scout roles in team plan
- If scout crashes, the scout role is not fulfilled
- *AND-combination* implies that the team plan fails

STEAM: Monitor and Repair

- *Joint commitment* to replan by reorganization, if critical failures
 - Determine candidates for roles via capability matching
 - Candidates for roles ensure no conflicting critical commitments
 - Individual/subteam may volunteer
 - Highest capability agent wins


Scouting failure example (continued):

- *Wait-for-battle-position-scouted* is the failed team plan
 - Locate other pilots capable of scouting
 - New candidate scout ensures no conflicting commitments
 - Candidate scout(s) volunteer
 - Best capability scout wins

STEAM: Communication Selectivity

Addresses communication costs and risks:

- Incorporate *decision-theoretic* communication selectivity
- *Tradeoff* communication vs. team incoherence costs



Communicate if $EU(C) > EU(NC)$: $\tau * C_{mt} > C_c$

- More complex reasoning being explored: MDP-based models

STEAM: Algorithm Overview

Execute team-orient program (α : team plan, Θ : team(α), π : parameter)

- If $EU(C) > EU(NC)$, execute establish-joint-commitment protocol
 - Install team plan α as a joint commitment with team Θ
 - While team-state(Θ) does not satisfy *AUI* conditions of α
 - If $F \in$ private state, satisfies *AUI* conditions of α
 - If $EU(C) > EU(NC)$, Communicate (Terminate α , Reason: F)
 - If receive message(Terminate α , Reason: F), update team-state(Θ)
 - If child plan β_i applicable and team(β_i)= Ω and self $\in\Omega$
 - In parallel execute team-oriented-program (β_i , Ω , ...)
 - Instantiate role constraints
 - If teammate failure, evaluate role constraints
- If status(α)=*unachievable*, team-oriented program (*Repair*, Θ , α)

失败. Recover

STEAM: Implementations

- Implemented in the *Soar* integrated agent architecture

Example of rules:

Create-communicative-goal-on-achieved

IF

Agent A1's private state contains a fact F AND

Fact F matches an achievement condition of team plan AND

Fact F is not in team state currently

THEN

Create possible *communicative goal* CG to communicate fact F to the team

STEAM: Evaluation and Applications



Applications:

- Pilot teams for synthetic *Attack* agents: 1576 rules
 - Player teams for *RoboCup* Soccer agents: ~ 550 rules
 - Pilot teams for synthetic *Transport* agents: 1333 rules
 - Heterogeneous teams in *TEAMCORE*: ~1000 rules
-
- STEAM reuse in (% of rules) in complex domains:

Attack	RoboCup	Transport	Teamcore
First use	45%	100%	100%+

STEAM: Evaluation on Communication

■ Communication selectivity:



Influence of Teamwork Theories on STEAM

- *Joint commitments* as basic building blocks of teamwork
 - Commitments guide coordination and communication
- Specify entire hierarchy of intentions as in *SharedPlans*
 - Joint intentions for high-level team goal and joint actions for goal attainment
- Knowledge of other team members as in *SharedPlans*
 - Domain-specific coordination relationships explicit to monitor
 - Role-performance ability of individual/subteam monitored
- Joint intentions to *replan* on *unachievability* (*Partial SharedPlans*)
 - Individuals may volunteer or request to take up tasks

GRATE* (Jennings 95)


- Cooperative problem solving in electricity transportation domain
- One of the *first* to operationalize joint intentions
- Use *joint responsibility*, based on joint intentions
- Joint-goals as well as joint recipe
- Differences with *STEAM*
 - Two levels of plan hierarchy
 - Three agents (no organization hierarchy)
 - No recovery from agent *failure* (e.g., if one agent cannot fulfill its role)
 - No *selective* communication

Summary: Teamwork

- Teamwork is increasingly *critical* in a vast range of applications
 - Training, education, entertainment, manufacturing, design...
- Fundamental *understanding* of teamwork is important
 - Teamwork theories
 - Not all aspects of teamwork covered
- Practical *teamwork models* based on theories
 - Reuse teamwork capabilities
 - Flexibility in teamwork
 - Team-oriented programming

Asimov's Three Laws of Robotics

- A robot may not injure a human being, or through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm
- A robot must obey the orders given it by human beings except where such orders would conflict with the first law
- A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the first and second laws



Isaac Asimov, first published in 1942

Outline

- Understanding teamwork
- Teamwork theories
- Practical teamwork model (STEAM)
- Agent communication
 - Speech act theory（言语行为理论）
 - Formal semantics for speech acts
 - Agent communication language (ACL)

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Speech Act Theory

- Most treatments of communication in (multi-) agent systems borrow their inspiration from *speech act theory*
- Speech act theories are ^{语用的} *pragmatic* theories of language, — theories of language use
 - Attempt to account for how language is used by people every day to achieve their goals and intentions
- The origin of speech act theories are traced to Austin's 1962 book: *How to Do Things with Words*
- Austin points out that our utterances ^{话语} function like *physical actions* that can *change the state of the world*
 - Example: "I hereby declare you husband and wife"

Speech Acts

- *Speech act theory* specifies how utterances^{言语} are used to achieve intentions and goals of the speaker
- Different aspects of *speech acts*:
 - *Locutionary act* (言内行为)

Speech acts are linked together by grammatical conventions so as to say something meaningful
 - *Illocutionary act* (言外行为)

In uttering meaningful language, speech acts are used to do things, e.g. provide information, offer advice or make a promise
 - *Perlocutionary act* (言后行为)

Speech acts have an effect on those who hear the meaningful utterances, e.g. frighten a child by telling a ghost story at night

言语行为理论

- 日常语言哲学中最重要的流派之一、语用学研究中最重要
的方法之一，对言语分析影响深远的理论
- Austin (1962) 论著 “*How to Do Things with Words* ”
《如何以言行事》
 - 人们通过言语完成某种行为（即**言语行为**）
 - 言语行为分为三类：
 - 言内行为（Locutionary act）：以言表意
“**I hereby declare you husband and wife.**”
 - 言外行为（即**言外之意**，Illocutionary act）：以言行事
 - 言后行为（Perlocutionary act）：以言取效
 - 其中，**言外行为**是核心，通过断定词、阐释词、执行词、行为词、
承诺词等行事动词引入

Classification of Illocutionary Acts

- Searle (1969) identified five *main types* of speech acts:
 - *Assertives* (断言/阐述类)
such as *informing*, e.g. “It is raining outside”
 - *Directives* (指令类)
attempt to *get the hearer* to do sth e.g. “please make the tea”
 - *Commissives* (承诺类)
commit the speaker to doing sth, e.g. “I promise to...”
 - *Expressives* (表达类)
express psychological state, e.g. emotion or attitude
 - *Declaratives* (宣告类)
such as *declaring war*, *designating officer*

言外行为的分类

- Searle (1969) 系统完善了言外行为的分类：

类别	适从方向	典型描述	基本特征
断言/阐述类 (Assertives)	话语→现实	表达说话人相信正确的话	陈述句
指令类 (Directives)	现实→话语	表达说话人的要求、愿望 如命令、请求、建议等	祈使句、疑问句
承诺类 (Commissives)	现实→话语	说话人承担做某事的义务 如承诺、保证、威胁、警告	第一人称
表达类 (Expressives)	无适从方向	表达说话人的情感、态度 如祝贺、感谢、抱怨、道歉等	表达说话人的心理状态
宣告类 (Declaratives)	双向	通过话语去改变一种情形 如宣战、命名、放弃权利等	说话同时即是动作执行

Speech Act Representation

Speech act representation generally has two parts:

- *Performative verb* (行事动词)
e.g., request, inform, promise, ...
- *Content*
e.g., “the door is closed”

Examples:

- Speech act: “*Please close the door.*”
 - Performative: *Request*, Content: *Close the door* (action)
- Speech act: “*The door is closed.*”
 - Performative: *Inform*, Content: *The door is closed* (proposition)
- Speech act: “*Is the door closed?*”
 - Performative: *Inquire/Question*, Content: *The door is closed*

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Plan-Based Semantics

- Agent-based systems require agent communication having a *clearly defined semantics*
- Cohen & Perrault (1979) defined semantics of speech acts using the *precondition-delete-add* list formalism in *AI planning*
- Note that a *speaker* cannot (generally) *force* a *hearer* to accept some desired mental state
- In other words, there is a discrepancy between the *illocutionary act* and the *perlocutionary act*

Plan-Based Semantics

■ The semantics for “*request*”:

Request (s, h, ϕ)

Preconditions:

- s believe h can do ϕ (i.e. you don't ask someone to do something unless you think they can do it)
- s believe h believe h can do ϕ (i.e. you don't ask someone unless *they* believe they can do it)
- s believe s want ϕ (i.e. you don't ask someone unless you want it)

Effects:

- h believe s want ϕ (i.e. the effect is to make them aware of your desire)

Semantics for Communicative Acts

- Agents build, maintain and disband teams through their performance of *communicative acts* (e.g. *attempt*, *refuse*, *confirm* ...)
- Smith & Cohen (1996) defined *semantics* of basic communicative acts for *agent team communication*
- *Communicative acts* serve as the means that agents use to *communicate their mental states* and *form teams with other agents* to achieve their *goals*

Definition 4 Request

$(REQ\ x\ y\ e\ a\ p) \stackrel{def}{=} (ATT\ x\ e\ \phi\ \psi)$

where ϕ is:

$(DONE\ y\ a) \wedge$
 $(PWAG\ y\ x\ (DONE\ y\ a)\ [PWAG\ x\ y\ (DONE\ y\ a)\ p])$

and ψ is :

$(BMB\ y\ x\ (PWAG\ x\ y\ [(DONE\ y\ a) \wedge$
 $(PWAG\ y\ x\ (DONE\ y\ a)$
 $(PWAG\ x\ y\ (DONE\ y\ a)\ p)])))$

➤ Will not cover in class

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Agent Communication Language

- We now introduce *agent communication languages* (ACLs) — the standard formats for exchanging message
- The best known ACLs are KQML and FIPA, developed by *DARPA knowledge sharing initiative* and *Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents*, respectively
- Have similar basic structure, for instance, *KQML* consists of *two parts*:
 - Knowledge Query and Manipulation Language (KQML, 知识查询与操纵语言)
 - Knowledge Interchange Format (KIF, 知识交换格式)

KQML and KIF

- KQML is an “*outer*” language that defines various acceptable *performatives verbs*

Example performatives:

- *ask-if* (i.e. is it true that ...)
 - *perform* (i.e. please perform the following action ...)
 - *tell* (i.e. it is true that ...)
 - *reply* (i.e. the answer is ...)
-
- KIF is a language for expressing *message content*, include:
 - *Properties* of things in a domain (e.g. Dan is a professor)
 - *Relationships* between things in a domain (e.g. Bo is Jon’s wife)
 - *General properties* of a domain (e.g. Everyone has a mother)

KIF（知识交换格式） Examples

- The temperature of m1 is 83 Celsius（对象之间的关系）
(= (temperature m1) (scalar 83 Celsius))
- An object is a bachelor if the object is a man and is not married（定义新概念）
(defrelation bachelor (?x) := (and (man ?x) (not (married ?x))))
- Any individual with the property of being a person also has the property of being a mammal（概念之间的关系）
(defrelation person (?x) :=> (mammal ?x))

KQML/KIF Dialogue

- Example KQML/KIF dialogue:

A to B: (ask-if (> (size chip1) (size chip2)))

B to A: (reply true)

B to A: (inform (= (size chip1) 20))

B to A: (inform (= (size chip2) 18))

... ..

KQML/KIF Critiques

- In order to be able to communicate, agents must have agreed on a *common set of terms*
- A formal specification of a set of terms is known as an *ontology*
- The knowledge sharing effort has associated with it a large effort at defining *common ontologies* — software tools like *ontolingua* for this purpose
- KQML/KIF *critiques*:
 - Large performative set, lack strict constraints, inter-operation issue, missing commissive (承诺类) performatives, etc

FIPA

- Since 1995, the Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA) started work on a program of agent standards — the centerpiece is an ACL
- Basic structure is quite similar to KQML:

- *Performative verbs*

- 20 performatives in FIPA

- *Message content*

- (inform

:sender	agent1
:receiver	agent5
:content	(price good20 150)
:language	s1
:ontology	hpl-auction

-)

FIPA Performatives

行事动词	传递信息	请求信息	协商	执行动作	错误处理
accept-proposal			x		
agree				x	
cancel		x		x	
cfp			x		
confirm	x				
disconfirm	x				
failure					x
inform	x				
inform-if	x				
inform-ref	x				
not-understood					x
propose			x		
query-if		x			
query-ref		x			
refuse				x	
reject-proposal			x		
request				x	
request-when				x	
request-whenever				x	
subscribe		x			

“Inform” and “Request”

- *Inform* and *Request* are the two basic performatives in FIPA. All others are *macro* definitions, defined in terms of these

The meaning of inform and request is defined in two parts:

- Precondition
 - What must be true in order for the speech act to succeed
- “Rational effect”
 - What the sender of the message hopes to bring about

“Inform” Performative

For the “*inform*” performative:

- The content is a *statement*
- **Precondition** is that *sender*
 - holds that the content is *true*
 - *intends* that the receiver believe the content
 - does not already believe that the receiver knows whether content is true or not

“Request” Performative

For the “*request*” performative:

- The content is an *action*
- **Precondition** is that *sender*
 - *intends* action content to be performed
 - *believes receiver is capable of performing this action*
 - *does not believe that receiver already intends to perform action*

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End.